Banks on Board Jeffrey Fear, Christopher Kobrak
Banks on Board Jeffrey Fear, Christopher Kobrak To cite this version: Jeffrey Fear, Christopher Kobrak. Banks on Board: Banks in German and American Corporate Governance, 1870-1914. 2007. hal-00287760 HAL Id: hal-00287760 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00287760 Preprint submitted on 12 Jun 2008 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. August 22, 2007 – Working Paper Not to Be Quoted Without Permission of the Authors Banks on Board: Banks in German and American Corporate Governance, 1870-1914 Jeffrey Fear, Global Business, University of Redlands Christopher Kobrak, ESCP-EAP, European School of Management Abstract : As part of a series of related papers, the authors examine the conceptual foundations of German and American corporate governance, specifically highlighting the role of banks’ relationships to corporations and the stock market. This paper focuses on how the regulatory and macroeconomic environments of the two countries helped shape how banks, especially money-centred bankers, actually interacted with their clients. Prior to 1914, despite many regulatory obstacles, American banks wielded more power over U.S. corporations than the legendary German ones because they had more “opportunities” for intervention.
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