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The net result of Mr. Gorbachev's reform is unclear. The USSR has become even more of a military powerhouse on his watch. The Soviet Empire Seeks a Course

BY THOM SHANKER

ITH Moscow's interests being Baltic area. Communism, the Displays of the most battered by one setback after Kremlin declared, would never re- modern Soviet fighters, W like the Sukhoi Su-27 another, the state of the Soviet su- cede, but would only advance. This Flanker (right), at West- perpower is coming under close was the public strategy, based in ern events such as the scrutiny. At issue are questions part on an unspoken desire for buff- 38th Paris Air Show at Le about the purpose—even the util- ers against powerful rivals. Bourget symbolize the paradox of heavy mod- ity—of Soviet military power. The aggregate size of the Soviet ernization of Soviet The last true empire in the world, military machine and the extent of weapon systems in the the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- its territory tell only part of the sto- midst of Soviet political publics has amassed a fearsome mil- ry about the Communist super- reform. The purpose and itary arsenal and fielded millions of power as it embarks on the 1990s. It the utility of Soviet mili- tary power are coming men at arms in the decades since the may not even be the most important under new international Cold War began at the end of World part. scrutiny. War II. Depending on who is doing the talking, the is con- Economic and Political Rot ceded to have either the first or the The other reality of today's USSR second mightiest military force on is political rot. The German strat- earth. egist Clausewitz noted long ago that As the partner of the ruling Com- physical aspects of military pow- munist Party, the Soviet military er—troops and weapons—"seem has been aided by internal militia little more than the wooden hilt" of and KGB secret-police shock the sword of war, "while the moral troops in maintaining order and se- factors are . . . the real weapon, the curing cohesion in a land that is real- finely honed blade." At no time in ly many nations within a common memory has the hilt of Soviet mili- border, spanning eleven time zones tary arms been so tenuously at- and encompassing more than 100 tached to the sword of public will. ethnic groups. When came Since 1917, Soviet forces have to power in March 1985, he inher- taken small nibbles and big gulps ited a nation that could not feed it- from Central Asia, the Caucasus, self, had suffered years of zero eco- Finland, eastern Europe, and the nomic growth, and faced the pros-

54 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1989

pect of being relegated to Third The central criterion used by the tegic posture during a landmark ad- World status by 2000 in every realm USSR when judging the correlation dress to the United Nations. "It is save military power. He has preached of forces was provided by dictator clear today that the increase of mili- radical restructuring of society, . Hearing that the Vat- tary force does not make any single with particular emphasis on the ican might play a useful role in de- power all-powerful. A one-sided economy and intellectual life. feating the Nazis, Stalin is said to emphasis on military force, in the Things aren't going very well. De- have sneered: "The Pope? How final analysis, weakens other ele- mocracy, as Gorbachev now knows, many divisions does the Pope ments of national security." is messy. The move toward open- have?" Today, in Washington and In principle, he seemed to say, the ness and diffusion of power has Moscow and other capitals around concept of reasonable sufficiency prompted minorities in Kazakh- the globe, a new twist on Stalin's would set concrete levels of man- stan, Armenia, and Georgia to take formulation is being posed as the power and weapons such that nei- to the streets. Baltic states seek na- real test of whether the Cold War ther superpower could mount a sur- tional autonomy, even indepen- can come to an end: How many divi- prise attack or launch offensive dence. Even full-blooded sions will Gorbachev have? operations, but which would allow are rebelling; witness the coal miner both to possess adequate troops and strikes this past summer. Reasonable Sufficiency armament to rebuff an attacker. Discontent within Warsaw Pact Gorbachev has broken the back The underlying logic of reason- nations resulted in the appearance of Soviet Communist Party ortho- able sufficiency can be traced di- in Poland of the first non-Commu- doxy, shocking the world and his rectly to the stagnant Soviet econo- nist prime minister in forty-five own generals by calling for uni- my and Gorbachev's desire to bring years. Similar ferment is visible in lateral military cutbacks and by re- his country to superpower status in Hungary. Stalinist hard-liners in defining Soviet military policy. He some way other than measurements East Germany, Romania, and Bul- has attempted to rewrite Soviet mil- of military power. garia, meanwhile, hope for a quick itary doctrine with a ground-break- Depending on whose figures are retreat from , Gorba- ing theory of "reasonable sufficien- used, militarization continues to de- chev's catchall name for his social cy," accompanied by pledges to vour anywhere from fourteen to and economic restructuring. reduce Soviet forces and lessen the twenty-five percent of the USSR's In short, the empire shows signs importance of military power as a annual gross national product, com- of crumbling. The Kremlin cer- tool of foreign policy. pared to only about six percent in tainly retains the capacity to retract Gorbachev first raised the banner the US. The Brezhnev era, now de- perestroika and return to business of reasonable sufficiency during the nounced as "the period of stagna- as usual. However, as matters 27th Communist Party Congress in tion," left as its legacy a tottering stand, Western military experts see Moscow in 1986. He declared, "We technological base that even con- both dangers and opportunities in can never be secure while the servative Politburo members are the growing turbulence that now has United States feels insecure." forced to admit is unable to compete become the hallmark of Soviet pol- Three years later, he elaborated on with the West in sophisticated itics. his planned changes in Soviet stra- weaponry and computers or civilian

industrial and consumer goods. to fo The Central Intelligence Agency, in conjunction with the Defense In- telligence Agency, prepared a re- —TASS/Sov cent study in which top Sovietol- ogists report that Gorbachev's plan produced poor results in its first four years, the span of a US presi- dent's first term in office. The intel- ligence report noted that, although Gorbachev "remains committed to his original vision of a revitalized Soviet economy, he has apparently concluded that he cannot realize this vision as rapidly as he once thought possible, nor proceed di- rectly along the path he initially planned to follow." In an ominous note, the agencies said Gorbachev has plotted a "midcourse correction" because of "growing popular discontent" over empty market shelves and a stan- Having fought an unpopular war in Afghanistan, this young Soviet soldier may find alienation at home similar to that encountered by US veterans of Vietnam. A Supreme dard of living that refuses to im- Soviet committee has been formed to help young veterans readjust in the face of prove despite the dust being kicked civilian guilt and ambivalence regarding USSR's Afghan involvement. up by perestroika. 56 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1989 —TASS/Sovfoto AIR FORCE Magazine / fensive orcounteroffensivecapable force vastenoughtomountanof- forms whilestatingthatmoreproof reduced levels.Atthesametime, Warsaw troopstoequalandmuch- ventional ArmedForcesinEurope Gorbachev atViennawiththeCon- Bush Administrationhascountered cies nolongerapply. bachev istobebelieved,thosepoli- vakia, andAfghanistan.IfGor- they didinHungary,Czechoslo- and eventointervenedirectly,as rogates suchasLibyaandSyria, awesome nuclearforce,tobacksur- of sweepingEurope,tobuildan ets havefeltcompelledtomaintaina tary thought.Fordecades,theSovi- theory, awatershedinSovietmili- than inthetentativeassessments of tainty inWashingtonmore evident ing isrequired. of long-lastingmilitaryrestructur- proach, applaudingGorbachev'sre- leadership adoptedacautiousap- President BushandthePentagon (CAFE) plantocutNATOand cept ofreasonablesufficiencyis,in and wouldbe "replacedbysome- Gorbachev "would ultimatelyfail" Cheney. Initially, hepredictedthat Secretary ofDefenseRichard US HopefulbutWary Washington remainswary.The Born ofeconomiccrisis,thecon- Nowhere isthehigh-leveluncer- November 1989 bly lesstodaythanatanytimeinthe tone, sayingthereisnoquestion body whowillbefarmorehostile" postwar period."Whenonceagain the USandSovietUnionisproba- that thelikelihoodofwarbetween tions. Ithinkitwouldbefairtosay tal shifts may—be onthevergeoffundamen- that "wemay—Iwouldemphasize to theWest.Later,hesoftenedhis bachev tookpower." formidable offensivestrategicarse- the UnitedStatesisfacingamore bachev. "Butithasnot.Ifanything, continued togrowunderGor- ing thatSovietarmsspendinghas past fiveyears,"Cheneysaid,not- threat hasbeenreducedoverthe and saythattheSovietstrategic Wars. new viewwasexpressedinamajor Cheney againalteredhistone.The and public-relationsoffensives, confronted withGorbachev'speace toric, unilateralstepstaken by point towhattheydescribe ashis- remains firmlyincontroland who kle militarycommentators inthe nal todaythanbeforeMr.Gor- speech totheVeteransofForeign cy ismorethan hotair. and provethat reasonablesufficien- Moscow toalteritsstrategic footing USSR, whostressthatGorbachev The negativeUSresponsesran- "I wishIcouldstandbeforeyou . inUS-Sovietrela- bachev's accomplishmentsincurb- two analystatMoscow'sprestigious border toreducetensionswith Angola, abolitionoftherank ment toremoveCubantroopsfrom Afghanistan, supportforanagree- withdrawal ofSoviettroopsfrom ing theSovietmilitary.Hecites and Canada,hasareadylistofGor- Institute fortheStudyofUSA form. Sixtankdivisionsaretobe most tenpercentofhismeninuni- troops fromtheSovietmilitary,al- Gorbachev promisedtocut500,000 over Sovietmilitarypower. rope havecrystallizedthedebate prospective unilateralcutsinEu- egy. Gorbachev'sannouncementsof the primefocusofUSmilitarystrat- Pact forcescomefacetoface,thatis . out offorcesalongtheSino-Soviet marshal inpeacetime,andthethin- from easternEuropeandSoviet ter- tanks, 8,500artillerypieces, and bachev pledged.Inall, 10,000 withdrawn fromEastGermany, Europe, whereNATOandWarsaw Union. pean andAsian regionsoftheSoviet the dividinglinebetween Euro- ritory westoftheUralMountains, 800 combataircraftwillbe removed Czechoslovakia, andHungary,Gor- Andrei Kokoshin,thenumber However, itistheCentralFrontin In hisUnitedNationsaddress, aged bythechangesin cal discontent,encour- bachev's policieshave to SovietPresidentGor- July 1989—justbefore greets theGorbachevsat years. Here,Gen. minister inforty-five non-Communist prime election ofPoland'sfirst the USSR,resultedin varied. InPoland,politi- the election. the Warsawairportin Warsaw Pactreactions Wojciech Jaruzelski 57 The unspoken agenda of Gor- have given breakdowns of the Sovi- bachev's speech came through loud et military budget. Senior Pentagon and clear: Once these cutbacks and intelligence officials argue that have been completed, the USSR these figures do not include a full and its Warsaw Pact allies will no accounting of rubles spent on re- longer be able to conduct a blitzkrieg search and development, repairs across Western Europe. and overhaul—or the huge sums spent to procure new weapons. Unequal Cuts Even former Marshal of the Sovi- A blemish was discovered on et Union Sergei Akhromeyev, the these attractive developments last principal military advisor to Gor- August when a congressional panel bachev, concedes that statistics is- touring East Germany was told by a sued by his colleagues do not tell the Soviet general that not all elements full story. In an unprecedented ap- of the six tank divisions would be pearance before the House Armed withdrawn under the unilateral Services Committee last summer, pullback. Important hardware, in- the bemedaled veteran of World cluding air defense weapons, artil- War II and the Afghan conflict con- lery, and armored personnel car- ceded that Defense Ministry offi- riers, would remain in eastern Eu- cials in Moscow would be unable to rope .under new assignments to tabulate military spending accu- existing units said to be undergoing rately until there is a loosening of restructuring to a more defensive state controls that place absurdly posture. low, fixed prices on raw materials Startling Western Kremlin-watchers and finished goods. who count rubles in the Soviet de- In fact, Akhromeyev recently re- fense budget, Gorbachev told a vis- ported that the newly empowered are not so clear about what they are iting delegation last January that Committee on Defense and Securi- cutting or how far and how fast. Re- military spending will be cut by 14.2 ty, part of the Soviet Union's new member, too—the Soviets are cut- percent over the next two years and parliament, will soon conduct the ting from extraordinarily high levels that a number of defense factories first-ever, full-scale hearings into to begin with." will be converted to production of the USSR's defense budget. Air Force Gen. Robert Herres, consumer goods. In Washington, there continues to Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Gorbachev's promise to cut mili- be healthy skepticism. "We think Staff, said he believes the ultimate tary spending also remains some- that cuts are coming," explains Paul goal of Gorbachev's military re- what ambiguous. Soviet officials, Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's new Un- forms would be to trim the fat from a including Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov der Secretary of Defense for Policy. wasteful defense bureaucracy to and Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, "But I think even [Soviet leaders] "make their forces more capable and effective and professional." The reason, he says, is that the Kremlin's military leaders have come to understand that are a "hollow instru- ment" without a strong, vibrant economy to underpin them. "If restructuring can be used to streamline their military posture," he said, "I'm sure they will try to do that. Clearly, Mr. Gorbachev is not doing anything that he does not think is in the interest of the Soviet Union." General Herres then said that the analysts who work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be looking for specific signs in Gorbachev's mili- tary restructuring to prove that the Soviet leader is transforming his forces to a defensive posture. These include the reduction of bridging equipment, which would be used to Almost everyone agrees that Soviet force cuts will be made, but no one agrees on what that will mean. Gorbachev has promised to withdraw six tank divisions from cross rivers in Germany in a Euro- eastern Europe, for example, but much important hardware will be reassigned to pean offensive; cuts in spare parts, units left behind. Above, Soviet main battle tanks; top right, a MiG-29 Fulcrum. fuel, and ammunition stored in Po- 58 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1989

Gorbachev first aired his to theory of reasonable S/Sovto

sufficiency during the S 27th Communist Party —TA Congress in Moscow in 1986. He discussed it fur- ther in an address to the United Nations in late 1988: "The increase of military force does not make any single power all-powerful. A one-sided emphasis on military force. . . weakens other elements of national security."

land and East Germany, vital to sus- budgets, when American policy- ica's security interests will more taining an offensive; and demobi- makers are convinced that military likely be threatened in future years lization of mobile radar and air- reform has taken hold in the USSR, by terrorism, low-level violence in defense units, needed to protect should personnel and weaponry be the Third World, and the buildup of land forces from air attack. reduced, Aspin said. ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads, This back-from-the-brink theme and chemical weapons in develop- Moving Back From the Brink is echoed by Richard Perle, the ing countries. Despite lingering uncertainties hawkish Assistant Secretary of De- Blackwell said Pentagon planners and ambiguities, congressional fense for International Security Pol- should be reviewing the need for leaders and civilian military ana- icy during the Reagan arms buildup. more flexible and mobile forces to lysts are redefining national securi- He maintains that it is crucial for better deal with such crises as ty to respond adequately to Gor- military planners to take advantage American hostages in Iran, the min- bachev's new military thinking. of the warming East-West climate to ing of the Persian Gulf, or keeping a Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), Chair- funnel more money into "generic cease-fire in Beirut. man of the House Armed Services technologies." Though the Soviet empire may be Committee, says the US must pre- "We now are in a period of rela- fraying at the edges, most strategic pare for the possibility that its rela- tive tranquility," Perle said. "We analysts are quick to make a critical tionship with the USSR will some- might be better advised to take risks point. So long as Moscow retains a day reflect a step back from direct in the short term—like cutting the sizable nuclear armory and a large, confrontation. "The question is how standing army—in order to protect well-equipped conventional force— to respond to Gorbachev's initia- America's technological base for and no one believes that the Krem- tives, fashion a defense budget to the turn of the century, which more lin will do otherwise—the USSR protect against changes in the Sovi- likely will be a period of uncertain- will continue to rate as a military et Union, and still be prepared for ty." superpower and an exceptionally other things that can go wrong in the Analyst James Blackwell of dangerous adversary. The Soviet world," Aspin said. Washington's Center for Strategic Union may well be fated to remain a The moderate Democrat has his and International Studies calls for one-dimensional superpower, and own ideas of how to do this. Ad- "a fundamental reassessment of the the political utility of its military vocating a defense program for "this roles and missions" of the US mili- power may be on the wane, but the time of promise, this time of uncer- tary. This review, he claims, should basic military problem that has long tainty," Aspin laid out a strategy for be prompted not only by the glim- confronted the West isn't solved military spending on national de- mer of reduced tensions with the just yet, and likely won't be for fense whose "first phase makes cuts USSR, but by the fact that Amer- some time. • that can quickly be reversed if things in the Soviet Union take a U- Thom Shanker, who covers defense and national security for the Chicago Tribune, turn." Initial reductions should trim was the Tribune's correspondent in Moscow from 1985 to 1988. His most recent readiness, operations, and mainte- article for AIR FORCE Magazine was "Inside Gorbachev's " in the March '89 nance spending. Only in subsequent issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1989 59