DOCSLIB.ORG

Defectors Betrayed Most Soviet Intelligence Secrets, KGB Ex-Official Says

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Defectors Betrayed Most Soviet Intelligence Secrets, KGB Ex-Official Says THE WASHINGTON POST Defectors Betrayed Most Soviet Intelligence By Susan Cornwell "From 1960 to 1980, three KGB officers to the contrary—of maintaining a strong Renter defected to the West," Kalugin wrote in clandestine presence in every Soviet insti- Komsomolskaya Pravda, the Communist tution and organization. MOSCOW, July 3—The KGB has little youth newspaper. "And since 1980, about The KGB—the Russian intiials for Com- left to hide because most of its secrets have 20 people betrayed the country; the latest mittee for State Security—responded with been taken abroad by a score of defectors defector went to Belgium this spring. So we a sharp attack in the Communist newspaper • since 1980, a former top-level KGB official can speak not about a leak of information, Pravda saying that Kalugin had embarked said in an article published here today. but about the transfer and sale to the West on the road to treachery and that weakness Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin- of the majority of secrets of Soviet intelli- of character lay behind his disclosures. who was stripped of his rank and decora- gence, about the complete collapse of a The Pravda article portrayed Kalugin as tions earlier this week for making other huge number of spy networks." an ineffective official whose blunders had public revelations about the secret intelli- Kalugin, who says he was forced to retire caused Soviet intelligence to lose one of its gence and police agency—said also that in in March after a falling out with his supe- most prized agents inside the CIA. But the seven years he headed counter-espio- riors, accused the KGB last month of trying Kalugin, in his article today, said there had nage operations abroad the KGB had failed to discredit populist Communist politician been no such agent. He was stripped of his to infiltrate the CIA with even one under- Boris Yeltsin and Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, rank and medals Saturday in orders signed cover operative. and—despite the security agency's claims by President Mikhail Gorbachev. WEDNESDAY, JULY 4, 1990 A27 1 Secrets, KGB Ex-Official Says Komsomolskaya Pravda also published a Kryuchkov, a member of the Communist letter today from several Soviet legislators Party's ruling Politburo, warned that the urging an investigation of Kalugin's disclo- Soviet Union should not be lulled into a sures about the KGB. The letter urged that sense of false security by changes in inter- the legislature, or Supreme Soviet, examine national relations or reform at home. The the KGB's budget, operations and methods West is still spending more on intelligence and find out how it is controlled and to what than Moscow, he said. extent it still penetrates public organiza- "Foreign spies cost us millions of rubles, tions. and dozens of agents have been unmasked Meanwhile, KGB chief Vladimir Kryuch- in recent times, some of them, regrettably, kov defended his agency's work in a speech Soviet citizens," he said. "The five years of perestroika show that to the 28th Soviet Communist Party Con- socialism and democracy need protection. gress here today, telling the delegates that We believe it is our most important task to it is unmasking foreign agents by the dozens thwart the criminal activity of instigators and is still needed to help round up domes- and extremists." He made no mention of tic "instigators and extremists." Kalugin's allegations. .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Spy on the Wall Tour: Washington's Cold War Monuments Byvernok Loeb Ifashington Stajfwriter
    The "Wi^HiNGTON Post The Spy on the Wall Tour: Washington's Cold War Monuments ByVernok Loeb IFashington StajfWriter Seven blocks on R Street in Georgetown are all that separate the rise and the fall of Americanintelligence, from the mansion of World War II spy master William "Wild Bill" Donovan to the mailbox where CIA traitor Aldrich H. Amesleft signals in chalk for his Soviet han- ; \ dlers. .! David Major calls it "Spy Street," standing infront of a tour bus one morninglast week,microphonein hand. ' He is midwaythrough "SpyDrive," a tour of 30 Wash ington espionage sites that twists and turns throu^ . 1 most of the major spy cases of the past 50 years. This may sound likejust another cheesy Washington tourist attraction, but the running commentajy provid ed by Major and his sidekick, Oleg Kalugin, is well wor^ the $35 a seat. I Major spent a career chasing foreign spies for the FBI and ultimately became counterinteUigence adviser at the Reagan White House. Kalugin was a Soviet spy BYGERALD MAfiTlNEAU—THE WASHINGTON POST David Majorcan tell youall about the history of espionage in See SPIES, C9. Col. 1 Washington—and he won't even haveto killyouafterward. SpyDrive's International Mystery Tour SPIES, fijom CJ in Washington—the youngest ma jor general in KGB history. "What we're going to show you is buildingsand monuments," Ma jorsays as thebuspulls away from the Grand Hyatt Hotel downtown. "But ... you're going to see it throughthe eyesofa counterintel- Ugence officer and an intelligence • collector." The SpyDrive (umw.spp- drive.com), whichruns a coupleof times a month, is a commercial spinoff ofa tourMajor startedrun ning several years ago for corpo rate executives and U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation
    Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation J. MICHAEL WALLER "They write I'm the mafia's godfather. It was Vladimir Ilich Lenin who was the real organizer of the mafia and who set up the criminal state." -Otari Kvantrishvili, Moscow organized crime leader.l "Criminals Nave already conquered the heights of the state-with the chief of the KGB as head of a mafia group." -Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin.2 Introduction As the United States and Russia launch a Great Crusade against organized crime, questions emerge not only about the nature of joint cooperation, but about the nature of organized crime itself. In addition to narcotics trafficking, financial fraud and racketecring, Russian organized crime poses an even greater danger: the theft and t:rafficking of weapons of mass destruction. To date, most of the discussion of organized crime based in Russia and other former Soviet republics has emphasized the need to combat conven- tional-style gangsters and high-tech terrorists. These forms of criminals are a pressing danger in and of themselves, but the problem is far more profound. Organized crime-and the rarnpant corruption that helps it flourish-presents a threat not only to the security of reforms in Russia, but to the United States as well. The need for cooperation is real. The question is, Who is there in Russia that the United States can find as an effective partner? "Superpower of Crime" One of the greatest mistakes the West can make in working with former Soviet republics to fight organized crime is to fall into the trap of mirror- imaging.
    [Show full text]
  • The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia’S Policies Abroad
    02 BLITT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2011 10:25 PM RUSSIA’S “ORTHODOX” FOREIGN POLICY: THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN SHAPING RUSSIA’S POLICIES ABROAD PROF. ROBERT C. BLITT* TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ................................................................................364 2. The Russian Orthodox Church’s Foreign Policy Mandate ......................................................................................365 3. Russian Foreign Policy and Disregard for the Constitutional Obligations of Secularism, Separation, and Nondiscrimination .............................................................367 3.1. The Ideological Centrality of Orthodoxy in Russian Foreign Policy as Expressed through Euphemism ...................... 368 3.1.1. The Role of “Spirituality" in Russia’s National Security Strategy .................................................................. 368 3.1.2. A Note on Culture as a Synonym for Orthodoxy ......374 3.1.3. “Spiritual Security” & “Spiritual Revival” ..............377 3.2. Putting Rhetoric into Practice: The Ascendancy of “Spirituality” in Russia’s Foreign Policy ....................................380 3.2.1. Russian Orthodox Church-Ministry of Foreign Affairs Working Group .........................................................380 3.2.2. Russkiy Mir Foundation: A Chimera State-Church Foreign Policy Tool ................................................................383 3.2.3. Support for Days of Spiritual Culture .....................390 3.2.4. Facilitating an Exclusive
    [Show full text]
  • PERESTROIKA PROPAGANDA in the SOVIET FOREIGN PRESS by Matthew Brown
    CONTRIBUTOR BIO MATTHEW BROWN graduated from Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo in June of 2013 with a Bachelor of Arts in History and a minor in Geography & Anthropology. His academic in- terests include the Cold War, the Soviet Union, and revolutionary political theory. Matthew is currently working as a substitute teacher while pursuing a Social Science teaching credential at CSU Long Beach, and is exploring his op- tions for teaching English abroad next school year. He plans on pursuing a Master’s degree in Russian and/or Eastern European history, and would like to eventually teach at the uni- versity level. ECHOES OF A DYING STATE: PERESTROIKA PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN PRESS By Matthew Brown “Perestroika means mass initiative. It is the comprehensive devel- opment of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative and creative endeavor, improved order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our society. It is utmost respect for the individual and consideration for personal dignity.”230 The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of one of the most tumultuous and volatile periods in modern history. The Soviet Union was not destroyed by a foreign military invasion, nor was it torn apart by civil war. The events that resulted in one of the most powerful countries the world has ever seen literally signing itself out of existence were official government policy, heavily promoted by the Communist Party as the pinnacle of Soviet ideology, and praised by the Soviet intelligentsia as a clear path to a prosperous society. The perestroika and glasnost reforms, instituted under Mikhail Gorbachev, represent the final 230 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 34.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kgb's Image-Building Under
    SPREADING THE WORD: THE KGB’S IMAGE-BUILDING UNDER GORBACHEV by Jeff Trimble The Joan Shorenstein Center PRESS ■ POLI TICS Discussion Paper D-24 February 1997 ■ PUBLIC POLICY ■ Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government INTRODUCTION The KGB, under many different sets of graduate student at the Pushkin Russian Lan- initials, evokes frightening memories of the guage Institute in Moscow during the 1979-80 Soviet period of Russian history. A garrison academic year, later as Moscow correspondent state within a state, it provided the terror that for U.S. News & World Report from 1986 to glued the Soviet Union into a unitary force for 1991, Trimble observed the changes not just in evil. Few bucked the system, and dissent was the old KGB but in the old Soviet Union and, in limited, for the most part, to whispers over this paper, based on his own research, he ex- dinner or under the sheets. Millions were herded plains their significance. At a time in American into the communist version of concentration life when we seem to be largely indifferent to the camps, or transported to Siberia, or simply rest of the world, we are indebted to Trimble for executed for crimes no more serious than having his reminder that the past is not too far removed the wrong economic or ideological pedigree. from the present. The KGB, by its brutal behavior, came to be The question lurking between the lines is identified throughout the world with the Soviet whether the changes in image are in fact system of government. When the system, with changes in substance as well.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia
    Connections: The Quarterly Journal ISSN 1812-1098, e-ISSN1812-2973 Steve Abrams, Connections QJ 15, no. 1 (2016): 5-31 http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/Connections.15.1.01 Research Article Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia Steve Abrams Abstract: This paper investigates the role of Soviet-style “active measures” as an element of modern Russian “political warfare.” These techniques were commonly used during the Soviet-era, encompassing a broad range of influence activities, including: covert media placement, forgery, agents of influence, “friendship” societies, front organizations, and more. Today, in Putin’s Russia, these active measures are once again in use, updated for digitally interconnected “global information space.” The paper begins with an introduction to active measures, then discusses their role in Soviet foreign policy and the attempts by the American “Ac- tive Measures Working Group” to counter them. The paper then de- scribes how the Soviet active measures playbook has been updated for the modern era, using three case studies as examples. The paper con- cludes with a discussion on strategy, reproducing a number of recom- mendations from key publications. Keywords: active measures, agent of influence, deception operations, disinformation, hybrid warfare, subversion, KGB, Russia, Siloviki. Preface: An Awakening The neatest trick of the devil is to persuade you that he does not exist. — Charles Baudelaire, 1869 1 They began to appear in late February 2014. Equipped with the latest military weapons and gear, stripped of identification and riding unmarked military vehi- cles, they rapidly seized ground.2 While the world looked on in confusion, in a few weeks it was over; Crimea belonged to the Little Green Men.
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy and Institutional Design in Russia
    Democracy and Institutional Design in Russia EUGENE HUSKEY he stunning political comeback of Boris Yeltsin serves as a reminder of the T vital role of the individual in politics. A disengaged and irresolute president through much of his first term, Yeltsin revived himself in time to capture the sup- port of the nation in the 1996 presidential elections. These elections also high- lighted the many informal sources of power in Russia that lie beyond the consti- tution. One of the most influential of these was the media. Through a careful manipulation of the tone and content of campaign coverage, Yeltsin’s backers managed to portray the contest between candidates as a referendum on good ver- sus evil. Personality, informal politics, and circumstance—these are the forces that come to mind during periods of political transition. But a country’s institutional arrangements also shape its development, often in profound though less obvious ways. Put simply, Russia’s particular pattern of institutions and rules has favored certain political outcomes over others.1 The decision to adopt an unusual variant of semi-presidentialism, for example, has had fateful consequences for the sta- bility and efficacy of the new regime.2 This article examines the impact of semi- presidentialism on Russia’s post-communist transition as well as the ways in which the logic of semi-presidentialism has adapted to the distinct circumstances and culture of Russian politics.3 The Origins of Semi-Presidentialism in Russia, 1989-1991 At the end of the 1980s, faced with broad-based resistance to reform within the Communist Party apparatus, Mikhail Gorbachev sought alternative institutional arrangements that would at once enhance regime legitimacy and offer the leader an additional base outside of the party.4 Invoking a variant of the Leninist slogan “All Power to the Soviets,”5 Gorbachev settled upon a reinvigoration of the mori- bund legislature.
    [Show full text]
  • The Okhrana and the Cheka: Continuity and Change
    The Okhrana and the Cheka: Continuity and Change A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Amanda M. Ward August 2014 © 2014 Amanda M. Ward. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled The Okhrana and the Cheka: Continuity and Change by AMANDA M. WARD has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Steven M. Miner Professor of History Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT WARD, AMANDA M., M.A., August 2014, History The Okhrana and the Cheka: Continuity and Change Director of Thesis: Steven M. Miner The most notorious aspect of the Soviet Union was its culture of secret policing that, through a series of state security agencies, carried out mass arrests, deportations, and executions. Since the collapse of the socialist state and the opening of the Soviet archives, the historical community has only begun to understand the full extent of crimes committed at the hands of the Cheka, and its successors, the OGPU, NKVD, and KGB. Yet, after tracing this repression to its origins, historical evidence indicates that Imperial Russia first cultivated this culture of secret policing and introduced many of the policing techniques the Bolsheviks later implement and further perfected. By the turn of the 20th century, the Okhrana – the Tsarist secret police – developed into a highly effective political police force which was, by and large, quite successful in penetrating underground revolutionary organizations, including Lenin’s Bolshevik party.
    [Show full text]
  • February 13, 1976 Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services Take Joint Countermeasures Against Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
    Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified February 13, 1976 Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services Take Joint Countermeasures against Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Citation: “Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services Take Joint Countermeasures against Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty,” February 13, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, BstU, Berlin. MfS HAX 541. Obtained by A. Ross Johnson. Translated by Christian Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121518 Summary: This GDR document is a German translation of the draft Action Program of Countermeasures against RFE and RL which was discussed at a multilateral meeting of Bloc intelligence services (minus Romania) in Prague in February 1976. The Prague meeting was suggested by the Czechoslovak interior ministry but dominated by the Soviet Union. Oleg Kalugin, then in charge of KGB counterintelligence, gave the opening speech (no copy of which could be located). Some of the measures listed in the Action Program, such as disinformation, were implemented. Others, such as a public tribunal to condemn the Radios, were never pursued. Original Language: German Contents: English Translation Scan of Original Document Translation from Russian TOP SECRET! Draft The representatives of the intelligence organs of the PRB, HPR, GDR, PPR, USSR and CSSR, who met on 12-13 February 1976 in Prague exchanged experiences on active measures, both completed and in preparation, against the centers of ideological subversion, the radio stations Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), and came to the conclusion that minimum objective for the short term was the necessity to expel the US centers of subversion in the form of RFE and RL from the European continent.
    [Show full text]
  • 27-36 Aron Win 8 Rev.Indd
    Was Liberty Really Bad for Russia? (Part I) LEON ARON Abstract: Criticizing previous regimes is a popular pastime of Russian leaders. But in denouncing the “chaos of the 1990s,” the Vladimir Putin regime has an additional pur- pose: to defame the idea of liberty itself. Part I of this article examines the claim that the revolution was entirely responsible for Russia’s economic woes in the 1990s—what might beA called the errors of commission, or false attribution, which lay at the revolution’s door the crisis mostly inherited from the decaying Soviet economy. Yet the “chaos” theme also contains errors of omission, for, on closer inspection, there was a great deal in the 1990s besides the alleged “chaos.” This legend is discussed in the second half of this article. Keywords: 1990s, myths, liberty, Putin’s Russia, Yeltsin “Like Providence in reverse, the Russian government seeks to arrange for the better not the future, but the past.” —Aleksandr Herzen1 t is very much in the Russian and, even more so, Soviet political tradition for rulers to I deprecate their predecessors. As they ascend the power ladder, the would-be Kremlin occupants must profess complete loyalty to the current leader to succeed. Once in power, the country’s new masters bolster their authority by dissociating themselves from previous leaders. Along with Russia’s weak political institutions, which undermine the transitions’ legitimacy, such repudiations almost inevitably result in the personalization of power, as the new occupants mold the political, social, and economic systems to their liking. Hence, Russian and—and especially—Soviet history have often resembled a succession of distinct personal political regimes—indeed, sometimes different states under the same name.
    [Show full text]
  • Perestroika Versus the Command-Administrative System
    Perestroika Versus the Command-Administrative System Nikolai V. Zlobin* In the article published in the last issue of Demokratizatsiya we gave an analysis of the Russian political evolution—from ancient times to the start of Gorbachev's perestroika. The article discussed the most complicated and controversial episode of Soviet state history, which ended with the Union's disintegration and the emergence of an independent Russian state. However, it is difficult to speak about the basic elements of the political process which occurred during those years. First, any analysis of these events is limited by the length of the article. But mainly, these political factors are still in transition: their relevance as well as their importance is still changing, and the lack of reliable information is felt. As a famous Russian poet, Sergei Yesenin, wrote; "Nothing is noticed when you are face to face." Very little time has passed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the emotional stigma of recent events is still very evident. It is difficult to evaluate current information as it is generated, and many researchers are influenced by their private sympathies and antipathies. But there is no shame in trying. Centrism in Russia—a Rare Phenomenon After Mikhail Gorbachev appeared on the political scene, political analysts, especially those from the West, realized quickly that he really had a very respectful and rather rare quality (even among politicians of classic democracies). He had the willingness and skill (albeit to a much lower degree) to pursue a logical centrist policy. In Russia, Gorbachev's centrist policies were misunderstood as being expedient and he was, therefore, labeled an opportunist.
    [Show full text]
  • Economic and Political Reform in China and the Former Soviet Union
    CSD Center for the Study of Democracy An Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine www.democ.uci.edu The contrast between the two cases is well known: China’s economic reforms were stunningly successful whereas those of Gorbachev failed. Moreover, his political reforms set in motion forces that he could not control, eventually bringing about the unintended end to communist rule and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Why this difference? Numerous variables are at issue. This paper focuses on the policies, strategies, and values of reformers and on opportunities to carry out economic reforms, which favored China but not the SU. A common explanation for the difference is that the leaders in both countries decoupled economic from political reform. China, it is said, implemented wide ranging economic reforms but not political reforms. In contrast, Gorbachev pursued increasingly radical political reforms, which ultimately destroyed the Soviet political system. 1 Actually, both pursued economic reforms and both pursued political reforms. However, there is a vital distinction between two types of political reform, namely those undertaken within a framework of continued authoritarian rule and those that allow political liberalization (PL). This distinction defines the two cases. PL entails the dilution of the rulers’ power in that independent social and political forces are permitted or are able to organize, and media are freed up to advocate views that can challenge the foundations of the existing system. PL falls short of full electoral democracy. It creates an unstable situation, since it inevitably leads to demands for further democratizing changes. Hence, rulers who have agreed to political liberalization come under increasing public pressure to go further.
    [Show full text]