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Libya Country of Origin Information (Coi) Report

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Libya Country of Origin Information (Coi) Report LIBYA COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service 7 March 2012 LIBYA 7 MARCH 2012 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN LIBYA FROM 15 FEBRUARY 2012 TO 5 MARCH 2012 REPORTS ON LIBYA PUBLISHED BETWEEN 15 FEBRUARY 2012 AND 5 MARCH 2012 Useful news sources for further information Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 1.01 Map ........................................................................................................................ 1.07 Geographic and tribal issues .............................................................................. 1.10 The east ................................................................................................................. 1.12 Islamism ............................................................................................................. 1.12 State policy (under Gaddafi) towards the east ................................................... 1.13 Transport ............................................................................................................... 1.14 Roads ................................................................................................................. 1.14 Railways ............................................................................................................. 1.15 International and internal airports and flight routes ............................................ 1.16 Sea ports ............................................................................................................ 1.20 2. ECONOMY ................................................................................................................ 2.01 3. HISTORY .................................................................................................................. 3.01 Early History to 1911 ............................................................................................ 3.01 Italian occupation to the peace treaty of 1947 .................................................. 3.02 1949 under King Idris until the military coup of September 1969 .................... 3.03 1 September 1969 - 2011 Libya under Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi [aka Gaddafi] ‘Leader of the Revolution’ (de facto head of state) ........................... 3.04 The Green Book ................................................................................................. 3.06 The Men of the Tent ........................................................................................... 3.07 The rise to prominence of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi ................................................ 3.08 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (FEBRUARY 2011 – NOVEMBER 2011) .................................. 4.01 Anti-Gaddafi uprising ........................................................................................... 4.01 UN resolution 1973 (2011) .................................................................................... 4.05 NATO military intervention .................................................................................. 4.06 Rebel fighters ....................................................................................................... 4.07 National Liberation Army .................................................................................... 4.09 Defectors ............................................................................................................ 4.10 War crimes ............................................................................................................ 4.11 National Transitional Council .............................................................................. 4.18 Death of Gaddafi and end of conflict .................................................................. 4.25 Capture of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi ......................................................................... 4.27 5. CONSTITUTION .......................................................................................................... 5.01 6. POLITICAL SYSTEM ................................................................................................... 6.01 Before the 2011 uprising ...................................................................................... 6.01 General People‘s Committee ............................................................................. 6.02 The 1977 declaration on the establishment of the authority of the people ......... 6.03 Political parties ................................................................................................... 6.04 ii The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 14 February 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 5 March 2012. 7 MARCH 2012 LIBYA Since the Declaration of Liberation (23 October 2011) ..................................... 6.05 New prime minister............................................................................................. 6.06 New transitional cabinet ..................................................................................... 6.08 Human Rights 7. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 7.01 Before the 2011 uprising ...................................................................................... 7.01 Since the 2011 uprising ....................................................................................... 7.03 8. SECURITY FORCES .................................................................................................... 8.01 Overview ............................................................................................................... 8.01 Police ..................................................................................................................... 8.03 Before the fall of Gaddafi .................................................................................... 8.03 Since the Declaration of Liberation..................................................................... 8.04 Armed forces ........................................................................................................ 8.06 Army/militia clashes............................................................................................ 8.12 Human rights violations by the security forces (under Gaddafi regime) ........ 8.14 Arbitrary arrest and detention ............................................................................. 8.14 Torture ................................................................................................................ 8.17 Extra-judicial killings ........................................................................................... 8.19 The 1996 Abu Salim Prison Massacre ........................................................... 8.19 Human rights violations by government forces (under the National Transitional Council ............................................................................................. 8.22 Arbitrary arrest and detention ............................................................................. 8.22 Torture ................................................................................................................ 8.26 Human rights abuses committed by both sides during the uprising .............. 8.28 9. MILITARY SERVICE .................................................................................................... 9.01 Conscription (under Gaddafi regime) ................................................................. 9.01 During the 2011 uprising .................................................................................... 9.04 Conscientious objection ...................................................................................... 9.08 10. NON-GOVERNMENT ARMED FORCES ........................................................................... 10.01 Overview ............................................................................................................... 10.01 Militia groups ........................................................................................................ 10.03 Rebels‘ National Army ........................................................................................ 10.03 Tripoli Military Council ........................................................................................ 10.04 Western Military Council ..................................................................................... 10.05 Misratan Military Council .................................................................................... 10.06 Difficulties facing the new government in disarming the militia groups ......... 10.07 Proliferation of arms and related material .......................................................... 10.12 11. JUDICIARY ................................................................................................................ 11.01 Before the 2011 uprising ...................................................................................... 11.01 Organisation ....................................................................................................... 11.02 Independence and fair trial ................................................................................. 11.03 Penal Code .......................................................................................................
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