Current Trends in Islamist Ideology JANUARY, 2013
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Current Trends in Islamist Ideology JANUARY, 2013 VOLUME 14 ■ WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION ANYWAY? / Samuel Tadros ■ EGYPT’S LOOMING COMPETITIVE THEOCRACY / Eric Trager ■ THE JORDANIAN BROTHERHOOD IN THE ARAB SPRING / Jacob Amis ■ ANSAR AL-SHARIA IN SOUTHERN YEMEN / Robin Simcox AFTER AL-SHABAAB / Ioannis Gatsiounis ■ THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT IN AZERBAIJAN / Fuad Aliyev HUDSON INSTITUTE Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World Current Trends in Islamist Ideology VOLUME 14 Edited by Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown, and Hassan Mneimneh hudson institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World ©2013 Hudson Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN: 1940-834X For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publica- tions, please visit Hudson’s website at www.hudson.org/bookstore or call toll free: 1-888-554-1325. ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE Hudson Institute is a nonpartisan, independent policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom. Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strate- gic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, eco- nomics, health care, technology, culture, and law. With offices in Washington and New York, Hud son seeks to guide public policymakers and global leaders in government and business through a vigor- ous program of publications, conferences, policy briefings, and recommendations. Hudson Institute is a 501(c)(3) organization financed by tax-deductible contributions from private individuals, corpo- rations, foundations, and by government grants. Visit www.hudson.org for more information. ABOUT THE CENTER ON ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD Hudson Institute’s Center on Islam conducts a wide-ranging program of research and analysis ad- dressed to the political, religious, social, and other dynamics within majority Muslim countries and Muslim populations around the world. A principal focus of the Center’s work is the ideological dy- namic within Islam and the connected issue of how this political and religious debate impacts both Islamic radicalism and the Muslim search for moderate and democratic alternatives. Through its re- search, which includes collaboration with partners throughout the Muslim world and elsewhere, the Center aims to contribute to the development of effective policy options and strategies to win the worldwide struggle against radical Islam. For more information, visit www.CurrentTrends.org Contents What is a Constitution Anyway? / 5 By Samuel Tadros Egypt’s Looming Competitive Theocracy / 27 By Eric Trager The Jordanian Brotherhood in the Arab Spring / 38 By Jacob Amis Ansar Al-Sharia in Southern Yemen / 58 By Robin Simcox After Al-Shabaab / 74 By Ioannis Gatsiounis The Gülen Movement in Azerbaijan / 90 By Fuad Aliyev What is a Constitution Anyway? By Samuel Tadros n the 15th and 22nd of december 2012 egyptians headed again to the polls for the eighth time1 since the January 25, 2011 revolution which toppled President Mubarak and his regime. The frequency of the voting was not, however, an indication of a vibrant democracy taking shape; rather, it has been the result of the haphazard transition that Opost-revolutionary Egypt has undergone. Nearly two years after the revolution and af- ter seven elections, Egypt has still not formed the institutions required to sustain a democracy. Today, the country only has an elected president and an upper chamber of parliament—a body which, even though it exists, suffers from the same specter of unconstitutionality under electoral law that haunted its lower counterpart’s existence and led ultimately to its dissolution. However, what was at stake in the elections was far more important than merely an elected body. Moreover, the election wasn’t pure- ly about approving or rejecting a proposed constitution. Instead, the battle over Egypt’s proposed constitution is a function of the larger battle unfolding over ownership of the 2011 revolution and the very identity of the country. As the saying goes, victory has many fathers, and the Egyptian revolution is no ex- ception. The astonishing success of the revolution in bringing down the Mubarak regime has left political forces scrambling to take credit for the revolution and sole ownership of its narrative.2 Non-Islamists, who can claim few political successes if any over the past two years, have become nostalgic for the eighteen days of protest in Tahrir Square which set-off the revolution. Given their lack of anything to cele- brate since the uprisings, non-Islamists are adamant on being the sole owners of the WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION ANYWAY? ■ 5 revolution. It was the non-Islamists, they claim, who sparked the revolution and who led its battles. In a sense, life itself began for them on January 25, 2011 when a new Egypt was born in Tahrir Square.3 At a time when the Muslim Brotherhood remained in the shadows hesitant to join the anti-regime protests, when Salafi Shaykhs were rejecting the popular calls for disorder, it was the non-Islamists who were on the front lines and who fought for every yard and inch of the street. For Islamists, however, the revolution represents the culmination of a much longer historical struggle. Some trace the struggle back to 1954, when the Brotherhood be- lieved itself close to taking power but was then ruthlessly crushed and forced under- ground by Nasser.4 Others trace it to an older battle between Islam and secularism that began in the nineteenth century and which Muslims have fought ever since against foreign missionaries, colonialism and Westernization.5 After languishing for years in Mubarak’s prisons, newly released members of jihadist groups asserted that it was their struggles that were the precursors to the 2011 revolution. When accused of being latecomers to and hangers-on of the revolution, Islamists are quick to re- spond that it was they who protected the revolution during its darkest moment in the “Battle of the Camel,” when all hope seemed to be lost. Left unsaid is the role Islamists played in the attacks on police stations and prisons throughout the country, which arguably was the most important factor in the regime’s collapse. The struggle now between Islamists and non-Islamists over ownership of the revo- lution is only one part of the story, however. Before the constitutional referendum and the present-day impasse and street clashes between the supporters and detractors of President Morsi, the battle over the constitution and over Egypt’s future was fought not only along Islamist vs. non-Islamist lines, but among the Islamists themselves. In- deed, within the Islamist camp, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis were involved in a battle over what Islamism both meant and necessitated in post-revolutionary Egypt and how this should be expressed in the language of the country’s new constitution. Each side approached the question of the constitution from a different point of view, and while they have, for the time being, managed to overcome their differences and unite against non-Islamists, examining the past disputes between them provides fas- cinating insights into their current relationships and their prospective ones as well. The Brotherhood’s Plan the muslim brotherhood approached the constitutional writing process with a keen eye on how to manipulate both the process and the new document to 6 ■ CURRENT TRENDS IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY / VOL. 14 further strengthen their power in Egyptian politics. With a long history of political participation and organization, the Brotherhood’s senior leadership is politically so- phisticated and shrewd. They have clearly been aware that the new constitution could potentially give them unparalleled powers to shape the political process in their fa- vor. As an Islamist movement that has sought to both rule Egypt and shape its people’s identity, no area of the new constitution was irrelevant to the Brotherhood, and all areas represented opportunities to enlarge the movement’s power. The first area of attention for the Brotherhood was the political system. Following the uprising, when the Brotherhood was still unsure of the governing military coun- cil’s agenda and was also eager to assuage Western and non-Islamist fears, the Broth- erhood had initially promised not to run a presidential candidate. Because of this, and since they were also well-aware of their movement’s potential to dominate a parlia- ment, the Brotherhood leadership was adamant that the country adopt a parliamentary system. In articles and press releases the vices of a presidential system including its prospects for authoritarianism were highlighted while the virtues of parliamentari- anism lauded. The Freedom and Justice Party’s official program stated explicitly that the Brotherhood preferred a parliamentary system.6 However, changed political cir- cumstances and dynamics, including ones that led to the Brotherhood’s decision to contest the presidential elections (and ultimately win them), changed the movement’s thinking about the desired political system. Especially after the Constitutional Court dissolved parliament, the Brotherhood sought to give its man in the presidential palace all the powers needed to ensure its domination of the political system. After the revolution, the Brotherhood wasn’t initially convinced that the regime had actually fallen. There was in fact disbelief over how easily Mubarak fell. After decades of conducting its affairs secretly under heavy state repression, the movement was sure that a “deep state” still stood and was actively conspiring against its vision of Islamist revival and reform. A series of court rulings dissolving parliament, the first constituent assembly, and barring the Brotherhood candidate Khairat El Shater from running for the presidency, while all legally sound, only served to strengthen this conspiratorial mindset. As a result, the Brotherhood felt driven to ensure that the sole institution it dominated, the presidency, was more powerful and able to defeat all others.