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2014 Annual Report Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service 1 Table of Contents 2 Foreword by Minister of Defence 4 Introduction 8 Mission support 10 Monitoring and stability 20 Capable and alert 30 Cooperation 44 Accountability 50 3 Minister of Defence “DISS’s task is to remove as many uncer- tainties as possible. Without intelligence there can be no operation.” 4 The disaster of flight MH17, the rise of ISIS and our participation in several stakeholders with timely intelligence in order to support missions, facilitate military missions were events and developments that had a huge impact on mission decision­making, protect Dutch interests and ensure the security and the Netherlands and our armed forces in 2014. Not only do these events differ effectiveness of Dutch military personnel and coalition troops. Everything de­ widely in nature and background, but the threats and conflicts we face no long­ pends on making the right choices and deploying our troops efficiently. To do er confine themselves to national borders, and organisations and movements this, it is vital that we gain a clear and deep understanding of the operational travel freely from one place to another and operate in several countries at once. environment. DISS’s task is to remove as many uncertainties as possible by sup­ What the above events have in common is that they spawn a strong need for plying high­quality intelligence, because without it there can be no operation. reliable intelligence that enables us to make well­informed decisions. This intelligence must be made readily available to multiple command levels. The DISS also aims to provide early warning of developments that could affect our Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS) aims to provide future or require a policy change. Such strategic warning is vital to the opti­ mum deployment of our armed forces in that it ensures timely, accurate action by our decision makers and the flexible deployment of our military personnel. A threat or instability that originates overseas and poses a potential danger to our national security needs to be contained at the source. A threat or instability that originates overseas and poses a potential danger to our national security needs to be contained at the source. However, deploying Dutch military personnel abroad can also affect national security. DISS identifies potential threats, and by doing so protects the Netherlands and its interests. But DISS cannot keep an eye on everything. We do not have the resources to do so, nor is it our aim. What we do strive to do, however, before we deploy personnel to a particular area, is find out exactly what we are up against and how we should prepare for it. To do this we need partners, not only inside the defence ministry’s intelligence and security network, but also outside it. Our armed forces often work closely with international partners by joining coali­ tions and sharing expertise. DISS’s methods of operation are secret. This is not because we are unwilling to be transparent, but because we need to protect our current information 5 position, methods and sources, as laid down by law. DISS puts it as follows: our purpose is not secrecy, but purposeful secrecy. Intelligence is invaluable, de­ pending in part on the exclusivity with which it is obtained and disseminated. A military intelligence and security service’s added value lies mainly in its ability to generate intelligence that is unique and not publicly available to others. This places restrictions on what we can share with the outside world. The defence ministry cannot afford to compromise its sources and information position as this would put people’s lives at risk. “Our purpose is not secrecy, but purposeful secrecy” For the coming years, I foresee a growing demand for timely and reliable military intelligence and security products. Recent developments show that crises can evolve quickly and spill over national borders, making it vital that we rapidly build up an information position. We also aim to make our armed forces more flexible for rapid deployment. By being an information­driven organisation, we can deploy our personnel and equipment as effectively and safely as possible. Gathering intelligence used to be fairly straightforward, but the information revolution has opened up innumerable possibilities. New technologies offer new opportunities, but also pose new threats. Overall, collecting vital intelli­ gence is becoming increasingly complex, and requires a clear legal framework such as the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 – Wiv 2002). The act, which is currently being modernised to accommodate today’s technological developments, lays down the statutory provisions governing the activities of the intelligence and security services in the Netherlands and the oversight of these activities. Minister of Defence J.A. Hennis­Plasschaert 6 7 INTRODUCTION 8 The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS) produces threat and intelligence analyses for the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of DISS uses the following sources for its analyses: General Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Security and Justice, as well as partners and national and international organisations. It dis­ - Open source intelligence (OSINT): information collected from open tinguishes three levels of analyses. The first of these is strategic analysis, which sources provides insight into the general security situation and the stability of a region or country. The second is military or operational analysis, which supplies intel­ - Imagery intelligence (IMINT): intelligence based on imagery from ligence on the capabilities, activities and intentions of opposing military forces satellites and airborne platforms in support of military operations involving Dutch military personnel. These analyses are tailored to the needs of mission units and provide specific, validat­ - Classified intelligence (CLASSINT): classified information and intel- ed information on their area of operation. The third is tactical analysis, which ligence obtained from national and international military networks provides intelligence in support of patrols and operations in mission areas. and partners DISS works with teams consisting of intelligence analysts and intelligence col­ - Signals intelligence (SIGINT): intelligence obtained through the lection specialists. Its reports are all­source products based on OSINT, IMINT, interception and processing of data from telecommunications and CLASSINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, MEDINT, GEOINT and Cyber, information from electromagnetic emissions other parts of the Ministry of Defence’s intelligence and security network and information from partners at home and abroad. Useful intelligence products - Human intelligence (HUMINT): intelligence based on information are timely, succinct and tailored to the information requirements of the user. provided by human sources Besides different levels of analyses, there are also gradations in the information - Medical intelligence (MEDINT): intelligence based on medical infor- requirements of customers of intelligence products. DISS makes agreements mation with customers such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Commander of the Armed Forces on the scope of the research to be carried out. Customers - Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT): an analysis technique in which seeking a broad basis for action generally require a robust intelligence product. different types of intelligence are projected on a map The rule of thumb here is the more sources that are used, the more robust an intelligence product becomes. - Cyber (computer network exploitation): intelligence collected from networked computer systems In an increasingly unsafe world, there is a substantial and growing demand for detailed analyses. However, not all analyses can be carried out with equal thoroughness, and priorities have to be set. Time can be a limiting factor when producing high­quality intelligence products from scratch, but the real problem is usually a lack of capacity. When the MH17 disaster and events in the Middle East prompted DISS to reassign its internal capacity, the cabinet respond ed to this undesirable internal development by raising DISS’s annual budget by €17 million in order to bolster the security chain. These funds will be used to hire additional personnel for gathering, processing and analysing information on terrorism and extremism, and for specialist support capability. 9 Chapter 1 MISSION SUPPORT 10 Military operations in 2014 For more information on current and past operations visit www.defensie.nl MH17 repatriation mission -BMDTF (Turkey) - EUFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina) - KFOR (Kosovo) - UNTSO (Lebanon, Syria and Israel) - NIC (Kosovo) - UNDOF (Israel, Syria) - EU BAM Rafah (Gaza Strip) - USSC (Gaza Strip) - MFO (Egypt, Sinai) - ATFME (Iraq) - Training Mission Iraq - CMF (Bahrain) - ISAF (Afghanistan) MINUSMA (Mali) - - RS (Afghanistan) EUTM Mali - - EUFOR CAR (Central African Republic) - VPD - Ocean Shield (HNLMS Van Speijk) - EU ATALANTA (HNLMS Johan de Wi) - EUTM Somalia - UNMISS (South Sudan) - ACOTA Burundi - SSR Burundi 11 Russian Federation, Ukraine and MH17 The Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea, its involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine and its troop build­up near NATO territory are The developments in 2014 show that the military reforms the signs of its assertive and aggressive foreign and security policy.
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