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Surveillance by Intelligence Services – Fundamental Rights Safeguards And FREEDOMS FRA Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU and remedies safeguards rights fundamental services: intelligence by Surveillance Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU Mapping Member States’ legal frameworks This report addresses matters related to the respect for private and family life (Article 7), the protection of personal data (Article 8) and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial (Article 47) falling under Titles II ‘Freedoms’ and VI ‘Justice’ of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). Photo (cover & inside): © Shutterstock More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Schwarzenbergplatz 11 – 1040 Vienna – Austria Tel. +43 158030-0 – Fax +43 158030-699 fra.europa.eu – [email protected] Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015 Paper: 978-92-9491-225-1 10.2811/85028 TK-04-16-020-EN-C PDF: 978-92-9491-224-4 10.2811/009038 TK-04-16-020-EN-N © European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2015 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged. Printed in Belgium Printed on process chlorine-free recycled paper (PCF) Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU Mapping Member States’ legal frameworks Foreword Protecting the public from genuine threats to security and safeguarding fundamental rights involves a delicate bal- ance, and has become a particularly complex challenge in recent years. Terror attacks worldwide have triggered broad measures allowing intelligence services to cast ever-wider nets in the hope of preventing further violence. At the same time, the digital age has produced technological innovations facilitating large-scale communications data monitoring – which could easily be abused. These developments affect a variety of fundamental rights protected by European Union (EU) law, particularly the rights to privacy and data protection – enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro- pean Union, the EU treaties and EU directives. The Snowden revelations, which uncovered extensive and indiscriminate surveillance efforts worldwide, highlight that violations of these rights are not merely a theoretical concern. The sheer magnitude of the uncovered intelli- gence activity has prompted disquiet and underscored the importance of maintaining effective mechanisms to help prevent fundamental rights encroachments. The European Parliament responded with a resolution which, among others, calls on the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights to research thoroughly fundamental rights pro- tection in the context of surveillance, in particular in terms of available remedies. This report – which constitutes the first part of FRA’s response to this request – aims to support the adoption and meaningful implementation of oversight mechanisms in the EU and its Member States. It does so by analysing the legal frameworks on surveillance in place in EU Member States, focusing on so-called ‘mass surveillance’, which car- ries a particularly high potential for abuse. The report does not assess the implementation of the respective laws; instead, it maps the relevant legal frameworks in the Member States. It also details oversight mechanisms introduced across the EU, outlines the work of entities tasked with overseeing surveillance measures, and presents the various remedies available to individuals seeking to challenge such intelligence activities. The research findings presented in this report demonstrate the complex considerations involved in safeguarding fundamental rights in the context of surveillance. Finding a balance between national security protection and respect for fundamental rights is a challenge that requires thorough and candid discussion. This report contributes to that discussion. Constantinos Manolopoulos Director a. i. 3 Country codes Code EU Member State AT Austria BE Belgium BG Bulgaria CY Cyprus CZ Czech Republic DE Germany DK Denmark EE Estonia EL Greece ES Spain FI Finland FR France HR Croatia HU Hungary IE Ireland IT Italy LT Lithuania LU Luxembourg LV Latvia MT Malta NL Netherlands PL Poland PT Portugal RO Romania SE Sweden SK Slovakia SI Slovenia UK United Kingdom 4 Contents FOREWORD ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 3 INTRODUCTION ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7 1 INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND SURVEILLANCE LAWS ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 1.1. Intelligence services ................................................................................................................................................. 13 1.2. Surveillance measures .............................................................................................................................................. 15 1.3. Member States’ laws on surveillance ................................................................................................................... 18 FRA key findings ................................................................................................................................................................. 27 2 OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29 2.1. Executive control ...................................................................................................................................................... 32 2.2. Parliamentary oversight ......................................................................................................................................... 34 2.3. Expert oversight ........................................................................................................................................................ 41 2.4. Approval and review of surveillance measures ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 51 FRA key findings ................................................................................................................................................................. 57 3 REMEDIES ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 59 3.1. A precondition: obligation to inform and the right to access ............................................................................. 61 3.2. Judicial remedies ...................................................................................................................................................... 66 3.3. Non-judicial remedies: independence, mandate and powers .......................................................................... 70 FRA key findings ................................................................................................................................................................. 75 CONCLUSIONS ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 77 REFERENCES ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 79 CASE LAW INDEX ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 86 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS INDEX ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 87 ANNEX: OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE EU‑28 ������������������������������������������������������������� 93 List of figures and tables Figure 1: A conceptual model of signals intelligence ..................................................................................................... 16 Figure 2: Intelligence services’ accountability mechanisms ......................................................................................... 31 Figure 3: Forms of control exercised over the intelligence services by the executive across the EU-28 .............. 33 Figure 4: Specialised expert bodies and DPAs across the EU-28 ................................................................................. 50 Figure 5: Remedial avenues at the national level .......................................................................................................... 60 Figure 6: Types of national oversight bodies with powers to hear individual complaints in the context of surveillance, by EU Member State ................................................................................................ 73 Table 1: Categories of powers
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