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HOW DUTCH SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES CAN SUPPORT CYBER OPERATIONS Van Hooren, Jonas

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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2019-12 THE IMPERATIVE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOF AND CYBER: HOW DUTCH SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES CAN SUPPORT CYBER OPERATIONS van Hooren, Jonas Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64086 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE IMPERATIVE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOF AND CYBER: HOW DUTCH SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES CAN SUPPORT CYBER OPERATIONS by Jonas van Hooren December 2019 Thesis Advisor: Ryan Maness Co-Advisor: John D. Tullius Second Reader: Kalev I. Sepp Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2019 Master's thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS THE IMPERATIVE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOF AND CYBER: HOW DUTCH SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES CAN SUPPORT CYBER OPERATIONS 6. AUTHOR(S) Jonas van Hooren 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY Dutch SOCOM, Den Haag, Netherlands 2511CR REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) As a knowledge-based economy, the Netherlands is vulnerable to digital hybrid threats from state and non-state actors. The Dutch strategic military leadership sees the importance of improving its digital defense, but struggles with the right approach. This research, based on a heuristic method including literature reviews and interviews, provides an answer to the question, “How can Dutch Special Operations Forces (SOF) enhance the national cyber capabilities to counter the hybrid threats that the Netherlands currently faces?” by offering three options: 1) SOF can gain access to hard targets for cyber operations; 2) it can provide the means to get wetware, hardware, and software in or out the operation area; and 3) it can understand, deceive, and influence the cultural environment. Furthermore, the thesis provides the Dutch Ministry of Defense three potential integration options for SOF and cyber capabilities. The ministry can 1) delegate cyber-SOF teams to the operational commands; 2) embed SOF and cyber personnel in each other’s organizations; and 3) create a new cyber-enabled special operations unit. With the new Special Operations Command, the Defense Cyber Command, and the Joint SIGINT Cyber Unit, there are opportunities for SOF to support cyber operations and increase the digital security for the Netherlands and its NATO allies. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF composite special operations command, cyber supporting operations, cyber terrorism, PAGES defense cyber command, ministry of defense, hackers, hacktivists, hybrid threat, hybrid 125 warfare, offensive cyber operations, information warfare, intelligence, irregular warfare, 16. PRICE CODE secret services, special operations command, special operations forces, strategic implications, technology, the Netherlands, unconventional warfare 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THE IMPERATIVE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOF AND CYBER: HOW DUTCH SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES CAN SUPPORT CYBER OPERATIONS Jonas van Hooren Major, Netherlands Marine Corps BEc, Nederlands Talen Instituut, 2008 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS (IRREGULAR WARFARE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2019 Approved by: Ryan Maness Advisor John D. Tullius Co-Advisor Kalev I. Sepp Second Reader Kalev I. Sepp Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT As a knowledge-based economy, the Netherlands is vulnerable to digital hybrid threats from state and non-state actors. The Dutch strategic military leadership sees the importance of improving its digital defense, but struggles with the right approach. This research, based on a heuristic method including literature reviews and interviews, provides an answer to the question, “How can Dutch Special Operations Forces (SOF) enhance the national cyber capabilities to counter the hybrid threats that the Netherlands currently faces?” by offering three options: 1) SOF can gain access to hard targets for cyber operations; 2) it can provide the means to get wetware, hardware, and software in or out the operation area; and 3) it can understand, deceive, and influence the cultural environment. Furthermore, the thesis provides the Dutch Ministry of Defense three potential integration options for SOF and cyber capabilities. The ministry can 1) delegate cyber-SOF teams to the operational commands; 2) embed SOF and cyber personnel in each other’s organizations; and 3) create a new cyber-enabled special operations unit. With the new Special Operations Command, the Defense Cyber Command, and the Joint SIGINT Cyber Unit, there are opportunities for SOF to support cyber operations and increase the digital security for the Netherlands and its NATO allies. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. PROLOGUE ...............................................................................................1 B. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM ...................................................2 C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE ...........................................................................6 D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................7 E. CHAPTER OUTLINE...............................................................................8 II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY ..........................................9 A. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................9 B. THE ROLES OF SOF AND CYBER IN EACH OTHER’S DOMAINS ................................................................................................13 C. SOF AND CYBER IN THE NETHERLANDS .....................................19 D. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................24 III. CYBER CHALLENGES AND SOF CAPABILITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS .................................................................................................27 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................27 B. DEFINING THE CURRENT HYBRID THREATS FOR THE NETHERLANDS .....................................................................................27 C. ASSESSING THE DUTCH CYBER MEANS TO COUNTER THE HYBRID THREATS ......................................................................33 D. SOF’S POSSIBLE ROLES TO FILL THE CYBER GAPS ................36 1. Gain Access to Hard Targets for Cyber Operations ................38 2. Provide the Means to Get Wetware, Hardware, and Software in or out the Operation Area ......................................41 3. Understand, Deceive, and Influence the Cultural Environment .................................................................................43 IV. ANALYZING THE INTEGRATION OF DUTCH SOF AND CYBER ........47 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................47 B. INTEGRATION OPTIONS FOR DUTCH SOF AND CYBER .........47 1. Delegate Hybrid Cyber-SOF Teams to the Operational Commands ....................................................................................48 2. Embed SOF and Cyber Personnel..............................................50 3. Create a New Cyber-enabled Special Operations Unit ............52 C. DYNAMICS AND CONDITIONS CHALLENGING THE SOF CYBER INTEGRATION ........................................................................54 D. SOF AND CYBER PLANNING ON VARIOUS LEVELS..................58 vii V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................61 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................61
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