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Evaluatie Wet Op De Inlichtingen- En Veiligheidsdiensten 2002

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Evaluatie Wet Op De Inlichtingen- En Veiligheidsdiensten 2002 Evaluatie Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 Naar een nieuwe balans tussen bevoegdheden en waarborgen. EEvaluatie Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 Naar een nieuwe balans tussen bevoegdheden en waarborgen VVoorwoord De Commissie evaluatie Wiv 2002 is in februari 2013 ingesteld om de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 te evalueren. De commissie is zodanig samengesteld dat daarmee geborgd is dat de commissie als geheel deskundigheid en affiniteit bezit met betrekking tot het (wettelijk) kader waarbinnen veiligheidsdiensten, civiel en militair, in een democratische samenleving behoren te opereren. De brede samenstelling heeft ertoe geleid dat er steeds vruchtbaar overleg heeft plaatsgevonden in de commissievergaderingen, waarin de aandachtsgebieden mensenrechten, wetsevalu- atie en werkzaamheden van de van inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten onderling goed gewogen konden worden besproken. De evaluatiecommissie spreekt haar waardering uit voor de medewerking van de betrokken ministeries en meer specifiek de AIVD en MIVD aan het voorzien van de commissie van de benodigde en gewenste informatie. De evaluatiecommissie heeft in dit onderzoek een breed palet aan deskundigen en verantwoordelijken bevraagd en heeft twee deelonderwerpen bij daarin gespecialiseerde organisaties uitbesteed. De evaluatie- commissie is deze organisaties en alle personen met wie zij heeft gesproken in het kader van dit onderzoek, zeer erkentelijk voor hun medewerking. Zonder hun inbreng had dit rapport niet tot stand kunnen komen. De evaluatiecommissie constateert dat de Wiv 2002 aanpassing behoeft. In dit rapport wordt uiteengezet waarom een aanpassing nodig is en op welke onderdelen van de wet. De commissie heeft daarbij voortdurend voor ogen gehad dat inlichtingen- en veilig- heidsdiensten alleen dan hun rol in een democratische samenleving goed kunnen vervullen als zij enerzijds over de juiste, noodzakelijke bevoegdheden beschikken en anderzijds die bevoegdheden goed in balans zijn met de waarborgen, die moeten gelden in een democratische samenleving. De evaluatiecommissie spreekt de hoop en verwach- ting uit dat de lezer hiermee tot de opvatting komt dat er een weloverwogen oordeel over de Wiv 2002 is gegeven. De commissie is niet zover willen gaan om in dit rapport concrete wetsvoorstellen te doen, maar wel geeft het rapport de kaders aan waaraan de wet naar haar mening zou moeten voldoen. C.W.M. Dessens, voorzitter IInhoudsopgave Lijst van afkortingen 6 Beschouwing 8 1 Aanleiding en doelstelling van het onderzoek 12 1.1 Aanleiding 13 1.2 Doelstelling 14 2 Onderzoeksverantwoording en indeling rapport 16 2.1 Onderzoeksverantwoording 17 2.2 Indeling rapport 20 3 De Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 – een balans tussen nationale veiligheid en rechtsstatelijke waarborgen? 22 3.1 Inleiding 23 3.2 Voorgeschiedenis en aanleiding voor de Wiv 2002 23 3.3 Opbouw en algemene kenmerken van de Wiv 2002 27 3.4 Doelstellingen van de Wiv 2002 27 3.5 Taken van de AIVD en de MIVD 29 3.6 Bevoegdheden van de diensten 35 3.7 Democratische en rechtsstatelijke waarborgen 39 3.8 Reikwijdte van de Wiv 41 3.9 Voorstellen tot wijziging van de Wiv 2002 42 3.10 Deelconclusies en aanbevelingen Wiv en waarborgen 44 4 Sturing en toezicht 46 4.1 Inleiding 47 4.2 Sturing 47 4.3 Deelconclusies en aanbevelingen over de sturing 56 4.4 Extern toezicht 57 4.5 Deelconclusies en aanbevelingen toezicht en waarborgen 68 4 5 Inzet van bijzondere bevoegdheden in de digitale wereld 70 5.1 Inleiding 71 5.2 Technologische ontwikkelingen 71 5.3 Conclusies en aanbevelingen over kabelgebonden interceptie 78 5.4 Cyber 85 5.5 Extern toezicht op de inzet van bijzondere bevoegdheden 89 5.6 Deelconclusies en aanbevelingen bijzondere bevoegdheden en waarborgen 106 6 Samenwerking 108 6.1 Inleiding 109 6.2 Samenwerking tussen de AIVD en MIVD 109 6.3 Samenwerking met buitenlandse diensten 117 6.4 Samenwerking met politie, Koninklijke Marechaussee, rijksbelastingdienst en IND 119 6.5 Samenwerking met het Openbaar Ministerie 125 6.6 Overige samenwerkingsvormen: samenwerking met de NCTV en de NCSC 128 6.7 Deelconclusies en aanbevelingen samenwerking 129 7 Overige waarborgen 132 7.1 Inleiding 133 7.2 Kennisneming van gegevens (inzagerecht) 134 7.3 Notificatie 142 7.4 Behandeling van klachten over de AIVD en de MIVD 145 7.5 Het gebruik van geheime stukken in gerechtelijke procedures 152 7.6 Vernietiging en archivering van gegevens 158 7.7 Deelconclusies en aanbevelingen overige waarborgen 164 8 Conclusies en aanbevelingen 166 8.1 Opdracht 167 8.2 Conclusies en aanbevelingen Wiv en waarborgen 168 8.3 Conclusies en aanbevelingen Sturing 169 8.4 Conclusies en aanbevelingen Toezicht 170 8.5 Conclusies en aanbevelingen Inzet van bijzondere bevoegdheden in de digitale wereld 171 8.6 Conclusies en aanbevelingen Samenwerking tussen de AIVD en MIVD 173 8.7 Conclusies en aanbevelingen Samenwerking tussen de diensten en andere organisaties 174 8.8 Conclusies en aanbevelingen Overige waarborgen 175 Bijlagen 1 Samenstelling Commissie en secretariaat 178 2 Instellingsregeling 180 3 Literatuurlijst 188 5 Lijst van afkortingen ABRS Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst AMvB Algemene maatregel van bestuur AO Algemeen Overleg appl. nr. Application number (van een klacht bij het EHRM) Awb Algemene wet bestuursrecht BD Bijzondere Dienst BES Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba BID Buitenlandse Inlichtingendienst BIM Wet op de Bijzondere Inlichtingenmethode (België) BSB Brigade Speciale Beveiligingsopdrachten BZ Buitenlandse Zaken BZK Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties BVD Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst CAOP Centrum Arbeidsverhoudingen Overheidspersoneel CBP College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens CDS Commandant der Strijdkrachten CIVD Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (Tweede Kamer) CNCIS Commission Nationale de Controle des Interceptions de Sécurité (Frankrijk) CND Computer Network Defense CNE Computer Network Exploitation Coördinator IVD Coördinator van de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten CPG Centrum Parlementaire Geschiedenis CPN Communistische Partij van Nederland CT Infobox Contra Terrorisme Infobox CTIVD Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten CVIN Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland CZW Constitutionele Zaken en Wetgeving (ministerie van BZK) DefCert Defensie Computer Emergency Response Team DIVR Defensie Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsraad ECRM Europese Commissie voor de Rechten van de Mens EHRM Europese Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens EVRM Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden EU Europese Unie FIOD Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst 6 FIU Financial Intelligence Unit GovCert Computer Emergency Response Team HF High frequency ICT Informatie- en communicatietechnologie IDB Inlichtingendienst Buitenland IND Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst Inspectie OOV Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid IP Internet Protocol IPT Investigatory Powers Tribunal I&V-diensten Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten JSCU Joint Sigint Cyber Unit KB Koninklijk Besluit KLPD Korps Landelijke Politiediensten KMar Koninklijke Marechaussee LID Landelijke Inlichtingendienst LOvJ Landelijk Officier van Justitie MICIV Ministeriële Commissie voor de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten MID Militaire Inlichtingendienst MIVD Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst NAVO Noord-Atlantische Verdragsorganisatie NCSC Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum NCTV Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid NCTb Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding NFI Nederlands Forensisch Instituut NSA National Security Agency NSO Nationale Sigint Organisatie OM Openbaar Ministerie para. paragraaf RFI Request for Information RID Regionale Inlichtingendienst RIV Raad voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten Sigint Signals Intelligence SG Secretaris-generaal SIOD Sociale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst Stb. Staatsblad Stcrt. Staatscourant TCG Team Caribisch Gebied UCP Unit Contraproliferatie VenJ Veiligheid en Justitie VN Verenigde Naties WiFi Wireless Fidelity Wiv 2002 Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 Wob Wet openbaarheid van bestuur 7 Beschouwing Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (I&V-diensten) spelen een belangrijke rol in een democratische rechtsstaat. Enerzijds zijn deze diensten nodig om de democratische rechtsstaat te beschermen en de grondrechten van haar burgers te waarborgen. Anderzijds doen die diensten hun werk met gebruikmaking van bijzondere bevoegdhe- den, die inbreuk kunnen maken op diezelfde grondrechten van burgers. In het belang van de nationale veiligheid is het noodzakelijk dat diensten in het geheim kunnen opereren en vertrouwelijk informatie kunnen delen en verwerken. Wil een democratische samenle- ving blijvend vertrouwen kunnen hebben en houden in het werk van veiligheidsdiensten dan is het zaak een goede balans te vinden tussen de effectiviteit van hun operationele vermogen (de – bijzondere – bevoegdheden, geheimhouding, capaciteit) en het waarbor- gen van rechtsstatelijke garanties zoals grondrechtenbescherming, alsmede effectieve en in een democratische rechtsorde passende controle en toezicht op hun werk (zo groot mogelijke transparantie, adequate sturing en een stevig toezicht). Die balans en dat vertrouwen zijn geen gegeven: ze vergen voortdurende doordenking en herijking in een snel veranderende wereld. De ontwikkelingen in de wereld om ons heen De nationale
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