A Népirtás És Tömeges Emberi Jogi Jogsértések Megelőzése

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A Népirtás És Tömeges Emberi Jogi Jogsértések Megelőzése Biedermann Zsuzsánna: Genocídium és destabilizáció az afrikai Nagy Tavak régióban – Ajánlások a megelőzésre Nemzetközi Tanulmányok Intézet Témavezető: Kardosné Dr. Kaponyi Erzsébet egyetemi tanár A Bíráló Bizottság névsora: © Biedermann Zsuzsánna Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Multidiszciplináris Doktori Iskola Biedermann Zsuzsánna: Genocídium és destabilizáció az afrikai Nagy Tavak régióban – Ajánlások a megelőzésre Ph.D. értekezés Budapest, 2013 3 Köszönetnyilvánítás Ez a dolgozat soha nem készülhetett volna el tanáraim, családom és barátaim segítsége nélkül. A továbbiakban a teljesség igénye nélkül szeretném külön kiemelni néhányukat. Elsőként szeretném megköszönni témavezetőm, Kardosné dr. Kaponyi Erzsébet munkáját. Minden konzultáció alkalmával újra és újra hasznos tanácsokkal és ötletekkel látott el. Kedvessége és lelkiismeretessége átsegített a dolgozatírás legnehezebb szakaszain. Szeretném megköszönni Édesanyámnak és Édesapámnak, hogy megteremtette a feltételeket számomra ahhoz, hogy doktori tanulmányokat folytassak. Édesanyámnak, hogy számtalanszor elolvasta írásaimat és segítő megjegyzésekkel látott el. Doktori tanulmányaim kezdeti szakaszában sokat segített Dr. Matus János, aki a téma iránti lelkesedésemet segített első angol nyelvű publikációmra váltani. Szeretném megköszönni a Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Doktori Iskola vezetőjének, Dr. Rostoványi Zsoltnak, valamint a Világgazdasági alprogram vezetőjének, Dr. Blahó Andrásnak, hogy lehetővé tették részvételemet több külföldi konferencián és képzésen. A dolgozatírás során számtalan alkalommal volt lehetőségem eszmét cserélni a Budapesti Központ a Népirtás és Tömeges Atrocitások Nemzetközi Megelőzéséért szakértőivel, többek között Dr. Enzo Maria Le Fevre Cervini, Dr. Tatár György, Dr. Ashad Sentongo is hozzájárult a dolgozatban szereplő hipotézisek és ajánlások végső formába öntéséhez. Külön köszönet illeti a disszertáció tervezetének bírálóit, Dr. Csapó Zsuzsannát és Dr. Hoffmann Tamást, akik kritikai megjegyzéseikkel, iránymutatásukkal új irányba terelték eredeti elképzeléseimet, és hozzájárultak ahhoz, hogy választott témámat több szempontból és más megvilágításban is lássam. Köszönöm az MTA KRTK Világgazdasági Intézetben dolgozó kollégáimnak támogatásukat, megértésüket. Orosz Ágnes és Kovács Olivér felbecsülhetetlen értékű segítséget nyújtottak a disszertáció és a tézisfüzetek formázásának egységesítésében. Végül, de nem utolsósorban köszönöm évfolyamtársamnak, Illés Zoltánnak, hogy átolvasta a Szudánnal kapcsolatos részeket. 4 5 Tartalomjegyzék Bevezetés........................................................................................................................... 9 1. fejezet: Kutatásmódszertan, hipotézisek, ajánlások .................................................... 10 1.1. A téma relevanciája, körülhatárolása ................................................................... 10 1.2. Hipotézisek, ajánlások.......................................................................................... 13 1.3. A kutatás forrásainak áttekintése ......................................................................... 17 2. fejezet: A genocídium fogalmának értelmezése ......................................................... 21 2.1. A genocídium-fogalom eredete, nemzetközi jogi szabályozása .......................... 21 2.2. Az Egyezmény felülvizsgálatára irányuló kísérletek ........................................... 24 2.3. Az Egyezmény alkalmazása a gyakorlatban ........................................................ 27 2.4. A genocídium fogalmának elemei az Egyezményben, és az ezzel kapcsolatos problematikus kérdések ............................................................................................... 28 2.5. A genocídium fogalmának alternatív tudományos értelmezései ......................... 32 2.6. Darfúr: népirtás vagy sem? .................................................................................. 38 2.7. A népirtás elkülönítése más, hasonló jellegű bűncselekményektől ..................... 41 2.8. Összefoglalás........................................................................................................ 45 2.9. Javaslat a Genocídium-egyezmény módosítására ................................................ 46 3. fejezet: A népirtás megelőzésének nehézségei ........................................................... 49 3.1. A megelőzés gyakorlati nehézségei ..................................................................... 49 3.2. A genocídium kiváltó okai, előjelei, és szerepük a megelőzésben ...................... 52 3.3. Az előjelek értékelése, megelőzés, korai figyelmeztetés az ENSZ rendszerében 58 3.3.1. A népirtás-megelőzési különleges tanácsadó és a védelem felelősségére koncentráló különleges megbízott hivatala ............................................................. 60 3.3.2. Emberi Jogi Tanács ....................................................................................... 61 3.3.3. A Nemzetközi Bíróság, az Emberi Jogi és Menekültügyi Főbiztosság, valamint egyéb releváns szervek ............................................................................. 62 3.3.4. Mi az oka a megelőzés sikertelenségének? ................................................... 65 3.4. Az előjelek értékelése az ENSZ rendszerén kívül, regionális és civil szervezetek szerepe a megelőzésben .............................................................................................. 67 4. fejezet: A védelem felelőssége .................................................................................... 69 4.1. Az elv kialakulása és nemzetközi jogi elfogadottságának alakulása ................... 70 4.2. A védelem felelősségének gyakorlati alkalmazása Líbiában ............................... 78 4.3. Szíria: a védelem felelősségének kudarca? .......................................................... 82 5.fejezet: Népirtás Burundiban – 1972............................................................................ 91 5.1. Történelmi háttér .................................................................................................. 93 5.2. A felkelés ............................................................................................................. 96 5.3. A nemzetközi közösség reakciója ...................................................................... 100 5.3.1. Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok .................................................................. 100 6 5.3.2. Belgium és Franciaország ........................................................................... 104 5.3.3. Afrikai Egységszervezet, ENSZ.................................................................. 106 5.4. A népirtás hosszú távú hatása ............................................................................ 108 6. fejezet: Népirtás Ruandában – 1994 ......................................................................... 112 6.1. Történelmi háttér ................................................................................................ 112 6.2. Előkészületek ..................................................................................................... 118 6.3. A népirtás ........................................................................................................... 122 6.4. A népirtás következményei ................................................................................ 125 6.5. A nemzetközi közösség reakciója ...................................................................... 129 6.5.1. ENSZ: A békefenntartás történetének egyik legsúlyosabb kudarca ........... 129 6.5.2. Afrikai Egységszervezet: a szolidaritás határai ........................................... 135 6.5.3. Belgium: Hátraarc ....................................................................................... 136 6.5.4. Franciaország: a Fashoda-szindróma hatása ............................................... 138 6.5.5. Amerikai Egyesült Államok: Szomália árnyéka ......................................... 143 7. fejezet: Zaire – 1996 ................................................................................................. 148 7.1.Történelmi háttér ................................................................................................. 149 7.1.1.Észak-Kivu ................................................................................................... 149 7.1.2. Dél-Kivu ...................................................................................................... 151 7.2. Menekültáradat ................................................................................................... 152 7.3. A burundi politikai háttér ................................................................................... 155 7.4. Ruandai katonai támadás ................................................................................... 157 7.5. A nemzetközi közösség ...................................................................................... 163 7.6. A beavatkozás mellett és ellen: Belgium, Franciaország és az USA álláspontja ................................................................................................................................... 165 7.7. A nemzetközi misszió ötletének körvonalazódása, és megvalósulásának kudarca ................................................................................................................................... 167 7.8. Nemzetközi reakció a 2010-es ENSZ-jelentésre................................................ 170 8. fejezet:
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