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Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock

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Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock BURUNDI: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK The Urgent Need For A New Negotiating Framework 14 May 2001 Africa Report No. 29 Brussels/Nairobi TABLE OF CONTENTS MAP OF BURUNDI............................................................................................................ i OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................ii INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 1 A. A CEASE-FIRE REMAINS IMPROBABLE..................................................................... 2 B. THE FDD FROM LIBREVILLE I TO LIBREVILLE II: OUT WEST, NOTHING MUCH NEW?.............................................................................................................. 3 1. The initial shock: Laurent Kabila's legacy ..........................................................3 2. Libreville II, and afterwards? ..............................................................................4 3. Compensating for the shortcomings of being a mercenary force........................5 C. AGATHON RWASA IN POWER, UNCERTAIN CHANGE IN THE FNL........................... 7 1. The origin of the overthrow of Cossan Kabura ...................................................7 2. Interpreting the attack on Kinama .......................................................................7 3. The alliance of the ex-FAR and FDD: a poorly-calculated risk..........................9 D. THE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE ..................................................................... 11 II. AN IMPOSSIBLE TRANSITION IN THE CURRENT SITUATION ............... 12 A. THE ATTEMPTED PUTSCH ON APRIL 18, AN ALARM SIGNAL................................. 13 1. Putsch or farce? .................................................................................................13 2. Interpretations and consequences......................................................................14 B. THE BUYOYA-BAMVUGINYUMVIRA OPTION: DANGEROUS MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO..................................................................................................... 15 1. Bururi: power or nothing...................................................................................16 2. The recycling of the Partnership Agreement.....................................................18 C. THE BAYAGANAKANDI-NDAYIZEYE OPTION: A FALSE ALTERNATIVE, YET A REAL THREAT ......................................................................................................... 21 1. An attempt to weaken the enemy .....................................................................21 2. The temptation to prepare for violence .............................................................23 D. A PROCESS WITHOUT CLEAR DIRECTION .............................................................. 25 1. The Accord implementation and monitoring committee, a costly arena of interminable debate ...........................................................................................25 2. Nelson Mandela: an unclear mediation .............................................................26 III. BREAKING THE DEADLOCK ............................................................................. 27 A. REORGANISING RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE FACILITATION PROCESS AND DEFINING A COHERENT MEDIATION STRATEGY FOR LIBREVILLE AND PRETORIA ............................................................................................................... 27 B. SOLVING THE TRANSITIONAL LEADERSHIP QUESTION ONCE AND FOR ALL ......... 28 C. CONCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON POWER SHARING IN A NON-INCLUSIVE AND FINAL MANNER BY DRAFTING A TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION ................... 28 D. CEASE-FIRE: CONFIRMING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE REBEL GROUPS AND OFFERING AN INCENTIVE TO STOP FIGHTING ................................................ 29 E. ELICITING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS 30 F. HARMONISING THE TERMS OF THE ARUSHA AND LUSAKA PEACE PROCESSES .... 30 G. RESUMING INTERNATIONAL AID TO ALLEVIATE SUFFERING AND REVIVE ECONOMIC PRODUCTION........................................................................................ 31 IV. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 31 APPENDICES A. TABLE 1: MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC COMPANIES IN BURUNDI............................. 32 B. TABLE 2: REGIONALISM IN THE ARMY: THE LAST BASTION................................. 34 C. GLOSSARY .............................................................................................................. 36 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP........................................................ 39 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................. 40 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS.......................................................................................... 44 29° 00' 29° 30' 30° 00' The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or RWANDA acceptance by the United Nations. Lac Lac Kivu Rweru Kagera Lac BURUNDI ° Cohoha 2 30' 2° 30' u Kirundo uv Ru uv hwa KIRUNDO R u r UNITED a y REPUBLIC OF Kan MUYINGA CIBITOKE TANZANIA NGOZI Muyinga go si Cibitoke uswaga go u wa Ngozi am i r ant y e ul M w b N a Kayanza M K garo ran ra 3° 00' u 3° 00' KAYANZA M Buhiga Bubanza vuvu Ru Karuzi DEMOCRATIC i u CANKUZO z i m REPUBLIC s u u r BUBANZA u OF THE R d a i d N KARUZI Cankuzo it n uw a R CONGO p zi a Muramvya r M a b u vu M u Ruv RUYIGI Bujumbura Sa MURAMVYA Gitega nzu i us BUJUMBURA N g Lu ° y Ruyigi 3 30' onza a ° ir k 3 30' v i u j a L GITEGA n u d g a n u p m Bukirasazi u R zi Ruziba Matana L BURURI RUTANA A e K w b E m Rutana le Bururi BURUNDI u M M u i International boundary T Rumonge yovoz 4° 00' 4° 00' A Provincial boundary N National capital G i az A Makamba r M ga Provincial capital u a tam N r bala Ru u Y MAKAMBA koz Town, village ir M I i Road K Mabanda A Airport Nyanza-Lac 0 10 20 30 km 0 10 20 mi ° 4° 30' 4 30' 29° 00' 29° 30' 30° 00' 30° 30' Map No. 3753 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS Department of Public Information December 1997 (Colour) Cartographic Section ICG Africa Report No 29 14 May 2001 BURUNDI: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK THE URGENT NEED FOR A NEW NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS The attempted coup d’etat by a group of young interior minister/ex-secretary-general of army officers against President Pierre Buyoya on FRODEBU permitting an impartial or satisfactory 18 April 2001 was a grave warning about the peace implementation of the peace accord. The first process in Burundi. More than eight months after scenario is nothing but a dangerous continuation of its signing, in August 2000, the Arusha peace the status quo, demonstrating the regime’s accord is at an impasse. Questions that were reluctance to relinquish power, while the second unresolved at the time have still not been dealt may reflect a real change of head of state, but with and the conditions for the accord's would give legitimacy to another "institutional implementation have not improved. There is no deadlock". cease-fire in sight between the army and rebel groups, and the leadership of transition envisaged With security deteriorating, a humanitarian at Arusha has still not been chosen. Moreover, the catastrophe underway, and political fragmentation Implementation and Monitoring Committee (IMC) in both camps, the limited achievements of the seems to be ineffective and incapable of fulfilling Arusha accord are shrivelling to nothing. Although its mission. part of the responsibility for the obstruction of the peace process lies with President Buyoya, he is Nelson Mandela, in spite of receiving the support becoming the major target of resentment and faces of regional heads of state and the international the real risk of assassination. Such an event would community, has failed persuade the rebel groups to undoubtedly provoke a reckoning between political renounce violence and accept the terms of the leaders, and renewed ethnic violence. Arusha accord. Far from weakening their position, the death of Laurent Kabila appears to have It would be counterproductive to press for the convinced the rebels to go ahead with their long- implementation of an empty accord. However, the planned offensive against Burundi, which remains status quo is just as dangerous and must not be the weakest link in the anti-Kinshasa alliance. allowed to continue, as the war option becomes From a situation of “Neither War nor Peace”1, more likely. A radical change in the management Burundi is sliding once again towards widespread of the peace process is therefore needed. civil war. Both the army and the rebels are now preparing for a major confrontation. Nelson Mandela should offer Pierre Buyoya an honourable exit strategy, but must also obtain In the mean time, the political drama continues, assurances that the current political-military power with neither of the proposed leadership scenarios structures will be dismantled. A power-sharing of the current president/vice president or ex- agreement should be negotiated, but only between UPRONA (Union for National Progress) and FRODEBU (Front for Democracy in Burundi). All other small political parties should be excluded 1 "Burundi: Neither Peace nor War", ICG Africa Report from these initial negotiations. The agreement N°25, 1 December 2000. Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock ICG Africa Report No29, 14 May 2001 Page iii should then be sealed with the drafting of a on Burundi,
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