War and Peace in International Rivalry
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War and peace in international rivalry Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS ANN ARBOR Contents List of Tables vii List of Figures ix Acknowledgments xi 1 Introduction 1 I The Rivalry Approach to War and Peace 15 2 The Concept and Measurement of Rivalries 17 3 The Empirical Importance of the Rivalry Concept 49 4 The Rivalry Approach to War and Peace 67 5 Rivalries as a Testing Methodology 85 6 The Rivalry Approach to the Democratic Peace 107 II Enduring Rivalries 129 7 A Punctuated Equilibrium Model of Enduring Rivalries 131 8 An Overview of Enduring Rivalries 143 9 Stability in Enduring Rivalries 163 10 The Con¯ict Management of Enduring Rivalries 185 11 Breaking the Stability of Rivalries 221 12 Linkages between Enduring Rivalries 241 vi Contents 13 Future Research 263 Appendix A The Rivalry Web Site 279 Appendix B An Index of Dispute Severity 281 References 299 Index 315 vi Tables 2.1 Data-Based Operational De®nitions of Enduring Rivalries ... 36 2.2 Rivalries by Dispute Propensity, 1816±1992 .......... 43 2.3 Rivalries by Duration, 1816±1992 ............... 45 3.1 Distribution of Cases Across Rivalry Types .......... 50 3.2 Distribution of Rivalry Cases by Relative Power Status of Rivals 51 3.3 Nations Most Frequently Involved in Rivalries ......... 53 3.4 Rivalry Context and the Frequency of Disputes, 1816±1992 .. 60 3.5 Rivalry Context and the Severity of Disputes, 1816±1992 ... 61 3.6 Rivalry Context and the Frequency of War, 1816±1992 .... 62 3.7 Rivalry Context and the Probability of at Least One War .... 63 3.8 Rivalry Context and Territorial Changes, 1816±1992 ..... 63 3.9 Rivalry Context and Violent Territorial Changes, 1816±1992 . 64 5.1 The History of Rivalry Testing ................. 90 5.2 Patterns of Deterrence Failure in Rivalries: Pattern 1 .....101 5.3 Patterns of Deterrence Failure in Rivalries: Pattern 2 .....102 6.1 Dyadic Regime Type and Probability of Rivalry Onset .....117 6.2 Dyadic Regime Type During Rivalries, by Type of Rivalry ..118 6.3 Militarized Dispute Propensity in Regime-Change Rivalries ..120 6.4 Democracy and Con¯ict in Regime-Change Rivalries .....121 6.5 Democracy and Con¯ict in Post-Transition Periods ......122 6.6 Democracy Levels before and during Rivalry .........124 6.7 Democracy Levels during and after Interstate Rivalry .....125 8.1 Enduring rivalries, 1816±1992 .................145 9.1 Patterns in Enduring Rivalries .................176 9.2 Negative Residuals at the Beginning and End of Rivalries ...179 9.3 Patterns in Enduring Rivalries .................182 10.1 High BRL Enduring Rivalries and War Avoidance .......195 10.2 High Dispute Enduring Rivalries and War Avoidance .....196 vii viii Tables 10.3 Patterns in Extreme Values ...................197 10.4 Mediation Attempts in Rivalries, 1946±1992 ..........210 10.5 The Timing of Mediation in Rivalries .............211 10.6 The Impact of Mediation on the Likelihood of WarÐLogit ..212 10.7 The Impact of Mediation on Con¯ict Levels in Rivalries ....213 10.8 The Impact of Mediation on Dispute ªWaiting Timesº .....214 10.9 Con¯ict Management Patterns .................219 11.1 Political Shocks, 1816±1992 ..................231 11.2 Political Shocks at the Beginning of Enduring Rivalries ....232 11.3 Shocks and Rivalry Initiation: Comparison Across Time ....235 11.4 Political Shocks and the Termination of Enduring Rivalries ..236 11.5 Shocks and Rivalry Termination: Comparison Across Time ..237 12.1 Number and Types of Linkage with other Enduring Rivalries . 253 12.2 The Timing of Rivalry Linkage ................255 12.3 The Timing of Rivalry Delinkage ...............256 12.4 Intercorrelations among Different Forms of Rivalry Linkage ..257 12.5 The Impact of Rivalry Linkage on the Basic Rivalry Level ...258 12.6 The Impact of Rivalry Linkage on Volatility ..........259 12.7 The Impact of Rivalry Linkage on the Frequency of War ....260 B.1 MID Hostility Scale ......................287 Figures 2.1 Conceptualizing Rivalries ................... 29 3.1 Rivalries over Time, 1816±1992 ................ 55 3.2 Rivalries over Time, 1816±1992, Controlled for System Size . 56 7.1 Punctuated Equilibrium and Incrementalist Models ......138 9.1 Patterns of Rivalry Evolution .................171 12.1 Forms of Rivalry Linkage ...................247 12.2 Hierarchy of Causation .....................250 B.1 Cumulative Distribution of Dispute Severity, Nonfatality Cases 293 B.2 Cumulative Distribution of Dispute Severity, Fatality Cases ..295 B.3 Cumulative Distribution of Interval Severity Scores ......296 ix Acknowledgments We have received signi®cant support from a number of programs and institu- tions in completing this manuscript. We would like to express our deep ap- preciation to all of them. The National Science Foundation (grant no. SES± 9309840) provided much of the early support for our work on enduring rival- ries. Essential research assistance was facilitated by grants from the Univer- sity of Illinois Research Board. Release time for Paul Diehl to draft much of this book was graciously given by a sabbatical from the University of Illinois Board of Trustees and a fellowship from the University of Illinois Center for Advanced Study. Gary Goertz would like to thank the Department of Politi- cal Science at the University of Toronto for providing him time to work on this project by not inviting him to one committee meeting during his years there. He extends special thanks to the late Professor Paul Bairoch whose Institute for International Economic History at the University of Geneva provided a genial home and support during the beginning and end years of this research project. Various individuals offered useful comments on the different chapters of this book, including preliminary versions that appeared as conference papers and journal articles. We are especially grateful to Paul Hensel, Scott Bennett, William Thompson, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Manus Midlarsky in this regard. Some of the chapters here include material from collaborations with other schol- ars. Thus, we are thankful for the important roles that Paul Hensel played in the research in chapter 6 and that Jacob Bercovitch and Patrick Regan played in the analyses in chapter 10. Data for the analyses in this book were provided by the Correlates of War Project, with special thanks going to J. David Singer and Stu- art Bremer, and by Jacob Bercovitch and his project on international mediation. Finally, we are grateful for Jaroslav Tir's assistance in editing and index prepa- ration. xi CHAPTER 1 Introduction Since its origins, the study of international relations has centered on the analy- sis of war. This analysis has taken on various forms: Small and Singer (1982) and Bueno de Mesquita (1981) examined all wars since 1816, Jervis (1976) chose wars that related to his speci®c purposes, Van Evera (1984) examined the causes of World War I, and Lebow (1981) analyzed 13 crises, many of which ended in war. In spite of their ideological and methodological differences, war as the phenomenon to be explained unites these diverse scholars. In contrast, we suggest in this volume that one can learn much about war by taking a step back and focusing attention on militarized relationships, what we refer to as rivalries. We argue that examining war only is like trying to un- derstand a problem marriage by looking only at when a husband beats his wife. Understanding such a marriage requires understanding the kind of relationship in which violence is possible. Wars do not suddenly occur between two states, but rather almost always arise in situations in which the two countries have had serious con¯icts and have been using the military instruments of foreign policy against one another. Only recently have students of war become conscious of what they already intuitively knew: a large portion of wars occur in long-term enduring rivalry relationships (see chapter 3). Jervis, Singer and Small, Bueno de Mesquita, Lebow, Van Evera, and other scholars want to understand the causes of war. In contrast, we examine the causes and consequences of rivalry. For us, war is potentially both a cause and an effect of rivalry. War occurs within rivalry because both parties are manag- ing their con¯icts with military tools. Yet, at the same time, war can establish the relationship as militarized. For example, the Korean War initiated a milita- rized rivalry between the United States and China that lasted until a rapproche- ment between the states in the 1970s. This book explores someÐcertainly not allÐof the implications that this fundamental shift in perspective from war to rivalry has for the study of international con¯ict. 1 2 Introduction Rivalries provide us with a way of thinking about many issues of war and peaceÐwhat we call the rivalry approach. The rivalry approach has theoret- ical, methodological, and empirical dimensions. The ®rst part of the book delves into the many rami®cations of the rivalry approach in terms of theory and methodology. There we examine how rivalries enter into standard theories of international con¯ict and how they provide new testing strategies for many classic hypotheses. The rivalry approach sheds new light on classic theories as well as classic phenomena such as power transitions. It also points out impor- tant phenomena for which there are no standard theories or explanations, be- cause these phenomena appear only as a result of the rivalry framework. Here we see the multifaceted character of the rivalry approach. In chapter 6, for ex- ample, we use rivalries to test aspects of democracy that do not ®t into standard methodologies, as we can look at regime changes within rivalries (interrupted time-series) as well as compare patterns of democracy and war across rivalries. The former escapes completely the cross-sectional methodologies that domi- nate the analysis of democratic peace, while the later uses a different unit of analysis, the rivalry.