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The Anglo-German Trade Rivalry, 1887-1913: a Counterfactual Outcome and Its Implications

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The Anglo-German Trade Rivalry, 1887-1913: a Counterfactual Outcome and Its Implications Social Science History, Vol. III, No. 2 (Winter, 1979) 187-201 THE ANGLO-GERMAN TRADE RIVALRY, 1887-1913: A COUNTERFACTUAL OUTCOME AND ITS IMPLICATIONS Hugh Neuburger and Houston H. Stokes Introduction We are probably fools not to find a reason for declaring war on Germany before she builds too many ships and takes away our trade. Arthur Balfour 1907. Projecting economic variables is a difficult art but one which statesmen practice with relish. In parliamentary democracies it is a rare candidate who does not forecast that under his tenure the pots of the electors will be graced with chickens. A more sober, careful kind of forecasting is required in conduc­ ing foreign affairs. Sound judgments about tariffs, subsidies, military and naval force levels, and even alliances depend upon prior analysis of the effects of each such policy over some specified length of run. Although one suspects that some kind of forecasting was always a part of statecraft, industrialization in Western Europe necessitated a change in the time frame of the predictions of statesmen. As the pace of economic change quickened, the rate at which the economic and military potential of states might change also accelerated. For many Englishmen observing the growth of the German economy during the 1890s, learning this lesson produced more than a little anxiety. So great was the attention which the British gave to German economic growth that predictions of Germany's overtaking of Britain came to be a staple item of British politics in the two decades before World War One. Should these predictions have been taken seriously by contemporaries? The best answer is that given by the outcome of the pre-1914 Anglo-German rivalry: Germany did not overtake Britain in that era.1 Because war intervened, we cannot know the outcome of continued peaceful economic rivalry, but by using a relatively new statistical method we can chart the course this rivalry may well have followed had the peace been kept in 1914. Our projections suggest a sequence of events that never occurred but may nonetheless be used as a guide in evaluating the views and expectations of contemporaries. German industrialization did not begin in earnest until about 1850 at which point British industrialization had been under way for close to a century. The example of British industrial development had a profound im­ pact in Germany where more energetic entrepreneurial types set as their goal to be "los von England."2 In many respects that goal was achieved in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Before 1870 British dominance in exports of cotton and woolen textiles, coal, and metallurgical goods was scarcely contested and even in 1880 the British position still seemed reasonably secure. Not until the last two decades of the nineteenth century was the scope of the German challenge to Britain revealed.3 Among older industries, British 188 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY cotton, coal, and shipping did well in the face of intensified competition, but iron and steel did not. In terms of average annual steel output (by ton), Germany had already overtaken Britain in the years 1895-1899 and in average annual pig iron output Germany was no longer very far behind. Among newer industries, German superiority in chemical and electrical goods could scarcely be questioned. A combination of stronger foreign competition and higher tariffs on the Continent and in the United States made export sales in­ creasingly difficult for British industry as the turn of the century approached. Although American competition did not go unnoticed, the Anglo-German commercial rivalry gave rise to far more comment and concern. The German assault on British export markets produced a range of responses within Britain. Reacting to losses in non-imperial markets, British exporters concentrated their efforts on imperial markets where political influ­ ence might provide welcome assistance. In 1897 Canada went so far as to impose preferential rates on United Kingdom goods, a step that was bitterly resented in Germany. In defense of the home market there arose in Britain a vociferous, if not terribly effective, "fair trade" movement. Its aim was a system of preferential tariffs for the empire. Fair trade agitation began in the mid-1880s and its intensity tended to vary inversely with the business cycle. One of the movement's few accomplishments was the passage of the Merchandise Marks Act of 1887, which required that the origin of an im­ ported article be plainly identified. Hoffman notes that the act's "practical effect was to put the stamp 'made in Germany' on countless imported wares throughout the United Kingdom and the Empire, to awaken the British to a realization of the surprisingly large quantity of goods that came from Germany .... "4 This greater public awareness had its price, for many buyers of British reexports discovered where their purchases were actually manufac­ tured and struck a better bargain by buying directly from Germany. With this exception the consequences of the fair trade movement were political rather than economic. Joseph Chamberlain's speeches helped to make tariff reform a major political issue and to sour Anglo-German relations but did not turn Britain away from free trade. What is not clear is the extent to which trade rivalry and the fair-traders' reaction to it were responsible for the deterioration of Anglo-German relations in the period 1897-1914. Serious conflicts among European nations also arose in colonial regions during these years and Britain's colonial quarrels with Germany proved more difficult to compose than those with France and Russia. There is no need to review the familiar record of British disputes with Germany over arrangements in Southern Africa, Persia, Mesopotamia, and China. German pro-Boer sentiments alone were sufficient to affect Anglo-German relations adversely. A third irritant, related to both commer­ cial rivalry and colonial tensions, was the Anglo-German naval race. The building of Admiral Tirpitz's battle fleet was perceived in Britain as a chal­ lenge that had to be met. How should the strength of these various irritants to Anglo-German relations be gauged? Angelike Banze argues that "German-English economic rivalry was not an independent factor in political decisions before the [First] World War" but rather that "the economic rivalry was used for political purposes." 5 The political factor she stresses is antago- THE ANGLO-GERMAN TRADE RIVALRY 189 nism arising from colonial disputes. Ross Hoffman takes the opposite view. After charting the course of German displacement of British trade in the years 1875-1914, Hoffman concludes that the world's greatest industrial, commercial, maritime trading power found a deadly enemy in its most successful economic rival-is it conceivable that this enmity did not spring mainly from that rivalry?6 These conflicting interpretations are also reflected in analyses that appeared during the First World War. Anton Hofrichter's Krieg und Handelsrivalitiit (1917) presents a view that differs little from that of Banze, and E.R.A. Seligman' s An Economic Interpretation of the War (1915) offers an argument similar to that of Hoffman. 7 Although the influence of trade rivalry in worsen­ ing Anglo-German relations is not clear, historians and contemporaries have at least analyzed the problem so that alternative interpretations are clearly identifiable. Can quantitative methods generate a new perspective that will add to our understanding of the problem with which these familiar interpretations are concerned? While only written sources can convey the perceptions of those who took part in events of that era, there is a quantitative way to examine certain of those events. The Anglo-German commercial rivalry pro­ vides a helpful example of how such a novel method may be employed. It is evident that a basic concern of the participants in such a rivalry is its outcome. In Britain there were those who believed that Germany was overtaking them and those who were confident that Britain would hold her own. In Germany there was a similar range of views. There is no reason to doubt that these different views represent honestly held beliefs about the future. Such beliefs differ because individuals are subject to different combinations of influences and because they respond to these influences differently. Under certain cir­ cumstances a statistical procedure can also be used to predict the future course of the Anglo-German rivalry. While contemporaries could argue about possible outcomes, leaving us at a loss to know whose predictions would have been soundest, this statistical technique identifies one outcome that is more probable than any other. This unique outcome can then be used as a counter­ factual result in the light of which the views of contemporaries may be examined.8 Analyzing the Anglo-German commercial rivalry as a forecasting pro­ blem requires that some appropriate forecasting method be chosen. A suita­ ble method is the Markov probability analysis (explained below). This tech­ nique requires only that data on annual exports and imports of the nations included in the model be chosen. The model formulated below includes Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These seven countries were chosen because the total of their exports and imports comprised a large part of world trade and because, given their factor endowments and the level of industrialization they had attained, they were judged to be the countries best placed to expand their trade during the period under consideration,9 The period 1897-1913 has been 190 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY selected because it was in these years that Anglo-German commercial rivalry became a major issue in both nations and predictions of its outcome began to appear frequently in the press and elsewhere.
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