Cefas contract report C7372

A review of international fisheries management regimes

Authors: Stuart A. Reeves, James B. Bell, Giulia Cambiè, Sarah L. Davie, Paul Dolder, Kieran Hyder, Hugo Pontalier, Zachary Radford & Duncan Vaughan

Issue date: 02/08/2018

Cefas Document Control

Title: A Review of International Fisheries Management

Submitted to: Georgina Karlsson/Charlotte Wicker Date submitted: 02/08/18 Project Manager: Stuart A. Reeves Report compiled by: SAR Quality control by: Defra various & Kieran Hyder Approved by & Kieran Hyder, 8/1/2018 date: Version: 3.5a

Version Control History Author Date Comment Version SAR et al. 20/06/17 Compiled from individual 2 chapters SAR et al. 19/07/17 Working version for comment 2.1 SAR et al. 1/09/17 Complete draft for comment 2.2 SAR et al. 21/11/17 Revised to take account of 3.1 comments SAR et al. 12/12/2017 Further revisions in response to 3.2 comments SAR et al. 12/12/2017 Revised structure inc. MRF 3.3 chapter SAR et al. 24/1/2018 Further corrections & enhanced 3.4 exec summary. SAR et al. 26/2/2018 Minor corrections 3.4a SAR et al. 27/7/18 Pre-publication corrections & 3.5 formatting SAR et al. 02/08/18 Fixing minor typos & formatting 3.5a

A review of international fisheries management regimes Page i

A review of international fisheries management regimes Page ii

An international review of fisheries management regimes

Authors: Stuart A. Reeves, James B. Bell, Giulia Cambiè, Sarah L. Davie, Paul Dolder, Kieran Hyder, Hugo Pontalier, Zachary Radford and Duncan Vaughan1

Issue date: 02/08/2018

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A review of international fisheries management regimes Page iii Executive Summary

1. This report summarises a review of international fisheries management regimes. The review summarises the available information on specified topics related to fisheries management in a number of specified study countries. The topics were a) Fisheries management; b) Quota allocation and trading; c) Enforcement; d) Science; e) Data collection; f) Access arrangements; g) International investment in the fishery; h) The role of industry; i) Discard policy; j) the ecosystem- based approach to fisheries management, and k) Marine recreational fisheries. The management regimes under review were those of , Norway, the , Australia, New Zealand, the USA and Canada. 2. Of the study countries, Iceland and the Faroes stand-out in terms of their high dependence on fisheries for both employment and the national economy. This reflects their status as small, remote island nations surrounded by productive fishing grounds. Some key indicators related to fisheries are summarised in the table below. EEZ area Fleet Size Employment in fisheries Landings

% of Volume Value Value (% ‘000 km2 No. vessels Harvest Processing workforce ('000t) (million $) of GDP) Iceland 763 1,394 4,900 4,200 4.27% 1,427 1,262 9.72% Norway 2,022 6,211 12,048 10,927 0.79% 2,008 2,332 0.81% Faroes 264 1,240 3,700 n/a 13% 487 n/a 45% Australia 8,990 318 7,047 n/a > 0.05% 159 1,351 0.14% New Zealand 4,105 1,417 1432 5,790 0.22% 284 410 0.25% USA 8,610 27,000 n/a 37,436 > 0.02% 3,473 4,938 0.03% Canada 5,770 18,740 43,250 33,034 0.32% 800 2,116 0.14%

3. Fisheries for demersal such as , haddock and saithe are important in terms of both volume and value for all of the North-east Atlantic States considered here, as are fisheries for small pelagic species, primarily mackerel and herring. In comparison with the more northerly countries however, the UK also has high value fisheries for shellfish such as scallops and Norway . This situation is also similar to the North-Eastern USA where fisheries for scallops and lobster are among the most important in terms of both volume and value. 4. In relation to fisheries management, most of the study countries have broadly stated objectives for their fisheries related to biological sustainability and ensuring social and economic benefits. In practice, the sustainability objectives are closely linked to achieving Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and the socio-economic objectives are less clearly defined. Only Australia has a primary management objective specified in terms of Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), rather than MSY,

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but technical difficulties associated with estimating MEY mean that the practical management targets are usually derived from MSY. 5. Some strengths and weaknesses of the approaches that the study countries use to set biological, economic and social management objectives are summarised in the following table: Feature Description Strength / Weaknesses / Opportunities Threats Biological Broad high-level Management goals for fish Broad objectives which Uncertain prioritisation. objectives stocks are general, e.g. allow flexibility. No clear success criteria. sustainable, efficient or Can be backed by based on the precautionary specific goals (e.g. FMSY) approach and international in individual stock commitments rather than plans. specific, e.g. legislating for a reference point (i.e. MSY, MEY) Specific legislated Legislated commitment to Clear, objective criteria objectives fish at or below MSY (e.g. for assessing success NZ) Promotes economic Technically difficult to Legislated to fish at or efficiency and reduced define & estimate below MEY (AU.) environmental impact (lower fishing effort) Legislative commitment to achieve optimum yield (US) Clearly established Not as clearly defined as requirement MSY Economic Maximise economic There is an explicit objective Clear focus on Generally larger efficiency to enact policies for measures to support vessels/companies more economic efficiency (IS) economic efficiency, efficient, which implies has been successful in consolidation of fleets. improving profitability and stock status Economic stability The objective of economic Seek to maintain Not clear what ‘economic stability used as a general income in rural stability’ means in guiding principle (NO) communities practice.

Include market- Policies to deregulate Demonstrated added May lead to oriented action market and focus on export value through consolidation, reduce jobs oriented value (IS) specialisation. in supply chain (e.g. in Opportunity to processing) maximise income from landed catch Social Stable employment as Policy indicates stable Clear prioritisation of Stable employment has secondary objective employment an objective objectives (i.e. not been achieved in but below economic employment practice due to efficiency and stock status contingent on consolidation (declined (IS) economic efficiency) from ~ 8k in 1991 to ~ 4k in 2003), though stable since 2003

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Stable employment General objective for stable Provides equal weight No specific prioritisation and settlement broad employment and settlement to economic and social or goals set out. Not clear objective in relation to quota goals whether stable allocations – but no specific employment achieved. targets. (NO)

6. Most of the study countries use annual catch limits as their primary management measures. These are usually specified as Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and form part of fishery management plans which allow a long-term approach to be taken to management. The exception to this is the Faroes which currently uses a system of effort management and has not yet adopted any management plans. Some strengths and weaknesses of the different management measures used in the various study countries are summarised in the following table: Feature Description Strength / Weaknesses / Opportunities Threats Main instrument is Main approach to Limits total fishing May limit fishing output control (TACs) controlling fishing mortality if enforced opportunities for other exploitation through stocks when quota annual TACs with reached (‘choking’). discard ban (e.g. NO, IS) Flexibilities Ability to carry-over Allows for vessels to Over-quota and mixed uncaught quota the adapt when quotas do catches increase following year, inter- not match catch mix pressure on stocks species flexibility, mitigating ‘choke effect’ allowable over-quota landings (IS) Main instrument is input Fishing is controlled Removed incentives for Has not controlled controls (effort) through days-at-sea high-grading & over- fishing mortality in its regulations with no quota discards current implementation quotas (FO) Widespread use of Temporary spatial Adaptive management Requires effective spatio-temporal management measures measures to avoid system to identify management used extensively to unwanted catch closure areas. reduce catches of May be disruptive to juvenile and spawning normal fishing patterns fish (NO, IS, FO) Shellfish receive light Shellfish generally Low regulation Limits control over touch management managed by close Provides alternative exploitation – how to seasons, minimum sizes, fishery to quota species measure sustainability technical measures etc... for shellfish? rather than catch limits (NO, IS)

7. The processes by which fishing rights, usually in terms of quota shares, are allocated and traded can be important in incentivising the rationalisation of fishing fleets. This has been the case for Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) schemes which have typically helped improve the profitability of fishing when they have been introduced. However, such schemes do tend to have an associated administrative cost, and they can lead to the concentration of quota holdings in the hands of relatively few operators unless measures are in place to prevent this.

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8. The following tables summarise policy objectives and positive and negative outcomes of the quota management systems in the various study countries: Policy objectives of quota management systems

Decrease Improved overcapacity economic Improve Iceland and performance stock health rationalise and the fleet efficiency

Decrease Improved Provide overcapacity economic Improve socially Norway and performance stock health acceptable rationalise and outcomes the fleet efficiency

Ensure Increase Reduce stockholders efficiency fishing effort engagement Australia and and pressure and social rationalise on stocks acceptable fishing fleet outcomes

Allocate Provide the harvesting Reduce security of rights overcapacity New future Improve equitably of the Zealand resource stock health based on inshore access to commitment fishing fleet companies to the fishery

Decrease Reduce Create overcapacity Improve Improve fishing effort Reduce gear opportunities USA and product safety at sea and pressure losses for Alaskan rationalise quality on stocks communities the fleet

Provide fair distribution Economic Ensure Improve of benefits Employment development Fair treatment Canada Conservation safety at sea from stabilization in coastal of crews property communities rights

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Positive outcomes from quota management system

Increased Increased Improved stock Iceland profitability product quality conditions

Increased Involvement of Improved profitability for Reduction of Norway Fishermen stocks limited-entry overcapacity associations conditions fisheries

The New involvement of opportunities Improved Improved vessel Rationalisation of stakeholders Australia through the stocks profitability fleets ensured quota lease conditions adherence to market the rules The tender process avoids the increase of Annual Catch fishing effort for Entitlements non-quota (ACEs) and the Improvement species and market’s New Improved stock of productivity created an transparency Zealand conditions and opportunity for enhance entry employment ore New opportunities Zealanders to for small-scale become involved fishers in developmental fisheries. Economic and social benefits from the Increased Improvement Improved USA Community profitability of of the state of safety at sea Development fishing the stocks Quota (CDQ) program

capacity Improvement Improved stock Increase of Improvement Canada reduction and the economic condition catch prices of safety at sea rationalisation performance

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Negative outcomes of quota management system

Overfishing condition Loss of jobs in rural Disengagement for some stocks due Reduced crew Increased Iceland areas and in processing of small-scale to the species salaries inequalities facilities fishers transformation

Difficulty of assessing Deployment of large results of quota scheme administrative Obstacle to profit Norway because highly resources for maximisation regulated system; management;

TACs for many species were set at Only few fisheries are higher levels than managed purely using recommended, Australia ITQs: great amount of causing low administrative time and incentives to exit the effort; fishery (limiting rationalisation) The new entry The open quota opportunities with ACE ownership to the ITQ gradually New regime could threaten general public can more Zealand the sustainability and obstacle the fishing concentrated in efficiency of the industries to few companies fisheries. maximise their profits

Only few fisheries are managed purely using Limits in quota trade Inefficient Quota ITQs. The system obstacle fishing USA Pound (QP) requires a significant efficiency and profit market amount of maximisation administrative time.

Few examples of initial widespread excessive Inefficient quota Canada misreporting of catches consolidation of lease market quota

9. All of the study countries have some form of access agreements in place which allow controlled access by other countries’ vessels into their waters and vice versa. The number of agreements in place in USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are rather limited, reflecting the fact that these countries have few near-neighbours. The negotiation of such agreements is much more routine

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for Iceland, Norway and the Faroes, where resources are often shared with neighbouring States. The UK is currently party to some of these agreements through its membership of the EU. 10. All nations considered here have fisheries enforcement regimes in place and the main elements of these are broadly similar in all cases. All nations employ some form of satellite monitoring (Vessel Monitoring System, VMS and/or Automatic Identification System, AIS) and have the capacity to inspect vessels both at sea and in port. There is variation in the extent to which at-sea observers are deployed on vessels, and in the extent to which electronic logbooks have been introduced. 11. The following table summarises the enforcement measures in place in the different study countries: Country VMS/ Electronic On board Interception/ Inspections Other Policies AIS Logbooks Observers & Notes At-sea In-dock Post- landing Iceland Yes Not apparent Yes (varies by Yes (Coast Yes Yes fishery and Guard) vessel nationality) Norway Yes Yes (>15m) Yes Yes (Coast Yes Yes Guard) Faroe Yes Not apparent Yes Yes Yes Unknown Supported by Islands Danish patrol vessels Australia Yes Yes (optional) Yes Yes Yes Yes Legislation ~500- variously 800 enhanced by vessels each state. New Yes Piloted in 2011 Yes Yes Probably, Yes FishServe Zealand for trawlers. (includes not handles quota Has been high-seas) explicitly monitoring rolled out to confirmed on behalf of others since Ministry of but coverage Fisheries. unknown. Aerial surveys Black market surveillance USA Yes Being trialled Yes (varies by Yes Yes Yes in Gulf vessel size/ fisheries fishery) Canada Yes Yes, being Yes Yes Yes Yes Aerial surveys implemented

12. Good relationships between fisheries scientists and the can contribute to the effectiveness of any fisheries management system. This can be helped by ensuring routine collaboration between the two in areas like research and data collection. This collaboration takes

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various forms in the different study countries but a notable example is the Norwegian reference fleet approach which uses a subset of the commercial fishing fleet as a platform for catch sampling and research. 13. The nature of the co-operation between scientists and the fishing industry in each of the study countries is summarised in the following table: Country Policies/ Successes Failures Situation Iceland No formal collaboration Norway Norwegian Self-funding Biased fleet composition Reference Industry involved (quota Fleet too small Fleet allocation) NRF fleet behaviour different to (NRF) High quality data collected non-NRF vessels? across large area Training for NRF crews Data collected by fishing vessels, not research vessels trying to emulate them

Faroe Lack of Scientists forced to represent Islands representative environmental interests stakeholder Limited industry cooperation involvement

Australia Management Multi-disciplinary panels Advisory Committees New Devolved to a Encourages stakeholder Limited vessel capacity and uptake Zealand company: stewardship Lack of trust between industry, ‘FishServe’ Reduces some costs state and NGOs USA Research Set- Fisheries research funded Asides through quota allocation of TAC to science partners Canada Fisheries Camera monitoring to increase Science observer coverage Mostly state funded Collaborative Program

14. All of the countries considered apply restrictions to foreign investment in their fishing fleet and to access by foreign vessels to their waters. By comparison, the UK is currently one of the least restrictive economies with regards to foreign investment in fishing. Similarly, the fact that UK waters currently form part of a combined EU EEZ means that there is access to EU vessels in some cases to within 6nm of the UK coast.

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15. The restrictions placed upon foreign investment in the national fishing industry and fishing by foreign fleets in the national waters of each of the study countries are summarised in the following table: Restrictions upon foreign investment & involvement Fishing by foreign fleets Iceland Fishing companies must: Various bilateral  Not have more than a 25% share controlled agreements for the by foreign interests. exchange of quota in . Norway Fishing companies must: Under various bilateral  Be 60% owned by Norwegian citizens. agreements (e.g. with  Have a Norwegian CEO and at least 60% EU) Norway exchanges board be Norwegian. quota with some foreign  Base their main office in Norway. fleets. Faroe Islands Fishing companies/ vessels must: Various bilateral  At least 2/3 owned by Faroese interests agreements.  Be subject to taxation in the Faroe Islands Australia  Vessels must be registered to Australia. Foreign flagged vessels, Foreign investment proposals are considered through bilateral by AFMA and, in the case of larger agreements, may fish investments, the FIRB. No specific limits for quota surplus to capacity foreign ownership have been set but of national fleets. investment must be compatible with existing industry. New Zealand To hold quota or register a vessel, companies must: Non-NZ flag vessels  Not have more than a 25% share controlled currently not permitted by foreign interests. to fish in NZ waters. USA Not controlled: Very limited fishing, if  Ownership of processing facilities any, by foreign fleets.  Shore fishing  Fishing by vessels <5Gt Fishing companies must:  Only be allowed access to quota surplus to US fleet requirements  Be majority controlled by US citizens  Use vessels registered and built in US Canada Fishing companies must: One historic agreement  Be majority Canadian controlled (but DFO has with France but discretion as to acceptable levels of foreign generally foreign flagged investment up to this point). vessel activity very  Have their vessel(s) registered to Canada limited. (though not necessarily built there).

16. All of the study countries have attempted to address the problem of discarding of catches of over- quota or under-sized fish by implementing a discard ban in some or all of their fisheries. Some of these bans have proved effective in incentivising more selective fishing, either through the use of more selective gear, or by closing areas where high densities of undersized fish are encountered.

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In general, attempts to reduce over-quota catches have proved less successful. Attempts have been made to manage this by allowing flexibility so that over-quota catches can be landed subject to certain conditions. 17. A summary of the experience with discard bans in the different study countries is summarised in the following table: Nation Discard Policy Successes Failures/ Challenges Iceland Total ban since Area closures where No clear impact of temporary closures 1984 for Cod & proportion of juveniles Selective fishing improvements Haddock. Others is high limited, not policy driven. Still high added since proportion of undersized landings Norway Ban on discarding Rapid opening/ closing Not clear whether closure or discard any commercial of areas with high policy is driving improvements. species since 1983 proportions of under- Discard ban apparently not adding sized fish. much. Problems with multi-species over- quota catch remain Faroe Total ban since Failure to set appropriate effort limits Islands 1994 High-grading not disincentivised Limited enforcement/ observer coverage Australia Policies very Bycatch rate/composition not limited and relate measured officially, bycatch largely to specific fisheries processed as fishmeal New Discard ban since Sliding scale of cost for purchasing Zealand 1986, excepting additional quota incentivises discards species with a high Below-MLS individuals don’t count post-release against quota survival or those below Minimum Landing Size (MLS) USA Ban since 1998 Vessel cooperation High observer cost (Alaska), Identification of bycatch monitored but not hotspots controlled elsewhere Canada Ban discards from High-grading Shifted fishing effort to other species Rockfish fishery disincentivised with higher TACs and no discard ban since mid-1990s Overage allowance (West coast) disincentivises discards Discards count towards a vessel’s ITQ

18. The Ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management (EBFM) has become increasingly popular in recent years as a possible means to consider the ecosystem-wide impacts of fishing and other human activities and promote more sustainable practices. Among the study countries, the approach is most established in Australia and the USA. Within the UK, progress towards the

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implementation of EBFM has taken place within the framework of the EU’s Marine Strategy Framework Directive, as well as through the establishment of a network of Marine Protected Areas. 19. The current state of play with regard to the implementation of EBFM in the different study countries is summarised in the following table: Nation 2017 status Iceland Some interest in combining and improving existing regulation towards EBFM but very little information regarding recent progress. Norway Substantial conceptual design but lacking much specific guidance on implementation. Faroe Very limited progress towards EBFM. Some scientific interest but little else. Islands Australia Relatively mature. Harvest strategies created for most fisheries. Environmental factors take precedence in decision making. New Implemented several policies that collectively constitute some degree of EBFM but Zealand not yet as a coherent statutory framework. To be implemented as part of ‘Fisheries 2030’ USA Strong legislative and stakeholder support. Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) variously engaged and pushing towards EBFM but not yet implemented. Most commercial fishers support incremental move towards EBFM. Canada Integrated fishery management plans developed and currently being implemented for Newfoundland and British Columbia.

20. In certain areas for some species, it is increasingly recognised that marine recreational fishing (MRF) can be responsible for a considerable proportion of fishing mortality. Recreational fisheries can be motivated by a complex mixture of leisure, catch, food provision, and social factors, and are spread across a range of gear types and platforms. Consequently, the challenges associated with managing MRF are often very different to commercial fisheries, and mandatory reporting of catches is rare. 21. Many countries have a system of control measures for MRF such as bag limits, minimum landing sizes, closed seasons, and area closures. However, where there are significant conflicts between recreational and commercial sectors or species are overexploited, the impacts of MRF can be difficult to manage and allocation between the two sectors is difficult. These challenges have been addressed in some countries, with Australia and the USA having the most comprehensive systems for the co-management of commercial and recreational fisheries, including schemes such as species being allocated recreational quota, addressing overlap in MRF and commercial hotspots, and engaging anglers in fisheries science and management.

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22. The status of marine recreational fishing and any associated control measures are summarised in the following table:

Country Licence Survey? (and Quota/ Catch limits? MRF included in stock required? interval) assessment? Iceland Yes No Charter vessels and MRF are MRF allocated TAC allocated quota for select species. proportion Norway No Yes (variable Seal and king only. Tourists No interval) export limits. Charter vessels have quota. Faroes No No No No Australia Yes Yes (varies by Yes Yes state) New Yes Yes (variable Yes Yes Zealand interval) USA Yes Yes (annual) Yes Yes Canada Yes Yes Yes No (5 years)

23. Key strengths and weakness of national MRF management programmes are summarised in the following table: Component Strengths Weaknesses Stewardship  Vision for MRF is clearly outlined  Anglers disconnected from  Control measures clearly managers and perceive control communicated and anglers measures as ‘red tape’ or understand their value interference from the state  Anglers engaged in science and  Threats posed by MRF perceived management process and perceive at individual level. control measures as beneficial, rather than confrontational. Data Collection  Data collection regularly reviewed  Small, irregular surveys with by fisheries and social scientists biased samples  Participants regularly contacted Management  Most/ all MRF species managed:  Conflicts between commercial Prioritise most threatened species and recreational sectors not and adopt precautionary approach addressed otherwise  Spatial distribution of effort not  Management process is monitored transparent and accessible.  Significant recreational landings Anglers understand and value the not captured in stock process of fisheries management. assessments  Cost recovery through licencing

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Table of contents

1 Introduction ...... 24 1.1 Project specification ...... 24 1.2 Report structure ...... 24 1.3 Glossary and species list ...... 25 2 Country Overviews ...... 32 2.1 UK ...... 33 2.2 Iceland ...... 35 2.3 Norway ...... 37 2.4 Faroes ...... 39 2.5 Australia ...... 40 2.6 New Zealand ...... 42 2.7 USA ...... 43 2.8 Canada ...... 45 2.9 Summary ...... 47 3 Fisheries Management Approaches ...... 48 3.1 Introduction ...... 48 3.1.1 Fisheries management in the UK ...... 48 3.2 Iceland ...... 49 3.2.1 Fisheries management framework ...... 50 3.2.2 Management processes ...... 52 3.3 Norway ...... 54 3.3.1 Fisheries management framework ...... 55 3.3.2 Management processes ...... 56 3.4 Faroes ...... 57 3.4.1 Fisheries management framework ...... 57 3.4.2 Management processes ...... 61 3.5 Australia ...... 64 3.5.1 Fisheries management framework ...... 66 3.5.2 Management processes ...... 68 3.6 New Zealand ...... 70 3.6.1 Fisheries management framework ...... 70 3.6.2 Management processes ...... 72 3.7 USA ...... 73 3.7.1 Fisheries management framework ...... 74

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3.7.2 Management processes ...... 75 3.8 Canada ...... 79 3.8.1 Fisheries management framework ...... 80 3.8.2 Management processes ...... 81 3.9 Discussion ...... 83 3.9.1 Management objectives ...... 83 3.9.2 Management tools ...... 83 3.9.3 Regulatory process ...... 84 3.9.4 Costs of fisheries management: ...... 84

4 Quota Allocation and Trading ...... 91 4.1 Introduction ...... 91 4.1.1 The current UK quota system ...... 91 4.2 Iceland ...... 94 4.2.1 Overview ...... 94 4.2.2 Quota allocation method ...... 96 4.2.3 Trading rules (national and international) ...... 97 4.2.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) ...... 99 4.2.5 SWOT analysis ...... 102 4.3 Norway ...... 103 4.3.1 Overview ...... 103 4.3.2 Quota allocation method ...... 106 4.3.3 Trading rules (national and international) ...... 107 4.3.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) ...... 108 4.3.5 SWOT analysis ...... 110 4.4 Faroes ...... 111 4.4.1 Overview ...... 111 4.5 Australia ...... 112 4.5.1 Overview ...... 112 4.5.2 Quota allocation method ...... 114 4.5.3 Trading rules (national and international) ...... 116 4.5.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) ...... 117 4.5.5 SWOT analysis ...... 119 4.6 New Zealand ...... 120 4.6.1 Overview ...... 120 4.6.2 Quota allocation method ...... 122

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4.6.3 Trading rules (national and international) ...... 123 4.6.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) ...... 124 4.6.5 SWOT analysis ...... 126 4.7 USA ...... 127 4.7.1 Overview ...... 127 4.7.2 Quota allocation method ...... 128 4.7.3 Trading rules (national and international) ...... 129 4.7.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) ...... 137 4.7.5 SWOT analysis ...... 139 4.8 Canada ...... 140 4.8.1 Overview ...... 140 4.8.2 Quota allocation method ...... 141 4.8.3 Trading rules (national and international) ...... 141 4.8.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) ...... 148 4.8.5 SWOT analysis ...... 150 4.9 Summary ...... 150 4.9.1 Quota allocation methods ...... 156 4.9.2 Trading rules ...... 156 4.9.3 Outcomes ...... 157

5 Access Arrangements ...... 158 5.1 Introduction ...... 158 5.1.1 UK context ...... 158 5.2 Iceland ...... 159 5.3 Norway ...... 161 5.4 Faroes ...... 162 5.5 Australia ...... 162 5.6 New Zealand ...... 163 5.7 USA ...... 164 5.8 Canada ...... 164 5.9 Discussion ...... 164 6 Enforcement ...... 165 6.1 Introduction ...... 165 6.1.1 Fisheries enforcement in the UK ...... 167 6.2 Iceland ...... 168 6.3 Norway ...... 169 6.4 Faroes ...... 169

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6.5 Australia ...... 169 6.6 New Zealand ...... 171 6.6.1 Cost efficiency ...... 171 6.7 USA ...... 172 6.7.1 Observers as enforcers ...... 172 6.7.2 Enforcement and compliance under individual quota based systems ...... 173 6.8 Canada ...... 173 6.9 Discussion ...... 174 6.9.1 Enforcement budgets ...... 174 6.9.2 Observers ...... 174 6.9.3 Technological opportunities ...... 175 6.9.4 Summary ...... 175

7 Science-Industry Collaboration ...... 178 7.1 Introduction ...... 178 7.1.1 Science-industry collaboration in the UK ...... 178 7.2 Iceland ...... 179 7.2.1 Institutional Arrangements ...... 179 7.2.2 Science funding ...... 179 7.2.3 Collaborative research ...... 179 7.2.4 Fishery-dependent data ...... 179 7.2.5 Scientific Advisory process ...... 179 7.3 Norway ...... 180 7.3.1 Institutional Arrangements ...... 180 7.3.2 Science funding ...... 180 7.3.3 Collaborative research/Fishery-dependent data ...... 180 7.3.4 Scientific Advisory process ...... 182 7.4 Faroes ...... 183 7.4.1 Institutional Arrangements ...... 183 7.4.2 Scientific Advisory process ...... 183 7.5 Australia ...... 184 7.5.1 Institutional arrangements ...... 184 7.5.2 Science funding ...... 184 7.5.3 Collaborative research ...... 185 7.5.4 Fishery-dependent data ...... 185 7.5.5 Scientific Advisory process ...... 185

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7.6 New Zealand ...... 186 7.6.1 Institutional Arrangements ...... 186 7.6.2 Science funding ...... 187 7.6.3 Collaborative research ...... 187 7.6.4 Fishery-dependent data ...... 188 7.6.5 Scientific Advisory process ...... 188 7.7 USA ...... 189 7.7.1 Institutional arrangements ...... 189 7.7.2 Science funding ...... 189 7.7.3 Collaborative research ...... 189 7.7.4 Fishery-dependent data ...... 190 7.7.5 Scientific advisory process ...... 191 7.8 Canada ...... 192 7.8.1 Institutional arrangements ...... 192 7.8.2 Science funding ...... 192 7.8.3 Collaborative research ...... 192 7.8.4 Fishery-dependent data ...... 193 7.8.5 Scientific advisory process ...... 193 7.9 Summary and discussion ...... 194 8 Foreign Investment ...... 198 8.1 Introduction ...... 198 8.1.1 UK context ...... 199 8.2 Iceland ...... 200 8.2.1 Foreign Investment ...... 200 8.2.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets ...... 200 8.3 Norway ...... 201 8.3.1 Foreign investment ...... 201 8.3.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets ...... 201 8.4 Faroes ...... 202 8.4.1 Foreign Investment ...... 202 8.4.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets ...... 202 8.5 Australia ...... 203 8.5.1 Foreign Investment ...... 203 8.5.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets ...... 204 8.6 New Zealand ...... 205

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8.6.1 Foreign Investment ...... 205 8.6.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets ...... 205 8.7 USA ...... 206 8.7.1 Foreign Investment ...... 206 8.7.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets ...... 206 8.8 Canada ...... 207 8.8.1 Foreign Investment ...... 207 8.8.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets ...... 207 8.9 Summary ...... 207 9 Discard Policy ...... 209 9.1 Introduction ...... 209 9.1.1 Discard policy in UK fisheries ...... 209 9.2 Iceland ...... 210 9.3 Norway ...... 210 9.4 Faroes ...... 211 9.5 Australia ...... 212 9.5.1 Sub-Antarctic Fisheries ...... 212 9.5.2 Australian Margin Trawl Fisheries ...... 213 9.6 New Zealand ...... 213 9.7 USA ...... 213 9.7.1 Alaska ...... 214 9.8 Canada ...... 214 9.8.1 British Columbia ...... 215 9.8.2 Atlantic Coast & the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) ...... 215 9.9 Summary ...... 216 9.9.1 Acceptable discards ...... 217 9.9.2 Incentivising and enforcing change ...... 217 9.9.3 Management of Discard bans ...... 218 9.10 SWOT analysis ...... 220 10 Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management ...... 222 10.1 Introduction ...... 222 10.1.1 UK progress towards ecosystem-based fisheries management ...... 224 10.2 Iceland ...... 227 10.3 Norway ...... 228 10.4 Faroes ...... 229 10.5 Australia ...... 229

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10.6 New Zealand ...... 230 10.7 USA ...... 230 10.7.1 California Coast ...... 232 10.7.2 Alaska ...... 233 10.7.3 Washington state ...... 233 10.7.4 Atlantic Coast ...... 234 10.8 Canada ...... 235 10.8.1 Atlantic coast...... 235 10.8.2 Pacific Coast ...... 236 10.9 Summary ...... 237 11 Marine recreational fishing ...... 240 11.1 Introduction ...... 240 11.2 Recreational fishing in the UK ...... 242 11.2.1 Monitoring & assessment ...... 242 11.2.2 Licensing ...... 243 11.2.3 Management ...... 244 11.2.4 Control and enforcement...... 245 11.3 Iceland ...... 246 11.3.1 Data collection and monitoring ...... 246 11.3.2 Enforcement...... 246 11.4 Norway ...... 247 11.4.1 Data collection and monitoring ...... 247 11.4.2 Enforcement...... 248 11.5 Faroe Islands ...... 249 11.6 Australia ...... 250 11.6.1 Legislation and Licensing ...... 251 11.6.2 Data collection and monitoring ...... 251 11.6.3 Management ...... 252 11.6.4 Enforcement...... 252 11.7 New Zealand ...... 253 11.7.1 Legislation and Licensing ...... 253 11.7.2 Data collection and monitoring ...... 253 11.7.3 Enforcement...... 254 11.8 USA ...... 255 11.8.1 Legislation and Licensing ...... 255 11.8.2 Data collection and monitoring ...... 256

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11.8.3 Management ...... 257 11.8.4 Enforcement...... 258 11.9 Canada ...... 260 11.9.1 Legislation and Licensing ...... 260 11.9.2 Data collection and monitoring ...... 260 11.9.3 Management ...... 261 11.9.4 Enforcement...... 262 11.10 Summary ...... 263 11.10.1 National Attitudes ...... 263 11.10.2 Accuracy of Survey Estimates ...... 264 11.10.3 Allocation of fishing opportunities...... 265 11.10.4 Enforcement & the community ...... 266 11.10.5 Impacts upon non-target species & the environment ...... 266 11.10.6 Conclusions ...... 267

12 References ...... 271 12.1 Introduction ...... 271 12.2 Country overviews ...... 271 12.3 Fisheries management approaches ...... 272 12.4 Quota Allocation and Trading ...... 275 12.5 Access arrangements ...... 279 12.6 Fisheries enforcement ...... 279 12.7 Science-Industry Collaboration ...... 280 12.8 Foreign Investment ...... 281 12.9 Discard Policy ...... 282 12.10 Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management ...... 283 12.11 Marine Recreational Fishing ...... 285

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1 Introduction

1.1 Project specification This report is intended to fulfil the requirements of Defra Research and Development project MF1242: ‘An international review of fisheries management regimes.’ The specification of the work for this study was as follows:

The aim of this study is to assess the fisheries management regimes that are in place around the globe and consider the costs and benefits of them. The objective is to provide evidence on international fisheries management regimes and their applicability to the English fleet.

Globally fisheries are managed in many different ways with different approaches to quota allocation and trading and different roles for industry in terms of enforcement and science and data collection. This project is intended to provide information on these different regimes in order to understand what has worked well and why.

The study will cover the following 11 topics; a) Fisheries management; b) Quota allocation and trading; c) Enforcement; d) Science; e) Data collection; f) Access arrangements; g) Regional co-operation; h) International investment in the fishery; i) The role of industry; j) Discard policy; j) Wider management goals (e.g. the ecosystem approach or integrated approaches).

The management regimes in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Iceland and the Faroes Islands will be reviewed.

1.2 Report structure The report is structured in order to address the requirements listed in Section 1.1. Each of the topics listed are covered in different chapters which first give a brief introduction to the relevant topic, including an overview of the UK situation for the relevant topic, then summarise how the topic is addressed in each of the study countries. During this review it was decided to include a chapter on marine recreational fishing instead of one on regional cooperation. The content of the report is outlined below.

Chapter 2 gives some broad details about the study countries in terms of their key fisheries and their economic importance. This is intended to give some overall context for the more detailed coverage in subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 gives an outline of the fisheries management regime in each country, with particular reference to broad objectives and management frameworks and processes. Chapter 4 covers quota allocation and trading within each of the study countries. Chapter 5 summarises the agreements the countries have made to permit other countries to fish in their waters and to obtain access for their vessels to fish in other countries’ waters. Chapter 6 covers fisheries enforcement while Chapter 7 combines the topics of data collection, science and the role of industry to give an overview of science-industry collaboration. Chapter 8 looks at the extent and nature of foreign investment and

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participation in the fisheries of the different study. Chapter 9 is concerned with national and regional policies in relation to discarding with particular emphasis on practical experience in the implementation of discard bans. Chapter 10 addresses the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management with particular reference to the progress each country has made towards adopting this approach. Chapter 11 is the additional chapter that covers marine recreational fishing. Chapter 12 summarises the literature cited in each chapter.

Most of the study countries have English as an official language, hence most of the relevant reference material for these countries is available in English. This is also the case for Norway and Iceland. In general there was less material available for the Faroes, partly due to the small size of the country but also due to language issues, with Faroese legislation for instance only being available in Faroese. This limitation is reflected in the material available for summary and analysis in this report.

This report is a literature review and any views contained within it are not those of the authors or the UK Government.

1.3 Glossary and species list Error! Reference source not found. summarises the abbreviations and technical terms used in this report. Table 1-1, Summary of abbreviations and technical terms used in this report

Term Definition ACE Annual Catch Entitlement (New Zealand) ACOM Advisory Committee on Management; the ICES Committee responsible for providing scientific advice in support of the sustainable management of marine resources and ecosystems. ACT Annual Catch Target (USA) AFMA Australian Fisheries Management Authority Anadromous Fish species that spawns in fresh water then migrates to the sea to feed, e.g. salmon. B Biomass; the overall weight of fish present in a stock. See also SSB B-lim, B- Specific values of stock biomass, B, defined as biological reference points (see also BRPs) MSY etc. BC British Colombia BREP Bycatch Reduction Engineering Program (USA) BRPs Biological reference points; metrics of the state of a fish stock which are used to guide management. BRPs are typically defined in terms of both the abundance of the fish stock, often defined in terms of its SSB, and the pressure on the stock, typically given in terms of F. BRPs can be either limits or targets. For instance, B-lim can be defined as the SSB at which there is an increased risk of the stock not being able to reproduce itself. This is a limit reference point and management is intended to keep the stock away from this level. In

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contrast, F-MSY is the fishing mortality associated with achieving MSY. This is often a main objective of fisheries management so F-MSY can be regarded as a target reference point. CCAMLR Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CCSBT Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna CDQ Community Development Quota (USA) CDR Catch Disposal Records (Australia) CFP ; the 's fisheries policy CFRN Canadian Fisheries Research Network cod- A 'currency' used in trading quotas for different stocks. equivalent CRP Cooperative Research Program (USA) DCF Data Collection Framework. The Framework established in the EU to fund and support the collection of fisheries data. Demersal Fish that live on or near the sea floor, e.g. cod, haddock. DFL Daily Fishing Logbooks (Australia) DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada) DKK Danish Krone (currency) EAFM Ecosystem approach to fisheries management EBFM Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization EEZ ; a sea zone around a coastal State over which the State has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources. The rights arise from UNCLOS. EFZ (Exclusive fishing zone) is an earlier version of the same concept which refers only to fishery resources. ENSO El Niño southern oscillation; an irregularly periodic variation in winds and sea surface temperatures over the tropical eastern Pacific Ocean, affecting much of the tropics and subtropics. It has substantial impact on the productivity of fish stocks in that area and beyond. EU European Union F Fishing mortality; a measure of the proportion of the fish stock removed by fishing in a given time period. F-MSY, F-lim Specific values of fishing mortality, F, defined as biological reference points (see also BRPs) etc. FAO The Food and Agriculture Organisation FAP Financial Administrative Penalty (UK) FEP Fisheries Ecosystem Plan FIRB Foreign Investment Review Board (Australia) FMA Fisheries Management Area (New Zealand) FMC Fisheries Management Council FMP Fisheries Management Plan (USA) FQA Fixed Quota Allocations. FQA units are the main means by which fishing quota are apportioned and allocated amongst the UK industry. The system of FQA units as an allocation mechanism was introduced in 1999. The number of FQA units which were to be allocated to each over 10 metre vessel was calculated based on each vessel’s share of landings over the period 1994 – 1996. GDP Gross Domestic product GES Good Environmental Status; A key objective of the MSFD is to achieve GES for European seas.

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GRT Gross register tonnage; a measure of the capacity of a vessel. This measure has been superseded by gross tonnage. GT Gross tonnage; A measure of the total capacity of a vessel HCR Harvest Control Rule; an algorithm which determines what the TAC should be for a given stock depending on criteria such as the state of the stock relative to its biological reference points and the level of previous TACs HSP Harvest strategy policy (Australia) IATTC Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission ICCAT International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ICES The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea; an intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to increase the scientific knowledge of the marine environment and its living resources and to use this knowledge to provide unbiased, non-political advice to competent authorities. ICES co-ordinates the stock assessments that are the basis of the scientific advice for most European fish stocks. IFCA Inshore Fisheries & Conservation Authority; In England, there are ten regional IFCAs that are responsible for the management of the fisheries out to six nm from the national baseline IFMP Integrated Fisheries Management Plan (Canada) IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission IPHC International Pacific Commission. IQ Individual Quota; Provides a right to fishers, vessel owners or any other entity allowed, to catch a percentage of a TAC. The race for fish that exists under a competitive TAC is largely eliminated, but the lack of transferability restricts the efficiency of harvesting. IQE Icelandic Quota Exchange ISK Icelandic krone (currency) ITE Individual Transferrable Effort units (Australia) ITQ Individual transferrable quota; a management system where individual quotas are transferable. This means that fishers or vessel owners that own ITQs can sell and lease them or buy other ones. In a “pure” ITQ system, quota shares perfectly divisible and transferable IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing IVQ Individual Vessel Quota; management scheme that allocates privilege to catch a share of the TAC of fish or shellfish in for a defined period of time to each vessel involved in that fishery. IVQ is a smaller individual portion of a TAC and is allocated only to individual vessels. IVQs are usually non-transferable or transferable with limitations. IWC International Whaling Commission LLP Licence Limitation Program (USA) MAC Management Advisory Council (Australia) MCS Monitoring, control & surveillance MEY Maximum Economic Yield; a variant of MSY that seeks to maximise economic return from the stock instead of catch. MLS Minimum Landing Size MMO Marine Management Organisation (UK) MPI Ministry of Primary Industries (New Zealand) MRF Marine recreational fishing MRIP Marine Recreational Information Program (USA) MRM Minimum Realistic Model MSA Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (USA) MSFD Marine Strategy Framework Directive; an EU strategy to provide more effective protection for the marine environment

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MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield; an approach to fisheries management that seeks to maximise the long-term yield that can be taken from a fish stock. MSY in its current form is derived was introduced through the WSSD. NAFO Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation NAMMCO North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission NASCO North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organisation NEAFC North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission NGO, eNGO (Environmental) Non-Governmental Organisation nm Nautical miles NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service (USA); the fisheries division of NOAA NOAA The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration of the US Department of Commerce. NOK Norwegian Krone (currency) NPAFC North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission NRF Norwegian Reference Fleet. Also hsNRF and cNRF for the high seas and coastal components of the fleet. OECD The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OLE Office of Law Enforcement (USA); the enforcement division of NMFS. OPC Office of Partnership & Collaboration (Canada) PA The Precautionary Approach to fisheries management; an approach to fisheries management which requires increased caution when the information about a stock is more uncertain. The PA generally involves defining reference points associated with poor stock status (i.e. low abundance or high fishing pressure) then taking actions to keep the stock away from these reference points. Pelagic Fish species that live and feed away from the sea floor and the shore, e.g. herring, mackerel. PO Producer Organisation (EU); officially recognised bodies set up by fishery or aquaculture producers. They are in charge of the day-to-day management of fisheries. PRS Post-release survival PSC Pacific Salmon Commission PSP Puget Sound Partnership (USA) QMA Quota Management Area (New Zealand) QMS Quota Management System (New Zealand) QP Quota Pound, the annual amount of resource a participant is allowed to catch, usually defined in terms of total weight. (USA) QS Quota Share, the percentage of the sector's catch limit to which the holder of quota shares may harvest (USA) Quota An allocation of fishing opportunities. Usually expressed as a proportion of a TAC or as an absolute quantity of fish. RAG Resource Assessment Group (Australia) RSA Research Set Aside (USA) RTC/RTAC Real-time [Area] Closure SARC Stock Assessment Review Committee (USA) SAW Stock Assessment Workshop (USA) SBT Southern Bluefin Tuna SEAFO South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation SET South East Trawl fishery (Australia) SFF Sustainable Fisheries Framework (Canada)

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SFR Statutory Fishing Rights (Australia) SIOFA South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement SPRFMO South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation SROs Several & Regulating Orders (UK). Legal instruments used in the establishment and management of inshore shellfish fisheries SSB Spawning Stock Biomass; the total weight of fish in a fish stock that are sexually mature and thus able to contribute to spawning. SSB is often used as a measure of stock abundance in biological reference points. SWOT A planning technique that can be used to identify the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, analysis Threats associated with a particular approach or organisation TAC Total Allowable Catch; a limit on the quantity of fish permitted to be harvested from a give fish stock. TACs typically apply to a specific year or season, and are specified in live weight, or sometimes numbers of individuals. TACC Total Allowable Commercial Catch (New Zealand) UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; the UNCLOS III agreement of 1982 established many of the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans. This includes the right to define an EEZ out to 200nm from their national baseline. WCPFC Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development. The WSSD took place in Johannesburg in 2002, hence is also known as the Johannesburg agreement. In respect of fisheries management, the WSSD called for the introduction of an ecosystem approach and for the rebuilding fisheries to maximum sustainable yield.

For clarity, given that species names such as ‘lobster’ or ‘whiting’ are used for different species in different countries, and further that headings such as ‘’ or ‘redfish’ can cover multiple species, Table 1-2 summarises the scientific names of fish species mentioned in the report text together with the relevant region and any alternative names in regular use.

Table 1-3 contains the corresponding information for shellfish species.

Table 1-2, Scientific names of fish species mentioned in the text

Species name Region Scientific name Alternative names Albacore Thunnus alalunga Arrowtooth flounder N Pacific Atheresthes stomias Australian sardine Australia Sardinops neopilchardus Barracouta New Zealand Thyrsites atun Cape snoek Bigeye tuna Thunnus obesus Black drum NW Atlantic Pogonias cromis Blue whiting NE Atlantic Micromesisteus poutassou Bluefin tuna Thunnus thynnus BFT Bocaccio N Pacific Sebastes paucispinis Bocaccio rockfish Capelin N Atlantic Mallotus villosus Cod N Atlantic Gadus morhua Eel NE Atlantic Anguilla anguilla European eel Golden tilefish SE USA Lopholatilus chamaeleonticeps Great northern tilefish Greenland halibut N Atlantic Reinhardtius hippoglossoides Greenland turbot

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Grouper SE USA Mycteroperca spp. Haddock N Atlantic Melanogrammus aeglefinus Halibut N Atlantic Hippolglossus hippoglossus Atlantic halibut Halibut N Pacific Hippoglossus stenolepis Pacific halibut Herring N Atlantic Clupea harengus Atlantic herring Hoki New Zealand Macruronus novaezelandiae Blue grenadier Icefish Southern Ocean Champsocephalus gunnari Mackerel icefish Jack mackerel Australia Trachurus spp. Ling NE Atlantic Molva molva Lumpfish NE Atlantic Cyclopterus lumpus Lumpsucker Mackerel N Atlantic Scomber scombrus Atlantic mackerel Menhaden NW Atlantic Brevoortia tyrannus Monkfish N Atlantic Lophius spp. Anglerfish Northern Wolffish N Atlantic Anarhichas denticulatus N Pacific Gadus macrocephalus Pacific salmon N Pacific Oncorhynchus spp. Pink snapper Australia Pagrus auratus Snapper Pollack N Atlantic (NW Atlantic) Red snapper SE USA Lutjanus campechanus Redfish N Atlantic Sebastes mentella & S. Oceanic/pelagic redfish & marinus golden redfish Rock sole N Pacific Lepidopsetta spp. Rockfish N Pacific Sebastes spp. Sablefish N Pacific Anoplopoma fimbria Black cod, butterfish Saithe N Atlantic Salmon N Atlantic Salmo salar Atlantic salmon Sea bass NE Atlantic Dicentrachus labrax European sea bass Silvergray rockfish N Pacific Sebastes brevispinis Skate N Atlantic Rajidae Southern Blue Whiting New Zealand Micromesisteus australis Southern bluefin tuna Thunnus maccoyii SBT Spiny dogfish N Pacific Squalus suckleyi Pacific spiny dogfish Spotted Wolffish N Atlantic Anarhichas minor Steelhead trout N Pacific Onchorhynchus mykiss Rainbow trout Sturgeon NW Atlantic Acipenser spp. Swordfish Xiphias gladius Tilefish SE USA Lopholatilus spp. Toothfish Southern Ocean Dissostichus spp. Tuna Thunnus spp. Tusk NE Atlantic Brosme brosme Walleye pollock N Pacific Gadus chalcogrammus Pollock White NW Atlantic Urophycis tenuis Whiting NE Atlantic Merlangius merlangus Whiting N Pacific Merluccius productus North Pacific hake Yelloweye Rockfish N Pacific Sebastes rubberimus Yellowtail flounder NW Atlantic Pleuronectes ferruginea

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Table 1-3, Scientific names of shellfish species mentioned in the text.

Species name Region Scientific name Alternative names Abalone Australia Haliotis rubra & H. laevigata Blacklip abalone & greenlip abalone

Atlantic surfclam NW Atlantic Spisula solidissima Blue crab Australia Blue swimming crab Butter clam N Pacific Saxidomus gigantea Snow crab NW Atlantic opilio Queen crab Crabs UK , Necora puber Edible crab, velvet swimming crab Crabs N Pacific Paralithodes spp, , tanner crab, Chionoecetes bairdi & Metacarcinus magister Geoduck N Pacific Panopea generosa Pacific geoduck Giant crab Australia Pseudocarcinus gigas Tasmanian giant crab Jumbo flying squid S Pacific Dosidicus gigas Humboldt squid King crab Norway Paralithodes camtschaticus Southern Ocean Euphausia superba Lobster NE Atlantic European Lobster Lobster NW Atlantic Homarus americanus Mussels New Zealand Perna canaliculis New Zealand green- lipped mussel Norway lobster NE Atlantic Nephrops, Dublin bay Ocean Quahog N Atlantic Arctica islandica Australia Fenneropenaeus spp., Penaeus Banana prawns, tiger spp. & Metapennaeus spp. prawns & endeavour prawns Rock lobster Australia , Western rock lobster, edwardsii, Southern rock lobster, verreauxi Eastern rock lobster

Rock lobster New Zealand Southern rock lobster Scallops Iceland Chlamys islandica Scallops New Zealand Pecten novaezealandiae Scallops UK Pecten maximus & King scallop & Queen Aequipecten opercularis scallop Scallops NW Atlantic Placopecten magellanicus Sea scallop (Canada) Shrimp N Atlantic Northern shrimp, northern prawn

Spanner crab Australia Whelk NE Atlantic Buccinum undatum

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2 Country Overviews

The countries that are considered in this report differ in various interlinked ways reflecting their geography and the nature of their fisheries. These, together with other factors such as each nation’s socio-cultural features (such as Iceland’s and Faroes’ relation to the sea), economic organisation (e.g. free market, protectionism), legal framework (federal or unitary state) and history (indigenous populations) have profoundly shaped the current fisheries systems. As these factors are influential in determining the approaches a country takes to managing its fisheries, the following sections give an overview of each country with particular reference to the importance and nature of fisheries in each case. In order to facilitate comparisons between countries, Table 2-1 summarises a number of statistics on the relative importance of fisheries to each country and their contribution to the national economy. As much as possible, the values in this table have been derived from OECD data. This does mean that in some cases the values quoted may differ from those given, for instance, on the websites of the relevant fisheries administration, not least because different countries have different ways of calculating and reporting these indicators. The key benefit of using data from a consistent source is the ability to compare data between countries. As the main reason for the use of such indicators here is to allow comparison between the study countries, Table 2-1 gives values based on OECD data. The table also includes information on the size of each country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Table 2-1, Summary of some key indicators in relation to fisheries for the study countries. Figures are for the year 2012 and are based on OECD data except where stated.

EEZ areaa Fleet Size Employment in fisheries Landings

% of Volume Value Value (% ‘000 km2 No. vessels Harvest Processing workforce ('000t) (million $) of GDP) Iceland 763 1,394 4,900 4,200 4.27% 1,427 1,262 9.72% Norway 2,022 6,211 12,048 10,927 0.79% 2,008 2,332 0.81% Faroesb 264 1,240 3,700 n/a 13% 487 n/a 45% Australia 8,990 318 7,047 n/a > 0.05% 159 1,351 0.14% New Zealand 4,105 1,417 1432 5,790 0.22% 284 410 0.25% USA 8,610 27,000 n/a 37,436 > 0.02% 3,473 4,938 0.03% Canada 5,770 18,740 43,250 33,034 0.32% 800 2,116 0.14% UK 733 6,406 12,445 n/a2 > 0.03% 401 902 0.04% a Figures from Flanders Marine Institute, 2016; b Figures from non-OECD sources; n/a – not available

2 Data from Lawrence et al (2016) indicate a total employment of 18,718 FTE in the UK fish processing industry in 2012. Combined with the figure for the harvest sector, this leads to a figure of 0.08% of the workforce employed in fisheries.

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2.1 UK The UK joined the European Union (or the European Economic Community as it was then) at the start of 1973. As such, this event preceded the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1977 which, among other things, established the right of coastal States to establish 200 nautical mile (nm) fishery limits. This agreement acted as a spur for the development of a European Community fisheries conservation policy as it meant that the Community policy could now apply to all waters occupied by key stocks, rather than only covering part of their range which would previously have been the case. Hence, for Atlantic waters the Community decided that the relevant Member States would extend their fisheries limits to 200nm from 1 January 1977. After this and an extensive period of negotiation, much of which concerned the establishment of quota shares, the first Community Fisheries Conservation Policy finally came into force in January 1983 (Holden 1994). Since then, UK fisheries have been subject to what has since become the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the most recent iteration of which came into force in 20133.

The timing of the UK’s accession to the European Community means that, since its establishment, the UK EEZ has in effect been part of a larger, European EEZ. Externally, the UK part of this EEZ has maritime boundaries with the Faroes and Norway (Figure 2-1). The UK also has maritime boundaries with , Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Ireland.

In 2012 the UK fishing fleet comprised around 6400 vessels. Around 79% of these were less than ten metres in length. Overall, 56% of the total fleet was administered in England and , where the proportion of vessels <10m long was slightly higher at 84%.

In terms of both volume and value, the most important UK fisheries are a mix of pelagic species, particularly mackerel; shellfish species, notably Norway lobster, scallops and crabs; and demersal species, particularly haddock and cod.

3 EC regulation 1380/2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1380&from=EN

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Figure 2-1, The UK Exclusive Economic Zone. From: www.parliament.uk

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2.2 Iceland The Icelandic EEZ represents 763,172 km2 or seven times the area of the island itself (Flanders Marine Institute 2016; Figure 2-2). It shares nautical boundaries with Greenland, the Faroes and Norway. Iceland is poorly suited for agriculture and the fishing industry has historically always been a major component of the Icelandic economy. The fishing grounds around Iceland have long been considered prolific, and were routinely fished by vessels from other States before Iceland took control of its waters. As a result, the incremental extension of the EEZ (12nm in 1958, 50nm in 1972, 200nm in 1975) led to conflicts with the UK and Germany over access to these waters. These conflicts were known as the ‘cod ’ (Guðmundsson 2006). Since the 1975 extension, Iceland has maintained full control over its EEZ, and its relative remoteness means that the majority of the stocks it exploits are contained within its own EEZ and it has not had to agree on the management of straddling fish stocks to the extent that other North Atlantic States like Norway or the UK have (Arnason et al, 2004).

To manage the resources in its waters, Iceland established a fishery management policy under the Fisheries Management Act 2006. The main element of this is Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs, introduced in 1984). Overall, this fishery management has allowed the fish stocks to recover and the industry to increase their profits. However, it also had the consequence of the rationalisation of the fishing fleet in favour of large companies, with consequent losses to small-scale fishers. This is described in more detail in Chapter 4.

As of 2012, OECD data (Table 2-1) indicates that the capture sector of the fishing industry contributed directly to 9.7% of the GDP (fishing and aquaculture), with national data indicating a further indirect contribution through fishing, aquaculture and fish processing to bring the total contribution to around 25%. The total export value of product reached ISK 220.5 billion in 2010 (£1.6 billion at the 2010 exchange rate) and ISK 250 billion in 2014 (£1.8 billion at the 2014 exchange rate). In 2012, around 4.3% of the Icelandic workforce was linked to the fishing industry, with 4,900 people employed in the harvest sector and 4,200 people in the processing sector4.

The Icelandic commercial fishing fleet was composed of 1,394 vessels in 2012 (Table 2-1). Undecked vessels, mostly between 3 and 7 GT in size and used by part-time fishermen, accounted for 52% of the fishing fleet (859 vessels) but their catch quantity represented only 0.8% of the Icelandic total fish catches that year. Vessels larger than 1000 GT (decked vessels and trawlers) accounted for 2.6% of the fishing fleet (44 units) but provided 50% of the Icelandic total fish catches. Over the last five years,

4 http://www.iceland.is/files/icelandic-fisheries-press-kit-enska-juni-2015.pdf

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cod, blue whiting, capelin, mackerel and herring represented more than 75% of the Icelandic landings (125 million tonnes average annual landing). Cod represented by far the most valuable species landed in 2015 (ISK 61 billion; £460 million), followed by redfish (ISK 13.5 billion, £102 million) and haddock (ISK 11 billion, £87 million). Europe is the largest market for Icelandic seafood and within the EU the is the main destination, accounting for about 17% of total marine export value (Statistics Iceland 2013). From a UK perspective, in 2015 Iceland was the most important nation in terms of its imports of seafood, with the UK importing 63,600t of Icelandic seafood for a total imported value of £302,000 (Marine Management Organisation, 2016).

Figure 2-2, Map showing the EEZs of Iceland and the Faroes. From www.fisheries.is

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2.3 Norway The 200nm EEZ of Norway in the Northern Hemisphere (Figure 2-3) comprises the waters surrounding Norway’s mainland (933,667 km2), the Svalbard archipelago (796,621 km2) and Jan Mayen Island (291,637 km2). In addition, the overall Norwegian EEZ also includes the waters around Bouvet Island (441,840 km2) in the Southern ocean (Flanders Marine Institute 2016). The total area is more than six times the area of Norway’s mainland. Norway is surrounded by the in the south west, the Norwegian Sea along the western coast and by the Barents Sea on the north coast. The most important fish stocks (cod, haddock, capelin, herring) are distributed across both Norwegian and neighbouring waters and around 90% of Norway fisheries are conducted on stocks that are shared with other countries.

Norway’s fishery management policy is governed by the Marine Resource Act 2010. It aims at the sustainable management of the resources and a commercial viability of the industry through stable employment in coastal areas and economic sustainability. This management policy has allowed fish stock recovery and an increase in industry profitability. The side effects are the rationalisation of the fishing fleet and large administrative resources deployed in regulations to ensure social acceptable outcomes.

The capture sector of the fishing industry contributed around 0.8% of Norway’s GDP in 2012 (Table 2-1). Around 95 % of the Norwegian seafood production is exported, with the most important markets being the European Union and Russia. The fishing industry employed around 0.8% of the total workforce in 2012 (Table 2-1).

The Norwegian commercial fishing fleet was composed of 5,884 fishing vessels in 2015 of which 54% were less than 10 m (3,163 units) (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2016). The smaller vessel size group (in this case, vessels less than 11m) provides the highest catch value, representing NOK 1.3 billion (£117 million; Henriksen, 2014). Between 2012 and 2015, cod was the main demersal species and herring, mackerel and blue whiting were the main pelagic species) fished. Together, these four species accounted for more than 60% of Norwegian landings over this period. Norwegian landings in domestic harbours accounted for 88% of the total landing in 2012.

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Figure 2-3, Map of Norwegian Fisheries Management Zones. From Steinshamn (2010)

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2.4 Faroes The Faroe Islands have been a self-governing country within the Kingdom of Denmark since 1948. They have an EEZ of 264,369 km2, 188 times the size of the combined islands’ areas, and share maritime borders with the United Kingdom, Norway and Iceland (Flanders Marine Institute 2016; Figure 2-1).

The current framework for the legislation of Faroese fisheries is the Commercial Fisheries Act of 1994. It has been adopted after the measures in place at that time (area closures, minimum mesh sizes and fishing licences) failed to maintain acceptable levels of the key demersal stocks of cod, haddock and saithe. It introduced a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) system implemented by Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). The TAC system was discontinued in 1996 and was replaced with a system of effort quotas (fishing days), area closures and licences. This is described in detail in Chapter 3.

The Faroes are not an OECD country in their own right so OECD data are not available for Faroese fisheries. As a result, the figures for the Faroes given in Table 2-1 are not strictly comparable with the figures for the other study countries. With that caveat however, it is clear that the Faroese have a high economic dependence on their fisheries. The fishing industry accounts for around 45% of the GDP and 95% of the Faroese exports are seafood products. In 2012 around 3,700 people worked for the fishing industry (fishing, aquaculture, processing) which represented 13% of the total Faroese workforce. The main fisheries are for demersal species, particularly cod, haddock and saithe. Saithe and cod represented around 50% of the average annual total landed value (DKK 745,000 or £87,400) between 2011 and 2015. However, they only represented 14% of the average annual total landed weight (466,000 tonnes) between 2011 and 2015 (Statistics Faroes). The number of fishing vessels in the Faroes is not well documented, but the available figures suggest a fleet of around 240 vessels of 20 GRT or greater, as well as around 1,000 smaller vessels.

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2.5 Australia Australia’s EEZ is more extensive than the land area comprising 8,990,013 km2 which includes 2,119,272 km2 from external territories (Flanders Marine Institute 2016; Figure 2-4). It is the third largest EEZ in the world, but these waters are nutrient poor and the fisheries are of relatively low production. It shares maritime borders with Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, New Zealand and Kerguelen Islands.

Australia has adopted Total Allowable Catches and Individual Transferable Quotas as means of managing fisheries. Responsibility for the management of Australian fisheries is split between the State Governments and the Commonwealth (Federal) Government, with the latter having responsibility for commercial fisheries in the waters from 3nm out to the EEZ boundary. All other fisheries, including recreational fisheries, fall under the jurisdiction of the State Governments or the Northern Territories. The consequences of the ITQ policy are said to include a sustainable harvest of the stocks and an increase in the vessels profits, especially in the tuna fishery. At present, however, relatively few stocks are subject to ITQ management. The range of input controls (e.g. statutory fishing rights or gear restrictions) is effective in pursuing biological and economic sustainability of the fisheries but it also requires a great amount of administrative time and effort. The quota allocation method has been the result of a strong stakeholder engagement and this ensures the legitimacy of the policies applied and the adherence to the rules.

Crustaceans are the most important species landed in terms of value (80% of the total landed value in 2013), followed by tuna (8% in 2013), pelagic species (5% in 2013), shellfish and molluscs (4%) and groundfish (3%) (OECD 2016). Seafood imports remain an important feature of the domestic fish product consumption with a total value of seafood importation 60 % higher than that of the exports in 2013. The seafood exports in 2012 were primarily composed of rock lobster (A$ 447 million), abalone (A$ 186 million) and tuna (A$163 million) (Australian Department of Agriculture 2014). The Australian Bureau of Statistics does not provide separate employment statistics for the fishing sector and include the hunting and trapping sector. Therefore it is estimated that around 10,000 jobs are directly supported by the industry and around 100,000 are indirectly supported by the fishing industry (transport, storage, wholesaling, retailing), or 0.08 to 0.8% of the total workforce. (ABARES 2013, Partners 2010). According to OECD (2015 - Table 2-1), the fleet consisted of 3185 vessels in 2012 totalling 35,360 gross tonnage. 47% of the fishing fleet was composed of vessels between 18 and

5 This figure may underestimate the true fleet size as the Australian ship register includes a total of 1949 vessels registered as fishing vessels

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23.9m in length and 25% being between 12 and 17.9m in length and the remaining 28% being less than 12m in length.

Figure 2-4. Map of Australia’s EEZ. From mesa.edu.au.

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2.6 New Zealand New Zealand’s isolated position gives it one of the largest EEZs in the world with 4,104,579 km2 which is more than fifteen times the area of the two main islands (Flanders Marine Institute 2016, Figure 2-5). It only shares nautical boundaries with Australia on two extremities of its EEZ.

Most of the fished species are managed through the Quota Management System (QMS). It divides each species into stocks that are managed independently according to their Quota Management Areas (QMAs). The New Zealand EEZ is divided into 10 Fisheries Management Areas (FMAs). The QMA’s boundaries are based on those of the FMAs and on biological understanding of the stock distributions of each species. QMA boundaries can be changed by the Government after consideration of a range of factors, including biological features and industry interests (Lock & Leslie 2007). The main component of the QMS is a system of Figure 2-5 Map of New Zealand’s EEZ and the ten fisheries management areas. Individual transferrable Quotas (ITQs) and associated trading Courtesy of www.fs.fish.govt.nz rules. These have given the New-Zealand ITQ system much flexibility and has limited the rate of accumulation of quota holdings into few big companies. This is discussed further in Chapter 0.

The fishing industry (fishing and processing) employed around 7,000 people in 2012 which represented less than 0.5% of the workforce (Table 2-1). This industry is one of New Zealand’s largest exporters, although it accounts for a small share of the workforce and value added to New Zealand GDP.

More than 70% of the seafood production is exported. In 2012 the main export destinations were China (22% of the exports), Australia (18%) and the (10%)6. Seafood exports totalised a value of NZ$ 1,573 million (c. £900 million) with mussels, rock lobster and hoki being the most exported species. The most fished species in 2012 are the hoki (28% of the total landings representing 128,000 tonnes), jack mackerel (10%), squid (8%), southern blue whiting (7%) and barracouta (6%). The fishing fleet was composed of 1,417 vessels in 2012; 62% of these were less than 12m in length.

6 https://thefishsite.com/articles/economic-review-of-new-zealands-seafood-industry

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2.7 USA The US EEZ represents 8,609,642 km2 (Contiguous USA, Alaska and Hawaii only – see Figure 2-6) (Flanders Marine Institute 2016). It is the world’s second largest exclusive economic zone and shares borders with Canada, the Russian Federation, Mexico, Cuba and the Bahamas.

The legal basis for governing marine fisheries management is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 which created eight regional fishery management councils responsible for the fisheries management in their regions. Responsibility for e.g. the setting of TACs and the development of fisheries management plans is devolved to these councils.

The US commercial fishing industry employed 37,436 people in 20127. Landing revenue was dominated in 2012 by crab (US$ 680 million, £ 418 million at 2012 exchange rate), scallop (US$ 559 million, £ 344 million at 2012 exchange rate) and shrimp (US$ 490 million, £ 301 million at 2012 exchange rate), but in terms of volume landed walleye pollock comes first (1.3 million tonnes in 2012), followed by menhaden (724,000 tonnes) and Pacific cod (326,000 tonnes). The latter three species accounted for more than half the total volume landed in 2012. The US imported US$ 31 billion worth of fishery products in 2012 (45% being non-edible products) mainly from China (23% of the shares), Thailand (12%) and Canada (12%). That same year it exported US$ 27 billion worth of fishery products (81% being non-edible products) mainly to China (29%), Japan (14%) and Canada (13%). Leading export edible products were comprised of groundfish (US$ 592 million, £ 364 million at 2012 exchange rate), (US$ 510 million, £ 314 million at 2012 exchange rate) and salmons (US$ 439 million; £ 270 million at 2012 exchange rate) (Lowther 2012).

The seafood industry (commercial harvesting, processing, dealing, wholesale, distribution, importing and retailing) employed 1,270,141 persons in 2012 which represented 0.7% of the US workforce. Based on OECD, data (Table 2-1), fishery landings contributed around 0.03% to the US GDP in 2012.

7 https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/Assets/economics/documents/feus/2012/FEUS2012.pdf

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Figure 2-6,The USA's EEZ. From nationalgeographic.org

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2.8 Canada Canada possesses an exclusive economic zone of 5,769,849 km2, making it the 7th largest in the world (Flanders Marine Institute 2016, Figure 2-7). Territorial waters account for a very large part of this area due to the contribution of Hudson Bay, the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and the internal waters of the Arctic Archipelago. It shares maritime borders with the United States, Greenland and the French territory of Saint Pierre and Miquelon.

The Fisheries Act 1985 is the primary statute for the conservation of fish and habitats and for the management of fisheries. It is regularly amended, most recently in April 2016. Total Allowable Catches (TACs), Individual Quota (IQs) and subsequently Individual Transferable Quota (ITQs) and Individual Vessel Quota (IVQs) are the most commonly used output control measures. Input control measures consist mainly of vessel entry limits to fishery.

Canada’s fisheries underwent major changes in the 1990s along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts due to the collapse of groundfish fisheries (cod moratorium in 1992) and Pacific salmon fisheries respectively. Since the collapse of the traditional fisheries, the sector turned to shellfish on the Atlantic coast and to groundfish and shellfish on the Pacific coast. Shellfish represented 79% of the Canadian total landed value in 2011.

More than 80% of Canadian landed value is from the Atlantic fisheries and 85% of all seafood landed by Canadian harvesters is exported. The main export destination is the United States and the main exported species are . There is a relatively high-volume herring fishery in Atlantic waters, but otherwise the main Atlantic fisheries are for American lobster, shrimp, snow crab and scallops8. The most valuable fisheries in Pacific waters are for crabs, shrimp, Pacific Salmon and Pacific halibut.

8 Canadian fisheries statistics: http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/stats/stats-eng.htm

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Figure 2-7, The EEZ of Canada. From http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/folios/00025/images/map01-eng.png

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2.9 Summary Of the countries considered here, Iceland and the Faroes stand-out in terms of their high dependence on fisheries for both employment and the national economy (Table 2-1). This reflects their status as small, remote island nations surrounded by productive fishing grounds. The available information suggests that although fisheries may be relatively important for employment in Norway, the fisheries sector is of minor economic importance for the other countries considered here, including the UK. In comparison with the UK, the other countries considered here land a much higher proportion of their catch into domestic ports. Again, this is mainly for geographic reasons.

In terms of the major fisheries (Table 2-2), the fisheries for demersal species such as cod, haddock and saithe are important for all of the North-east Atlantic States considered here, as are fisheries for small pelagic species, primarily mackerel and herring. In comparison with the more northerly countries however, the UK also has high value fisheries for shellfish such as scallops and Norway lobster. This situation is also similar to the North-Eastern USA where fisheries for scallops and lobster are among the most important in terms of both volume and value.

Table 2-2 Overview of the most important fisheries in each country.

Most important fisheries by volume by value Iceland cod, blue whiting, capelin cod, redfish, haddock Norway cod, herring mackerel cod, herring, mackerel Faroes cod, saithe, haddock cod, saithe Australia Australian sardine, prawns crabs, prawns, rock lobster, tuna New Zealand hoki, jack mackerel, squid mussels, rock lobster, hoki USA pollock, menhaden, Pacific cod scallops, lobster, pollock Canada lobster, herring, crab, shrimp lobster, crab, shrimp, scallops UK mackerel, herring, scallops mackerel, Norway lobster, scallops, cod

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3 Fisheries Management Approaches

3.1 Introduction Here we analyse the broad fisheries management systems in place for each of the countries, including what legislation governs management, the overarching goals and objectives, what measures are in place to achieve them and what structures are in place to deliver them. For context, we first give a short summary of fisheries management in the UK, then describe the systems in place in each country and identify where they have been successful and what elements have been key to that success.

3.1.1 Fisheries management in the UK As a member of the European Union, UK fisheries have been subject to the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) since its inception in 1983. As such, the main management measure for most stocks is annual Total Allowable Catches (TACs). The starting point for these is scientific advice provided by ICES. While TACs are agreed annually, they are increasingly based on multi-annual management plans which allow for a longer-term approach to be taken to the management of these stocks. In some cases, particularly for cod (EC, 2008), these plans also include limits on fishing effort alongside the catch limits. Historically, EU fisheries legislation has also included a large number of technical measures, particularly those related to fishing gear selectivity (Reeves et al. 2008).

The most recent version of the CFP dates from 20139. With regard to objectives, this regulation introduced a firm commitment that the fishing mortality consistent with ensuring maximum sustainable yield from each stock should be achieved by 2015 where possible, and by 2020 at the latest. Other measures introduced by the 2013 regulation included a more regionalised approach to decision making, and a landing obligation which made it illegal to discard commercial fish species. The 2013 regulation also stated the need to implement an ecosystem approach to fisheries management (Chapter 10) and also to ensure that marine recreational fisheries (Chapter 11) are conducted in a manner consistent with the objectives of the CFP.

EU legislation contains few regulations relevant to shellfish and inshore fisheries. Instead, many of these are managed more locally. In the case of fisheries that take place within 6nm of the English coast, the management is the responsibility of the relevant Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority or IFCA.

9 Regulation (EU) 1380/2013. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1380&from=EN

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3.2 Iceland Iceland has developed its fisheries management system since extending its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1976 (see Figure 2-2). The main legislation governing fisheries in Iceland is the Fisheries Management Act of 200610, setting out fisheries as a common property with the stated objective to “promote the conservation and efficient utilisation, thereby ensuring stable employment and settlement throughout Iceland” (Government of Iceland, 2006).

There is no explicit prioritisation of objectives in the Iceland fisheries legislation, though since the introduction of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in 1984 there has been an expectation that the system promotes economic efficiency and stock sustainability (Marchal et al., 2016). Similarly, while Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is not explicitly mentioned in legislation, quotas for the main stocks are subject to a harvest policy which is consistent with the precautionary approach and the intention to generate the MSY in the long-term (Fiskistofa, 2016). In this context, the precautionary approach involves ensuring that the spawning stock of a given target species has a high probability of remaining above specified limit values. For instance, management of the Icelandic cod stock is intended to have a high probability of maintaining the spawning biomass of the stock above the defined B-lim (limit biomass) of 125,000t. As part of this, there is a ‘harvest control rule’ in place which determines what the TAC for the next year should be based on the stock size. This includes The MSY-trigger value of 220,000t which is well above the limit value. In essence the harvest control rule ensures that action is taken if the stock falls below the trigger value in order to ensure that it doesn’t fall far enough to take it below the limit value. This is done by reducing the recommended catch so as to reduce the fishing mortality on the stock Such harvest control rules are specified in the management plans for the main demersal stocks (cod, haddock & saithe; Icelandic Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries, 2016).

In Iceland three key changes in regulation introduced during the 1980s, namely the abolition of export barriers, the introduction of an ITQ system and the establishment of fish auctions, have proved important for the long run profitability of the fisheries. Some of this has been due to the specialisation in specific fisheries and products that has been encouraged in the processing sector by the introduction of fish markets, and in the catching sector by the transferability of quota (Knútsson et al., 2016; see also Section 4.2).

10 http://www.fisheries.is/management/fisheries-management/the-fisheries-management-act/

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3.2.1 Fisheries management framework In Iceland, commercial fisheries are managed by a mixture of input and output controls. All major commercial stocks are subject to Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limits. The only exception is the lumpfish fishery which is managed through limited entry, short season (e.g. 32 days in 2005) and subject to net length and mesh restrictions (Chambers and Carothers, 2016). This distinction reflects the traditional nature of the lumpfish fishery; the species has been harvested in Iceland for centuries when they move into inshore waters to spawn and thus are very easy to catch (Icelandic ministry of Fisheries, 2016).

Discarding of all quota species is prohibited (Marchal et al., 2016). However, there are several provisions to enable maximum take-up of quotas in mixed fisheries; these include flexibilities for i) a 20 % carryover of quota to the following year, ii) permission to land up to 5 % over-quota under certain conditions11, iii) interspecies transferability between demersal species (limited up to 5 % of demersal quota), iv) ability to withdraw a part of juvenile catch from quota (Government of Iceland, 2006; Marchal et al., 2016). In addition, the Minister for Fisheries retains each year up to 12,000 tonnes of demersal species quota to offset major fluctuations in quotas of individual species, allocate to smaller fisheries-dependent communities or allocate to particular communities that suffer significant unexpected cuts in quota likely to impact on employment (Government of Iceland, 2006). The extent to which this system of retained catch allocations is used in practice is not clear given that annual variations in quota due to fluctuations in stock size are mitigated by harvest control rules which reduce the inter-annual variation in TACs, and many coastal communities already have specific quota holdings in recognition of their dependence on fisheries.

Catch limits are supported by technical measures such as a minimum catch size for most stocks, a minimum mesh size in the trawl fisheries (135 – 155 mm), extensive provision for temporary and permanent closure of fishing areas to protect spawning and juvenile fish or vulnerable habitat (Fiskistofa, 2016; Marchal et al., 2016; Figure 3-1).

While the large majority of species are subject to TACs, non-quota species can be fished by vessels holding a valid fishing licence, subject to more general limitations on area, gear and fishing season, while recreational fisheries are generally permitted for personal consumption without permit provided it’s not sold or for financial gain (Articles 6 & 7, Fisheries Management Act 2006).

11 including separate storage and sale at a special market where proceeds go to a levy fund to support research (Article 11(2) of Fisheries Management Act 2006)

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Access to fisheries is limited to two types of commercial licence; a general permit with a catch quota and a general permit with a hook-and-line catch quota. In each case the owner must fulfil requirements under the ‘Act on Investment by Foreign Parties in Industrial Operations’ and the ‘Act on Fishing and Processing by Foreign Vessels in Iceland's Exclusive Fishing Zone’ – generally excluding foreign access to Icelandic waters unless otherwise permitted (Government of Iceland, 2006).

The most important invertebrate fisheries in Icelandic waters are scallop, Nephrops, whelk, ocean quahog and shrimp and these are the only species subject to TACs. All fisheries are localised and specialised, with landings not being a significant part of Icelandic fisheries catch volume or value. Scallop catches were ~ 10,000 tonnes annually up until 2004 when the stock collapsed due to a parasite infection with no fishery having since taken place. Landings of ocean quahog have been negligible in recent years, while common whelk are fished in western Iceland using special pots – with variable landings of < 1000 t. The Nephrops fishery takes place from 15 May to 31 August, though it is permitted up to the end of September – with landings of 1,200 – 4000 tonnes annually using Nephrops trawls (Fiskistofa, 2016). Catches of other species are minor and are not subject to TACs. a

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b

Figure 3-1, (a) Example of temporary fishery closures in Iceland to protect juvenile or spawning fish, (b) Number of temporary fishery closures in place: Source: Fiskistofa (2016)

3.2.2 Management processes Most Icelandic fisheries are geographically isolated from those of other countries and fish stocks are exclusively or largely in the Icelandic EEZ. The exceptions are the widely distributed pelagic stocks of Atlanto-Scandian herring (ASH), Atlantic mackerel and blue whiting. For the majority of Icelandic commercial fish stocks management (principally a TAC) is based on recommendations from the stock assessments and recommendations on catches according to Harvest Control Rules advised by the national laboratory (Marine Research Institute), as reviewed by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). These catch recommendations form the basis of a regulation for the following fishing year (1 September to 31 August), ultimately approved by the Minister for Fisheries at the Ministry of Industry and Innovation, following informal consultation with stakeholders (Figure 3-2).

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Figure 3-2, Schematic overview of Icelandic fisheries governance (from Chambers & Carothers, 2016),

In Iceland, fisheries now contribute to the cost of fisheries management through a resource tax. The tax base is equal to 9.5 % of the annual landed value, following deductions of fuel cost, salary cost (fixed at 39.8 % of landed value) and other stipulated costs. Haraldsson & Carey (2011) note that the tax is levied in such a way that that it depends both on the amount of quota held by the fishing firm and its economic performance. The tax base for the reference year is divided by the annual catch, expressed in cod-equivalent kg. This leads to a tax that is levied per cod-equivalent kg of the catch for the following year. This approach ensures that the amount of tax paid takes account of fluctuations in the profitability of the fishery as well as in the amount of quota issued. In 2012 and 2013 the industry contributed approximately €60 m, equivalent to around a 6 % share of catch value (Gunnlaugsson and Saevaldsson, 2016).

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3.3 Norway Norway has a developed fisheries management system operating in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Norwegian mainland, a fishery protection zone around Svalbard and a fishery zone around Jan Mayen (Steinshamn, 2010, – see Figure 2-3).

The principle legislation governing fisheries management is the Marine Resources Act of 201012 determining overarching objectives to “ensure sustainable and economically profitable management of wild living marine resources and genetic material”. Further provisions on licensing are governed by the Fisheries Participation Act 199913.

Norway has four overarching policy objectives (Baltic Sea 2020, 2009), namely:  Commercial viability of the industry,  Sustainable management of resources,  Stable employment and settlement in coastal areas,  Economic sustainability through market orientation.

With regard to sustainable management, Section 7 of the Marine Resources Act provides the overall objectives and priorities as follows: a) a precautionary approach, in accordance with international agreements and guidelines, b) an ecosystem approach that takes into account habitats and biodiversity, c) effective control of harvesting and other forms of utilisation of resources, d) appropriate allocation of resources, which among other things can help to ensure employment and maintain settlement in coastal communities, e) optimal utilisation of resources, adapted to marine value creation, markets and industries, f) ensuring that harvesting methods and the way gear is used take into account the need to reduce possible negative impacts on living marine resources, g) ensuring that management measures help to maintain the material basis for Sami culture.

While the requirement for MSY is not explicit in the Norwegian legislation, it is generally accepted that the goal is to maximise long term yields in line with international commitments (UNCLOS). This objective is indicated though the advisory Memorandum of Understanding14 with the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) where advice is prioritised based on i) existing management plans deemed to be precautionary, ii) the (ICES) MSY approach, and iii) the precautionary approach, where no MSY estimate is available. No specific economic or social objectives are specified beyond the general overarching policy objectives for stable employment and economic sustainability.

12 https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/FKD/Vedlegg/Diverse/2010/MarineResourcesAct.pdf 13 Machine translation here 14 https://www.ices.dk/explore- us/Documents/Cooperation%20agreements/Norway/20160623_MoU_Norway_ICES_.pdf

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3.3.1 Fisheries management framework In Norway, management of commercial fisheries involves a mix of input and output controls. Stock sustainability is achieved through the use of TAC limits allocated as ITQs covering 75 – 80 % of landings (Hannesson, 2013). There is also a requirement to land all catches of fish, although the Ministry of Fisheries has the right to grant exemptions from this requirement (Section 15 of the Marine Resources Act 2010). These limitations are supported by technical measures including mesh size regulations, minimum size limits, temporary or permanent closures of fishing grounds, real-time closures, selective gear and by-catch regulations (Baltic Sea 2020, 2009). In general, closures are used as a means to promote improved fishing patterns and reduce catches of juvenile fish, though in some cases they can also be used to reduce tension between different sectors (e.g. trawl and passive gears) (Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, 2009). Although Section 22 of the Marine Resources Act of 2010 provides provision for catch limits for recreational fisheries, these are not applied at present.

A strict system of access licensing is also in place in the purse seine and trawler fleets with the goal of aligning capacity to resource availability to promote sustainable harvest and economic efficiency. This includes licensing for specific fisheries (e.g. cod trawl, industrial, blue whiting) where a licence is issued to a given vessel and cannot be transferred. In some cases, a vessel may hold more than one licence to participate in different fisheries throughout the year. In principle the coastal fleet is not capped, though a licensing system also exists for some vessel types (Årland and Bjørndal, 2002) and access to fisheries is regulated through annual permits (OECD, 2005). Norway has in the past used decommissioning schemes to reduce capacity in specific fleets (OECD, 2005).

With the exception of the king crab, shellfish fisheries are more lightly managed through technical measures. European Lobster are managed through a close season, with fishing only 1 October – 31 November in Southern Norway and 1 October – 31 December in Northern Norway. A minimum landing size of 25mm carapace width and a prohibition on landing berried lobster also exists. Pot regulations require a minimum 60 mm escape vent (panel). The edible crab fishery is managed with a close season in the North and a minimum size of 13 cm carapace width, while in the South there is no close season and a minimum carapace width of 11 cm. Pot regulations require a minimum 80 mm escape vent. The king crab fishery is only accessible to smaller coastal vessels (< 15m) and managed by quota and a minimum landing size of 130 mm.

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3.3.2 Management processes Many of the stocks exploited by Norwegian fisheries cross international boundaries and are exploited by several countries, particularly in the North Sea, meaning Norway generally manages fisheries collectively with other partners. The main mechanism for this is through bilateral negotiations (see Section 5.3).

Responsibility for fisheries management in Norway lies with the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs. Because a large proportion of fish stocks are shared with other countries, scientists from the national fisheries laboratory (the Norwegian Institute for Marine Resources, IMR) participate in expert groups of ICES to derive management advice for the majority of fish stocks. Once TACs are agreed through negotiation, the Directorate of Fisheries develops a proposal consisting of: 1. Duration and specification of the fishing season. 2. Any technical measures or regulations. 3. Size of bycatch quotas. 4. Criteria for participation in the fisheries.

This regulation is then subject to consultation through meetings with a range of stakeholders (industry, eNGOs, processing sector, the Sami Parliament, regional counties and recreational fishermen) before a recommendation is made to the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (see Figure 3-3). The regulation is valid for one-year, but adjustments can be made such as to any bycatch quota allocations.

Figure 3-3, Diagram of Norway's regulatory process for fisheries. From Steinshamn (2010)

In Norway, costs for the administration of fisheries are paid by central Government. Costs peaked in the early 1990s as around 13 % of the first sale value of catch, but had reduced to around 6.5 % by 2001. Most costs relate to control activity, with advice, management and research also significant. While a ‘resource tax’ was proposed to cover these expenses, it has not yet been introduced (OECD, 2005).

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3.4 Faroes The Faroes did not gain home rule from Denmark until 1948, and until 1959, they only maintained control of fisheries within their three nautical mile zone. Subsequently, they began to gain more control over their continental shelf, with an EEZ of 200 nm being established in 1977. At this point, the only management measures in place were technical measures such as area closures and minimum mesh sizes, with no constraints on the amount of fish that could be landed. A licensing system was introduced in 1987 in order to provide a means of limiting commercial fishing fleet capacity.

Following the near collapse of the key demersal stocks of cod, haddock and saithe, an event which had a substantial economic impact on the Faroes where fish account for around 45% of the national Gross Domestic Product and 95% of the exports (Gibson et al, 2015), a TAC system was introduced in 1994. The intention of this was to reduce fishing mortality and allow the stocks to rebuild. TACs were set to be restrictive (Maguire, 2001) and were implemented as Individual Transferrable Quotas. A discard ban was implemented at the same time. The TAC system met stiff resistance from the fishing industry, and it resulted in substantial discarding and misreporting of catches. The TAC system was discontinued by the Faroese parliament in May 1996. It was replaced with a system of input (effort) controls and area closures which is explained in more detail below. The discard ban remained in place.

The main framework for the legislation of Faroese fisheries is the Commercial Fisheries Act of 1994 and its subsequent amendments (Ministry of Fisheries and Natural Resources, 2016). This is only available in Faroese15, so the overall objectives of fisheries management are not clear but Jákupsstovu et al. (2007) note that the Act stipulates that care should be taken that fisheries are biologically sustainable. Hegland and Hopkins (2014) note that Faroese fisheries management has been criticised for being out of step with major international agreements on sustainability as the target fishing mortalities are well above values that would be consistent with achieving MSY. Similarly, the Faroes have not yet implemented any long-term management plans for their stocks, despite the widespread adoption of such plans elsewhere.

3.4.1 Fisheries management framework Following the discontinuation of the TAC scheme in 1996, a new system based on effort quotas and area closures was introduced. Effort quotas are specified in days and are transferrable within a given fleet category but trading between groups is restricted. Official effort conversion keys are used when

15 http://www.logir.fo/Logtingslog/28-fra-10-03-1994-um-vinnuligan-fiskiskap-sum-seinast-broytt-vid- logtingslog-nr-87-fra

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trading effort between fleet groups in order to account for differences in fishing capacity between vessels. Fishing days can be leased out for one year or sold permanently (Hegland & Hopkins, 2014). Conversion is permitted between longlining and jigging where one day of longlining is considered equivalent to two days of jigging. This is to allow fishers some flexibility in which gear they use and how to deploy their effort (Jakupsstovu et al, 2007).

The system was developed in close collaboration with the fishing industry and in addition to the effort quotas there is a strong spatial component to the scheme. Part of the intention of this was to ensure that the different fleet sectors took different target shares of each fish stock, hence the system includes areas that are closed to trawling. There was also an intention to minimise conflict between static and mobile gears (Jakupsstovu et al, 2007).

Different licensing conditions apply to different fleet segments - see Table 3-1. To illustrate, trawlers with engines greater than 400 HP (300kw) are not subject to effort restrictions, but they are not permitted to fish within the 12nm zone or in various other closed areas. Their catches are also limited by bycatch provisions. Less powerful trawlers are given special licenses to target flatfish within the 12nm zone, but their catches are limited by a by-catch allocation of 30% cod and 10% haddock and they are required to use a sorting device in their trawls (Maguire, 2001; Hegland & Hopkins, 2014). The fleet segments in use are shown in Table 3-1 along with the regulation tools that apply to that fleet sector. Figure 3-4 shows the area closures in use to protect fish during the spawning season and the areas closed to trawling; some of which are closed to protect areas of coral. This figure also shows ‘the ring’; a line around the islands roughly corresponding to the 200m depth contour. Vessels holding effort quota are permitted to fish three days outside the ring for every day allocated inside the ring. This was intended to encourage diversion of effort on to deeper water species such as saithe, ling and tusk, rather than haddock and cod (Jákupsstovu et al, 2007).

In terms of fleet capacity, there is an intention to maintain the fleet at the 1997 level. There are rules for allowing vessel transfer between groups (e.g. vessel replacement) and merging capacity. The capacity policy is based on vessel licenses: a ‘harvesting licence’ attached to a specific vessel > 15 GRT, and a ‘fishing licence’ which allocates a certain number of fishing days in the EEZ and tonnes of fish outside the EEZ (Hegland & Hopkins, 2014).

The fishing year runs from 1 September to 31 August each year, and the total effort allocations for each fleet group are fixed in advance of each fishing year by amending the Commercial Fisheries Act

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(see Section 3.4.2). The total effort is then allocated equally to each individual vessel within that vessel group. For the inshore fisheries, 60% of the effort is allocated equally to full-time fishers within this group, with the remainder being used as a pooled effort quota for part-time artisanal fishers (Hegland & Hopkins, 2014).

At the start of the scheme the initial allocations of effort to each fleet sector were based on recent fishing mortalities by each fleet sector on each of the three key fish species together with recent effort trends for each of these fleet sectors. This information was used to estimate the amount of fishing mortality by each fleet sector on each stock for each fishing day, and these figures were then used to calculate effort allocations for each fleet with the constraint that fishing mortality on any stock should not exceed the specified target fishing mortality of 0.45 (Jakupsstou et al, 2007).

Jákupsstovu et al (2007) reviewed the Faroese effort scheme after it had been in place for ten years. They found that while the scheme had minimised conflict between different gears and had achieved a balance in catching opportunities across the different fleet sectors, it had not been successful in controlling fishing mortality. This was at least partly because the initial effort allocations were too high. Even though the allocations were reduced by a total of 15% over the ten year period to adjust for likely changes in fishing efficiency, not all effort allocations were used by the end of the fishing year. Jákupsstovu et al (2007) noted that this was either because the quotas exceeded the capacity of the vessels within the group or that the market in fishing days wasn’t functioning well. In addition, a number of changes to vessels and to fishing practices meant that fishing power was increased, so on average more fish could be caught for a day’s fishing.

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Table 3-1; Definition of fleet categories used in the Faroese effort management system and the main tools for regulating their activities. From Jákupsstovu et al, 2007.

In addition to the effort and spatial management measures, other technical measures are also used. Regulations concerning minimum mesh sizes and the use of sorting grids apply to specific fisheries. As part of the overall discard ban, all fish of commercial interest have to be retained on board and recorded (Hegland & Hopkins, 2014). Minimum landing sizes are also specified for the main commercial species and vessels are also required to report when catch in numbers of undersized cod haddock and saithe exceed 30% of the catch. Areas where catch rates of undersized fish exceed this 30% threshold are closed to fishing for one – two weeks in order to protect juvenile fish (Jákupsstovu et al, 2007).

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Figure 3-4 Fishing area regulations around the Faroes (ICES Division Vb): (a) areas closed during the spawning season and (b) areas closed to trawling. From Jákupsstovu et al, 2007.

3.4.2 Management processes The key annual process in the management of Faroese fisheries is the revision of the effort quotas. The initial stage in this is scientific advice from the Faroese Marine Research Institute which is delivered to the Fisheries Ministry. There is then substantial input from fishing industry stakeholders before the final allocations are decided and written into law. This process is described by Hegland and Hopkins (2014) and illustrated in Figure 3-5.

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Figure 3-5, Flowchart for setting the number of days at sea in the Faroese effort management scheme. FAMRI is the Faroese Marine research Institute. From Hegland and Hopkins, 2014.

Hegland and Hopkins (2014) note that there are no environmental NGOs involved in this process so all stakeholder involvement comes from commercial fishing interests, particularly the catching sector. This means that the process leads to an adversarial relationship between the scientists and industry, Helgland and Hopkins (2014) further note that there is a core disagreement between scientists and industry about the need to adjust effort allocations in response to fluctuations in fish stocks. The industry view is that effort allocations should only be adjusted in response to increasing efficiency of the fishing fleet and not in response to changes in stock size. They argue that vessels will naturally change their fishing to target the most abundant stocks, and that this effect, together with the large closed areas, should minimise the risk of stock collapse. The assumption that vessels would change their fishing practices in response to stock abundances was central to how the effort scheme was established. Jakkupstovu et al (2007) looked at whether this had actually happened during the first ten years of the effort regime and found no evidence that it had. Grétarsson & Danielsen (2014) analysed the Faroese effort scheme from a legal and policy perspective and concluded that current scheme had not constrained capacity and that demersal stocks were in decline so the fleet was not performing well financially.

The most recent ICES advice (ICES, 2016) indicates that the Faroese stocks of cod and haddock are currently at very low levels. Fishing mortality on the saithe stock has recently decreased and fishing mortality on the stock is now indicated to be below the MSY level. There is substantial variation in the natural productivity of Faroese waters which also influences the state of the stocks.

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In June 2017 the Faroese Government introduced a bill to parliament which is intended to substantially reform their fisheries policy16. Current fishing licences are due to be terminated on 1 January 2018 with the intention new legislation concerning licensing and resource management should be in place at that point. The reform will be based around a number of principles, as follows:  All fisheries must be biologically, economically and socially sustainable.  All living marine resources in Faroese waters, as well as any the Faroes dispose of under agreements negotiated with other countries, remain the property of the people and cannot become the property of private companies or individuals or be sold abroad.  The legislation prevents private sales of licenses and fishing rights.  To a greater extent, fishing rights are to be granted in line with the principles of a market-based system.  Catches and all related products should be landed in the Faroes and, to the greatest extent possible, processed there for added value.  Only Faroese-owned companies registered in the Faroes, paying taxes in the Faroes and paying their crews in accordance with Faroese collective agreements may seek to participate in Faroese fisheries.  Provisions to remove foreign ownership from the industry by 2022.

16 https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2017/06/16/faroes-brings-new-fisheries-reform-to-parliament/

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3.5 Australia Australia’s marine resources are essentially fully exploited and subject to strict management controls operating within the 9 million km2 sovereign EEZ (Figure 2-4), established in 1979. There are two classes of governance within this area, Commonwealth (or federal) governance and governance by the individual states and the Northern Territory. Individual states govern from the shore out to 3 nautical miles. Each of the six states can have their own fisheries legislation and objectives, which typically covers recreational, commercial coastal and inland fishing, and aquaculture. Different state fisheries agencies often have similar objectives, placing emphases on social, economic, and community benefits from the fisheries resources, and in the fair sharing of fisheries resources between competing users. Federal governance covers from 3nm to the EEZ boundary (or Australian Fishing Zone; AFZ). Federal governance is also responsible for fisheries which cross between states. Fisheries subject to federal governance are managed by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA).

During the 1960’s Australia accepted Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) as an important management objective, however, by the 1980s a management objective termed Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) had gained a wider acceptance. MEY represents the largest net economic return that can be achieved over a prolonged period, while maintaining stock productive capacity. The intention with the objective is to account for the financial objectives of fishers within management. Such alignment between fisher drivers and management objectives have been found to be a significant factor underlying stock recovery in most fisheries where recovery has occurred (Worm et al., 2009). In the 1950’s, the biomass target that maximises the economic yield was shown to always be greater than the biomass that maximises the sustained yield (Gordon, 1954). Therefore, an MEY results in yields and effort levels that are less than at MSY (Clarke, 1990; Grafton et al., 2007). MEY has been extended to apply to multispecies fisheries using the assumption that the species are caught in fixed proportions. The optimal catch and biomass for any single species in a multispecies fishery may be greater or less than at MSY (Clarke, 1990).

Originally MEY was developed as an equilibrium concept. However, fisheries are not in equilibrium. Similarly, its extension to mixed-fisheries assumes that the species are caught in fixed proportions which, again, is not the case (Dichmont et al., 2010). Operationalising MEY requires development of bioeconomic models accounting for the dynamics of stocks, fleets, costs, and prices. Identifying a specific target is difficult, as MEY is a moving target changing with predictions of the economic environment and practical considerations. Therefore, a single-point estimate of MEY may never be

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achieved, however a fishery can be expected to come as close as possible to achieving optimal profits over time (Dichmont et al., 2010). In practice within Australian fisheries, the MEY control rules are based on a proxy value for the ratio of the biomass at which MSY is achieved to that at which MEY is achieved, BMEY/BMSY, of 1.2 (Rayns, 2007). The northern prawn fishery is unique in that a bioeconomic model is used to specify the control rules and associated target level of tiger prawn fishing effort (Dichmont et al., 2008, 2010). The control rule involves projecting population dynamics models forward for three species under different levels of fishing effort for two fleets (each targeting a specific species of prawn) for the next 7 years (effort for the eighth and all future years are set equal to that for the seventh year) and selecting the sets of effort levels in which the discounted profit is maximized (Punt et al., 2010, 2011).

Federal government saw the use of a rights based market with Individual Quota and Individual Transferable Quota systems as a way of developing more rational economic and sustainable outcomes for fishing operators and society. Enabling reduction of catches to sustainable levels while providing a mechanism to support industry to restructure, aiding those who wished to leave to achieve a return for their previous access (Ford & Nicol, 2001). In several cases where ITQs have been introduced, the size of the fleet has restructured into a smaller fleet with a capacity more in-line with the resource available, either with the aid of government or as a result of placing monetary value onto access and quota rights. Australia has implemented several buy-back schemes to reduce capacity. In 2005 and 2006 for example, considerable investment (150 million Australian dollars) was undertaken in federally managed fisheries to reduce excess capacity (30-60% in six fisheries (DAFF, 2008)). These included fisheries managed by ITQs and individual transferable gear units, as well as fisheries managed solely using input controls (e.g. licence and seasonal restrictions) (Pascoe & Gibson, 2009). A total of 550 boat statutory fishing rights and permits were bought out of the fisheries, representing around a third of the total potential fleet operating in federal waters, and around 50% of potential boats in several key fisheries (Pascoe & Gibson, 2008). One of the key fisheries where the greatest structural adjustment had taken was the South-East Trawl (SET) component of the Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (Pascoe & Gibson, 2008). Within the SET a reduction on fishing pressure was urgently required to rebuild several stocks within a mixed fishery, post 2006 there was reduced effort and a reduction in the number of operators, with initial assessment estimates of spawning stock biomass recovering toward Blim for several stocks in subsequent years.

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In 1991 Federal governance introduced the Fisheries Management Act17 which provided the legal framework underpinning the current management system. The Act specifies what can be considered as two main pillars: biological and economic objectives. The biological pillar focuses on being “consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development (which include the exercise of the precautionary principle)”, therefore implementing a broader ecosystem based approach to management. While the economic pillar looks at “maximising the net economic returns to the Australian community” and cost recovery. Within the Fisheries Management Act, MSY is only specifically referred to in relation to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. In a Ministry direction to AFMA during 2005 the use of Blim and Btarget reference points were introduced to aid the prevention of , where biomass must be greater than Blim while considering the maximum economic yield and MSY (Rayns, 2007).

The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act of 199918 runs alongside the Fisheries Management Act providing a legal framework to protect flora, fauna, and ecological communities. It requires all Commonwealth-managed fisheries to be demonstrably assessed as ecologically sustainable and requires each fishery to have a strategic environmental impact assessment. The objectives of the strategic assessments require that: catch levels maintain ecologically viable stocks at an agreed level; if stocks fall below a defined reference point, the fishery must promote recovery within a specified time; the fishery does not threaten bycatch species and; the fishery avoids mortality/injury to endangered, threatened or protected species or ecological habitats and communities.

3.5.1 Fisheries management framework In the mid-2000s a formal Harvest Strategy Policy (HSP) framework was adopted, enabling the implementation of management requirements under the Fisheries Management Act 1991, Fisheries Administration Act 1991, and Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Within which harvest control rules (HCR) are defined including for example, maximisation of economic yield

(for many SSBMEY is estimated as 48% of unfished stock by default; (Smith et al, 2008; Large et al., 2013), target biomass, limit biomass reference points, and fishing mortally equivalents. Minimum standards are established, and rebuilding strategies include use of zero targeted catches in stock rebuilding situations. The HSP has a tiered decision support framework approach, accounting for various levels of information and assessment, reflecting the importance of accounting for uncertainty

17 https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C01062 18 https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00777

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in stock status. The framework explicitly includes HCRs for data limited stocks. Each layer of the framework has its own applicable HCRs to advise TAC setting. Final TACs are sometimes lower than those advised by the HCRs but never higher as the HSP provides legally binding requirements tying TACs to advice.

Although the Fisheries Management Act is focused on application of TACs and ITQs, fisheries are managed in combination with input controls, including: Statutory Fishing Rights (SFRs), limited entry, licensing, individual transferable effort units (ITEs), gear restrictions, and spatial management which has seen an increased focus in recent years with the development of a large network of MPAs. Australia does not prohibit discarding.

The use of statutory fishing rights and/or permit limits have been used to separate out fishing areas helping to prevent over capacity in certain areas as well as providing protection for non-quota species. Boat SFRs operate as licences or permits in a limited entry fishery, while the effort/gear or quota SFRs provide mechanisms by which self-directed fishery adjustment may be possible (Pascoe & Gibson, 2009). SFRs play a role in compliance and enforcement whereby the right may be cancelled under certain circumstances, such as non-compliance with fishery regulations, or suspended if cost recovery levies have not been paid (Pascoe & Gibson, 2009).

The majority of fisheries now operate under a limited access arrangement although access licenses are usually freely tradable. This arrangement has led to significant increases in access license values, resulting in a concentration of ownership and development of economic barriers to new entrants. The active quota market, especially for leasing, has led to fewer vessels which fish more intensively for better value fish rather than higher catch (FERM, 2004).

Individual quota and individual transferable quota systems have been introduced across several Federal fisheries including:  The Southern Bluefin tuna (SBT) fishery, ITQs were introduced in 1984 and given legal force through the Southern Bluefin Tuna Management Plan, made under the Fisheries Act 1952. The management basis was that each fisher had to hold a Commonwealth Fishing Boat Licence to which a certain number of quota units were assigned (Meany, 2001). After their introduction, a rapid adjustment in the fishery occurred. After two years, nearly two-thirds of operators with an initial allocation of more than 5 tonnes of quota had sold their entitlements and left the fishery. Most operators left the fishery in the first six months. Prior to ITQ

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introduction, the SBT stock had reached historic lows and the economic position of many operators had begun to deteriorate. The adjustment facilitated improvement in the profitability of operators, created new opportunities and encouraged a change in fishing behaviour (Campbell, Brown, & Battaglene, 2000). SBT is subject to a trilateral agreement between Japan, New Zealand and Australia, with annual trilateral meetings held since 1982.  The Southeast trawl fishery first introduced individual quotas in 1992. It was the first to do so under the 1991 Fisheries Management Act. This was initially applied to 16 species (or species groups) for which the catch history was associated with the vessel licence and history was based on the catch revenue returns rather than “unreliable” logbooks (Shotton, 2001). However, restrictions were placed on the transferability of individual quotas, limiting the realised advantages of the ITQ system (Campbell et al., 2000). Furthermore, many of the TACs having been set somewhere between average and maximum historic catch levels were not restrictive in this fishery with 14 of the 20 ITQ stocks not fully utilised in 2003, further reducing effectiveness (FERM, 2004).  The giant crab fishery introduced ITQs in 1999, allocating to eligible fishers on a 50/50 basis. Half based on holding a permit to fish, and half based on the previous catch history. Where five quota units went to each fisher who held a Commonwealth permit, and an additional 1 quota unit for each 150kg of catch history above a yearly average of 500kg, limited to 35 quota units per licence-holder (Ford & Nicol, 2001).  Other examples include the abalone fishery where individual quotas were introduced in 1985 which later became transferable. Transfer was permissible from the outset in the rock lobster fishery in 1998.

There is no direct country to country stock sharing. Any transboundary fisheries are dealt with through RFMOs, with the exception of the Torres Strait Treaty signed between Australia and Papua New Guinea limiting non-indigenous participation since 1989.

3.5.2 Management processes Fisheries management decisions are made by the statutory body Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA). The AFMA provides management, advisory, compliance and licensing services, and implements appropriate fisheries management arrangements within the commonwealth fishing zone (3-200nm). The AFMA additionally, by arrangement, manages a number of the State 3nm zones, including multi-State fisheries. There are some issues with jurisdiction sharing.

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The Board of Directors (termed commissioners) of AFMA is responsible for making management decisions consistent with the 1991 Fisheries Management Act and is overseen by the federal Department of Agriculture and Water Resources who hold responsibility for policy setting. Commissioners hold a term of 3-5 years, during which they cannot hold any executive position in a fishing industry association, nor can they have a controlling interest or executive role in any entity holding a Commonwealth fishing concession. Each is appointed for their high level of expertise in at least one field of fisheries management, fishing industry operations, science, natural resource management, economics, business or financial management, law, public sector administration or governance. The minister of Department of Agriculture and Water Resources makes the final decisions, and may overrule any AFMA decision. The Department of the Environment and Energy is responsible for conservation (including threatened and endangered-species legislation) and evaluates the ecological sustainability of fisheries under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.

The AFMA Board established Management Advisory Committees (MACs) and Resource Assessment Groups (RAGs) for each of its fisheries to provide management and scientific advice, respectively. Group members are co-opted from management agencies, the industry, the science community, and conservation groups (Rayns, 2007). Strong stakeholder involvement is a key feature of the Australian co-management system, with representatives present at both groups and often appointed as members of the AFMA board (Smith, Sainsbury, & Stevens, 1999).

Each year the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) compiles a report on the stock status, summarising research and assessments undertaken. Any science and assessments are passed to the RAGs who provide advice and inputs for the formal harvest strategies for each stock. With the outcomes passed to the MACs and AFMA board.

Within the Fisheries Management Act 1991, a mechanism for cost recovery (or ‘user pays’) is stipulated, which requires that resource users (i.e. fishers) pay the cost of supporting federal fisheries management for the fishery in which they operate. The management of domestic commercial fisheries are fully recoverable from industry (although the costs associated with collapsed, exploratory or developmental fisheries may only be partially recoverable) (Cox, 2000). The cost of surveillance and enforcement are split equally between the government and industry, as enforcement is not recoverable (AFMA, 1998). A degree of research and stock assessment are included within the recovery.

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3.6 New Zealand New Zealand has a developed fisheries management system operating within the 7 million km2 sovereign Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is divided into ten Fisheries Management Areas (FMAs), see Figure 2-5.

As a result of overfishing and over capitalisation by the early 1980’s, New Zealand restricted access to many of their fisheries with a freely tradable Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system open to every New Zealand citizen. This was developed in consultation with stakeholders and legislated for by two main acts, the latest of which is the Fisheries Act of 199619. The primary purpose of this act is to “provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability”, where “ensuring sustainability” specifically relates to both the fisheries resource and protection of the aquatic environment, and “utilisation” means “conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fisheries resources to enable people to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being”.

The New Zealand Fisheries Act 1996 provides legally binding management targets, explicitly stating that stocks should be maintained at or above the level that produces the maximum sustainable yield. This is implemented through application of Harvest Control Rules detailed within National Management Plans.

When ITQs were first introduced, New Zealand carried out a buy-back of excess capacity based on vessel catch “case histories” (based on two years of a three-year range) resulting in the removal of 15 800 tonnes catch capacity at a cost of $NZ 45 million (present value) (FAO, 2005-2017). The use of ITQs has reduced over-capacity facilitating industry restructuring and made commercial fishing more economically viable.

3.6.1 Fisheries management framework In New Zealand, commercial fisheries are managed by a mixture of input and output controls. There are no subsidies available to commercial fishers. Management is focused around total allowable catch (TAC) for the most commercially important species. Each year an allowance is made for recreational and customary fishing and other fishing-related mortality from the TAC. The remainder is the total allowable commercial catch (TACC).

19 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0088/170.0/DLM394192.html

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The majority of TAC species (managed under the quota management system; QMS) are managed independently, although groups of species can be considered together for the purpose of management. For example, groups of similar species which are caught together, or where identification or differentiation by fishers is difficult. When first introduced, the New Zealand QMS covered 21 species (FAO, 2005-2017). This has increased to the current 100 species (or species groupings)20, including data limited stocks. These species represent 638 separate stocks.

Stocks controlled by TACCs fall under the quota management system (QMS) and are distributed to quota holders as ITQ shares (100 million shares per stock). On the first day of the fishing year, typically October 1st, each ITQ (expressed as a percentage of the TACC) generates for each quota holder, and each stock, an annual catch entitlement (ACE) in kg. A 10% maximum carry over is allowable between years. If the stock is deemed to have declined the 10% carryover is lost.

ITQs have monetary value and are freely tradeable on the open market and accessible to any NZ citizen. Overseas individuals may only hold ITQ shares by specific permission from the Minister. All commercial fishers must obtain sufficient ACE to cover the QMS fish they catch in a fishing year. Quota concentration limits are legislated for to prevent ownership of more than a 20 percent limit applied to species/area ITQ holdings to safeguard opportunities within communities. Any aggregation above the limit is forfeit without compensation.

Anyone taking fish for sale must hold a commercial fishing permit which can be issued for between one and five years. In return for a commercial permit, fishers must fish from a registered vessel, land into an approved licensed fish receiver, and record all catch, effort and landings to report to the Ministry of Primary Industries. Discarding (dumping) of QMS fish in the sea is prohibited (with limited exceptions).

Other control methods include size limits to ensure enough sexually mature individuals within a population, area restrictions to protect important life history or depleted areas, fishing gear restrictions to limit impact and sex based restrictions (e.g. egg-laden females). There are additional and extensive recreational fishing rules including bag and catch limits, minimum sizes, restricted and closed areas as well as regulations on potting and netting methods, types of equipment as set out within the Fisheries (Amateur Fishing) Regulations21 2013.

20 Ministry for Primary Industries website: fs.fish.govt.nz, last accessed 08/06/2017. 21 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/regulation/public/2013/0482/latest/DLM3629901.html

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3.6.2 Management processes New Zealand has no straddling stocks requiring management in co-operation with neighbouring nations as their EEZ only abuts high seas and fish stocks are exclusively, or largely, within the sovereign EEZ. Any straddling stocks or widely distributed (typically pelagic) stocks are dealt with through RFMOs.

Fisheries are governed by the Ministry of Primary Industries with the majority of final decisions are made by the Minister, including the setting of annual Total Allowable Catches. The Minister is led by advice from two annual fisheries assessment plenaries which amalgamate all the latest information available to determine stock status. Full scientific stock assessments are one component of information fed into the plenary reports and are carried out in line with relevant National Fisheries Plans every two to three years for commercially important stocks. There is a high degree of stakeholder involvement within the whole process, including development of policies, standards, and fishery plans. For example, stock assessment and assessment review groups are open to attendance by stakeholders and the general public under strong protocols dictating their level of involvement. A proportion of fisheries management costs are recovered from the fishing industry through legislated cost recovery levies covering costs including management, stock assessment, some research, and observer programs. On average 40-45% of the NZ$80-$85 million annual government expenditure on managing fisheries is recovered from the fishing industry22.

22 OECD information; https://www.oecd.org/newzealand/39927566.pdf last accessed 08/06/2017.

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3.7 USA The cornerstone of fisheries management in the USA is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA). Originally passed in 1976, the Act has since undergone substantial revision in 1996 through the Sustainable Fisheries Act and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 200723. A key element of the original Act was extending US jurisdiction out to 200nm (see Figure 2-6) when previously only waters out to 12nm had been under US control. The Act is intended to ensure the long-term biological and economic sustainability of US marine fisheries within this 200nm zone.

Key objectives of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (NOAA, 2016) are to:  Prevent overfishing.  Rebuild overfished stocks.  Increase long-term economic and social benefits.  Ensure a safe and sustainable supply of seafood.

NOAA (2016) also note that: “Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, US fisheries management is a transparent and robust process of science, management, innovation, and collaboration with the fishing industry”. The 1976 Act also established eight regional Fishery Management Councils. These have representation from fishery stakeholders and from the relevant states (Figure 3-6).

Figure 3-6, Fishery Management Council Regions. From NOAA, 2016.

23 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/laws_policies/msa/documents/msa_amended_2007.pdf

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The primary responsibility of the Fishery Management Councils (hereafter ‘Councils’) is the development of fisheries management plans (FMPs). It is these plans that provide the basic framework for the management of US marine fisheries.

3.7.1 Fisheries management framework One of the core elements of the MSA is that it establishes national standards for fishery conservation and management which any FMP or other regulation prepared by the Councils has to be consistent with. These standards have been modified and added to over the years, but there are currently ten which are given in

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Table 3-2. The Act also specifies the required contents of FMPs, including both required and discretionary provisions. Full details of these provisions are given in the MSA, but Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 provide brief summaries of these provisions.

Taken together, the requirement to develop management plans for all fisheries, the provisions that these FMPs must contain, and the standards that the FMPs must be consistent with provide a strong framework for the management of US fisheries through the “transparent and robust process of science, management, innovation, and collaboration with the fishing industry” that the MSA is built around.

One of the key objectives of FMPs is the achievement of ‘Optimum Yield’. The MSA defines “optimum”, with respect to the yield from a fishery, as the amount of fish that: 1. Will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems; 2. Is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor; and 3. In the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery. In effect this means the objective of Optimum Yield is closely-underpinned by the concept of MSY but with additional flexibility to take into account additional socio-economic or ecological factors.

The MSA seems to be widely recognised as having been effective in ensuring the sustainability of US fisheries. A report by the Pew foundation24 describes it as “The law that’s saving American fisheries” (Pew, 2013) and a review by Schwaab (2012) is similarly positive. A more detailed review by Dell’Apa et al. (2012) acknowledged that the Act has been successful in stopping overfishing of a high proportion of stocks, but still identified some criticisms of the Act. One of these was that the Act did not prevent the over-capitalisation that occurred after its initial implementation. The declaration of the 200nm fishing zone that occurred at that point meant that foreign fleets were excluded from the zone so the US fleet expanded rapidly to take advantage of this. The continuation of this process led to over-capitalisation. The other main criticism of the Act noted by Dell’Apa et al. (2012) is the lack equal representation among the regional Councils, and in particular the over-representation of

24 ‘The Law That’s Saving American Fisheries – the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act’ – Available here.

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industry interests among voting members of the Councils. Associated with this, Dell’Apa et al. (2012) identify a possible failure to achieve National Standard no. 4 (see

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Table 3-2) in relation to the fair and equitable apportionment of fishing privileges.

3.7.2 Management processes As well as defining the framework for fisheries management the MSA also determines the fishery management processes. The practical management of fisheries is devolved to the regional Councils. The membership of the Councils includes both voting and non-voting members intended to represent the commercial and recreational fishing sectors as well as environmental, academic, and government interests. Under the MSA, councils are required to:

 Develop and amend Fishery Management Plans.  Convene committees and advisory panels and conduct public meetings.  Develop research priorities in conjunction with a Scientific and Statistical Committee.  Select fishery management options.  Set annual catch limits based on best available science.  Develop and implement rebuilding plans.

The principle of transparency is central to the process of fisheries management under the MSA hence the organisation of public meetings is a key responsibility of the Councils.

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Table 3-2 The ten National Standards that US Fisheries management Plans must comply with

1, Optimum Yield Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry 2, Scientific Information Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific information available 3, Management Units To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination. 4, Allocations Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between residents of different states. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be (a) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (b) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and (c) carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such privilege. 5, Efficiency Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose. 6, Variations and Conservation and management measures shall take into account Contingencies and allow for variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches. 7, Costs and Benefits Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication. 8, Communities Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation requirements of this Act (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities by utilizing economic and social data that meet the requirement of paragraph (2) [i.e., National Standard 2], in order to (a) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and (b) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities. 9, Bycatch Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (a) minimize bycatch and (b) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such bycatch. 10, Safety of Life at Sea Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, promote the safety of human life at sea.

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Table 3-3, Summary of the required provisions of US Fishery Management Plans. Adapted from NOAA, 2016.

1 Conservation and management measures to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks 2 A description of the fishery including the number of vessels, the gear in use, the species of fish involved, likely revenues and costs of management and the extent and nature of any recreational fishing and Indian treaty fishing rights. 3 An assessment of the present and likely future maximum sustainable yield and optimum yield from the fishery 4 An assessment of the capacity of US vessels and fish processors to harvest and process the anticipated optimum yield. 5 The data to be submitted by participants in the fishery including commercial, recreational and charter fishing as well as processing. The data can include such information as type and quantity of fishing gear in use, catch compositions location and amount of fishing effort, processing capacity in use etc. 6 The possibility for temporary adjustments to access provisions to allow for circumstances where vessels have been prevented from harvesting due to e.g. adverse weather. 7 A description of essential fish habitats relevant to the fishery. 8 An assessment of the extent and nature of any scientific data needed for effective implementation of the plan. 9 A fishery impact statement to assess the likely conservation, economic and social impacts of the conservation and management measures on participants in the fishery and on fishing communities. 19 Objective and measurable criteria for identifying when the fishery is overfished, and, where this is the case, conservation and management measures to end overfishing and rebuild the fishery. 11 A standardised reporting methodology to assess the nature and extent of any bycatch, and conservation and management measures to minimise the extent and impact of that bycatch. 12 An assessment of the quantities of fish caught and released in recreational fisheries, the likely extent of mortality on these fish and conservation and management measures to reduce this mortality. 13 A description of the commercial, recreational and charter fishing sectors including their economic impacts. 14 The requirement that, where rebuilding measures are necessary, their impact is distributed fairly across all fishery participants and sectors. 15 A mechanism for specifying annual catch limits as well as accountability measures to specify what happens where catch limits are exceeded.

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Table 3-4, Summary of the discretionary provisions of US Fishery Management Plans. Adapted from NOAA, 2016.

1 The requirement for permits and the option to charge for these.

2 The possibility to designate zones where only specific vessel/gear types may be used, or which protect areas of deep sea coral from damage by fishing gears.

3 The possibility to introduce limitations on catch or sale or transport of fish where such measures may be appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery

4 Prohibitions on the use of specified types of fishing gear or fishing vessel.

5 The possibility to incorporate relevant conservation and management measures from the relevant coastal States.

6 The possibility to establish a limited access scheme for the fishery in order to achieve optimum yield.

7 The requirement for processors to submit data on the fish they receive.

8 The requirement for vessels to carry observers for the purposes of data collection.

9 An assessment of the effects that the plan’s conservation and management measures will have on anadromous fish naturally spawning in the region.

10 Incentives for participants in the fishery to fish in a way that reduces bycatch.

11 The possibility to reserve a proportion of the allowable biological catch for use in scientific research.

12 Conservation measures for habitat and non-target species.

13 Other measures for the conservation and management of the fishery as required.

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3.8 Canada Canada’s fisheries are managed by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). Fisheries management legislation is contained within the 1985 Fisheries Act25 (and subsequent amendments) and the Oceans Act, 199626. The act covers all aspects of management relating to commercial activity; aboriginal fishing rights; area closures; responsibilities of fisheries officers; recreational fishing; and the rights and responsibilities of the fisheries minister. The act contains “two key provisions on conservation and protection” of habitats that are critical to sustaining freshwater and marine resources (DFO Fisheries Act Summary, 2017). Section 35 pertains to the habitat protection, relating to activities that might harm, disrupt or destroy fish habitats and section 36 pertains to the control and management of pollution and waste that might affect marine resources and their dependent communities.

Further relevant legislation includes the Oceans Act (1996 and as amended), which relates to Canada’s territorial waters and its ‘oceans management strategy’ (includes marine protected area designation) and the Species At Risk Act (200227 and as amended), which covers the management of endangered and otherwise threatened wildlife. These include some marine species, including killer whale, but most measures implemented concern freshwater fish.

25 http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-14/ 26 http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/O-2.4/index.html 27 http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S-15.3/index.html

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Figure 3-7, Canadian fishery management zones. Source: DFO

Commercial fishing in Canada is broadly grouped into two geographic regions: Pacific and the Yukon, and Atlantic and Arctic. These regions are further sub-divided by the various provinces/territories (Figure 3-7). Most of the fisheries landings (by value) are made on the Atlantic coast, within Nova Scotia and Newfoundland (CAN$2.07 billion of 3.20 billion in 201528). The most valuable fisheries are American lobster (and other decapods) in the Atlantic fisheries and decapods and groundfish in the Pacific fisheries.

3.8.1 Fisheries management framework Most fisheries-related legislation is covered by the Fisheries Act and the Oceans Act. Under the Oceans Act (1996 and as amended), DFO is committed to several principles in fisheries management:  Canadian marine territory is the common heritage of all Canadian people;  Conservation is fundamental to biodiversity and productivity and should be achieved through the application of an ecosystem approach;  The precautionary approach is widely applied to the conservation, management and exploitation of marine resources;

28 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/stats/commercial/land-debarq/sea-maritimes/s2015pv-eng.htm

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 Coastal and oceanic systems represent a significant source of wealth and benefit to Canadian citizens.

TACs are the most commonly used management measure, which is further sub-divided by region and fleet to give individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to each vessel operator or consortium (or individual quotas if not tradeable). Quotas are calculated using historic catch levels or evenly distributed and can be usually traded between vessels on either a permanent or temporary basis (see Section 0).

The DFO minister is responsible for overseeing the development of management measures, in partnership with provincial/territorial governments, affected first nation and coastal communities and other interests. In recent years, Canadian fisheries management has taken the form of ‘Integrated Fisheries Management Plans’ (IFMPs), which constitute some degree of Canada’s drive towards ecosystem-based fisheries management (Section 10.8). IFMPs are developed to manage a specific fishery (may be multi-species) in a given region and must combine the best available science with industry information on fleet capacity and harvest methods29. IFMPs will typically include catch limits, area closures (seasonal or permanent), concessions for recreational and first nation fishing activities. Much of the guidance relating to IFMPs is contained within the Sustainable Fisheries Framework (SFF)30, which is designed to synthesise existing measures with evolving policies relating to ecosystem- based management and the precautionary approach. The SFF is comprised of two main components: 1) policies for conservation and sustainable use and 2) tools for planning and monitoring. Conservation/sustainable use policies that have been implemented include assessment of vulnerable marine ecosystems (e.g. cold-water corals & sponges), bycatch management and recovery of severely depleted stocks (e.g. Pacific Salmon). Planning and monitoring tools are predominately implemented through the development of IFMPs and include a strong element of periodic review and a commitment to regularly identify areas of weakness within a policy and address them.

3.8.2 Management processes There is limited collaboration between Canada and neighbouring States (predominately Greenland and USA), beyond the regional fisheries management organisations (mostly the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation, NAFO and the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council, NPFMC). Most stocks, excepting a few of the more migratory species (e.g. swordfish) are therefore managed solely by the DFO. Stock assessments are carried out at varying intervals (e.g. annually for Atlantic cod31) and

29 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/peches-fisheries/ifmp-gmp/index-eng.htm 30 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/reports-rapports/regs/sff-cpd/overview-cadre-eng.htm 31 http://www.nfl.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/NL/Statement-Stock-Assessments-Northern-cod

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TACs are set year on year. Vessel operators can carry above-quota landings into the next year, a policy designed to discourage discarding of over-quota catch (see Section 9.8).

Management plans are developed through the application of IFMPs, which includes a formal stock assessment and setting of TAC limits as well as broader socio-economic and environmental considerations, in line with an ecosystem approach to fisheries management and the precautionary approach. Stock status is evaluated through a combination of two groups of reference points; maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and historical status (Cadigan, 2012; DFO, 2012; Holt et al., 2016). MSY-based reference points incorporate a precautionary approach based decision making framework and limit reference points of stock biomass, relative to BMSY. For example, biomass of rock sole and silvergray rockfish may not be reduced below 40 % of the female spawning biomass required to sustain the stocks (SSBMSY) and maximum MSY is 80 % of SSBMSY (Holt et al., 2016; Starr et al., 2016). Historical reference points typically include target & current biomass and target harvest rates (Holt et al., 2016).

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3.9 Discussion This section discusses the differences and similarities of the fisheries management approaches taken in the different study countries. Table 3-5, provides a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis of these and compares them with the approach take in the UK.

3.9.1 Management objectives Broadly, Norway and Iceland have similar management objectives in seeking to ensure biological sustainability of the stocks while supporting economic and social goals. Neither has specific hard goals detailed in legislation, relying more on individual management plans to specify goals (e.g. F-MSY consistent with long-term sustainability and the precautionary approach. The limited material available for the Faroes means that any management objectives, beyond the vague requirement that fisheries should be biologically sustainable, are unclear. In practice, the target fishing mortalities defined for the main Faroese stocks are significantly above those that would result in MSY so this basic requirement for sustainability is not met.

Australia is unique amongst the study countries in that a primary management objective is specified in terms of Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) rather than MSY. In practice however, the technical difficulties involved in estimating MEY have meant that in practice, management targets are derived from a proxy for MEY, which is based on MSY, and in effect leads to a fishing mortality slightly below the MSY level. Fisheries management in New Zealand and Canada also makes explicit reference to MSY, but in the USA, the less clearly defined concept of ‘Optimum Yield’ is used. In practice, the definition of Optimum Yield implies that it is closely linked to the concept of MSY but with additional flexibility to take into account additional socio-economic or ecological factors.

3.9.2 Management tools Both Norway and Iceland limit entry to fisheries through a licensing scheme, while catch limits with a discard ban are the primary management tool to control fishing mortality. This is supported in both countries by spatial management and gear restrictions (mesh size limitations) to reduce catches of juvenile and spawning fish, improve fishing patterns and reduce gear conflict. Iceland also makes use of a number of flexibilities such as carry-over quotas, inter-species flexibilities and limited over-quota landings in order to maximise quota uptake in the mixed fisheries. The only fishery either country manages by effort limitation is the lumpfish fishery in Iceland. These control measures are similar to those currently being implemented within Europe under the revised Common Fisheries Policy, and so

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are in keeping with the approach being taken in the UK. Similarly, a light-touch is taken towards managing shellfisheries and recreational fisheries, though the impact of such an approach on stocks in Norway and Iceland, where shellfish fisheries are of relatively minor importance, is not known. In Atlantic Canada and the Northeast USA there are important fisheries for American lobster. Management of these fisheries involves a combination of measures including seasonal closure, minimum and maximum size limits, and restrictions on the numbers of traps in use and their construction.

In addition to the management tools considered here, some of the study countries, particularly Iceland and New Zealand, have also used quota sharing mechanisms as a means of achieving broader management goals for their fisheries. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.

3.9.3 Regulatory process With the exception of Norway, the study countries are all rather geographically isolated with limited need for shared management of stocks that occur within their waters. Conversely, Norway’s waters, particularly in the North Sea, border several other nations and as such 90% of its quotas are set through negotiation with other parties.

All of the study countries apart from the Faroes have fishery management plans which set out the broad management objectives for their stocks and/or fisheries and allow a multi-annual approach to be taken to management. While the Faroes have taken some steps towards developing management plans, these have not yet been implemented. The absence of such management plans is one area where Faroese fisheries management has been criticised for falling short of international standards of best practice. Within the EU, many important UK stocks are currently covered by multi-annual management plans. For North Sea stocks which are shared between the EU and Norway some, but not all elements of the management plan, are agreed between the two parties. This provides a possible model for future UK co-operation on the management of shared stocks.

3.9.4 Costs of fisheries management: Costello and Mangin (2005) summarised data on the costs of fisheries management for most major fishing States. These data are summarised in Figure 3-8 where they are broken down into the percentage allocations to administration, research and enforcement (Figure 3-8a) and expressed as costs per tonne of landings (Figure 3-8b). Based on these figures, costs to the UK were roughly 50%

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on enforcement, 30% on administration and 20% on research. Compared to this breakdown, Iceland, Norway and New Zealand generally spent less on administration and more on research. The USA, Australia and Canada had a slightly larger proportion of the total costs allocated to administration, but no clear trends on how the remainder was broken down between research and enforcement. In terms of management costs per tonne of landings, the UK was behind only the USA and Canada, with much higher costs than Norway and particularly Iceland.

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a, Overarching policy objectives Feature Description Examples of Strength / Weaknesses / Threats UK/English context application Opportunities Biological Broad high-level Management goals for fish Norway, Iceland Broad objectives which Uncertain prioritisation. Current policy has objectives stocks are general, e.g. allow flexibility. No clear success criteria. broad objectives for sustainable, efficient or based on Can be backed by specific sustainability backed the precautionary approach and goals (e.g. FMSY) in by legislated international commitments individual stock plans. commitment to MSY by rather than specific, e.g. 2020. legislating for a reference point (i.e. MSY, MEY) Specific legislated Legislated commitment to fish at New Zealand Clear, objective criteria objectives or below MSY for assessing success

Legislated to fish at or below Australia Promotes economic Technically more difficult to MEY efficiency and reduced define and evaluate environmental impact (lower fishing effort)

Legislative commitment to USA Clearly established achieve optimum yield requirement Not as clearly defined as MSY Economic Maximise economic There is an explicit objective to Iceland Clear focus on measures Generally larger Broad CFP objectives efficiency enact policies for economic to support economic vessels/companies more towards ‘economic efficiency efficiency, has been efficient, which implies benefits ‘, but no successful in improving consolidation of fleets. specific measures profitability and stock status Economic stability The objective of economic Norway Seek to maintain income Not clear what ‘economic stability used as a general in rural communities stability’ means in practice. guiding principle

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Include market-oriented Policies to deregulate market Iceland Demonstrated added May lead to consolidation, Not currently a stated action and focus on export oriented value through reduce jobs in supply chain policy objective in UK value specialisation. (e.g. in processing) Opportunity to maximise income from landed catch Social Stable employment as Policy indicates stable Iceland Clear prioritisation of Stable employment has not Broad CFP objectives secondary objective employment an objective but objectives (i.e. been achieved in practice towards ‘social and below economic efficiency and employment contingent due to consolidation employment benefits’ stock status on economic efficiency) (declined from ~ 8k in 1991 to ~ 4k in 2003), though stable since 2003 Stable employment and General objective for stable Norway Provides equal weight to No specific prioritisation or settlement broad employment and settlement in economic and social goals goals set out. Not clear objective relation to quota allocations – whether stable employment but no specific targets. achieved.

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b, Key management approach (i.e. input/output controls) Feature Description Examples of Strength / Weaknesses / UK/English context application Opportunities Threats Main instrument is Main approach to Norway, Iceland Limits total fishing May limit fishing Most fisheries currently output control (TACs) controlling fishing mortality if enforced opportunities for other managed through hybrid exploitation through stocks when quota quota and effort annual TACs with discard reached (‘choking’). limitation system. ban Flexibilities Ability to carry-over Iceland Allows for vessels to Over-quota and mixed Limited scope for uncaught quota the adapt when quotas do catches increase pressure carrying-over quota, and following year, inter- not match catch mix on stocks some flexibilities species flexibility, mitigating ‘choke effect’ introduced through allowable over-quota landings obligation landings Main instrument is input Fishing is controlled Faroes Removed incentives for Has not controlled fishing controls (effort) through days-at-sea high-grading & over- mortality in its current regulations with no quota discards implementation quotas Widespread use of Temporary spatial Norway, Iceland, Faroes Adaptive management Requires effective system Some use of spatio- spatio-temporal management measures measures to avoid to identify closure areas. temporal closures (mainly management used extensively to unwanted catch May be disruptive to North Sea) reduce catches of juvenile normal fishing patterns and spawning fish Shellfish receive light Shellfish generally Norway, Iceland Low regulation Limits control over Most shellfisheries touch management managed by close Provides alternative exploitation – how to management through seasons, minimum sizes, fishery to quota species measure sustainability for licence limits and technical measures etc... shellfish? technical rules (some rather than catch limits exceptions, e.g. scallops)

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c, Regulatory process Feature Description Examples of Strength / Weaknesses / UK/English context application Opportunities Threats Independent Management of the Iceland Full accountability, May be more susceptible Most stocks shared, management – indep of fisheries is made by a No compromise in to lobbying pressure management through what? Arms length or single body/Government management goals Unilateral management negotiation and indep of international agreement parties? Shared fisheries Management of the Norway management with other fisheries is done through nations? international negotiation/agreement Formal stakeholder Stakeholders are fully New Zealand, USA, consultation involved and contribute to Australia the regulatory management process Informal stakeholder Stakeholders are Norway, Iceland consultation indirectly involved in management Cost recovery through Some or all costs of Iceland UK industry currently resource tax fisheries management are contributes to industry borne by the industry body (SEAFISH) through a levy on landings No cost recovery No costs are covered by Norway the industry – management publicly funded Table 3-5, SWOT Analysis of management approaches of the study countries.

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a)

b)

Figure 3-8, a) Breakdown of fishery management costs and b) estimated total costs of fisheries management for major fishing nations. From Costello & Mangin, 2015.

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4 Quota Allocation and Trading

4.1 Introduction Where fish stocks are subject to catch limits, typically in the form of Total Allowable Catches (TACs), the catch limits are usually divided into quotas which are, in effect, shares of the total catch that each vessel is permitted to catch. This raises the question of how these quotas are allocated and what rights are associated with holding those quotas. Such quota allocation and trading mechanisms are an important aspect of fisheries management, particularly with regard to more long-term, strategic aspects of fleet policy.

This chapter is intended to provide a brief summary of the UK quota system, followed by an overview of the quota allocation and trading systems implemented in each of the different study countries. The latter overviews include descriptions of the historical evolution of the system, the quota allocation method currently employed and the corresponding trading rules. This is followed by a synthesis of the positive and negative aspects of each specific quota system implemented and a final analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT).

4.1.1 The current UK quota system Since the inception of the TAC/quota system under the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, fish producers’ organisations (POs) have gradually become more responsible for managing fishing quotas and, by 2000, POs were together responsible for managing over 90% in weight of UK quotas (Hatcher et al., 2002). Each PO manages the quota allocation for the vessels over 10m in length in their membership. Outside the POs, quota allocation mechanisms are also present for vessels over 10 m length that are not members of a PO (“non-sector” allocations) and for vessels ≤ 10 m length. In 2016, 99% of pelagic fish and 96% of demersal fish landed by the UK fleet were caught by vessels in a PO, with only 42% of shellfish landings being by members of a PO.

The basis for the allocation of quota to vessels and fishing operators is a system known as Fixed Quota Allocations (FQAs). These are based on a track record period which in most cases was 1994 to 1996 so that vessels were allocated one FQA unit for a given stock for each kg they landed of that stock during the reference period. FQAs are attached to vessel’s licences. The POs have always been allowed to decide their own quota allocation methods. Some POs use a common quota pool and set monthly landings limits which apply to all members. Others allocate individual annual quotas (IQs) to member vessels based on each vessel’s FQAs (Hatcher et al., 2002; Table 4-1). For the over 10m vessels outside

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the POs, a quota pool is reserved based on the sum of these vessels’ FQAs. Their landings of quota stocks are regulated by means of monthly limits (or per trip limits in the case of some pelagic stocks) which are varied as necessary, in consultation with the industry. Vessels of 10m or under in length, which make up some two-thirds of the fleet by number, do not have FQAs32. Allocations are set aside for the 10m and under fleet based on the total number of units assigned to this group. The quota pool reserved for them is a very small part of the total UK quota, but for certain stocks, mainly in the English Channel, they account for a significant proportion of total landings.

Table 4-1 Quota management approaches used by the POs in UK. Unless otherwise indicated, information was collected from Anderson (2008) and Le Gallic (2006).

Basic approach Definition “Pure” pool All members are given a monthly catch allocation (either each the same, or subject to a consistent formula). No individual member can enhance his allowance relative to other members “Pool-plus” The core management system is pool, but individual vessels are allowed to “top up” their allowances, with quota bought or leased in from other vessels. This system aims to prevent early exhaustion of quotas and to restrict the incentives to race for fish. Pool + IQs Similar to the “pool-plus” system but where members can specifically allocate quota to individual vessels. Members are also offered the opportunity to operate on an IQ only basis. IQs only The only management system available to members is that of management on an Individual Quota entitlement basis

The EU CFP permits trading of quota between Member States and while this trading is administered by the relevant Fisheries Administrations, in practice the trading operates between POs and the equivalent organisations in other Member States. A similar situation applies within the UK where, after 1996, rules on quota trade between POs became more flexible and POs were allowed to make quota “gifts” (i.e., with no reciprocal transfer of quota, which had previously been required) (Hatcher et al., 2002). This made it much easier for a vessel in one PO to lease quota from a vessel in another

32At the time of introduction of FQAs individual track records were not held by the inshore fleet, but a track record was established for the group as a whole for the period 1994-96 (Le Gallic, 2006).

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PO. Under the current FQA system, however, no permanent adjustments of vessels’ FQAs are permitted. Within the POs operating with IQs, quota trading has always been possible.

The current system is thus the result of the evolution of a trading system which allows POs some flexibility to adjust their fishing rights to their catches. This is a dynamic process and most POs employ one or two full-time quota traders to ensure their vessels have enough quota to continue fishing throughout the year if possible (Hatcher et al., 2002).

In the UK the market-like instruments employing a quota system have been gradually characterised by an increasing flexibility of the trading rules that, to a certain extent, resemble elements of individual transferrable quotas (ITQs). In particular, the pool-plus system and the IQs applied show many elements that accommodate the need of fishers to plan their fishing activities across the year, to adapt fishing possibilities to their fishing capacities and facilitate short term adaptations to unpredictable fishing (Le Gallic, 2006). The “pool-plus” system represents a variant of the vessels catch limits (VCs) because fishers are allowed to lease quota and fish against their own allocations once they have finished their monthly limits, thus preventing early exhaustion of quotas and to restrict the incentives to race for fish (Le Gallic, 2006). Application of IQs can be different by POs. While in some POs IQs are non-tradable (e.g. in the case of beam trawler for sole), most of them allow for internal trade between members as well as trade between POs (Le Gallic, 2006).

Access to UK fishing opportunities is limited by the licensing system i.e. overall fishing capacity is capped and in order to fish a quota or shellfish stock a fishermen needs to acquire an existing licence or permit. Licences may be bought and sold subject to certain conditions, depending on whether the vessel is above or below ten metres in length.

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4.2 Iceland

4.2.1 Overview In Iceland the earliest ITQ systems were initiated during the latter half of the 1970s, following the extension of the fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. Since then, the ITQ system has been extended and now involves almost all Icelandic fisheries (Arnason, 2008) The evolution of the ITQ system in Iceland is characterised by incremental steps where the system, initially limited both in terms of fisheries and fleet coverage, gradually expanded to cover all commercial fishing vessels (Table 4-2)

Table 4-2, Chronological overview of the Icelandic ITQ system (adapted from Arnason, 2008)

Year Details of system 1976 Herring fishery: individual vessel quotas introduced 1979 Herring fishery: vessel quotas made transferrable 1980 Capelin fishery: individual vessel quotas introduced Demersal fisheries: individual transferrable quotas introduced for larger fishing vessels. 1984 Small vessels (< 10 GRT) exempted 1985 Demersal fisheries: vessel quotas made transferrable 1986 Capelin fishery: vessel quotas made transferrable Fairly complete, uniform ITQ system adopted for all fisheries. Small vessel (<6 GRT) 1991 exemption retained 2004 Small vessels incorporated into ITQ system

Before the ITQ system, Icelandic fisheries were regulated by combining different management measures such as gear and effort restrictions, area closures, licensing and catch quotas. Iceland’s experience of the various fisheries management systems, however, has led to a widespread adoption of the ITQ system (Arnason, 2005).

With the Icelandic Fisheries Management Act in 1990 the ITQ system, initially characterised by transferability restrictions, became fully transferable and was applied to most of the commercial species for boats over six gross registered tonnage (Arnason, 2008; Chambers & Carothers, 2016). Small vessels have also been managed through ITQs since 2004, giving rise to a uniform ITQ system for almost all Icelandic fisheries, except: i) coastal fishing vessels33 with a maximum of four jig machines. These vessels are allowed to fish up to 14 hours per day from Monday to Thursday during May–August and are subjected to an effort restriction of fishing time such as hours fished and days at sea and

33 Coastal vessels are less than 15 meters long and under 30 gross tonnage in size.

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to a daily catch limit in cod equivalents34 of demersal species (mainly cod, saithe, and rockfish); ii) small boats dedicated to the gillnet lumpfish fishery. This fishery has always existed outside of the ITQ system. It is managed by limited entry licensing and effort restrictions such as days-at-sea, net length and mesh size (Chambers & Carothers, 2016).

The current fisheries management system is based on ITQs as stipulated in the Fisheries Management Act of 1990. Since 1991, a number of amendments have been made. In August 2006 the legislation was re-issued as Law 116/200635, thus including all the changes made to the original 1990 legislation.

The Fisheries Management Act is the cornerstone of the fisheries management system. According to Arnason (2005), the essential features of this system are as follows:

 All fisheries subject to a TAC are managed on the basis of catch quotas.  The quotas are assets of indefinite duration, perfectly divisible and transferable with minor restrictions.  All commercial fishing, with the exception of a subset of the coastal fleet, are subject to these quotas.  The quotas were initially allocated on the basis of catch history prior to the institution of the quota system (on the basis of catch performance for the last three fishing periods).  The quotas are subject to a fee.

This fishing fee is imposed on annual quota allocations and is based on the total value of landed catch between 1st May and 30th April. The fee is 9.5% of the net landed value (i.e. gross value less running costs and salaries). The total fee value is further divided by the corresponding landed volume (landings in cod-equivalents) and this ratio then becomes the resource fee per allocated cod equivalent in the ensuing fishing year (http://www.fisheries.is). The fee was 6% in 2004, but gradually increased to 9.5% in 2009. Quota owners are responsible for the payment of the fishing fee to the Directorate of Fisheries36.

34 The term "cod equivalent" refers to weight and implies the relative value of different fish species on the market compared to cod. This value reflects the relative market values among species over the previous year. For a vessel the total quota may be calculated in kg as cod equivalents if it has a quota for several species. Quota transfer between vessels is often measured in cod equivalents (http://www.fisheries.is) 35 http://www.fisheries.is/management/fisheries-management/the-fisheries-management-act/ 36 http://www.fisheries.is/

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The ITQ system applies to fisheries targeting multiple species which are found primarily within the Icelandic EEZ and, together, represent 98% of the landed value (Agnarsson et al., 2016). However the ITQs also apply to a number of fisheries that involve Icelandic vessels operating outside the 200 mile EEZ (Arnason, 2005). These fisheries include: i) the shrimp fishery on the Flemish Cap, ii) the Barents Sea cod fishery, iii) the Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery and the iv) blue whiting fishery (Arnason, 2005).

If an international agreement exists to regulate the exploitation of species outside the Icelandic EEZ, Iceland allocates the share derived from the agreement as ITQs. When no international agreement on shared stock exists, Iceland often imposes a TAC and allocates the corresponding ITQs to its vessels (Arnason, 2005).

4.2.2 Quota allocation method The Ministry of Industry and Innovation determines the TAC. The TAC decision is made on the basis of recommendations from the Marine Research Institute (Figure 3-2).

The Icelandic ITQ system comprises two basic assets: i) the permanent quota share (%) and ii) the annual quota (in weight) (Arnason, 2008). The permanent quota share represents the right to a share in the annual TAC. These rights are of indefinite duration. They are defined as a percentage of the TAC and sum to 100%. The annual quota is a property right derived from the TAC-shares and represents the permitted annual catch (in weight) (Arnason, 2005). The initial allocation of permanent TAC-shares represents an important step in how the system is perceived and considered legitimate.

With the introduction of the ITQ system in 1984, the initial allocation of TAC-shares to individual vessels varied over fisheries. In the demersal, lobster and deep-sea shrimp fisheries the TAC-shares were based on the vessel’s historical catch record during previous years. However, according to Arnason (2005), some exceptions to this rule were applied. In particular: 1. If the vessel in question was not operating normally during 1981–1983 (e.g. major repairs) the calculated share was adjusted upwards. 2. During 1985–1987, it was possible to modify the TAC-shares by temporarily opting for effort restrictions instead of vessel quotas and demonstrating high catches during this period. 3. In the herring and inshore shrimp fisheries the initial TAC-shares were equal (not based on past catches) for all eligible vessels (those vessels with a recent history of participation in the

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fishery). In the capelin fishery, 2/3 of the TAC was allocated in equal TAC-shares to all vessels, with 1/3 allocated through TAC-shares on the basis of vessel’s hold capacity (Arnason, 2005).

The maximum share of all fisheries in Iceland that one company or group can own is limited. According to the Fisheries Management Act (2006), the permanent TAC-shares held by any company or individual are subject to an upper bound that ranges from 12% of the TAC for cod up to 35% of the TAC for oceanic redfish. In addition, the total TAC-share of fishing vessels owned by individual companies, or owned by connected parties, may never amount to more than 12% of the value of all TACs, or over 5% of the total value of the hook-and-line quota share, in order to prevent an excessive concentration in the fishing industry (Arnason, 2005; Le Gallic, 2006).

Since 2003, a “community quota system” has been established, in which each year the Ministry gives quota directly to the fishermen who land the catches in specific communities. This system has been established to contain the impacts that rural communities can suffer from the concentration of the total quota in fewer companies. However, the amount of the community quota is small, representing, in 2015, less than 2% of the total TAC in cod equivalents. In 2004 the small-boat ITQ system was created to counteract the accumulation of quota by large factory trawlers and companies (Chambers & Carothers, 2016).

Since 2009, another portion of the TAC (again less than 2%) has been given to coastal jigging fisheries, where vessels with a maximum of four jig machines are allowed to fish (14hours/day from Monday to Thursday between May and August) with a daily catch limit of 650 kg (cod equivalent weights). This portion of TAC is split between 4 regions and the licenses are only for landings in the region that the boat is registered to.

4.2.3 Trading rules (national and international) Markets exist to sell the perpetual right to a share of a stock’s TAC (permanent quota share), as well as to lease the right to catch a given tonnage in a particular year (annual quota) (Korolev, 2011). In September 1998, the Icelandic Quota Exchange (IQE) was established. The IQE was a centralised auction market to facilitate trading. In particular, the IQE recorded purchase bids and sale offers, represented a forum for trade in catch quotas providing information on trading (e.g. prices) and handled payment settlement between buyers and sellers. The IQE was funded through a registration fee of quota transferability (0.13% of trade volume). The IQE operated until 2001. Since 2001, quotas have been transferred on an open market through brokers or by individual firms (Haraldsson & Carey, 2011).

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Both the TAC-shares and the annual quotas are transferable and perfectly divisible, which means that any fraction of a given quota may be transferred. However, some minor restrictions on quota transferability have been implemented. 1. Neither TAC-shares nor annual quotas may be transferred to non- and the recipient of a transfer must be able to register the transfer to a licensed fishing vessel. Apart from this, TAC-shares are transferable without any additional restriction. 2. No more than 50% of the annual quota allocated to a vessel at the beginning of the fishing year can be transferred. However, any quantity of purchased quotas can be re-traded (Arnason, 2005). 3. For any vessel that does not harvest 50% of its initial annual quota at least once in 2 years, its TAC-share will be cancelled and distributed to other competing vessels. 4. No vessel may be associated with quota purchases that are clearly in excess of its fishing capacity.

The intention of the above restrictions are to discourage speculative quota holdings and trades and to increase short term job security to fishermen (Arnason, 2005). In fact by ensuring that vessels owners actively fish part of their annual quota, these measures limit speculation of holding quotas by non- fishing interests and encourages quota holding by those that really need to have quota (fishermen). Apart from this, transfers of quotas are only subject to registration with the Directorate of Fisheries. The details of the exchange are registered and listed on the Directorate’s web site. In addition to purchase or lease of quota, a flexible catch balancing system is implemented and allows:  Between-year transfers. Up to 15% of a species quota can be transferred to the next year. This percentage can be carried forward indefinitely (but not accumulate). In addition 5% from the following year quota can be used to account for accidental overfishing (Woods et al., 2015).  Species transformations. ITQs can be transformed from one species to any other species according to ratios of “cod equivalence”. However, some restrictions on species transformations are applied: 1. no more than 1.5% of the total quota holdings in cod equivalent units may be transferred into any one species, and 2. no more than 5% of that same total may be transferred at all (Woods et al., 2015).  No species quota can be transformed into cod quota (i.e. cod quota cannot be created) (Woods et al., 2015).

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4.2.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) The introduction of the ITQ system in the mid-1980s and the introduction of quota trades in 1991, characterised by only minor restrictions, led to positive consequences in the Icelandic fisheries (Knútsson, Kristófersson, & Gestsson, 2016). First, the Icelandic fishing industry has been characterised by an increasing profitability, especially in the fish processing component of the industry (Gunnlaugsson & Saevaldsson, 2016). The profitability sharply decreased only in the time around the 2008 global economy crisis (Figure 4-1). The two economic indicators used to assess the profitability of the Icelandic fishery in Gunnlaugsson & Saevaldsson (2016) (Figure 4-1) are the EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortizations), margin (EBITDA/revenue) and the profit margin (profit before tax/revenue), which behaved differently during the 2008 financial crisis. The industry invested heavily in quotas 2004-2008 and the access to the credit was extremely easy, the industry accumulated a massive unsustainable debt. Most of the debt was denominated in foreign currencies and, with the financial crisis in 2008, the Icelandic krona lost half of its value and, consequently, the cost of amortization and depreciation (which are included in the profit margin but not in the EBITDA margin) increased disproportionally (Gunnlaugsson & Saevaldsson, 2016).

Figure 4-1 The development of the EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortizations) margin (EBITDA/revenue) and the profit margin (profit before tax/revenue) in the Icelandic fishery 1991-2013 (Gunnlaugsson & Saevaldsson, 2016)

The increase of this profitability is connected to various aspects of the ITQ system implemented: 1. The rise of a new market for trading quotas, as a result of the free trade of TAC and quota shares. In this market, the permanent quota share and the annual quota are both traded and equilibrium prices are established. This allows future profits of the fishery to become a marketable asset (Arnason, 2008). The market price of the quota shares reflects the present value of expected profits from holding these shares and, since 1984, the overall quota value

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of the Icelandic fisheries has risen significantly (Figure 4-2) (Arnason, 2008). In addition the new capital associated to the ITQs has found its way into other industries, thus contributing not only to the profitability of the fishing industry but, in general, to the country’s rapid economic growth (Arnason, 2008). 2. The rapid consolidation of both fishing and fish processing sectors. This consolidation was supported by the quota trade system (limited by a few minor restrictions) and the liberalisation of primary fish trade and fish exports. As the export licensing system was abolished, fishing companies could start to incorporate export and marketing activities into their value chain (Knútsson et al., 2016). The diversification and specialisation of the fishing companies, which was possible thanks to the combination of the ITQ system and the de- regulation of the market, helped to create additional value relative to the wet fish price. In particular, companies started to respond to market demand, controlling the supplied quantity and attributes of fish (e.g. freshness, size, delivery time, transformation of fish products etc.), thus emphasising product quality rather than quantity and introducing products that created maximum profit (Knútsson et al., 2016).

Figure 4-2 Evolution of the overall quota value of the Icelandic fisheries (as sum of the quota value in each of these fisheries) (estimates in million US$) (Arnason, 2008).

Following point 2, the system implemented caused a rationalisation of the fishing fleet. The number of trawlers decreased by 46% between 1992 and 2011. With the contraction of the fishing fleets, fish stock declines have generally been halted and some previously depleted stocks have been rebuilt. For example, after the implementation of the ITQs, the stock of the Icelandic summer-spawning herring fishery increased to its highest recorded level (Arnason, 2008). While the increase of this stock abundance is certainly driven by climate change, causing a northward extension of the herring’s range, the decrease of the fishing effort deriving from ITQs has clearly contributed towards improving the stock condition.

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The ITQ system implemented in Iceland has some downsides, mostly relating to social justice and equity in the rural communities. The total quota held by the five biggest fishing companies increased from 17% in 1995 to 35% in 2011, and this concentration of the total quota among fewer companies (the total quota held by the five biggest quota-holding fishing companies increased from 17% in 1995 to 35.2% in 2011) has caused serious impacts on rural communities and small-scale fisheries. In particular: 1. Many crew and boat owners lost their jobs due to the increase of the costs of quota share in the quota market. This forced small-boat owners to sell fishing rights (Chambers & Carothers, 2016); 2. Remaining crew started to receive lower shares, due to the widespread practice of deducting ITQ costs from vessel earnings before paying crew share, or become wage labourers, as they were often forced to lease quota from the big companies, becoming “tenants” who were “fishing for others” (Carothers & Chambers, 2012, 2016), thus losing the advantages of a share remuneration system. In fact, in a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. 3. Loss of jobs in the processing facilities, due to the decrease in fish deliveries, which became concentrated in fewer companies, and to the general consolidation of the processing sector. For instance, the number of processing licenses has fallen since 1992, from 402 to 275 in 2007 (Knútsson et al., 2016). 4. Marginalisation of the local/artisanal fishing practices employed by fishers who do not seek to maximise the profit from fishing and may only fish when they need income (Chambers & Carothers, 2016). Thus the focus on economic end goals tends to overshadow the social component of the fishing activity in rural communities. 5. Increase of existing social inequalities between “capitalistic” fishermen, privileged by ITQ management, and other small-boat fishermen (Carothers & Chambers, 2012; Chambers & Carothers, 2016). 6. Disengagement of the small-scale fishers from the management system. In fact small-scale fishers that do not own quota have inferior economic and political power than quota owners and they are often separated from the decision-making process. This aspect increases the risk of devaluation of the governance system (Chambers & Carothers, 2016; Eythórsson, 2000).

To contain the impacts on the rural communities, different measures have been enacted such as the “community quota system”, the creation of the small-boat ITQ system, and the separate management

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of the “coastal fishing”. The introduction of a special fishing fee imposed on annual quota allocation also represents a way to redistribute the wealth created by the ITQ system. In fact this fee represents a considerable cost to the industry and is responsible for a significant decrease of its profitability, but it gives the Icelandic public (the Icelandic government), a share in the resource rent of the industry. This remains a highly controversial matter and subject to intense political debate (Gunnlaugsson & Saevaldsson, 2016).

In addition to the social problems above, another limitation of the ITQ implemented in Iceland is related to the species transformation system (ITQs can be transformed from one species to another according to the “cod equivalent” ratio). It has been recently recognised that this system can lead to catches greater than TACs that might persist and causes, in some cases, depletion of fish stocks. In particular, this threatens stocks with lower biomass, which may be more vulnerable to persistent overfishing (Woods et al., 2015).

4.2.5 SWOT analysis Strengths Weaknesses  Rationalisation of the fishing fleets and  The development of market driven value reduction of the over-capacity chains (with free quota trade and liberalisation of fish market) takes decades.  Fish stocks recover from overfishing

 Increase profitability of vessels and processors that remain in the fishery

Opportunities Threats  Adding value to fish products through  The consolidation of fishing and fish diversification and specialisation. This is processing sectors can determine a possible with the free quota trades and the significant loss of jobs and impoverishment, liberalisation of fish trade and exports especially in the rural communities

 The capital associated to ITQs can be  Disengagement of the small-scale fishers invested, through financial intermediation, from the management system. into other industries  Once the process of liberalisation of quota  Reduce Government intervention trading + deregulation of fish market is initiated, the way back is difficult

 Depending how easy it is to get credit, the liberalisation of the quota trade could create a massive debt in the companies

 The species transformation system can cause overfishing and depletion of fish stocks

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4.3 Norway

4.3.1 Overview The evolution of the Norwegian fisheries management regime towards an ITQ system has been slow due to a combination of: opposition from the fishing industry to structural changes; limitations to entry into the fisheries; and potential problems of social equity connected with a “pure” ITQ system, when quotas are perfectly divisible and transferable (Hannesson, 2013).

The evolution of the quota system and the quota allocation varies depending on the fleet groups considered. The Norwegian fishing fleet is composed of 3 main groups: 1. Purse seiners (offshore fleet) 2. Trawlers 3. The coastal fleet37

The purse seine fleet (offshore fleet) was the first one to experience a limited access to major fishing resources in 1973 (Hersough, 2008). The collapse of the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock and the North Sea mackerel in the 1970s lead to the establishment of catch quotas for fish stocks exploited by this fleet segment (first capelin and then herring, blue whiting and mackerel). For each species the overall catch quota was divided into boat quotas, established through a formula linking a ‘‘base quota’’ to the size of the boat (hold capacity). The base quota increased with the hold capacity of the boat, but at a diminishing rate (Hannesson, 2013). Quota allocation could only indirectly be traded through fishing licences. This trading system came into force in 1996 and caused a significant rationalisation of the purse seine fleet, with a gradual disappearance of small vessels (Hannesson, 2013). This 1996 transfer scheme allowed those who bought another boat to retain, for a certain number of years, a portion of its base quota. This portion depended on the areas involved in the trading (e.g. boats sold from the north to the south or vice versa, or within each area) (Hannesson, 2013). This transfer scheme has been in force ever since, with only minor changes (see Section 4.3.2 for details) (Hannesson, 2013).

While pelagic species were managed through the quota allocation to the purse seine fleet, for the commercially most important groundfish species (cod, haddock and saithe) fisheries authorities had to make allocations between the trawlers and the coastal fleet. This allocation started as a result of the cod crisis in the late 1980s (Hersough, 2008). The Norwegian Fishermen’s Association (NFA) was involved in the process and proposed a sharing system of the cod quotas (and then haddock) between

37 Until 2008, coastal vessels were defined as vessels <28 m length. Currently they are defined as vessels having a cargo hold of less than 500m3

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the trawler fleet and the coastal fleet, depending on the annual TAC level (Hersough, 2008). This system was called the “trawler ladder”. The trawler ladder was the allocation key for cod and gave the coastal fleet a larger share of the catch when the TAC was low and the trawler fleet a larger share when the TAC was high. Cod trawlers received the quota from the trawler ladder and, similarly to the purse seine fleet, they were allowed to trade their quota by trading fishing licences since 1996. Once again, this resulted in a restructuring of the trawl fleet with a decrease of the number of cod trawlers (Figure 4-3).

Figure 4-3, Number of purse seiners and cod trawlers with concessions (from Hannesson, 2013)

While purse seine and trawlers were characterised by a closed access system so no other vessels could join them in the quota system, the coastal fleet was characterised, at least in part, by an open access regime, applied to fishers using traditional fishing practices (Hersoug et al., 2000).

In the coastal fleet the quota system was constructed and implemented in 1990. This system was characterised by implementing two different types of quotas, one for the most active vessels, and one for the less active vessels. These quotas were structured as follows:  The first type of quota involved the most active vessels (full- time vessels, measured from the cod landed in the three previous years). Each of these vessels received a quota directly from the fishing authorities. This quota was exclusive to each vessel, thus allowing the vessel’s owner to decide when and where to use it. The vessels that received this quota formed a “closed group”, so no other vessels could join them in the quota system. However from 1994, continued participation in this closed group was subject to a minimum activity requirement, corresponding to at least 40% of the quota allocation being used in the previous year, later adjusted to 10% (Bjørn Hersoug, Holm, & Rånes, 2000).

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 Membership of this group was decided in 1990, on the basis of cod landings during the previous three years, but historic landings were not used to set vessel quotas. First, vessels in the overall group were divided into size groups by length, and each in one size group was assigned the same quota (regardless of how much that particular vessel had previously fished). Second, the quota of each size group was defined through a formula similar to that applied in the purse seine fishery, calculated on the basis of a key that decreased with increasing vessel size. Therefore, the smaller vessels were given preferential treatment, because they were expected to be the main losers in a transition to a rights-based regime, as demonstrated from the Icelandic experience (Hersoug et al., 2000; Chambers & Carothers, 2016).

This system was abandoned after only one year, in favour of a group quota, where each individual vessel got the same quota. The group quota had a quota share much bigger than the quota assigned to the less active vessels, taking for example 80% of the TAC for coastal . This group continued to be a “closed group” and this exclusivity increased the value of these boats compared to the other boats (Hannesson, 2013). This group, in the current allocation system, is named “Group I” (see Section 4.3.2).

 The second type of quota involved the less active vessels and in the current allocation system is called “Group II” (see Section 4.3.2). These vessels formed a group, which was an “open group”, which any of the less active vessels could join. The quota to these vessels was initially awarded through a “group quota”. This group quota initially amounted to about 20% of the TAC for coastal cod fisheries and vessels could compete for quota up to a maximum individual share. According to this “Maximum Quota System”, each individual vessel has a maximum quota for each stock (which cannot be exceeded by any vessel participating in the same fishery). However, the sum of the maximum vessel quotas is larger than the group’s quota and the fishery is stopped when the group quota is taken, even if some vessels have not reached their individual quota limits. This system gives an incentive to fish the quota in shortest possible time (“race to fish”). This competitive element was possibly introduced to reduce the number of fishing days and therefore to reduce the variable costs associated to the fishing activity (OECD, 2005). It may be also implemented to rationalise the fleet and to gradually encourage the exit of less efficient vessels.

The 1996 transfer scheme, firstly implemented in the purse seine and trawl fisheries, was also gradually applied to the smaller boats fishing with traditional gears (e.g. longline, gill nets and hand lines). Oceanic longliners (> 28 m length) were included in this transfer scheme in 2000, and, from

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2004, quota transfer was allowed for boats 15–28m. This drove a decline in the number of boats in this category (Hannesson, 2013).

4.3.2 Quota allocation method The TACs are established through three integrated steps: 1) stock assessment, 2) management advice, 3) TAC decision. In Norway the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) is responsible for the scientific research of the commercial stocks and provides data to ICES, where scientists from all involved countries participate in regional stock assessment working groups and in the ICES Advisory Committee on Management (ACOM). ACOM makes recommendations and provides various TAC options. The final TACs are fixed by the resource “owner”, which is the national State or the institutions responsible for managing joint stocks (e.g. the Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission for cod, haddock and capelin; Norway/EU-Commission for North Sea cod, blue whiting, mackerel, herring, etc.) (Hersough, 2008).

All the elements of the quota allocation system are dealt with by the Regulatory Board, which meets periodically. The Board is composed of many interested stakeholders (e.g. the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association, the Norwegian Seafood Association, the Federation of Norwegian Fishing Industries, the Norwegian Seamen’s Union, NGOs and others), which present their views. NFA has always had a major role in the Regulatory Board and generally most recommendations are according to the decisions made by the NFA, especially regarding resource allocations (Hersough, 2008). After the meeting, the Directorate of Fisheries recommends next year’s quota allocations to the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs.

The Norwegian national quotas are allocated to different groups of vessels. Quotas are allocated to each vessel, either by individual vessel quotas (IVQs) (the purse seine and trawl fleets, “Group I” of the coastal fleet and vessels above 28 meters fishing with traditional gear) or by maximum quotas (“Group II” of the coastal fleet). In the IVQ system the quotas are fixed for each vessel with a licence or annual permit and this guarantees them a fixed percentage of the group quota. The maximum quota system, on the other hand, is a group quota divided in a manner that results in a certain competition between the vessels in the group, as described above (OECD, 2005). For cod fisheries the general division scheme is illustrated in (Figure 4-4).

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Figure 4-4 Distribution of National Quota of the Northeast Arctic Cod in 2002 (OECD, 2005)

4.3.3 Trading rules (national and international) Quota allocations can only be bought together with the boat and leasing of quotas is not permitted (Hannesson, 2013). For many vessel groups Norway has established a quota transfer system called “Unit Quota System” (UQS), with the main purpose of reducing the fleet size and increasing its economic performance. If a vessel in the unit quota system is withdrawn from the fishery, its quotas, can be transferred and used by other vessels, less 20%, which is redistributed among all remaining vessels in the fishery (Nøstbakken, 2006). The system also allows the owner of two vessels to fish both quotas from one vessel if the other vessel is withdrawn from fishing. If the vessel withdrawn from the fishing fleet is sold, the vessel owner may fish both quotas for a period of 13 years, and for 18 years if the vessel is scrapped. This last option aims to contribute to the reduction of the over-capacity. The UQS has been implemented for the offshore fishing fleet and for vessels above 28 meters fishing with traditional gear (longliners) (OECD, 2005).

Since 2004 a similar system for quota transfer has been allowed for smaller vessels in the coastal fleet, known as the “Structural Quota System” (SQS). According to Hannesson (2013), this system implies:

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1. Each boat starts out with a quota factor, which entitles it to a share in the total quota allocated to its size class. 2. The purchase of another boat provides the owner with a new quota factor (potentially for more than one species). The transferred quota factors are valid only for 20 years. 3. The owner of two vessels can transfer quota from one vessel to another if one vessel is scrapped. 20% of the quota attached to the scrapped vessel remains in the group the vessel was withdrawn from and distributed among all boats in that group. 4. There is an upper limit on the number of quota factors one boat can have.

A new system called Quota Exchange System (QES) was developed and implemented for part of the coastal fleet in 2004. The QES allows two vessel owners to team-up and fish both quotas on only one vessel for a limited period (OECD, 2005). Quotas for purse seiners or trawlers can only be traded within each fleet segment (Hannesson, 2013). The rest of the fleet is divided into size groups and vessels can trade their fish quota only within each size group (Hannesson, 2013). There is also a spatial restriction for trading quotas between different regions. For purse seiners, when quota transfer involves two vessels, both registered in northern Norway, 5% of the quota is withdrawn, but 15% for vessels registered in southern Norway. For transfers from north to south, 40% of fish quota allocations in the purse seine fishery are withdrawn, but only 5% the other way. This disparity reflects the fact that the most profitable part of the Norwegian fishing industry is located in the south region. In the coastal fleet, fish quota rights can only be transferred within the county where the boat is registered, and some of the white fish trawlers are required to land their fish to specific processing plants and not where it would be most convenient (Hannesson, 2013). Finally, unfished quotas cannot be “saved” and transferred to the next year, they have to be reallocated by the end of the year (Hersough, 2008).

4.3.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) The introduction of the quota transfer system implemented in Norway has improved the overall profitability of the fisheries characterised by limited entry. The purse seiners, being a “closed group”, were able to maintain high levels of profitability, which otherwise could have been eroded by new potential entrants competing for a share of a given catch quota (Figure 4-5) (Hannesson, 2013). As with the Icelandic experience, another positive aspect has been related to the rationalisation of the fleets. In fact, rights to fish quotas have been gradually concentrated on fewer boats, which caused a restructuring of the fleet. The system however strongly differs from Iceland, because the quota transfer is subjected to several limitations on free market transactions. These limitations are due to the strong involvement of the management institutions in the quota allocation and transfer policies. In Norway, allocation is considered a public responsibility and, since they are of great interest to all

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fishers, a great amount of administrative time and effort is required. By deploying large administrative resources, fisheries authorities take on a responsibility in providing socially acceptable outcomes. From a social perspective, this system is positive because many stakeholders are involved in the management process through the Regulatory Board. In particular, the NFA plays an essential role in the resource allocations and, according the principle of co-management, this system can generate consensus and vessels are more likely to comply with regulations.

Figure 4-5 Evolution of the profit before taxes for the purse seine fisheries between 1980- 2010 (Hannesson, 2013)

On the other hand, the strong involvement of the fisheries authorities and the choice to allocate the quota administratively instead of using the market is also associated with various disadvantages: 1. The fishing sector is highly heterogeneous and comprises many vessels, and fisheries authorities are not able to assess the detailed consequences from the implementation of the allocation rules. 2. The restrictive rules on quota trading result in less restructuring of the fleet than the implementation of market-based trading. 3. The increase of the profitability of Norwegian fisheries has been less rapid than in Iceland. A free transfer and allocation of catch quotas are essential tools for achieving specialization, flexibility and, ultimately, higher profitability. In addition, Norway has highly regulated primary markets, with minimum prices and limits on vertical integration, and thus fishing vessel companies do not own processing facilities (in Norway almost all of the catch is sold through mandatory dealers subject to guaranteed minimum prices in accordance with the Fresh Fish Act). The separation between fisher and processor reduces information flow (e.g. real time catch and price) and fishers have also limited incentive to specialise and to add value

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to their products. In conclusion the combination of restrictive rules on quota trade and fish market can be an obstacle to fishing industries in maximising their profits (Knútsson et al., 2016).

4.3.5 SWOT analysis

Strengths Weaknesses  Rationalisation of the fishing fleets and  Difficult to assess consequences of quota reduction of the over-capacity allocation for heterogeneous fleets if the  Fish stocks recover from overfishing system is highly regulated by fisheries  Increase profitability of fisheries authorities. characterised by a limited entry  Government interventions and deployment of large administrative resources  Involvement of Fishermen associations in  Less rapid increase of profitability due to the resource allocation Government intervention and highly regulated primary market  The separation between fisher and processor reduces information flow

Opportunities Threats  Engagement of fishermen (co-management  Over-regulated market is an obstacle to approach) fishing industries in maximising their profits

 Maintaining healthy and competitive rural communities

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4.4 Faroes

4.4.1 Overview Traditionally, the most important fishery in Faroese waters has been the mixed demersal fishery targeting cod, haddock and saithe, primarily conducted on the Faroe Plateau and Faroe Bank. A collapse in demersal stocks in the early 1990s led the Faeroe Islands to implement a TAC-based management system under the Commercial Fisheries Act of 1994. The quota system was also coupled with a discard ban. However, both measures received considerable criticism and resistance from the catching sector. In addition, substantial discarding and misreporting catches was registered (Hegland & Hopkins, 2014). To deal with the unpopularity of these measures as well as with the issues of discarding and misreporting in mixed fisheries, the Faroese government changed to an effort-based management system (Gibson, Zylich, & Zeller, 2015). The ITQ system was therefore abandoned after only two years and has not been implemented since.

The Faroes holds quota shares for a number of wide-ranging stocks of pelagic species including North- east Atlantic mackerel, Atlanto-scandian herring and North-east Atlantic blue whiting. No information is available on how these quotas are managed or allocated. Because of this and the fact that the demersal fisheries are managed through effort rather than catch limits, the Faroes are not considered any further in this section.

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4.5 Australia

4.5.1 Overview In Australia, the fisheries management is shared between the State governments, which operates up to three nautical miles off the Australian coast and the Commonwealth (Federal), which manages between 3 – 200nm. ITQs are often employed as a management instrument in both State and Commonwealth fisheries (in this last case the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) is the governmental body responsible of establishing TACs and the allocation of the quota shares, according to the 1991 Fisheries management Act and the Fisheries Administration Act establishes) (Marchal et al., 2016).

In Australia, ITQs have been gradually implemented in various Commonwealth and State fisheries. Historically the principal fisheries implementing ITQs have been: 1) the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery; 2) the South-East Trawl Fishery; 3) various State fisheries.

In the Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) Fishery ITQs were introduced for the first time in 1984, and have always been fully transferable. According to Meany (2001), to be eligible for a quota share, a fisher had to meet one of the following criteria:

 Being the holder of a Commonwealth Fishing Boat Licence (CFBL) of a boat that took at least 15t of SBT in the period 1 October 1980 and 30 September 1983.  A person who would have qualified as a holder of a CFBL but who sold the boat (and received the money from the sell before 7 September 1984) to buy another boat for the same SBT fishery.  A SBT fisher who purchased a boat before 6 July 1984 to enter into the SBT fishery and who worked in the fishery for at least two complete fishing seasons on a boat catching at least 15t of SBT in at least one season.

Fishers that met one of the above criteria were allocated quota units on the following bases:

i. 75% of the quota units was allocated according to the best catch taken in a fishing year in the period 1980-81 to 1982-83. The catch of each fisher (in his best year) was then transformed as a proportion of the total catch taken by all qualifying fishers in their best year. This fraction was then multiplied by 0.75 and then by 14 500, which represented the TAC in 1984.

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ii. 25% of the quota was allocated according to the investments made in the fishery and calculated as a proportion of the value of the individual boat among all qualifying boats. This fraction was than multiplied by 0.25 x 14 500. iii. The sum of i) and ii) represented the individual’s allocation of quota units, for 1984-85.

The quota allocation of SBT fishery significantly varied between the different states and their boats (average allocation was 39.3 tonnes, 77.7 tonnes and 231.8 tonnes per boat for Western Australia, New South Wales and South Australia respectively) (Campbell, Brown, & Battaglene, 2000).

The Australian ITQ system in the SBT fishery caused a rapid adjustment and restructuring of the fleet. More than two-thirds of the Western Australian fleet, and nearly all the New South Wales fleet had withdrawn from the Australian SBT fishery by 1986. Most of those boats were pole boats and non- specialist tuna vessels (often small and less efficient vessels), that could easily join other non-ITQ fisheries.

Reductions in TAC occurred in the following years and reflected the decline of the stock. Currently a trilateral agreement between Australia, Japan and New Zealand, ratified as Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), is the basis of the stock management.

For the trawl fishery, ITQs were first established in the South East Australian fishery for orange roughy in 1989. By 1992 ITQs already covered 16 species (or species groups) in 19 stocks exploited by the South-East Fishery. The fishery is a mixed trawl fishery with three method sectors: Danish seine, inshore otter trawl and deep water trawl (Connor & Alden, 2001).

Trawl vessels were allocated quota shares based on their historical catch records. For each vessel, catch history was connected to the vessel’s licence. Therefore, if the vessel was sold and the licence transferred the catch history would also have been transferred. Initially catch histories were based on catch revenue returns and not on logbooks, considered as a biased source of information. The allocation formula was then changed and catch history was calculated as catch average over the entire fishing period from 1984 (Shotton, 2001). Similarly to the SBT fishery, a part of the quota allocation for trawlers was also based on the investment in the fishery, based on the vessel size and the engine power. The formula to estimate the vessel’s investment was not applied to the Danish-seine fleet, where each vessel was considered to have an equal "investment" value in the fishery (Shotton, 2001)

In some State fisheries, ITQs were implemented to manage inshore resources. In Tasmania ITQs were first introduced to the abalone fishery in 1993, the rock lobster fishery in 1998 and the giant crab

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fishery in 1999. In the giant crab fishery, the ITQs were allocated to eligible fishers on a 50/50 basis, half for holding the permit for the fishery, and half based on catch history (Ford & Nicol, 2001). In the rock lobster fishery the allocation was initially based on i) a per-pot basis (a number of quota units per pot) (~ 90% of the quota) and ii) catch history (the best year's catch out of the previous nine years) (~ 10% of the quota). Since March 2001 the allocation was 100% based on a per-pot basis, thus removing the catch history as a factor in the allocation method (Ford & Nicol, 2001). In the abalone fishery individual quotas were introduced in January 1985 and became transferable in 1993. Quota units were equally allocated to the divers involved in the fishery. Similar arrangement was made in the Western Australia Abalone Fishery, where the allocation of quota units was equal among the participants and became transferable since 1999 (Metzner, Crowe, & Borg, 2001).

4.5.2 Quota allocation method In Australia the TAC setting process has often been characterised by a number of difficulties, which include the lack of information on biological parameters of the species exploited as well as on fishing mortality and harvesting strategies. For example, in the South East Trawl (SET) Fishery, quotas are in place for sixteen species. For most of them, TACs are set based on historical catch levels but for one species, the TAC setting process was based on negotiation with trawl and hook sector representatives. Because TACs are based on different processes (biological parameters or historic catch records or negotiations), the resulting values do not necessarily correspond with the usual catch ratios. This inconsistency often generates over-quota catches and discarding of some bycatch species38. Similar to the TAC setting processes, the quota allocation methods have also been based on different rules, and have historically been an ad hoc decision, as the examples in the previous paragraph showed. When in a fishery, the management changes from an input-controlled (e.g. closed areas, gear and effort restrictions, etc.) to an output-controlled process (ITQs), the identification of the vessels that meet a minimum requirement to receive an ITQ allocation is often problematic.

Allocations are generally based on past participation or “history” in the fishery. In South Australia for example, the method to consider previous catch history is called the “Adjusted Preferred Method”, which gives participants the choice of how they want previous catch history in the fishery to be taken into account (e.g. average catch over last x years, catch in previous season, etc.). The individual catch shares are then uniformly scaled back to match the desired TAC. In this system, the cost of the resource rent for the fishers to which ITQs have been allocated is usually based on a “cost recovery”

38 https://www.oecd.org/australia/34427707.pdf

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process, which means a charge for services via the regulatory authority to the fishery. The rationale of this system is that the beneficiaries of the ITQs are expected to pay for the Government’s cost of the fisheries management, enforcement and research (Morgan, 1997). This system has been applied in the Southern Australia rock lobster fishery.

Another example of quota allocation based on catch history has been in the Queensland spanner crab fishery. In 1995 the management authority limited licences to those vessels that could demonstrate a past dependence on the fishery (reporting landings of a minimum of 500kg annually between 1992 and 1994) and introduced a TAC value. Catch shares were allocated giving 500 kg to each eligible licence and then the rest of the shares according to the portion of the catch recorded in logbooks by each licence holder. However many appeals against this quota allocation system were heard by Queensland Fisheries Appeals Tribunal, demonstrating the difficulties in finding an allocation method that satisfied all participants in the fishery (McPhee, 2008).

Allocation of ITQs is not always based on catch history. For example, in the Western and Southern Australia abalone fishery, and in the Southern Australia pilchard fisheries, allocation was done on an equal basis among all existing license-holders. In these cases, historical catches were not used as a basis for allocating catch shares because the fishery participants declared that equal shares seemed to be a more equitable and acceptable allocation method (Lynham, 2013).

The AFMA recently reviewed the policy for administrating the ITQs in the current Commonwealth- managed ITQ fisheries (e.g. SBT) to provide simple and consistent quota administration arrangements (http://www.afma.gov.au). The key points of this policy are: 1. introduce a maximum 28 day “set period” for quota reconciliation, which represents a reconciliation period to allow fishers to balance their quota holdings. Fishers who do not reconcile within the “set period” will be subject to orders to return to port and/or suspension. 2. Remove personal-use allowances (take-home packs). AFMA removed personal-use allowances by removing personal-use provisions from fishery management plans. 3. Accounting for catches of quota stocks in overlapping and adjacent fisheries. Fishers may incidentally catch quota species managed under separate plans. In adjacent fisheries, where quota species are caught and are likely to be the same stock, AFMA establishes catch trigger levels. 4. Review of under-catch and end-of-season over-catch provisions, to improve reconciliation between quota hold and catch.

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5. Individual accountability of discards against quota. Because all sources of fishing mortality on fish stocks have to be taken into account when setting TACs, AFMA requires that each fishery provide an annual discard rate estimate for each quota stock.

OECD (2004a) lists the current State inshore fisheries managed through quota allocations as follows:  The abalone fishery, the Shark Bay pink snapper fishery and the sardine fishery in Western Australia.  Rock lobster and abalone in New South Wales (NSW).  The Southern and Northern Zone Rock Lobster fisheries, abalone, blue crab, giant crab and sardine fisheries in South Australia (SA).  The abalone and rock lobster fisheries in Tasmania.

4.5.3 Trading rules (national and international) In Australia, quota holders are free to lease or sell their quota holdings, which can also be broken down and traded in smaller units. All quota transfers are subject to approval by AFMA, but reporting prices is not a requirement (Connor & Alden, 2001). In some fisheries, a minimum unit holding of species is required. Maximum quota holding limits are present to avoid concentration of ownership. Markets for both permanent sale and temporary lease of quota units have developed. Similar to New Zealand, the majority of the transactions between small and medium-sized quota owners are handled through brokers, which charge a brokerage fee while larger companies have quota managers on staff (Léon et al., 2015). Quota markets respond to change in stock abundance. In the Tasmania rock lobster fishery for example, a larger number of permanent quota transfers was registered during the period of stock growth, when expectation of future profit was high, and a lower number as stocks declined (Léon et al., 2015). On the other hand, besides the low catch expectations during the stock decline, small quota owners increased their quota holdings because of the decrease in the quota unit price (Figure 4-6, León et al., 2015). Similar trend was observed in the lease quota market, where the number of the small leaser-in (operators that acquire quota shares for one fishing year) grew during the stock decline because the decrease of the lease price (León et al., 2015).

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Figure 4-6, Trend over time of quota ownership categories (from Leon et al., 2015)

In the South East trawl Fishery the participation in quota leasing has increased since the introduction of ITQs (from 54% up to 96% in 1998) (Connor & Alden, 2001). In this type of fishery, characterised by a variable mix of species, leasing is often used for balancing holdings. The uncertainty of the stock abundance, which may vary as a consequence of variation in recruitment as well as other factors, can drive the operators to prefer repeated annual leasing over permanent trade. Therefore in the SET Fishery, the combination of uncertainty over stocks (and therefore the appropriateness of TAC levels), and lack of alternative fisheries to move to may tend to lock-in existing vessels, thus interfering with the fleet restructuration (Connor & Alden, 2001).

4.5.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) Positive effects of the introduction of the ITQs in Australian fisheries can be summarised in the following points:

 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery, ITQs system improved the vessels profitability, and encouraged a change in fishing behaviour, as fishers concentrated on minimising the cost of taking

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their catch and on maximising the value of their quota (Campbell et al., 2000). New opportunities were also created through the quota lease market and the access arrangements with the Japanese fleet, which were based on join venture agreements. The cash flow generated from tuna leasing under the joint venture was essential for the economic performance of some operators. Operators also improved their economic performance by targeting larger fish for the Japanese market as well as adding sale value through farming.  In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery, the ITQ system brought a rationalisation of the fleet (Pascoe & Gibson, 2009). Around two-thirds of the vessels had left the fishery within 2 years of the introduction of ITQs and only the most efficient vessels remained.  The application of ITQs caused a rapid reduction in catch and thus provided some conservation benefit for different stocks (e.g. Southern Bluefin Tuna, orange roughy in the SET fishery).  In various Australian fisheries, the quota allocation method has been the result of a strong stakeholder engagement. For example, the “Adjusted Preferred Method” applied in the Southern Australia gives participants the choice of how they want previous catch history to be accounted for. In other fisheries (e.g. the in Western and Southern Australia abalone fisheries), equal quota shares have been applied, because fishery participant considered it the most equitable and acceptable allocation method. The involvement of stakeholders in the quota allocation process has the advantage of ensuring the legitimation of the policies applied and adherence to the rules.

Possible negative aspects associated to the system implemented have been related to:

 Only few fisheries are managed purely using ITQs. A range of input controls are used, including use of statutory fishing rights, limited entry, gear restrictions, and spatial management. While this combination of multiple management measures can be effective in pursuing biological and economic sustainability of the fisheries, it also requires a great amount of administrative time and effort.

 In the SET fishery, TACs for many species were set at higher levels than recommended (Pascoe & Gibson, 2009). For most species in recent years, the catch has been less than 70% of the established TAC, resulting in an excess supply of quota. This caused a low demand for additional quota, and, consequently, lowered the price per unit quota (Pascoe & Gibson, 2009). The low incentives to exit the fishery through quota sales resulted in only limited restructuring and adjustment in fleet size, maintaining some of the less efficient vessels in the fishery.

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4.5.5 SWOT analysis

Strengths Weaknesses  Rationalisation of the fishing fleets and  Only few fisheries are managed purely using reduction of the over-capacity in various ITQs. The system requires a great amount of fisheries administrative time and effort.

 Fish stocks recover from overfishing

 Strong stakeholder involvement

 Increase of fishing profitability

 Efficient quota and lease market

Opportunities Threats  In the South Bluefin Tuna Fishery new  In some fisheries TACs were set at high opportunities have been created through levels resulting on low quota prices and less the quota lease market and the access incentive for fleet restructuring. arrangements with the Japanese fleet.

 Opportunities to develop co-management process through stakeholder involvement

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4.6 New Zealand

4.6.1 Overview The Quota Management System (QMS) represents the cornerstone of fisheries management in New Zealand and controls the total commercial catch for all the main fish stocks found within New Zealand’s 200 nautical mile EEZ. The QMS currently covers about 100 species, which are divided into 638 separate stocks. Each stock is managed independently and is defined by Quota Management Areas (QMAs), which are based on the knowledge of the stock distribution and on administrative factors at the time of introduction of the species into the QMS39. Under the QMS, the Minister of Fisheries is responsible for ensuring the sustainable utilisation of the commercial stocks, according to maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Once the MSY is identified, the TAC of a stock can be set and remain in place for each of the following fishing years until amended. Final decisions on all TAC setting and allocation are made by the Minister for Primary Industries (Marchal et al., 2016).

For each stock, TACs include allowances for recreational fisheries, customary fisheries, and other fishing-related mortality of that stock. The remainder (TACs minus allowances) is available to the commercial sector and represents the Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC). This is the total quantity of each fish stock that the commercial fishing industry can catch for that year. Once the TACC is set the quotas are distributed to quota owners through the QMS.

Quotas are generated when a stock is introduced into the quota management system. The quota for a stock is expressed as shares (ITQs). Each TACC is divided into 100 million ITQ shares. In 1986 New Zealand adopted ITQs as a cornerstone of the QMS. The initial allocation process of the ITQs in 1985- 86 was based on the principle that quota entitlement should reflect the commitment to the fishery (Connor, 2001). For deep-water fisheries, a similar criterion was already adopted in 1983, where the commitment was assessed considering the catch levels, the companies' degree of investment in the activity (e.g. processing, employment) and fishing capital (Connor, 2001). Therefore, the initial allocation in 1986 was based on catch records between 1982 and 1984 and adjusted according to commitment and dependence factors. The commitment factor considered recent investments made by fishers into the fishery, investments that did not generate yet any financial returns. Dependence took into account if the continuation of fishing was vital to the ability of fishers to support themselves (Bess, 2005). While this criterion was intended to preserve the status quo of a fishery and to gain the support of the industry (Bess, 2005), it penalised small fishers (many of them Maori) who were not

39 https://www.mpi.govt.nz/law-and-policy/legal-overviews/fisheries/quota-management-system/

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able to meet the required condition to obtain ITQs (McCormack, 2016). The ITQs could be subdivided, leased or sold. Initially ITQs were a fixed amount of absolute tonnage of fish allocated in perpetuity (Mace et al., 2014). While this system was designed to provide the fishing industry with a reduced uncertainty in the annual catches, it clearly failed in representing the natural variation in the abundance of the fish stocks and, in 1990, the QMS was changed from fixed to proportional shares of the TACCs (Mace et al., 2014).

Between 1986 and 2001 fisheries managers adopted multiple mechanisms to manage the bycatch of non-target species in the QMS and to balance catch against quota. According to Peacey (2002) and Mace et al. (2014) these mechanisms included: i) Transfer up to 10% of unfished quotas to the next year. ii) Bring forward up to 10% of ITQ holdings from the following year. iii) Surrender all the fish caught without ITQ to the government. iv) trade (buy or lease) uncaught ITQ by the end of the fishing year. v) trade-off catch of one fish stock against ITQ of another fish stock taken in the same fishery (bycatch trade-off scheme). i) Pay a deemed value for overcaught quota of each fish stock.

The allocation under the 1996 Fisheries Act removed the consideration of commitment and dependence (Bess, 2005). ITQ allocations were based on: i) the best twelve consecutive months of catch history during the 1990/91 and 1991/92 fishing years; or ii) the Individual Catch Entitlements (ICE) (Bess, 2005). ICE was an annual amount of a fish stock that the permit holder was able to catch in a non-ITQ fishery that had a commercial catch limit (Bess, 2005). ICE allocation could also (but not necessarily) be based on previous catch history (the chief executive was able to allocate ICE based in whole or in part on the fisher's previous catch history for that stock). When present, ICE was used to determine the “provisional catch history” (PCH), which represented the base on which to calculate the future ITQs if the species become managed through the QMS. However, ICE only ever existed for a very small number of fisheries.

The Fisheries Amendment Act 2004 (No. 2) changed again the way that quota was allocated. This amendment stopped the use of ICE to control the catch of non-ITQ species and removed the use of ICE to establish PCH allocation (Lock & Leslie, 2007). After 1 October 2009, PCH was not considered anymore in quota allocation for all species, except for tuna inside New Zealand waters and highly migratory species outside New Zealand waters.

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In 2001 a new system, based on annual catch entitlements (ACE), was introduced to simplify the catch balancing regime and facilitate the transfer of catching rights. ACE is the catching right generated each year from quota and gives the holder the right to take a certain amount (weight) of fish stock during the fishing year (Mace et al., 2014). While ITQ shares represent the long-term asset owned by a single person (including any legal entity and "associated persons"), ACE is the annual harvest right and is allocated to the entities that own quota shares at the beginning of the fishing year. On the first day of the fishing year, each ITQ generates for each quota holder, and each stock, an amount of ACE, in kg. ACE is not required to be owned before fishing occurs, which represents an essential change from the previous regulations. The introduction of ACE defined a clear separation between the right to harvest a specific amount of stock in a particular year and the permanent ownership of the harvest right (Lock & Leslie, 2007).

4.6.2 Quota allocation method Following changes in 2004 (Fisheries Amendment Act 2004), quota for all future species introduced into the QMS was, with the exception of tuna and other highly migratory species, subject to a tender process rather than allocation by catch history. Currently, when a species is introduced into the QMS, the Crown and Te Ohu Kai Moana (TOKM; the corporate trustee which manages Maori fishing assets) will receive 80 million and 20 million quota shares respectively. The Crown quota will usually then be made available to the fishing industry and other interested parties through the Government quota tendering process, which does not provide preferential access to any interest groups. The introduction of new species into the QMS via public tender has created an opportunity for more New Zealanders to become involved in developmental fisheries.

In the QMS, owners are able to sell their current harvesting entitlement/ACE, while retaining their long-term ownership of the fishery. ACE can only be obtained by: i) owning quota shares (ITQ) at the beginning of the fishing year or at the time of an in-season TAC increase or ii) purchasing ACE from another vessel (Mace et al., 2014).

Catch balancing is regulated through the trade of ACE as well as the payment of a deemed value for overcaught quota of each fish stock. Fishers are currently required to pay an interim deemed value for each unit of catch they land above their ACE holdings (Marchal et al., 2016). This system regulates the potential mismatch between catch and ACE held and is composed of two parts: i) a refundable interim deemed value which is paid at the end of every month; and ii) a non-refundable annual deemed value which is payable at the end of the fishing year. The amount paid through the monthly

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deemed value is credited against the annual deemed value. Similarly to the TAC and the TACC, the deemed value is also reviewed annually in order to reflect fluctuations in fish port and quota prices (Mace et al., 2014; Marchal et al., 2016). ACE holders are also allowed to carry forward up to 10% of their ACE to the following fishing year. However, the % of ACE carried forward is lost if the TACC is reduced (Marchal et al., 2016).

4.6.3 Trading rules (national and international) Before the introduction of ACE, leasing quota was legally complicated as the quota holders were leasing the ownership right to the resource (long-term right) for a short period of time (Lock & Leslie, 2007). This situation was simplified in 2001 with the introduction of ACE, when individuals became able to purchase the right to harvest fish for a particular fishing season without changing the permanent ownership of the harvest right (Lock & Leslie, 2007). ACE are traded through an open ACE market, via broker and bilateral trading agreements.

In New Zealand markets exists both for selling the perpetual rights to fish a certain quota stock (ITQs) and for leasing quotas (ACE). In practice, all leases are for a period of one year or less. Although there are no official statistics, it has been recognised that the majority of the transactions between small and medium-sized quota owners take place through brokers, which cover a brokerage fee between 1% and 3% of the total value of the trade (Newell et al., 2005). Quota prices and quantities for sale or lease are usually advertised by brokers in trade magazines, newspapers, and on the internet. Larger companies, on the other hand, have quota managers on staff and engage in bilateral trades with other large companies (Newell et al., 2005). All quota trades have a fee associated with them and all quota trades must be registered with a subsidiary of the NZ Fishing Industry Board (FishServe)40.

Both ITQs and ACE are freely tradable on the open market and accessible to any New Zealand citizen (Marchal et al., 2016). No pre-trade approval is required and there is no limit on the number of times that the quota can be sold. ITQs and ACE are divisible so that quota owners can trade parts of their fishing rights. Overseas companies can obtain both ITQs and ACE only if it can be demonstrated that New Zealand will benefit from the exchange. If New Zealand ceases to benefit from a specific quota trade with foreign companies, the government is entitled to take back the quota and ACE without any compensation.

40 https://www.fishserve.co.nz/

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The current system also established statutory limits on the accumulation of quota (Section 59 of the Fisheries Act, 199641). This controls the percentage ITQs a single person (including any legal entity and "associated persons") may hold in a particular species, thus restricting the level of quota aggregation (Stewart & Callagher, 2011). Some species have aggregation limits at a species level (the sum of all the TACCs of all QMAs for that species), while other species have aggregation limits at a stock level. This aggregation limit is generally set at 35%, but in some important mid-depth and deep water fisheries the limit is set at 45%. Exemption from aggregation limits is provided to the Crown, Te Ohu Kaimoana Trustee Limited (Maori Fisheries Trust) and the Chatham Islands Enterprise Trust. In particular, the Maori Fisheries Settlement Act (2004) establishes specific rules for quota allocation in Chatham Island and among tribes. Aggregation limits do not apply to ACE.

Minimum limits for holding quota are also in place establishing that no person is able to hold quota (ITQs) equivalent to less than 5 tonnes of a finfish species, 3 tonnes of rock lobster and 1 tonne of any other shellfish species within any QMA. For ACE, minimum holding levels have only been put in place for few species.

4.6.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure) Various positive effects of the current Quota Management System in place in New Zealand have been stressed by many authors, and in particular:  The Quota Management System helps ensure sustainable utilisation of fisheries resources by controlling the harvest levels for each species in a nominated geographical area (QMA42). The QMS has been successful in improving the biological status of the resources as well as the economic performance of the commercial industry (Annala, 1996; Marchal et al., 2016).

 The change of the quota allocation system, from allocation by catch history to allocation subject to a tender process had a positive effect to avoid the increase of fishing effort for the non-QMS species. In fact, with the previous system, fishers increased effort to catch non-QMS species once they understood the value that catch history had for ITQ allocations, thus threatening the biological status of many resources (Bess, 2005).

41 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0088/latest/DLM394192.html

42 https://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=81

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 The ACE system allows quota owners who decide not to fish their annual catch share to remain in the industry, obtaining an annual return from the sale of ACE. This system also facilitates fishers to exploit multiple species in the inshore fishery as fishers go online, enter their permit number, and top up their ACE requirements. This system thus enhances entry opportunities for small-scale fishers (Stewart & Callagher, 2011). The proliferation of ACE fishers is restricted to the inshore fishery, while the entry into the deep-water fisheries, which are characterised by larger vessels with high costs and investments, is limited by the high economic performance required.

 The dynamism promoted by ACE mechanism, together with the transparency of the ACE market facilitate the entry of new (or the re-entry of former) fishers (e.g. Snapper fishery). In addition the ACE market represents an effective platform where price and information are freely available and transaction costs are reduced.

 The New Zealand ITQ system is very flexible (more flexible than the Icelandic one), and every New Zealand citizen may acquire ITQ or ACE, because the quota ownership is not restricted to vessel owners. This system thus tends to contrast, at least in part, with the accumulation of quota holding into few big companies. The quota concentration limits imposed have also safeguarded the fishing opportunities of specific communities.

 The ITQ system implemented has enhanced the productivity of the New Zealand fishing industries. Batstone & Sharp (1999) provided evidence of the increase in harvest by domestic vessels, an export growth, and an increase of fishing employment.

Besides many positive aspects, some weaknesses of the ITQ system implemented in New Zealand have also been stressed:  In the QMS, the overall quota ownership (ITQs, permanent/long-term asset) continues to become more concentrated. While the limits on quota accumulation prevent the emergence of a monopoly market structure over the quota for a fish stock, they make possible the existence of a tight oligopoly, where the entire quota for a species could be held by only three or four fishers, potentially generating social conflicts.

 The concentration of the ownership of ITQs has the potential of encouraging the sustainable management of the fishery. The ACE regime in turn has allowed for increased participation in the inshore fishery. It is unclear if this wider participation could threaten the sustainability and efficiency of the fisheries.

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 The open quota ownership to the general public can be an obstacle to the fishing industries to maximise their profits.

4.6.5 SWOT analysis

Strengths Weaknesses  Rationalisation of the fishing fleets and  The open quota ownership to the general reduction of the over-capacity public can be an obstacle for fishing industries looking to maximise their profits  Fish stocks recover from overfishing

 The allocation subject to tender has positive effect to avoid the increase of fishing effort for the non-QMS species.

 Increase of fishing profitability, export and fishing employment.

 The ACE system revitalize inshore fisheries

 Transparency of the ACE market

Opportunities Threats  Processors can purchase (and sell) ITQs and  Concentration of the ITQs (oligopoly) with ACE, which can improve the information potential social conflicts flow (e.g. real time catch and price) and  The ACE regime has allowed for increased product quality. participation in the inshore fishery. This  New entry opportunities for small-scale wider participation could threaten the fishers for the existing and new QMS sustainability and efficiency of the fisheries. fisheries

 Opportunities to be involved in the business for every New Zealand citizen

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4.7 USA

4.7.1 Overview The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) represents the primary law governing marine fisheries management in US federal waters. The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) created eight regional fishery management councils (hereafter: Councils) responsible for the fisheries management in their region. The Councils are composed of members representing the commercial and recreational fishing sectors in addition to environmental, academic, and government interests. Using scientific data from the stock assessment provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries Service, the Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee recommends the stock’s acceptable biological catch (ABC). Councils set annual catch limits (ACL), which cannot exceed the Scientific and Statistical Committee’s recommendation for acceptable biological catch (ABC). Finally, the Council determines the TAC based on social and economic considerations, where TAC ≤ ACL ≤ ABC. All federal fisheries are currently managed under annual catch limits except for international fisheries and stocks with a short (one year) life history43.

In the USA, fisheries management through the use of a quota share system is applied in different regions under the so called “catch share program”. NOAA’s usage of the term “catch share” is shorthand for several fishery management strategies that allocate a specific portion of the annual overall catch limit to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. Each recipient of a catch share is required to stop fishing when its exclusive allocation is reached. Catch shares involves specific management programs, including the “individual fishing quota" (IFQ) programs. The term "IFQ", which includes the Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ), is used to include programs where the quota share is not (or not fully) transferable. Catch share programs have been used in US federal fisheries since 1990. Individual fishing quotas are applied in the Alaska, Greater Atlantic, Pacific Islands, Southeast and Caribbean, and West Coast regions.

The earliest IFQ programs in US were initiated at the beginning of the 1990s, such as the IFQ Program for the Alaskan Pacific halibut and sablefish fisheries and the ITQ program for the Atlantic surfclam and ocean quahog fisheries. Alaska halibut and sablefish fisheries are regulated by similar IFQ programs. Before 1995, when IFQ systems in the fixed-gear halibut and sablefish fisheries off Alaska were instituted, both fisheries were managed through TAC and seasonal limitations (fishery permitted

43 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/management/acls_ams/index.html

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only during a specific, often short, season) (Hartley & Fina, 2001). The entry to both fisheries, which were separated into regulatory areas, was cost-free to fishers equipped and operating in other fisheries. TACs were set for each species in each respective regulatory area, which reflected the biological distribution of the stocks of fish. For both fisheries, this management strategy led to an intensive fishing and the fishing seasons became progressively shorter (Pautzke & Oliver, 1997).

Hartley & Fina (2001) underlined various problems associated with this management system:

 Safety at sea was often compromised because fishers would intensively fish during the short season regardless of weather.  TAC management was often imprecise, especially in short seasons (e.g. halibut fishery), because individual fishers were permitted unlimited catch during the season, and thus over- or under- harvesting could not be predicted.  Fishing overcapacity. As seasons were shortened, fishers overequipped their vessels with redundant gears.  Excessive gear losses. To maximize catch in the short (often single-day) season, fishers would set more lines than they could retrieve in the allowable time (so the lines in excess were simply abandoned). The gear losses worsened the potential condition of overfishing.  General poor quality of the product. The race for fish in the short season led to poor handling and storage of some catch and the higher-value fresh fish would only be available for a short time after the fishing season (most of the fish caught during short seasons was frozen for later use).

These problems were often common, at least in part, to other fisheries in different regions determining a gradual expansion of IFQs programs. Table 4-3 gives a summary of the principal IFQ programs. Quota allocation for highly migratory species such as tuna is not included as they do not rely on quota share

4.7.2 Quota allocation method For most of the IFQ programs implemented in the US, the initial quota allocation has generally been based on the vessel’s historical catch record during previous years. However, the participants in the IFQ programs (harvesters, processors and coastal communities) as well as the rules in the allocation method and the conditions to obtain a quota share vary between regions and inside the same region (Table 4-3).

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To avoid opposition to the IFQ program and to preserve the existing fleet structure, no charge on quota shares issuance was generally applied at the beginning of an IFQ program. Payments for initial allocation might have excluded some traditional participants from the fleet due to their potential inability to afford quota shares. However, from 2001, a cost-recovery fee program has been implemented to cover the majority of the costs of program administration. Under the cost-recovery program fishers are charged a fee of up to 3% of the ex-vessel value (value that fishers receive for their catch at the dock) of IFQ landings. Total fee collections cannot exceed the annual cost of program management and enforcement.

4.7.3 Trading rules (national and international) Different trading rules of Quota Share (QS, the percentage of the sector's catch limit to which the holder of quota shares may harvest) and Quota Pound (QP, the annual amount of resource a participant is allowed to catch, usually defined in terms of total weight) are established depending on the fisheries and the region. Several restrictions on the sale of quota shares were adopted at the beginning of various IFQ program (e.g., Alaskan Pacific sablefish and halibut fisheries) generally to avoid excessive consolidation and other changes in the character of the fishing fleet. In many cases trading rules changed after few years from the implementation of the programs (Table 4-3). Caps are often imposed to limit the amount of QS and QP a person/vessel can hold. These caps are intended to prevent negative impacts of an excessive consolidation of shares. Different caps are chosen for the different fisheries because fleet characteristics and dependence differ across fisheries (Table 4-3).

All QP transfers must be done through an online system operated by NMFS, which provides a publicly available listing44 of IFQ permit holders and their QS and QP holdings and a web-based system to implement transfers of QP between permit holders. This represents the main platform for quota trade and represents a relatively simple way to transfer QP, but it did not automatically create a functional QP market (Holland & Norman, 2015).

44 https://www.webapps.nwfsc.noaa.gov/apex/ifq/f?p=155:1::::::

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.

Table 4-3, Examples of management system with quota shares by region of the USA

Alaska

Sector Allocation rules Additional notes Trading rules Community A portion of the federal TAC for commercially important CDQ shares are non-transferable, but the communities can hire Development Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) species — fishers to fish their quota. Quota - CDQ including pollock, crab, halibut, and various groundfish Some communities have sold the annual harvest rights to in the Bering Sea — is allocated to participants in the fishers, and transfers of annual fishing rights for royalties have CDQ Program (65 eligible West Alaskan fishing proven an effective source of income. communities and the community of Adak). The CDQ Program was implemented by the North Pacific Fishery Other communities have developed their own fishing sector Management Council and NMFS in 1992 with and have benefited from both revenue created and jobs allocations of 7.5% of the pollock TAC. Allocations of generated by the CDQ program. halibut and sablefish were added to the program in 1995. Currently, the CDQ Program is allocated portions of the groundfish fishery that range from 7.5% to 10.7%. Alaskan Vessel owners with landings records of halibut or There are two main types of vessels During the first three years of the IFQ program, catcher vessel Pacific sablefish in 1988, 1989 or 1990 were eligible to receive in the fishery, each with specified shareholders were only allowed to lease 10% of their shares sablefish and quota shares. For halibut, one quota share was issued quota share categories: per year, and were not allowed to permanently sell shares halibut for each pound of halibut landings recorded in the (Pautzke and Oliver 1997). 1. catcher-processor vessels (also fisheries fisher's best five of the seven years from 1984 to 1990 called freezer longliners) and Quota shares can only be traded within their respective vessel inclusive, while for sablefish in the best five of the six 2. catcher vessels, which are further class size, vessel operation mode and region. Each vessel class years from 1985 to 1990 inclusive. divided into size categories. has particular rules on trading: Crews were therefore excluded from the allocation of There are 3 vessel categories for Catcher vessels can only permanently transfer (i.e., sell) quota shares. halibut and 2 vessel categories to “eligible buyers,” (e.g. participants who received quota for sablefish. shares during initial allocation). Temporary leasing is not allowed in the catcher vessel class. Catcher-processor vessel quota shares can be temporarily leased and permanently transferred to any US citizen.

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Minimal inter-season trading is also permitted. Participants are cannot carry over unused quota, but in the event of overage, they can borrow up to 10% of the following year’s share (Mcllwain, 2013) Bering Sea To receive a QS allocation, a harvester must hold a A processing privilege is allocated to Transfer of QS and IFQ, either by sale or lease, are allowed, and Aleutian permanent, fully transferable licence from the License processors. Qualified processors subject to limits including caps on the amount of shares a Islands (BSAI) Limitation Program (LLP) endorsed for that crab fishery. (processors with processing history person may hold or use. Separate caps will be imposed to limit King and The Licence Limitation Program required harvesters to during a specified qualifying period the amount of QS and IFQ a person can hold and to limit the Tanner Crabs hold an LLP license to participate in Gulf of Alaska for each fishery) are allocated use of IFQ on board a vessel. Fisheries (GOA) fisheries. The harvester’s allocation of QS for a processor quota share (PQS) in each Vessel concentration caps differ across the crab stocks, ranging fishery was based on the landings made by the vessel in crab fishery. from 1-10%. Crew share concentration caps also differ across that fishery during a specific qualifying period, which PQS represents an exclusive but the fisheries, ranging from 2-20% of the total crew shares. was selected to balance historical and recent revocable privilege to receive Vessels that are not part of Cooperatives are restricted to participation. deliveries of a specific portion of the fishing between 2% and 20% of the total shares. The IFQ for a vessel are issued in two classes, Class A annual TAC from a fishery. The Processor shares are transferable, including the leasing of IPQs IFQ and Class B IFQ. annual allocation of pounds of crab and the sale of PQS, subject to caps and to community based on the PQS is IPQ, which is the 1. Crabs harvested with Class A IFQ must be delivered protection measures. IPQs can be used without transfer at any correspondent of IFQ for the to a processor holding unused processing quota. In facility or plant operated by a processor. New processors can extracting sector. IPQ are issued for addition these IFQs are subject to a regional delivery enter the fishery by purchasing PQS or IPQ or by purchasing 90% of the IFQ allocated harvesters, requirement (they must be delivered either in a North crab harvested with Class B IFQ or crab harvested by CDQ equalling the amount of IFQ or in a South region). groups or the Adak community entity. A PQS holder is limited allocated as Class A IFQ. IPQs will be to holding 30% of the PQS issued for a fishery, except that 2. Crabs harvested with Class B IFQ can be delivered to regionally designated for processing initial allocations of shares above this limit can be retained and any processor and will not be regionally designated. (corresponding to the regional used. Landings in excess of IFQ will be forfeited in all cases. designation of the Class A IFQ). For each region of each fishery, the allocation of Class B IFQ could be transferred between crab harvesting Harvesters may form voluntary crab IFQ are 10% of the total allocation of IFQ to the cooperatives, subject to NMFS’ approval. harvesting cooperatives in order to harvesting sector. collectively harvest their IFQ Unlike the Alaskan Pacific sablefish and halibut holdings. A minimum membership of fisheries, qualifying crew were allocated 3% of the four unique QS holders is required to initial QS pool. form a crab harvesting cooperative. Central Gulf of The Rockfish Program allocated harvest privileges to Rockfish QS may only be harvested Both permanent and temporary transfers are permitted under Alaska holders of LLP groundfish licenses with a history of through cooperative membership. the program, with some restrictions. Quota shares can be sold Rockfish Central GOA rockfish legal landings associated with No minimum number of LLP licenses permanently as a package, but are not allowed to be divided or

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Program those licenses. LLP license holders were eligible to is required to form a cooperative. On sold separately from the license. Annual allocations of (Rockfish receive rockfish QS if the LLP license was used to make an annual basis, an LLP holder will Cooperative Quota can be transferred both between Program). legal landings of rockfish primary species between 2000 assign the LLP license and rockfish QS Cooperatives and within Cooperatives during the fishing and 2006, or participated in the “Pilot Program” entry for use in a rockfish cooperative. season. Within the Cooperatives, members are able to freely level trawl fishery in 2007, 2008, or 2009. Each rockfish cooperative receives an transfer their allocations to maximize fishing efficiency and annual Cooperative Quota (CQ), minimize halibut catch (FCA, 2010). Inter-Cooperative transfers LLP licenses that received initial allocations based on based on the collective rockfish QS of can occur before and after the quota are fished to cover legal landings (best 5 of 7 years) between 2000 and the LLP licenses held by the unintended overages. To protect the shore-based processors 2006 were given 97.5% of the total allowable catch cooperative members. CQ is an and the community of Kodiak, a “one-way” transfer rule (TAC). LLP licenses used to make rockfish legal landings amount of rockfish primary and prohibits catcher-processor Cooperatives from receiving in the Pilot Program entry level trawl fishery, in 2007, secondary species, and halibut Cooperative Quota from catcher vessels. This was designed to 2008, or 2009, received an initial allocation of 2.5% of prohibited species catch (PSC) that increase the fish available for processing by Kodiak-based the TAC under the Rockfish Program. may be harvested by that rockfish processors, which has strengthened local employment cooperative in that fishing year. opportunities (Mcilwain & Hill, 2013). Caps limits are applied on the A minimum of 2 LLP licenses in each cooperative is required to amount of rockfish QS that may be transfer CQ. Transfer of CQ would be valid only during the held or used by a rockfish eligible calendar year of the transfer. harvester and the amount of CQ that may be held or used by a rockfish cooperative, harvested by a vessel, or received or processed by a rockfish processor. Greater Atlantic

Sector Allocation rules Additional notes Trading rules Individual A vessel is eligible to be issued an IFQ scallop permit if it A vessel issued an IFQ scallop permit IFQ scallop vessels can transfer IFQ on a temporary or fishing quota landed at least 1,000 lb (454 kg) of scallop meat in any may not be allocated more than 2% permanent basis. LAGC scallop fishing year between March 1, 2000, and November 1, of the TAC allocated to the fleet of Each IFQ allocation must be transferred in full before it is permit (IFQ 2004, and a limited access general category (LAGC) vessels issued IFQ scallop permits. In utilized, and a vessel that uses IFQ in a fishing year cannot scallop scallop permit had been issued to the vessel during the addition, an individual may not have transfer its IFQ during that fishing year. An IFQ can be permit). fishing year in which the landings were made. ownership interest in more than 5% transferred only once in a fishing year. An IFQ transfer is not of the TAC allocated to the fleet of A vessel issued an IFQ scallop permit receives a approved if it results in the receiving IFQ scallop vessel having a vessels issued IFQ scallop permits. percentage of the TAC based on the vessel’s share of more than 2% of the total TAC allocation to the IFQ ‘‘contribution factor.’’ The contribution factor for each fishery.

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vessel is determined by multiplying a vessel’s best fishing year of landings during the March 1, 2000, through November 1, 2004 (qualification period) by an index factor based on the number of years the vessel was active in the scallop fishery during the qualification period. The owner of a vessel who cannot qualify for an IFQ scallop permit can apply for and be issued a Northern Gulf of Maine (NGOM) or Incidental scallop permit. These permits have the same qualification requirement but have the following restrictions: to land up to 200 lb (90.7 kg) per trip and fish exclusively within the most Northern portion of the scallop resource.

Individual Allocation of surf clams for vessels coming from ports in For both surf clams and ocean quahogs - which are part of the Transferable the Mid-Atlantic area - the vast majority of vessels in same fishery management plan but managed separately - the Quota (ITQ) the fishery - was primarily based on the vessel's average ITQ is a percentage of the TAC. The ITQ has two components: Program for historical catch between 1979 and 1988. The last four (a) the "quota share," expressed in percentages of the TAC, the Atlantic years were counted twice and the two worst years which can be transferred permanently, and (b) the "allocation surfclam and were excluded. The resulting figures were summed and permit", which takes the physical form of a set of tags that are ocean quahog divided by the total catch of all harvesters for the allocated at the beginning of each calendar year to the ITQ fishery period. 80% of a vessel's allocation came from this holders. These coded tags are associated to the 32-bushel steel ratio, while 20% was computed on the basis of the mesh cages in which the clams and quahogs are moved to the vessel's cubic capacity (length x width x depth). This last processing plants. They can be transferred only within a % was called “cost factor”, to take into account calendar year. Cage tags may be sold to other individuals but participants without strong historical landings who had they are valid for only one calendar year. invested in larger (replacement) vessels. The minimum holding of ITQs is five cages (160 bushels); there The allocation method chosen for ocean quahog vessels is no maximum holding and no limit to accumulation. By law (which might be surf clam vessels as well) and for surf the ITQ is not a property right; it is designated revocable clam vessels coming from New England ports (a distinct privilege. minority) was simply determined from the average historical catch for the years actually fished between 1979 and 1988, excluding the year of the lowest catch.

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Mid-Atlantic To qualify for an IFQ Allocation Permit, an applicant was For the initial allocation of permits, An IFQ Allocation Permit grants an individual or entity a Golden required to have a vessel with a recent tilefish fishing 3% of the catch limit was set aside percentage of the IFQ catch limit that may be possessed, Tilefish history, a valid permit in 2005 and average landings of for research, 5% was allocated to the leased or transferred within the Tilefish Management Unit for Individual at least 0.5% of their category’s average total from incidental catch category and 15% each year. Each annual permit also notes the total pounds Fishing Quota 2001 to 2005 (Poon, 2013) was set aside for appeals resolution. allowed for the fishing year (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009b). Program The remaining 77% was distributed An IFQ Allocation Permit may be permanently or temporarily between the full-time and part-time transferred to any eligible US citizen, and the 49% ownership fishing categories based on recent cap is the only limitation on trading (NOAA Fisheries Service, landings (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009) 2009)

Allocation of Consistent with ICCAT recommendation on annual TAC Allocations of individual BFT quota to individual Purse Seine Bluefin tuna of Bluefin tuna, the US quota is allocated among: participants may only be transferred through leasing. Any (BFT) quota quota allocation that is unused at the end of the fishing year 1. General category vessels- e.g. Charter vessels and may not be carried forward. commercial fishermen using rod and line gear. The permit holders of vessels issued valid Atlantic Tunas 2. Angling vessels Longline permits and participants in the Atlantic Tunas Purse 3. Longline vessels. Seine category are eligible to lease IBQ allocation to and/or from each other. A person who holds an Atlantic Tunas 4. Purse seiners. Longline permit that is not associated with a vessel may not For each of the categories 1-3, quota available is issued lease IBQ allocation. for the whole category and fishing is closed when the

quota is reached. For purse seiners, individual allocations are based in part to equal allocation among purse seine participants and then based on annual adjustment based on the previous year's catch In addition under the Individual Bluefin Quota (IBQ)? Program, NMFS assign eligible Atlantic Tunas Longline permit holders initial IBQ shares, which represent the amount of BFT that can be incidentally caught during a calendar year. The IBQ share is equivalent to a percentage of the annual Longline category quota. Pacific Islands

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Western and Catch limit for bigeye tuna in the in the US EEZ No ITQ program implemented. Central Pacific surrounding the Hawaiian Archipelago and in the Longline- Convention area of the Central Pacific Fisheries Bigeye Tuna Commission (WCPFC) by US longline vessels are Catch Limits established by the NMFS. Catch limits are issued for the whole category and fishing is close when the quota is reached. Southeast and Caribbean

Gulf of RS-IFQ. Initial shares were issued to Gulf reef fish For the first five years, IFQ shares/allocations could be Mexico red permit holders with valid Class 1 (vessels harvesting up transferred only to individuals/vessels with a valid commercial snapper IFQ to 2,000 lb per trip) or Class 2 (vessels harvesting up to reef fish permit and to US citizens and permanent resident (RS-IFQ) and 200 lb per trip) red snapper licenses on November aliens thereafter. After this period all US citizens and grouper and 2006, based on the amount of red snapper landings permanent resident aliens with an IFQ shareholder account tilefish IFQ reported under each vessel class during the qualifying were eligible for and IFQ shares and allocation. (GT-IFQ) time period. For Class 1 license holders, RS-IFQ shares Each shareholder is allowed to harvest their allocation, transfer were based on the best ten consecutive years from their allocation to other fishermen, or purchase allocation from 1990-2004. For Class 1 historical license other fishermen. holders, RS-IFQ shares were based on seven years of landings from 1998-2004. For Class 2 license holders, A share cap of ~6% for red snapper was based on the maximum RS-IFQ shares were based on the best five years of RS-IFQ share issued to a person, business, or other entity at the landings from 1998-2004. time of initial apportionment. For tilefish the share cap is ~12% GT-IFQ. Initial IFQ shares were allocated to everyone All transfers take place online via the IFQ Web site who owned a valid or renewable commercial Gulf of IFQ shareholders can land 10% over their remaining allocation Mexico reef fish permit as of October 1, 2009, and who on the last fishing trip of the year. Any overage are deducted had grouper or tilefish landings reported under their from the shareholder's allocation for the next fishing year. permit during the qualifying time period of 1999 through 2004. Owners of a valid or renewable commercial Gulf of Mexico reef fish permit that did not have any landings during the qualifying time period did not receive initial IFQ shares or allocation but were able to purchase shares or allocation from IFQ shareholders.

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West coast

West Coast The Shore-based IFQ Program applies to qualified Under the Shore-based IFQ Program, both Quota Share (QS) Groundfish participants in the Pacific Coast Groundfish fishery and and Quota Pound (QP) are transferable between vessels. All US Trawl Catch includes a system of transferable QS for most citizens will be eligible to acquire QS percentages from existing Share groundfish species or species groups, IBQ (individual QS owners. However, the program places limits on the amount Program- bycatch quota) for Pacific halibut, and trip limits or set- of QS that can be owned or controlled by one person, or the shore-based asides for the remaining groundfish species or species amount of QP that can be assigned to a vessel’s QP account. IFQ program groups. These accumulation limits are expressed as a percentage of the Shore-based IFQ Program’s allocation. From 2016, any QS held For each limited entry trawl permit owner, QS by a person in excess of the accumulation limits will be revoked allocations are established for: and redistributed to the remainder of the qualified fishermen 1. Non-whiting trips. NMFS calculates the non-whiting in proportion to their QS holdings. No compensation will be preliminary QS allocation differently for different due for any revoked share. species groups, Groups 1 through 3. For the Group 1 The Shore-based IFQ Program accumulation limits vary species, the preliminary QS allocation follows a two- between 2.5 and 17.7% depending on the species step process, one to allocate a pool of QS equally among all eligible limited entry permits and the other to allocate the remainder of the preliminary QS based on permit history. For the Group 2 species, QS allocation is linked to the 2003-200 Logbook catch data. Allocation of Group 3 species combined the two approached for Group 1 and 2 species. 2. whiting trips. The preliminary QS allocation follows a two-steps process, one to allocate a pool of QS equally among all eligible limited entry permits and the other to allocate the remainder of the preliminary QS based on permit history. Through these two processes, preliminary QS totalling 100% for each species will be allocated. In later steps, this amount will be adjusted. 3. the Pacific halibut IBQ allocation formula is based on i) QS allocation of 2 target species, ii) area of distribution of fishing effort, iii) average bycatch ratio by area and iv) non-whiting QS allocation.

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4.7.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure)

Positive effects of the introduction of different quota systems in the U.S fisheries can be summarised in the following points:

 The CDQ program was designed to assist area communities by allocating them portions of the TAC. However, unlike Iceland, whose community quota system aimed to maintain the fishing activity in the coastal communities, the aim of the CDQ program in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) was to create fishing opportunities in the communities where it was applied (communities often characterised by lack of economic capital). In particular, the aim of the CDQ program was to support economic development in western Alaska, to alleviate poverty and provide economic and social benefits for residents of western Alaska and to achieve sustainable and diversified local economies in western Alaska. At the beginning of the CDQ program, the 65 Western Alaskan communities represented by the CDQ organizations had inadequate infrastructure, low household income, and high unemployment. With the allocation of 10% of pollock harvests, western Alaskans gained access to valuable offshore resources that were otherwise unattainable (Criddle & Strong, 2013). While initially the CDQ organizations derived their income from royalties obtained from leasing their quota shares, most of their current revenue is now generated from investments in fishery-related enterprises (Criddle & Strong, 2013).

 In the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands management area (Northeast Pacific) the use of annual catch limits (ACL) reduced the risk of overfishing and enhanced the recovery of overfished stocks (Dicosimo et al., 2010). Although there has been resistance by some councils to move from input controls to output controls as the primary means of limiting commercial harvests, it has been recognised that the probability of success under the ACL system is higher than under current input controls (Dicosimo et al., 2010).

 By distributing shares based on historical catch, the initial allocation of IFQs in the halibut and sablefish fisheries (as well as in other IFQ fisheries) was based on preserving the character of the fleet. The broadly inclusive initial allocation had the effect of limiting the dissatisfaction of excluded fishers and, once active in the fishery, fishers could trade shares in the market to determine their level of participation.

 The adoption of an IFQ program in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery (RS-IFQ program) caused important structural changes in the fleet. The fleet size fell by 29% and the number of

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days fished and crew-days declined by 4% and 6%, respectively and improvements in the technical efficiency and profitability were documented (Solís et al., 2015). The RS-IFQ program 5-year review (GMFMC and NMFS, 2013) concluded that the RS-IFQ program has had moderate success in reducing overcapacity. The IFQ program was successful in mitigating the “race to fish” behaviour, and the fishing season expanded allowing fishers to harvest, process, and market their catch more efficiently (Solís et al., 2015). The findings of the study suggest that the IFQ program had a positive impact on the productivity of the fleet, which was driven by changes in technical efficiency (83%) followed by changes in stock abundance (12%) and technical change (5%). In addition, safety at sea has increased and annual mortalities related to fishing have declined since the RS-IFQ implementation (GMFMC and NMFS, 2013).

Besides the positive output mentioned above, some negative aspects of the systems implemented need to be underlined:  In the Alaskan fisheries, the Community Development Quota (CDQ) program is allocated portions of the groundfish fishery that range from 10.7% to 7.5%. The rest of the TAC is portioned between four fishing sectors (Catcher Processors (CPs), High Seas Catcher Vessels (HSCVs), Catcher Vessels (CVs) that delivered to at-sea motherships, and CVs that delivered to shore-based processors). CDQ can be leased to any of these sectors, but leasing or sale between sectors is not allowed. These limits on intersectoral transfers have reduced the ability of sectors to respond to changes in the abundance and distribution of target species (especially pollock), in the prices of input factors (e.g. fuel) and products and ultimately to maximise the profitability (Criddle & Strong, 2013).

 The RS-IFQ program has not yet reach an economically optimal fleet configuration as one-fifth of the existing fleet could feasibly harvest the entire quota (Solís, del Corral, Perruso, & Agar, 2014). Thus, additional reductions in fleet capacity are still necessary to achieve the economically efficient fleet size. In addition, the red snapper stock remains overfished, although it is not subject to overfishing (Solís et al., 2015).

 The IFQ quota market does not appear to be particularly efficient. For example, the QP market for Pacific groundfish IFQ has high price dispersion and a small number of transactions for species that are not primary targets (Holland & Norman, 2015). The Pacific groundfish fishery is highly complex and has relatively rigid catch balancing rules, which can affect the efficiency of the market. In this context, many multispecies IFQ fisheries include a number of catch balancing mechanisms that provide flexibility thus reducing the uncertainty and the risk fishers face if there is a mismatch between current and expected catches. In the Pacific

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groundfish IFQ each vessel account can carry over as much as 10% of its QP by species, which appears to be a measure less flexible that other IFQ systems (e.g. New Zealand, Iceland) (Holland & Norman, 2015).

4.7.5 SWOT analysis Strengths Weaknesses  The CDQ program provided economic and  Only few fisheries are managed purely using social benefits for residents of western ITQs. The system requires a substantial Alaska administrative input.

 Increase of fishing profitability  Inefficient QP market

 Increase safety at sea

 Improvement of the state of the stocks

Opportunities Threats  New economic opportunity created by the  Limits in quota trade can obstruct fishing CDQ program efficiency and profit maximisation.

 Increase the profitability of the fisheries through a better restructuration of the fleet

 Increase the role and economic power of the cooperative

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4.8 Canada

4.8.1 Overview Canada’s commercial marine fisheries operate along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the last decades major changes of the fisheries and their management system have occurred on both coasts. On the Atlantic coast, the rapid expansion of shrimp and after the collapse of the Atlantic groundfish fishery in the early 1990s represented the most significant change in the fishing system and shellfish represents the most dominant sector on the Atlantic coast in recent times (OECD, 2004b). In 2000, four Atlantic shellfish species (lobster, snow crab, shrimp and scallop) accounted for 64% of the total Canadian landed value (OECD, 2004b). On the Pacific coast, the importance of the groundfish and shellfish fisheries increased after the failure of Pacific salmon fishery in the mid-1990s (OECD, 2004b).

In Canada, the fishing sector is mainly composed of vessels under 65ft (c. 20m) and a few large vertically-integrated companies that harvest and process catches. TACs are the most commonly used output control measures, usually subdivided at area or fleet levels. Individual quota (IQ) of the annual TAC gives an individual producer or fishing unit the right to catch a specified quantity and species of fish in a specific location during a specific period. The quota share is assured from year to year, but the annual catch quota varies with the TAC. If transfers are allowed, IQ becomes individual transferable quota (ITQ) which may be assigned, traded, and exchanged on a temporary or permanent basis depending on management programs. In certain fisheries, there are transferable individual vessel quotas (IVQ) and Enterprise Allocations (EA). At a more aggregate level, there are community- based quotas (CQ) where temporary quota transfers are permitted at community level (OECD, 2004b). The implementation of ITQ programs on the groundfish fishery in both the Atlantic and Pacific coast are representative examples of the initial application of quota management programs in Canada.

In the Atlantic groundfish fishery cod has traditionally been the most important target species, but haddock, saithe, redfish and many flatfish species are also targeted. The rights-based management system started with the Atlantic-wide Enterprise Allocation (EA) Program for offshore vessels (≥ 100 ft.) owned by fishing firms, introduced as a trial program in 1982 and then extended on a permanent basis in 1989. Annual EAs were based on percentage shares of the offshore quota and have been based, for the most part, on catch history prior to the implementation of EAs (OECD, 2004b). For mid- shore vessels (65-100ft length) a similar implementation of EAs based on catch history was introduced through a five-year trial program in 1988 and became permanent in 1994.

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The implementation of ITQs in the inshore mobile groundfish fleet took place in different ways, depending on stock areas. Also in this case, the ITQ program started with a three-year pilot project with enterprise allocations for of otter trawlers less than 65ft. In 1989 the trial program became a ten- year program, where each vessel was allocated a shares of cod depending on the length category of the vessel (OECD, 2004b). There has been no directed cod fishery for this fleet since the cod moratorium in 1993. Due to the cod moratorium and the general poor resource conditions since 1988 (which caused a rapid decline of the fishing activity), the assessment of the impact of the program on the fleet has been difficult or inconclusive.

In the Pacific, the groundfish trawl fishery has been managed by limited entries and TACs since 1976. In 1997, the industry implemented a fully transferable ITQ system specific by area and species. ITQs were determined according to vessel length and catch history. Limits on the accumulation of quota for individual species and total licence ITQ holdings caps have been established to inhibit excessive consolidation of the fishing rights (Le Gallic, 2006). Since 2002, there has been an agreement between the groundfish trawl and sablefish commercial fishing sectors on a pilot program that allows temporary transfer of IVQs between these two fishing sectors (Le Gallic, 2006).

Many fisheries on both coasts are currently managed under IQ, EA or ITQ systems, whose characteristics are summarised in Table 4-4. Cost-recovery mechanisms are generally applied to cover some services, such as the cost of monitoring the landings of fishing vessels and research.

4.8.2 Quota allocation method In most of the quota programs implemented in Canada, EA/IQs/ITQs are determined as percentage shares of the global or area/fleet quotas either evenly distributed or based on catch histories among the participants. Different rules and examples in the allocation method are summarised in Table 4-4.

4.8.3 Trading rules (national and international) In Canadian fisheries, different quota systems are implemented and characterised by different trading rules. Transfer of EA/IQs as well as Community-based quotas are generally limited in time and space. ITQs are always transferable but in some cases, maximum ceilings have been applied to inhibit excessive consolidation. Table 4-4 provides a resume of the trading rules by fishery. Quota “overage” is allowed. Fishermen can exceed or undershoot their quota by a specified percentage (depending on

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the fishery), which can be deducted from or added to next year’s quota. Overage for some species is not allowed (e.g. halibut).

Quota sale and lease are generally made through private arrangement. Many quota owners prefer to lease their quota out through a processor as a broker for two main reasons: 1) The processor can afford to pay more due to access to capital and thus quota owners can get the highest value, 2) Vessel operators do not want to be blamed by other fishermen about the high lease price they are asking (Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009).

Quota owners try to maintain their leasing arrangements secret (Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009). When processors lease out the quota to fishers, the price remains confidential and it can vary with arrangements and the bargaining power of the lessee (Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009). The arrangement often includes an agreement under which the lessee delivers catch from other fisheries to the processor. There is, therefore, asymmetric information between buyers and sellers of quota leases (Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009).

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Table 4-4. Examples of quota management systems for the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada. Unless otherwise indicated, information was collected from (from OECD, 2004b)

Atlantic

Fishery Allocation rules Trading rules Groundfish  For the offshore fleet (≥ 100ft) and mid-shore fleet (65-100ft) EA  Any portion of an EA can be transferred on a temporary basis program has been implemented where annual allocations were between enterprises. All permanent transfers must be approved by based on catch history prior to the implementation of EAs the Minister of Fisheries.  For the inshore fleet (< 65ft) ITQ program was implemented, with  In the ITQ program of the inshore fleet, both temporary and annual allocations based on: i) length category of vessels permanent transfers of allocations are allowed but they are subjected (Newfoundland, Quebec North Shore), ii) catch history (Scotia- to a maximum ceiling to inhibit excessive consolidation. In addition, Fundy), iii) catch history and vessels length (Southern Gulf of St. access by foreigners is restricted. Any fraction of an individual quota Lawrence). may be divided, aggregated and transferred.  A community-based quota was developed for the Scotia-Fundy  For the community-based quota the community boards are permitted fixed gear fleet and represented an alternative to the individual to trade quotas on a temporary basis at the community level. quota system. In 1996, the fixed-gear sector was divided into a

series of community or geographic quota groups for cod, haddock and pollock stocks. A quota was calculated for each group based on the average landings within the community from 1986-1993. The quota groups largely follow the county boundaries. In each community a management board develops an harvesting plan, that usually included further quota divisions into gear sector quotas (handline, longline and gillnet groups). purse seine A 10-year ITQ program was set in 1983 to rationalise the Atlantic-wide The purse seine fleet is authorized to participate in a Transfer System herring fishery seiner fleet, which was divided into two fleets, the Southwest Nova (internal to the purse seine fleet). Transfers may be temporary or Scotia/Bay of Fundy (NAFO Divisions 4WX) and the Gulf of St. permanent. There is no cap on transfers. Lawrence, both with separate quota and fishing areas. Initial allocation for the 4WX fleet involved a fixed percentage share of the annual purse seine quota for each vessel depending on the vessel category (independent mobile vessels and processor-owned vessels).

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For the Gulf fleet initial quota allocation was divided equally among vessels Newfoundland TAC for the Newfoundland capelin fishery is divided among fleet No transfer or sale is allowed. capelin fishery sectors within quota management areas, determined by geographical location and gear type, and is allocated according to an established sharing arrangement. Quota within each fleet sector is fished competitively. In NAFO Divisions 4R3Pn (Newfoundland) IQ has been issued based on a combination of equal shares and the landing history of individual area fishers since 1993. Snow crab fishery ITQ system is adopted for snow crab fishery in NAFO areas 16 Area 16: since 1992, temporary transfers of up to 100% of the individual (Northern Gulf of St. Lawrence), 19 (Southern Gulf of St. Lawrence) quota are authorized although no participant can get, through transfers, and 24 (Eastern Nova Scotia) with each participant receiving an equal more than the equivalent of one quota. share of the global quota. Area 25-26: limited temporary transfers of quotas are allowed. IQ system was implemented in area 12 (Southern Gulf of St. Area 24: no transfer is permitted between the permanent and temporary Lawrence), 17 (Northern Gulf of St. Lawrence) based on a sharing fleets; transfers are limited to a single season and resulting vessel quota formula where 80-90% of the global quota was equally shared among cannot be more than double the initial quota. the fishers and the remaining 10- 20% divided according to individual catch recorded (1984-1989 for area 12 and 1989-1991 for area 17). IQ system was also implemented for the inshore fleet in Areas 20-23 (Eastern Nova Scotia) and 25-26 (Southern Gulf of St. Lawrence), where annual TACs would be equally shared among licence holders. Offshore lobster EA program established in 1985. Each licence was given an equal EAs could be transferred on a temporary and permanent basis. fishery share of the TAC, which was determined after an assessment of financial performance of the fleet in 1984 sea scallop fishery  Offshore sector. EAs, established in 1986 and made permanent in EAs are not permanently transferable except in the event of the sale of a 1990, were based primarily on historical catch shares of vessels in company, subject to the approval of the Minister of Fisheries. Temporary the offshore fishery. transfers of EAs within the fishing year are permitted. No one fishing enterprise may hold more than 50% of the quota for any specific scallop  Inshore sector fleet in the Bay of Fundy has adopted an ITQ stock. program since 1998 while in the Northern Gulf, along the upper

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and mid North Shore and north of Anticosti Island, there is also a In the ITQ program for the inshore fleet both permanent and temporary mixture of competitive, IQ and ITQ fleets. transfers are allowed. Offshore Surf Clam TACs and EAs were introduced in 1987. Allocations were based on Permanent transfers of allocation between the enterprises are equal sharing of the TAC for each fishing bank (Banquereau and Grand prohibited. Temporary transfers are permitted within a single fishing Banks) among the existing licence holders. season. Sea urchin fishery The sea urchin fishery in southwestern New Brunswick (Bay of Fundy) IQs are non-transferable is managed through TACs and an IQ program have been implemented since 1995. Shrimp fishery  Offshore northern shrimp fishery (freezer trawlers). EAs are based Permanent transfers between enterprises are not allowed. Inter- on an equal sharing arrangement among the participating licence enterprise transfers of EAs are permitted on a temporary basis within the holders for each of the northern shrimp fishing areas. fishing season and subject to approval of the Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)  Gulf fishery. In the Lower North Shore of Quebec and West Coast of Newfoundland an IQ program was established in 1991. For the In the Gulf fishery ITQ program, permanent transfers were permitted. rest of Quebec and New Brunswick, since 1991 an ITQ program However, no permanent transfers are authorized between different was implemented. Each participant received a shrimp quota based provinces. on catch history from 1987 to 1989, within established lower and upper limits.  For the Scotian Shelf fishery ITQs were introduced in 1996 with initial allocations based on individual catch history.

Pacific

Fishery Allocation rules Trading rules Groundfish trawl In 1997 the groundfish trawl fishery adopted area and species Groundfish trawl IVQ can only be transferred between trawl licensed fishery specific IVQ system. Each year, 80% of the TAC is allocated to the vessels. All quota transfers must be registered and approved by Federal groundfish trawl fleet. The licenced vessel's initial quota allocation Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). Unlimited transfers of quota was based on 1986 to 1989 catch history (70%) and vessel length are permitted subject to species- and holdings-caps designed to prevent (30%). excessive quota concentration. There are no temporary quota transfers, only permanent. However, lease arrangements between licence-holders The Minister allocates the remaining 10% Groundfish Development are permitted and result in short-term or annual transfers. Quota (GDQ) and the 10% Code of Conduct Quota (CCQ). To obtain a GDQ share groups of vessels owners and processors submit a

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proposal, which is ranked based on its contribution to regional CCQ is subject to the same transferability rules as IVQ while GDQ cannot be development and employment objectives. CCQ provide an incentive transferred. to ensure that crew members are treated fairly and equitably under the IVQ programme. CCQ is allocated to each vessel in proportion to the vessel's IVQ holdings. Any complaints of poor treatment of crew can cause the removal of some, or all, of the CCQ of the vessel involved in the claim (Sporer, 2001). Since 2002, temporary reallocations of IVQs between the groundfish trawl and sablefish commercial fishing sectors are allowed.

Halibut fishery Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) system was implemented in the IVQs were implemented in the BC halibut fishery as non-transferable halibut fishery in 1991 and in the initial allocation formula, each individual quotas for the first two years, 1991–1992, and became halibut vessel received a percentage of the annual TAC. 70% of the temporarily transferable as leases in 1993. In 1999, both permanent (sale) initial allocation was based on the vessel's historical catch between and temporary (lease) quota transfers were permitted and thus IVQs 1986 and 1989 and 30% was based on the vessel's overall length became ITQs. ITQs could be traded on a per pound basis to another (Sporer, 2001). licenced halibut vessel. No one vessel could hold more than 1% of the TAC (unless it had fished greater than this amount from 1993 to 1998). In addition, each commercial licensed vessel was required to hold a minimum amount of permanent ITQ. This minimum could be temporarily transferred during the year (Sporer, 2001). Sablefish fishery Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) programme was implemented in the Only temporary (annual) transfers of quotas have been permitted between sablefish fishery in 1990. The initial quota allocation was based on a sablefish licensed vessels. Initially, each sablefish licence was assigned a formula that calculated 70% of the quota based on historical catch "quota block", determined by the initial allocation formula, and vessel and 30% on the licensed vessel's overall length. Historic catch was owners were permitted to trade quota blocks. In 1993 each quota block determined by taking each licence's best catch in either 1988 or was broken into smaller quota shares that could be transferred. In 1995, 1989. quota shares were dropped and sablefish IVQ could be traded on a per pound basis (Sporer, 2001). British Columbia  Spawn-on-kelp fishery. Since early 1970s onward, a small-scale  Spawn-on-kelp fishery. The current program allows on-ground transfers herring fishery spawn-on-kelp (SOK) fishery has occurred for short periods of SOK product between licence holders operating in the same stock between mid-February to end of April, harvesting herring spawn assessment areas. deposited on marine plant. The SOK fishery has operated under an individual quota (IQ) system since its inception. The IQ is A review of international fisheries management regimes Page 148 of 298

based on the quantity of SOK produced, not the amount of  Roe herring fishery. Licences and the associated quota cannot be herring used. Since 1978, the majority of licences have had an IQ divided and transferred in smaller quantities (the entire allocation of eight tons of drained product. moves with the licence and cannot be separated or split into shares).  Roe herring fishery. Since 1998 this fishery has been managed under a “pool “fishery plan, where vessels were grouped together. Each pool has its own quota depending on the TAC for the area and the number of licenses included in the pool. An allocation of herring was attached to each licence, which was granted an equal share of the target-catch in the fishing area chosen for 1998. Under vessel-pooling a maximum of two licences can be placed on a single vessel. Geoduck Geoducks have been fished commercially in British Columbia since Licences can be transferred, and up to a maximum of three commercial 1976. This fishery was manged under an IVQ program since 1989. geoduck licence can be fished by a single vessel. Temporary quota Geoduck licence quotas were set at 1/55 of the annual coast-wide transfers subject to a maximum limit between licences are permitted. quota, and fishers were required to select one of three licence areas Licences, and the associated IVQ, cannot be divided and transferred in in which to fish smaller quantities. Sea urchin and sea In the second half of the 90’s, IQ programs were initiated in both the The current IQ programs in both fisheries allow temporary quota transfers cucumber green sea urchin and sea cucumber fishery. In each fishery, the subject to a maximum limit between licences. coast-wide commercial TAC was divided equally among licences.

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4.8.4 Evidence of Impact (success/failure)

Positive effects of the introduction of different quota systems in Canadian Atlantic and Pacific fisheries can be summarised in the following points:

1. Evidence of capacity reduction and rationalisation of the fishing fleets has been reported for various fishing fleets involved in different quota programs. For example, in the 4WX purse seine herring fishery the number of active vessels has been declining over the years after the introduction of the ITQ program. A reduction of 31% of purse seiners operating in the Gulf of St. Lawrence was also recorded during the 10-year of the ITQ plan. There is evidence that the offshore scallop EA program and the Pacific halibut ITQ program has reduced fishing capacity and rationalised the fishing fleet (Barrow et al., 2001). 2. Quota management may help improve the health of various stocks. In the Pacific coast groundfish trawl fishery for example, many groundfish stocks have been exploited more sustainably after the introduction of the IVQ program. In addition the industry has established the Canadian Groundfish Research and Conservation Society (CGRCS) to deal with the lack of research and assessment resources dedicated to the fishery. The CGRCS provides financial and human resources to improve groundfish stock assessments, demonstrating a participatory approach from the industry, as fishers are willing to spend their own time and money to improve knowledge and management of the resource (Sporer, 2001). 3. The improvement of the economic performance of the fleets involved in quota programs has also been stressed. For example, in the Halibut fishery, after the implementation of the IVQs, the halibut season was open for nine months, thus much longer if compared with the season in 1990 (which lasted just six days). Net revenues increased as commercial fishers modified their fishing patterns to meet market demand, improve product quality and reduce operating costs (Sporer, 2001). Further, the number of active vessels has decreased, and thus fixed costs and crew payments were reduced. 4. The quota programs implemented have been often been associated with an increase of the catch prices (e.g. geoduck, Figure 4-7) due to year-round supply of live product. In various cases the quota programs improved the stocks (e.g. sea scallop fishery) resulting in higher landings and increased value. In many cases quota programs improved the safety at sea, which was previously compromised by fishers who would fish the short season regardless of weather.

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Figure 4-7, Geoduck annual catch vs. landed value 1982 – 1999 (from Sporer, 2001)

Besides the positive output mentioned above, some negative aspects of the systems implemented need to be underlined: 1. widespread misreporting of catches throughout the duration of the initial quota programs was observed in various fisheries (e.g. Atlantic groundfish fishery, 4WX purse seine herring fishery). To correct this problem the industry funded and implemented a Dockside Monitoring Program (DMP), demonstrating that enforcement is an essential component to ensure the desired outputs from a quota program. 2. In some cases excessive consolidation of quota has been reported. For example, under the EA program of the Atlantic offshore lobster fishery, seven of the eight licences were held by a single company and the early years of the EA program for the Atlantic northern shrimp fishery have been characterised by licence consolidation (Barrow et al., 2001). 3. In the sale and lease quota markets, the price of quota is confidential. In the halibut fishery processors compete to secure quota at the beginning of the season to guarantee delivery of fish to themselves. Having a large amount of quota pre-season also puts processors in the best bargaining position as they can re-lease the quota under the most advantageous conditions (Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009). The lease (and sale) price of quota increased disproportionally with respect to the ex-vessel price (landed value of the fish paid to the fisherman). Leasing is therefore the largest fixed annual cost, often causing reduction of (or negative) profit margins. The halibut ITQ system does not guarantee social benefit, since the cost of leasing is passed on the crew, who often struggle to bear the cost. In addition, there is asymmetric information between buyers and

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sellers of quota leases because the price of quota is confidential and can vary with arrangements and because the lessee usually agrees to deliver catch from other fisheries to the processor as part of the arrangement. The resulting allocation of quota leases, and the confidential terms under which they are allocated, clearly represent the consequences of the absence of a freely operating market with open competition (Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009).

4.8.5 SWOT analysis

Strengths Weaknesses  Increase of fishing profitability  Not all fisheries are managed purely using ITQs. The system requires a significant  Increase safety at sea amount of administrative time.  Improvement of the state of the stocks  Lack of perfect information among all  Major involvement of the industry (e.g. parties on all aspects of the negotiation, and Dockside Monitoring Program) quota trading (inefficient quota lease market)

Opportunities Threats  New economic opportunity created by the  Limits in quota trade can obstruct fishing community-based quotas (CQ) program efficiency and profit maximisation.

 Increase the profitability of the fisheries  Concentration of the value in the lease price through a better restructuration of the fleet minimises the potential social benefit derived from the system

4.9 Summary There is substantial variability regarding quota programs implemented, the allocation system and the trading rules, both within and between different countries and, with the exception of the Faroe Islands, all of the study countries have implemented individual quota program to various degrees. The programs implemented are compared in Table 4-5.

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Table 4-5, Objectives and characteristics of the quota programs implemented in the study countries.

Iceland Norway Australia New Zealand USA Canada Policy - Decrease - Decrease - Reduce fishing effort - Provide the security - Decrease - Ensure Conservation objectives overcapacity and overcapacity and and pressure on stocks of future resource overcapacity and - Improve safety at sea rationalise the fleet rationalise the fleet - Increase efficiency access rationalise the fleet - provide fair - Improve economic - Improve economic and rationalise fishing to companies - Improve safety at sea distribution of benefits performance and performance and fleet - Reduce overcapacity - Reduce fishing effort from property rights efficiency efficiency - Ensure stockholders of the inshore fishing and pressure on stocks - Employment - Improve stock - Improve stock health engagement and social fleet - Reduce gear losses stabilization health - Provide social acceptable outcomes - Improve stock health - Improve product - Economic acceptable outcomes - Allocate harvesting quality development in coastal rights equitably based - Create opportunities communities on commitment to the for Alaskan - Fair treatment of fishery communities crews - Increase economic benefit Type of quota - ITQ - IVQ + UQS - ITQ - ITQ (ITQ represents - IFQ (QS is the - IQ program - Community quota - IVQ + SQS the permanent quota permanent quota - ITQ implemented system - IVQ + QES share and ACE the share and QP is the - IVQ - Maximum quota annual catch annual catch - EA system (open access entitlements, entitlements) - CQ (community- fisheries) associated to quota - ITQ based quotas) share) - CDQ (Alaska) - GDQ (Groundfish - IPQ (Individual Development Quota) Processing Quota) - CCQ (Code of Conduct - CQ (Cooperative Quota) Quota) Allocation Catch history - Quota linked to Ad hoc decisions. - Each stock is Ad hoc decisions. In most of the quota method (based on catch vessel’ size (purse Different rules applied, managed Different rules applied, programs performance for the seine) for example: independently and it is depending on the implemented, last three fishing - “Trawler ladder” - catch history (best defined by Quota region and fisheries, EA/IQs/ITQs are periods) (allocation of cod catch or average over a Management Areas for example: determined as between trawlers and certain period) (QMAs). - the CDQ Program is percentage shares of coastal fleet) - catch history + - Allocation initially allocated portions of the global or area/fleet investments based on previous the groundfish fishery quotas either evenly

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- Equal share in each - catch history with years catch records that range from 7.5% distributed or based on size group (coastal “Adjusted Preferred adjusted according to to 10.7% catch histories among fleet) Method” investment in the - Catch history (based the participants - per pot basis (e.g. fishery. Subsequently on best years over a rock lobster fishery) only on catch history. certain period) - equal basis among - For new quota - vessel’s ‘‘contribution existing licenses (e.g. species, TAC divided factor’’ (IFQ scallop abalone and pilchard between Crown (80%) permit) fisheries) and Maori (20%). - equal basis among Current allocation existing licenses + based on tender logbook catch data process. Limits on the - Upper bound of - Not needed (no risk Maximum quota Aggregation limits by Caps limits applied in For many fisheries, accumulation permanent TAC- of consolidation due to holding limits are species generally set at many (but not all) permanent transfers of of quota shares for single limitation of quota present to avoid 35%, but in some fisheries (accumulation allocations are species (12-35% of transfer) concentration of fisheries the limit is set limits vary depending subjected to a single spp TAC) ownership (e.g. at 45%. The Crown and on the species, region, maximum ceiling to - Upper bound of maximum quota- Maori are exempted and fisheries). In inhibit excessive total TAC-share holding limit of 200 from aggregation Alaskan fisheries caps consolidation owned (12% of all units in rock lobster limits. Aggregation limits also applied to TACs, or 5% of the fishery) limits do not apply to processing sector (caps hook-and-line quota ACE. Minimum limits in PQS holding). share) are also applied. Transferability Quotas are assets of - Quota is not divisible, Quota holders are free Both ITQs and ACE are Several restrictions Permanent and and divisibility indefinite duration, leasing is not allowed to lease or sell their freely tradable on the applied, particularly in temporary transfer of perfectly divisible and permanent quota holdings. ITQs open market and the Alaskan fisheries IQs, IVQs and EAs are and transferable transfer is highly are divisible. accessible to any New (e.g. trade of IFQ only often restricted. (both sale and lease) restricted. Generally, quotas may Zealand citizen. ITQs within vessel class; In the CQ system trade with minor - UQS and SQS systems only be transferred to and ACE are divisible. catcher vessels can of quotas is permitted restrictions. regulate permanent those already Overseas companies only permanently on a temporary basis at Foreigners are transfer for purchasing participating in the can obtain both ITQs transfer quota share; the community level. excluded and scrapping vessels. particular fishery. and ACE only if it can community protection CCQ can be transferred Spatial restrictions are When quotas can be be demonstrated that measures to trade IPQ only permanently also applied. transferred to non- New Zealand will and PQS; minimum GDQ cannot be traded - QUE system allows 2 industry members, benefit from the number of licences to vessels owners to fish foreigners are exchange transfer CQ; CDQ

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both quotas with 1 excluded. shares are non- vessel for a limited transferable). In the period. rest of U.S fisheries quota trade is less restricted. Quota market Since 2001, quotas No quota market has All quota transactions Quota prices and All QP transfers must Quota sale and lease have been been created due to are subject to approval quantities for sale or be done through an are generally made transferred on an the trading restrictions. of AFMA, but reporting lease are usually online system through private open market (sale Transfers of quota prices is not a advertised by brokers operated by NMFS, arrangement (via and lease market) must be approved by requirement. in trade magazines, which provides a broker) through brokers or the fisheries Markets for permanent newspapers, and on publicly available by individual firms authorities sale and temporary the Internet listing of IFQ permit lease of quota units. holders and their QS Most of the and QP holdings, and a transactions between web-based system to small and medium- implement transfers of sized quota owners are QP between permit handled through holders. brokers while larger companies have quota managers on staff. Quota An overage of 5% is Un-fished quotas - Overages of up to an - Up to 10% of un- Generally, participants Overage allowed. overages allowed every year. cannot be “saved” and approved % are fished quotas can borrow up to a Fishermen can have an rules/catch Also, up to 15% can transferred to the next deducted from next transferable to the certain % of the overage or underage of balancing be postponed to year, they are year. Un-fished quotas next year. following year’s share. a certain %. Up to this next year. These do reallocated by the end can be carried - Up to 10% of ITQ Any overage is amount, catch can be not apply to cod. of the year. Overage is over to the next year holdings can be deducted from the retained but quantities Species not allowed (% varies by species borrowed from the shareholder's are deducted from or transformation is and year). A maximum following year, allocation for the next added to next year’s allowed with 20% overcatch is - Surrender catch to fishing year quota. Overage for restrictions enforced except for the government. some species is not few species with 0% - Bycatch trade-off allowed (e.g. halibut) overcatch allowed. scheme. - 28 day “set period” - Pay a deemed value for quota reconciliation for overcaught quota

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Financing 9.5% of total values - Licence fee Cost-recovery schemes All quota trades have a Cost-recovery fee Industry funds the of landed catch is the - Fee for for administering and fee associated with program. Up to 3% of Dockside Monitoring annual resource fee decommissioning enforcing ITQ systems them and all quota the ex-vessel value of Program and at-sea to cover for scheme trades must be IFQ landings. Total fee observers and research management, registered with a collections cannot (e.g. Canadian enforcement, subsidiary of the NZ exceed the annual cost Groundfish Research research etc. Fishing Industry Board of program and Conservation (FishServe) management and Society) enforcement. Positive - Increase - Increased profitability - Improved vessel - Improved stock - Economic and social - Capacity reduction outcomes profitability for limited-entry profitability conditions benefits from the CDQ and rationalisation - Increase product fisheries - Rationalisation of - The tender process program - Improved stock quality - Reduction of the fleets avoids the increase of - Increase of fishing conditions - Improved stock overcapacity - New opportunities fishing effort for the profitability - Improvement of the condition - Involvement of through the quota non-QMS species and - Increase safety at sea economic performance Fishermen associations lease market created an opportunity - Improvement of the - increase of the catch - Improved stocks - Improved stock for ore New Zealanders state of the stocks prices conditions conditions to become involved in Improve safety at sea - The involvement of developmental stakeholders ensured fisheries. adherence to the rules - ACEs and the market’s transparency enhance entry opportunities for small-scale fishers - Improvement of productivity and employment Negative - Loss of jobs in rural - Difficulty of assessing - Only few fisheries are - ITQ gradually more - Only few fisheries are - initial widespread outcomes areas and in results of quota managed purely using concentrated in few managed purely using misreporting of processing facilities scheme because highly ITQs: great amount of companies ITQs. The system catches - Reduced crew regulated system; administrative time - The new entry requires a significant - Few examples of salaries - Deployment of large and effort; opportunities with ACE amount of excessive consolidation - Increased administrative - TACs for many regime could threaten administrative time. of quota inequalities resources for species were set at the sustainability and - Inefficient QP market - Inefficient quota management; higher levels than lease market

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- Disengagement of - Obstacle to profit recommended, causing efficiency of the - Limits in quota trade small-scale fishers maximisation low incentives to exit fisheries. obstacle fishing - Overfishing the fishery (limiting - The open quota efficiency and profit condition for some rationalisation) ownership to the maximisation stocks due to the general public can species obstacle the fishing transformation industries to maximise their profits

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4.9.1 Quota allocation methods A variety of approaches are used within the study countries to allocate quota shares to different operators. They are quite often based on catch track record, but other approaches such as allocation based on vessel size or simply distributing the quota evenly to all participants are also used in some cases. Community-based approaches to allocation are used in Iceland, Alaska and Canada as a way of recognising the specific dependence of some communities on fishing. Perhaps the most interesting example is the ‘Adjusted Preferred Method’ used in South Australia which has substantial stakeholder involvement in deciding the basis for allocation.

Within the UK, the central role of the POs for quota allocation and management could be partially compared to the community-based catch quotas implemented in Iceland, Alaska and Canada as the quota allocated to POs is managed and organised collectively (e.g. the “pool-plus” system). There are also parallels with the strong stakeholder engagement of the Australian ‘Adjusted Preferred Method’, as POs are relatively free to decide how to manage their quota allocation and generally, the choice of the management system is based on the preference expressed by the PO’s members.

4.9.2 Trading rules As with quota allocation methods, each of the countries considered here has a different approach to quota trading, with the systems having evolved in response to local conditions and requirements. In most cases there are limits on how much quota any single operator can accumulate, and there are also restrictions on transferability, often aimed at limiting or preventing transfer of fishing rights out of the relevant country.

Norway probably represents the country with the most similar quota management system to that of the UK, where the IVQs have been made partially tradeable through a stepwise approach, which gradually established a form of quota trading. This is comparable with the ‘pool-plus’ approach used in the UK where flexibility of quota trading has been increasingly introduced. In contrast, New Zealand and Iceland represent the countries with the strongest difference in the quota management system with respect to the UK. In fact, both countries apply an ITQ system characterised by limited restrictions on the quota trade. Iceland is also characterised by a market structure very different from the UK, where few fishing companies own not only most of the quota shares but also most processing facilities, and are therefore fully vertically integrated.

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4.9.3 Outcomes Where quota trading schemes have been introduced in the examples considered here, there have often been positive outcomes, typically including improved status of the target fish stocks, increased profitability of the fishing fleet and in some cases also improved safety at sea. The negative outcomes observed have been less consistent across the different countries, although in a number of cases there has been a tendency for quotas to be accumulated among relatively few operators, sometimes at the expense of fishery-dependent communities. Some systems also carry a relatively high administrative burden.

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5 Access Arrangements

5.1 Introduction Typically, a high proportion of the fisheries exploited by the fishers from a given country will take place within that country’s EEZ. However, there are often also cases where vessels participate in fisheries outside of their national waters, either in international waters, or within the EEZ of a neighbouring State. Fishing in international waters is generally managed by the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisation. Where a fishery takes place in the waters of a neighbouring State, access is usually agreed through negotiation between the relevant States. This section describes the fishery agreements in place through which the study States agree access to other States’ waters.

5.1.1 UK context Fisheries is an area of exclusive Union competence and the EU therefore negotiates any agreement relating to fishing opportunities and management on behalf of its Member States. All negotiations relating to the agreeing of fishing opportunities are carried out on behalf of the EU by the Commission. Currently three types of fishery agreements are in place which allow for Union fishing vessels to fish in third countries’ EEZs and in international waters, and also for third countries’ vessels to fish in Union waters:

1. Bilateral reciprocal agreements between the EU and Third Countries. These are in place with Norway and the Faroe Islands and establish reciprocal access to each other’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and quota exchanges for both exclusive and shared stocks. They include a number of traditional quota/access exchanges with the principal benefit for the UK being fishing opportunities for Arcto-Norwegian cod (exchanged for EU blue whiting). Joint management of shared stocks is a further important element of the agreement with Norway.

2. Bilateral non-reciprocal agreements or ‘Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements’ (SFPAs). These agreements are typically between the EU and ‘southern’ countries, but include an important agreement with Greenland. They involve a financial/technical support from the EU in exchange for fishing opportunities in third countries’ EEZs.

3. Multilateral agreements on TACs, sharing arrangements, and management plans between the Coastal States (countries in whose EEZs the stocks occur) for the pelagic ‘straddling stocks’ in the northeast Atlantic. The Coastal States to these stocks are the EU, Norway, Faroe Islands, and Iceland. The stocks covered are mackerel, blue whiting, Atlanto-Scandian herring and redfish. Negotiations between the

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Coastal States take place within the framework the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), a Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO). The agreements do not include quota swaps or access arrangements, which are formalised through the bilateral reciprocal agreements with Norway and the Faroe Islands.

5.2 Iceland Iceland is a geographically isolated island and most of its fisheries take place on stocks either wholly or mainly in Iceland’s EEZ (see Figure 2-2). There is a long history of other countries fishing in Icelandic waters (Figure 5-1; Table 5-1) and as a result, Iceland’s incremental extension of the economic exclusive zone (12nm in 1958, 50nm in 1972, then 200nm in 1975) led to conflicts with the UK and Germany over access to these waters. These conflicts were known as the ‘cod wars’ (Guðmundsson 2006). Following on from the extension of Iceland’s EEZs to 200 miles in 1975, landings from Icelandic waters by foreign vessels have declined significantly, with landings of demersal species now negligible (Figure 5-1).

Figure 5-1, Catches by foreign vessels in Icelandic waters, 1900-2010. Source: fiskistofa (2016).

Since 1975 Iceland has developed bilateral reciprocal fisheries agreements with other countries, including limited access arrangements with neighbouring States including Norway, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, the European Union and the Russian Federation. Iceland has negotiated agreements that permit Norwegian and Faroese longliners fishing for groundfish in Icelandic waters; Norwegian, Faroese and Greenlandic purse- seiners fishing for capelin and herring in Icelandic waters; and Greenlandic and European Union (mainly British and German) trawlers fishing for redfish. Russian and European herring boats and Faroese boats are also permitted to fish a limited amount of blue whiting in Icelandic waters. Except for the groundfish fisheries,

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these all occur at the fringes of the Icelandic EEZ; redfish in the southwest, herring in the east and capelin in the north (Fiskistofa, 2016).

Iceland has a trilateral agreement with Norway and Russia on cooperation in the area of fisheries (Univ.Oslo, 2016) with management of certain fish stocks under the jurisdiction of the Joint Russian-Icelandic Fisheries Commission (JRIC). This was considered an example of successful cooperation among coastal States as, under the ‘loophole agreement’ it ended disputed Icelandic fishing in a high sea enclave in the central Barents Sea, providing Iceland with access to the Norwegian and Russian EEZ (Churchill, 1999). Under the JRIC there is an annually agreed protocol between Russia and Iceland giving Iceland access to fishing for cod in Russian waters, while Russia has recently indicated a desire for access to Icelandic waters for fishing capelin, mackerel and herring (Anon, 1999; Smith, 2016).

Table 5-1, in Icelandic waters. From Fiskistofa (2016)

Nation Gear Target species Period Annual catch range

Belgium Trawl Demersal fish 1905* to 1994 1,000 to 25,000 t

Denmark Danish seine Flatfish 1890 to 1955 Less than 1,000 t

European Union Trawl Demersal fish 1999 to recent years 1,000 to 2,000 t Faroe Islands Trawl and longline Demersal fish 1905* to recent years 5,000 to 50,000 t

Faroe Islands Purse seine Herring 1926 to 1966 1,000 to 10,000 t

Faroe Islands Purse seine Capelin 1977 to recent years 2,000 to 65,000 t

Finland Purse seine Herring 1931 to 1967 1,000 to 7,000 t

France Handline Cod Mid 18th c. to 1915 1,000 to 15,000 t

France Trawl Demersal fish 1905* to 1973 1,000 to 15,000 t

Germany Trawl Demersal fish 1905 to 1977 10,000 to 200,000 t

Germany Purse seine Herring 1931 to 1968 1,000 to 27,000 t

Japan Longline Bluefin tuna 1996 to 2000 few tonnes

Netherlands Handline Cod Mid 18th to mid-19th c. 1,000 to 3,000 t

Netherlands Trawl Demersal fish 1905* to 1965 1,000 to 3,000 t Norway Trawl and longline Demersal fish 1905* to 1989 1,000 to 15,000 t

Norway Purse seine Herring 1905* to 1968 10,000 to 150,000 t

Norway Purse seine Capelin 1978 to recent years 50,000 to 200,000 t

Poland Trawl Greenland halibut 1970 to 1974 500 to 1,000 t

Soviet Union Trawl Greenland halibut 1965 to 1974 1,000 to 20,000 t

Soviet Union Purse seine Herring 1960 to 1968 10,000 to 35,000 t

Sweden Trawl Demersal fish 1928 to 1950 Less than 1,000 t

Sweden Purse seine Herring 1905* to 1961 1,000 to 8,000 t

United Kingdom Handline Cod 15th to 17th century Unknown

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United Kingdom Trawl Demersal fish 1891 to 1976 100,000 to 200,000 t

United States Handline Atlantic halibut 1880 to 1890 Unknown *Formal records start in 1905.

5.3 Norway Since the introduction of EEZs to 200 miles in 1977 Norway has developed bi- and tri- lateral fisheries agreements with Russia, Greenland, Faroe Islands and the EU – as well as more recently, Iceland.

Norway has three agreements with the EU. First, with regards to reciprocal access for the North Sea and the West of in EU waters and the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, the Barents Sea and the Fisheries zone around Jan Mayen in Norwegian waters. The agreement covers both access arrangements and quota exchanges (to be fished in the other party’s waters). Second, a reciprocal arrangement exists between Norway, Denmark and Sweden for the Skagerrak and Kattegat where fishing is allowed up to 4 nautical miles from the coast for each State. The access for the Skagerrak has been subject to renegotiation to ensure the conformity to the UNCLOS (The initial Skagerrak agreement was concluded prior to the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982). The agreement expired in 2012 and interim arrangements have since been agreed on a yearly basis between Norway and the EU. Third, Swedish access to the Norwegian EEZ waters is also subject to a special agreement due to historic rights. In fact some fisheries have been traditionally conducted by Swedish vessels in certain areas of the North Sea, which became part of the Norwegian EEZ after 1977. For this reason, Norway offered Sweden an agreement which guaranteed Swedish fishers the right to continue fishing in the Norwegian zone in the North Sea. The EU currently negotiates annually with Norway on these quotas.

Norway has had an agreement with Greenland since 1991 for reciprocal access to each other’s national EEZs and since 2005 including specific control conditions. Similarly, Norway has an agreement with Russia with regards to reciprocal access to national zones, in particular the Barents Sea. These agreements are annually negotiated though long-standing. For example, the agreement with Russia has been in place since the 1970s, and with EU countries since 1977 (Mace, 2014).

Norway also has an agreement with Faroe Islands. Established in 1979, this bilateral agreement between Faroe Islands and Norway is mutually balanced and regulates the exchange of quotas of exclusive stocks. In line with the agreement every year Norway and the Faroe Islands establish the fishing quotas in each other’s economic zone. The agreement also gives the Faroe Islands access to fishing part of its mackerel quota in Norwegian zone.

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5.4 Faroes The Faroe Islands also have bilateral fisheries agreements with the EU, Greenland, Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation, which provide for mutual exchange of fisheries opportunities and access to fish in each other’s waters.

Under the agreement with the EU reciprocal access is granted for mackerel, blue whiting, and Atlanto- Scandian herring. The Faroe Islands have had bilateral agreement with Greenland for reciprocal fishing access for herring, blue whiting and demersal fish and, until 2004, for redfish as the Faroe Islands had a quota of this species in Greenland waters. This quota, however, is now being negotiated between Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland and no final agreement has been reached.

The Norway – Faroe Islands Agreement is described in Section 5.3. According to this agreement (which is reviewed annually) for 2017 the Faroese fleet gets access to 4,410 tonnes of cod, 1,025 tonnes of haddock, 500 tonnes of saithe and 200 tonnes of other species in Norwegian waters. The Norwegian quotas in Faroese waters are 2,000 tonnes of ling and blue ling, 1,700 tonnes of tusk and 800 tonnes of other species, plus 4,979 tonnes of mackerel and 34,800 tonnes of blue whiting.45

Bilateral agreement between Iceland and Faroes islands enable Icelanders to catch a quota of blue whiting, herring other than the Atlanto-Scandian herring and mackerel in Faroese waters. Within the Icelandic jurisdiction, the Faroese may catch blue whiting and capelin.

Reciprocal access and quota allocations between Faroese and Russian vessels are granted under annual agreements (annual protocol of the joint Faroese – Russian Fisheries Commission). Russian vessels are permitted to fish an established quota of blue whiting and mackerel in the Faroese Fishing Zone. Maximum bycatch limits for herring and other species are also established. Faroese fishing vessels can fish cod, haddock, flatfish, shrimp and by-catches of other species in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea.

5.5 Australia The only current access agreement that allows foreign vessels to fish in the Australian EEZ is the Multilateral Tuna Treaty between the United States of America and Pacific Island countries (including New Zealand and Australia) (South Pacific Tuna Treaty, Figure 5-2). Under the terms of this treaty, US purse seine vessels are allowed to fish in the Australian EEZ only if they hold a regional fishing licence issued by the Pacific Islands

45 http://fiskerforum.dk/en/news/b/faroes-and-norway-agree-2017-access

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Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) as well as an Australian foreign fishing licence. These licences are characterised by specific conditions consistent with the Treaty (OECD, 2005).

In the past, bilateral access arrangements granting access for foreign fishing fleets to fish in Australian EEZ were negotiated from time to time. According to these arrangements, foreign fleets had access to the EEZ to fish for species under-exploited by the Australian domestic fishing fleet. However, the growth in the Australian domestic fleets has meant that Australia has not renegotiated these access arrangements.

Figure 5-2 Boundary of the South Pacific Tuna Treaty

5.6 New Zealand Similar to Australia, the South Pacific Tuna Treaty between the United States of America and Pacific Island countries gives the US purse seine fleet access to the New Zealand EEZ. This is the only current access agreement that allow foreign vessels to fish in the New Zealand EEZ.

Under the Fisheries Act, New Zealand flagged vessels that take or transport fish in the national jurisdiction of another country must do so in accordance with the laws of that country.

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Currently under the CCAMLR agreement, authorised New Zealand vessels can fish in the Ross Sea fishery area for Antarctic toothfish.

5.7 USA The USA has currently in place two access agreements for tuna fisheries:  United States - Canada Albacore Treaty. It allows US vessels to fish for albacore tuna in Canadian waters and Canadian vessels to fish for albacore tuna in US waters. The treaty also allows Canadian vessels to use certain US ports to obtain supplies and services and to land fish; similarly, it allows US vessels to use certain Canadian ports for the same purposes.

 South Pacific Tuna Treaty. US purse seine vessels are allowed to fish for tuna in the EEZs of the Pacific Island Parties. US tuna industry pays access fees, costs associated with observer coverage (including training), vessel monitoring system deployment and associated recurring costs, and a regional registration fee to the Forum Fisheries Agency.

5.8 Canada Canada has currently in place two access agreements  Canada has agreed with the United States of America an access arrangement for the albacore tuna fishery (see Section 5.7 for more details).

 Agreement between Canada and France on their mutual fishing relations. This bilateral agreement establishes how to manage transboundary stocks in NAFO area 3Ps (near to the South coast of Newfoundland and around Saint-Pierre et Miquelon). According to this agreement France receives a percentage of TACs for transboundary stocks of Atlantic cod, American plaice, Iceland scallop and other stocks, including fixed allocations on other stocks. Canadian and French vessels have reciprocal access to each other’s waters to catch their respective allocations.

5.9 Discussion For reasons of size and/or geographic isolation, Australia, New Zealand, the USA and Canada have little reason to negotiate access arrangements with other countries. Iceland, the Faroes and Norway have negotiated agreements for reciprocal access to each other’s waters with neighbouring States, i.e. each other and the EU, Greenland and Russia. The need for such agreements is essentially a European issue, partly because of geography, with a number of relatively small countries bordering the same seas, and partly historic, reflecting past fishing activity by those nations.

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6 Enforcement

6.1 Introduction The central goal of fisheries enforcement is to simultaneously increase the chance of detection of non- compliance and reduce the potential reward available to those that avoid detection. Enforcement also plays a role as a deterrent and can help to generate support amongst fishing communities to adhere to certain code of conduct. This seeks to create appropriate levels of ‘rational optimisation’ amongst vessel operators (relating to the balance between profit, effort and resource availability), whereby the effort they expend is consistent with proscribed limits on TACs and individual quotas (Nøstbakken, 2008). Without some degree of enforcement, fisheries management would rely solely upon the commitment of fishers and vessel operators to perform to the recommended standards laid out by the relevant scientific agencies or fishing collective groups. While many countries may consider it a goal to foster an increased sense of stewardship amongst the fishing industry, a complete absence of enforcement would clearly be untenable (Nøstbakken, 2008). Compliance may relate to several interacting factors, including economic (e.g. competition & incentivisation), as well as social such as personal morality, the perception of existing legislation and general societal attitudes towards crime (Nøstbakken, 2008).

Fisheries management and enforcement costs can represent a significant governmental burden; a study in 2001 (Wallis & Flaaten, 2001) concluded that it comprised some 36% of all OECD government spending on fisheries. While some of this cost may be recovered through licence fees and taxes on landings, this is generally only a small proportion of the total cost of enforcement. Enforcement tends to be provided by a mixture of dedicated fisheries observers (usually provided or commissioned by federal agencies), the coast guard and the navy and in 1997, OECD countries spent ~US$752 million on enforcement (Wallis & Flaaten, 2001). This cost varies widely between countries and equates to a mean enforcement cost (per tonne landed fish) of US$71.43, ranging between US$2.63 (South Korea) and US$407.79 (Australia) (Wallis & Flaaten, 2001).

, adapted from Wallis & Flaaten (2001), summarises the costs of fisheries management and enforcement between various OECD countries and, together with the discussion of each study country below, is intended to provide a standardised context to assess the costs of fisheries management. Note that the information refers to 1997 so is likely to be out of date, although the comparison between countries is still of interest. This table needs to be considered with the caveat that the value of landings per unit volume can vary greatly (i.e. according to the value of the target species). The market value of a species strongly relates to the risk of it being fished illegally, meaning that higher enforcement costs per unit weight landings is not necessarily indicative of an inefficient system and may just mean that the target species warrants increased protection.

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Table 6-1, OECD estimates of national expenditure on research, management and enforcement in 1997, relative to total landed value. Adapted from Wallis & Flaaten, (2001).

Enforcement takes various forms and has traditionally included: logbook checks; vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and observers (at-sea or on-dock). More recently, more advanced techniques, such as molecular or isotopic techniques for determining catch composition and provenance or autonomous monitoring of catches, have started to become real possibilities. Though these techniques are rarely routine at this point, they could be considered as possible components of UK fisheries enforcement policy. Striking a balance between enforcement costs, the severity of punitive measures and corporate responsibility is the key challenge facing the implementation of almost any environmental legislation (Nøstbakken, 2008).

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The following section reviews enforcement policies and strategies from around the developed world, with a particular focus upon novel or innovative approaches, that the UK may consider incorporating into its future fisheries management. In contrast to most of the other topics considered in this report, fisheries enforcement is relatively poorly documented. As a result. The amount of information on enforcement in some of the study countries is limited and that is reflected in the following sections.

6.1.1 Fisheries enforcement in the UK Waters beyond 6nm are currently managed under the auspices of the Common Fisheries Policy, jointly with other EU Member States. Inshore fisheries are managed separately. Within the UK the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) is an executive non-departmental public body that has responsibility for enforcing EU and UK laws that protect fisheries resources in the waters of England and Wales. This includes inspecting fishing vessels at sea and in port.

In relation to inshore fisheries, ten IFCAs (Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities) were created under the 2009 Marine and Coastal Access Act, with the mandate of managing and enforcing fisheries legislation for all marine fishing activities on land and up to 6nm from the shore baseline. IFCA Boards are comprised of appointees from the MMO, Natural England, the Environment Agency and representatives from various local stakeholders. IFCA officers have extensive powers to board/enter UK vessels, vehicles and other premises and to make region-specific by-laws and several and regulating orders (SROs).

A report by the NGO ClientEarth (2017) took a detailed look at the control and enforcement of fisheries in England with particular reference to the legal framework. The report notes that over 2014-2016 the MMO carried out 1541 compliance checks at sea and 3203 inspections of vessels in port. Based on their analyses, ClientEarth identified a number of areas of concern with the enforcement regime in England. These included too much emphasis placed on reduction of regulatory burden, the practice of using ‘soft’ measures such as written warnings and the absence of anything in the English legal system that allows prosecution for environmental damage caused to European Marine Sites.

In the UK fleet, fisheries coverage by scientific observers is limited with a coverage of approximately 1% of fishing trips46 In the UK, observers are only intended to collect data for scientific purposes, with no enforcement role. The sampling programmes aim to ensure that the data collected by the observers can be

46 This is fishing by UK fleets in UK/ EU waters. High seas fisheries observer programmes are set by the relevant RFMO (usually NEAFC or NAFO).

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regarded as being representative of the whole fleet. This requires that vessels do not change their practices in response to the presence of an observer, as might be the case if the observers also had enforcement responsibilities.

Sanctions Under the Marine and Coastal Access Act (2009), the MMO has a number of options dealing with non- compliance. Sanctions range from verbal and written warnings and license revocation47. Financial administrative penalties (FAPs) may be up to £10,000. During investigations in relation to non-compliance, the MMO has a range of powers including rights to:  Search vessels and business premises (and exceptionally homes);  Seize documentation, fish and equipment;  Board, inspect and detain vessels.

6.2 Iceland The is responsible for monitoring and enforcing fisheries legislation at sea48. All landings are weighed and recorded in port by licenced operators employed by the port. Landings and VMS data are collated by the Directorate of Fisheries, who also monitor records of sales of fish that is exported outside of Iceland.

Iceland has a bilateral agreement with the EU whereby any EU vessel fishing in Icelandic waters must have an observer, approved by the Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries Icelandic vessels fishing in high seas waters are also required to have 25% observer coverage49. Icelandic enforcement and management costs (1989-1996) were 2-3% of the catch value (Arnason et al., 2000).

6.3 Norway Norwegian fishing enforcement operations occur at sea, in port and during export. The coast guard is responsible for at-sea inspections (Norwegian and foreign vessels) and performs > 1800 inspections a year50.

47https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/317543/compliance_enforcement. pdf 48 https://www.responsiblefisheries.is/seafood-industry/management-and-control-system/statement-on-responsible- fisheries/ 49 https://www.responsiblefisheries.is/files/pdf-skjol/certification/icelandic-rf-redfish-full-assessment-report-final-july- 2014.pdf 50 http://www.fiskeridir.no/English/Fisheries/Control-and-enforcement

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All vessels >15m (EU) or >24m (Norwegian) in length must be operating an approved VMS. Norwegian management costs 1989-1996 were typically around 10% of the catch value at US$90-110 million per year (Arnason et al., 2000).

Catch data are reported through an electronic logbook system, implemented at the start of 201151 and is required for all vessels >15m in length. Some Norwegian vessels may have e-logs but no requirements to operate VMS. The electronic logbook requirement was extended to bilateral agreements with Iceland, the EU and Russia by 2014. Levels of observer coverage seems to vary by fishery, vessel nationality and the risk posed to vulnerable marine ecosystems (such as bottom trawling >1000m depth)52. Norwegian observers are also entitled to inspect catches from Norwegian vessels in ports in other countries. WWF-Norway (2008) note that provisions exist to deploy up to three observers in the Norwegian cod fishery but that this level of coverage is likely to be too small to noticeably improve upon what the coast guard inspectors already manage.

6.4 Faroes All vessels >15GT (gross tonnage) must keep a daily log according to an authorised log book format and must have VMS to ensure compliance with catch limits and area closures (Faroe Islands Govt., 2008). Inspections occur on vessels at sea and in port. Danish patrol vessels provide some operational support for enforcement (Faroe Islands Govt, 2008).

6.5 Australia The Australian enforcement program consists of vessel monitoring (approx. 500 vessels on VMS currently53, set to be extended to ~800 by early 2020s), catch inspections and vessel operator education, together with a formalised system for prioritising risks that includes flexibility for discretionary decisions (AFMA, 2015). Penalties include fines, licence suspensions and catch forfeitures. AFMA takes the view that it is better to deter offences and use discretion for some more minor infractions. There are several tiers of enforcement response, ranging from verbal warnings to licence revocation, but only in more extreme circumstances are criminal prosecutions pursued (AFMA, 2015 - see Figure 6-1). In Australia, much of the market for illegally caught seafood products, , is thought to be in east Asia, either for the culinary or pharmaceutical industries (Anderson & McCusker, 2005). Over 2015-2016 the New South Wales fishery enforcement agency seized over 60,000

51 https://www.fiskeridir.no/English/Fisheries/Electronic-Reporting-Systems 52 http://www.fisheries.no/ecosystems-and-stocks/Environmental-measures/Vulnerable-marine-ecosystems- protected-in-Norwegian-waters/#.WQhMvWd1qM9 53 http://www.fao.org/fishery/vmsprogramme/VMS_AUAFMA/en

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specimens and 2,400 items of fishing gear, issued ~6,400 warnings or penalty notices and successfully prosecuted around 69 cases54. Individual fines do not usually exceed AUS$ 10,000 (~US$7,800).

Various states and jurisdictions may have additional legislation that results in differences in the response to illegal fishing activities across the country. The variation in how fisheries offences are viewed in difference parts of the country may create a situation that skews illegal activities towards areas that are considered to be more lenient. (Anderson & McCusker, 2005). In several Australian states, the value recovered through enforcement is put back into the enforcement budget (Anderson & McCusker, 2005). The ability of fisheries officers to enforce legislation also varies by jurisdiction and in some cases, officers routinely carry suppressive weapons (e.g. pepper spray) or wear stab vests (Anderson & McCusker, 2005).

Australia has the highest research, management and enforcement costs of any OECD country, at US$408 per tonne of landings, compared with OECD mean of US$71 (Wallis & Flaaten, 2001). Around a third of this cost during this period was met by levies on the commercial industry (Cox, 2001).

Figure 6-1, The AFMA ‘compliance pyramid’ (from AFMA, 2015)

54 http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/fishing/compliance/fisheries-compliance-enforcement

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6.6 New Zealand In addition to the standard complement of enforcement activities of fisheries patrols, observers and VMS monitoring, the New Zealand Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) also analyses social media, market and fishery trends to identify black market activities55. There are reports of this approach being successfully used to seize large volumes of IUU fish and prosecute offenders (200856 and 201557) but there is limited information about how this is practically/undertaken.

Observer coverage ranges by fishery and the MPI currently employs around 65 observers, with up to 35 at sea at any one time 58. Observer data is subject to peer review by other groups (e.g. the fishing industry, CCAMLR, the NZ Natural History Unit) (MPI, 2014). Within New Zealand Observer coverage in the SPRFMO (South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation – south Pacific high seas) area is 100 % for trawl vessels and > 10 % for other bottom fishing gears. Observers in the SPRFMO area are required to report on Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (VMEs); composition of landings; catch effort and to obtain biological data for both target and non-target species. In the CCAMLR region (e.g. in the toothfish fishery), NZ vessels are required to have two observers on board (one of which must be from a country other than NZ59).

Most of the cost of observers is met by vessel operators60. Recently, some fisheries in NZ territorial waters have been progressed towards a fully documented fishing approach (with remote camera monitoring), though there are still concerns that these systems have not proved themselves adequate replacements for human observers on board, largely owing to reliability issues (e.g. in the east coast pink snapper fishery where 80% of the cameras failed during their first few months61).

6.6.1 Cost efficiency Relative to most of the OECD, New Zealand fisheries management is considered to be cost effective, at just 4% of landed value (mean across OECD in 2002 = 17%) (Harte, 2007). New Zealand does not subsidise its fishing industry and recovers some costs from the commercial sector. Profits from levies on the commercial sector increased by NZ$12.6 million (to NZ$34.6m) following the switch from a resource rental scheme to one of cost

55 https://www.mpi.govt.nz/law-and-policy/legal-overviews/fisheries/fisheries-management-system-review/future- proofing-fisheries-management/ 56 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10512789 57 http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/71665217/Black-market-fishing-targeted-in-Hawkes-Bay-sting- operation 58 https://www.environmentjobs.com/green-jobs/fisheries-observer-officer.20485.htm 59 https://www.niwa.co.nz/fisheries/research-projects/antarctic-fisheries-research/the-toothfish-fishery 60 http://www.mpi.govt.nz/news-and-resources/consultations/removal-of-fee-charged-to-vessel-operators-for- observers-to-supervise-returning-fish-to-the-sea/ 61 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/319425/fisheries-observers-replaced-by-faulty-cameras

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recovery in 1994, but pressure from the industry forced the MPI to review this in 1998 (Harte, 2007). The scheme was revised in 1999 to more fairly represent management costs and the benefits gained/risks posed by the industry following a beneficiary/ risk creator pays approach (Harte, 2007). Between 1994 and 2005, NZ government spending on fisheries management rose sharply (85% increase), reflecting the staffing needed to administer an increasingly complex system. This complexity arose, in part from the introduction of a cost- recovery system, but also from such non-commercial drivers as recreational and customary fisheries management (Harte, 2007). Some costs have since been reduced by deferring some administrative duties to a 3rd party company (FishServe), created by the New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (see Section 0) (Townsend et al., 2008). New Zealand has been able to develop an effective cost recovery policy but the transferability of the NZ scheme and its experience is questionable (Harte, 2007). Harte (2007) argues that the New Zealand system could only operate in an environment that performs well in: public sector transparency and efficiency; durability of fishing rights; commercial stakeholder dialogues with government and industry involvement in the delivery of management services. However, while Harte (2007) argues that NZ fisheries are now well managed with cost effective enforcement, the account given of the implementation of the system suggests that achieving this was far from straightforward. The cost recovery scheme pursued by the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) initially proved to be very complex and the administrative costs associated spiralled as more and more stakeholders registered appeals. 6.7 USA

6.7.1 Observers as enforcers In many fisheries the role of observers is purely to provide support for scientific activities during normal vessel operations (e.g. recording bycatch composition or species length-frequency distributions) but in Alaskan waters, observers are also mandated to report regulatory violations (Porter, 2010). The North Pacific Groundfish Observer Program (NPGOP) reported some 590 violations in 2000-2002 and demonstrates the value of observers also serving as enforcement officers. Observer coverage in the NPGOP is 100% for vessels >124ft (38m) in length (31 vessels in 201762) and 30% for vessels 60-124ft (18-38m) length. Smaller vessels are not required to carry observers. (Porter, 2010). In-dock observers are mandatory for vessels that process >500t per calendar month. The costs of the observer program are met by NPGOP vessels, which contract observers from a pool of National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)-approved staff. This is relatively rare amongst US fisheries and, in all but two other cases, the cost of the US fisheries observer program is met by federal funds, with the levels of observer coverage being determined by the vessel type and the typical length of trip (Porter, 2010).

62 https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/2017obscoveragebsaitrawlcv.pdf

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Unsurprisingly, this program increases the number of incident reports, particularly those which are typically hard or impossible to identify in port (e.g. at-sea discards), but interestingly, at-sea observer reports have tended to be less likely to be followed up by a prosecution (Porter, 2010). Part of the reason for this lower prosecution rate may relate to there being insufficient substantiation of the alleged non-compliance or because the violations identified are considered to be less serious than those identified by other enforcement officers, simply because of the increased scrutiny afforded by higher observer involvement (Porter, 2010). Whilst increased response from enforcement agencies is recommended, it has also been argued that increased observer scrutiny, even if it does not result in substantially more prosecution, still has potential to modulate industry behaviour and incentivise compliance (Porter, 2010).

6.7.2 Enforcement and compliance under individual quota based systems Changes to quota allocations or the price per unit product can usually be expected to shift the levels of compliance to some degree (Porter et al., 2013). The respective ecological and economic controls upon these amounts are complex and by and large are beyond the direct control of a fisheries management agency. Individual quotas of a certain proportion of a stock can be thought to give quota owners incentive both to promote the sustainability of a stock but also to identify incidents of non-compliance in others (Fujita & Bonzon, 2005). Where individual quotas pose a threat is through failures to set sustainable catch limits or adequately limit a small number of organisations from accumulating excessive proportions of the TAC. The latter is a common consideration in many business sectors and there are several legislative means to prevent this (see Section 4). Reported estimates of the prevalence of non-compliance under IQ systems vary widely (reviewed by Porter et al., 2013) and, although in general compliance is believed to be high, strong enforcement is considered to be a key element of this (Branch, 2009).

In the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery, the introduction of individual fishing quotas (previously under effort- limitation) does seem to have shifted the fishery towards increased compliance, as well as increasing the prevalence of violations being reported (Porter et al., 2013).

6.8 Canada Canada’s Department for Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) are responsible for fisheries enforcement. The DFO’s operational system includes a mixture of at-sea/dockside inspections and vessel monitoring, but also a contingent of aerial surveillance operating both within and beyond Canada’s EEZ (DFO, 200563). There are three tiers of enforcement personnel under the Canadian fisheries act64: Officers; guardians and inspectors,

63 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/npoa-pan/npoa-iuu-eng.htm 64 http://www.ec.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang=En&n=D6B74D58-1&offset=3&toc=show

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each of whom have various degrees of enforcement powers. Guardians tend to be more peripheral agents that do not have search powers without a warrant, whereas officers and inspectors are mandated to enforce regulations relating to fisheries and marine pollution. Penalties for fisheries non-compliance include gear/fish seizures and fines, which typically range between CAN$250-1500 (c. US$200-1200) for individuals. There are around 10 infractions a month on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts (DFO, 201765).

The US and Canada have a bilateral agreement to share information relating to fisheries non-compliance and form collaborative partnerships to improve detection, including transfer of illegal marine products across land borders (Government of USA & Government of Canada, 1990).

6.9 Discussion

6.9.1 Enforcement budgets The expense associated with management and enforcement seems to vary considerably (Wallis & Flaaten, 2001). It is difficult to determine precisely what influences the cost of enforcement for a given nation, as cost may vary according to a considerable number of factors:  Observer costs;  Typical vessel trip length & processing capacity (relates to the number of observers needed per vessel);  Fleet sizes and standards of observer coverage for each fishery;  Size of the recreational fishing activities in each country, and levels of enforcement for recreational anglers;  Cost of involvement from Navy/ Coast Guard/ Police;  Governmental efficiencies (bureaucracy, sub-contracts etc.);  Value of the fishery;  Geographic context – EEZ size and distribution of fisheries;  Fleet composition;  Complexity of the harvest control rules and conservation/technical measures.

6.9.2 Observers A 2012 news report66 concerning observers on board Spanish and Portuguese vessels in the NAFO regulatory area (North-west Atlantic) highlighted a number of concerns regarding observer programs. The article

65 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/charges-inculpations-eng.htm 66 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/may/18/fishing-inspectors-intimidated-bribed-crews

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identified a culture of bribery, misdirection and intimidation that can be experienced by fisheries observers. Allegedly common tactics used to conceal illegal landings include depriving observers of sleep, timing hauls to coincide with observer down time (e.g. meals), attempted destruction of records made by observers and bribery. For observers to be effective, cooperation by fishers is clearly important. Unfortunately, it is likely the vessels which are most hostile are those most in need of observer oversight. It is also unknown as to what extent vessels modify their usual practice when an observer is present.

6.9.3 Technological opportunities New techniques may be becoming practical for fisheries management and enforcement. Improved access to, and quality of, Automatic Identification System (AIS) data is of great value, particularly to fisheries in remote areas (e.g. the UK Overseas Territories). Furthermore, autonomous technology may represent new opportunities for management, largely through the use of marine67 and aerial68 drones for inshore and offshore surveys. Other techniques such as Synthetic Aperture Radar used in its own right (Montgomery, 2000) or in conjunction with VMS (Perez, et al., 2013) have also shown promise for application in fisheries enforcement but have not yet seen wider use. Similarly, E-monitoring using e-logbooks and video monitoring, has been trialled in Australian69 and Pacific70 tuna fisheries with some success.

6.9.4 Summary The approaches taken by each country are broadly similar in many cases (Table 6-2), as is the range of punitive measures in use. A number of multi-lateral agreements are in place covering enforcement (Table 6-3), although these largely reflect the extent to which different countries share resources with each other. There is a general lack of any policies that could be considered genuinely innovative, excepting limited evidence of practices such as exploiting social media in New Zealand. Such measures do exist (e.g. genetic sequencing to determine unidentified species or using stable isotopes to determine catch provenance) but they are largely confined to academic circles and have yet to be rolled out as part of routine screening.

67 http://www.marinet.org.uk/drone-to-patrol-fisheries-in-pitcairn-islands-marine-reserve.html 68 https://secure.toolkitfiles.co.uk/clients/15340/sitedata/Misc/latet-quart.pdf 69 http://www.iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2016/05/IOTC-2016-0S20-Inf03_- _ISSF_Side_Event_AFMA_Presentation.pdf 70 http://www.iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2016/05/IOTC-2016-0S20-Inf05_- _ISSF_Side_Event_SPC_Presentation.pdf

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Table 6-2, Summary of enforcement methods used in each country Country VMS/ Electronic On board Interception/ Inspections Other Policies AIS71 Logbooks Observers & Notes At-sea In-dock Post- landing Iceland Yes Not apparent Yes (varies by Yes (Coast Yes Yes fishery and Guard) vessel nationality) Norway Yes Yes (>15m) Yes Yes (Coast Yes Yes Guard) Faroe Yes Not apparent Yes Yes Yes Unknown Supported by Islands Danish patrol vessels Australia Yes Yes (optional) Yes Yes Yes Yes Legislation ~500- variously 800 enhanced by vessels each state. New Yes Piloted in 2011 Yes Yes Probably, Yes FishServe Zealand for trawlers72. (includes not handles quota Has been high-seas) explicitly monitoring rolled out to confirmed on behalf of others since Ministry of but coverage Fisheries. unknown. Aerial surveys Black market surveillance USA Yes Being trialled Yes (varies by Yes Yes Yes in Gulf shrimp vessel size/ fisheries73 fishery) Canada Yes Yes, being Yes Yes Yes Yes Aerial surveys implemented74 UK Yes Yes (in Yes Yes Yes Yes IFCAs cover Scotland for inshore vessels >12m) waters. IFCAs have powers to implement local legislation. 6- 200nm managed within EU CFP.

71 VMS and AIS are distinct systems but that both fall under the umbrella of satellite tracking. Though they may not be distinguished in available information, VMS is likely to be the more widely used system in most cases. 72 http://www.doc.govt.nz/documents/science-and-technical/dmcs9entire.pdf 73 http://www.galvestonlab.sefsc.noaa.gov/ELB/index.html 74 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/sdc-cps/nir-nei/logbooks-elec-journaux-eng.htm

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Table 6-3. Reciprocity matrix for bi- /multi-lateral enforcement arrangements USA Canada Norway Iceland Faroe Australia New UK Islands Zealand [EU] USA Y N N N N N N Canada Y Y N N N N N Norway N Y Y Y N N Y Iceland N N Y Y N N Y Faroe Islands N N Y Y N N Y Australia N N N N N Y N New Zealand N N N N N Y N UK [EU] N N Y Y Y N N

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7 Science-Industry Collaboration

7.1 Introduction Strong relationships between industry and science underpin a healthy fisheries management system. The following chapter summarises different aspects of the interactions between science and the fishing industry in each of the countries of interest. Some of the issues considered include the institutional arrangements that apply, how the science is funded, and the nature of any collaborative research involving scientists and the fishing industry. The nature of any collection of fishery-related data is also of interest, as is the stock assessment and advice process that uses this information. The extent of industry-science collaboration varies greatly from country to country, as does the amount of information available on these topics, and that is reflected in the following accounts.

7.1.1 Science-industry collaboration in the UK England and Wales operate a program known as the ‘Fisheries Science Partnership’ (FSP), predominately as a means to facilitate scientific research that is likely to be of interest to the industry and to provide a forum for fishing groups to express concerns with existing assessments or with stocks not currently assessed. Past FSP projects have included the trialling of new gears and supplementary surveys to improve stock assessments. The FSP invites fishers to propose projects to Cefas, which are assessed for feasibility and then sifted through a competitive awards process. A comparable process that operates in Scotland is known as the Fishing Industry Science Alliance (FISA).

In addition to the collaborative research facilitated through the FSP process, fishery-dependent data is collected by routine sampling of catches both at fishing ports, and on board fishing vessels by scientific observers. The UK are members of ICES and UK scientists participate in a wide range of ICES expert working groups which provide the basis for scientific advice on the management of fisheries of UK interest. Currently, both the data collection and the participation in ICES assessment Working Groups is funded as part of the EU’s Data Collection Framework (DCF).

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7.2 Iceland

7.2.1 Institutional Arrangements Interactions between science and industry are managed by the Iceland Directorate of Fisheries (DoF) and the Fisheries Science Centre at the University of Akureyri. This includes setting TAC and ITQs for vessels, managing area closures and gear restrictions. The Icelandic Marine Research Institute (MRI), part of the DoF, independently operates 2 research vessels and a mariculture laboratory. Both ships are involved in oceanographic and fisheries research, including stock assessments, which are part of Iceland’s participation in ICES assessments. The mariculture laboratory focuses primarily on the farming potential of the halibut, cod, turbot and abalone. The laboratory frequently works with fish farming private companies and aims at developing cod farming in Iceland especially through selective breeding and optimised juvenile production.

7.2.2 Science funding Science activities seem to be predominately funded by the DoF and a 9.5% levy on landings. This levy is calculated as ISK per cod-equivalent kilograms on the value of catches of the previous year (from 1st May to 30th April), costs of fuel and operational/salary costs being deducted from the total value of catches. The fishing fee is payable “in three equal payments due on 1 October, 1 January and 1 May” (Fisheries Management Act, Articles 22-23). The available documentation indicates that no exemptions of any kind apply and all vessels are required to pay this fishing fee.

7.2.3 Collaborative research There appears to very limited involvement of the commercial fleet in supporting scientific research, beyond the expected standards of reporting landings, bycatch etc.

7.2.4 Fishery-dependent data Over-quota landings may be surrendered to the MRI to incentivise fishers to reduce discards but allow them to preserve a higher quota allocation for the following year – see Section 9.2 for more details.

7.2.5 Scientific Advisory process Iceland is a member of ICES and although stock assessments for their main commercial stocks are generally prepared by the Icelandic Marine Research Institute, they are reviewed and documented by the relevant ICES stock assessment working group. The results of these assessments are translated into management advice by the ICES Advisory Committee on Management (ACOM).

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7.3 Norway

7.3.1 Institutional Arrangements The Norwegian Institute for Marine Research (IMR), in collaboration with the commercial fleet, manages a system known as the Norwegian Reference Fleet (NRF). Commercial vessels tender to become part of a fully instrumented subset of the full fleet (representing about 0.6% of the total fishing fleet) and provide research capacity and samples for the IMR. The IMR also has access to research vessels which can also provide some independent samples and data.

7.3.2 Science funding Fisheries science is funded predominately through the NRF. The NRF is a self-funding program (Institute of Marine Research 2013) and in 2011 was funded by the allocation of quota worth approximately NOK 45.4 million (£5.1 million at June 2011 exchange rate), representing around 0.35 % of the total value of landings in 2010 (Institute of Marine Research 2011). During NRF trips, the vessel owners retain 50-60% of the catch to cover expenses and the remaining proportion is used to cover the costs of the administration and research. A certain proportion of the TAC is allocated to the NRF each year, mainly cod and to a lesser extent herring, Greenland halibut and mackerel (Nedreaas et al, 2006), shared amongst its vessels, but it is not clear precisely how the size of this quota is set.

The fishermen sell all the catches in the name of IMR. The vessel owner gets 50-60% of the value of catch, from both regular quotas and NRF extra quotas, and the remainder 40-50% composes IMR’s share which covers running costs and payment to the fishermen. Samples received by IMR are a mixture of directly allocated samples and samples purchased from the NRF at a fixed price (Institute of Marine Research 2011).

7.3.3 Collaborative research/Fishery-dependent data The Norwegian strategy includes a mixture of dedicated marine research activities, coupled with an innovative industrial partnership (the NRF). The IMR handles research cruises and the collation/analysis of fisheries data but vessel operators are closely involved in data collection.

The NRF is divided into high seas and coastal contingents. The high seas NRF (hsNRF; high seas seems to describe a vessel class >30m mostly operating longlines, trawl and purse seines rather than describing a fishing distance from shore) was established in 2000 and usually consists of some 15-20 vessels. The coastal NRF (cNRF; coastal also seems to describe a class of vessel 9.5-15m operating gillnets or Danish seine), which consists of around 20 vessels, followed in 2005 (Institute of Marine Research 2013). The vessels are contracted

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for a period of four years, after which new vessels are selected randomly by drawing lots from those vessels that have submitted a tender and meet all criteria.

The hsNRF in 2013 was comprised of a mix of longline, trawl, purse/Danish seine and gillnet vessels, mainly from the central and southern part of the Norwegian coast and the cNRF mostly comprised of gillnet and pot fishing vessels, distributed along the coast (Institute of Marine Research 2013). Each vessel is equipped with a suite of specialised instruments and software for recording relevant scientific fish data. The NRF has been described as a “potentially useful tool” for monitoring environment and ecosystems (Institute of Marine Research 2011). It indeed collects data on sea mammal and seabird bycatch. It can also be requested to collect hydrographic and environmental data, if it does not hamper fishing operations, but this seems to be rare and most data collection concerns fish. Vessel operators also agree to conform to an electronic logbook format, including discards (but reporting standards vary between gear types) and crews are trained to perform to the Institute’s standard sampling protocols. For most vessels, the IMR can view the electronic data in near real- time via satellite link and has capacity to direct vessels remotely and request that they make specific observations or collect particular samples of interest (Institute of Marine Research 2013). The data collected by NRF vessels are mostly used as part of stock assessments (e.g. for CPUE trends) but the communication links allow the IMR to direct the vessel’s movements, ensure that catch data are recorded in a statistically sound fashion and use vessels to trial new gear or regulations.

There are some criticisms of this scheme, mainly that the NRF is too small to cover the breadth of fishing activities and that the tender process can potentially bias data on vessel behaviour (i.e. less compliant vessels can avoid involvement) (Institute of Marine Research 2013; Institute of Marine Research 2011). Offshore demersal and pelagic vessels and certain length classes for example were over-represented in the 2010 NRF (Institute of Marine Research 2011). It is also contended that the NRF does not always behave in a manner representative of the wider fleet (e.g. in their attitude to discards) (Institute of Marine Research 2011). These fairly minor and rectifiable criticisms aside, the NRF has been independently assessed as high performing and cost-effective (Institute of Marine Research 2011). Possible measures that might be taken to improve upon the NRF format could be; to introduce some level of vessel nomination by the relevant fishing authority (to address the vessel bias question) and more thoroughly compare observer data from non-NRF vessels with the NRF to assess the suggestion that there are discrepancies in vessel behaviour.

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7.3.4 Scientific Advisory process Norway is a member of ICES and Norwegian scientists participate in the relevant ICES stock assessment working groups. The results of these assessments are translated into management advice by the ICES Advisory Committee on Management (ACOM).

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7.4 Faroes

7.4.1 Institutional Arrangements The key annual process in the management of Faroese fisheries is the revision of the effort quotas. The initial stage in this is scientific advice from the Faroese Marine Research Institute which is delivered to the Fisheries ministry. There is then substantial input from fishing industry stakeholders before the final allocations are decided and written into law. This process is described by Hegland and Hopkins (2014) and described in more detail in Section 3.4. Hegland and Hopkins (2014) note that there are no environmental NGOs involved in this process so all stakeholder involvement comes from commercial interests and the scientists/fisheries managers are also forced to represent environmental concerns. This means that the process leads to an adversarial relationship between the scientists and industry.

The Faroese have operated a full discard ban since 1994, but the management of catches through effort controls (which have often been set too high) and the relatively poor capacity for enforcement means that practices such as high-grading are still thought to occur (Condie et al. 2014).

No information is available on the extent of any collaboration between Faroese scientists and their fishing industry. However, given the nature of the relationship between the two noted above, collaboration is likely to be limited.

7.4.2 Scientific Advisory process The Faroe Islands are a member of ICES and although stock assessments for their main commercial stocks are generally prepared by the Faroese Marine Research Institute, they are reviewed and documented by the relevant ICES stock assessment working group. The results of these assessments are translated into management advice by the ICES Advisory Committee on Management (ACOM). The ICES advice is expressed in terms of catch options to achieve MSY objectives but the advice is not followed by the Faroese authorities, at least partly because fishing is managed using limits on days-at-sea rather than catch, and no MSY objectives have been implemented.

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7.5 Australia

7.5.1 Institutional arrangements The management and sustainable use of the Australian fisheries and sea resources is administered by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), part of the Department of Agriculture. Each fishery is covered by a management advisory committee (MAC) which provides scientific and economic advice on fish stocks and fishing impacts. The MACs are composed of industry (commercial and recreational fishing experts recognised within their stakeholder group), research, conservation and governmental (state and territory) members. The future MAC members are recommended according to their expertise by an assessment panel and appointed for up to three years by the AFMA Commission. The committees provide evidence-based advice and address economic and ecological factors affecting the state of the fishery. Committee recommendations must align with AFMA’s legislative objectives. Each fishery is also covered by a resource assessment group. These groups provide advice and recommendations to management advisory committees (AFMA management, the AFMA Commission and the AFMA Research Committee) on the status of fish stocks, sub- stocks, species (target and non-target), fishery economics and on the impact of fishing on the marine environment. The resource assessment groups also give advice on the type of information required for specific stock assessments. These groups are composed of fishery scientists, industry members, fishery economists, AFMA management and other interest groups. This wide range of members ensures that knowledge and experience from each sectors are being considered when providing recommendations and, most importantly, are being accepted when taking actions.

7.5.2 Science funding Australia is the ninth largest country in the world in terms of subsidies to the fishing industry (Sumaila et al.2016). The government spent around US$ 0.5 billion of subsidies in 2009 to its fishing industry, 30 to 40% of it being beneficial subsidies (management, research and development). The Australian Fisheries Management Authority is mainly funded by the government which contributed to 88% (A$ 33 million) of its budget in 2015-2016 (AFMA Financial Statement 30 June 2016) while the remainder 12% came from own source income (sale of goods, rendering of services and rental). The Fisheries Research and Development Corporation (FRDC) is also mainly supported by the government. It was funded to 67% of its budget by the federal government and to 28% by the fishing industry in 2015-2016, with the remaining 5% coming from unspecified other sources (FRDC Annual Report 2015-16). A significant proportion of the FRDC funding is directed at research to benefit the three fishing industry sectors (commercial, both wild catch and aquaculture, recreational and indigenous).

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7.5.3 Collaborative research The Fisheries Research and Development Corporation (FRDC) is a co-funded partnership between its two stakeholders, the Australian Government and the fishing industry and is responsible to the Australian Minister for Agriculture. The FRDC’s role is to plan and invest in fisheries research, development and extension (RD&E) activities in Australia. This includes providing leadership and coordination of the monitoring, evaluating and reporting on RD&E activities, facilitating dissemination, extension and commercialisation. The FRDC achieves this through coordinating government and industry investment, including stakeholders to establish and address RD&E priorities.

7.5.4 Fishery-dependent data Landings data are gathered by both the fishermen and the fish receiver in the AFMA catch disposal records (CDR). Catch and effort details (including gear and spatial location) are also recorded by fishermen while at sea in the AFMA daily fishing logbooks (DFL). CDRs and DFLs are then submitted and entered into AFMA databases. The Australian at-sea observer program places AFMA trained observers aboard fishing vessels for data collection and monitoring of fishing activity and compliance with fishing regulations and licence conditions. The degree of observer coverage varies by fishery and in some cases is based on an Environmental Risk Assessment process which identifies those fisheries with the highest risk of causing damage to components of the marine ecosystem.

7.5.5 Scientific Advisory process As well as a MAC, each fishery in Australia is also covered by a Resource Assessment Group (RAG). These groups are intended to provide scientific advice and recommendations to the relevant MAC, hence their work includes running stock assessments and advising on the research necessary to support stock assessment. Membership of the RAGs is drawn from fishery scientists, industry members, fishery economists, AFMA management and other interest groups. Having this range of skills and interests represented on the RAG is intended to ensure that its recommendations are based on e.g. industry knowledge and market and cost information as well as on scientific analyses.

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7.6 New Zealand

7.6.1 Institutional Arrangements New Zealand’s administrative structure divides competing interests into several independent advocacy groups (governmental, commercial and environmental), which collaborate as part of ongoing fisheries management. In recent times, there has been a movement in New Zealand towards a self-governing industry, comprised of several groups with competing interests, but collectively overseen at a governmental level (Townsend et al. 2008). Under the 1996 Fisheries Act, the Minister for Fisheries may choose to devolve responsibility for certain management functions to specific stakeholders. Additionally, the Fisheries Ministry may sub-contract work to third parties but in this case, the ministry retains responsibility and accountability.

New Zealand fisheries are co-managed by the Ministry of Fisheries and the Dept. of Conservation, each of whom represent various stakeholders and environmental/socio-economic objectives in NZ and there exists a memorandum of understanding between the two departments that decisions are made communally. Almost the entire commercial sector is collectively represented by the New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (NZSIC), which is divided into four units: science; business; policy, trade and information, and industry training (Townsend et al. 2008). The science group is responsible for fisheries science and research; the business group is concerned with fisheries law and regulations, access rights and aquaculture; the trade and information group largely deals with international policy and exports and the industry training group provides competency- based training across all aspects of the industry (Townsend et al. 2008). NZSIC is comprised of more than 30 individual commercial stakeholder groups for specific fisheries or geographic areas. The Mäori interests are represented by Te Ohu Kaimoana, established by the Mäori Fisheries Act (2004), which is responsible for advocating the customary fishing rights of New Zealand’s indigenous peoples. In addition there are a number of independent NGOs in New Zealand who represent other interests in environmental management, sustainability and recreational fisheries (Townsend et al. 2008).

Services that have been devolved to NZSIC, which operates under the company name ‘FishServe’75 include: vessel registration; licencing and allocating and monitoring quotas (Townsend et al. 2008). Legislative restructuring, and the fact that FishServe is an independent, private company with greater operational flexibility, have significantly reduced costs and bureaucracy from NZ$8.6 million in 2000/01 to NZ$4.9 million in 2005/06 (Townsend et al. 2008). FishServe is held to account by industry investment to reduce its costs and improve its technical capacity and, whilst it still has to conform to management guidelines (e.g. TAC limits), it is also reliant upon retaining industry support as its customer base. This effectively places FishServe as a

75 https://www.fishserve.co.nz/

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mediatory organisation and perhaps helps to diffuse friction between science and industry, particularly as the fisheries ministry is not responsible for allocating individual vessel quotas.

7.6.2 Science funding Commercial vessels and state funded departments, like the National Institute for Water and Atmosphere (NIWA) can tender for state funding for particular research activities. Vessels have been invited to compete for research funding as it was believed that in some cases, they could provide research or surveys more cheaply than NIWA or other similar institutes. However, there has not been a significant uptake and by 2006, very few contracts had attracted more than one bid and the publicly-funded NIWA had been awarded 85% of the 241 contracts put out to tender, proving that uptake by the industry has been quite limited (Townsend et al. 2008).

7.6.3 Collaborative research Reducing the workload on publicly funded departments has obvious financial benefits but raises critical questions regarding conflict of interest and resource sustainability. Following amendments to the Fisheries Act in 1999, it became possible for fishers to tender to provide particular research services. The rationale was that this would give the industry more responsibility and sense of ownership and, in some cases, commercial vessels would have lower overheads and thus could reduce the Fisheries Ministry’s operating expenditure (Townsend et al. 2008). Plainly, this is a radical move away from a federally-administered system, where the management agency operates independently of the commercial sector, and relies heavily upon the belief that enhanced sense of stewardship amongst commercial fishers will elicit reliable information. This assumption may be valid, since clearly the vessels do not want to be responsible for crippling their own resources but it clearly depends upon the timescale of their investment in the fishery (i.e. some vessels may be willing to have a short period of high-intensity, high-profit activity and then move on, following the collapse of the fishery). Despite the obvious contentiousness of management devolution, and continued opposition from environmental groups, there have been success stories for Rock Lobster and Scallop fisheries, which subsequently became heavily involved in surveys and management (Townsend et al. 2008).

Successes in the push towards self-governance suggests that the principle may be sound under certain circumstances but in general, mistrust from NGOs and lack of industry capacity has stymied a considerable amount of the desired reduction of fisheries management costs.

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7.6.4 Fishery-dependent data Commercial fishers can tender to provide research activities but there has be relatively little uptake by the industry, resulting from either a lack of capacity or will (Townsend et al. 2008).

7.6.5 Scientific Advisory process TACs are set by the Ministry of Fisheries but independent stakeholders are encouraged to help design and propose their own fisheries management plans, subject to approval by MoF. It was hoped that this would encourage innovation and increased stakeholder engagement and permit reduced federal involvement. However, there has been suggestion that NZSIC parties have been reluctant to invest in developing their own strategies because of concerns that the fisheries ministry would be unlikely to accept them, preferring to leave stock assessments to state-funded agencies (Townsend et al. 2008).

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7.7 USA

7.7.1 Institutional arrangements The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS or NOAA Fisheries) division is responsible for managing the ocean resources and exploitation and for ensuring conservation of the ecosystems. NOAA is a scientific agency of the US Department of Commerce. NOAA Fisheries work adheres to the legislative goals set by the Magnuson-Stevens Act and approves and implements the decisions made by the Regional Fishery Management Councils. There are eight Councils, each of which is responsible for management of the fisheries and the development of management plans in their jurisdiction (usually 3nm to the EEZ limit, except in Texas and Florida where jurisdiction begins at 9nm). The Councils are composed of both voting and non-voting members from the fishing industry, academic research groups, environmental advocacy organisations and the government.

7.7.2 Science funding Government subsidised the fishing industry by around US$ 4.1 billion in 2009, 80% being beneficial subsidies (management and R&D). It is ranked third in the world in terms of providing subsidies to its fishing fleet (behind Japan and China). However, the US is the only country amongst the ten largest subsidising economies to provide more beneficial subsidies than capacity-enhancing subsidies (Sumaila et al.2016). NOAA received US$ 958 million in 2015 from the federal government, of which about half was dedicated to fisheries science and management.

7.7.3 Collaborative research In 2001, NOAA Fisheries set a collaborative research program called National Cooperative Research Program (CRP). It is a partnering program between the fishing industry and scientists (federal and universities) to make science progress in the fisheries. It aims at creating a synergy between the sectors in every phase of the research program, from data collection to publication and communication. The CRP received about US$ 12 million each year between 2013-2017 from the federal government. Some examples of programs being part of CRP are the Bycatch Reduction Engineering Program (BREP), which aims at developing technologies and fishing practices for reducing bycatch; the Saltonstall-Kennedy Grant Program, which funds programs addressing the needs of the fishing community and optimising economic benefits; and the Sea Grant Program76 which is a federal-local partnership operated by a network of 33 universities across the US. In 2007, the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act called for the establishment of cooperative research and

76 http://seagrant.noaa.gov/

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management programs to be “implemented on a regional basis and developed and conducted through partnerships among Federal, State, and Tribal managers and scientists, fishing industry participants, and educational institutions” (US Public Law 109-479, Title II, §318).

Several cooperative programs have been set up within each of the Council’s jurisdiction. The New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Councils have created the Research Set Aside grants (RSA). This is not substantially different to the Norwegian system, whereby some proportion of the catch by the reference fleet is used to fund fisheries research. Examples of RSA programs which exist or have existed include: Atlantic Sea Scallop (est. 1999), Monkfish (est. 2005), Herring (est. 2008) and the Mid-Atlantic fisheries (2001-2014). The Councils set-aside quota of catch for these species which are awarded through a competitive grant process administered by NOAA Fisheries. Unlike typical grant programs, the award is transfer of catch quota, rather than of money. The quotas are harvested through partnerships between scientists and fishermen which generates the funds necessary to support research projects. Set-aside quotas may vary depending on the year and the market conditions but are typically in the order 1.25 million lbs (567 tonnes) of scallops per year, equivalent to approximately $15 million (of which approximately $3 million supports research projects), 500 days-at-sea per year for monkfish, equivalent to approximately $1.75 million (of which approximately $300,000 supports research projects) and up to 3% of the annual catch limit from each herring management area. Due to the uncertainty of management area closures, funds generated under the herring RSA program are variable. In general, approximately $100,000-$200,000 is generated to support research each year. NOAA’s philosophy is to provide financial assistance to researchers to achieve a focus on fisheries research and RFMO research priorities. As a grant, and not contract, NOAA does not acquire services from the applicants for its benefit or use. RSA programs have proven to be an effective approach for funding cooperative research that can address fishery-specific science and management needs (Adams 2015).

7.7.4 Fishery-dependent data Data on fisheries comes from various sources, particularly logbooks and at-sea observers. Observers are recruited and hired by NOAA-fisheries-approved observer provider companies. When possible, abundance data are obtained from a fishery independent survey through research or contracted commercial fishing vessel separately from commercial fishing operations. Landings data are also recorded and audited through dockside monitoring, often in partnership with state agencies and fishery commissions. Kaplan & McCay (2004) note that: “Co-operative or joint research efforts, such as government researchers using active fishing vessels and crew or side-by-side trials of government research vessels and private fishing vessels, have recently become more frequent”.

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7.7.5 Scientific advisory process The process by which fish stocks are assessed and the results translated into management advice varies across the different regions, but the process used for stocks in the New England region is typical. There, the initial stock assessment is done by Stock Assessment Workshop (SAW) working groups. These groups are generally chaired by a leading scientist from the National Marine Fisheries Service’s North-East Fisheries Science Center, and a relevant member of staff from the appropriate Fisheries Management Council will also have automatic membership. The remaining members of the working group are drawn from respondents to a public announcement seeking candidates for membership. The selection process is based on ensuring that the appropriate skills and expertise are represented in the membership. All meetings of the SAW working groups are open to the public.

Once the SAW working group has agreed a final assessment for the relevant stock the next step is that a Stock Assessment Review Committee (SARC) meets to provide a scientific peer review of the stock assessment and its adequacy as the basis for providing scientific advice. The membership of the SARC is drawn largely from relevant experts from other parts of the world provided via the Center for Independent Experts. As with the assessment working group meetings, SARC meetings are open to the public. Once the SARC has finally agreed that an assessment is acceptable, it is then used as the basis of scientific advice on the management of the fishery. This advice is drafted by members of the relevant committees of the Fisheries Management Council.

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7.8 Canada

7.8.1 Institutional arrangements Fisheries and Oceans Canada (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, DFO) is the government agency responsible for the fisheries management and sea exploitation in line with the legal requirements of the Fisheries Act 1985, the primary statute for the conservation of fish and habitats and for the management of fisheries.

7.8.2 Science funding Canada spent around US$ 1 billion of subsidies in 2009 to fishing industry. It is ranked 6th in the world in terms of providing subsidies to its fishing industry. Around 40% goes to management, research and development (Sumaila et al.2016). As part of it, the CAN$5 million Partnership Fund serves many collaborative research projects (Fisheries Science Collaborative Program). In 2016, the Canadian government gave a boost of CAN$197.1 million for ocean and freshwater science.

7.8.3 Collaborative research DFO created the Office of Partnership and Collaboration (OPC) to work with Canada’s scientific community. Its role is to improve the development and application of scientific information and advice; to strengthen Canadian knowledge on ocean and freshwater science and to build networks for partnering and collaboration. The OPC is also in charge of managing the yearly CAN$5 million Partnership Fund that supports collaborative scientific initiatives undertaken with partner organizations. It is engaging with members of the larger scientific community and other aquatic science stakeholders to explore ways to share knowledge, expertise and infrastructure in support of science data collection, integration, and access; ocean and freshwater monitoring and managing, conserving and promoting our ocean and freshwater resources.

From 2010 to 2016 the Canadian Fisheries Research Network (CFRN) was a collaboration of academic researchers, fishing industry stakeholders from Atlantic to Pacific and government researchers and managers. The CFRN was centred around issues that were directly relevant to the industry and involved projects that required collaboration of each sectors to achieve “a sustainable and viable fishing industry in an evolving management system”. It was funded by the NSERC (Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada) Strategic Network Grants for five years.

Today, the Fisheries Science Collaborative Program, supervised by Fisheries and Oceans Canada, allows scientists and the Atlantic fishing industry stakeholders to work together. This joint venture is revised every year to ensure that the projects are aligned with the conservation and management priorities for the Atlantic fisheries.

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7.8.4 Fishery-dependent data Section 61 of the Fisheries Act requires that fish harvesters keep a record of their catches and fishing efforts and report to the DFO. Since April 2013, the industry has assumed the full costs of the at-sea observer program, as well as the groundfish electronic monitoring program in the Pacific region. Canada's at-sea observer program places certified private-sector observers aboard fishing vessels for data collection, fishing activity monitoring and monitoring of industry compliance with fishing regulations and licence conditions. The Pacific region's groundfish electronic monitoring program carries through the same tasks but relies on cameras and sensory devices on board fishing vessels instead of observers.

7.8.5 Scientific advisory process Stock assessment for Canadian stocks are co-ordinated by the Canadian Science Advisory Secretariat. Stock assessment meetings are open to representatives of the fishing industry, representatives of the relevant provinces, aboriginal communities and non-government organisations. In most fisheries managed by DFO, inputs and advice are provided by an advisory committee. Committees are composed of representatives of the stakeholders of the fisheries.

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7.9 Summary and discussion

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Table 7-1 gives an overview of the successes and failures of the different national approaches considered here and Table 7-2 summarises different elements of these approaches. The English FSP system is comparable with the New Zealand and Norwegian systems, in that it makes use of existing vessel capacity, rather than relying upon dedicated research cruises. The key difference between the English and NZ systems is that in England, vessels are invited to propose their own activities and are then supported by competitively awarded funding, rather than simply to tender for outstanding contracts issued by the fisheries ministry. This has apparently resulted in improved uptake, relative to the NZ system where the only significant change seems to have been the passing of administrative duties to FishServe. The Norwegian system by comparison, is more active and can directly task the reference fleet with particular research activities. Despite some relatively minor criticisms regarding biases within the NRF, this generally appears to have been a successful program, particularly as it is operated on a full cost-recovery basis. The Faroese situation is characterised by an adversarial relationship between scientists and the fishing industry which has been attributed to a lack of representation of environmental pressure groups in the management process. This underlines the importance of ensuring that the full range of stakeholders are adequately represented. Iceland seems to have little formalised system in the sense of other countries like the US or Norway. The Icelandic discard policy does result in some samples being provided to the marine institute free of charge but overall, the system seems to lack any tangible innovation. That said, there is no obvious source of friction between managers and vessel operators in Iceland, and the fisheries are collectively considered to be broadly well-managed.

The commonalities between the successful programs include:  Commercial partners that feel a sense of stewardship and involvement in the wider process of fisheries management.  Use of existing vessel capacity and facilities to meet research requirements.  Costs to the state are met or reduced by operational policies.

Common themes amongst the less successful programs include:  Science-industry partnership is too passive.  Insufficient vessel capacity or motivation to become involved in fisheries management.  Lack of trust between stakeholders.

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Table 7-1, Summary of science-Industry partnerships and their successes and failures

Country Policies/ Successes Failures Situation Iceland No formal collaboration Norway Norwegian Self-funding Biased fleet composition Reference Industry involved (quota Fleet too small Fleet allocation) NRF fleet behaviour different to non- High quality data collected across NRF vessels? large area Training for NRF crews Data collected by fishing vessels, not research vessels trying to emulate them

Faroe Lack of Scientists forced to represent Islands representative environmental interests stakeholder Little industry cooperation involvement

Australia Management Multi-disciplinary panels Advisory Committees New Devolved to a Encourages stakeholder Limited vessel capacity and uptake Zealand company: stewardship Lack of trust between industry, state ‘FishServe’ Reduces some costs and NGOs USA Research Set- Fisheries research funded Asides through quota allocation of TAC to science partners Canada Fisheries Camera monitoring to increase Science observer coverage Mostly state funded Collaborative Program

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Table 7-2, Summary of science-industry partnership arrangements

Topic Iceland Norway Faroe Islands Australia New Zealand USA Canada UK (England) Institutional No obvious Norwegian No formalised Fisheries Research Encouraging National Fisheries Science Commercial Arrangements formalised Reference Fleet, agreement. and Development involvement from Cooperative Collaborative fishers can agreement approx. 40 vessels Corporation industry in Research Program Program (DFO) propose research between administered by (FRDC) co-funded research and formalise the binds industry to projects to Cefas commercial and IMR, which partnership administration. agreement scientists (e.g. trialling of scientific partners. provide research between science between industry new gears). capacity. and industry and scientists From science IMR provides NRF crews trained Faroes Ministry of Management Fishing vessels NOAA Fisheries DFO’s Office of Cefas provides to scientific advice in scientific Fisheries sets Advisory can tender to approves and Partnership and scientific and management for determining standards of data effort limits. Committee and provide scientific implements Collaboration management TAC limits etc. collection and Resource surveys (but ~85% Regional Fishery advice, with input reporting. IMR is Assessment of research Managements from vessel responsible for Group gather remains state Councils operators. data analysis and industry and funded). management setting TAC limits. scientists (AFMA) decisions Reporting by Proportion of NRF reports Poor reporting Basic standards Industry and At-sea At-sea private Any additional Vessel below-MLS landings and standards. only of catch, science interface independent independent concerns/ Operators individuals per environmental effort, gear etc. managed by observers observers questions can be (beyond basic fishing area. data real-time. FishServe (quotas) posed through reporting Other vessels At sea AFMA and Ministry of Independent CCTV and sensory FSP as potential subject to various observers Fisheries surveys through devices (Pacific research projects standards for reporting (research). research or Region landings) standards and contracted Groundfish levels of observer commercial Fisheries) coverage vessels Funding for MRI is state- NRF operational Ministry of Minister of Costs met by US Department of Department of Cefas is largely research and funded (at least in costs fully Fisheries state- Agriculture mixture of state Commerce Fisheries and state-funded. FSP management part through the recovered from funded. (AFMA) funding and (NOAA) Oceans projects funded 9.5% tax levied on levy on the NRF devolvement of by state funding net fishing profits (~40-50%). Fishing industry administrative or Research Set- for Cefas, through profits). contribution research Asides: fishing competitive through FRDC activities. quotas given to award process. (~67% state science) funded, ~28% by industry) A review of international fisheries management regimes Page 199 of 298

Subsidy Value US$1.5bn [2003] US$2.9bn [2003] Unknown US$0.5bn [2009] Nil US$4.1bn [2009] CAN$1bn [2009] US$0.6bn [2009] and Main Target (most Capacity Capacity recent Capacity enhancing Ambiguous Beneficial enhancing Capacity estimate)77 enhancing enhancing Role of Industry and Industry tenders No involvement Management FishServe Alaska: Industry involved Industry proposes Industry in research activities to join NRF for beyond Advisory responsible for Groundfishing in Collaborative research projects research and apparently mostly four years and is mandatory Committee and allocating and vessels share Programs to the FSP. management separate. contracted by IMR reporting Resource managing IVQs information about Implemented in for this period. standards. Assessment from TAC limits. bycatch hotspots. Full costs of the partnership with Group gather Industry may observers Cefas. industry and tender to provide Industry harvest supported by scientists (AFMA) research the quotas industry activities, but allocated to Vessel operators limited uptake. science to extract support costs the financial when having potential observer onboard Novel N/A Norwegian N/A Devolution of Fisheries Science approaches Reference Fleet research and Partnership (Quota allocation administration to fund research).

77 Subsidy values from (Sumaila et al. 2016) & Sumaila et al. (2010). Beneficial subsidies are those which favour the sustainability and resilience of natural capital. Capacity enhancing subsidies focus upon building facilities and infrastructure to improve or expand fishing capabilities. Ambiguous subsidies are those which have no clear effect to either improve or reduce the resource status (Sumaila et al. 2016).

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8 Foreign Investment

8.1 Introduction In most countries, it is possible for foreign investors to have some degree of access to a fishery controlled by another State. This often raises concerns amongst local or national interests that the employment opportunities and profits/ taxes may get diverted to the country in which the investor is based. This typically results in a complement of procedures outlining the conditions under which foreign parties may become involved in territorial fisheries (OECD, 1990). Additionally, vessels from other flag States may fish within another nation’s territorial waters, usually through reciprocal agreements and the negotiation of historic fishing rights (see also Section 5 on Access Arrangements). This chapter deals with the guidelines and laws through which foreign involvement in territorial fisheries is facilitated.

Different countries naturally have different attitudes to foreign investment, which also varies according to the perceived importance of a particular industry. In Iceland and Faroes for example, fishing contributes a substantial proportion of the GDP but in other countries much less so. An OECD report into how amenable different countries are to foreign investment across a range of sectors, not just fishing (2002), rated Iceland and Canada as the most restrictive countries, followed by (in descending order of those reviewed here): Australia; New Zealand; Norway and USA (Faroe Islands not rated). The UK by comparison was rated as being the least restrictive of any of the OECD nations reviewed (OECD, 2002). In comparison to other EU member States, the UK was rated as being broadly similar to Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany but less restrictive than other States such as France, Greece and (OECD, 2002).

In terms of fishing, most countries implement some combination of (OECD, 2008):  Limits upon stake in fishing companies that foreign investors may hold;  The nationalities of crew members;  Stipulations about where the vessel is registered, built and maintained;  Limits to ownership and allocation of quota;  Proportion of quota that must be landed in the host nation  The number of foreign nationals that can hold senior positions in fishing companies.

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8.1.1 UK context In the UK, there are restrictions upon foreign owned vessels fishing the UK’s quota of allowable catch. To qualify for a licence, the respective vessel must be registered to the UK and provide genuine economic benefits to the UK economy, in particular UK coastal communities dependent on fisheries and fisheries related industries. The current economic link78condition requires that vessels must comply with at least one of the following: A. Land 50% of the quota into the UK; B. 50% of crew normally be resident into the UK; C. Incur 50% of operating expenditure in the UK; or D. Gift quota to the Government for use by the under 10 metre fleet.

Defra commissioned a review of the effectiveness of the Economic Link (vivideconomics, 2009). They noted that 75 foreign-owned vessels which fish UK quota account for more than 50% of the overseas landings of UK stocks. Of these, two fleets are the most economically important; the Anglo-Dutch and the Anglo-Spanish. Of these, the former fish for demersal species in the North Sea, land their catch almost entirely in the Netherlands and comply with the Economic Link through quota donations. The Anglo-Spanish fleet, fishing to the west of the , land more than half their catch in the UK, and the rest in Spain and Ireland. Vivideconomics (2009) also noted that, in terms of their contribution to the UK economy, the crew residency and quota-gifting options (B and D above) appear to have been the most effective.

As a member of the EU, the UK’s EEZ currently forms part of the EU’s EEZ, and within that area the CFP gives Member States equal access to the EU EEZ. The exception is inshore waters within 12 nautical miles of national baselines which remain under national control. In some cases there are so- called ‘Grandfather rights’ in place which permit other States access to parts of other States’ inshore waters to within 6nm of the baseline. These rights are based on access agreements that pre-date the establishment of the CFP. Under these arrangements, 31 different access rights exist for other Member States in UK waters, and the UK has similar rights of access to inshore waters of Germany, France, the Netherlands and Ireland. In addition, the London Fisheries Convention79 of 1964 also established rights of access to UK inshore waters. This convention became redundant once the CFP was established and the UK is presently engaged in a separate two year withdrawal process which will revoke the current agreement in June-July 2019.

78 https://marinedevelopments.blog.gov.uk/2017/08/10/statistics-about-fishing-in-the-uk-and-beyond/ 79 http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1966/TS0035.pdf

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8.2 Iceland

8.2.1 Foreign Investment Foreign companies or people may not own more than a maximum (cumulative) share of 25% of any fishing or fish processing company (FAO, 201080). Vessels and companies must also be registered to Iceland and the company director must be an Icelandic national (OECD, 1990). There is very little evidence of Icelandic fishing companies having significant involvement from foreign groups, with only a single company being split between Iceland and Denmark (Fish Information & Services: Companies Directory Iceland81). International investment in aquaculture by comparison is being encouraged (Invest in Iceland, 201782). The controls exerted over levels of foreign ownership for aquaculture are unclear.

8.2.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets Landings by foreign vessels in Icelandic waters have decreased in recent years (~7% of total in 2007) and are mostly limited to pelagic fisheries (predominately Capelin and Blue Whiting). The Faroe Islands makes about half of these landings, and Greenland and Norway around 15% each (FAO, 2010).

80 http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/ISL/en 81 http://fis.com/fis/companies/index.asp?l=e&filterby=activities&country_id=is&activity_id=1261 82 http://www.invest.is/key-sectors/fish-farming

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8.3 Norway

8.3.1 Foreign investment In terms of operating procedures, Norwegian vessels owned by foreign companies are subject to the same level of regulation as those owned by Norwegian interests. Norway has a strict policy of controlling the levels of involvement by foreign interests (FAO, 201183). All Norwegian citizens/ entities have the right to purchase fishing licences but for a foreign company to gain the same rights, it must meet several conditions (assuming that quota is available). The company must agree to base its main office in Norway, have a majority of its board (at least 60% including the chairperson) who have lived in Norway for at least two years, and Norwegians must own a minimum of 60% of the shares and votes (FAO, 2011). The practice of demanding that the main company office be based in Norway substantially obscures the extent of foreign investment because it requires detailed knowledge of the nationalities of the various shareholders. To all intents and purposes, the company to which the licence can actually be awarded is Norwegian, and investment from foreign interests cannot exceed 40% of the shares. This likely means that foreign investment is quite limited in most cases (and in any case, could not have a controlling interest) and we could find only very limited evidence of Norwegian fishing companies, or their holding companies, having non-Norwegian senior staff (Fish Information Service: Norway Company Directory).

8.3.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets EU vessels fishing in Norwegian waters are subject to more stringent VMS requirements than Norwegian vessels (applies to all vessels >15m, rather than >24m for Norwegian flagged vessels). Agreements between Norway and the EU determine the level of access granted to the various Norwegian and non-Norwegian fleets within the Norwegian EEZ. Norway also has some bilateral agreements with non-CFP nations (e.g. the Faroe Islands and Russia – see Section 5.3). Around 90% of Norway’s commercially important stocks are to some degree shared with the EU. Under EU-Norway agreements, losses to Norwegian quota are compensated by quota allocation from other areas of the European fishing area (Fisheries Norway, 201084). Norway also agrees a raft of stock-specific, gear and other restrictions that are to be met in its waters each year (Westberg & Verborgh, 2016). In 2009, foreign vessels landed around 2,000-3,000t in Norwegian ports, compared with around ten times this value landed by domestic fleets (2.5 million t) (FAO Norway Fishing Profile85).

83 http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/NOR/en 84http://www.fisheries.no/resource_management/International_cooperation/Cooperation_EU/#.WQmqpmd1 qM9 85 http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/NOR/en

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8.4 Faroes

8.4.1 Foreign Investment Faroese interests must own at least 2/3 of any vessel or company and the vessel be subject to taxation within the Faroe Islands jurisdiction (Faroe Islands Govt., 2008). There are apparently very few foreign companies active in the Faroe Islands (FIS: Companies Directory Faroe Islands86). For individuals wishing to apply for a work permit in the Faroes, there are certain restrictions placed upon levels of employment for EU citizens, but citizens of do not need to apply for visas.

Most foreign investment into the Faroes (not fisheries-specific) comes from Denmark (approx. 50% of the US$285 million in 201287). Several sources (e.g. US State Dept.88) note that the Faroese economy is heavily reliant upon fishing exports (97% in 2014 by value) and consequently the economy may be vulnerable to foreign takeovers if stock biomass or export values decline.

8.4.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets Most of the demersal fisheries are harvested by Faroese fishers but the majority of pelagic fisheries are conducted by foreign vessels, licenced through various bi-/multi-lateral agreements, usually through reciprocal agreements that offer Faroese access rights in other countries, such as Greenland (FAO, 200589; OECD90; Faroe Islands Govt., 2008). The levels of foreign activity changes with each review of quota allocations in annual negotiations and Scottish fishers have in the past complained that the Faroese disproportionately benefit from EU quota allocation arrangements, particularly for blue whiting, mackerel91 and herring (Scotland Herald, 201592).

86 http://fis.com/fis/companies/index.asp?l=e&filterby=activities&country_id=fo&activity_id=1261 87 https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241536.htm 88 https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241536.htm 89 ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_FO.pdf 90 https://www.oecd.org/countries/greenland/34431581.pdf 91 http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Expert%20Group%20Report/acfm/2002/wgmhsa/2- Northeast%20Atlantic%20Mackerel.pdf 92 http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14121877.Faroe_Islands_gain_too_much_from_fishing_deal/

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8.5 Australia

8.5.1 Foreign Investment The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) has discretion to award or revoke licences to foreign-controlled vessels under the Australian Fisheries Management Act (199193). The Act does not set specific limits on the level of foreign investment/ control that is permissible. AFMA is tasked with levying payments from these parties under the Foreign Fishing Licences Levy Act (199194), with the specific amount relating to the agreement made at the point of licence issue.

Vessels must be considered ‘Australian’ to hold licences. To be considered ‘Australian’ the vessel must satisfy one of the following criteria, following the Fisheries Management Act (1991):  The boat is operated from Australia, wholly owned by an Australian person/ company and was built in Australia.  The boat is listed on the Australian shipping register and is not owned by a foreign resident chartering it to an Australian entity. To be listed on the register the vessel must either by majority owned by Australian nationals or be <12m in length and wholly owned or operated by Australian resident’s nationals.  AFMA has declared it to be an Australian boat.

Even if a boat has been flagged to Australia, it is still considered foreign if it is majority controlled by a foreign entity (even if it is under charter to an Australian resident/company) (AFMA). Foreign vessels may land catches in Australian ports but only where they have been given explicit permission by AFMA or the minister responsible.

The Australian Foreign Investment Review Board95 (FIRB) reviews all agribusiness (including fishing, agriculture and mining) proposals that are valued at or above AUS$55 million (or AUS$1094 million for partner countries within existing free trade agreements). The FIRB must balance the need for foreign capital with concerns that national/ local interests are being preserved (FIRB Policy96). In making its decisions, the FIRB has to consider national security, competition, economic & social impacts and the ‘character’ of the investor. However, it is worth noting that many fishing investments may not meet the threshold for review and it is not currently clear to what extent these are controlled.

93 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/fma1991193/ 94 https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004A04225 95 https://firb.gov.au/exemption-thresholds/monetary-thresholds/ 96 http://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias_Foreign_Investment_Policy_December_2015_v2.pdf

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During 2007-201197, foreign direct investment across agriculture, forestry and fishing ranged AUS$624 – 740 million [US$490 – 580 million] per year. This accounts for a very small proportion of the total foreign investment in 2011 of AUS$507.3bn (of which 35% was invested in mining). Gross value of Australian fisheries production in 2010 was AUS$2.18bn [US$1.71bn] (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 201298).

8.5.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets Fishing by foreign fleets is permitted in Australian waters through bilateral agreements but only for fisheries where there is excess quota (OECD, 2013).

97http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1 314/ForeignInvest 98http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/Lookup/by%20Subject/1301.0~2012~Main%20Features~Fishing~ 182

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8.6 New Zealand

8.6.1 Foreign Investment The ownership of quota and the registering of vessels is not permitted for any company that is deemed to be ‘foreign controlled’ (i.e. one which has >25% of shareholders who are not New Zealanders) (OECD, 1990).

8.6.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets Following the expansion of foreign fishing activity in New Zealand’s waters in the 1960s and 70s, and the establishment of the EEZ in 1977, foreign involvement had to be on the basis of a bilateral agreement (NZ Ministry of Fisheries99). Under these agreements, NZ offered quota for such stocks which cannot be fished by the current domestic fleet, but some areas were closed entirely to foreign fleets. In 2012, The Minister for Primary Industries announced a four year transition period leading to an eventual ban on fishing by non-NZ flagged vessels, following reports of IUU and other misconduct illegal under NZ law amongst foreign vessels operating in NZ waters (NZ Herald, 2012100). Presently, foreign-flagged vessels may not fish in NZ territorial waters.

99 http://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=51&tk=166 100 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10807590

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8.7 USA

8.7.1 Foreign Investment Fish processing facility ownership is not controlled and many are or have been partially or fully owned by foreign interests (OECD, 1990). Fishing vessels registered to the US must have been built in the US (OECD, 1990). Foreign involvement in shore-based fishing activities and vessels with a net tonnage of <5t is not controlled. For vessels >5t, US citizens must hold a majority interest for the vessel to be registered to operate in US territorial waters (OECD, 1990). Access to particular fisheries are variously controlled at either a state or federal level, and some (e.g. Atlantic Surf Clam) are reserved for those who can demonstrate historic rights. Foreign investors may acquire a proportion of historic rights if they own or operate participating vessels (OECD, 1990). US citizens and companies take priority in quota allocation and foreign vessels may only fish for the portion of quota that is surplus to the requirements or capacity of US domestic fleets (OECD, 1990).

8.7.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets In the 1960s and 1970s, foreign fishing was relatively substantial (e.g. Pacific groundfish landings, except Halibut, were dominated by foreign fleets until 1977) but were quickly replaced with US national fleets (FAO, 2005101). There is currently very limited activity by foreign fleets in US territorial waters, following the declaration of a 200 nm EEZ and the implementation of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (Chapter 3; NOAA, 1999102).

101 ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_US.pdf 102 http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/natdia_pdf/ctrends_proceed.pdf

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8.8 Canada

8.8.1 Foreign Investment The Canadian Dept. for Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has discretion with regard to issuing licences and the acceptable levels of foreign investment, with the exception that foreign interests may not own more than 49% of the shares of any Canadian fishing organisation. If this threshold were to be exceeded, the licence would be revoked (OECD, 1990). Foreign-built vessels are free to be registered in Canada, provided that they be owned by a Canadian Citizen or a majority-Canadian-controlled company (Metcalf & Montgomery, 2006).

8.8.2 Fishing by Foreign Fleets A treaty between the US and Canada, which permitted cross-border fishing for albacore tuna, expired in 2011103 and does not appear to have been renewed. There is also a limited agreement between France and Canada (see Section 5.8), whereby Canadian fishers have access to a proportion of the quota of the French fishery for Iceland scallop (OECD, 2013).

8.9 Summary All countries reviewed here have some degree of restrictions placed upon the levels of foreign investment and activity by foreign fleets, which vary in their rigidity and levels of national ownership required (Table 8-1). Only the UK and Australia do not have explicit requirements that foreign investors may not hold a controlling stake in a fishing company (and Australian vessels must still be majority controlled by Australian citizens or companies).

Of the countries reviewed here, the UK is arguably the least restrictive economy with regards to foreign investment in fishing. The number of historic fishing rights that exist within UK territorial waters means that negotiating revised access arrangements and the terms under which foreign investment and involvement in UK fisheries is likely to be complex and highly contentious.

103 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/u-s-bars-canadian-tuna-fishing-in-pacific-1.1150941

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Table 8-1, Restrictions upon foreign involvement in territorial fisheries. Fishing companies means both fish processing and harvesting companies, unless explicitly otherwise described.

Restrictions upon foreign investment & involvement Fishing by foreign fleets Iceland Fishing companies must: Various bilateral  Not have more than a 25% share controlled agreements for the by foreign interests. exchange of quota. Norway Fishing companies must: Under various bilateral  Be 60% owned by Norwegian citizens. agreements (e.g. with  Have a Norwegian CEO and at least 60% EU) Norway exchanges board be Norwegian. quota with some foreign  Base their main office in Norway. fleets. Faroe Islands Fishing companies/ vessels must: Various bilateral  At least 2/3 owned by Faroese interests agreements.  Be subject to taxation in the Faroe Islands Australia  Vessels must be registered to Australia. Foreign flagged vessels, Foreign investment proposals are considered through bilateral by AFMA and, in the case of larger agreements, may fish investments, the FIRB. No specific limits for quota surplus to capacity foreign ownership but investment must be of national fleets. compatible with existing industry. New Zealand To hold quota or register a vessel, companies must: Non-NZ flag vessels  Not have more than a 25% share controlled currently not permitted by foreign interests.* to fish in NZ waters. USA Not controlled: Very limited fishing, if  Ownership of processing facilities any, by foreign fleets.  Shore fishing  Fishing by vessels <5Gt Fishing companies must:  Only be allowed access to quota surplus to US fleet requirements  Be majority controlled by US citizens  Use vessels registered and built in US Canada Fishing companies must: One historic agreement  Be majority Canadian controlled (but DFO has with France but discretion up to this point). generally foreign flagged  Have their vessel(s) registered to Canada vessel activity very (though not necessarily built there). limited. UK Fishing companies must: Fishing by foreign vessels  Register their vessel to the UK largely administered at  Maintain a genuine economic link to UK by EU level. UK has some combination of: jurisdiction through 1. Land a certain proportion of catch/ trans- IFCAs <6nm from coastal shipment in UK baseline. IFCAs 2. Employ a certain proportion of crew from UK considered vessel 3. Other measures considered appropriate ownership through To lease real estate or fish processing facilities, the byelaws and Several and owners of the property being leased must: Regulating Orders  Have ≥ 75% British board of directors  Have ≥ 75% shares controlled by UK citizens

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9 Discard Policy

9.1 Introduction Discards are the proportion of a vessel’s catch which is returned to the sea, either dead, dying or healthy. There are several reasons for discarding catch, usually related to either catch quotas or individuals that are: below minimum landing size (MLS); in poor condition (damage or disease) or of a commercially unimportant species (and therefore low market value) (Condie et al., 2014).

Understanding the extent and composition of discards can be important for effective fisheries management as discards can account for a significant proportion of the fish removed from the marine ecosystem by fishing. In EU beam trawlers for example, discards may comprise 40-60% of the total catch (STECF, 2006). Proper standards of data reporting and compliance monitoring are therefore highly important for determining fisheries impacts and ensuring that stock assessments and future MSY estimates are as reliable as possible (Condie et al., 2014). Consequently, changes to discard policies were proposed during the most recent iteration of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which included a discard ban, more formally known as a landing obligation, coupled with the existing system of Total Allowable Catches (EC, 2013; Condie et al., 2014). The EU landing obligation is currently being phased-in, and will be fully in place at the start of 2019, hence the impacts and effectiveness of the policy are not yet clear. Here we review the discards policies of several non-EU nations that have previously implemented such schemes.

9.1.1 Discard policy in UK fisheries Discards in UK fisheries have been sampled by scientific observers for a relatively long time, with sampling of Scottish vessels commencing in the mid-1970s and English vessels in the mid-1990s. These data were collected for inclusion in stock assessments but indicated that in some fisheries the quantity of fish discarded was substantial. This led to attempts to reduce discards by requiring the use of more selective gears. For instance, in 1980 the minimum mesh size that could be used in the main North Sea fisheries for roundfish species like cod and haddock was 80mm, it is now 120mm. The main EU technical measures regulation (EC, 1998) also includes other measures which are intended to improve the selectivity of gears including regulations on maximum twine thickness and other aspects of codend construction, and the requirement for some gears to incorporate square mesh panels to release smaller fish.

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The 2013 reform of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (EC, 2013) introduced a discard ban to EU fisheries, although it is formally known as a landing obligation. This is being phased-in with all affected stocks (i.e. those with catch limits) due to be covered by the ban at the start of 2019. The sequence in which stocks and fisheries are phased into the landing obligation is being decided based on regional consultation. The regulation allows limited exemptions from the landing obligation including cases where scientific evidence demonstrates high survival of returned individuals of a given species caught in a given fishery. There is also a provision for a de minimis exemption for cases where further improvement in selectivity would either be very difficult or disproportionately expensive to achieve. Other provisions which are included in the regulation to help manage the effects of the landing obligation include the so-called ‘inter-species flexibility’ whereby, under certain limited circumstances, the catch of one species can be counted against the TAC of another; and the flexibility to transfer up to 10% of the national quota of a given stock between years.

9.2 Iceland Iceland operates a system of Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs). This system includes an ‘overage’ allowance of 5% of quota that can be borrowed against the next year’s quota. Overage can also be donated to fisheries research or covered by additional purchase (Condie et al., 2014). Discards have been banned for some time and although they still occur, have been in decline since the early 1990s (Condie et al., 2014). Discards of haddock, cod and saithe are generally in the range of 0-2% (Condie et al., 2014; Palsson, 2009). Iceland uses temporary closures of certain areas (either to penalise non- compliance or as a response to increased catches of juveniles), which are unlikely to benefit the stocks individually but may have had some as yet unquantified cumulative impact (ICES, 2011).

It is not clear the extent to which Icelandic discard policies have incentivised more selective fishing, partly because size-frequency distributions are generally not available for bycatch and undersized individuals. Some 10,000t of over-quota/undersized catch is still landed annually and the proportion of undersized catch has not consistently declined, suggesting that there may still be a significant amount of improvement to be had in the selectivity of the fisheries (EC, 2011).

9.3 Norway The Norwegian fishing authority has banned all discards of any commercially important species since 1983, which extends to any Norwegian vessel and any vessel operating within the Norwegian EEZ

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(Condie et al., 2014). Norway manages its stocks through TACs that are sub-divided into ITQs (assigned to either individual vessels or collectives). Extra landings are confiscated by sales organisations (over quota) or the Directorate of Fisheries (under-sized). Forfeiture of sales is designed to discourage discards and over quota catches.

Bycatch reductions are promoted by a system of real-time area closures (RTACs) aimed at reducing the proportion of below MLS fish. Areas are closed once the catch exceeds 15% of MLS fish and not re-opened until the bycatch levels have decreased below the closure threshold, administered by observers on board commercial or survey vessels (Petter Johnsen & Eliasen, 2011). Following an area closure, vessels are excluded from a circle of 10 nm in diameter from the point where the bycatch threshold was exceeded (Condie et al., 2014). Independent data for re-opening a RTAC seems to be provided either by fisheries survey vessels or the Norwegian Reference Fleet (see Section 7.3). The effectiveness of the current legislation is undermined by the general lack of monitoring, leading to problems with illegal discards of non-target species and high-grading (Condie et al., 2014). It is currently unclear whether changes in the reduction in the catches of below-MLS fish relates to the discard ban and subsequent changes to selectivity or the policy of closing areas with high proportions of below-MLS fish and is more likely to be the latter (Condie et al., 2014; ICES, 2011). The Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs has argued that, despite the lack of clear evidence, the attitudes of the industry have changed as a result of the introduction of the discards ban (MFCA, 2010 in Condie et al., 2014).

9.4 Faroes The Faroe Islands have operated a full discard ban since 1994 and 99% of the Faroese fleets are managed by effort controls (Gezelius, 2008; Hegland & Hopkins, 2014). TAC limits were abandoned in 1996 following reports that landings, particularly cod, were being heavily misreported, partly because bycatch issues with mixed groundfish fisheries, coupled with a surprisingly rapid recovery of the cod stocks on the Faroe Plateau (Gezelius, 2008). An effort management system was introduced in 1996 and still remains in place – see Section 3.4.

Controls on reducing bycatch include: mandatory reporting on the proportion of undersized specimens; seasonal area closures (e.g. Inshore trawling is only permitted in the summer) and the use of particular mesh sizes and sorting grids offshore (reviewed by Condie et al., 2014). If juveniles of cod, haddock or saithe exceed 30% of a catch, a local area closure is implemented. Similarly, if the

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proportion of cod <40cm length exceeds 4%, vessels must vacate the area (Gezelius, 2008; Hegland & Hopkins, 2014; Løkkegaard et al., 2007).

Discard rates for cod, haddock and saithe on the Faroe Plateau are thought to be low, but the management through effort control, rather than imposing TACs for each species, means that high- grading of higher value individuals is not disincentivised (Condie et al., 2014; ICES, 2011). The main challenges facing the Faroe Island system are proper enforcement of the ban and the availability of reliable data to assess whether the policies have had any effect upon discard rates. These uncertainties aside, cod, haddock and saithe are all thought to be subject to unsustainable levels of effort (Condie et al., 2014; ICES, 2011). Whilst the discard policies may be influencing levels of selective fishing and preventing increased fishing mortality in juveniles, the Faroese system has not enforced an appropriate level of effort limitation and has thus not adequately preserved its stocks (Condie et al., 2014). The situation in the Faroe Islands underlines the fact that a discard ban, without an appropriate level of enforcement and catch/effort limitation, is unlikely to have positive impacts on stock status.

9.5 Australia The Australian Fisheries Management Authority has a complex system of bycatch policies104, that relate to different target species or gear types. These policies mainly relate to reducing bycatch rather than discards specifically but there are some fisheries for which discards are controlled. The AFMA’s general policy document of 2008105 states that it will work to assist fisheries “to minimise discarding to as close to zero as practically possible”. This overview has given rise to several documents that relate to specific fisheries:

9.5.1 Sub-Antarctic Fisheries All discards are retained except for a few species that have high post-release survival rates (e.g. Skate, sharks or crabs). Retained bycatch is processed as fishmeal. Fishing vessels have full observer coverage (AFMA, 2013).

104 http://www.afma.gov.au/sustainability-environment/bycatch-discarding/bycatch-discard-workplans/ 105 http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Bycatch-and-Discarding-Implementation-Strategy- feb-08.pdf

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9.5.2 Australian Margin Trawl Fisheries Discards are reported as being “historically negligible” in Australian Trawl fisheries (AFMA, 2012a, 2012b), owing to their low effort and the generally very high proportion of retained catches.

9.6 New Zealand The NZ fishing authority enacted a discard ban in 1986 (incorporated into an ITQ system). This prevents discards of any species with the exception of those below MLS and those with high post-release survival rates. Over quota landings and landings of non-target/bycatch species are permitted to incentivise compliance, which must be paid for through an additional licence or quota (Condie et al., 2014). The cost of purchasing additional quota (termed the ‘deemed value’) increases with the amount over quota run by the vessel (Sanchirico et al., 2006), a policy aimed at incentivising selectivity amongst NZ fisheries.

Despite the discard ban and the deemed value system, discards are viewed as an increasing problem by the NZ Ministry of Fisheries (Condie et al., 2014; Sanchirico et al., 2006). There are few data regarding the rate and composition of discards and the incentives are apparently insufficient to improve the selectivity of fisheries. High deemed values make it more likely that over-quota catches will be discarded (Sanchirico et al., 2006). Landings of below-MLS species are not documented or counted against a vessel’s ITQ and are not charged against deemed value. Consequently these landings are not effectively disincentivised (Condie et al., 2014; MRAG, 2007).

9.7 USA In the USA, discard rates vary widely by gear and area (Harrington et al., 2005). Bottom trawling and shrimp trawling are the most indiscriminate, with 25.1% and 46.9% of total catch as discards in 2002 (Harrington et al., 2005). Fisheries along the west coast have bycatch rates of 12-20% of total catch, compared with 49-59% in east coast fisheries, likely largely relating to target species and gear selectivity (Harrington et al., 2005). The USA does not have a federal policy regarding discards. Discards are included within the definition of bycatch and each regional Fishery Management Council is required to develop fishery management plans for its fisheries, and these plans are required to include conservation and management measures to reduce the extent of any bycatch (Magnuson- Stevens Act, 1976). Pacific (continental USA) and Atlantic fishery discards are monitored (e.g. NOAA,

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2010106; NOAA, 2013107, NOAA Snapper Grouper management plan108) but not controlled. Only the NW Pacific (Alaska) currently has a formalised system of discard bans.

9.7.1 Alaska Discarding of Pacific cod and walleye pollock has been banned in Alaskan waters since 1998, with non- target species (e.g. herring or Pacific halibut) protected through fishery specific bycatch levels (Graham et al, 2007). Exceeding discard or bycatch levels in this context can lead to area/fishery closures. Since 1998, discards in the walleye pollock fishery have dropped from 6.8% to 0.4% and has prompted the industry to move towards more selective gear types (pelagic trawls) to reduce bycatch of species like king crab and halibut (Graham et al., 2007). Improvements to bycatch rates in the demersal longline fishery have also been facilitated by increased vessel communication and the collation of observer data to identify bycatch hotspots. This strategy has reportedly led to a 33% reduction in halibut bycatch (Gilman et al., 2006).

The Alaskan fisheries agency operates a system of individual vessel quotas (IVQs), either attached to a specific vessel or shared amongst a fishing collective (Condie et al., 2014). Consequently, the size of the fleet is limited, allowing the remaining vessels to concentrate activities in the most productive regions (with fewer juveniles) and greater proportions of commercially important species to reach maturity and underpin recruitment (Sigler & Lunsford, 2001).

The discard ban, high observer coverage and the use of IVQs, amongst a rationalised fleet, in Alaskan groundfish fisheries has reduced bycatch levels and incentivised more selective fishing gears, reduced activity in less productive areas and increased vessel communication (Condie et al., 2014). The 2016 assessments of the various groundfish stocks have found no evidence of any stock currently being overfished in Alaskan waters (NPFMC, 2016).

9.8 Canada Canada has a similar governmental framework as the USA, in that separate coasts are managed differently. British Columbia has a well-established system regarding discards for certain fisheries but

106https://www.greateratlantic.fisheries.noaa.gov/aps/discard/review/index.html?utm_source=discard+metho dology+review+peer+review&utm_campaign=Discard+Methodology&utm_medium=email 107https://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/research/divisions/fram/observation/pdf/Groundfish_Mortality_Report_2013 .pdf 108 http://safmc.net/fishery-management-plans-amendments/snapper-grouper-fishery-management-plan/

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there seems to be little legislative control in NW Atlantic fisheries around Newfoundland and the surrounding areas.

9.8.1 British Columbia The British Columbia (BC) fishing authority have placed a ban upon discards in the Rockfish fishery. Only species designated as prohibited are exempt from this ban (Condie et al., 2014). The BC fishing authority operates a system of individual transferrable quotas (ITQs), coupled with 100% observer coverage. When the landings quota for a species reaches 100%, fishing activities must cease in that area (or additional quota purchased by the vessel) (Branch & Hilborn, 2008). Pacific whiting and halibut can be caught by 15% and 35% over the quota respectively without the need for additional quota purchasing, reducing the incentive to discard smaller individuals. This ‘overage’ is then subtracted from the next year’s quota. Quota usage is calculated by the combination of landed fish and the proportion of marketable of discards, disincentivising the practice of selecting only the largest and most pristine individuals (Condie et al., 2014).

The discard ban in BC waters has reportedly led to some vessels targeting species with higher TACs and avoiding areas that are known to support relatively high densities of the more stringently controlled fishes (Branch & Hilborn, 2008). This has in some rockfish species resulted in a 50% reduction in catches (Branch & Hilborn, 2008). The imposed bycatch and discard limits have also led to reductions in discard rates of spiny dogfish and halibut (Grafton, Nelson, & Turris, 2005).

The discard bans in BC have incentivised selective fishing to some degree and, coupled with the observer coverage reducing the benefits of increased discards, have encouraged fishers to match catches to available quota (Branch & Hilborn, 2008; Grafton et al., 2005). Most BC groundfish stocks are considered to be within sustainable fishing levels (although some still have historically very low spawning biomass, e.g. Yelloweye Rockfish) (DFO, 2012, 2015a, 2015b).

9.8.2 Atlantic Coast & the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) Fisheries and Oceans Canada (FOC) in the Atlantic is part of NAFO, which recognises FAO guidelines on reducing bycatch and discards and the reporting of data (NAFO, 2014). Discard rates are monitored (e.g. of Yellowtail Flounder, Cod and Haddock in the Scallop fishery; Van Eekhaute et al, 2005) but there does not seem to be evidence of associated reduction policies (e.g. avoiding bycatch hotspots).

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9.9 Summary There is substantial variability regarding discard policies, both within and between different countries (Table 9-1), but several common themes have emerged. The more successful programmes in reducing the waste of fish at sea appear to have strong elements of both persistent observer coverage and effective incentivisation. Observers ensure compliance (e.g. Alaska and British Columbia) but can also effectively administer real-time closures of areas where the landings of juveniles are excessive (e.g.

Norway).

Table 9-1, Summary of national discard policies

Nation Discard Policy Successes Failures/ Challenges Iceland Total ban since Area closures where No clear impact of temporary closures 1984 for Cod & proportion of juveniles Selective fishing improvements Haddock. Others is high limited, not policy driven. Still high added since proportion of undersized landings Norway Ban on discarding Rapid opening/ closing Not clear whether closure or discard any commercial of areas with high policy is driving improvements. species since 1983 proportions of under- Discard ban apparently not adding sized fish. much. Problems with multi-species over quota catch remain Faroe Total ban since Failure to set appropriate effort limits Islands 1994 High-grading not disincentivised Limited enforcement/ observer Australia Policies very Bycatch rate/composition not limited and relate measured officially, bycatch largely to specific fisheries processed as fishmeal New Discard ban since Sliding scale of cost for purchasing Zealand 1986, excepting additional quota incentivises discards species with a high Below-MLS individuals don’t count post-release against quota survival or those below MLS USA Ban since 1998 Vessel cooperation High observer cost (Alaska), Identification of bycatch monitored but not hotspots controlled elsewhere Canada Ban discards from High-grading Shifted fishing effort to other species Rockfish fishery disincentivised with higher TACs and no discard ban since mid-1990s Overage allowance (West coast) disincentivises discards Discards count towards a vessel’s ITQ

Data reporting is often quite scant and rarely available as a synthesised resource, if it is even recorded at all. Effective data collection is a vital means to ensure that the industry is compliant and to check

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the value of the policies in effect. Particularly in the case of Icelandic fisheries, where discard measures have not succeeded in incentivising selective fishing, discard rates still vary widely between years and have not shown any consistent decline when compared to the variability in the proportion of discards in comparatively unregulated fisheries (e.g. USA Pacific Arrowtooth Flounder & Pacific Hake). However, the cases of the Alaskan and British Columbian fisheries have shown some success, underpinned by effective incentivisation and a high level of observer coverage.

9.9.1 Acceptable discards Much of the debate around what should and should not be discarded relates to post-release survival (PRS). In species with high PRS, discards (e.g. of individuals below MLS) may be more practical and ecologically defensible than harvesting the individual, irrespective of size or condition. A mature discard policy might opt to take such information into account but may be difficult to enforce.

In most countries, the discard bans often relate to commercially important species only. This overlooks the fact that many of the other discard species are likely to be of value for other reasons (e.g. as prey items for commercially important species). Depending on the nature of the discard ban, and the PRS of the target (those that are below MLS) and non-target species, it may be more appropriate to pursue a system similar to that of Alaska, whereby vessels and observers co-operate to reduce activity in areas of bycatch hotspots. Real-time closures, such as in Norway and Iceland, may also be an effective measure to consider but it is generally difficult to isolate the benefits associated with this measure from others (such as changes in gear or fleet size or dynamics).

9.9.2 Incentivising and enforcing change It is apparent from the successes and failures of policies enacted by other countries that the most effective management of discards in fisheries includes a strong element of incentivisation. As a case- in-point, the Canadian Boccaccio fishery discard rate increased dramatically in 2004, following conservation concerns which mandated that all Boccaccio generated revenue would be donated to research (Driscoll et al., 2009). This was intended to have the effect to reducing Boccaccio landings, which was successful, but also had the effect of increasing Boccaccio discards from 300 kg per year to almost 40 tonnes, since there was no incentive for fishers to land it (Driscoll et al., 2009). As in the case of the Canadian Rockfish fisheries, viewing marketable discards as part of a vessel’s quota creates an imperative for fishers to adapt their strategies to make their activities more selective. However, without adequate enforcement (see Faroe Islands and New Zealand), incentivisation schemes may fail

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(Condie et al., 2014) and give way to the more established practice of high-grading. High observer coverage carries an associated cost, which increases with the proportion of the TAC assigned to smaller vessels.

9.9.3 Management of Discard bans Several countries have implemented a range of policies and measures designed to reduce bycatch and discards. The extent of the discard ban varies from particular species (e.g. Alaska or British Columbia) to total (e.g. Faroe Islands).

Real-time closures Iceland, Norway and the Faroes have formalised systems of real-time area closures and Alaska has one that is similar, but less clearly defined, in that vessels agree to share information on bycatch hotspots and avoid them. The Icelandic, Faroese and Norwegian systems operate under the basis that once the catch of juveniles or other controlled species exceeds a defined threshold, that the immediate area is closed. In Norway, the area remains closed until observers independently confirm that the proportion of juveniles has decreased, whereas in Iceland, there is a default closure of 2 weeks, a blunt measure that likely varies in its effectiveness (Condie et al., 2014). In Alaska, observers and vessel operators collaborate to use landings data to identify bycatch hotspots and subsequently try to ensure that these areas are avoided. There is currently no formalised system for determining how long these areas are avoided. The success of the Alaskan system is that it effectively engages the fishing community and if properly incentivised, would likely continue to be effective even with a lower observer coverage. Using data and knowledge collected from fishermen and observers alike regarding the proportion of under-sized or non-target species catch would certainly be a powerful tool for reducing the wider ecosystem effects of fishing activities. These data, coupled with a Norwegian style system of RTACs would appear to represent an effective blend of existing policies, though it is untested in the specific context of UK fisheries.

Over-quota catches An important criticism of the New Zealand system is that it does not disincentivise the discarding of lower grade or undersized catches. The policy of increasing the per-unit cost of over-quota, coupled with the poor standards for reporting discard data mean that it is easy for fishermen to discard under- sized and non-target catch without consequence. Most countries have a policy of permitting vessels a certain amount of additional quota (usually either at additional cost, or borrowed against subsequent years) and the consensus is that this does provide incentive not to discard over-quota catches. In British Columbia, any marketable discards also count against quota, further incentivising a low-discard

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rate, but it is difficult to see how this could be controlled without high observer coverage ensuring compliance. Whilst requiring significant regulatory involvement, this policy is likely to be more effective at accounting for the actual fishing mortality for a stock.

Permissible discards The specific nature of the discard ban in each country varies widely, from Australia (limited formal policy) to the Faroe Islands (total ban of discards). The effectiveness of this varies as per the effectiveness of compliance monitoring and in certain countries has not proved effective (e.g. New Zealand). Several countries require that certain species should be released, usually either those below MLS or with a high post-release survival, but this policy requires a detailed knowledge of the stress response and capacity to recover from injury for each species (which also likely varies according to age and maturity status). In the NW Pacific, the policy tends more towards bycatch limits for certain species that either trigger area closures if exceeded (Alaska) or push vessels towards more selective gear (British Columbia) (Condie et al., 2014).

Consequences of non-compliance In general, fisheries managers opt to avoid revoking fishing licences, in favour of a combination of area closures or charging vessels for over-quota catch. Though these measures have limited punitive consequences for vessel operators beyond the costs associated with purchasing additional quota or the increased retention of relatively low-grade individuals, this is not to say that they cannot be productive. The effectiveness of this relatively lenient attitude likely depends on how well engaged the fishing community is and their sense of community investment in the industry. Certainly in Alaska, vessel operators are involved in the process of reporting bycatch and avoiding areas of higher proportions of juveniles, so there is anecdotal evidence of these policies being effective. By comparison, New Zealand vessel operators are not held accountable and bycatch/discard reporting is poor, meaning that for these vessels there are few consequences for mismanagement and little reason to invest time and money in more sustainable practices. Compliance in general seems to relate to the degree of observer coverage but the proportion of EU vessels that are relatively small raises concerns that achieving similar levels of observer coverage as in British Columbia and Alaska may not be tenable.

The case of Icelandic fisheries shifting effort from cod to haddock, because of the much higher TAC for the latter (Condie et al., 2014) illustrates the management implications of considering individual fisheries in isolation. More stringent restrictions upon the cod fishery led to increased fishing mortality

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amongst haddock (which was also over-fished at the time) because the vessels perceived that, in management terms, haddock was an easier target that allowed for higher catches. Similarly, the devaluation of the newly protected Boccaccio in the British Columbian fisheries led to a huge increase in discard rate of fish that were previously routinely caught and sold as part of a mixed fishery (Driscoll et al., 2009). In these cases, a more holistic evaluation of the wider fishing industry and a focus upon a more fully ecosystem-based fisheries management schema could have identified these shifts in how vessel operators work to maintain regulatory compliance and thus reduce increased wastage or pressure on other stocks. Summary

Evidence of effective discard management in other developed nations is underpinned by several policies, notably: strong standards of reporting of data relating to discard rate and composition; vessel operator engagement and incentivisation; identification and closure of bycatch hotspots. Release of species with high post-release survivability needs to be based on good evidence and should not be considered a back-door for legitimising the discarding of marketable individuals.

9.10 SWOT analysis The following points summarise strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats identified from the review of existing discard policies. These are here considered in terms of the strength, weaknesses etc. they represent in terms of the implementation of a successful discards policy.

Strengths Weaknesses  A strong element of incentivisation to  Discards and high-grading not promote compliance disincentivised  Identify and manage areas where juvenile  Discard data not reported and non-target species are caught in high  Discard policies not supported by adequate proportions, through the use of seasonal associated measures (e.g. TAC) and real-time area closures.  Historic composition of fishery not  Include marketable discards as part of a acknowledged vessels quota.  Low levels of observer coverage and  Mandatory reporting of the composition compliance monitoring and amount of discarding.  Vessel operators are engaged in the process, to support observers and communicate with each other.  Implications of changes to management of one stock considered for wider ecosystem and associated fisheries.

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Opportunities Threats  Combine successes of other national policies  Discard and bycatch limits targeted at one with holistic EBFM strategy fishery shifts effort to another rather than  Underpinning sustainability in an industry controlling fishing mortality that is involved in the development of  Lack of industry engagement leading to poor successful fisheries management and or incorrect discard reporting, stock committed to its success assessments inaccurate and TACs set too  Alternate markets for traditionally discarded high catches developed, catches used more efficiently.  Increased public awareness about choices they can make about their consumption of marine resources

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10 Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management

10.1 Introduction Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) has become increasingly popular in recent years, particularly amongst academic stakeholders, as a possible means to consider the ecosystem-wide impacts of fishing and other human activities and promote more sustainable practices. Implementation of EBFM includes various considerations, such as: appropriate spatio-temporal scale; impacts upon non-target and non-fished species; competition between species; trophic cascade implications; damage to habitats important for juveniles or prey species and pressures resulting from other human activities or future climactic variability (Field & Francis 2006; Morishita 2008; Zhang et al. 2016). In the past, EBFM has constituted relatively isolated measures, such as the closure of coral grounds to demersal fishing activity. The definition of EBFM has been the subject of much debate (Morishita 2008) but in general, should encapsulate the interactions between and within environmental and socio-economic factors associated with the management of the full breadth of human activities within a particular, coherent set of habitats. Pikitch et al. (2004) describe EBFM as a reversal of priorities in fisheries management, whereby the cumulative ecosystem impacts supersede the drive to maximise sustainable yield, a concept mirrored in the Australian system. Here, we will follow the NOAA (2013109) usage, deriving from a description of EBFM by the FAO, and define EBFM as: “Ecosystem-based fishery management recognises the physical, biological, economic and social interactions among the affected components of the ecosystem. EBFM attempts to manage fisheries to achieve a stipulated spectrum of societal goals, some of which may be in competition”

Note that the term ‘Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management’ (EAFM) is also sometimes used interchangeably with EBFM. In formal definition however, there is a subtle difference between them in that EAFM is more an extension of existing fisheries management frameworks to include ecosystem considerations than an approach in its own right110.

There is a significant scientific movement towards using EBFM as a tool to manage fisheries, and other human uses of the marine environment, but its practical application has so far been limited, particularly regarding the governance structure (Patrick & Link 2015). A performance review of 33 countries engaged in implementing EBFM (Pitcher et al. 2009) found that less than half were seeing

109 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/CMS_DEV/Councils/Training2013/O_Ecosystem_Based_Mgmt.pdf. Societal goals include both socio-economic and environmental targets. 110 http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4773e/y4773e03.htm

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any improvement attributable to EBFM (though this information is now a decade out of date). These countries were rated on EBFM in terms of their grasp of the principles (Table 10-1), how far they were along the process of implementation and indicators of performance, with Norway, New Zealand, Canada and the US emerging as some of the most consistently high scoring nations (Figure 10-1). The UK by comparison was not rated good across any of the criteria and, relative to its development index, performed much more poorly than most nations (though was broadly similar to several EU nations, suggesting that performance likely related to the Common Fisheries Policy). It is also worth noting that the UK has since implemented or adopted several relevant measures, such as the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD), and also that the CFP has been reformed since then.

A central question to the development of EBFM is whether it is possible to simultaneously optimise the yield of all stocks within a contiguous ecosystem and ensure that no individual stock is being over- exploited or ecosystem resilience being impacted (Link et al. 2011). The cycle of depletion of stock A, followed by resurgence of competing stock B, means that collectively managing multiple stocks at a sustainable level will require an extensive understanding of how each stock interacts with all other stocks and its environment and how the gears used for each fishery impact each stock and the marine environment. EBFM of course takes a much wider view of ecosystem management than traditional single stock management approaches but delivering sustainable management of multiple, co- occurring stocks that compete for resources remains a complex challenge.

This chapter reviews the current implementation of EBFM in several countries outside of the EU.

Table 10-1, Principles of EBFM following WWF (2002)

1 Maintaining the natural structure and function of ecosystem, including the biodiversity and productivity of natural systems and identified important species, is the focus of management. 2 Human use and values of ecosystems are central to establishing objectives for use and management of natural resources. 3 Ecosystems are dynamic; their attributes and boundaries are constantly changing and consequently interactions with human uses also are dynamic. 4 Natural resources are best managed within a system based on a shared vision and set of objectives developed amongst stakeholders. 5 Successful management is adaptive and based on scientific knowledge, continual learning and embedded monitoring processes.

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Figure 10-1, Scores from a 2007 workshop for 33 countries that are implementing some form of EBFM. Countries reviewed here highlighted in blue. Modified after Figure 1 in Pitcher et al. 2009. N.B.The Faroe Islands were not assessed as part of this review.

10.1.1 UK progress towards ecosystem-based fisheries management Currently, the UK’s main legal instrument for progressing towards ecosystem-based approaches is the MSFD. The breadth of the required indicators and structure of periodic review (on a 6 year cycle - Figure 10-2) means that the MSFD can broadly be considered a drive towards EBFM. The MSFD is relatively far-sighted in the sense of EBFM but the implementation is currently challenging, since many of the requisite indicators either have ambiguous success criteria or none at all (Rossberg et al. 2017).

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Figure 10-2, Cycle of periodic review and assessment outlined by the MSFD (Lynam et al. 2016). Next review of MSFD due in 2018.

As part of the MSFD, the UK has been committed to achieving good environmental status (GES) for its seas. GES means that111:  Ecosystems, including their hydro-morphological (i.e. the structure and evolution of the water resources), physical and chemical conditions, are fully functioning and resilient to human- induced environmental change.  The decline of biodiversity caused by human activities is prevented and biodiversity is protected.  Human activities introducing substances and energy into the marine environment do not cause pollution effects. Noise from human activities is compatible with the marine environment and its ecosystems.

111 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/good-environmental-status/index_en.htm

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The progress towards GES, an obligation introduced by the EU after the evaluation by Pitcher et al. (2009), could be considered EBFM to some degree, though arguably it lacks sufficient stakeholder involvement, particularly from commercial interests, and consideration of economic factors to constitute a full EBFM-style approach. There are, of course, several methods in the UK through which marine science agencies engage with other stakeholders (e.g. the Fisheries Science Partnership – see Chapter 7 or online information platforms like the Marine Information System112). Precedence of GES over other considerations (i.e. compromising environmental sustainability for improved economic development is prohibited) would be analogous to the Australian system of harvest strategies (see section 0).

In the context of wider ecosystem management, the UK has also been developing a network of variously defined marine protected areas. This currently constitutes around 23% of the UK’s territorial seas (JNCC, 2017113 - Figure 10-3), as well as large areas of several of its overseas territories, such as British Indian Ocean Territory; Ascension and St Helena and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Most of the MPAs in territorial seas address a particular set of concerns but permit other kinds of human activities and the proportion of no-take areas is very low. Most of these areas have only recently been designated so it is too early to evaluate their long-term effectiveness.

112 http://mis.marinemanagement.org.uk/ 113 http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-4549

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Figure 10-3, UK MPA Network (source: JNCC, 2017)

10.2 Iceland Fishing makes up a significant proportion of the Icelandic economy (~40 % of exports, Corkeron (2014)). Sígurjonsson (2006) has argued that in the Icelandic context, a strengthening of the pre- existing single species measures would constitute a move toward EBFM, but acknowledges that such measures are still subject to much debate as to their practical application. Pitcher et al.'s (2009)’s analysis supports this assessment, suggesting that Iceland performs well in the EBFM principles category, but less well in terms of implementation. Issues that are being considered as part of Iceland’s progression towards EBFM include assessment methods; discards; multi-species interactions and environmental shifts (Chapt. 15 in Bianchi & Skjoldal, 2009). One of the main conclusions of the 2001 conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem (Reykjavik) was that countries should not wait to implement EBFM until all of the requisite components have been developed (Bianchi &

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Skjoldal 2009). Since the implementation is naturally an incremental process (as seen in several other countries), it should be viewed as a learning process and, through periodic review (cf. the MSFD), can be continually developed. Some of the measures that have been adopted in Iceland include area closures/MPAs; fishery impacts (may be data poor) and multi-species management assessments (e.g. that reviews linkages between different target and non-target species and adjusts quota accordingly) (Bianchi & Skjoldal 2009).

Pro-whaling groups in Iceland have invoked the concept of EBFM as means to justify culling whale populations (Corkeron 2014), though this may be a means to permitting a higher fishing mortality on the whales’ prey species. This attitude mirrors concerns of Canadian fishers that expanding seal populations pose a threat to the viability of fishing activities on the Atlantic coast but also highlights the social issue of previous expectations and practises amongst the resident fishers.

10.3 Norway Norway, like its western Atlantic counterparts, has taken steps towards developing an EBFM framework, though the management plans are not yet ready to implement (Gullestad et al. 2017). The drive towards EBFM follows the Marine Resources Act of 2009114, which mandates “an ecosystem approach that takes into account habitats and biodiversity” and is marked by several criteria including enhanced stakeholder engagement and the integration of conservation and management (Gullestad et al. 2017). This Act is an extension on the previous one in that it includes all living marine resources115, rather than just those which are commercially significant, and requires that economic development not be at odds with conservation goals and the long-term viability of the ecosystems. Part of the aim of this reform is to widen the focus by fisheries managers on the most economically important species and ensure that attention is given the less economically important species to improve their biodiversity and ecosystem function is maintained (Gullestad et al. 2017). Gullestad et al. (2017) note that “the objective is clear but how to achieve it is not”, particularly in terms of a high- level generic approach that can be applied across different fisheries. They also highlight that certain conflicts are likely to arise relating to the issue of the amount of environmental footprint that should be acceptable, but this issue is certainly not unique to an EBFM-style of marine environmental management.

114 https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/FKD/Vedlegg/Diverse/2010/MarineResourcesAct.pdf 115 Similar to the UK Marine and Coastal Access Act (2009) definition of ‘Sea Fisheries Resources’ (Article 153; Sub-section 10) – any or plants, other than fish falling within subsection (11), that habitually live in the sea, including those that are cultivated in the sea.

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10.4 Faroes The Faroe Islands have limited capability with regards to developing and administering novel fishing strategies, relative to other countries reviewed here. That said, there should certainly be no shortage of incentive to develop an EBFM strategy, given the economic importance of fisheries to the Faroese (~44 % of GNP in 2003) (Zeller & Reinert 2004). There has been limited attention given to a more EBFM-style of fisheries management, which addressed the interactions between fishing effort and the proportion of fishing areas closed to fishing for the major commercial species (predominately cod, haddock and blue whiting) (Zeller & Reinert 2004). Zeller & Reinert (2004) concluded that, unsurprisingly, commercial stocks would benefit from decreased effort and a greater proportion of closed areas, seeming to imply that EBFM-style measures should in principle be of value to the Faroese fishing industry. However, there was no consideration of the associated socio-economic effects, suggesting that the proposed measures may not even have been practical to the resident industry, much less supported. Beyond this study, there is little or no evidence that the Faroese Government are actively involved in pursuing EBFM.

10.5 Australia Australia has a relatively long history of support for EBFM, with related legislation dating back to 2000 and a number of subsequent or ongoing legal instruments developed (Fletcher et al. 2016; Scandol et al. 2005). One of the early developments was the incorporation of environmental impact assessments into fisheries management, stimulating the development of new management and research applications (Scandol et al. 2005). The approach to EAFM/EBFM in Australia is one that considers EAFM as a risk management process, and not purely as a justification for additional research (Chapt. 8 in Bianchi & Skjoldal 2009). Essentially, this attitude means that threats to environmental and economic interests are used as the basis for a particular management strategy but, where research is lacking or data-poor, this is generally accounted for in the risk assessment rather than deferring until better information is available116. The Australian government have developed guidelines for what they term ‘harvest strategies’ that will determine TAC limits across multi-gear, multi-species (commercial and recreational) fisheries (Sloan et al. 2014). Species requiring some form of specific management are identified through a process of assessing their ‘cumulative risk status’ and any related legislation. Risk factors include: direct or indirect fishing mortality; life history traits (such as fecundity or distribution) and likely future changes (Fletcher 2015; Fletcher et al. 2016). Any target species automatically gets selected for a formal harvest strategy but also triggers increased attention amongst

116 This attitude of proceeding with the best available current information may be similar in practice to other countries (cf. Iceland), but it seems that only in Australia is this directly enshrined in the legislation.

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its typical bycatch species and the habitats in which it operates (Fletcher et al. 2016). Harvest strategies give precedence to ecological and stock sustainability, which are mandatory, and only require that other considerations (e.g. socio-economic) be given attention, without a formal mandate that they be included, much less prioritised. The intended result is a legislative structure that includes socio-economic factors but not at the expense of sustainable management (Fletcher et al. 2016). The harvest strategies have been implemented across several western Australian multi-species fisheries and show potential to deliver a comprehensive EBFM style set of outcomes, with a key ingredient in this success being the permitted tolerance levels for each objective managing to smooth the proposed changes to some degree (Fletcher et al. 2016).

As an example of a harvest strategy, the AFMA’s ‘small pelagic fishery harvest strategy’117 (last revised 04/2015) considers small pelagic fish, mostly mackerel and sardine that are important commercial and recreational species in Australia. This species group is managed collectively but they reportedly have limited impacts upon the wider ecosystem and have few higher trophic level predators, meaning that the ecosystem-wide consequences of mismanagement are limited (Australian Fisheries Management Authority 2013). Ecological impacts that are formally included in the harvest strategy include interactions with protected or endangered species and “changes in ecosystem function” such as breeding success of seabirds.

10.6 New Zealand In principle, the New Zealand fisheries ministry is in favour to the concept of EBFM as a management framework and, although it has implemented or is developing a number of policies that are related (e.g. MPA network creation or multi-species stock assessments) (Hurst & Mace, no date118), they are not yet part of a unified framework (WWF NZ 2015; Cryer et al. 2016). EBFM forms a part of the principles of New Zealand’s ‘Fisheries 2030’ policy (Ministry of Fisheries 2009) and development is ongoing. There is relatively little information regarding how the New Zealand government plans to implement EBFM, suggesting that it is currently at a similar stage to Norway.

10.7 USA The general structure of fisheries management in the US is that decisions are deferred to regional Fisheries Management Councils rather than being administered federally – see Section 0. National legislation is detailed in the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, with

117 http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SPF-Harvest-Strategy-20152.pdf 118 http://slideplayer.com/slide/5179939/

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amendments in the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act119 (Field & Francis 2006). The result of this is that there are often several contrasting management strategies between different groups of coastal States and a useful degree of flexibility for individual Councils. EBFM is not currently mandated, but is widely accepted amongst American environmental groups, commercial interests and fisheries managers to be the end goal for US fisheries management and there is a clear appetite for change amongst a number of stakeholder groups (Biedron & Knuth 2016; Ainley et al. 2014). However, the complexity of applying this approach should be acknowledged, as it still requires extensive information and validation.

Several of the US regional Councils (e.g. the North Pacific FMC, which manages the Alaskan/Aleutian portion of the Pacific and areas of the Bering and Beaufort Sea), are currently developing ‘Fishery Ecosystem Plans’ (FEPs)120, following the EBFM roadmap issued by NOAA published in late 2016121. FEPs have a series of core priorities (each with a subset of aims): 1. Implement ecosystem-level planning. 2. Advance understanding of ecosystem processes. 3. Prioritise vulnerabilities and risks to ecosystems and their components. 4. Explore and address trade-offs within an ecosystem. 5. Incorporate ecosystem considerations into management advice. 6. Maintain resilient ecosystems.

NOAA will review FEPs produced by the regional Councils and update the road map approximately every 5 years. This nation-wide measure is relatively new but is preceded by FEPs introduced by some of the FMCs (e.g. the Aleutian FEP (Aydin et al. 2007)). The Aleutian FEP includes a range of considerations including food webs; stock structure and single species stock assessments; climate variability; industry data (including exports and effort distribution) and other uses of the marine environment (Figure 10-4).

119 In particular: Section 108 & 116 of Sustainable Fisheries Act (1996) http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/laws_policies/msa/documents/sustainable_fishereries_act.pdf 120 E.g. Bering Sea FEP: https://www.npfmc.org/bsfep/. The Pacific FMC: http://www.pcouncil.org/ecosystem- based-management/fep/ 121 https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/Assets/ecosystems/ebfm/EBFM_Road_Map_final.pdf

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Figure 10-4, Schematic of a FEP (after Aydin et al. 2007). SSSA = Single Species Stock Assessments. FMP = Fishery Management Plan

10.7.1 California Coast The Californian coast is host to a wide range of fishing activities, as well as substantial climactic variability, relating to the cycle of El Niño/ southern oscillation (ENSO) events that affect the eastern Pacific. Interest in EBFM along the US Pacific coast is therefore partly driven by the desire to incorporate the ecological implications (e.g. recruitment or species seasonal distribution) of ENSO into a fisheries management framework (Field & Francis 2006). For example, Pacific hake are known predators of juvenile salmon, so a strong year for recruitment of hake will consequently lead to an increased natural predation pressure upon salmon and may lead to a depletion of salmon stocks in subsequent years (Field & Francis 2006). This point evidences the need for an extensive dataset underpinning EBFM, but also provides a framework for much more comprehensively estimating the stressors affecting a given stock or species than in traditional stock assessments. In the Pacific context. A mature EBFM protocol would be able to adjust estimates of MSY in response to the projected status for climatic features such as ENSO or the Pacific Decadal Oscillation across an appropriate time period.

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There is a strong case for EBFM on the US west coast and the US Sustainable Fisheries Act (1996) created a legal framework in which an EBFM-type strategy could be pursued (Field & Francis 2006). This concept is beginning to be translated into environmental legislation as part of the ‘California Current Integrated Ecosystem Assessment’. This strategy has initially led to a pre-emptive ban of fishing for currently unmanaged forage fish species (PFMC 2016), which is an important step towards protecting the components of the marine environment that underpin sustainable stocks of commercially important species. However, the progress towards EBFM in the California Current ecosystem is still ongoing; most species remain assessed as single stocks and the requisite data for an EBFM approach is not available in its entirety (Ainley et al. 2014). This is different from the Australian model, where implementation of the harvest strategy would still progress and the uncertainty be factored into the risk assessment.

10.7.2 Alaska Off Alaska, the various policies implemented by the North Pacific FMC fisheries, mainly with a view to reducing effort and bycatch impacts, might be considered EBFM to some degree (Witherell et al. 2000), but there is currently not a formalised, coherent plan in place. The Alaskan fishing authority has trialled a multi-species stock assessment model (NOAA, 2013122) and recently published a single assessment of walleye pollock, pacific cod and arrowtooth flounder (Holsman et al. 2016). This assessment was based on a limit of maintaining spawning biomass above 40% of unfished biomass and an aggregate MSY for all three species.

10.7.3 Washington State The Puget Sound Partnership (PSP)123 in Washington state has one of the most well-developed EBFM systems in place anywhere (Tallis et al. 2010), aiming to fully implement EBFM by 2020. This covers the US section of the Puget Sound, from the Pacific coast/ Juan da Fuca Strait to the edge of the watershed (PSP map124, approximate high-water area of the sound = 1,020 sq. miles). The initial phase of the integrated ecosystem assessment collated scientific inputs, structured stakeholder engagement and the creation of legislative controls that required ecosystem restoration (Tallis et al. 2010). The PSP implemented a blend of analytical tools to address six goals (food webs; habitats; water quality and quantity; human health and well-being), consisting of 657 candidate indicators that was reduced to 73 operational indicators (and a list of those components of each goal where effective monitoring was

122 https://www.afsc.noaa.gov/Quarterly/amj2013/divrptsREFM2.htm 123 http://psp.wa.gov/ 124 https://www.eopugetsound.org/maps/puget-sound-watershed-boundary

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not in place). This is broadly similar to the EU system of classifying good environmental status. This was followed by a multi-stage risk analysis procedure that identified threats and places where historic baseline data were inadequate (Tallis et al. 2010). The proposed end result will be an adaptive management framework that incorporates the various local and regional objectives identified in the initial assessment, coupled with specific ongoing management plans (e.g. water quality or salmon stock assessments). The 2015 assessment125 has showed mixed results with improvements to salmon and shellfish but declines in herring and killer whale populations and water quality.

Zador (2015) summarised a number of lessons that could be learnt from the implementation of EBFM considerations into the Aleutian Island FEP: 1. Indicators need to be based on ecologically meaningful definitions or areas and need to be agreed across the fisheries management organisation; 2. The selection and implementation of ecosystem indicators needs to be flexible and adaptive; 3. Need to understand the annual management cycle and when best to deliver ecosystem information; 4. Deliver ecosystem information regularly and in an accessible format; 5. Involve multiple and diverse stakeholders in the process of selecting indicators.

10.7.4 Atlantic Coast Whilst EBFM is frequently cited as the management technique of the future by scientific organisations, a critical component of its success is the engagement of the wider stakeholder community and the extent to which they feel represented and involved at the level of regional management organisations (Biedron & Knuth 2016; Morishita 2008). Along the US eastern seaboard (New England and Mid- Atlantic fisheries management councils), there is evidence that commercial fishermen and recreational anglers agree well with Council members and with NGOs/scientific groups slightly less so, about the definition of EBFM and their expectation of its implementation (Biedron & Knuth 2016). Despite this, there is still substantial disagreement about the outcomes between Council members and other stakeholders (Biedron & Knuth 2016). As EBFM has yet to be widely implemented in the US, it is perhaps not surprising that there are disagreements about the likely outcomes, but it is encouraging that at this point, most groups at least agree on what EBFM should be, and how a future EBFM policy would relate to the management practices. Eastern US fisheries stakeholders generally

125 https://pspwa.app.box.com/v/2015-sos-vitalsigns-report

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support an incremental transition towards EBFM from the current set of arrangements (Biedron & Knuth 2016).

10.8 Canada Canada, particularly the Atlantic coast, has had well-documented problems with fisheries management in the past, resulting in some catastrophic stock collapses in groundfish in the early 1990s. These abrupt collapses and their associated socio-economic problems have created a strong incentive for Canada to pursue a sophisticated fisheries management programme (Link et al. 2011). Similar to the US, Canadian authorities are in the process of implementing an EBFM approach, but acknowledge that the process is ongoing and still requires substantial considerations of how the more traditional single species approaches can be incorporated into a holistic, multi-species and multi-use framework (Link et al. 2011). It is difficult to provide an up-to-date picture, given the time scales over which EBFM progress reports and journal articles tend to be published.

Canada’s marine legislative structure (deriving from the ‘Canada’s Oceans Act’ of 1996), requires the creation of Integrated Fisheries Management Plans (IFMPs). IFMPs must include detailed plans for ecosystem management (including conservation and the precautionary principle), sustainable development and stakeholder involvement (Link et al. 2011). The first IFMP was produced by the Dept. of Fisheries and Oceans in 2007126 for the Eastern Scotian Shelf management region, with the Pacific North Coast IFMP only having been endorsed in February 2017127.

10.8.1 Atlantic coast Particular considerations in the Canadian Atlantic region include avoiding past problems with uncontrolled fishing mortality and accurately capturing the mortality of commercially important species by other marine predators (e.g. Seals predating upon cod) (Link et al. 2011). Grey seals have been expanding their range southward in recent years, likely following the cessation or reduction in seal hunting (Bowen et al. 2003), and this has been associated with changing levels of natural mortality amongst prey species. In this instance, part of the challenge of implementing an EBFM approach will be to determine MSYs for commercially important species that also account for other sources of mortality from protected species, and to convince industrial partners that the measures are proportionate to all parties concerned.

126 http://www.inter.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Maritimes/Oceans/OCMD/ESSIM/Strategic-Plan/Full-Plan 127 http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1187619&tp=3&_ga=1.67664273.1451689877.1487852033

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A network of MPAs is being designated around the waters of the Canadian east coast, which are being designed in partnership with corresponding authorities in the American north-east regional fisheries management organisation (Link et al. 2011). A coherent MPA network is considered a vital tool in creating meaningful protection for the regional area as a whole, but future changes to species distribution relating to climate change (Cheung et al. 2009) underline the point that these networks need to be periodically reviewed in order to maintain their effectiveness. MPAs, whilst important for several reasons, are not a cure-all for meeting EBFM goals and should be considered one of a range of management tools (Link et al. 2011). There also remain substantial questions regarding their effectiveness in protecting highly migratory species.

In terms of the modelling approaches, Canadian fisheries managers are transitioning through a system of increasing complexity, from single species models, to extended stock assessment and multispecies models (Link et al. 2011). The strength of these ‘Minimum Realistic Models’ (MRMs) is that they rely upon existing data and a relatively familiar series of outputs. Where MRMs have been implemented in the NW Atlantic, primarily for forage species like herring and mackerel, they have in some cases proved to be controversial (Link et al. 2011). MRMs are criticised as being overly cautious as they tend to produce more conservative biological reference points and are thus thought to be over-stating the importance of other sources of mortality or under-estimating growth or recruitment for a given stock. Although more sophisticated than previous efforts, MRMs lack the incorporation of sufficient stakeholder representation to be considered as EBFM (Link et al. 2011). There are various other modelling approaches in development along the North American east coast and elsewhere (e.g. Ecopath/Ecosim etc.), which either individually or in some collective form, are set to be important components of a future EBFM framework but currently are insufficiently tested to have become widely accepted (Link et al. 2011).

10.8.2 Pacific Coast The most recent iteration of the North Pacific IMP was published in February 2017 (DFO 2017) and includes a suite of new measures for the British Columbia continental shelf. This plan considers a range of ecological factors, as well as the competing human interests (e.g. between commercial fishing and first nation groups) and can be considered a relatively comprehensive EBFM style document. It outlines a series of objectives and strategies that need to be addressed but in general, includes very limited technical data regarding the manner in which the plan will be implemented from a fisheries management perspective. The Canadian North Pacific IMP has the potential to provide a useful example of an approach to EBFM but currently it is insufficiently far along the implementation process

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to provide evidence of the potential successes of EBFM. It is difficult to place a time scale for evaluating the impact of such plans, since various elements of each IMP will respond at different rates (and may have unique responses to other extrinsic factors like climactic variability, e.g. in recruitment). The North Pacific IMP includes measures to protect deep-water sponge and coral grounds that will only recover slowly, but other species are likely to demonstrate shifts much more quickly. This is an important consideration when reviewing or evaluating the success of a particular strategy.

10.9 Summary Table 10-2 summarises the status of EBFM in the study countries based on the work of Pitcher et al., 2009, and the more recent information summarised above. Given that in the majority of cases, the implementation of EBFM is either quite recent (e.g. British Columbia, Western Australia) or in ongoing development (e.g. New Zealand and Norway), it is difficult to clearly identify which parts of the various approaches have proved most successful. In general, the response to EBFM from the various stakeholders appears to be relatively positive (though the need for gradual implementation has been stressed by several groups) and, whilst there are substantial questions outstanding, strong resistance to the concept of EBFM appears to be very limited. What is evident from the experience of the nations reviewed is that the process of implementing EBFM should be regarded as a complex, incremental process, depending as it does upon significant levels of involvement from scientific, regulatory and industrial partners. A practical implication of this is that it would take some time to properly design and phase in any new guidelines for such an approach. In each country, the pre-existing legislative framework will be variously well-adapted to the concept of EBFM. In the UK, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive; the MPA network and progress towards ‘good environmental status’ have contributed towards EBFM. Developments in relation to conventional stock-orientated fisheries management have also had an influence, particularly through the achievement of MSY for many stocks which in turn contributes to GES, and also through the development of mixed-fishery approaches which, among other things, improve understanding of the impacts of individual fisheries. Much of this progress has been made since the review by Pitcher et al., (2009).

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Table 10-2, Summary of EBFM status across reviewed nations. N.B. Data from Pitcher et al., (2009) taken from graph, not reported directly. Faroe Islands not reviewed. Scores >70 rated as ‘good’ and <40 rated as ‘failing’.

Nation 2007 EBFM Rating (Pitcher et al. 2009) 2017 Status (Score /100, ± 95% C.I.) Principle Implementation Indicators Iceland 61 (± 7) 44 (± 3) 67 (± 6) Some interest in combining and improving existing regulation towards EBFM but very little information regarding recent progress. Norway 69 (± 5) 55 (± 2) 68 (± 9) Substantial conceptual design but lacking much specific guidance on implementation. Faroe - - - Very limited progress towards EBFM. Some Islands scientific interest but little else. Australia 63 (± 4) 55 (± 4) 55 (± 3) Relatively mature. Harvest strategies created for most fisheries. Environmental factors take precedence in decision making. New 69 (± 6) 54 (± 6) 68 (± 3) Implemented several policies that collectively Zealand constitute some degree of EBFM but not yet as a coherent statutory framework. To be implemented as part of ‘Fisheries 2030’ USA 72 (± 7) 62 (± 4) 66 (± 8) Strong legislative and stakeholder support. RFMOs variously engaged and pushing towards EBFM but not yet implemented. Most commercial fishers support incremental move towards EBFM. Canada 62 (± 5) 65 (± 3) 64 (± 4) Integrated fishery management plans developed and currently being implemented for Newfoundland and British Columbia. UK 42 (± 3) 39 (± 2) 40 (± 2) EBFM not currently implemented under the CFP but policies under development. Some previously developed instruments (e.g. MSFD & MPA network) valuable for future progress towards EBFM.

Key challenges that face the implementation of EBFM (generic to all countries) include:  Given complexity of predator-prey and competitive interactions between species, is it even possible to simultaneously achieve management targets for multiple stocks when managed collectively? This may also decrease TACs for many stocks, and cause friction between commercial fishers and fisheries management;  Lack of ecological data but also of good governance (which in some cases is more pressing);  Adapting management targets in an increasingly unpredictable climate (and the resultant changes to species distribution and fitness);  Collecting and maintaining sufficiently large and diverse datasets;

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 Robust, real-world tests of the EBFM concept that demonstrate its efficacy;  Ensuring that EBFM is phased in and that regulators provide adequate transitional support to commercial stakeholders;  Should EBFM be treated as a bi-/multilateral system in stocks that operate across borders? Potential for spiralling complexity, particularly where species may be protected in one nation but harvested in another;  To what extent should non-target apex predators, predominately marine mammals, be ‘managed’ in the context of EBFM?  Defining ‘best outcomes’ for competing interests;  Establishing robust success criteria, measured against a meaningful baseline.

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11 Marine recreational fishing

11.1 Introduction Marine recreational fishing (MRF) is a popular activity globally, with an estimated 8.7 million participants in Europe alone, including approximately 1.8% of the UK population (Hyder et al., 2017). Expenditure can be significant with around €5.89 billion spent each year across Europe (Hyder et al., 2017b) and £1.23 billion spent in England alone (Armstrong et al., 2013). There are also many social benefits of fishing that include health and well-being (e.g. Griffith et al, 2016) and environmental improvement (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2013). In addition, catches of some species can be high with between 2 and 72% of total catch for some species (Hyder et al., 2017a; 2017b). The value and impact of MRF is recognised in many countries with species managed for recreational purposes and quotas allocated (Ryan et al., 2016). However, in Europe recreational catches are rarely accounted for in stock assessments affecting the ability to manage fish stocks sustainably (Hyder et al., 2014; 2017a; 2017b).

There are many definitions of MRF and it is difficult to separate recreational and subsistence fishing. This is because many recreational fishers, even in wealthy countries, have strong subsistence-like incentives to harvest fish, through personal consumption (Schumann and Macinko 2007; Pawson et al., 2008; Hyder et al., 2017b). As a result, many scientific and legal definitions exist that differ in terminology to cover recreational, sport, and leisure fishing (Hyder et al., 2017a). In Europe, the legal definition covers any non-commercial fishing, and the scientific definition used follows ICES (2013): “the capture or attempted capture of living aquatic resources mainly for leisure and/ or personal consumption. This covers active fishing methods including line, spear, and hand–gathering and passive fishing methods including nets, traps, pots, and set–lines”. The scientific definition permits that anglers can sell a small proportion of the catch, as is the situation for MRF in countries like Norway (see Hyder et al., 2017 for a general review). EU legislation prohibits the marketing of catches from recreational fisheries.

MRF can be shore-based or carried out from private or chartered vessels, with several gears being common to both. In European waters, recreational fisheries take many species that are also important to commercial fisheries, such as Atlantic cod, European sea bass, mackerel, whiting, pollock, numerous species of flatfish, skates, sharks, and shellfish such as lobsters (see Hyder et al., 2017a; 2017b). Some sea angling activity is regarded as “sport fishing” where the primary driver is the challenge of catching and landing species such as sea bass, sharks, and tunas, often using specialised fishing techniques, and where release rates are typically very high (Ferter et al., 2013). Post-release mortality can be affected

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by fishing situation (Bartholomew & Bohnsak, 2005) and can be low (e.g. Ferter et al., Lewin et al., in press; Weltersbach et al., 2013; 2016), but there is a lack of data for many species (Ferter et al., 2013). Historic trends in recreational fishing and the problems associated with enforcement and public awareness may be of concern, particularly where sustained interest in a particular species overlaps with depleted stocks and compromises sustainable exploitation (Hyder et al., 2014).

Participation and fishing mortality in MRF, and the extent to which it is controlled, can vary substantially from country to country (see Pawson et al, 2008; Hyder et al., 2017a). Typically, policy instruments are implemented at state or administrative region level (e.g. Common Fisheries Policy – CFP (2013/1380/EC)) and are supported by large scale data collection (e.g. the EU Data Collection Framework – 2001/1639/EC, 2008/199/EC128, 2016/1251/EC). However, limited data have been collected across Europe, and there are considerable differences in data collection protocols and the quality of the available information (Hyder et al., 2017a; 2017b). The extent of international MRF tourism is also something that requires careful consideration, some countries, such as Norway, issue specific limits on the species that may be fished by non-nationals and policies on the amount that may be retained (Borsch et al. 2011; Vølstad et al., 2011), but other countries, including the UK, do not have rules in place (Hyder et al. 2017a).

Other than for a small number of species (e.g. salmon, eels, western Baltic cod, salmon and sea trout in the Baltic, and sea bass), there have been few attempts to include recreational fishing in the management of fish stocks in Europe, in contrast to fisheries management in some of the other countries reviewed here. However, recreational landings of some target species may be a considerable proportion of the total fishing mortality (e.g. sea bass or cod) (Armstrong et al., 2017; Hyder et al., 2017; OSPAR 2014; Rocklin et al. 2014; van der Hammen and de Graaf 2013; Persoon 2015) and it is estimated that global recreational fish landings may account for around 14% of the total capture production in both marine and freshwaters (Cooke and Cowx 2004). Recreational catches were 27% of the total catch in 2012 for both the Northern sea bass and western Baltic cod stocks (Hyder et al., 2017b). For such species, exclusion of recreational fisheries from stock assessments can lead to difficulties in managing annual fishing mortality to meet targets such as maximum sustainable yield (MSY), because a significant component of total fishing mortality is unobservable (Hyder et al., 2014; 2017a; 2017b).

128 Recast by DCF: 2017/1004/EC

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Owing to the diffuse nature of recreational fisheries (i.e. many individuals fishing from large numbers of shore fishing marks and launching boats from many sites beyond the main fishing ports), data collection, enforcement, and compliance remains a substantial challenge. Most countries rely upon some self-reporting or periodic surveys to estimate recreational catches. The statistical basis for such surveys are well established worldwide, and under continual development by the ICES Working Group on Recreational Fisheries Surveys (WGRFS - ICES, 2010; 2013; 2017). However, as with many such surveys there are sources of bias that need to be evaluated and considered when collecting and using the data (e.g. Pollock et al., 1994; ICES, 2010; 2013; 2017). It is important to consider approaches for monitoring, enforcement, and assessment, before implementation of MRF management and policy, and should be prioritised for individual species according to the risk posed by MRF. There are a variety of approaches for MRF applied across the world, but the strengths and weaknesses of each approach have not been assessed. In this review, we first give some background on UK MRF, then review data collection, management measures and related aspects of MRF in the several countries (Iceland, Faroes, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, USA, and Canada), and consider how the learning from other countries might be used to develop future UK MRF policy and management.

11.2 Recreational fishing in the UK Both marine and diadromous fish are caught in UK marine and estuarine waters, and are subject to different degrees of monitoring and technical measures, but the focus of this review is on marine recreational fisheries, so diadromous fish are not considered further apart from the estimation of marine catches. There are more than 1 million sea anglers or about 2.2% of the population in (Armstrong et al., 2013), and a further 65,000 in (McMinn et al., 2013). Shore fishing is the most common form with around 3 million days per year, compared with about 1 million on private / rented boats and 0.1 million on charter boats (Armstrong et al., 2013). Common target species include mackerel, whiting, cod and sea bass. Shore anglers are thought to release around 75% of their catches and boat anglers around 50%, mostly resulting from catches below minimum landing size (Armstrong et al. 2013). The majority of fishers use rod and line, though, other gears can also be used, including pots, traps, nets and spears.

11.2.1 Monitoring & assessment A large survey for England was conducted in 2012 (Sea Angling 2012) and included around 11,000 anglers (Armstrong et al. 2013). The Armstrong et al. (2013) survey was developed with the recreational fishing community and based upon a mixture of online, household and on-site surveys of

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anglers (stratified by avidity and region). In addition, studies were done in Scotland (Radford & Riddington, 2009) and Northern Ireland (McMinn et al., 2013), but these contained limited information on catches. Since 2015, the UK has been running offsite surveys to assess numbers, effort, catch, and value of MRF (www.seaangling.org). This included assessment of the numbers of anglers from the National Watersports Survey and a diary panel of between 500 and 1000 anglers who report monthly catches and releases of all species. In addition, every 6 months the diarists are asked about expenditure on both capital items for the last six months and the cost of their last trip. This allows estimation of the total economic impact, gross value added (GVA), and numbers of jobs supported.

Assessment of a few species including recreational and commercial catches has been done (e.g. sea bass, western Baltic cod, Atlantic salmon), usually at an international level and relate to a particular stock (e.g. sea bass in ICES areas 4b&c, &a, d-h) (Hyder et al., 2017a). To support assessment, catches and releases by UK MRF have been used alongside data from other countries exploiting the stock (i.e. France, The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Denmark) within the stock assessments of sea bass to ensure that MRF mortality is properly accounted (e.g. ICES, 2016). It is important to have robust and regular time series data for MRF catches and releases to manage sea bass stocks effectively (Hyder et al., 2014; 2017a; 2017b).

11.2.2 Licensing Most forms of recreational sea fishing do not require a licence, including angling which is by far the most common activity. However, permits are required for some recreational fishing activities that are issued by the Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority (IFCA) and vary by species and region. For example, in the North East IFCA permits are required to fish for shellfish and lobster129. In England, a rod licence is required for freshwater angling (coarse and game angling), but no licence is required for sea angling130. Catches cannot be sold in the UK without a commercial licence, but charter fishing vessels can sell catch provided they have the necessary commercial fishing licence. Unpowered vessels of under 10m in length do not require a licence131. In addition, collection of bait (e.g. lugworm, peeler crabs etc.) is also permitted without a licence, unless there are local byelaws that restrict the collection of bait species132 (Pawson et al., 2008; Watson et al., 2016).

129 NE IFCA Permit: http://www.ne-ifca.gov.uk/apply-for-a-permit/ 130 https://www.gov.uk/fishing-licences 131 http://www.association- ifca.org.uk/Upload/News/2905294%20Illegal%20fish%20Phase%201%205%20A5%20leaflet%20IN%20ORDER%20v0_3.pdf 132 E.g. digging for bait prohibited in the Humber Estuary SAC (http://www.eastern-ifca.gov.uk/protected- areas-byelaw/)

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11.2.3 Management Management of recreational fisheries in the UK is through a combination of approaches applied at different spatial scale. These include: EU-wide measures defined under European legislation (e.g. CFP), national legislation set by Defra often under the Sea Fisheries (Conservation) Act, and local bylaws set by the IFCAs in England for the area out to 6 nm from shore.

The main management of MRF in the UK is delivered through the CFP (2013/1380/EC – EU, 2013) that states: “Recreational fisheries can have a significant impact on fish resources and Member States should, therefore, ensure that they are conducted in a manner that is compatible with the objectives of the CFP”. A good example is sea bass, where for the Northern stocks in 2017 there was a one fish bag-limit for 6 months each year, a no take fishery for the remaining six months, and a minimum conservation reference size of 42 cm to protect rapidly declining sea bass populations (EU, 2017). A second mechanism for management of MRF in Europe is the Control Regulation (EU, 2009) that specifies recreational fisheries must be conducted in a manner compatible with the CFP and that recreational catches of stocks subject to recovery plans must be monitored, but only for vessels registered in each country. Minimum conservation reference sizes (MCRS) are set under the CFP at a European level that also apply to MRF. Hence, without these legislation, additional means to manage MRF from both shore and boats would need to be adopted and/ or adapted into UK law, if not already covered under the UK Sea Fisheries (Conservation) Act (1967) or in IFCA bylaws.

National measures (e.g. designation of MCZs133) generally consist of statutory instruments, which derive from the 1967 Sea Fisheries Act. The Sea Fisheries (Conservation) Act (1967) provide an enabling framework under which MRF can be managed at a national level through the addition of Statutory Instruments. Statutory instruments relate to the protection of a range of species (e.g. prohibition of collection of razor shells in a specified sea area134). A good example is the establishment of bass nursery areas in 37 river estuaries and other coastal sites in England and Wales, where additional restrictions on commercial and recreational fishing are imposed during all or part of the year (Bass (Specified Sea Areas) (Prohibition of Fishing) Order 1990: SI1990 No. 1156; Order 1999: SI1999 No. 75).

133 Restrictions on fishing area and bag limit for sea bream in the Kingmere Reef MCZ (Sussex IFCA) http://www.anglingtrust.net/page.asp?section=1240; https://secure.toolkitfiles.co.uk/clients/34087/sitedata/files/KingmereleafletfinalA5.pdf 134 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1998/1276/contents/made http://www.ne-ifca.gov.uk/legislation-and-byelaws/uk-legislation/

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At a local level, there are bylaws introduced by IFCAs that may also control recreational fishing or commercial fishing with recreational only areas (e.g. Devon & Severn IFCA135). IFCAs are responsible for setting byelaws in England for inshore sea angling136 relating to control measures such as minimum landing sizes; area closures, gear restrictions and catch limits.

11.2.4 Control and enforcement Control and enforcement of regulations relating to MRF in England is generally done by the MMO for recreational vessels beyond 6 miles, by IFCAs for all MRF at a local scale in inshore areas, and the Environment Agency for diadromous fish within estuaries. IFCA and MMO enforcement officers conduct inspections of recreational fishermen at sea and on shore, however enforcement is generally challenging due to the diverse and dispersed nature of both MRF and the relevant charter boat owners.

135 E.g. the Emsstrom Wreck (https://www.planetseafishing.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/downloads/IFCA- zones.pdf) 136 NE IFCA: http://www.ne-ifca.gov.uk/recreational-fishing/; Cornwall IFCA: http://www.cornwall-ifca.gov.uk/january- 2017-new-restrictions-on-bass-fishing

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11.3 Iceland Around 31.5% of Icelanders currently engage in recreational fishing (a rate similar to Norway, but with far fewer people at approximately 103,000), who spend around €60 million a year on the activity (Hyder et al., 2017b). The main species targeted by Icelandic anglers are cod and elasmobranchs. MRF does not require a licence and is exempt from quota-based fisheries, except for charter vessels (Popescu and Poulsen 2012). Quota is issued to charter fishing vessels that is transferrable between vessels, and all catches must be reported. Catches by charter vessels total around 232 tonnes per year, with approximately 48 – 61 kg landed per vessel per day (Solstrand 2015). Most charter vessel tourism is based in the northwest of Iceland (the ). MRF landings are permitted a proportion of TAC, based on an estimate of the likely mortality (Solstrand 2013). It is unclear how this estimate is reached and there seems to be no way to assess whether it is an accurate assessment of recreational mortality.

11.3.1 Data collection and monitoring There are very limited data on recreational fishing in Iceland. Vessels for charter fishing are issued with quota and must report catches, but individual anglers are not required to report catches, nor are they formally surveyed (Hyder et al., 2017b).

11.3.2 Enforcement Species restrictions do exist, but there is little information as to any associated penalties issued in Iceland. Tourists fishing in Iceland may only use hook and line, but are not restricted in terms of catch (Hyder et al., 2017b). Filleting and freezing facilities are not available to tourists and there is thought to be very limited profitability for exporting recreational landings (Solstrand 2015). For marine fishes, catch and release is not permitted except for Atlantic halibut that must be returned if alive.

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11.4 Norway Norway has the highest participation rates in MRF in Europe, with around 33% of the population involved (ca. 1.3 million people) and is worth approximately €1.16 Bn a year (Hyder et al., 2017b). Norwegian nationals do not require licences and are permitted to use a range of gears, but are subject to effort restrictions (e.g. maximum number of hooks per longline and lengths of nets) (Borch et al., 2011; Directorate of Fisheries, 2012). Norwegian citizens are also permitted to sell a proportion of their catch without a commercial licence, up to NOK 50,000 per year and sales must be registered through the same system as used by commercial fishers. The main species of interest to Norwegian anglers are Atlantic cod, saithe and Atlantic mackerel (ICES, 2010), which are caught using a range of gear types. Recreational landings of cod in coastal Norwegian waters were estimated to be 35% of the total fishing mortality (in coastal waters) in 2009 (OSPAR 2014).

Fishing tourism is very common in Norway, with around 585,000 ‘guest nights’ and an associated expenditure typically of around €170-180 per day in 2008 (Borch et al., 2011). Tourists can fish as much as they please using handlines or rod-and-line, but cannot sell their catch and may only export up to 15kg (whole or filleted weight) plus one trophy fish (excluding fish purchased from commercial fishers) (Borch et al. 2011; Directorate of Fisheries 2012).

Tourists and Norwegian nationals are subject to various gear restrictions and minimum landing sizes, but neither require licences. Certain species are subject to quotas (e.g. charter fishery for king crab), but the majority are not. Most species are subject to a minimum landing size137, but may be retained below this size if they are dead or dying (Borch et al., 2011; Directorate of Fisheries 2012). Fishing is not permitted within 100 m of fish farm installations138. Fishing for king crab is only permitted for approved charter companies in Finnmark and seal hunting is allowed under certain conditions (participants must be, or be accompanied by a, Norwegian national and have a firearms licence).

11.4.1 Data collection and monitoring Recreational fisheries monitoring has been conducted periodically since the 1970s, although it has predominately focussed upon freshwater (Vølstad et al. 2011; Vorkinn et al. 1997). A large survey in 2003 (Hallenstvedt and Wulff 2003) estimated some 48,000 tonnes of fish were caught annually in marine waters, but there has also been suggestion that these data may be skewed by a significant recall bias (Hyder et al., 2017b). Owing to Norway’s extensive coastline, it is generally judged that

137 http://www.fisheries.no/PageFiles/371353/minstemalstabell-eng-04022011_1_.pdf 138 http://www.fiskeridir.no/English/Recreational-fishing/Regulations-for-foreign-tourists/Fishing-by-tourists-in-Norway

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providing quantitative estimates of recreational fishing mortality by tourists would require an extensive research budget (Borch et al., 2011).

The charter fishing sector provides approximately 15,000 beds and 2,400 boats to fishing tourists, of which roughly half are based in northern Norway. Over half of fishing tourists to Norway come from Germany (59%) with a further 19% being either from Sweden or elsewhere in Norway (Borch et al., 2011). Despite the challenges, work is underway to survey MRF in Norway funded by the Norwegian Research Council that involves onsite and offsite surveys of catches and estimates of economic value and social benefits.

11.4.2 Enforcement Without issuing licences and/ or quota to recreational anglers, there is little basis for an enforcement scheme amongst recreational fishers. Species restriction measures are in place in Norway and there are enforcement patrol vessels, but Norway’s extensive coastline makes intercepting non-compliance very challenging. Tourists can also be subject to random inspections of fish products being exported upon leaving Norway.

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11.5 Faroe Islands Data collection for recreational fishing in the Faroe Islands is limited. There is no clear divide between commercial, subsistence, and recreational fishing for any species, but biomass removal is presumed to be low, owing to the small population and limited tourism. Recreational anglers in the Faroe Islands do not require licences and are subject to no restrictions. Commercial crews are also sometimes allowed to retain some of their catch for subsistence purposes (Reinert 2001), a practice which may reduce discarding.

The main target species are likely to be predominately groundfish (cod, haddock and saithe) (Gibson et al., 2015), but catch data are not collected. Gibson et al. (2015) estimated that, in 2010, recreational and subsistence landings by the Faroese were approximately 200 and 900 tonnes139, respectively, using estimates of per capita subsistence fishing rates from Iceland and changes in Faroes population size. This is minimal in comparison with the 280,000 tonnes of commercial landings. MRF mortality is not monitored but largely presumed to affect groundfish. The Faroese also fish opportunistically for pilot whales and catches are distributed between commercial and recreational interests (Faroese Fisheries Ministry, personal communication). There is limited tourism in the Faroe Islands, hence significant additional landings by non-nationals is considered unlikely, beyond a small number of charter vessels operated by fishing trip companies.

139 Recreational catches are presumed to be a subset of total non-commercial fishing, rising from 0 to ~20% of total between 1950 and 2010.

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11.6 Australia Australia has one of the highest participation rates of any non-European nation, with some 19.5% (4.7 million people) of the population actively involved in recreational fishing, with an average of 6.1 days per angler per year (Cisneros-Montemayor & Sumaila, 2010; Henry & Lyle, 2003). Recreational fishing in Australia has federal and state level support, with a national recreational fishing strategy (Natt et al., 2011) and schemes to promote engagement (e.g. the Victoria Fisheries Authority ‘Target One Million’ programme140). Shore-based angling is most popular, but both boat ownership and the mean size of individual vessels are increasing141. There are a variety of commonly fished species around Australia, most of which are shellfish and reef fishes. The position and principles of recreational fisheries are laid out in the Australian recreational fishing strategy (Natt et al. 2011)142, summarised below:  Key principles - o Healthy environments are fundamental to sustainable recreational fishing. o Management of recreational fishing should be based on sound scientific advice. o Recreational fishers and state governments share responsibility and costs of managing and enhancing recreational fishing. o Recreational fishers are encouraged to use best practice in all aspects of their activities. o Recreational fishing provides valuable social and economic benefits and should be actively encouraged. o Recreational fishing should be considered a valuable educational opportunity for schools to promote environmental science; sustainable resource use and social responsibility.  Goals - o Recreational fishing is acknowledged as an important activity that contributes to the health and wellbeing of Australian society; o Recreational fishers are respected partners in the stewardship of Australia’s aquatic environment, along with government, indigenous Australians, commercial fishers, conservation groups and the broader community; o Recreational fishers have access to a fair and reasonable share of Australia’s fish resources; o An information base in available at national, state and regional levels on recreational fishing to meet the needs of government and the community;

140 https://vfa.vic.gov.au/recreational-fishing/target-one-million 141 https://soe.environment.gov.au/theme/marine-environment/topic/2016/commercial-and-recreational-fishing 142 http://www.agriculture.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/fisheries/recreational/rec-fishing-june2011.pdf

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o Stewardship of fish and their environment ensures quality and sustainable recreational fishing opportunities into the future; o The recreational fishing industry is attractive, vibrant and adaptive, encouraging investment and participation.

Beyond a purely optional activity, the Australian government also views recreational fishing as a means to address societal issues, including improving quality of life for persons with disabilities or to rehabilitate people involved with drugs or violent crime (see Armstrong et al., 2013; MacManus et al., 2011; Monkman et al., 2015 for a general review of social benefits).

11.6.1 Legislation and Licensing Most of the relevant guidelines and legislation are contained with the National Recreational Fishing Policy (1994) and the National Industry Development Strategy (2011)143. Each state is responsible for setting its own criteria for licences and control measures, with the species for which licences are required varying by territory and in some cases the gear type (e.g. rock lobster caught whilst diving or potting). Aboriginal fishers are usually exempt from licence requirements.

Australian licencing fees for recreational fisheries generate around AUS $20 million annually and most of this money is spent on research, stock enhancement, habitat improvements, outreach, and compliance monitoring (Natt et al. 2011). Victoria State government has two programmes of small and large grants (< AUS$ 5k and < AUS$ 100k respectively) that are generally awarded to recreational fishing interest groups to fund research, hold outreach events (e.g. for encouraging people to get involved with fishing) or to develop guidelines for best practice for a particular species or gear type144.

11.6.2 Data collection and monitoring The primary means of recreational fishing data collection are through surveys (Henry & Lyle, 2003). The interval and approach apparently usually varies between states, with survey design reflecting the characteristics of the recreational fishery and the licence conditions. For example, surveys tend to focus on boat users in the Northern Territories and Western Australia (WA), whereas in Tasmania surveys are done by selecting households for a phone interview (Lyle et al., 2014). In Western Australia, a survey of boat anglers is done biannually and vessels are required to keep logbooks of

143 http://www.agriculture.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/fisheries/recreational/rec-fishing-june2011.pdf 144 http://agriculture.vic.gov.au/fisheries/recreational-fishing/recreational-fishing-grants-program/small-grants- program/2015-small-grants

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their catches. Responses to Australian surveys are generally good (> 80 % for telephone surveys), but have declined in recent years (ICES, 2017).

The Department of Fisheries for Western Australia has a scheme encouraging anglers to submit fish as part of its long-term fisheries dependent monitoring programme: ‘send us your skeletons’ (Fairclough et al., 2014). Frozen samples are received by the fisheries science department along with details of catch location and date, allowing for the cost-effective compilation of a georeferenced database of biological data, which is of particular value to data limited stocks, and does not result in extra mortality from scientific surveys. Most Australian states also use some form of app-based method to communicate control measures and advice to recreational fishers.

11.6.3 Management Species of interest to recreational fishers are, as with several other countries, usually subject to a series of restrictions affecting gear types, area closures, minimum landing size, and retention limits. Under the recreational fisheries development strategy (Natt et al. 2011), it is recognised that recreational fishers are entitled to a proportion of the total catch of a species. In certain popular recreational fishing areas commercial fishing rights have been suspended (e.g. Port Phillip Bay, Melbourne145 , Hawkesbury River / Tuggerah Lake, New South Wales146),

11.6.4 Enforcement Individual states employ fishery officers who are engaged in routine inspections of recreational anglers and commercial vessels, usually concentrated at ports. In Victoria State, fishery officers are able to stop any vessel (at sea or on land); search equipment; issue infringement notices; seize catch, fishing gear and other equipment; and arrest alleged offenders. Fishery officers are also tasked with outreach activities and are responsible for distributing educational material amongst fishers.

145 https://vfa.vic.gov.au/commercial-fishing/removal-of-net-fishing-from-port-phillip-bay/frequently-asked-questions 146 https://afta.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2015-02-12-AFTAPR-Netting-Ban.pdf

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11.7 New Zealand New Zealand’s participation rate in recreational fishing is slightly less than Australia, at 17 % (600,000 people) and the number of days per angler is also slightly lower (5.1 days a year) (Wynne-Jones et al., 2014; Holdsworth et al., 2016). Attitudes to recreational fishing in New Zealand are broadly similar to Australia, emphasising the societal and mental health benefits that can be associated with MRF147 (see MacManus et al., 2011 for a general review). Target species are diverse, consistent with the wide range of climates throughout New Zealand, but are largely comprised of shellfish, reef, and groundfish species. The only areas of the New Zealand EEZ which are not actively fished by anglers are the remote islands to the north (Kermadecs) and offshore areas in the south-east (Chatham Rise).

11.7.1 Legislation and Licensing All recreational fishing is subject to licence requirements, usually set by the authority for each of the seven New Zealand fishing areas148. Conditions / catch limits etc. are communicated through the Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) website or a smartphone app (‘NZ Fishing Rules’). Some regulations apply throughout the country, including:  Recreational anglers are not permitted to sell (or swap) any portion of their catch.  Minimum landing sizes.  Daily catch limits.  Closed areas or seasons and restricted access149.

11.7.2 Data collection and monitoring Historically, there have been concerns that New Zealand’s recreational fishing survey, which has largely been based on telephone surveys, was subject to considerable bias (through self-selection and recall bias) (Wynne-Jones et al., 2014). In response, the New Zealand recreational fishery panel tasked the New Zealand National Research Bureau (social science surveys) to develop a population-based, known-probability sampling method (Wynne-Jones et al., 2014). This includes a large pool of surveyed fishers (around 7,000), remotely surveyed over a 12-month period and a structured interview directed at the ‘panellists’ (i.e. participants), selected using a random selection criterion stratified by location and avidity. Participants were contacted over one year, at intervals ranging between weekly and monthly, to ask whether or not they had fished, and if they had, the details of their catch. More ‘avid’

147 https://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=21 148 http://www.mpi.govt.nz/travel-and-recreation/fishing/fishing-rules/ 149 For example, the Central area: https://mpi.govt.nz/travel-and-recreation/fishing/fishing-rules/central-area-fishing- rules/#twistie

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(more frequent fishing trips) fishers were contacted more often to reduce recall bias. These survey estimates were then raised to the population as a whole.

11.7.3 Enforcement Transfer of recreational catches are strictly controlled and can result in substantial penalties for non- compliance, ranging between NZ$500 - $250,000, as well as seizure of fish, gear, and vessels. Fishery officers and the MPI have the power to issue infringement notices (fines of up to NZ$500) or begin court proceedings in more serious cases. The size of the enforcement taskforce and the encounter rate is not published.

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11.8 USA Participation rate in marine recreational fishing in the USA is 3.26% (NMFS, 2015), approximately 10.5 million people with an average of 6.5 days per angler, and an annual expenditure of $33 billion and total economic impact of $61 billion (NMFS, 2016a). Around 60% of the trips made each year are along the southern coast (between North Carolina and Texas) (NMFS, 2016b). Individual expenditure per trip is higher in the US and Canada than in Europe, possibly due to the increased vessel ownership (Hyder et al., 2017a).

The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is responsible for marine recreational fishing under the ‘National Saltwater Recreational Fisheries Policy’ (NSRFP; NOAA 2015) that sets out the framework in which recreational fisheries are managed, researched and supported in the USA. Within the USA, there are 8 regional fishery management councils (created pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976) that individually issue legislation and licences and collect data for the various areas of the US coast

11.8.1 Legislation and Licensing For most anglers (fishing within 3nm of the coast), recreational fishing is managed individually by states, usually operated by the state’s Department of Fish and Wildlife (e.g. Massachusetts150). Most states have a licence issuing system, the conditions and cost of which are variable. Highly migratory species (tunas, billfishes and sharks) are subject to both federal and state level restrictions and require specific permits151. Offshore fishing rights (> 3nm) and fishing around offshore islands (Hawaii, Puerto Rico & US Virgin Islands) are subject to a requirement to join the NOAA ‘National Saltwater Angler Registry’ and issued with a licence for the appropriate state. Some native peoples are exempt from this requirement. Owners / operators of charter vessels must also join the registry. This is a legal requirement and provides NOAA with an up-to-date record of active anglers and provides a means to document catches.

Most federal fisheries legislation in the USA stems from the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA; 1976 and as amended in 1996152 and 2007). In general terms, the MSA commits fisheries managers to a transparent, robust process for fisheries science and management. For recreational fishers, the MSA supports objectives that are more explicitly outlined in the National

150 http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/dfg/dmf/recreational-fishing/recreational-saltwater-permits.html 151 https://hmspermits.noaa.gov/news 152 Addition of the Sustainable Fisheries Act. http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/laws_policies/msa/

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Saltwater Recreational Fishing Policy. Recognising the considerable value of recreational fishing (both economic and for research), this programme aims to provide recreational fishers with resources and guidance to improve their enjoyment of MRF and their sense of stewardship, allowing them to better contribute to sustainable resource management and conservation.

11.8.2 Data collection and monitoring NOAA’s primary means of data collection is through the MRIP (Marine Recreational Information Program), taking the form of an annual mail survey to estimate effort and onsite surveys to estimate catch per unit effort (NMFS 2015). For some species (e.g. red snapper), there is ‘real-time’ management of season lengths based on catches (Abbott & Willard, 2017). The red snapper season opens on the 1st of June and closes when the annual catch target has been reached, but this is complicated by the mixture of state (out to 3 nm) and federal (3 – 200 nm) level management and may still lead to catches above recommended levels153. Collection of real-time data for this dynamic management of season length requires a platform for data to be collected and advice issued quickly. The annual diary review system in place in many European countries would not be suitable for such an approach, but an enhanced data collection programme could be considered for the more popular or at-risk species.

The MRIP is reviewed regularly to assess the quality of the survey and provide recommendations relating to survey design and the development of survey tools (e.g. smart phone apps). There is currently also an ongoing public comment process concerning its forthcoming 5-year strategic plan154, which has several stated aims (and proposed strategies) – see Table 11-1.

Table 11-1, Strategic Goals of the Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP)

Goal Proposed Strategies Meet Identify MRIP data customers and the way they use MRIP data. Customer Improve customer satisfaction. Needs Evaluate costs and feasibility of meeting customer needs. Provide Develop comprehensive minimum national reporting standards and data requirements. Quality Establish and improve internal data quality assurance and control procedures. Products Ensure complete transparency and access by stakeholders to methods. Ensure long-term continuity of comparable statistics. Inform Key Provide communication and outreach products tailored to stakeholder needs. Stakeholders Focus communication efforts on key stakeholders, particularly the ones most likely to pass information onto others.

153 http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf_fisheries/red_snapper/documents/pdfs/gulf_red_snapper_rec_seas on_2017.pdf 154 http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/recreational-fisheries/MRIP/mrip-strategic-plan-review

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Increase stakeholder comprehension of the importance of, and requirements for, accurate surveys. Integrate stakeholder feedback into outreach and education materials. Expand breadth of communications and tools offered. Update MRIP strategic communications plan & use website as key component of outreach. Ensure Sound Maintain program capability / funding to conduct research & to improve surveys. Improved Science surveys will address independent review recommendations and known sources of bias. Build and utilise expertise in survey design. Maintain best practices and best available survey / estimation methods. Operate Maintain a team-orientated program management structure to include partners / Collaboratively stakeholders in policy decisions and implementation. Create and maintain inventory of partner needs and priorities, particularly with reference to regional differences. Assess feasibility and costs / benefits of expanding regional data collection, field work and quality assurance. Meet Program Identify and maintain inventory of essential needs (including ability to prioritise between Resource and and within regions). Funding Needs Communicate MRIP needs and priorities to NOAA Fisheries and to stakeholders / partners.

Regarding data collection (Goal 4), MRIP have identified several areas of focus for development that largely revolve around: improving survey design; updating the means of survey (traditionally relied upon telephone surveys); and incorporating feedback from partners beyond NOAA and MRIP. Recreational fishermen are also encouraged to get involved in the collection of basic fisheries data (through the NOAA fisheries National Cooperative Research Program155), which is complementary to the MRIP. Self-reporting has been supported by the development of smartphone apps that allow anglers to easily communicate catch and biological data to NOAA fisheries (and in a standardised fashion) (Venturelli et al., 2017). Though this platform represents an obvious means to simply collect data and has been developed separately by fishery management organisations in the USA, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden (and others), there remain several challenges to its implementation, owing to concerns about bias and data quality (Venturelli et al., 2017).

11.8.3 Management NOAA issues up-to-date regulatory information to anglers through its website or through the ‘FishRules’ app. Species-specific measures vary between regional councils but typically include some combination of seasonal closures; minimum landing sizes; catch limits; gear restrictions, and area closures. A good example of gear restrictions is that recreational anglers in the Greater Atlantic Region may fish for American Lobster by diving, but pot fishing requires a commercial permit. Restrictions range in severity, from no restrictions (e.g. black drum or Atlantic herring) up to total bans on retention

155 http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/cooperative-research/index

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(e.g. Atlantic salmon or sturgeon)156. Recreational catches are included in stock assessments for many species (Lee et al., 2017).

In the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery, which has been over-fished to well below its current biomass target (26% of virgin egg production potential) since the late 1960s, quota allocation (in the form of annual catch targets - ACTs) has been introduced to manage recreational fishing mortality (51.5% of total catch in 2016)157. Under ACTs, the length of the fishing season is set with respect to the quota to reduce the risk of overfishing, and any overages are subtracted from the subsequent year’s ACT. This curtailing of season length creates a short, high intensity fishing season that incentivises a race to the ACT amongst anglers. Following several years of misreporting of recreational mortality and progressively shortening fishing seasons, threatening the charter vessel red snapper fishery (whom could only hire out their vessels for an increasingly limited period), the recreational fishery was split into private and charter vessel sectors. This allowed charter vessel operators more freedom to spread their own catch allocation throughout a longer season of 46 days for charter vessels in federal waters (states have local jurisdiction out to 3 nm and can set fishing seasons) in 2016, compared with just 9 for private anglers (Abbott & Willard, 2017). This demonstrates a clear step taken to protect the interests of charter vessel operators, recognising their increased economic dependence upon the resource, and its depleted status.

11.8.4 Enforcement Enforcement of recreational fishing legislation is conducted by the NMFS Office of Law Enforcement (OLE), supported by the US Coast Guard. The OLE is formed of 5 divisions (broadly relating to the jurisdiction of the eight Regional Fisheries Management Councils) and supported in prosecutions by the Department of Justice. The OLE has jurisdiction throughout the US EEZ, including its dependencies in the Pacific and Caribbean. The OLE has responsibility for commercial, recreational and indigenous fishing and, whilst much of its attention focusses upon commercial compliance, there are measures that address recreational fishing. For example, in Oregon (West Coast OLE Division), enforcement officers hold public meetings to increase awareness about the restrictions and responsibilities that recreational anglers are expected to adhere to (NMFS 2016b).

Most (60%) of the recreational effort, in terms of number of trips, occurs within the Southeast Division (North Carolina to Texas) (NMFS 2016b). The size of the divisional areas and the volume of recreational

156 https://www.greateratlantic.fisheries.noaa.gov/sustainable/recfishing/regs/ 157 http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf_fisheries/red_snapper/overview/

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activity makes enforcement a considerable challenge for the OLE, which has few employees (just 195 staff spread across the whole of the US in 2016, NMFS 2016b). Data on the encounter rate of recreational fishing infractions are not published, but is likely to be small given the size of the workforce (approximately 1 staff member for every 300,000 recreational trips, not including commercial activity).

Through the National Saltwater Recreational Fishing Policy (NSRFP), NOAA commits to engaging recreational anglers and engendering a sense of stewardship. The NSRFP plans to achieve this by more actively involving anglers in the process of designing measures to maintain or improve marine fish stocks and increase awareness about the importance of, and methods associated with, fisheries management amongst recreational fishers. Given the limited enforcement capacity, such measures are critical to encouraging compliance and reporting of data of sufficient quality.

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11.9 Canada There are approximately 350,000 recreational anglers in Canada, some 1.03% of the 2010 population, spending around €140 million a year (average of 9 days fished per angler) (Fisheries & Oceans Canda, 2012). Marine recreational fisheries are largely managed federally, by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), with varying degrees of involvement from territories / provinces (Fisheries & Oceans Canada, 2012). Walleye pollock is the most popular recreational fish species in recent times, surpassing trout in 2005, and the majority of the frequently caught species are either freshwater species or diadromous fish caught in freshwater (Fisheries & Oceans Canada, 2012). Popular marine fishes include cod, salmon, and mackerel, but marine species do not comprise the largest catches in any province, except British Columbia, where salmon is the most popular species (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2012).

11.9.1 Legislation and Licensing Licences are issued individually by provinces, although not all species require licences158, (e.g. Nova Scotia/ New Brunswick159). Most of the relevant legislation is contained within the Fisheries & Oceans Act (2012) and non-compliance is prosecuted under this act. Catches are subject to the usual complement of restrictions regarding seasonal closure, retention limits, and gear types, and each province / territory is responsible for issuing its own limits. Recreational fisheries have also begun to be implemented within DFO integrated fishery management plans (see Section 10.8) but these are mostly still under development160. Hence, the effectiveness of this more holistic approach has not yet been demonstrated, in part because it remains challenging to address the uncertainty associated with recreational catches (e.g. Integrated Fisheries Management Plan for Mackerel161).

11.9.2 Data collection and monitoring The DFO conducts a periodic survey of recreational fishing every five years, covering both marine and freshwater angling, but not subsistence activities by native peoples (Fisheries & Oceans Canada 2012). The survey collects information on the species fished (and retained), ages and home provinces (or countries if international) of anglers. In 2010, resident anglers retained approximately 62.7 million fish, from a total of 193.3 million caught, but the proportion of marine species, although presumably much smaller, was not published (Fisheries & Oceans Canada 2012).

158 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/policies-politiques/op-pc-eng.htm 159 http://www.inter.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Maritimes/Recreational-Fisheries/Home 160 http://www.inter.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Gulf/FAM/IMFP 161 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/peches-fisheries/ifmp-gmp/mackerel-atl-maquereau/mac-atl-maq-2007- eng.htm#sec5

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11.9.3 Management Table 11-2 gives some example management measures in place for some Canadian marine recreational fisheries for individual management areas. As in other countries, typical measures include retention bans, catch limits, gear restrictions, and seasonal closures.

Table 11-2, Example of groundfish restrictions on the Canadian Atlantic coast.

Restriction Area Details Seasonal/ New Brunswick/ Nova Scotia Fishing prohibited in January. area Labrador/ Newfoundland Fishing season variable. Usually open in mid-July to mid- closures August and late September. Eastport and Gilbert Bay MPAs are closed to recreational fishing. Southern Gulf of St Lawrence April 15th – October 2nd (in 2017) Gears New Brunswick/ Nova Scotia Handline/ rod-and-line only Labrador/ Newfoundland Handline/ rod-and-line only. Handlines may have no more than 3 hooks. Southern Gulf of St Lawrence Shore-based gears only* Catch Limits New Brunswick/ Nova Scotia 10 groundfish per day in total. No retention of halibut, northern wolf fish or spotted wolf fish permitted Labrador/ Newfoundland 5 groundfish per day per person or 15 per boat if >3 people fishing. No retention of halibut, any shark, northern wolf fish or spotted wolf fish permitted. All other species caught must be landed and highgrading is prohibited. Fish must be identifiable, filleting at sea not permitted. Recreational catch cannot be sold commercially. Southern Gulf of St Lawrence 15 groundfish per day in total. Cod retention permitted only in certain areas up to a maximum of 5 per day. Retention of white hake, skate, haddock, pollock, halibut, northern wolf fish, Atlantic wolf fish, and spotted wolf fish prohibited. Licence New Brunswick/ Nova Scotia No licence required. Labrador/ Newfoundland No licence required. Fishery open to residents and non- residents Southern Gulf of St Lawrence No licence stipulations issued. Other New Brunswick/ Nova Scotia No additional conditions. Labrador/ Newfoundland Fishing only permitted between 1hr after dawn and 1hr before dusk. Recreational and commercial operations cannot co- occur on the same vessel. Southern Gulf of St Lawrence Fishing between sunrise and sunset only between July and September (precise dates vary within region) *Fishing restrictions in Southern Gulf of St Lawrence are effective within 50m of the coastline.

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11.9.4 Enforcement Enforcement officers may be present in docks for inspection of offshore recreational catches162. Fishery non-compliance penalties are issued on the DFO website163. DFO publishes recent penalties issued to recreational and commercial fishers (Table 11-3), but data for levels of inspection, suspected illegal activity and prosecution are not available. Citizens are also encouraged to report suspected violations to a hotline as in several other countries.

Table 11-3, Recent examples of recreational fines/ penalties issued in marine recreational fisheries in Newfoundland and British Columbia in 2017.

Regulation Penalty Exceeding daily groundfish quota Fine CAN$800 (~ US$630). One year recreational fishery licence ban Exceeding daily groundfish quota Fine: CAN$3000 (~ US$2400) Forfeiture of 247 Atlantic cod. Forfeiture of vessel and engine Retention of a prohibited species Fine: CAN$600 (~ US$470). Forfeiture of catch (1 Atlantic halibut) Exceeding daily Dungeness crab. Fine: CAN$3500 (~ US$ 2800) Providing false statement to a fishery officer Forfeiture of crab traps and 16 crabs. One year ban from recreational crab fishing, possession of crabs or crab fishing gear Possession of a prohibited species (Butter Clams) Fine: CAN$500 (~ US$400)

162 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/decisions/fm-2013-gp/atl-015-eng.htm 163 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/charges-inculpations/nl-tnl-eng.htm

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11.10 Summary Table 11-4 gives a summary of the control measures in place and the status of MRF in each country.

11.10.1 National Attitudes Most non-Nordic countries adopt a generally similar complement of strategies to manage and control recreational fishing that are based upon a series of well-publicised control measures and licence agreements, with some degree of enforcement. Countries may also choose to emphasise the value (economic and / or social) of recreational fishing in management decisions and, particularly for Australia, the rights of recreational fishers have had taken precedence and displaced the commercial fishery in certain areas. In Norway, Iceland, and the Faroes, recreational fishing is generally very prevalent and there is usually a more limited number of conditions for involvement in recreational fishing. For some species, there are estimates of substantial recreational fishing mortality in these countries (e.g. cod in Norway) raising concerns about the proportion of national quotas that are being taken by unregulated, non-commercial interests. It is often argued that the spatial nature of recreational fishing and the size of area that can be affected means that quantitatively surveying and effectively enforcing recreational fisheries is untenable (e.g. in Norway), but it is also questionable whether this relates to political will and cultural disposition as much as it does practical constraints.

Table 11-4, Summary of control measures and status of marine recreational fishing (MRF) in each country.

Country Licence Survey? (and Quota/ Catch limits? MRF included in stock required? interval) assessment? * Iceland Yes◊ No Charter vessels and MRF are MRF allocated TAC allocated quota for select species. proportion^ Norway No Yes (variable Seal and king crab only. Tourists No interval) export limits. Charter vessels have quota. Faroes No No No No Australia Yes Yes (varies by Yes Yes state) New Yes Yes (variable Yes Yes Zealand interval) USA Yes Yes (annual) Yes Yes Canada Yes Yes Yes No (5 years) UK No Yes (annual) Yes‡ Yes‡ *Licence conditions usually different between species and provinces/ states and for charter vessel companies. ◊Licence required for charter vessels only. ^For certain species only, using an estimated value for recreational. ‡Driven primarily at a European level or through local IFCA measures.

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11.10.2 Accuracy of Survey Estimates Bias and precision in MRF estimates of catch, effort, or other variables is a serious ongoing concern in all nations which undertake recreational fishing surveys (Pollock, Jones, and Brown 1994; ICES 2010). Primary sources of error in survey estimates include:  Avidity bias: anglers that spend more time fishing, or who catch more, are over-represented in surveys.  Estimation error: errors related to sources of bias in survey design, such as incomplete coverage or non-randomness in sample selection.  Misreporting (innocently or wilfully) of the number and details of individuals caught/ landed.  Unlicensed, unreported activity: fishing by those who either do not require a licence (e.g. Canadian First Nation groups) or those that have illegally not sought a licence/ partake in activities not covered by their licence.

Both the USA and New Zealand have undergone major revisions to their survey design and implementation in recent years, and recreational surveys are periodically evaluated and incrementally improved in most countries. In Europe, this function is provided by the ICES Working Group on Recreational Fisheries Surveys164 using a quality assessment tool (e.g. ICES, 2015). However, in many cases, there are still insufficient data to properly inform stock assessments and there remains a small number of examples where individual recreational fishing is managed alongside commercial fisheries. In Norway for example, landings of popular species such as cod or saithe are likely very high and must be considered at the level of the relevant stock assessments. In Iceland, a proportion of TAC for coastal cod is allocated to MRF (200-300t) (Solstrand 2013). However, generally recreational catches are not included in stock assessments for many species, often because there are insufficient data. Licences can help with the accuracy of survey and collection of monitoring data in two ways: generation of funding streams for surveys; and providing a list frame for sampling of individual anglers to seek reporting of catches (Hyder et al., 2017a; 2017b).

Although smartphone apps have been developed in several countries, their purpose and functionality varies considerably and generally only a small proportion of users continue to use an app over sustained periods (around 5% after 12 months) (ICES, 2017). App usage is also strongly biased towards those willing to use it (i.e. the selection is non-random and so can’t be assumed to be representative). The Danish app ‘Fangstjournalen’ is considered to be one of the most effective and is recommended as a model for other developers (ICES, 2017). It might be legally possible for licence conditions to

164 http://www.ices.dk/community/groups/Pages/WGRFS.aspx

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require regular use of such an app but enforcing such a condition would be difficult. This might provide a more viable alternative once more thorough comparison with traditional approaches and standards developed for the different apps (Venturelli et al., 2017).

11.10.3 Allocation of fishing opportunities Although recreational fishing may be a source of substantial fishing mortality (Cooke and Cowx 2004; Hyder et al., 2017a; 2017b), there is considerable variability in how recreational landings are incorporated into stock assessments and how fishing opportunities are allocated at a country level to the recreational and commercial sectors.

More formally including MRF catches in stock assessments and management may, depending upon the approach, require some method for controlling fishing mortality. Some species are controlled by mandatory releases (e.g. salmonids in the UK, USA, and Iceland), as a means to reduce mortality (post- release mortality in some recreational fisheries is low). Whilst quota uptake in commercial fisheries can be monitored through landings declarations, most MRF do not have such a system. Thus, it would be necessary to have some form of real-time monitoring of catches through surveys165 to use quotas. This is both difficult and expensive, although it has been attempted for some US fisheries, such as red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. Most countries implement some form of daily catch limit for MRF, which could be adjusted to try and change the recreational catch in the management period on the assumption of a certain number of days fished per year, but without some formal control of fishing effort the catch limits may only have limited impact. European sea bass is managed under such a system, using forecasts from the previous year stock assessment and limits to personal catch through technical measures. Other means of adjusting MRF fishing mortality when required include adaptive changes to minimum landing sizes and closed seasons but again, would require within season data.

Recreational fishing is widely regarded as an important source of income and a positive activity (e.g. Australia) that large numbers of people will be engaged in (e.g. Nordic countries), so there may be little incentive for policy makers to impose significant additional restrictions. This attitude is to some degree important for maintaining compliance and increased restriction could lead to poorer reporting standards and hostility from anglers towards fishery managers (Borch, 2010). However, this does create concern, particularly for species that are popular amongst anglers and already heavily exploited (e.g. sea bass, western Baltic cod). To address these problems, fishing opportunities should be

165 https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/mdms/doc/32Recreational_Data_Timeliness_FINAL_Report.pdf

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partitioned between commercial and recreational fisheries using clearly specified rules that are seen to be rational and fair, and based firmly in reliable evidence. This is challenging, especially if social and economic criteria are brought into play (Voyer et al., 2017), highlighting the need for developing new approaches for co-management (Hyder et al., 2014). Countries like Canada and Australia must also consider the needs of aboriginal / first nation groups who, although generally small, may rely heavily upon fishing for subsistence and are usually very difficult to gain reliable survey information from (at least in part because they are usually not subject to license requirements).

11.10.4 Enforcement & the community The challenges associated with monitoring and enforcing MRF means that, in most cases, a culture of compliance depends upon individuals understanding and supporting the value of catch restrictions (i.e. stewardship). Between the countries reviewed here, the extent of enforcement capacity and penalties issued vary widely from Canada and New Zealand, where large penalties can be issued, to unrestricted fisheries such as in the Faroes. All countries, except the Faroes, implement some combination of size, gear, and retention restrictions and most stipulate that recreational catch cannot be sold. Enforcement capacity and detection rates are not available for each country.

Outreach and public education are important components of the mandate for fishery enforcement officers and organisations issuing licences. A common means to address this is to provide up-to-date information through a free smartphone app that fishers can routinely check and even use to submit catch data. Countries such as Australia and the USA have recognised the importance of creating a sense of stewardship or resource ownership amongst the recreational fishing community in order to promote understanding of fisheries management and the value of compliance. The Australian small grants and ‘send us your skeletons’ schemes are among the more innovative methods to involve anglers in the process of fishery management. There are associated costs (i.e. receiving samples is worthless if there are no staff allocated to analysis) and a more detailed analysis would be required to assess the potential cost-benefit and applicability to the UK166.

11.10.5 Impacts upon non-target species & the environment Generally, discussions of this topic in relation to MRF are limited, but there are several legitimate concerns, including: pressure upon bait species; trophic shifts associated with removal of target species; bycatch or disturbance of non-target species; physical damage to the environment (e.g. by

166 E.g. such as the CBA tool developed by CEH

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anchors); gear losses and introduction of pollutants, diseases or non-native species (Hyder et al., 2017a). The severity of these concerns varies with their potential spatial footprint and the ease of remedial measures (e.g. non-natives are often costly and difficult to eradicate). A recent review identified that MRF can have other impacts on the marine environment, particularly in coastal habitats, but the level of impact as well as the associated effects are unknown, and that more information is needed to determine MRF-induced impacts and separate them from other anthropogenic impacts (Hyder et al., 2017a). Most impacts were considered to be of minor importance due to their local scale, reversibility, and ease of management. The introduction of disease, pathogens, and non-native species and loss of lead were the highest risk due to the severity, difficulty to reverse, and challenge to manage, but more information is needed to properly assess levels of risk (Hyder et al., 2017a).

Scale is also an important issue to consider in the management of MRF (Hyder et al., 2017a). Even if localised depletion of a species has minimal regional impact upon a stock, it may still be possible for impacts to be felt, either in the local ecosystem or amongst other stakeholders (e.g. depletion of reef fish biomass affecting trophic structure or diving tourism). At minimum, this calls for MRF data collection to be spatially-explicit and may provide a simple basis for identifying areas where commercial and recreational fishing pressure (and so the risk of conflicts) is high. Consideration of scale also allows an estimation of the importance of certain impacts, as it relates to the practicality and cost of management, enforcement and remedial measures.

Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) is not often discussed in terms of national MRF management, but it is unarguably an important component (Gullestad et al. 2017; Fletcher et al. 2016), since it is a key element of the societal aspects of EBFM (i.e. the socio-cultural value of sustainably managed marine resources). Certainly, angling does not have the level of marine ecosystem impacts associated with commercial gears, but gear such as beam trawls can be used recreationally although this is not as common or widespread as commercial fisheries. At a more local scale, sustained pressure from MRF can have noticeable effects (e.g. trophic web disruption) that should be considered.

11.10.6 Conclusions Most of the countries reviewed here have a strong component of recreational fisheries within their national strategy for fisheries management, with the key difference being the degree to which the recreational fisheries are supported by regional, local, and national authorities and laws. Nordic

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countries tend to opt for a relatively passive approach, avoiding licensing or significant involvement from fisheries managers or law enforcement, whereas countries like USA and Australia take a much more proactive approach, particularly in mediating conflicts between the various commercial and recreational sectors in each area/ fishery.

There are several considerations that need to be accounted for in the management of MRF (

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Table 11-5), many of which are already implemented to some degree in each country, but challenges remain common to several countries. Chief among these challenges is the difficulty with obtaining high quality, reliable data on biological characteristics and catch and effort. This issue should be considered the highest priority in considering how recreational fisheries management is conducted in the UK, whilst recognising the cultural and economic value of MRF.

As mentioned above, much of the UK legislative framework for managing MRF derives primarily the Common Fisheries Policy, with the exception of some statutory instruments and aspects of the Sea Fisheries (Conservation) Act. Withdrawal from the CFP presents an opportunity to further integrate recreational angling into UK fisheries management decisions. Strengths and weaknesses of national MRF management programs are detailed in

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Table 11-6.

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Table 11-5, Examples of key considerations that need to be accounted for in the management of recreational fisheries.

MRF Tools Pros Cons Personal Limits^ (bag limits;  Support wider fisheries  Difficult to enforce effectively. minimum sizes; closed areas management, reducing fishing Relies heavily on individual etc.) mortality and protecting stewardship and awareness. juveniles. Licensing of MRF^  Facilitates more up to date  Some groups hard to reach or records of no. of recreational unwilling to submit to licence anglers. conditions.  Cost recovery & more funding for MRF-related projects Include more popular  More accurate stock assessments.  Usually requires enhanced data recreational fish species in  Quota can be allocated to collection* regional stock recreational groups.  Concerns about various sources assessments167 of bias. Prioritise recreational fishing  Emphasise cultural & economic  Increased costs/ pressure for in MRF hotspots value of MRF commercial sector (and  Reduce fishing pressure in most dependent industries). intensely fished areas Smartphone apps for  Simple platform for anglers to  Other bias concerns (e.g. avidity, communicating mgmt. easily report data (reduce recall unlicensed activity) not measures (e.g. bag limits) bias) and stay up to date on addressed. and reporting catch data personal limits.  Difficult to engage users with long-term, repeated use of app. Fines for non-compliance^  Disincentivise poor stewardship.  Requires that anglers are up to  Fines can supplement local date with control measures and management/ enforcement willing to engage. budgets.  Difficult to enforce effectively. Relies on individual stewardship. Engage anglers in  Enhanced sense of stewardship  Likely still subject to avidity bias. development of and involvement.  Consultation processes may be management measures  Improved understanding of the lengthy and costly and value of control measures. recommendations hard to implement. ^Measures already in place in most cases. *Data collection standards depend on the stock assessment method used. Fitting MRF data to complex, age or length-structured models (e.g. catch-at-age) is likely to be more difficult than simple, trends-based assessments.

167 Recreational fishing mortality recently highlighted in the North Sea Multi-Annual Plan (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/08/north-sea-fisheries-new-multiannual- management-plan-agreed/pdf)

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Table 11-6, Key strengths and weaknesses of national MRF management programs.

Component Strengths Weaknesses Stewardship  Vision for MRF is clearly outlined  Anglers disconnected from  Control measures clearly managers and perceive control communicated and anglers measures as ‘red tape’ or understand their value interference from the state  Anglers engaged in science and  Threats posed by MRF perceived management process and perceive at individual level. control measures as beneficial, rather than confrontational. Data Collection  Data collection regularly reviewed  Small, irregular surveys with by fisheries and social scientists biased samples  Participants regularly contacted Management  Most/ all MRF species managed:  Conflicts between commercial Prioritise most threatened species and recreational sectors not and adopt precautionary approach addressed otherwise  Spatial distribution of effort not  Management process is monitored transparent and accessible.  Significant recreational landings Anglers understand and value the not captured in stock process of fisheries management. assessments  Cost recovery through licencing

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12 References

The following sections summarise the literature that is cited in each of the previous chapters. Section numbering follows chapter numbers so that, for example, Section 12.3 summarises the literature that forms the basis of Chapter 3 and so on.

12.1 Introduction No literature cited

12.2 Country overviews ABARES (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences), 2013. Australian Fisheries Statistics 2012. FRDC, Australian Department of Agriculture. Arnason R., Sandal L.K., Steinshamn S.I., 2004, Optimal feedback controls: comparative evaluation of the cod fisheries in Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. American Journal of Agriculture Economics. 86(2), 531–542. Australian Department of Agriculture 2014. Australian fisheries and aquaculture statistics 2013. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences. FAO, 2005. Fishery country profile: Faroes. ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_FO.pdf FAO, 2005. Fishery country profile: USA ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/document/fcp/en/fi_cp_us.pdf FAO, 2010. Fisheries & Aquaculture profile, Canada. http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/CAN/en Flanders Marine Institute, 2016. Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase: Maritime Boundaries and Exclusive Economic Zones (200nm), version 9. Available online at: http://www.marineregions.org/.http://dx.doi.org/10.14284/242 GuÐmundsson G. J., 2006. The cod and the cold , Scandinavian Journal of History, 31:2, 97-118. Henriksen, 2014. Norwegian coastal fisheries: an overview of the coastal fishing fleet of less than 21 meters. Nofima. Holden, M., 1994. The Common Fisheries Policy: Origin, Evaluation and Future. Fishing News Books, Oxford, 288pp. Lawrence, S., Metz, S. and Russel, J., 2016. Quay Issues, Fleet economic performance, dataset 2014- 2015. Seafish Report No: SR691. Available at: http://www.seafish.org/media/publications/Seafish_Fleet_Economic_Performance_Dataset_0 514_v100316.pdf Lock K. & Leslie S., 2007. New Zealand’s Quota Management System: A History of the First 20 Years. Motu Economic and Public Policy Research. Lowther A., 2012. Fisheries of the United States 2012 – Current Fishery Statistics. NOAA. Marine Management Organisation, 2016. UK Sea Fishery Statistics 2015 Report.

Marine Socio-Economics Project (MSEP) Facts & Figures Series 1: How important is fishing to the UK economy? May 2014

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Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, 2016. Norwegian fishing vessels, fishermen and licenses 2015. Available online at http://www.fiskeridir.no/Yrkesfiske/Statistikk-yrkesfiske/Statistiske- publikasjoner/Fiskefartoey-og-fiskere-konsesjoner-og-aarlige-deltakeradganger OECD (2016), OECD Review of Fisheries: Country Statistics 2015, OECD Publishing. Available at: http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/agriculture-and-food/oecd-review- of-fisheries-country-statistics-2015_rev_fish_stat_en-2015-en Partners R., 2010. Overview of the Australian Fishing and Aquaculture Industry: Present and Future. Fisheries and Development Corporation and Ridge Partners Statistics Iceland (Hagstofa Íslands), 2013. Catch, value and processing of catch 2012. 2013:3 World Trade Organization, 2008. Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Norway. WT/TPR/S/205-01

12.3 Fisheries management approaches AFMA. 1998. AFMA Overheads. Fisheries Administration Paper Series No. 2, Canberra. Agnarsson, S., Matthiasson, T., Giry, F., Amendment, M. F. M. P., Amendment, M. F. M. P., Amendment, M. F. M. P., Amendment, M. F. M. P., et al. 2008. A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: Consolidation without consensus. Marine Policy, 24: 920–927. Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.08.016 (Accessed 12 May 2014). Årland, K., and Bjørndal, T. 2002. Fisheries management in Norway—an overview. Marine Policy, 26: 307–313. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X02000131. Baltic Sea 2020. 2009. ‘Best practices’ for Fisheries Management, 44: 96. Cadigan, N. G. 2012. Impact of stock-recruit and natural mortality process errors on MSY reference points. DFO Canadian Science Advisory Secretariat Research Document, 2012/075, 20pp. Campbell, D., Brown, D., & Battaglene, T. (2000). Individual transferable catch quotas: Australian experience in the southern Bluefin tuna fishery. Marine Policy, 24, 109-117. Clark, C. W. 1990. Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources. Wiley, New York. Chambers, C., and Carothers, C. 2016. Thirty years after privatization: A survey of Icelandic small-boat fishermen. Marine Policy. Costello, C. & Mangin, T. 2015. Country-Level Costs vs. Benefits of Improved Fishery Management (University of California-Santa Barbara) Advisors: Jim Anderson, Ragnar Arnason, Steve Gaine, Ray Hilborn, Rashid Sumaila, Jim Wilen, Matt Elliott and Emily Peterson. https://www.oceanprosperityroadmap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/6.-Country-Level- Costs-vs.-Benefits-Fishery-Management-Report-5-26-15A.pdf [Accessed 25/11/16] Cox, A. 2000. Cost Recovery in Fisheries Management: The Australian Experience. IIFET 2000 Proceedings, 9pp.DAFF. (2008). Round two outcomes - announcement made 22 December 2006. Available from: [accessed April2008]. In: Pascoe, S. & Gibson, B. (2009). Do boat licences have a role in fisheries managed through individual quotas? Experience in Australian fisheries. Marine Policy, 33, 297-304. Deng, R. A., Punt, A. E., Dichmont, C. M., Buckworth, R. C., and Burridge, C. Y. 2015. Improving catch prediction for tiger prawns in the Australian northern prawn fishery. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 72: 117-129.

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DFO, 2012. Reference points consistent with the precautionary approach for a variety of stocks in the Maritimes Region. DFO Canadian Science Advisory Secretariat Report, 2012/035, 35pp. DFO, 2017. Fisheries Act Summary. Available from: https://www.ec.gc.ca/pollution/default.asp?lang=En&n=072416B9-1 Dichmont, C. M., Deng, A., Punt, A. E., Ellis, N., Venables, W. N., Kompas, T., Zhou, S., et al. 2008. Beyond biological performance measures in management strategy evaluation: bringing in economics and the effects of trawling on the benthos. Fisheries Research, 94: 238–250. Dichmont, C. M., Pascoea, S., Kompas, T., Punt, A. E., and Denga, R. 2010. On implementing maximum economic yield in commercial fisheries. PANS, 107: 16-21. EC, 2008. Council Regulation 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2004. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008R1342&from=EN Faroese Ministry of Fisheries and Natural Resources, 2008. Faroe Islands Fisheries & Aquaculture: Responsible Management for a Sustainable Future. http://cdn.lms.fo/media/6850/final_070408.pdf. Accessed 09/02/2017 FAO 2005-2017. World inventory of fisheries. The evolution of fisheries management in New Zealand. Issues Fact Sheets. Text by Development Planning Service. In: FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department [online]. Rome. Updated 27 May 2005. [Cited 13 January 2017]. http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14755/en FERM. (2004). ITQs, ageing boats and the price of fish: Profitability and autonomous adjustment in the south east trawl fishery. Fiskistofa. 2016. Icelandic Fisheries website. http://www.fiskistofa.is/english/fisheries-management/ (Accessed 18 November 2016). Ford, W., & Nicol, D. (2001). The initial allocation of individual transferable quotas in the Tasmanian rock lobster and abalone fisheries. Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment. Gibson, D., Zylich, K. and Zeller, D. 2015. Preliminary reconstruction of total marine fisheries catches for the Faeroe Islands in Faroe Islands’ EEZ waters (1950-2010). Fisheries Centre, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper Series, Working Paper #2015 – 36. GlobalTrust 2014 FAO-Based Responsible Fisheries Management Certification Full Assessment And Certification Report for the Icelandic Cod Commercial Fishery Global Trust Certification Ltd, Report Code: ICE/Cod/001/2013 Government of Iceland. 2006. The Fisheries Management Act. Iceland. http://www.fisheries.is/management/fisheries-management/the-fisheries-management-act/. Grafton, R. Q., Kompas, T., and Hilborn, R. W. 2007. Economics of overexploitation revisited. Science, 318: 1601. Grétarsson, H. & Danielsen R. 2014. The Faroese Effort Quota Management System. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 5, 1/2014 pp. 100–122 Gunnlaugsson, S. B., and Saevaldsson, H. 2016. The Icelandic fishing industry: Its development and financial performance under a uniform individual quota system. Marine Policy, 71: 73–81. Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.05.018. Hannesson, R. 2013. Norway’s experience with ITQs. Marine Policy, 37: 264–269. Haraldsson, G & Carey, D. 2011. Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland Economics Department Working Paper No. 891, OECD, ECO/WKP(2011)60. http://www.oecd.org/offici

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aldocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(2011)60&docLanguage=En Hegland, T.J. & Hopkins, C.C. E. 2014 Towards a new fisheries effort management system for the Faroe Islands? – Controversies around the meaning of fishing sustainability. Maritime Studies 2014, 13:12. Holt, K. R., Starr, P. J., Haigh, R., Krishka, B. 2016. Stock Assessment and Harvest Advice for Rock Sole (Lepidopsetta spp.) in British Columbia. DFO Canadian Science Advisory Secretariat Research Document, 2016/009. 264pp. Icelandic Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries, 2010. http://www.fisheries.is/main-species/ (accessed 9 January 2017) Jákupsstovu S. H. í, Cruz, L.R., Maguire, J-J. and Reinert, J. 2007. Effort regulation of the demersal fisheries at the Faroe Islands: a 10-year appraisal. ICES Journal of Marine Science,64, 730-737. Knútsson, Ö., Kristófersson, D. M., and Gestsson, H. 2016. The effects of fisheries management on the Icelandic demersal fish value chain. Marine Policy, 63: 172–179. Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.03.015. Large, P. A., Agnew, D. J., Alvarez-Perez, J. A., & al., e. (2013). Strengths and weaknesses of the management and monitoring of deep-water stocks, fisheries and ecosystems in various areas of the world – a roadmap towards sustainable deep-water fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic? Reviews in Fisheries Science, 21, 157-180. Maguire, J. J. (2001) Fisheries Science and Management in the North Atlantic. In: Pitcher, T., Sumaila, U.R. and Pauly, D. (2001) Fisheries Impacts on North Atlantic Ecosystems: Evaluations and Policy Exploration. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 9(5), p36-48, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Canada. Marchal, P., Andersen, J. L., Aranda, M., Fitzpatrick, M., Goti, L., Guyader, O., Haraldsson, G., et al. 2016. A comparative review of fisheries management experiences in the European Union and in other countries worldwide: Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand. Fish and Fisheries, 17: 803–824. Meany, F. (2001). The introduction of individual transferable quotas into the Australian sector of the southern Bluefin tuna fishery. Norway’, ’Government of. 2010. Marine Resources Act. Norway. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs. 2009. Norwegian fisheries management, our approach on discard of fish. http://www.regjeringen.no. Norway-ICES MoU. 2016; http://www.ices.dk/explore- us/Documents/Cooperation%20agreements/Norway/20160623_MoU_Norway_ICES_.pdf . OECD. (2005). Country note on national fisheries management systems - Norway, 18pp, https://www.oecd.org/norway/34430920.pdf Pascoe, S., and Gibson, T. 2008. Report to the Australian Fisheries Management Authority: Assessment of the use of Boat Statutory Fishing Rights in Commonwealth fisheries. CSIRO. 752pp. Pascoe, S., & Gibson, T. (2009). Do boat licences have a role in fisheries managed through individual quotas? Experience in Australian fisheries. Marine Policy, 33, 297-304. Punt, A. E., Deng, R. A., Dichmont, C. M., Kompas, T., Venables, W. N., Zhou, S., Pascoe, S., et al. 2010. Integrating size-structured assessment and bioeconomic management advice in Australia’s northern prawn fishery. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 67: 1785-1801. Punt, A. E., Deng, R., Pascoe, S., Dichmont, C. M., Zhou, S., Plaganyi, E. E., Hutton, T.,et al. 2011. Calculating optimal effort and catch trajectories for multiple species modelled using a mix of size- structured, delay-difference and biomass dynamics models. Fisheries Research, 101: 201–211.

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Rayns, N. (2007). Short Communication: The Australian government’s harvest strategy policy. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64, 596-598. Reeves, S.A., Revill, A.S., Hutton, T.P. & Pinnegar, J.K. (2008) Technical Measures in the CFP and the reform of Council Regulation 850/98. Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Polices, Study IP/B/PECH/IC/2007/090 Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2008/408930/IPOL- PECH_ET(2008)408930_EN.pdf Shotton, R. (2001). Initial allocations of quota rights: the Australian southeast trawl fishery story. Marine Resources Service, Fisheries Department, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Smith, A. D., Sainsbury, K. J., & Stevens, R. A. (1999). Implementing effective fisheries management systems - management strategy evaluation and the Australian partnership approach. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 56, 967-979. Smith, A. D., Smith, D. C., Tuck, G. N., & al, e. (2008). Experience in implementing harvest strategies in Australia's south-eastern fisheries. Fisheries Research, 94, 373-379. Starr, P. J., Haigh, R., Grandin, C. 2016. Stock assessment for Silvergray Rockfish (Sebastes brevispinis) along the Pacific coast of Canada. DFO Canadian Science Advisory Secretariat Research Document, 2016/042, 176pp. Steinshamn, S. I. 2010. Norwegian Fisheries Management. Worm, B., Hilborn, R., Baum, J. K., Branch, T. A., Collie, J. S., Costello, C., Fogarty, M. J., et al. 2009. Rebuilding global fisheries. Science, 325: 578-585.

12.4 Quota Allocation and Trading Agnarsson, S., Matthiasson, T., & Giry, F. (2016). Consolidation and distribution of quota holdings in the Icelandic fisheries. Marine Policy 72, 263–270. Anderson, J. 2008. Rights Based Management in the United Kingdom: The Shetland Experience. Case Studies in Fisheries Self-governance, R.E. Townsend, R. Shotton, and H. Uchida, eds., pp. 53–65. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 504. Rome: FAO. Annala, J. H. (1996). New Zealand’s ITQ system: have the first eight years been a success or a failure? Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 6, 43–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00058519 Arnason, R. (2005). Property rights in fisheries: Iceland’s experience with ITQs. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 15(3), 243–264. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11160-005-5139-6 Arnason, R. (2008). Iceland’s ITQ system creates new wealth. The Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, 1(2), 35–41. Barrow, J., Jefferson, G.E., Eagles, M.D. & Stevens, G.J. (2001). Allocation of harvesting rights in three Atlantic Canada marine fisheries. In Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries. Shotton, R., (Ed), FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 411 Rome, FAO. 373 Pp. Batstone, C. J., & Sharp, B. M. H. (1999). New Zealand’s quota management system: the first ten years. Marine Policy, 23(2), 177–190. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(98)00036-0 Bess, R. (2005). Expanding New Zealand’s quota management system. Marine Policy, 29(4), 339–347. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2004.04.008 Campbell, D., Brown, D., & Battaglene, T. (2000). Individual transferable catch quotas: Australian experience in the southern bluefin tuna fishery. Marine Policy, 24(2), 109–117.

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https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(99)00017-2 Carothers, C., & Chambers, C. (2012). Fisheries Privatization and the Remaking of Fishery Systems. Environment and Society: Advances in Research, 3(1), 39–59. https://doi.org/10.3167/ares.2012.030104 Chambers, C., & Carothers, C. (2016). Thirty years after privatization: A survey of Icelandic small-boat fishermen. Marine Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.02.026 Connor, R. (2001). Initial allocation of individual transferable quota in New Zealand fisheries. In Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries. Shotton, R., (Ed), FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 411 Rome, FAO. 373 Pp. Connor, R., & Alden, D. (2001). Indicators of the effectiveness of quota markets: The South East Trawl Fishery of Australia. Marine and Freshwater Research, 52(4), 387–397. https://doi.org/10.1071/MF99164 Criddle, K. R., & Strong, J. (2013). Dysfunction by design: Consequences of limitations on transferability of catch shares in the fishery. Marine Policy, 40(1), 91–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.01.006 Dicosimo, J., Methot, R. D., & Ormseth, O. A. (2010). Use of annual catch limits to avoid stock depletion in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands management area (Northeast Pacific). ICES Journal of Marine Science, 67(9), 1861–1865. https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsq060 Eythórsson, E. (2000). A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: Consolidation without consensus. Marine Policy, 24(6), 483–492. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(00)00021-X Ford, W., & Nicol, D. (2001). The initial allocation of individual transferable quotas in the Tasmanian rock lobster and abalone fisheries. In Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries. Shotton, R., (Ed), FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 411 Rome, FAO. 373 Pp, 171– 186. Gibson, D., Zylich, K., & Zeller, D. (2015). Fisheries Centre,The University of British Columbia. Working Paper Series, 12. GMFMC and NMFS. (2013). Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota Program 5-year Review. Noaa, (April). Gunnlaugsson, S. B., & Saevaldsson, H. (2016). The Icelandic fishing industry: Its development and financial performance under a uniform individual quota system. Marine Policy, 71, 73–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.05.018 Hannesson, R. (2013). Norway’s experience with ITQs. Marine Policy, 37(1), 264–269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.008 Haraldsson, G., & Carey, D. (2011). Ensuring a sustainable and efficient fishery in Iceland economics. Economics Department Working Paper No. 891. Hartley, M., & Fina, M. (2001). Allocation of Individual Vessel Quota in the Alaskan Pacific Halibut and Sablefish Fisheries. In Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries. Shotton, R., (Ed), FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 411 Rome, FAO. 373 Pp., 251–265. Hatcher, A., Pascoe, S., Banks, R., & Arnason, R. (2002). Future options for UK fish quota management. Retrieved from http://eprints.port.ac.uk/11385/1/CEMARE_report_58.pdf Hegland, T. J., & Hopkins, C. (2014). Towards a new fisheries effort management system for the Faroe Islands? - Controversies around the meaning of fishing sustainability. Maritime Studies, 13(1), 12. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40152-014-0012-7 Hersoug, B. (1977). Between Plan and Market – the Quota Allocation System in Norwegian. IIFET 2008

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Vietnam Proceedings, 1–12. Hersoug, B., Holm, P., & Rånes, S. A. (2000). The missing T. Path dependency within an individual vessel quota system - the case of Norwegian cod fisheries. Marine Policy, 24(4), 319–330. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(00)00008-7 Holland, D. S., & Norman, K. (2015). The Anatomy of a Multispecies Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Market in Development. North American Association of Fisheries Economists 8th Biennial Forum: Economic Sustainability, Fishing Communities, and Working Waterfronts, (September). Knútsson, Ö., Kristófersson, D. M., & Gestsson, H. (2016). The effects of fisheries management on the Icelandic demersal fish value chain. Marine Policy, 63, 172–179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.03.015 Korolev Y. (2011). Capitalization of Fishing Industry Though Quota Markets (A Case Study of Iceland). MS Thesis, Bifrost University. Le Gallic, B. (2006). Using market mechanisms to manage fisheries. Smoothing the path. OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264036581-en Leon, R., Gardner, C., van Putten, I., & Hartmann, K. (2015). Changes in the lease and permanent sale quota markets of a rock lobster fishery in response to stock abundance. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 72, 1555–1564. https://doi.org/doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsu246 Lock, K., & Leslie, S. (2007). New Zealand’s Quota Management System: a history of the first 20 Years. Public Policy Research, (April), 75. Retrieved from http://deepwatergroup.org//wp- content/uploads/2013/03/QMS.pdf Lynham, J. (2013). How have catch shares been allocated? Working Paper No. 2013-8, 42–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.08.007 Mace, P. (2014). The evolution of New Zealand’s fisheries science and management systems under ITQs. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from http://www.fisheries.no/ Marchal, P., Andersen, J. L., Aranda, M., Fitzpatrick, M., Goti, L., Guyader, O., … Ulrich, C. (2016). A comparative review of fisheries management experiences in the European Union and in other countries worldwide: Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand. Fish and Fisheries, 17(3), 803–824. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12147 McCormack, F. (2016). Sustainability in New Zealand’s quota management system: A convenient story. Marine Policy, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.06.022 Mcilwain, K., & Hill, J. (2013). United States Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Cooperative Program. Mcllwain, K. (2013). Catch Shares in Action: Alaska halibut and Sablefish Fixed Gear Individual Fishing Quota Program., 1–11. Meany, F. (2001). The introduction of individual transferable quotas into the australian sector of the southern bluefin tuna fishery. Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries, 212–221. Metzner, R., Crowe, F. M., & Borg, N. J. (2001). Initial allocation of ITQs in the Western Australia abalone fishery. In Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries. Shotton, R., (Ed), FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 411 Rome, FAO. 373 Pp., 99(149), 144–151. Newell, R. G., Sanchirico, J. N., & Kerr, S. (2005). Fishing quota markets. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49(3), 437–462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2004.06.005 NOAA Fisheries Service Fisheries. (2009). Amendment 1 to the Tilefish FMP Approved Measures (p. 9). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration., 1–9.

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Nøstbakken, L. (2006). Cost structure and capacity in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries. Applied Economics 38(16): 1877 — 1887. OECD (2004a). Country note on fisheries management systems - Australia, 18pp, https://www.oecd.org/australia/34427707.pdf OECD. (2004b). Country note on fisheries management systems -- Canada, 33pp, https://www.oecd.org/canada/34427924.pdf OECD. (2005). Country note on national fisheries management systems -- Norway part, 1–18, https://www.oecd.org/norway/34430920.pdf. Pascoe, S., & Gibson, T. (2009). Do boat licences have a role in fisheries managed through individual quotas? Experience in Australian fisheries. Marine Policy, 33(2), 297–304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2008.07.007 Pautzke, C. G., & Oliver, C. W. (1997). Development of the Individual Fishing Quota program for sablefish and halibut longline fisheries off Alaska. Retrieved from http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/ram/ifq/ifqpaper.htm Peacey, J. (2002). Managing Catch Limits in Multi-Species, ITQ Fisheries. Proceedings of the Eleventh International Institute of Fisheries Economies and Trade, Wellington, New Zealand Pinkerton, E., & Edwards, D. N. (2009). The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas. Marine Policy, 33(4), 707–713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2009.02.004 Poon, S. E. (2013). Catch Shares in Action: United States Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish Individual Fishing Quota Program, 11. Shotton, R. (2001). Initial allocations of quota rights: the Australian southeast trawl fishery story. In Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries. Shotton, R., (Ed), FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 411 Rome, FAO. 373 Pp. Solís, D., Agar, J. J., & del Corral, J. (2015). IFQs and total factor productivity changes: The case of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery. Marine Policy, 62, 347–357. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.06.001 Solís, D., del Corral, J., Perruso, L., & Agar, J. J. (2014). Evaluating the impact of individual fishing quotas (IFQs) on the technical efficiency and composition of the US Gulf of Mexico red snapper commercial fishing fleet. Food Policy, 46, 74–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.02.005 Sporer, C. (2001). Initial allocation of transferable fishing quotas in Canada’s Pacific marine fisheries. In Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries. Shotton, R., (Ed), FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 411 Rome, FAO. 373, 266–303. https://doi.org/10.1080/08920750902851096 Stewart, J., & Callagher, P. (2011). Quota concentration in the New Zealand fishery: Annual catch entitlement and the small fisher. Marine Policy, 35(5), 631–646. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2011.02.003 Woods, P. J., Holland, D. S., Marteinsdóttir, G., & Punt, A. E. (2015). How a catch-quota balancing system can go wrong: An evaluation of the species quota transformation provisions in the Icelandic multispecies demersal fishery. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 72(5), 1257–1277. https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsv001 Yordanova, T., Milliken, K., Cameron, A., & Curtis, H. (2014). UK seafood processing industry report.

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12.5 Access arrangements Anon. Protocol between the Government of Iceland and the Government of the Russian Federation under the Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation (1999). Churchill, R. R. (1999). The Barents Sea Loophole Agreement: A “Coastal State” Solution to a Straddling Stock Problem. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 14(4), 467. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 Fiskistofa. (2016). Icelandic Fisheries website. Retrieved November 18, 2016, from http://www.fiskistofa.is/english/fisheries-management/ Guðmundsson G. J. (2006), The cod and the , Scandinavian Journal of History, 31:2, 97-118. Mace, P. (2014). The evolution of New Zealand’s fisheries science and management systems under ITQs. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from http://www.fisheries.no/ OECD. (2005). Why Fish Piracy Persists. The economics of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Retrieved from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/why-fish-piracy- persists_9789264010888-en Smith, G. (2016). Russia intends to obtain quota for fishing in exclusive economic zone of Iceland. Maritime Herald. Retrieved from http://www.maritimeherald.com/2016/russia-intends-to- obtain-quota-for-fishing-in-exclusive-economic-zone-of-iceland/ Univ.Oslo. (2016). Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries. Retrieved November 21, 2016, from http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/08/8-02/russia-cooperation.xml

12.6 Fisheries enforcement AFMA. (2015). National Compliance and Enforcement Policy, (July), 1–13. Anderson, K. M., & McCusker, R. (2005). Crime in the Australian fishing industry: Key issues. Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, Australian Institute of Criminology (Vol. 9). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-005-1022-z Arnason, R., Hannesson, R., & Schrank, W. E. (2000). Costs of fisheries management: the cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland. Marine Policy, 233–243. Bose, S., & Crees-Morris, A. (2009). Stakeholder’s views on fisheries compliance: An Australian case study. Marine Policy, 33(2), 248–253. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2008.07.004 Branch, T. A. (2009). How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems? Fish and Fisheries2, 10(1), 39–57. ClientEarth (2017) The control and enforcement of fisheries in England, September 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2016-12-02-the- control-and-enforcement-of-fisheries-in-england-ce-en.pdf Cox, A. (2001). Cost Recovery in Fisheries Management: The Australian Experience. Retrieved from https://core.ac.uk/display/21131408 Faroe Islands Govt. (2008). Faroe Islands Fisheries & Aquaculture. http://cdn.lms.fo/media/3541/fo_fisheries_and_aquaculture_final_revised.pdf Fujita, R., & Bonzon, K. (2005). Rights-based fisheries management: an environmentalist perspective.

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Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 15, 309–312. Government of USA, M., & Government of Canada, D. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Fisheries Enforcement (1990). Retrieved from http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/agreements/LMR report/us_canada_fisheries_enforcement.pdf Harte, M. (2007). Funding commercial fisheries management: Lessons from New Zealand. Marine Policy, 31(4), 379–389. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2006.11.002 Montgomery, D.R. (2000) International Fisheries Enforcement Management Using Wide Swath SAR. Johns Hopkins Apl. Technical Digest, 21, 141-147. http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td2101/montgom.pdf MPI. (2014). New Zealand SPRFMO Observer Implementation Report for 2013. South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation Report, SC-02-07, 15. Retrieved from https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/Meetings-2013-plus/SC-Meetings/2nd-SC-Meeting- 2014/Papers/SC-02-07-New-Zealand-Observer-implementation-report.pdf Nøstbakken,L. (2008) Fisheries law enforcement—A survey of the economic literature. Marine Policy, 32, 293-300. Perez, J.C., Alvarez, M.A., Heikkonen, J., Guillen, J. & Barbas, T. (2003) The efficiency of using remote sensing for fisheries enforcement: Application to the Mediterranean bluefin tuna fishery. Fisheries Research, 147, 24-31. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1f2a/91d550c4b5cb6e241067cdfef77543982bc6.pdf Porter, R. D. (2010). Fisheries observers as enforcement assets: Lessons from the North Pacific. Marine Policy, 34(3), 583–589. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2009.11.005 Porter, R. D., Jylkka, Z., & Swanson, G. (2013). Enforcement and compliance trends under IFQ management in the Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish fishery. Marine Policy, 38, 45–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.018 Townsend, R., Shotton, R., & Uchida, H. (2008). Case studies in fisheries self-governance. FAO. Fisheries Technical Paper. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/231f629d-848a- 5b52-8bcd-67ab287c1a61/ Wallis, P., & Flaaten, O. (2001). Fisheries Management Costs: Concepts and Studies. OECD Report, 211–223. WWF-Norway. (2008). Management and Technical Measures in the Norwegian Cod and Groundfish Fisheries, (October).

12.7 Science-Industry Collaboration Adams, E. K. (2015). Measuring the performance of the north-eastern united states research set aside programs. Master of Science Thesis, University of Massachusetts Darmouth, Departement of Fisheries Oceanography. Australian Fisheries Management Authority (2016). Annual Report 2015-16. Retrieved from http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/AFMA-Annual-Report-2015-16- Accessible.pdf Condie, H. M., Grant, A., & Catchpole, T. L. (2014). Incentivising selective fishing under a policy to ban discards; lessons from European and global fisheries. Marine Policy, 45, 287–292. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.09.001

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Government, New Zealand Maori Fisheries Act (2004). Retrieved from http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2004/0078/latest/DLM311464.html Fisheries Research and Development Corporation (2016). Annual Report 2016. Retrieved from http://www.frdc.com.au/about_frdc/Documents/Annual_Report/FRDC_Annual_Report_2016. pdf Hegland, T. J., & Hopkins, C. (2014). Towards a new fisheries effort management system for the Faroe Islands? - Controversies around the meaning of fishing sustainability. Maritime Studies, 13(1), 12. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40152-014-0012-7 Institute of Marine Research, N. (2011). Evaluation of the Norwegian Reference Fleet (Vol. 2011). Institute of Marine Research, N. (2013). The Norwegian Reference Fleet - A Trustful Cooperation between Fishermen and Scientists. Kaplan, I. M., & McCay, B. J. (2004). Cooperative research, co-management and the social dimension of fisheries science and management. Marine Policy, 28, 257–258. Nedreaas KH, Borge A, Godøy, H and Aanes, S (2006) The Norwegian Reference fleet: co-operation between fishermen and scientists for multiple objectives. ICES CM 2006/N:05 Sumaila, U. R., Khan, A. S., Dyck, A. J., Watson, R., Munro, G., Tydemers, P., & Pauly, D. (2010). A bottom-up re-estimation of global fisheries subsidies. Journal of Bioeconomics, 12(3), 201–225. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-010-9091-8 Sumaila, U. R., Lam, V., Le Manach, F., Swartz, W., & Pauly, D. (2016). Global fisheries subsidies: An updated estimate. Marine Policy, 69, 189–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.12.026 Townsend, R., Shotton, R., & Uchida, H. (2008). Case studies in fisheries self-governance. FAO. Fisheries Technical Paper. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/231f629d-848a- 5b52-8bcd-67ab287c1a61/

12.8 Foreign Investment Faroe Islands Govt. (2008). Faroe Islands Fisheries & Aquaculture. http://cdn.lms.fo/media/3541/fo_fisheries_and_aquaculture_final_revised.pdf Metcalf, F., & Montgomery, A. N. (2006). Current Restrictions on Foreign Access to Canadian Fish Stocks. OECD. (1990). Direct Investments in the Fishing Sector. OECD. (2002). VII. Foreign Direct Investment Restrictions in OECD Countries. OECD Report. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/2956455.pdf OECD. (2008). Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries: Policies and Summary Statistics. OECD. (2013). Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries: Policies and Summary Statistics. vivideconomics (2009) A review of the effectiveness of the Economic Link. Report of Defra R & D project MF1207. https://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=MF1207_9064_FRP.pdf Westberg, A. K., & Verborgh, J. (2016). Agreed Record of Fisheries Consultations Between Norway and the European Union for 2017. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/pages/2017-agreed-record-eu- norway-north-sea-12-2016.pdf

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12.9 Discard Policy AFMA. (2012a). North West Slope Trawl Fishery BYCATCH AND DISCARDING, 1–8. AFMA. (2012b). Western Deepwater Trawl Fishery BYCATCH AND DISCARDING. AFMA. (2013). Australian sub-Antarctic fisheries Bycatch and discarding workplan, (March). Retrieved from http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Bycatch-and-discard-workplan- 2013-2.pdf Branch, T. A., & Hilborn, R. (2008). Matching catches to quotas in a multispecies trawl fishery: targeting and avoidance behavior under individual transferable quotas. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 65(7), 1435–1446. Condie, H. M., Grant, A., & Catchpole, T. L. (2014). Incentivising selective fishing under a policy to ban discards; lessons from European and global fisheries. Marine Policy, 45, 287–292. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.09.001 DFO. (2012). Stock Assessment for the inside population of Yelloweye Rockfish (Sebastes ruberrimus) In British Columbia, Canada for 2010. (No. 2011/084). DFO Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Sci. Advis. Rep. (Vol. 2011/084). Retrieved from http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Library/346394.pdf DFO. (2015a). Stock Assessment for the outside population of Yelloweye Rockfish (Sebastes ruberrimus) In British Columbia, Canada for 2014. DFO Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Sci. Advis. Rep., 2015/060(December), 13. DFO. (2015b). YELLOWTAIL ROCKFISH (SEBASTES FLAVIDUS) STOCK ASSESSMENT FOR THE COAST OF BRITISH COLUMBIA , CANADA (No. 2015/010). Retrieved from http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/mpo-dfo/Fs70-6-2015-010-eng.pdf Driscoll, J., Robb, C., & Bodtker, K. (2009). Bycatch in Canada’s Pacific Groundfish Bottom Trawl Fishery. Retrieved from http://www.deslibris.ca/ID/230690 EC. (2011). Impact Assessment of Discard Reducing Policies Draft Final Report, (June), 125. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/case_study_en.pdf Gezelius, S. S. (2008). Management responses to the problem of incidental catch in fishing: A comparative analysis of the EU, Norway, and the Faeroe Islands. Marine Policy, 32(3), 360–368. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2007.08.008 Gilman, E. L., Dalzell, P., & Martin, S. (2006). Fleet communication to abate fisheries bycatch. Marine Policy, 30(4), 360–366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2005.06.003 Grafton, R. Q., Nelson, H. W., & Turris, B. R. (2005). How to Resolve the Class II Common Property Problem? The Case of British Columbia’s Multi-Species Groundfish Trawl Fishery. Network, (3). Graham, N., Ferro, R. S. T., Karp, W. a, & MacMullen, P. (2007). Fishing practice, gear design, and the ecosystem approach - three case studies demonstrating the effect of management strategy on gear selectivity and discards. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64, 744–750. Harrington, J. M., Myers, R. a, & Rosenberg, a a. (2005). Wasted fishery resources: discarded by catch in the USA. Fish and Fisheries, 6(4), 350–361. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-2979.2005.00201.x Hegland, T. J., & Hopkins, C. (2014). Towards a new fisheries effort management system for the Faroe Islands? - Controversies around the meaning of fishing sustainability. Maritime Studies, 13(1), 12. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40152-014-0012-7 ICES. (2011). Report of the ICES Advisory Committee. Løkkegaard, J., Andersen, J. L., Boje, J., Frost, H., & Hovgård, H. (2007). Report on the Faroese fisheries regulation: the Faroe model. Cophenhagen.

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MRAG. (2007). Impact assessment of discard policy for specific fisheries (Studies and Pilot Projects for Carrying out the Common Fisheries Policy No. FISH/2006/17). NAFO (2104) Bycatch and Discard reporting in NAFO fishing operations. NAFO/FC Doc 14/31, serieal No. N6401. https://www.nafo.int/Portals/0/PDFs/fc/2014/fcdoc14-31.pdf?ver=2016-02-19- 063603-420 NPFMC. (2016). Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Report for the Groundfish Resources of the Gulf of Alaska. NPFMC Report. Retrieved from http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2016/GOAintro.pdf Palsson, O. K. (2009). Discards in demersal Icelandic fisheries 2009. Marine Research in Iceland, 154, 21. Petter Johnsen, J., & Eliasen, S. (2011). Solving complex fisheries management problems: What the EU can learn from the Nordic experiences of reduction of discards. Marine Policy, 35(2), 130–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2010.08.011 Sanchirico, J. N., Holland, D., Quigley, K., & Fina, M. (2006). Catch-quota balancing in multispecies individual fishing quotas. Marine Policy, 30(6), 767–785. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2006.02.002 Sigler, M. F., & Lunsford, C. R. (2001). Effects of individual quotas on catching efficiency and spawning potential in the Alaska sablefish fishery. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 58(7), 1300–1312. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/documents/7_sigurjonsson.pdf STECF. (2006). Discards from community vessels report of the scientific, technical and economic committee for fisheries (STECF). STECF Reports. Van Eckhaute, L.; Gavaris, S. and Stone H.H. (2005) Estimation of Cod, Haddock and Yellowtail Flounder Discards from the Canadian Georges Bank Scallop Fishery for 1960 to 2004. Trans-boundary Resource Assessment Committee Reference Document 2005/02. http://www.bio.gc.ca/info/intercol/trac-cert/documents/ref/TRD_2005_02_E.pdf

12.10 Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management Ainley, D., Adams, P. & Jahncke, J., 2014. Towards Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management in the California Current System – Predators and the Preyscape: A Workshop Report to National Fish and Wildlife Foundation. Workshop Report to National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, (March). Australian Fisheries Management Authority, 2013. Small Pelagic Fishery Harvest Strategy. , (April), p.14. Aydin, K. et al., 2007. Aleutian Islands Fishery Ecosystem Plan. , (December), p.198. Bianchi, G. & Skjoldal, H.R., 2009. The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries. FAO, p.378. Biedron, I.S. & Knuth, B.A., 2016. Toward shared understandings of ecosystem-based fisheries management among fishery management councils and stakeholders in the US Mid-Atlantic and New England regions. Marine Policy, 70, pp.40–48. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.04.010. Bowen, W.D., McMillan, J. & Mohn, R., 2003. Sustained exponental population growth of grey seals at Sable Island, Nova Scotia. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 60(3), pp.1352–1360. Available at: http://icesjms.oxfordjournals.org/content/60/6/1352.short. Cheung, W., Lam, V. & Watson, R., 2009. Projecting Global Marine Biodiversity Impacts under Climate Change Scenarios. , (February 2017).

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Cryer, M., Mace, P.M. & Sullivan, K.J., 2016. New Zealand’s ecosystem approach to fisheries management. Fisheries Oceanography, 25(April), pp.57–70. DFO, 2017. Pacific North Coast Integrated Management Area Plan. , pp.604–666. Available at: http://www.pncima.org/media/documents/2016-plan/2316-dfo-pncima-report-v17- optimized.pdf. Field, J.C. & Francis, R.C., 2006. Considering ecosystem-based fisheries management in the California Current. Marine Policy, 30(5), pp.552–569. Fletcher, W.J. et al., 2016. Refinements to harvest strategies to enable effective implementation of Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management for the multi-sector, multi-species fisheries of Western Australia. Fisheries Research, 183, pp.594–608. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2016.04.014. Fletcher, W.R.J., 2015. Review and refinement of an existing qualitative risk assessment method for application within an ecosystem-based management framework. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 72, pp.1043–1056. Gullestad, P. et al., 2017. Towards ecosystem-based fisheries management in Norway – Practical tools for keeping track of relevant issues and prioritising management efforts. Marine Policy, 77(August 2016), pp.104–110. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.11.032. Holsman, K.K., Ianelli, J.N. & Aydin, K., 2016. Multi-species Stock Assessment for walleye pollock , Pacific cod , and arrowtooth flounder in the Eastern Bering Sea. NPFMC Report, (November). Available at: https://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/stocks/plan_team/EBSmultispp.pdf. Link, J.S. et al., 2011. Ecosystem-based fisheries management in the Northwest Atlantic. Fish and Fisheries, 12(2), pp.152–170. Lynam, C.P. et al., 2016. Uses of innovative modelling tools within the implementation of the marine strategy framework directive. Front. Mar. Sci., 3(September), p.182. Ministry of Fisheries, 2009. Fisheries 2030: New Zealands maximising benefits from the use of fisheries within environmental limits, Available at: http://fs.fish.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/4DD60325-CADD- 4E5C-92BF-A6E17C202A54/0/fisheries2030report.pdf. Morishita, J., 2008. What is the ecosystem approach for fisheries management? Marine Policy, 32(1), pp.19–26. Patrick, W.S. & Link, J.S., 2015. Hidden in plain sight: Using optimum yield as a policy framework to operationalize ecosystem-based fisheries management. Marine Policy, 62, pp.74–81. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.08.014. PFMC, 2016. Comprehensive ecosystem-based amendment 1: Protectiong unfished and unmanaged forgage fish species of the U. S. portion of the California Current Ecosystem. , 97220(503). Available at: http://www.westcoast.fisheries.noaa.gov/publications/fishery_management/ecosystem/ceba1 _ea_final_march2016.pdf. Pikitch, E.K. et al., 2004. Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management. Science, 305(5682), p.346 LP-347. Available at: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/305/5682/346.abstract. Pitcher, T.J. et al., 2009. An evaluation of progress in implementing ecosystem-based management of fisheries in 33 countries. Marine Policy, 33(2), pp.223–232. Rossberg, A.G. et al., 2017. Quantitative criteria for choosing targets and indicators for sustainable use of ecosystems. Ecological Indicators, 72, pp.215–224. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2016.08.005.

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Scandol, J.P. et al., 2005. Ecosystem-based fisheries management: An Australian perspective. Aquatic Living Resources, 18(3), pp.261–273. Available at: http://www.alr- journal.org/10.1051/alr:2005031. Sloan, S. et al., 2014. National Guidelines to Develop Fishery Harvest Strategies, Tallis, H. et al., 2010. The many faces of ecosystem-based management: Making the process work today in real places. Marine Policy, 34(2), pp.340–348. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2009.08.003. Witherell, D., Pautzke, C. & Fluharty, D.L., 2000. An ecosystem-based approach for Alaska groundfish fisheries. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 57(3), pp.771–777. WWF, 2002. Policy proposals and operational guidance for ecosystem-based management of marine capture fisheries, WWF NZ, 2015. WWF NZ Submission on the Review of the New Zealand Fisheries Management System. , (December), pp.1–25. Zador, S., 2015. Ecosystem Considerations. North Pacific Fishery Management Council Report, p.235. Zhang, C., Chen, Y. & Ren, Y., 2016. An evaluation of implementing long-term MSY in ecosystem-based fisheries management: Incorporating trophic interaction, bycatch and uncertainty. Fisheries Research, 174, pp.179–189. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2015.10.007.

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