Why Did the Cod Wars Occur and Why Did Iceland Win Them? a Test of Four Theories
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Why Did the Cod Wars Occur and Why Did Iceland Win Them? A Test of Four Theories Sverrir Steinsson MA Thesis in International Affairs School of Social Sciences June 2015 Why Did the Cod Wars Occur and Why Did Iceland Win Them? A Test of Four Theories Sverrir Steinsson MA Thesis in International Affairs Advisors: Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir and Guðni Th. Jóhannesson Faculty of Political Science School of Social Sciences University of Iceland June 2015 This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs at the University of Iceland. This thesis cannot be reproduced without the author’s consent. © Sverrir Steinsson 2015 090390-3689 Reykjavík, Iceland 2015 Abstract Few attempts have been made to provide theoretical explanations for the occurrence and outcomes of the Cod Wars. In this thesis, I test hypotheses derived from four IR theories and perspectives on the Cod Wars: the Rationalist Explanations for War perspective, which sees information problems, commitment problems and issue indivisibility as drivers of conflict; Liberal IR theory, which expects democracy, commercial ties, and institutions as pacifying influences; Structural Realism, which expects states to pursue their security interests; and Neoclassical Realism, which expects statesmen’s pursuit of security interests to be distorted by domestic pressures. I find that Liberal and Structuralist Realist expectations were not met, that rational miscalculation and misinformation contributed to the occurrence of the disputes, and Neoclassical Realist expectations were fully met in all of the disputes. Following these tests, I provide a new, structurally informed explanation of the Cod Wars. The disputes occurred due to powerful domestic pressures on statesmen to escalate. As the disputes escalated and security interests were put at greater risk, British statesmen were able to make greater concessions due to weaker domestic constraints than those faced by Icelandic leaders. Iceland therefore reached a highly favorable agreement in all Cod Wars. 3 Preface This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs at the University of Iceland. It comprises 30 ECTS credits. My gratitude goes to my instructors, Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir and Guðni Th. Jóhannesson, for advice and constructive comments. I would also like to thank Bradley Thayer, Erla Hlín Hjálmarsdóttir, Ólafur Darri Björnsson and Þorsteinn Kristinsson for constructively commenting on drafts of this thesis. All remaining errors are my own. I gratefully acknowledge the University of Iceland Research Fund for supporting this project with a grant. 4 Table of Contents Abstract................................................................................................................................................... 3 Preface.................................................................................................................................................... 4 List of Tables........................................................................................................................................... 6 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 7 2 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 12 3 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................................. 15 3.1 Realism ................................................................................................................................. 15 3.2 Liberalism.............................................................................................................................. 22 3.3 Constructivism....................................................................................................................... 25 3.4 The “Rationalist Explanations for War” Perspective.............................................................. 27 4 The Cod Wars............................................................................................................................... 29 4.1 Theories on the Cod Wars .................................................................................................... 29 4.2 The Dispute of 1952-56......................................................................................................... 34 4.2.1 The Costs and Risks of No Agreement .................................................................... 35 4.2.2 Testing the REW Dispute Hypothesis ....................................................................... 37 4.2.3 Testing the Liberal Dispute Hypothesis .................................................................... 39 4.2.4 Testing the Structural Realist Dispute Hypothesis .................................................... 42 4.2.5 Testing the Neoclassical Realist Dispute Hypothesis ............................................... 44 4.2.6 Testing the Outcome Hypotheses............................................................................. 45 4.3 The First Cod War................................................................................................................. 47 4.3.1 The Costs and Risks of No Agreement .................................................................... 48 4.3.2 Testing the REW Dispute Hypothesis ....................................................................... 49 4.3.3 Testing the Liberal Dispute Hypothesis..................................................................... 51 4.3.4 Testing the Structural Realist Dispute Hypothesis .................................................... 56 4.3.5 Testing the Neoclassical Realist Dispute Hypothesis ............................................... 58 4.3.6 Testing the Outcome Hypotheses............................................................................. 60 4.4 The Second Cod War............................................................................................................ 62 4.4.1 The Costs and Risks of No Agreement .................................................................... 63 4.4.2 Testing the REW Dispute Hypothesis ....................................................................... 63 4.4.3 Testing the Liberal Dispute Hypothesis..................................................................... 65 4.4.4 Testing the Structural Realist Dispute Hypothesis .................................................... 68 4.4.5 Testing the Neoclassical Realist Dispute Hypothesis ............................................... 68 4.4.6 Testing the Outcome Hypotheses............................................................................. 73 4.5 The Third Cod War................................................................................................................ 75 4.5.1 The Costs and Risks of No Agreement..................................................................... 76 4.5.2 Testing the REW Dispute Hypothesis ....................................................................... 77 4.5.3 Testing the Liberal Dispute Hypothesis..................................................................... 79 4.5.4 Testing the Structural Realist Dispute Hypothesis .................................................... 81 4.5.5 Testing the Neoclassical Realist Dispute Hypothesis ............................................... 82 4.5.6 Testing the Outcome Hypotheses............................................................................. 84 5 Explaining the Cod Wars .............................................................................................................. 87 6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 92 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 96 5 List of Tables Table 3.1.1 Classical Realism, Structural Realism and Neoclassical Realism ............................... 20 Table 3.1.2 Structural Realist and Neoclassical Realist Expectations of the Cod Wars................. 22 Table 5.1 Options for British Statesmen ...................................................................................... 90 Table 5.2 Options for Icelandic Statesmen .................................................................................. 91 Table 6.1 Findings for Dispute and Outcome Hypotheses .......................................................... 93 6 1. Introduction In 1976, Iceland’s exclusive economic zone extended to 200 nautical miles after a highly favorable resolution to the Third Cod War. This Cod War was the last of four post-WWII disputes in which Iceland and the UK incurred great costs and risks to achieve their preferred delimitation and fishing rights in the waters off the shores of Iceland.1 The first Anglo- Icelandic post-WWII dispute over fishery limits occurred in 1952-56 over Iceland’s unilateral extension from 3 to 4 nautical miles.2 The second dispute, referred to as the First Cod War, occurred in 1958-61 and revolved around Iceland’s unilateral extension from 4 to 12 miles.3 The Second (1972-73) and Third Cod Wars (1975-76) revolved around Iceland’s unilateral extensions from 12 to 50 miles,