Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies

Volume 10 Article 7

12-1-1992

Soviet Third World Policy Dilemmas and Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict

Deven Ogden

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma

Recommended Citation Ogden, Deven (1992) "Soviet Third World Policy Dilemmas and Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict," Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies: Vol. 10 , Article 7. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol10/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Soviet Third World Policy Dilemmas and Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict

by Deven Ogden

The recent resolution of the Cambodian problems that have lingered since after World War II are generally looked on as the product of American and Chinese action. However, Soviet policy also had a significant impact on recent developments. By encouraging Vietnamese withdrawl from and by dramatically reducing foreign aid to Cambodia, the was able to exert influence on Cambodia to settle the deeply rooted problems of the country.

For decades Cambodia has been the was 's "Vietnam." Since the with­ battleground of the Soviet Union, drawal, the parties have made significant , and the who have been progress toward a comprehensive peace the advocates of the various Cambodian settlement in the region. All four factions have contingents. Vietnam, one of the Soviet's most agreed to an enhanced UN involvement in the dependent clients, invaded Cambodia in the settlement. The will play an last weeks of 1978, ousting the genocidal unprecedented role as it will dismantle the from power . Yet, supported government and replace the by the Chinese, the Khmer Rouge were able bureaucracy with its own personnel and to maintain a significant resistance force to peacekeeping troops until UN-supervised fight a that has only recently come elections democratically empower a new to a cease-fire. To complicate matters, the neutral government. US revived two non-communist Cambodian When the UN first proposed its resistance factions in protest to the Vietnamese comprehensive settlement, the invasion. In 1982, these two factions--Ied by government in Phnom Penh strongly opposed Prince Sihanouk, former head of state of it as it highly disadvantaged his government. Cambodia during the 1950s and 60s, and Son As late as December 1990, Hun Sen expressed Sann, Sihanouk's fonner prime minister-joined his contempt for such an imbalanced plan: with the Khmer Rouge in the resistance effort against the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin The Prime Minister said that his government regime. will never consent to the presence in Cambodia of a large UN peacekeeping force and will not The Cambodian civil war raged on for agree to replacing the present administration with years until finally, in 1989, Vietnam surprised a "UN transitional authority,· much less to the world by announcing that it would with­ dissolving the legitimately functioning current draw all its troops from Cambodia by 1990. government before elections are held, which is In fact, it was in September of 1989 that essentially what the opposition is seeking (Vinogradov 1990). claimed that all its troops had indeed with­ drawn. What Vietnam had been to the US Hun Sen continued to make such protests in 1973 when the US withdrew its troops, throughout the various negotiations in 1991. Cambodia was to Vietnam in 1989--Cambodia ,

PSA Review 68

Yet on October 23, Hun Sen signed the peace The chronic economic decline in the treaty that set into action the very operations Soviet Union has affected its foreign policy he vowed he would never consent to. in that the Soviets can no longer afford to Several explanations have been given sustain the massive foreign aid programs it why Vietnam decided to unilaterally withdraw had once implemented in the Third World: its troops and why Phnom Penh conceded to the UN operation. Most of the analyses focus The Soviets had learned that counterinsurgency on the US and Chinese involvement in the problems in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and crisis and the effects of their foreign policy. Nicaragua exacerbated risks of getting in vol ved in a client state, meant sinking excessive US and Chinese policies focused on isolating investments into unsteady political systems, and­ Vietnam and Cambodia politically and consequently--worsened economic problems economically and supporting the resistance within the world socialist system (Goodman forces in an attempt to compel Vietnamese 1991,52). withdrawal and compromise in peace negotia­ tions. However, most of these studies pay Gorbachev formally recognized the problem little attention to the significant role played with his government's foreign aid program by the Soviets in influencing Vietnam to by issuing a decree on July 24, 1990 man­ undertake an -like withdrawal. dating major foreign aid reforms. Though While the resistance movement and the the Vietnamese withdrawal had already taken isolation and pressure imposed by the US and place by the time Soviet aid was cut, it had China have certainly been major factors been foreseen for some time and had been a bringing about the Vietnamese withdrawal and considerable threat for Vietnam and Cambodia the resulting peace process, they are not the to depend solely on the Soviet Union. It only factors. The Soviet's role in influencing became clear that they would have to bring the Vietnamese withdrawal and Phnom Penh's about political and economic changes that cooperation in the peace process will be the would allow them to integrate with the free focus of this study as a contributing explana­ market economies of the world. Vietnam's tion. occupation of Cambodia and the continuing Many fmd it unthinkable to believe that factional stalemate was, of course, a major the Soviet Union would undermine its own obstacle to this objective. Politically, the client state by encouraging it to cooperate in Soviet Union had suffered greatly in Asia and a peace settlement that would almost certainly elsewhere for Vietnam's occupation of eliminate it froin power or at least diminish Cambodia. The conflict threatened to increase its power profoundly. However, considering a US presence in the region, strengthened the political, economic, and social changes Sino-US ties, and eliminated any chances for that have had such a profound impact on the improved relations with ASEAN, the US. and Soviet Union since 1985, a dramatic change China. The entire political environment was in its foreign policy can also be expected. very dismal for the USSR's broader strategic In fact, the Soviet Union had been experienc­ objectives: ing severe dilem mas in the Third World for The Soviets found themselves at a disadvanw~~ some time. Gorbachev is responsible for many in Asia as China normalized relations with th~ policy reforms which were undertaken to deal United States and Iapan ... The USSR, for th~ with these dilemmas which fall into two most part, was excluded from the diplomatl( categories: economic and political. activity and burgeoning economic development of the region, perceived by Asian states as d Ogden 69

European power with threatening military assets stude~ts and intellectuals in Hong Kong to in the Pacific (Goodman 1991, 107-8) organIze the Indochina Communist Party (ICP)" (Isaacs et al 1987, 18). The Soviet It is the economic and political disad­ supported ICP was active in Cambodia as well vantages that provided the incentives for the but was mostly supported by Vietnames~ Soviet ~ nion to take such a provocative policy Cambodians. This was the beginning of Soviet stance In pressuring Vietnam to withdraw and involvement in Cambodia. allow a political settlement to take place in 1941 was a significant year in Cam­ Cambodia. The focus of this study will be ~ia for two important events that took place. on these incentives and the impact they had FIrst, the French picked the next king of on Soviet policy, how that policy was imple­ Cambodia, and the 18-year-old Norodom mented toward Vietnam and Cambodia and Sihanouk (the great-grandson of King Noro­ how it contributed to the eventual Vietna;"ese dom) ascended the throne. Later that same withdrawal and the progress toward a compre­ y~, France was invaded by Hitler's army. hensive settlement between the warring WIth the French administration of Cambodia Cambodian factions. in disarray, Japan invaded and occupied the colony, but allowed the French administration The Cambodian Conflict to continue operating. When the Japanese surrendered in 1945, King Sihanouk declared The Cambodian conflict has dragged independence. However, when the Allied on for decades and therefore has a large occupation forces left Cambodia, they restored ~umber of significant events that have shaped control of the country back to the French. It over the years. It is a very complex conflict The Cambodian people, and especially with divers actors, as can be attested to by Sihanouk, felt betrayed by the West. the fact that at the 1991 Paris Conference In Vietnam, after had where the peace treaty was finally signed, the already declared independence, the country four Cambodian factions were accompanied was restored to French rule. When Ho had by .1 ~ other countries who were integral d~l~~ independence, he made very strong partIcIpants to the negotiations. To be able sollcltatlOns toward the US, but was disap­ to understand and analyze the conflict and the pointed when the US allowed France to resume Soviet Union's role in that conflict, a review control of the country. The result was the of the events and actors that shaped it will be French-Indochina War which the French lost necessary. ~o Ho's Vietminh forces in a humiliating defeat During France's occupation of Indo­ In 1953 at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. Both china, students from all three colonies were China and the Soviet Union had supported the able to s~udy in France. In the early 1900s, Vietnamese in the war against the French. was the ideological fashion in The USSR provided some $365 million in aid France, and the Indochinese students were while Chinese aid totalled nearly $460 million. ~utomatically attracted to this anti-imperialistic However, it was probably because of China's Ideology. The most prominent of these ext~n.sive aid that Vietnam began seeking communist students was Nguyen Ai Quoc a addltlOnal dependence on the Soviets: Vietnamese activist who later became kno~n as Ho Chi Minh. During the 1920s Ho " ' The massive support that the Chinese provided worked as a Communist bureaucrat in to the Vietnamese exacerbated the dilemma of Moscow and elsewhere. Then, on February their relationship with China. The Vietnamese 3, 1930, he met with other Vietnamese Communists perceived that revolutionary debts PSA Review 70

can be weapons of exploitation in the hands of mained to continue the . This the Chinese which made it necessary for them younger group, headed by Saloth Sar (later to seek compensating support from the Soviet Union" (Buszynski 1986, 151). known as ), , and who had been fellow students in At the same time, King Sihanouk was leading France, formed a new party in 1960. As a his "Royal Crusade for Independence" in result of their disillusionment of Vietnam and Cambodia. Through some shrewd political the Soviets, this reorganized Khmer Rouge manipulation, Sihanouk was able to eliminate sought China's support, and when Sino-Soviet his opponents to become the prominent relations disintegrated, the Khmer Rouge sided nationalist leader and obtain the country's with the Chinese. On the other hand, the independence from France. Soviets had always strongly supported Ho Chi Minh, and so when the split occurred, Vietnam Sihanouk and Communist Insure;ency naturally went to the Soviet side. The Geneva Accords of 1954 divided Sihanouk set up a neutral government Vietnam into North and South, but required so as not to alienate either communist or elections the next year to reunite the country Western powers. The prime minister, Penh under a democratically elected government. Nouth stated in 1953: "Although we are not However, the Diem regime in the South communists, we do not oppose communism refused to comply, and the US expressed its as long as the latter is not to be imposed on support by funneling aid to the government. our people by force from outside" (Basu 1987, As a result, the Vietminh set out on a crusade 15). In fact, Cambodia tried to maintain good to unite the country under communism by relations with both China and the Soviet Union force, and thus the began. at the beginning of their disputes. However, Before long, the Vietnam War spilled it was clear that China played a much more over into Cambodia. As Vietminh transported significant role in Cambodia. It is during this supplies to the Vietcong along the Ho Chi period, however, that communist Minh Trail through Cambodia, ­ began taking place in Cambodia--the Khmer ese troops (often accompanied by US troops) Rouge started their guerrilla activities against began several incursions into Cambodian the Sihanouk government. territory. US bombing campaigns in Cambodia At the time Cambodia gained its were soon to follow. These bombings were independence, the Khmer Rouge made up only not confined to the jungles, but were carried a small rag-tag organization. They had been out in central population centers as well. supported by the Soviets and trained by the Moreover, US bombing campaigns in Cambo­ Vietnamese. However, at the Geneva Confer­ dia exceeded the magnitude of the US bomb­ ence on Indochina of 1954, the Soviets ings in Iraq. provided for a withdrawal of Vietminh troops The Cambodian people blamed Siha­ from Cambodia. The Soviets generally nouk for not being able to stop the bombings. considered the Cambodian communists too Subsequently, civilians in the country side insignificant among the Indochinese commu­ became more sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge, nists (Basu, 1987, p. 15). and the communists were able to make some As the Vietminh withdrew back into very strategic advances. Sihanouk's cabinet , most of the old-guard of the began to doubt his ability to resolve the crisis, Cambodian communist party went with them. so on March 18, 1970, while Sihanouk was But the younger and more reactionary re- on a diplomatic visit abroad, the defense Ogden 71 minister, , staged a coup and deposed Penh by early 1975. On , the Lon the prince. Nol government surrendered to the Khmer Sihanouk's main enemies during his Rouge. Once in power, the Khmer Rouge years in power were the communist insurgents. established the government of Democratic Yet only a few days after the coup, Sihanouk Kampuchea (DK). The Khmer Rouge insti­ announced the formation of the United Front tuted brutal Marxist agrarian reforms, and only with the Khmer Rouge to oppose the Lon Nol a few days after they captured Phnom Penh, regime. Considering Sihanouk's anti-commu­ they emptied the city and forced its residents nist past, it is difficult to understand why he into the countryside to work on state forced­ allied himself with the Khmer Rouge, his labor farms. The Party set out to purify former enemies. Betrayed by his own cabinet society from "corruption," especially religion and by the West, Sihanouk really had no one and Western institutions. Schools, libraries, else to tum to. All of these events forced him and ancient Buddhist temples were destroyed. closer to the Khmer Rouge who had imme­ All forms of Western technology were diately begun wooing the prince upon his being deplored and forbidden including televisions, ousted. Sihanouk later would join with the radios, trucks, and even farm tractors. All Khmer Rouge again in 1982 in a coalition were destroyed or abandoned. Power sources government that would represent the r€:Sistance and even water and sewage systems were to the Soviet-backed Heng Samrin regime. destroyed. Currency, markets, and financial For several more years, Soviet in­ institutions were abolished and industries were volvement in Cambodia would be limited until abandoned. the Vietnamese invasion in 1978. However, A program of autogenocide was several important events led up to the invasion, implemented aimed at the intellectual, mer­ but which exceed the scope of this study. chant, and elite classes who were considered Following Sihanouk's ouster, the Lon Nol unreformably corrupt. Even people who regime controlled Cambodia from 1970 to simply wore glasses were murdered. Children 1975. That corrupt regime, however, was were stripped from their parents and sent to displaced by the brutal Khmer Rouge which work on youth farms where they were controlled Cambodia up until the Vietnamese indoctrinated and forced to hard labor. Over invasion. Details of these two governments one million people were killed by starvation, will not be discussed in detail here because disease, and mass execution. Large interroga­ the Soviet Union had little influence with either tion and torture centers were set up where regime. hundreds of thousands were systematically The pro-US Lon Nol government--the murdered. During the Khmer Rouge days, Republic of Cambodia (RC)--was quickly some 400,000 Cambodians fled to Vietnam recognized by the US, and a river of US aid and . The magnitude of the slaughter gushed into the country. The Khmer Rouge and devastation caused by the Khmer Rouge immediately began a major offensive against is hard to comprehend. the Lon Nol government, starting a bloody, Part of Pol Pot's plan to restore the five-year civil war that left millions of ancient Khmer glory was to reclaim its ancient Cambodians homeless. US bombings in territory of the Mekhong delta in southern Cambodia continued until 1973 when the US Vietnam. Pol Pot called for the "liberation" began to pull out of Indochina. of southern Vietnam and heavy fighting on Khmer Rouge troops managed to the Vietnamese border began as Khmer Rouge capture the countryside and beseige Phnom troops launched numerous cross-border raids. PSA Review 72

Over 500,000 Vietnamese were forced to leave In 1982, with pressure from the US their homes because of the fighting (Mys­ and China, the two non-communist factions liewiec 1988, xxi). In response to these joined with the Khmer Rouge in an uneasy continued attacks over three years, and with coalition in opposition to the PRK and Soviet approval, Vietnam invaded Cambodia Vietnamese occupation forces. The coalition and ousted the was named the Coalition Government of government on December 25, 1978. The fact Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) reflecting that these border attacks took place, and the dominance of the Khmer Rouge which has therefore, that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia consistently had more than twice the number was provoked, is not well known. Throughout of troops as the two non-communist factions the following years, the Soviet Union would combined. Sihanouk became the president, continue to profess the legitimacy of the Khieu Samphan (Khmer Rouge) became the Phnom Penh regime and would engross itself vice-president, and (KPNLF) became in massive aid to Vietnam and Cambodia. the prime minister. Though all three factions were under the presidency of Sihanouk, they The PRK and the CGDK each retained their autonomous nature. The coalition was given the DK's seatin the UN. In , the Vietnamese, with In 1985, a full-force Vietnamese Soviet backing, established the communist offensive overran all of the resistance bases People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with within Cambodia, and the CGDK forces along Heng Samrin as president and Hun Sen as with 250,000 civilians were forced across the foreign minister (who in 1987 became prime border into Thailand. Eight enclosed camps minister). Heng Samrin and Hun Sen were, were set up near the border within shelling as were many officials of the PRK, former range of the Vietnamese army, each under Khmer Rouge officials, but part of a faction control of one of the CGDK factions. In that remained loyal to Vietnam after the split. September, the Khmer Rouge announced the Both had been regional officials in the DK, retirement of Pol Pot in order to bolster but took part in an unsuccessful uprising waning international support. Though it was against the Pol Pot regime in 1978, before clear that Pol Pot still controlled the faction, defecting to Vietnam. to their satisfaction they were able to get what Later in 1979, a new guerrilla force they wanted. Following the 1985 Vietnamese opposing the. PRK was formed: the Khmer offensive which nearly disabled the resistance, People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the US Congress debated the issue, then headed by Son Sann, one of Sihanouk' s former approved a substantial non-lethal aid package mInIsters. Thailand supported the non­ to the CGDK. communist force and armed its troops. In another two years, in 1981, Prince Sihanouk The Beginnings of Refonn returned from China and united several small pro-Sihanouk resistance factions into the For the Soviets, 1985 was a landmark Sihanoukist National Anny (ANS) and founded year with the arrival of Gorbachev to power a political organization that would control the and the commencement of and army--the United National Front for an . Gorbachev began to reevaluate Independent, Peaceful, and Cooperative Soviet policy in the Third World, especially Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola. The costs of maintaining sponsorship of these Ogden 73 movements had severely drained Soviet coffers SOC as soon as it complied with UN resolu­ and limited its political objectives in other tions, namely, withdrawal of all foreign troops areas. Gorbachev set out to resolve these long and permitting UN-supervised elections. term conflicts with the anticipation that the Soviet efforts to persuade Hanoi and "withdrawal from Afghanistan in addition to Phnom Penh to undertake a withdrawal just the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia as the Soviets had done in Afghanistan did and Cuban withdrawal from Angola will pay not have much success until 1987 when Hun dividends throughout Southwest and Southeast Sen agreed to participate in talks with the Asia, the Middle East and Africa" (Goodman resistance. This move was highly praised by 1991, 116). Gorbachev had a specific plan Moscow as an adoption of a reconciliation for Cambodia which he felt would end the policy which Moscow approved heartily conflict once and for all: (Duncan and Ekedahl 1990, 155). By this time, Soviet policy had made a major com­ The type of settlement Moscow envisioned in promise. In May 1987, at a dinner for Linh, 1985, however, was a non-aggression pact Gorbachev stated that the Cambodian problem: between Indochina and ASEAN. The war in Kampuchea [Cambodia) would then end because ASEAN and other outside parties would cease can only be solved proceeding from the highest interests of the Cambodian people and their aiding the Cambodian opposition groups. Vietnamese forces would withdraw from legitimate right to shape their destiny themselves, on the basis of the unification ofall their natioflill Cambodia, but the Heng Samrin government would remain in power. Moscow would not patrioticforces.(Katz 1989,51-52, italics added). even consider the possibility of its sharing power (Katz 1989,51). For the first time, the Soviets conceded to allow power sharing among the four Cambo­ In 1986, Nguyen Van Linh became the dian factions as part of the settlement. This head of Vietnam's Communist Party and in is evidence that the Gorbachev leadership had the spirit of Gorbachev's reforms began trying reduced its commitment in defending the pro­

to end Hanoi's international isolation, mainly Soviet regime in Phnom Penh. II As in caused by the Cambodian conflict. In 1987, Afghanistan, the cost to the Soviets of prop­ Hun Sen, the PRK foreign minister, was ping up the regime no longer appear[ed] worth appointed to the post of prime minister. He the effort" (Katz 1989, 52). undertook some dramatic reforms of the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze country, and before he had been in office a visited China in February 1989 and came to year he had led the country in an abandonment a momentous decision. The Soviets agreed of Marxism and in a new pursuit of a market that Vietnam would unilaterally withdraw its economy. However, he maintained the single troops from Cambodia with no conditions. party rule and close ties with Vietnam. In In April, Vietnam and Cambodia announced April 1989, the PRK changed its name to the that Vietnam would start immediately to State of Cambodia (SOC) reflecting its withdraw its troops and called for an end of abandonment of . Hun Sen's reforms foreign military aid to all sides and for an have improved the country's conditions international control mechanism to supervise immensely and have resulted in the SOC withdrawal and the end to foreign aid (Duncan gaining considerable legitimacy in the eyes and Ekedah11990, 156). This meeting came of the Cambodian people. Many nations such as a precursor to the Paris Conference on as began expressing to Hun Sen that Cambodia which took place in July 1989. their governments would like to recognize the PSA Review 74

The objective of the Paris Conference offensive against the SOc. Large chunks of was to negotiate the formation of a coalition northwestern Cambodia came under resistance government and to create an international control. However, most of the success was control mechanism that would verify troop achieved by the Khmer Rouge who began withdrawal and the end of weapon supplies forced repatriation of refugees into the newly from outside sources and to monitor democrat­ controlled areas: ic elections. The Conference failed on several issues, but mostly because China, the US, and From the murky claims and counterclaims, it ASEAN demanded a comprehensive settlement was difficult to pinpoint precisely what appre­ ciable gains had been made by any of the four while Phnom Penh refused to include the factions by the end of the dry season in May Khmer Rouge in an interim government. In 1990. Three conclusions seem valid: The Khmer addition, Vietnam was nearly finished with Rouge had given added proof of their superiority its withdrawal from Cambodia, and the resis­ on the battlefield, when they cared to demon­ tance was anxious to see if it could attain a strate it, and were building up their political and administrative infrastructure inside Cambodia; military victory. One member of the Sihanouk the noncommunist groups seemed somewhat delegation summed up the conferences' failure better organized and more effective militarily by stating: than in previous years but were tainted by their association with the Khmer Rouge and had We are deadlocked here because the military limited capability to affect events on the ground; situation is not decisive. If there is no result and although the SOC armed forces had not on the battlefield, there is no result at the collapsed under the CGDK's military pressure, negotiating table ... Hun Sen thinks he can still they were nonetheless hard pressed to fend off win the war. That is why he has made no attacks from a variety of quarters. These were concessions. When he is weak, he will negotiate some of the realities that had implications at the (United Nations Association 1991, 52). negotiating table. (United Nations Association 1991, 54) In September 1989, Vietnam finished withdrawing all of its troops from Cambodia, Development of a Comprehensive Political leaving the 45,000 troop SOC army and a Settlement poorly equipped militia behind to fend for itself against the 70,000 resistance guerrillas. This One of the first peace proposals for withdrawal was conducted unilaterally, without the Cambodian conflict was presented in 1981 UN-supervision as a UN resolution passed in after the International Conference on Kampu­ 1988 required. The resolution required that chea. ASEAN proposed a comprehensive the withdrawal be done under UN supervision settlement--ironically--very similar to the one and within the framework of a comprehensive that was finally adopted ten years later. The settlement. Once Vietnam completed its proposal involved UN-supervised disarmament withdrawal it requested a UN team to come of all Khmer factions, Vietnamese withdrawal, to Cambodia and verify that a complete and free elections involving all four factions. withdrawal had taken place. The UN refused However, at that time, both China and the US to do so unless it was within the framework opposed any proposal that would include the of a comprehensive settlement. The withdraw­ PRK in any power-sharing agreement or that al of Vietnamese troops has not been verified would in any way allow the Vietnamese­ to this day. installed government any legitimacy. The After the withdrawal, CaDK forces Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the PRK also experienced moderate success in a military rejected the plan because they opposed any role for the Khmer Rouge. Since then, several Ogden 75 proposals have been offered, but all have been capacity to the transitional authority. Howev­ rejected mainly over this issue of power­ er, this draft plan did not specify the scope sharing. China and the US would not accept of UN involvement in the administration of a power-sharing role for the PRK; Vietnam the government. and the PRK would not accept a power-sharing In a communique issued by the role for the Khmer Rouge; and Sihanouk, permanent five at their January 1990 meeting, China, and the US would not accept a settle­ they stated that "all Cambodians should enjoy ment without a role for the Khmer Rouge. the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities The result has been a stalemate in which no to participate in the election process" (United peace plan could succeed until there was a Nations Association 1991, 56). This statement substantial compromise. and the exclusion of the usual pledge regarding The Australians drew up a detailed draft a "non-return to the universally condemned proposal offering several configurations for policies and practices of the recent past" an enhanced UN role in a comprehensive indicate that the Khmer Rouge were given full settlement. The Australian proposal recog­ license to participate in the proposed elections. nized that the central challenge to a peace This may have been a "realistic acceptance settlement was the issue of power-sharing that the Khmer Rouge must be allowed to between the factions until a new government compete in elections so that their (presumed) could be elected. Therefore, the Australian defeat would allow China a graceful exit" proposal provided for the UN to create an (United Nations Association 1991, 56). international control mechanism that would At first, Vietnam and the Hun Sen involve a peacekeeping force and UN adminis­ regime strongly opposed any such UN tration of the country until a newly elected intervention that would violate its sovereignty government could replace it. In the meantime, and disregard its claimed legitimacy. Howev­ no single Cambodian party would be able to er, the Soviet Union was their main source determine the country's destiny. It provided of subsistence, and the Soviets had fully for important issues such as how to implement participated in drawing up the UN plan. The a cease-fire, how to run free elections, and Soviets obviously became concerned that the how to ensure a politically neutral administra­ Hun Sen government would not agree to a tion in the transition period. Shortly after settlement that the Soviets had a hand in Evans announced the Australian proposals, writing (Vinogradov 1990). With continued the five permanent members of the Security pressure from the Soviets, the Hun Sen Council adopted the issue onto their agenda. government yielded and agreed in principle to the UN plan. On January 15-16, 1990, the five The five permanent members of the permanent members of the Security Council, Security Council met again in March 1990 including the Soviets, met in Paris to examine and outlined the scope of involvement which the Australian proposals and write up a plan the UN was willing to take. This proposed based on its suggestions. The permanent five international control mechanism was to be draft included the formation of a Supreme called the UN Transitional Authority of National Council (SNC), a quadripartite body Cambodia (UNT AC). It proposed that the made up of representatives from each of the SNC would delegate to UNTAC all necessary four factions. The SNC would be the reposito­ powers to administer the government, but ry of Cambodian sovereignty, hold the seat would be consulted by and give advice to at the UN, and function in a delegative UNTAC. UNTAC would be headed by a PSA Review 76 special representative of the Secretary-General of the peace agreement. A cease-fire finally who would be given considerable powers over was implemented between the factions in May, Cambodian territory in order to protect the but both sides accused each other of violations. Cambodian people from economic and social In a meeting in June, all members of the SNC discrimination and protect their fundamental agreed to an indefinite cease-fire and to stop rights. accepting foreign arms. In July, Sihanouk Japan invited the Cambodian factions resigned from his post as head of FUNC­ to Tokyo on June 5, 1990 in order to decide INPEC to become the neutral leader of the on important issues of the settlement, partic­ SNC. A significant decision was reached by ularly the makeup of the SNC. Despite a the SNC in August in which it was decided Khmer Rouge boycott in protest over a to disband only 70% of current military forces diplomatic formality it did not approve of, the and put the remainder under UN control. In remaining parties were able to come to a September, the SNC resumed meetings in New decision on the SNC. It was agreed that the York where its members agreed to a com­ council would be made up of 12 representa­ promise system of elections providing for tives, six from the SOC and six from the three proportional representation that would allow resistance forces (two each). each faction places in the Parliament based In July 1990, US Secretary of State on its share of the popular vote. Finally, on James Baker announced a major policy October 23, 1991, the Paris Conference on reversal. Due to increased pressure at home, Cambodia was reconvened and the UN peace a realization that the Khmer Rouge could plan was signed by all four Cambodian parties possibly return to power, and the increased and 18 other involved nations ending more legitimacy of the Hun Sen government, the than 20 years of civil war. US retracted its recognition of the resistance coalition and opened talks with the SOC and Soviet Incentives for Concession Vietnam. Though this surprising reversal of US policy was popular in the US and other Examining the events and the in­ Western countries, it outraged the ASEAN volvement of the Soviets in the Cambodian nations who accused the US of trying to pull crisis, a major shift of policy has been the rug out from under its friends. On August identified where the Soviets began exerting 6, the US held its first talks with Vietnam on pressure on Vietnam and Phnom Penh to settle Cambodia, and then in September 6 with the the dispute. Most significant has been the SOC. Soviet's position as a permanent member of Through continued and difficult the UN Security Council and as a co-writer negotiations, the Cambodian factions finally of the UN peace plan. Though Phnom Penh came to an agreement on the UN plan. Then fervently resisted at first, it has conceded to on September 20, 1991, the Security Council Soviet pressures and has accepted the settle­ adopted resolution 668 showing unanimity and ment. A closer look at why the Soviets have support for the proposed expanded role of the made this policy change is warranted. UN in Cambodia. General Assembly resolu­ According to Kolodziej and Kanet there tion 45/3, adopted on October 15, 1990, are five main constraints to Soviet expansion showed the full support of the Assembly for in the Third World: Security Council resolution 668. During 1991, several events took place 1. Developing countries have an increas­ ing ability to resist subordination and making significant progress towards the signing Ogden 77

to manipulate the Soviets for their own nese economies which have stagnated and advantage. lacked significant development. 2. The Soviets have been checked by the economic and military power of the As was discussed above, the division US and its Western allies. between Soviet and Chinese communists caused 3. Divisions within the socialist camp-­ a multitude of problems for the Soviets in notably the Sino-Soviet split. Indochina. Its current dilemma in Cambodia 4. Receding relevance of the Soviet model is a product of that conflict with the Khmer to many Third World countries. 5. Scarce economic and technological Rouge in the Chinese camp, and the PRK in resources commanded by Moscow to the Soviet camp. However, since 1989, project its power and purposes abroad relations between the Soviets and China have (1989, xiii-xiv). warmed considerably. Their joint agreement in Beijing that Vietnam would withdraw from Developing countries have increased Cambodia and that all foreign military support their ability to resist subordination, not only to the Cambodian factions should end was a to the Soviets, but any country that might pose landmark decision. The fact that the Soviet's a threat. Small Third World countries have made most of the concessions is an indication taken a very aggressive posture in international that the Gorbachev government is anxious to organizations, particularly the UN. Through wrap up this drawn out conflict and move on bloc voting, the Third World has been able to more productive pursuits. to bring about several programs such as the The Third World perceives the Soviet UNO P that directly favor their particular needs Union as ideologically bankrupt. Marxism­ and often conflict with the interests of the Big Leninism is not widely perceived to apply to Powers. Not only have they been able to the conditions of developing countries today. protect themselves from subordination, but In addition, the economic problems that the they have been able to attain many objectives Soviet Union is facing at home has made it at the expense of the industrialized countries a non-model of economic development that (Bennett 1991, 291). In the case of Southeast is encouraging Third World countries to look Asia, Vietnam has been able to take consider­ for other models, mostly that of the US and able advantage of the Soviet Union. Vietnam's the NICs. The rapid economic development isolation from the rest of the world made it that occurred in the Soviet Union in its happier so that it could only trade with the CMEA days has all but ceased. Its inability to adjust countries. Its trade with the Soviets was highly to the needs and impulses of the day has imbalanced and the Soviets gained little more plowed its economic system into the ground. than an ideological victory in the aftermath This, obviously, is what the developing nations of the US-Vietnam War. are trying to avoid, not replicate. Though the Soviets have been able to Probably most significant of all these move into Vietnam after the US pulled out, issues is that scarce economic and techno­ the US military presence in nearby Philippines logical resources have become more scarce and elsewhere remained a continual threat to than ever in recent years and have eventually Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. The concl uded in the breakup of the Soviet Union. economic power of the US and its allies has Faced with this economic turmoil which has been a considerable constraint on Soviet impacted even Moscow, the Soviets can no expansion in the region. The isolation of longer afford the expansive aid commitments Cambodia and Vietnam by Western and to developing countries. In fact, this has been ASEAN countries has impoverished Indochi- a rising concern of the Soviets for some time PSA Review 78 and a major reevaluation of Soviet aid commit­ billion per year, a large portion of which goes ments and pTactices have been undertaken. to their military (Duncan and Ekedahl 1990, On June 13, 1990, the Supreme Soviet adopted 154). a resolution instructing the Council of Minis­ With the recent breakup of the Soviet ters "to work on cutting back the amount of Union, continued aid to Vietnam and Cam­ aid we give" (Arefyeva 1990). Arefyeva, a bodia is clearly at risk. However, in the years columnist for , summarized the debate leading up to the union's collapse, it would concerning the Supreme Soviet's resolution not have seemed likely for the Soviets to by stating: consider abandoning Indochina. Even so, it was obvious that the Soviets were anxious to I'd like to congratulate the Deputies on an reduce Indochina's dependency upon Soviet important step toward glasnost ... At the same resources, and tried to do so by three methods. time, however, one can only regret the fact that First, the Soviets tried to encourage more the question had been posed so narrowly and deals only with the volume of aid. For the efficient use of its aid and prompted Vietnam problem is not one of volume ... The essence of and Cambodia to pursue market economies. the problem lies elsewhere-namely, in the thrust Second, in order to reduce Vietnam and and objectives of our aid ... We should be talking Cambodia's dependency, the Soviets have tried about a full review of our aid policy, which to facilitate the integration of Indochina into would in turn lead to a reduction. At any rate, provided we base our reasoning not on ideology, the booming economic structure of the ASEAN as in the past, but on humanitarian considerations nations and make them eligible for internation­ and sober economic calculation (Arefyeva 1990). alloans. And third, in an attempt to improve their image in the region, the Soviets have This was followed by a decree from Gorbachev reduced their military presence in Southeast on July 24, 1990: Asia with a huge reduction of troops and navy at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. In implementing measures to further expand Previous to Gorbachev, the Soviets economic cooperation with developing countries, it is to base this cooperation on the principles underwrote the Vietnamese invasion of of mutual benefit and mutual interest, guided Cambodia. Soviet-bloc aid provided the by international norms and practice. It is to Phnom Penh regime with more than three­ proceed from the premise that economic aid must fourths of its budget. Recently, the Soviets be provided with due regard for our country's began cutting aid to Cambodia: "The USSR real capabilities (Gorbachev 1990). and Eastern European states are cutting economic aid to Cambodia and introducing When the head of the socialist countries 'pay-as-you-go' exchanges and loans payable department of the USSR Council of Ministers' in hard currency" (Goodman 1991, 180). This State Foreign Economic Council, V. Demchuk, changing-the-rules-of-the-game will make a was asked about Gorbachev's decree, he serious impact on Cambodia. Though Hun responded by saying that the main countries Sen had originally rejected the UN peace in concern were , Mongolia, and Viet­ settlement, the plan provided for a commitment nam. "Take Vietnam, for example," he said. of some 22 nations to aid Cambodia in its "One can cite a good many costly projects that reconstruction efforts--a very attractive offer were taken on without proper consideration, considering the fact that the Soviets could no resulting in the squandering of a lot of money" longer be counted on. With the breakup of (Romanyuk 1990). Vietnam possibly repre­ the Soviet Union after the attempted coup in sen ts the largest aid package the Soviets offer. August 1991, the SOC realized that a perma- It is estimated that Vietnam receives over $1.2

Ogden 79 nent cessation of Soviet aid was imminent and to the Cambodian crisis, which was used as it would have to make major concessions and the campaign for rapprochement. Soviet accept the UN plan which offered its only hope objectives with the ASEAN states has been of survival. to: Other factors responsible for the Soviet's eagerness for Vietnam and Phnom enhance its political image, increase its economic Penh to resolve the conflict through the UN participation in the region's rapid growth, plan are: 1) the Soviets could not foresee any facilitate the political and economic integration of the communist countries of the region into military solution to the problem, 2) US-Sino regional affairs (in order to reduce their reliance relations were strengthened against the Soviet on Moscow's largesse), and improve the environ­ Union largely because of the Cambodian ment for its own strategic objectives (Duncan conflict, and 3) the conflict prohibited rap­ and Ekedahl 1990, 157). prochement with ASEAN which Moscow saw as crucial for both the Soviet Union and for With a resolution to the Cambodian conflict, Indochina's integration into the regional and the Soviets would be able to pursue these global economy. objectives. Especially now with the breakup Considering the Soviet Union's wider of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis international objectives and its current eco­ they are facing, the Soviets more than ever nomic vulnerability, Moscow knew it would will need the support of ASEAN, the US, have to depend on international support. This China, as well as the rest of the international put military intervention of any sort out of the community. Thus, the Soviets have continued question. The hope of SOC troops obtaining to encourage and provide incentives for Hanoi a military victory on their own was not and Phnom Penh to submit to the provisions realistic after the fighting in 1990 ended in of the UN peace plan. stalemate that slightly favored the resistance. The only alternative was a peaceful settlement. Conclusion Poor SimrSoviet relations had for years hindered Soviet objectives in Asia, especially For years, the Cambodian conflict has when the US joined with China on the been a complex skein of contradicting interests Cambodian issue. For the last two decades , and violent confrontation. The Soviet Union no Asian country would want to increase stood opposed by the US and China who each Soviet presence for fear of antagonizing the supported different Cambodian contingents Chinese. [n 1989, Gorbachev made some in this very "international" civil war. But strong overtures to China by unilaterally since 1985, significant moves were made by meeting three of Beijing's conditions for Hanoi and Phnom Penh which allowed for a reconciliation: withdrawal from Afghanistan, comprehensive settlement to take place. First, Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and Vietnam withdrew all its troops in 1989. Then unilateral Soviet troop reductions on the Sino­ in 1991, Phnom Penh agreed to sign an un­ Soviet border (Goodman 1991, 110). precedented peace treaty ending the two In 1987, Gorbachev sent a strong decades of violence. message to ASEAN nations that it was Most of the analyses focusing on the committed to rapprochement. For the first recent developments of the Cambodian time ever, a Soviet Foreign Minister (Shev­ settlement have centered attention on the policy ardnadze) visited Thailand and . The implemented by the US and China and its visits were for the purpose of finding a solution impact on the decisions of Vietnam and PSA Review 80

Cambodia. However, they have neglected the international isolation in order to avoid fact that the Soviet Union, since 1985, has disaster. When the attempted coup in the played a major role in influencing those Soviet Union resulted in its breakup, Phnom decisions. The Soviets encouraged a Vietnam­ Penh realized its aid would be ceased and it ese withdrawal from Cambodia, reduced their would have to depend on the wider world for aid to both countries, and undertook a cam­ its survival. Thus, it would have to come to paign to integrate them into the region terms with the UN comprehensive settlement. politically and economically. On October 23, 1991, Phnom Penh The central incentive for the Soviets and the Cambodian resistance factions signed to encourage a speedy settlement was its the peace treaty and initiated the huge UN economic concerns. The devastating economic operation that will dismantle the Hun Sen decline in the Soviet Union made it incapable government and operate the country's key of attending to its former Third World commit­ ministries until a new coalition government ments. The Soviets closely reexamined their is elected through UN-supervised elections. development aid programs and instituted some Several challenges to the UN operation still sweeping reforms. Vietnam and Cambodia, lie ahead, but with unanimity in the UN who depended mostly on the Soviet Union for Security Council, chances are greatly improved their survival, realized that their economic aid that the operation will be successful and that was in jeopardy and that they must end their peace will finally be restored to the war-torn country. WORKS CITED

Allison, Roy, and Phil Williams, editors. 1990. Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arefyeva, Yelena. 1990. Political diary: Charity or still ideology? Izvestia, 24 July, 1 [as reported in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 42, (Sept. 5): 6].

Basu, Sanghamitra. 1987. Kampuchea as a Factor in the Sino-Soviet Conflict. Calcutta: Firma KLM Private Ltd.

Bennett, A. LeRoy. 1991. International Organizations: Principles and Issues. Englewood Cliff, , NJ: Prentice Hall.

Buszynski, Lesek. 1986. Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia. London: Croom Helm.

Duncan, W. Raymond and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl. 1990. Moscow and the Third World under Gorbachev. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Etcheson, Craig, 1984. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Goodman, Melvin A. 1991. Gorbachev's Retreat: The Third World. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. 1990. Decree of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: On changes in the Soviet Union's foreign economic practice. and Izvestia, 25 July, 1 [as reported in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 42 (Sept. 5): 7].

Haas, Michael. 1991. The Paris Conference on Cambodia, 1989. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii at Manoa.

Houk, Marian. 1991. In Cambodia, UN begins its most ambitious peacekeeping role ever. Christian Science Monitor, 18 Oct., 7.

Isaacs, Arnold R., Gordon Hardy, MacAlister Brown, and the editors of Boston Publishing Company. 1987. Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston Publishing Co.

Karnow, Stanley. 1983. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press.

Katz, Mark N. 1989. The evolution of the under Gorbachev. Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas. London: Routledge. PSA Review 82

Kimmit, Robert M. 1990. US Policy on Regional Conflicts: Cambodia, Afghanistan. Washington, DC: US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs.

Kolodziej, Edward A., and Roger E. Kanet. 1989. The Limits of Soviet Power in the Developing World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Laidi, Zaki, editor. 1988. The Third World and the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, Ltd.

Longmire, R. A. 1989. Soviet Relations with South-East Asia: An Historical Survey. London: Kegan Paul International.

Mysliwiec, Eva. 1988. Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation of Kampuchea. Oxford: Oxfam.

Romcinyuk, V. 1990. Within reasonable limits: Concerning our aid to developing countries. Izvestia, 26 July, 1 [as reported in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 42, (Sept. 5): 7].

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. 1988. Moscow's Third World Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Saivetz, Carol R. 1989. The Soviet Union in the Third World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Tefft, Sheila. 1991a. Cambodia's prospect for peace agreement moves a bit closer. Christian Science Monitor, 28 Aug., 6 .

---. 1991b. Cambodians are on verge of formal accord. Christian Science Monitor, 24 Sept., 5.

___. 1991c. UN set to send Cambodian refugees home. Christian Science Monitor, 18 Oct., 1.

___. 1991d. Vietnam and Cambodia seek aid. Christian Science Monitor, 23 Oct., 7.

___. 1991e. Khmer Rouge seen as threat to Cambodia Pact. Christian Science Monitor, 25 Oct., 4.

United Nations. 1981. Yearbook of the United Nations: 1981. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Association. 1991. Issues Before the 45th General Assembly of the United Nations. New York: UN Association of the USA.

Vickery, Michael. 1984. Cambodia: 1975-1982. Boston: South End Press. Ogden 83

Vinogradov, B. 1990. Obstacles in the way of a settlement. Izvestia, (4 Dec.), 7 [as reported in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 42 (Jan. 9): 17].