ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 4, pp 673± 686, 1997

Developmentin a wartornsociety: whatnext in ?

OZAY MEHMET

Thepublication of Cambodia’s FirstSocio-economic Development Plan, ( FSEDP) 1996± 2000 is asigni®cant event representing a majorstep in the country’ s re-emergencefrom ’ sKillingFields and long years ofcivil war. Moreover,the document is, technically speaking, a competent,realistic product, craftedby Cambodia’ s donors,to put that unfortunate country back on the road toreconstructionand sustainable development. Technical quality aside, however, Cambodiais bedevilledby deep-rootedpolitical, cultural and historical problems whichcast seriousdoubts about future prospects. Indeed, precisely because these problemsremained unresolved, and in particularbecause the donors assume that aidalone can save Cambodia,the country could, once again, slide back into chaosand . Before sustainable development can take hold in Cambodia, itshistory, culture and political legacies need to beanalysed realistically, and the lessons ofthe past must be effectively incorporated into its development strategy.This paper is asmallcontribution towards that end. Thepaper is organisedin ® veparts. After this introduction, part two brie¯ y highlightsthe principal targets and priorities of the FSEDP 1996± 2000. Part three isabriefhistorical survey to providethe bare-bones context for the of 1975±79, dealing with its external and internal causes. Thefourth part presents ananalysis of Cambodia’ s presentcoalition politics, which contain the same seeds ofdisunity that led to the civil war in the early 1970s and the tragedy of PolPot. The ® nalpart concludes with a briefreview of challenges and future prospects.

Cambodia’sdevelopmentplan 1996± 2000: a goodtechnocratic job Structurally,the Cambodian economy is asimple,traditional rice economy. Thereis anextremely small manufacturing and a rathertop-heavy services sector.No less than44.6% of the 1995 GDP originatedin agriculture, rice farmingbeing the most important activity, followed by livestock and rubber. In thesecondary sector, construction is byfar thelargest subsector, while in services,wholesale and retail trading accounted for 14.7% of GDP (Table 1). Accordingto the plan, the Cambodian economy grew rather impressively during1990± 95, registering an average annual growth of 5.9%. Most of the growthoccurred in the modern sectors, especially in construction and the hotel

Ozay Mehmetis atthe Norman Paterson School of InternationalAffairs, Carleton University, 1125Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, K1S 5B6

0143-6597/97/040673-14$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 673 OZAY MEHMET

TABLE 1. Structure andgrowth of Cambodian GDP, 1990± 95

Average annualShare in Sector growth(%) 1995 a

Agriculture 2.6 44.6 Crops 2.2 25.4 Rice 2 0.1 14.8 Rubberand others 7.1 10.6 Livestock 3.8 12.7 Fisheries 0 3.8 Forestry 5.2 2.7 Industry 10.9 18.7 Miningand quarrying 7.4 1.2 Manufacturing 7 7.4 Electricityand water 9.9 0.2 Construction 15.2 9.6 Services 8.3 36.7 Transportand communication 10.8 3.2 Wholesaleand retail 9.7 14.7 Hotelsand restaurants 20.8 0.6 Administration,education and health 3.2 3.9 Home ownership 6.6 6.7 Other 8.8 7.3 Gross domesticproduct 5.9 100

a Projected. Source: FSEDP,p86,Table 7.2, p 103,Table 8.2. andrestaurant subsectors. By contrast, agriculture lagged and the all-important riceeconomy declined in absolute terms. Whatare theplan’ s prioritiesand strategies? Table 2 providesthe sectoral allocationwhich is particularlyimportant in specifying the broad development prioritiesof Cambodia over the next ® veyears.The plan places top priority on povertyreduction, human resource development and employment generation throughthe private sector. The high proportion of public investment for educationand training (11%), with 75% earmarked for rural areas, is only secondto infrastructural investments to rebuild the war-damaged economy. The DevelopmentPlan isanambitious one, aiming at an overall 7.5% growth rateper annum (compared with 5.9% during 1990± 95). As aninvestment programmefor 1996± 2000, the FSEDP budgetsUS$5 billion in total, with about 75%of this expected to be ®nancedfrom foreign sources. The projected public investmentamounts to US$2.2 billion, of which65% is earmarkedfor the rural and35% for the urban sector. The high priority assigned to the rural sector is commendable,given Cambodian realities and challenges. But plans are one thing,implementation quite another. There are severe constraints,not just becauseof the extremely weak institutional capacity of the central government, bedevilledby factionalrivalry and political violence, but also because signi® cant partsof the countryside remain mined and un® t forproductive use, while other partsare stillcontrolled by theKhmer Rouge who, though much weakened, are 674 WHAT NEXT INCAMBODIA?

TABLE 2. Sectoralallocation targets for public investment, 1996± 2000 (%)

Total Sector RuralUrban Sector (US$ million)

Agriculture 97 3 10 220 Manufacturingand mining 25 75 4 88 Transportand communications 85 15 23 506 Electricity 26 74 8 176 Water supplyand sanitation 25 75 8 176 Educationand training 75 25 11 242 Health 75 25 10 220 Socialand community services 70 30 7 154 Religiousand cultural affairs 60 40 3 66 Administration,special programme 50 50 11 242 Unallocated 65 35 5 110 Total 65 35 100 2200

Source: FSEDP,p108,Table 9.2. hopingto return to power. That would be a tragedy,but it cannot be assumed thatthe is ®nished.

Thehistorical rootsof the PolPot revolution ThePol Pot revolution in 1975± 79 was amisguided utopiandevelopment experiment based on forced labour and total autarky, withoutmoney, markets or private property. What forces producedit? What moraljusti® cation did these revolutionary leaders have? What model were they relyingon? Why did they undertake such an inhuman action as thetotal evacuationof the towns and cities? ThePol Pot phenomenon was aproductof a dementedmind-set shaped by a tragicKhmer history. This human tragedy had external causes originatingin neighbouringcountries, in particular the brutalizing bombing of the country in Nixon’ssecret warduring 1969± 1972 as a`sideshow’to the con¯ ict. 1 Butinternal determinants must be givenprimacy. For, as weshallsee below,Pol Pot’sutopiawas AngkorWat, long buried in Khmerhistory, but still very much aliveas thesoul of `Khmerness’ . Foranyone who was fortunateenough to have visited before 1970,in itsprewar state, it isnotdif® cult to understandthe Khmer yearning for theglory that was theirsin ancienttimes. But times move on, and a peopleliving inthe past can easily ® nditself victim of its own mythologised grandeur. Cleansinga cultureof alien `impurities’ , seekingrevenge for `wrongs’ commit- tedlong ago, and above all, remaining `bottled up’ in permanent`mourning’ for pastcivilisations, are nosubstitute for realistic analysis as apreconditionfor progressand development. Theprimary explanation for Pol Pot’ sKillingFields lies in Khmerhistory and culture.As FrancËoisPonchaud has putit: `Without in anyway seeking to justify theexcesses ofPolPot, it appearsthat this revolution bears thestamp of Khmer 675 OZAY MEHMET culture:it istherevolt of thehinterland against the foreigners; it istherising up ofthe youth against their elders and their ancestors’ . 2 Nodoubt considerable blamemust be attributed to external actors such as theThais, Vietnamese, Frenchand Americans who, at various times in the last 500 years ofCambodian history,invaded the country and brutalised its people. But the primacy of internalover external determinants must be acknowledged, because one has toconcur with Marie A. Martin,a longtimefriend of the `martyred ’, whosejudgment was that`the Khmer people also produced the Pol Pots, theIeng Sarys, the Khieu Samphans, the barely adolescent yothea (combatants) who¼ [made]the Khmer revolution so terriblewhen ª thechildren were in powerº ’ .3 Chiefamong internal determinants has tobe the Khmer idea of kingship and power.It is ofcourse not unique, manifesting, for example, some remarkable parallelsto the Javanese ideaof power, 4 whichI haveexamined elsewhere. 5 Linkedto divine or supernatural power, the Khmer± Sanskrit idea of devaraja (godking or kingof gods) 6 legitimisesa traditionof cultworship, or `legitimacy bydivine royalty’ 7 which,by putting emphasis on form rather than substance andritual rather than accountability, places a hugesocial distance between the ruledand the ruler, elevates the patron± client relationship to thedivine order and endsup shelteringinjustice and exploitation. This divinely-sanctioned inequality, justifyingcaste andslavery for example, periodically bursts into horri® c viol- ence,as repeatedlydemonstrated in Cambodian history. Human suffering in this hierarchicaland fatalistic web of orderand disorder is partand parcel of theidea of karma (predestination)and the concept of neakmean bonn (he who has merit).Khmer society has alwaysbeen conservative and elitist: there is a relativelysmall (15%) urban and a large(85%) rural population living in quite differentworlds, but each further subdivided by greatinequalities. At thebottom ofthe social pyramid is thepoor peasantry, dependant on rice cultivation in an ecologicaland feudal order little changed since the heyday of AngkorWat. The peasantryis extremelyconservative, living a simpleand precarious life shaped bythe endless cycle of seasons andmonsoon rains. Superstition is partand parcelof this® xedworld-view in which the idea of a Kingof Cambodia is the essentialcore of Khmerness. The Khmer peasant equates kingship with legiti- macyand submits to higher authority as somethingsupernaturally determined withoutquestion. Khmers are taughtto liveby neak chuo,knowingone’ s place, withsilent dignity, but always in awe of higherauthority. In brief,it addsup to astructurethat appears to be incompatible with the idea of moderndevelopment andeconomic growth. Butthat would be too hasty a judgment.Other Southeast Asian nations, with similarcultural values, are nowemerging as Tigers.So it is necessary toprobe deeperinto the soul and structure of Cambodian society to analyse and understand`its horrifying uniqueness’ . 8 Thisis whereCambodia’ s past,speci® cally the civilization, comes in.For it still de® nes theCambodian soul. Khmer society is structured, likea Buddhisttemple, in layerupon layer of groups and classes, eachexploiting thosebelow, in a massive process ofrent-seeking atop mass povertyat the bottomof the social pyramid. In earlierdays, this society was simplyreduced to 676 WHAT NEXT INCAMBODIA? twounequal parts: rulerand subjects, a fewpatrons in control of a mass of slaves orpersonsin bondage. It isimportantto remember that Angkor Wat, the CambodianParthenon, was builtby slave labour! In the last 500 years, little seems tohave changed in the basic, hierarchical structure of Khmer society. Nowwomen, either unpaid rural family workers or those subsisting on petty tradingin the urban informal sectors, are atthe bottom of this socioeconomic pyramid. Arethere precedents for the Pol Pot model in Cambodian history? The short answer,sadly, is yes.Many, besides Pol Pot, have sought to change the seemingly® xedstructure of inequality throughout Cambodian history. The wereperhaps the earliest wave of invaders with a culturalagenda. Originatingfrom present-day and , these Muslim conquerors overranAngkor Wat in 1177 and sought to Islamise theKhmers. The Chams were® nallydefeated in 1191. The great Khmer hero, the victorious King JayavarmanVII, chose,at the pinnacle of his power, to break with the Khmer past,and imposed, in abrutaland totalitarian way, a Hinduisationprogramme on hispeople, forcing them to convertfrom the Mahayana to theTheravada variant ofBuddhism. The eminent historian of Cambodia, David Chandler, has com- paredthis cultural transformation to Pol Pot’ s genocidalrevolution during 1975±79.9 Duringthe next couple of centuries Angkor Wat declined, weakened intern- allyfrom moral decay and attacked by powerful neighbours. It was ®nally abandonedin the 14th century; literally left to be consumed by the jungle, the Khmercivilisation shattered. The of the Pol Pot clique was the productof this shattered civilisation, a mind-setso deludedthat it believed it couldrecreate a self-suf® cientrice economy with forced labour, copying the AngkorWat civilisation `in order to show that today’ s tinyCambodia could creategreat works’ . 10 PolPot used to boast:`If wecanbuild Angkor, we can do anything’.11 Inthe ® vecenturies after the abandonment of Angkor Wat, Khmers lived in constantwar and violence. Their larger neighbours, Siamese (Thais)to thewest, andVietnamese to the east, have sought repeatedly to invade, subjugate and transformthe Khmers, with frequent cycles of destruction and violence. Ulti- mately, physically replaced Angkor Wat as thenational capital. But inthe Khmer psyche the glory of Angkor survives as thesoul of Khmerness, symbolisedby a paradoxof extremesÐ the smiling Buddha engulfed by the seven-headedSerpent. The silent outward dignity of theKhmer discloses a latent furysimilar to a Malayrunning amok oranexploding volcano, indiscriminately destroyingeverything around it. TheKhmer history is tragic,Cambodia a scene ofnon-stop war and con¯ ict. The19th century was anespecially traumatic period. The Cambodian royal houseand the Okya,thehigh-ranking mandarins, were always divided, ready to dealwith the stronger Siamese orVietnamese, or whoeveroffered better aid and protectionfor self-aggrandisement. During 1835± 40 the Khmers suffered a particularlybrutalising Vietnamisation programme. Finally, in 1863 the French colonialistsarrived, at the invitation of the Khmer king, imposing yet another foreigndomination. Driven by their ` missioncivilisatrice ’,theFrench `discov- 677 OZAY MEHMET ered’Angkor Wat but then proceeded to destroy the Khmer culture by forcing onthe Khmers a totallyalien language, education and values. Theend of French colonialism in the mid-1950s did not lead to a patriotic revivalor post-colonial national development. On the contrary, the country slid intopolitical chaos, with a successionof weak royalist, republican and military governments.Phnom Penh became a denof decadence (the `cognac and concubinecircuit’ 12).In1970the military strongman , supported by the Nixonadministration, decided to overthrow the playboy Prince Sihanouk (his latestpassion was ®lm-making)who seemed obliviousto the agony of his nation.Lon Nol’ s republicwas initiallypopular among the urban Khmers but confusedthe peasantry, who continued as alwaysto venerate the kingship, thoughit was nowfalling into the hands of theCommunists. Sihanouk, in exile inBeijing and under Chinese protection, felt obliged to enter into a marriageof conveniencewith his earlier enemies the against Lon Nol and his USbackers.The marriage won the Khmer Rouge royalist legitimacy in theeyes ofthe Cambodian peasantry, who in `liberated’ areas weredesignated by the KhmerRouge as `theold people’ , whilegiving Sihanouk the chance to wage war againstthe US puppetLon Nol. During1970± 75 the Cambodian nation suffered not only from the civil war betweenthe Khmer Rouge and republican forces, but also from the extension of thewar in Vietnaminto Cambodia. Nixon’ s illegalwar in Cambodia and carpet bombingby US B52s,ostensibly targeting Vietcong sanctuaries, devastated easternprovinces bordering Vietnam. Finally, the Americans pulled the rug from underLon Nol’ s feet.The US Congressdecided to terminate aid and end Nixon’sillegalwar in Cambodia. As aresult,two weeks before the ,the Cambodian capital, now overcrowded with half a millionhalf-starv- ingand demoralised refugees, fell into the hands of the Khmer Rouge. As its armyof child soldiers marched into Phnom Penh on 17 claiming victoryover US imperialistsand `the oppressive, blood-sucking and bone- gnawingregime of the traitorous Lon Nol clique’ , 13 thePol Pot clique took the destinyof the Cambodian nation into its hands. InApril1975, then, this was thesorry state of Cambodia:a deposedSihanouk inexilein ,busy stoking the ® res ofabloodycivil war at home, yet still veneratedby a peasantrynow controlled by a brutalclique allied to the Vietcong,which was ®ghtinga US-backedpuppet military regime and found itselfparachuted into power with no agendaother than a concoctionof Marxist± Leninistideology and a desirefor revenge against the urban Khmers who, as `the newpeople’ , becamethe slave labour of the Khmer Rouge revolution. Withindays of taking power, the revolutionary clique, known mysteriously only as the Angkar (theorganisation) and led by the equally mysterious Saloth Sar,alias Pol Pot, a leaderobsessed withsecrecy andsecurity preferring simply tobe known as `BrotherNumber One’ , 14 begana reignof terrordirected at the `newpeople’ (ie the urban population), in contrast to the `old people’ in the `liberatedareas’ ,punishingthem with immediate mass expulsionfrom Phnom Penhand other towns to mark the start of the `Total Revolution’ for the constructionof a Kampucheanutopia. Theevacuation order was notpurely vindictive punishment in¯ icted on the 678 WHAT NEXT INCAMBODIA? enemy,the `’ . Therewas ademonicrationality behind it, indeed it was acalculated,revolutionary step: Itwas designedto provide forced labour for theregime’ s agriculturalstrategy. Somewhat surprisingly in view of the anti- intellectualbias of thePol Pot regime, its development strategy was designedby welleducated leaders who had themselves been teachers. While Pol Pot did not completehigher education, , and had extensiveuniversity education in France, where they learnt their Marxist± Leninisttheories. Khieu Samphan, who was widelyregarded as the`intellectual’ amongthe Khmer Rouge leadership, received his PhD in agriculturaleconomics in 1959.15 Ricecultivation was tobethecenterpiece of aclassless andentirely autarkic, self-reliantsociety. The `new people’ became the slaves ofthenew Angkor Wat. Theywere organised into production teams onthe collective farms andcom- munes,under the strict control of cadres, to produce surpluses and meet impossibleproduction targets by leaders ignorant of ricecultivation methods or irrigationhydrology. 16 Formally,the economic strategy of theregime was outlinedin the Four Year Plan,announcedby Pol Pot in August 1976. 17 Theplan followed no outside model.It was anideologically driven exercise in utopian agrarian centredon rice production, as inthe Angkorian period. Pol Pot was obsessed withrice. He believed that `if we have rice, we have everything’ . Accordingly, theplan’ s centralaim was thetotally unrealistic target of `threetons of rice per hectare’by 1980. This was expectedto produce an exportable surplus of 26.7 milliontons of paddyover the life of theplan, and to earn$1.4 billion in foreign exchange.The income would then be utilisedto purchase modern farm machin- ery,tools and fertiliser and to enable Cambodia to industrialise, ultimately acquiringheavy industries, even developing tourist resorts `¼as placesto relax’ .18 Thethree ton per hectare implied a triplingof rice production within four years,a technicallyimpossible task since past Cambodian yields had averaged amere oneton per hectare. What is more,the plan did not rely on any modern farm technology,or massive investmentin agricultural infrastructure. The sole `developmentresource’ was thelabour of more than one million `new people’ forcedinto slavery on collective farms andirrigation works. As atechnical document,the FourYear Plan was `slapdash,naive and uninformed’ . 19 It substitutedideology and party slogans for technical know-how and investible resources.Pol Pot’ s ideologywas partydictatorship in the extreme. The `collectivizedrevolutionary will’ became the tool of a deludedleadership set to eradicateindividualism. 20 Sufferingfrom extreme paranoia, the leadership equatedany adverse news or discontentas anti-revolutionarysentiment amount- ingto treason. After 1976 rice production fell and starvation emerged as waves ofpurges within the party and the military were matched by massive human rightsviolations in thecooperatives and collectives. The reign of terrorblocked anyeffective plan implementation or monitoring at grassroots. The party leadershipwas totallyisolated from actual realities in the rice ® eldsand the irrigationworks. Cadres andsubordinates only fed it whatthe central leadership wishedto hear, thereby `causing false optimismat the top even as rice 679 OZAY MEHMET productionfaltered and workers died’ . 21 Inshort, the FourYear Plan was a crudeand brutal prescription for forced labour mobilised to produce an export- ablesurplus. In return, the only material incentive explicitly promised to the peoplein theplan was increasedfrequency of `desserts’ infuture:`In 1977 there are tobe two desserts perweek. In 1978 there will be one dessert everytwo days.Then in 1979, one desert every day, and so on’ . 22 Seenin thistragic context, Pol Pot and his collaborators appear as demonised productsof Cambodian history, arrogant and deluded Khmer nationalists, in- spiredin part by Mao’ s GreatLeap Forward and the , but withminds distorted by a misreadingof the radical French ideology of mass violence aÁ la FranzFanon and Georges Sorel. 23 Inonefell swoop Pol Pot sought to copyKing Jayavarman VII, tobreak with thepast, to cleanse all injustice and oppression and to rebuild Khmer society afresh,with surplus rice and correct ideology. `The DK regimediffered pro- foundly[from the earlier regimes of Sihanouk and Lon Nol]. Its commitment was tothetotal transformation of Cambodia’ s economyand of people’ s waysof working,thinking and behaving.’ 24 Revolutionaryideology was suddenlydiscov- eredin the authentic Khmer worker-peasant, the source of all technical knowl- edgerequired to manage the rice cooperatives and communes under the brutal controlof cadres whowere themselves expected by theirsuperiors to bemodels inevery respect, perfectly implementing the will of the organisation. In their utopianrice economy, the arrogant Democratic Kampuchea ( DK)leadershiphad noroom for intellectuals or technical knowledge. As KhieuSamphan, the `intellectualguru’ of theKhmer Rouge and Chairman of the State Presidium put it, `Ourworker-peasant class ,underthe leadership of our revolutionary organi- zation, immediatelygrasped technical expertise after itseized politicalpower ’ . Whilethe slave-workers on collectives perished from undernourishment, over- work,disease anddeath, rice production fell and rations had to be cut, Khieu Samphandeluded himself into thinking ` ¼that technicalskill is notthe determiningfactor (ofef® ciency). Thedetermining factor is infactthe political andideological stand of ourfraternal dock workers .’ 25 Stateterror became a puri®cation instrument of the Total Revolution. Mass executionsfor `wrongdoing’ , tortureof counter-revolutionaries,waves of purges withinthe organisation itself increasingly emerged as thenecessary toolsto extractsacri® ce onthe altar of national reconstruction and defence. In 1977, againstthe background of an intensifying war with Vietnam, purges increased dramatically,consuming some ofPolPot’ sclosestfriends and leading ® guresof theregime including Hu Nim, the Minister of Information and Propaganda. Pol Potlived in constantfear oflosingpower and his mass executioncentre at SC21 workedovertime to eliminate spies andagents suspected of workingfor the CIA, Vietnameseand other enemies of the regime. This chronic fear was combined withtraditional Khmer pride and a hatredof the Vietnamese, who were constantlyexpected to invade the country. The result was extremexenophobia andan ideology of the most puritanical autarky, known as `independence- mastery’ 26,whichsurpassed eventhat of Enver Hoxha’ s Albaniain cutting itselfoff from the rest ofthe world. The DK revolutionwas tobe a uniquelyKhmer development, totally self- 680 WHAT NEXT INCAMBODIA? reliant,® nancedout of the labour and blood of thepeople. Labour and sacri® ce weredeemed to be suf® cientinputs in building a collectivisedrice economy. Ricesurplus was tobethe means of® nancingfuture industrialisation on theroad tomodernising the country. This purely domestic and autarkic development, neverattempted elsewhere, was onlycomparable to the glorious Angkor Wat. Intheir zeal for their utopia, the megalomaniac DK leadershipbelieved that it neitherneeded, nor followed, any outside models. Pol Pot’ s `independence- mastery’required rejection of allforeign aid, save alimitedquantity from the PRC. Thuscut off from the rest ofthe world, the Pol Pot clique monopolised andmaintained power with unbelievable arrogance. The ex-teachers, now turned totalitarianrulers of Cambodia, destroyed schools and education, eliminated intellectualsand technical personnel. Skilled human resources wereviewed with disdainand considered dangerous to the regime; persons wearing reading glasses weretargeted as parasiticalintellectuals and punished. Money was abolishedand replacedby barter, private property was banned.Family, education and religion wereall declared illegal to make room for the one virtue which the clique prizedÐparty loyalty, extracted by state terror. The ultimate contradiction was thatthe regime attempted to build a newAngkor Wat, with slave labour, in pursuitof a classless utopia. Stateterror had manifold uses inDemocratic Kampuchea. It became the inversionof justice and morality, the means ofsettling scores andimposing socialchange on the decadent and corrupt parasites such as thefeudalists, royalists,mandarins and petite bourgeoisie. 27 Anyrival authority from the past, suchas religionor education,was exterminated.Temples, churches and mosques weredestroyed or converted into warehouses. Marriages, now strictly regulated bythe fearful organisation, were solemnised by vows of loyalty to the Angkar. Nolonger needed, Buddhist monks, teachers and students were herded into the rice® eldsto join thousands of nameless otherscut off from their social, family orindividual identity. Schools were converted into centres of state torture and mass executions,such as thenotorious Tuol Sleng (Security Centre 21) in Phnom Penh,28 andCambodia was turnedinto a `KillingFields’ in anuncontrol- lablepassion for the blood of traitors,counter-revolutio nariesand enemies of the regimewho seemed tolurk everywhere. The only equality in Democratic Kampucheawas thateveryone had an equal chance of arbitrary death at the handsof Pol Pot’ shenchmenunder the leadership of Brother Number One.

Western guilt anddelayed response tothe genocide:the NGO invasion Withthe defeat and departure of Americans from Indochina, the Western responseto Pol Pot’ s mass-scale humanrights violations was initiallyone of totalindifference. The was ignored.`Even the UN turned a deaf ear.’ 29 Westernhuman rights organisations, including Amnesty Inter- national,were indifferent, 30 evenafter the overthrow of the DK leadershipin early1979 which, at least partially, removed the Khmer Rouge entry barriers. Fromthe late 1980s onwards Western indifference and guilt ® nallyresulted in thearrival of a newinvading force in Cambodia: Western NGOs. Nowthey are everywhere,managing and delivering essential services tothe large rural 681 OZAY MEHMET populationneglected by a restoredroyal government in Phnom Penh, which is ledby greedy coalition politicians and self-serving of® cials, as always,busy gettingrich. Gambling, prostitution and rent-seeking are, once again, spreading alarminglythrough the country, while Cambodia remains, in fact, a divided, arti®cial nation, with little governmental authority outside the capital. The royalty,politicians and of® cials have no more concern for the poor than before, contentto leave them in the care ofWestern NGOs, nowwilling to deliver. The dangerin allof thisis thatthe present fragile peace can easily turn into anarchy, plungingCambodia back into the dark days of the past. Howdid this situation come about? The historical evolution can quickly be sketchedout. The fall of Democratic Kampuchea in January 1979 came rather predictablyas aresultof invasion from Communist Vietnam. The principal consequenceof theVietnamese occupation over the next 10 years, unpopular as always,was therise ofHunSen, who had defected from Kampuchea to Vietnam in1977 and is thepresent leader of the Cambodian People’ s Party( CPP). Sihanouk,in exile and under Chinese protection in Beijing, opposed the Vietnameseinvasion. During the 1980s, after several meetings with and severalother factions in Association of Southeast Asian Nation ( ASEAN) capitals andFrance, Sihanouk managed, with international and ASEAN help,to promote apoliticalcompromise between the royalists and ex-Communist Hun Sen’ s forces,which paved the way for Vietnamese withdrawal and the UN Transitional Authority (UNTAC)inCambodia. Finally, following the UN supervisedelections in1993, Sihanouk was enthronedas aconstitutionalKing of Cambodia. Sihanoukreturned home with great expectations. He was initiallypopular, but hispopularity was short-livedas hequickly broke his promise of neutralityand non-interferencein politics. Surprisingly, he had campaigned openly for the CPP inthegeneral elections and against FUNCINPEC,theparty he had created, now led byhisson Prince Ranariddh. In the eyes ofthepeople, Sihanouk’ s meddlingwas inconceivablefor a divinelyordained King; among the peasantry, in particular, Sihanoukpossessed supernaturalpowers capable of in¯ uencing ¯ oodsand harvests.Once he started playing politics, Sihanouk’ s popularityplummeted. 31 HunSen’ s pro-Vietnamesepast, never popular among the Khmers, prevented a CPP victoryat the polls; it lost the election to FUNCINPEC.Sihanoukthen crafted anuneasy coalition between FUNCINPEC and the CPP,whichis as veneratedas a two-headedBuddha; it islimpingalong towards inevitable break-up, leading the countryonce again into a politicalabyss. Sihanouk, now an old man, has no clearheir apparent and factionalism, the Khmer sickness, is ever-present. Whathappened to Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge clique? Disgraced but not eliminated,it went whither it had reared its ugly head: back to the jungle near theThai border, running a pro®table crossborder trade in gems, logs and anythingelse, still able to exercise power in thewestern , hopingsomeday to return to power.

Coalition politics: whatnext? CouldCambodia relapse into another genocidal civil war in future? Sadly, it couldhappen again. There are threemain reasons forthis: cultural, historical and 682 WHAT NEXT INCAMBODIA? political.By culture Cambodian people have an in® nite capacity to endure suffering.Khmer culture cultivates silent submission, not resistance, to higher authority,even when it is tyrannical.This is anideal breeding ground for misrule.When misrule reaches aclimaxit produces dictators with grandiose ideasready to utilise state terror to implement their blueprints. Khmer history, unfortunately,reinforces this tendency. For, in the last 500 years, the Cambodi- ans haveknown little else butmisrule and suffering. This has beenmost aptly expressedin 1979 by none other than Sihanouk: `The humble people of Cambodiaare themost wonderful in theworld ¼ Theirgreat misfortune is that theyalways have terrible leaders who make them suffer. I am notsure thatI was muchbetter myself, but perhaps I was theleast bad.’ 32 Sihanouk’s dominanceof Cambodian political destiny since the 1940s, how- everdysfunctional, has providedan umbilical cord for the Khmers. But Si- hanoukis old,sick and now in his twilight years withoutan heir apparent. Vaingloriousas always,his last wish, apparently, is: `BeforeI dieI wantto have agoodname as thefather of a new,genuine democracy [in Cambodia]’ . 33 The vacuumafter him will not be ®lledby either of histwo sons, Prince Rannariddh, head of FUNCINPEC,andPrince Chakrapong, living in exile in France,who loathe each other. Thenext general elections are notdue until November 1998. However, it is unlikelythat the present fragile FUNCINPECÐ CPP coalitionwill last that long. Recently, FUNCINPEC threatenedto leave the coalition. Hun Sen has countered withan even tougher line, threatening to sendthe royal family back into exile. 34 Theambitious Hun Sen hopes that his CPP willemerge as thesole, or atleast the senior,party in power. In thesummer of1996some high-risknegotiations with KhmerRouge `defectors’ , ostensiblyfor national reconciliation, led to a pardon forIeng Sary from Sihanouk. But it is uncertainwhether this will lead to real reconciliationor simply a dealbetween his Khmer Rouge faction and Hun Sen atthe expense of PrinceRannariddh. On the sidelines the majority of Cambodi- ans are terri®ed of the Khmer Rouge, distrust Hun Sen’ s ownCommunist past andview with growing cynicism his emergence as therichest man in Phnom Penh.This high-risk manoeuvering is occurringagainst a risingtide of political violenceby the so-called A-teams in Phnom Penh, reminiscent of the earlier 1992pattern when the Hun Sen regime relied on intimidationand murder against itsenemies, particularly FUNCINPEC.Signsof anarchy now exist in the capital, wherecriminal elements (generally thought to bemembers ofthearmed forces) roamthe streets atnight, and during the day the rich and the powerful travel with wellarmed private bodyguards. There are political® ghtsand killings between rivalfactions. In March 1997 a grenadeattack killed at least 10 people and injuredmore than 100 at a politicalrally in Phnom Penh, apparently targetting theopposition leader ,who blamed Hun Sen for the attack. The ambitiousHun Sen may ultimately win the power struggle to emerge as thesole primeminister, but at a tremendoussocial cost to the fragile democratic experiment.Outside Phnom Penh large parts of the country are minedor under thecontrol of Khmer Rouge or local warlords, some linkedto Thai or Vietnameseinterests. Poverty and underdevelopment reign unchecked. Thepresent ruling coalition is ineptand seems incapableto tackle the 683 OZAY MEHMET fundamentalproblems of Cambodian society. Feudalism has littlechanged, povertyremains endemic, and virtually no development has takenplace to heal thewounds almost two decades after Pol Pot. The only developmental bene® ts forthe bulk of thepeople are incremental,generated by projectsrun by hundreds of Western NGOsdoingtheir own thing.

Conclusion: whatis andis notdevelopment? Atadeeper,psychological level, two simple conclusions emerge from the above analysiswith ominous foreboding for Cambodians. Simple though these conclu- sionsare, they provide us withsome fundamentalguidelines about what developmentis andis not. First,development cannot be based on slavery or forced labour. Human and socioeconomicdevelopment must ¯ owout of free labourand personal choice. AngkorWat and Pol Pot’ sgrandcollectivisation scheme wereboth based on slavelabour, and, for this reason, cannot be regarded as modelsof development. Ofcourse, the Pol Pot revolution had its defenders and sympathisers. Thus MichaelVickery, who wrote a scholarlybook on the Cambodian Revolution in theearly 1980s, concluded that the DK experimentwas notbased on slavery, but an`extreme form of voluntarismon theway to, not socialism, but ’ . 35 Healsoargued that Khieu Samphan’ s agriculturalcollectivisation plan `was not Marxist¼ Itfailed because he had not accurately assessed thereal conditions inthe country’ . 36 Thesejudgments are simplyunacceptable: the one million peoplewho died at the hands of Pol Pot’ sregimein just four years didnot die forvoluntarism. Second,grand, utopian designs for development using state terror are the ultimateantithesis of human development, ending in genocidal catastrophes. Whetherin Hitler’ s Germany,or Stalin’ s USSRorPol Pot’ sDemocratic Kampuchea,history provides a sad testimonyto theinsanity of usingstate terror andforced labour to build a newsociety. Development is aslow,patient, long-term,but above all, peaceful process withvoluntary labour. It needs to be craftedfrom within, evolving out of genuine consultation and compromise to solveproblems, not imposed from above or outside with force and mass violationof human rights. InCambodia, the root causes ofthe national tragedy are yetto be remedied. Theylie in economic injustice, social inequalities and obsolete feudal structures inthe country. The ruling elites, exploiting the trust of the peasantry in the divineright of kingship, are toosel® shand insensitive to the poverty of the masses. Thepoliticians, bureaucrats and military are consummaterentiers living offaid in¯ ows ostensibly designed as developmentassistance, while the donors, fortheir own reasons, keep pledging more. These `gatekeepers’ , alongwith the KhmerChinese-dominated commercial sector, are enjoyingprosperity and lux- ury,oblivious to mass povertyall around them, while the country slides back towardsthe past. Thetheoretical requirements of national salvation can be spelled out easily enough:the critical need is buildingsocial capital (trust, responsibility and a willingnessto share) throughslow accumulation of human capital, starting with 684 WHAT NEXT INCAMBODIA? primaryeducation for young girls. Women constitute the majority of the labour force,but they are themost neglected, oppressed and vulnerable part of the shatteredCambodian society. Young women (as wellas boys,of course) need tobe encouraged to stay in school, to be educated with a moderncurriculum taughtby quali® ed teachers. They must be equipped with productive skills and assisted withef® cientcredit for self-employment and high-paying jobs in industry,tourism and the service sectors. Subsistence agriculture, and informal sectors inurban centres, are nosubstitute for schooling; they are recipesfor persistentpoverty. The FirstSocio-economic Development Plan, 1995± 1999 ,forCambodia is a goodstart. It promises to devote two-thirds of the total public investment of US$2.2billion in rural areas toexpand the physical and social infrastructure, witha highpriority for education, especially at the primary level. The plan, whichrequires 100% external ® nancing,can only be put into practice if Cambodia’s donorsprovide the funds. For the sake ofCambodians, the supply ofthese funds must be on the basis of effective accountabilityrules , to ensure effectiveplan implementation that actually bene® ts intendedtarget groups and notthe rent-seeking gatekeepers. Onthis basis, the plan deserves tobe given a chanceand external support. Eventhen, however, its future remains in doubt.For one thing, it awaitspolitical endorsementfrom a paralysedparliament in Phnom Penh, where elected politi- ciansare boycottingthe legislature as partof the ongoing power struggle between the CPP and FUNCINPEC.37 Evenwith the best of goodwill, domestic actionis unlikelyto be suf® cientfor the Plan’ s successful implementation.The factis thatCambodia’ s destinyis notentirely in its own hands. Its larger neighbours,who have a greatstake in regional stability, have a crucialrole to play.It is hopedthat this role will be positive and constructive, leading to Cambodia’s integrationwithin ASEAN.Butsuch an integration must be tied to effectiveimplementation of the DevelopmentPlan . Beyondthe regional level, in the international arena, the most important requirementis toprovidedevelopment assistance witheffective rules ofaccount- abilityand transparency toensure that investment in Cambodian development actuallybene® ts thosein need, especially rural target groups, rather than the gatekeepers. Postscript:Since this article was written,a yearago, events in Cambodia have, sadly,evolved much as predicted,especially after Hun Sen’ s `coup’of July1997 oustingthe ® rst PM PrinceRanariddh. The collapse of the CPP-FUNCINPEC coalitionhas renewedthe civil war which has alarmedCambodia’ s donorsand ASEAN neighbours.The future is grimand uncertain.

Notes Grateful thanksare dueto DinMerican forhelp in writing this paper, which also bene® ted from the comments ofparticipantsat aseminar at theNational University of Malaysia,Bangi on 12 August1996. The author alone is responsiblefor all opinionsexpressed in the paper. 1 William Shawcross, Sideshow:Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia ,New York:Simon and Shuster,1979. 685 OZAY MEHMET

2 Karl D.Jackson(ed), Cambodia1975± 1978: Rendevouz with Death ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1989,p 152. 3 Marie AMartin, Cambodia:A ShatteredSociety ,Berkeley,CA, University of California Press, 1994,p xix. 4 BenedictAnderson, `The idea ofpower in Javanese culture’, inClaire Holt(ed), Cultureand Politics in Indonesia,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1972. 5 Ozay Mehmet,`Rent-seeking and gate-keeping in Indonesia: a culturaland economic analysis’ , Labour, Capitaland Society ,27(1), 1994, pp 56± 89. 6 See David,P Chandler, AHistory ofCambodia ,Boulder,CO: Westview,1993, pp 34± 36. 7 Martin, Cambodia:a ShatteredSociety , pp 23±24. 8 DavidP Chandler, TheTragedy of Cambodian History: Politics,War and Revolution since 1945 , New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1991,p 236. 9 Chandler, AHistory ofCambodia , pp 68±69. 10 Martin, Cambodia:a ShatteredSociety , p 205. 11 Quotedin Chandler, TheTragedy of Cambodian History , p 6. 12 As describedin Jackson, Cambodia 1975±1978, p 7. 13 Quotedin ibid, p 56. 14 DavidP Chandler, BrotherNumber One: APoliticalBiography of PolPot ,ChiangMai, : Silkworm BooksBoulder, CO: Westview, 1992. 15 Martin, Cambodia:A ShatteredHistory ,pp158±165; and Twinning, in Jackson, Cambodia1975± 1978 , pp 110±114. 16 Charles H.Twinning,`the economy’ in Jackson, Cambodia 1975±1978, pp 109±150. 17 Chandler, BrotherNumber One ,pp120±128. 18 Ibid, p 125. 19 Ibid, p 128. 20 Ibid, p 123. 21 Ibid, p 124. 22 FourYear Plan ,quotedin Chandler, BrotherNumber One , p 126. 23 KennethQuinn, `the pattern and scope of violence’ in Jackson, Cambodia 1975±1978, pp 231±233. 24 Chandler, TheTragedy of Cambodian History , p 240. 25 Quotedin Jackson, emphasis inthe original. 26 Chandler, BrotherNumber One ,pp121±122. 27 FrancËoisPonchaud. 28 See DavidHawk `thephotographic record’ and Quinn, in Jackson, Cambodia 1975±1978. 29 FrancËoisPonchaud, Cambodia,Year Zero (translatedfrom the French by Nancy Amphoux), London: Allen Lane/PenguinBooks, 1977, p 215. 30 Fora scathingattack onAmnesty International, see Martin, Cambodia:A ShatteredSociety ,Appendix12, pp 339±341. 31 Ibid,pp 288±289. 32 Quotedin Shawcross, Sideshow, p 392. 33 Quotedin William Shawcross,`A new Cambodia’, review ofChandler, BrotherNumber One , New York Review ofBooks ,12August 1993, p 40. 34 JasonBarber, `Hun Sen takes hardline at partysummit’ , PhnomPenh Post ,26July± 8 August1996, p 1. 35 MichaelVickery, Cambodia 1975±1982, Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984,p 267. 36 Ibid,pp 267±268. 37 Ker Monthit,` MPS busypassing 106 words a fortnight’, PhnomPenh Post ,12±25 July 1996, p 2.

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