ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 4, pp 673± 686, 1997 Developmentin a wartornsociety: whatnext in Cambodia? OZAY MEHMET Thepublication of Cambodia’s FirstSocio-economic Development Plan, ( FSEDP) 1996± 2000 is asigni®cant event representing a majorstep in the country’ s re-emergencefrom Pol Pot’ sKillingFields and long years ofcivil war. Moreover,the document is, technically speaking, a competent,realistic product, craftedby Cambodia’ s donors,to put that unfortunate country back on the road toreconstructionand sustainable development. Technical quality aside, however, Cambodiais bedevilledby deep-rootedpolitical, cultural and historical problems whichcast seriousdoubts about future prospects. Indeed, precisely because these problemsremained unresolved, and in particularbecause the donors assume that aidalone can save Cambodia,the country could, once again, slide back into chaosand civil war. Before sustainable development can take hold in Cambodia, itshistory, culture and political legacies need to beanalysed realistically, and the lessons ofthe past must be effectively incorporated into its development strategy.This paper is asmallcontribution towards that end. Thepaper is organisedin ® veparts. After this introduction, part two brie¯ y highlightsthe principal targets and priorities of the FSEDP 1996± 2000. Part three isabriefhistorical survey to providethe bare-bones context for the genocide of 1975±79, dealing with its external and internal causes. Thefourth part presents ananalysis of Cambodia’ s presentcoalition politics, which contain the same seeds ofdisunity that led to the civil war in the early 1970s and the tragedy of PolPot. The ® nalpart concludes with a briefreview of challenges and future prospects. Cambodia’sdevelopmentplan 1996± 2000: a goodtechnocratic job Structurally,the Cambodian economy is asimple,traditional rice economy. Thereis anextremely small manufacturing and a rathertop-heavy services sector.No less than44.6% of the 1995 GDP originatedin agriculture, rice farmingbeing the most important activity, followed by livestock and rubber. In thesecondary sector, construction is byfar thelargest subsector, while in services,wholesale and retail trading accounted for 14.7% of GDP (Table 1). Accordingto the plan, the Cambodian economy grew rather impressively during1990± 95, registering an average annual growth of 5.9%. Most of the growthoccurred in the modern sectors, especially in construction and the hotel Ozay Mehmetis atthe Norman Paterson School of InternationalAffairs, Carleton University, 1125Colonel By Drive, Ottawa,Canada K1S 5B6 0143-6597/97/040673-14$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 673 OZAY MEHMET TABLE 1. Structure andgrowth of Cambodian GDP, 1990± 95 Average annualShare in Sector growth(%) 1995 a Agriculture 2.6 44.6 Crops 2.2 25.4 Rice 2 0.1 14.8 Rubberand others 7.1 10.6 Livestock 3.8 12.7 Fisheries 0 3.8 Forestry 5.2 2.7 Industry 10.9 18.7 Miningand quarrying 7.4 1.2 Manufacturing 7 7.4 Electricityand water 9.9 0.2 Construction 15.2 9.6 Services 8.3 36.7 Transportand communication 10.8 3.2 Wholesaleand retail 9.7 14.7 Hotelsand restaurants 20.8 0.6 Administration,education and health 3.2 3.9 Home ownership 6.6 6.7 Other 8.8 7.3 Gross domesticproduct 5.9 100 a Projected. Source: FSEDP,p86,Table 7.2, p 103,Table 8.2. andrestaurant subsectors. By contrast, agriculture lagged and the all-important riceeconomy declined in absolute terms. Whatare theplan’ s prioritiesand strategies? Table 2 providesthe sectoral allocationwhich is particularlyimportant in specifying the broad development prioritiesof Cambodia over the next ® veyears.The plan places top priority on povertyreduction, human resource development and employment generation throughthe private sector. The high proportion of public investment for educationand training (11%), with 75% earmarked for rural areas, is only secondto infrastructural investments to rebuild the war-damaged economy. The DevelopmentPlan isanambitious one, aiming at an overall 7.5% growth rateper annum (compared with 5.9% during 1990± 95). As aninvestment programmefor 1996± 2000, the FSEDP budgetsUS$5 billion in total, with about 75%of this expected to be ®nancedfrom foreign sources. The projected public investmentamounts to US$2.2 billion, of which65% is earmarkedfor the rural and35% for the urban sector. The high priority assigned to the rural sector is commendable,given Cambodian realities and challenges. But plans are one thing,implementation quite another. There are severe constraints,not just becauseof the extremely weak institutional capacity of the central government, bedevilledby factionalrivalry and political violence, but also because signi® cant partsof the countryside remain mined and un® t forproductive use, while other partsare stillcontrolled by theKhmer Rouge who, though much weakened, are 674 WHAT NEXT INCAMBODIA? TABLE 2. Sectoralallocation targets for public investment, 1996± 2000 (%) Total Sector RuralUrban Sector (US$ million) Agriculture 97 3 10 220 Manufacturingand mining 25 75 4 88 Transportand communications 85 15 23 506 Electricity 26 74 8 176 Water supplyand sanitation 25 75 8 176 Educationand training 75 25 11 242 Health 75 25 10 220 Socialand community services 70 30 7 154 Religiousand cultural affairs 60 40 3 66 Administration,special programme 50 50 11 242 Unallocated 65 35 5 110 Total 65 35 100 2200 Source: FSEDP,p108,Table 9.2. hopingto return to power. That would be a tragedy,but it cannot be assumed thatthe Cambodian civil war is ®nished. The historical rootsof the PolPot revolution ThePol Pot revolution in Democratic Kampuchea 1975± 79 was amisguided utopiandevelopment experiment based on forced labour and total autarky, withoutmoney, markets or private property. What forces producedit? What moraljusti® cation did these revolutionary leaders have? What model were they relyingon? Why did they undertake such an inhuman action as thetotal evacuationof the towns and cities? ThePol Pot phenomenon was aproductof a dementedmind-set shaped by a tragicKhmer history. This human tragedy had external causes originatingin neighbouringcountries, in particular the brutalizing bombing of the country in Nixon’ssecret warduring 1969± 1972 as a`sideshow’to the Vietnam con¯ ict. 1 Butinternal determinants must be givenprimacy. For, as weshallsee below,Pol Pot’sutopiawas AngkorWat, long buried in Khmerhistory, but still very much aliveas thesoul of `Khmerness’ . Foranyone who was fortunateenough to have visited Angkor Wat before 1970,in itsprewar state, it isnotdif® cult to understandthe Khmer yearning for theglory that was theirsin ancienttimes. But times move on, and a peopleliving inthe past can easily ® nditself victim of its own mythologised grandeur. Cleansinga cultureof alien `impurities’ , seekingrevenge for `wrongs’ commit- tedlong ago, and above all, remaining `bottled up’ in permanent`mourning’ for pastcivilisations, are nosubstitute for realistic analysis as apreconditionfor progressand development. Theprimary explanation for Pol Pot’ sKillingFields lies in Khmerhistory and culture.As FrancËoisPonchaud has putit: `Without in anyway seeking to justify theexcesses ofPolPot, it appearsthat this revolution bears thestamp of Khmer 675 OZAY MEHMET culture:it istherevolt of thehinterland against the foreigners; it istherising up ofthe youth against their elders and their ancestors’ . 2 Nodoubt considerable blamemust be attributed to external actors such as theThais, Vietnamese, Frenchand Americans who, at various times in the last 500 years ofCambodian history,invaded the country and brutalised its people. But the primacy of internalover external determinants must be acknowledged, because one has toconcur with Marie A. Martin, a longtimefriend of the `martyred Khmer people’, whosejudgment was that`the Khmer people also produced the Pol Pots, theIeng Sarys, the Khieu Samphans, the barely adolescent yothea (combatants) who¼ [made]the Khmer revolution so terriblewhen ª thechildren were in powerº ’ .3 Chiefamong internal determinants has tobe the Khmer idea of kingship and power.It is ofcourse not unique, manifesting, for example, some remarkable parallelsto the Javanese ideaof power, 4 whichI haveexamined elsewhere. 5 Linkedto divine or supernatural power, the Khmer± Sanskrit idea of devaraja (godking or kingof gods) 6 legitimisesa traditionof cultworship, or `legitimacy bydivine royalty’ 7 which,by putting emphasis on form rather than substance andritual rather than accountability, places a hugesocial distance between the ruledand the ruler, elevates the patron± client relationship to thedivine order and endsup shelteringinjustice and exploitation. This divinely-sanctioned inequality, justifyingcaste andslavery for example, periodically bursts into horri® c viol- ence,as repeatedlydemonstrated in Cambodian history. Human suffering in this hierarchicaland fatalistic web of orderand disorder is partand parcel of theidea of karma (predestination)and the concept of neakmean bonn (he who has merit).Khmer society has alwaysbeen conservative and elitist: there is a relativelysmall (15%) urban and a large(85%) rural population living in quite differentworlds, but each further subdivided by greatinequalities. At thebottom ofthe social pyramid is thepoor peasantry, dependant on rice cultivation in an ecologicaland feudal order little changed since the heyday of AngkorWat. The peasantryis extremelyconservative, living a simpleand precarious life shaped bythe endless cycle of seasons andmonsoon rains. Superstition is partand parcelof this® xedworld-view