Altault Strike, Viet Nom AIR POWER: SOUTHEAST ASIA...THE INVADER RETURNS...COPYRIGHT & MILITARY AUTHOR NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1963 Air Power: E quaeizer in Southeast Asia Maj. Gen. Theodore R. Milton, usaf T he Invader Ret ur n s.................................... Col. Robert D. Johnston, usaf C opyright L aw and the Mil it a r y Author M. C. Freudenberg Air War Collece 1946-1963 ............................................................................................................................ 35 Col. John A. McCann, usaf SCIENTISTS IN B l U E ..................................................................................................................................................... 44 Col. David R. Jones, usaf Are You Rea dy for Spa c e? or Lost in the Land of AV?................................................................. 52 Col. Francis X. Kane, usaf Maj. Jack W. Hunter, usaf ^ir Operations in Viet Nam T he Vie t Nam Air Force........................................................................................................................... 60 Capt. Mack D. Secord, usaf Air Esc o r t —A COIN Air Technique..................................................................................................68 Lt. Col. James F. Sunderman, usaf R e SUPPLY IN THE PlCKLE B a R R E L .............................................................................................................................................7 4 Air University Review CoMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE D e CISION-Ma KINC P r O C E S S .....................................................................................7 7 Lt. Col. Clifton L. Nicholson, usaf Air c r a f t Tir e Management.......................................................................................................................................81 Col. Elmer G. Prohaska, usaf Air Force Review J ob-Knowledce Test ing in the Air F orce............................................................................................ 88 Dr. Chester J. Judy T he Contributors........................................................................................................................................................... 94 the cover Address manuscrípts to the Editor. Air Uni- versiti/ Review, Aerospace Studies Instituto, In our concem nbout the day-to-day Maxwell Air Force Base, Aia. Printed by the events of the limited conflict in Viet Covemment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Nam. we may tend to overlook the Copies are available from the Air University broader implications of the role of air Book Department, Maxwell Air Force Base. power in the Far East. Major General Ala.: single copy, 75 cents; yearly subscriptíon, 'Theodore R. Milton, in his article $3.50. USAF hecviuunc pu bl ic a t jo n 50-2. "Air Power: Equalizer in Southeast Asia,” challenges us to adopt a some- Vol. XV No. 1 NOVEMBEB-DECE.MBEH 1963 what wider perspective in this arca. * AIR POWER: EQUALIZBR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA M ajor Gen er a l Theodore R. M il t o n N TH E lush, green delta south of Saigon, in Southeast Asia he must consider the terms work stops in a rice paddv as a B-26 of this accord. It did, of course, provide for I bomber rattles by overhead. It is the the creation of an International Control Com- same old B-26 the peasant watched in 1953. mission, operating under the general purview But the inarkings are Vietnamese instead of of the United Nations, chaired by the U.S.S.R. Freneh, and the antagonists of record in this and England, and composed of military mem- present war are Vietnamese against Vietnam­ bers from índia, Poland, and Canada. The ese. Behind one side, of course, is interna- duties of this commission were to see that the tional Communism. Behind the other, the provisions of the Geneva accord were carried United States. out. Some nine years later this International The end of the Freneh war in Indochina Control Commission still functions. It is one was marked by the Geneva accord, and before of the more interesting sights these days at anyone can understand the military problems Tan Son Nhut, in Saigon, to watch the icc 4 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW members board their ancient Boeing Strato- gets, when identified, became a subject for liner, the same old Stratoliner that twa flew protracted negotiations, and it was sometimes in the late 1930’s, and set course serenelv for two or three w^eeks after reconnaissance had Hanoi. located a target before permission w'as given The accord of 1954 tinis inarked the end to strike it. More often the permission never of French military dominance in Indochina, carne. And so it was into this situation that although it vvould be fair to say that the pa c a k and the Thirteenth Air Force arrived in French military influence has lived on to the December 1961. present day in one wav or another. The vvith- The directives were clear, and the intent dravval of the French left a very considerable of the U.S. Government was even clearer. The vfacuuin. Except in rare instances, the Viet- directives w?ere to go into the Republic of Viet namese had not been trained for positions of Nam and establish Communications, put in a leadership in the French colonial forces and, tactical air control system, bring in an advisorv as a resnlt, were ill equipped to take over, tactical squadron, put new radars into posi- without help, the military defense of the Re- tion, build the cantonments necessary to house public of Viet Nam against either aggression the troops, and to do it all in a minimum or the increasinglv active Communist minority amount of time. The Administration s position vvithin the country. was stated much more simply: it did not in- The United States provided this outside tend to lose in the Republic of Viet Nam. help. A Military Assistance Program, and a The military scene suggested World War very substantial one at that, took on the job II all over again, and early World War II at of bolstering the government. It was a pro­ that. Officers and noncommissioned officers gram entirely dominated by classic ground- stared unbelievingly at each other as they force thinking. Its aim was to train and equip lined up. mess kits in hand, for their “C ra- a Vietnamese armv capable of withstandirig an tions. Old-timers, slogging through the mud to invasion by a similar force from North Viet their tents in the evening, had to pinch them- Nam. There was an Air Force in this program, selves to believe that it was not the old South but it was pitifully small. Overt externai ag­ Pacific Theater come to life. This time, how- gression has yet to come, but the situation in ever, the priorities were a little higher and the Republic of Viet Nam steadily worsened things moved much more quicklv. as the Viet Cong took over larger and larger Scarcely a vear and a half later the tents sections of the country and gained more and are almost all gone, and living conditions in more support, whether voluntary or not, from Southeast Asia are generally at a pretty decent the peasantry. levei. The first tactical air control system has Finally, in the fali of 1961, it looked very been replaced, from the Communications much as though the government of Viet Nam standpoint, with the very latest word in tropo- itself would be in danger of collapsing from scatter. For navigational aids we now have massive Hanoi-based infiltration and subver- tacan and the Tactical Area Positioning Sys­ sion unless immediate and sweeping measures tem. The old French airdromes at Bien Hoa, were taken. General Maxwell Tavlor, then the Tan Son Nhut, and Da Nang are graduallv President's Military Adviser, brought a mili­ being rejuvenated to modern standards. De- tary and civilian group to the scene for an tachment 2 of the lst Air Commando Group urgent and on-the-spot appraisal. The survey, has been in Viet Nam since December of 1961 in essence, showed that the armed forces were and has now flown literallv thousands of mis- incapable of dealing vvith the kind of threat sions with its Vietnamese counterparts. With- that w7as facing them. The Air Force, for out attempting to detail them here, it is suffi- example, though small, was reasonably well cient to say that our efforts in the Republic of equipped with A-1H aircraft, but there was no Viet Nam have been timely and productive. vestige of a tactical air control system. Tar-» Outside the old borders of French Indo­ AIR POWER: EQUAL1ZER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 5 china, but essential to our militarv position in Group in Laos, some progress was detectable Southeast Asia, is Thailand. in the right wing forces’ capability. Not to There are few better places for an air- overstate the case, the progress was modest. plane buff than the flight line at Don Muang, The Air Force, like the one in the Republic Bangkoks big and only airport. Anv day he of Viet Nam, was a minor appendage to the can vvatch the international jets of 21 flag program. When the U.S. Mission left Laos, carriers—Lufthansa, Quantas, Garuda, Pan there was not the vestige of a command and Am, Umted Arab Airlines, Cathav Pacific, and control system, and there was no reconnais- more. In between the comings and goings of sance capability. Lao pilots are able enough as the international traffic, our observer will see stick and rudder men and have a fine disre- vsaf F-102’s on dailv routine air defense gard for in-flight emergencies. But they, and scrambles and, from time to time, RF-101’s. the Lao Air Force, do not represent a very The Thai Air Force is flying F-86F’s, F-86L s, great force at this time. and assorted transports and trainers. Across The two countries, Thailand and Laos, the runwav he will see a C-46 taxiing out to have much in common. Their languages are take off for somewhere. C-130’s are alvvays in evidence. It is a scene—here at Don Muang—of enormous activitv. The chilian jets emphasize the commercial importance of the area. The F-102’s, the F-86s, the C-46 call attention to the basic uneasiness in Southeast Asia.