The Algerian Struggle for Democracy

Rentierism and Colonial History

Darpan Raj Gautam

Jakob Mathias Falk

Roskilde University

Basic Project Three

SIB Group 01

Supervisor: Jeannie Morgan

17th of December 2019

Character Count: 101.400 BP3 The Algerian Struggle for Democracy Group 01

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...... 2 2. Historical Overview ...... 4 3. Project Design ...... 9 4. Methodology ...... 9 4.1 Philosophy of Social Science ...... 9 4.2 Research Approach ...... 10 4.3 Methods ...... 11 4.4 Data and Limitations ...... 13 5. Theoretical Framework ...... 14 5.1 Modernization Theory ...... 14 5.2 Rentierism...... 16 5.3 Dependency Theory ...... 18 5.4 Internal-Colonization ...... 19 6. Analysis ...... 21 6.1 Modified Rentier Effect ...... 24 6.2 Modified Repression Effect ...... 25 6.3 Foreign Intervention Effect ...... 25 6.4 Internal Colonization Effect ...... 27 7. Conclusion ...... 30 8. Reflection and Discussion ...... 31 Bibliography ...... 33

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1. Introduction This project seeks to explore the persistence of authoritarianism in Algeria, in light of the pro-democracy demonstrations gripping the country since spring of 2019, part of the current wave of Arab protests referred to by some as the second Arab Spring.1

Since independence from French colonial rule in 1962 Algeria has gone through several phases of civil unrest, and attempted democratization in opposition to the FLN regimes authoritarian rule. The FLN party having ruled Algeria since independence, first as an official one-party state, later as a de facto one, committing massive government corruption along the way, and creating a system of hydrocarbon funded clientelism. This has led to the rise of a French speaking elite known as le pouvoir, oligarchs, military officers and politicians of the FLN, ruling Algeria as a new colonial regime.2

The Algerian people rose up against this system several times, most noticeably in 1988, where massive demonstrations by young Algerians, initiated a process of democratization that ultimately failed when the military took control of the country in a coup d’état in 1992 out of fear of Islamist influence in the new democratic Algeria.3 When the civil war, initiated by the coup, came to a gradual end in the late 1990’ies, official one-party rule had come to an end, and Algeria began a new era, described by several scholars as façade electoral authoritarianism.4 When the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in December 2010, and spread across the region, many observers assumed Algeria would be next in line. Many Algerians did rise up against the façade democracy in January and February of 2011, but the regime managed to ride out the storm, only giving symbolic concessions to the protesters.5

The demonstrations of 2019, part of a trend visible across the Middle East is seemingly challenging the regime in a way not seen since 1988 and perhaps never at all. Initially a protest against the ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika seeking a fifth term, the current demonstrations has been ongoing since February 2019, in opposition to those of 1988 and 2011, that only gripped the country for a few weeks. These demonstrations have managed to unite several rival groupings in Algeria, Islamists, Socialists, Seculars and Berbers, something the 2011 demonstrations failed to do. Further, the demonstrations are not localized but takes place all over the country, contrasting those of 1988 and 2011. Unlike the riots of 1988 the current demonstrations have remained completely peaceful putting further pressure on the government and gaining

1 Karim Mezran, ”Algerian demonstrations: What they mean for the future of the elite and the country,” Atlantic Council, 25-11-2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/algerian-demonstrations-what-they-mean-for- the-future-of-the-elite-and-the-country/. 2 J.N.C. Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics the Legacy of Colonial Rule, (London: Lynne Renner Publishers, 2009), 1-4. 3 Ahmed Aghrout and Yahiya Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform: Authentic Change?” Middle East Policy, 19 no. 2 (2012): 67-70. 4 Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi, eds, Democracy in the Arab World Explaining the deficit, (Ottawa: Routledge, 2011), 1st ed. 96-227. 5 Aghrout and Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform,” 70-73.

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international sympathy. The demonstrations quickly moved away from isolated anger with Bouteflika, to a demand for the resignation of the government and end to corrupt rule by the pouvoir. By peacefully occupying city centers in all major Algerian cities, the protests have managed to secure real political concessions from the regime, both Bouteflika and his prime minister resigned in April, and a constitutional council has been created with the goal of facilitating the country’s move to democracy.6

There are however causes for concern, the traditionally very powerful army, has been maneuvering back into the political arena,7 and the elections originally scheduled for April 2019, but held on December 12th, 2019 where boycotted by the protesters, as all candidates where members of the regime with close ties to Bouteflika. With the divide between protesters and government being deeper than ever, it will be interesting to see what happens next.

This trend of Algeria regime survival in the face of massive protests is quite unique and has been referred to as Algerian exceptionalism.8 While several scholars have sought to explain this exceptionalism, we find the main theory employed by most of them, namely rentierism, to be inherently flawed. Therefor it is interesting to investigate not only the patterns causing the pro-democracy protests in 1988, 2011 and 2019, but also the patterns ensuring regime survival. Especially as it seems like the trend might be at an end, with the current protests, and in the process build a rentierism theory with more explanatory power, to close the research gap. This we will do be employing an unorthodox and interdisciplinary approach, bridging international political economy, comparative politics, political science and international relations.

As such we seek to investigate:

How does the interplay between inherited colonial power structures and dependency challenge democratization in Algeria?

Further we will attempt to explain why the 2019 demonstrations, seems to take a different cause than those of 1988 and 2011.

6 Francisco Serrano,” After 8 Months on the Streets, Protesters in Algeria Aren’t Giving Up,” Foreign Policy, Accessed 26-11-2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/03/after-eight-months-on-the-streets-protesters-in-algeria-arent-giving- up/. 7 Ibid. 8 Aghrout and Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform,” 67-70.

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2. Historical Overview Prior to the French invasion in 1830, Algeria was a loosely organized province of the waning Ottoman Empire, who’s control was more monial than actual. The major cites on the coast being governed by autonomous deys and the interior by independent tribes, that payed tribute to the deys occasionally. This system remained relatively unchanged by the French invasion for the first decade and a half, the French ruling the cities on the coast, while tribal federations under leaders such as emir Abdelkader successfully defended the interior from French incursions. This was brought to an end in 1847 with the surrender of Abdelkader, when France extended its direct rule into and past the Atlas Mountains, occupying the desert beyond.9

Not only was Algeria one of the first European colonies established in Africa, it was the very first in the Middle East, and the first time the Europeans had taken over a functioning state in Africa, instead of occupying a largely unorganized tribal area. As a consequence of standardized colonial policies of autonomy not having developed yet, but more importantly due to its proximity to France, Algeria was not treated as other colonies by Paris. Instead of creating a local government, Algeria was annexed to France and divided into departments under direct French rule. To the outside world and the Algerians, France presented Algeria as being simply an extension of France, modeling the cities Algiers, Oran and Constantine in their own image. In reality the French treated Algeria much like any other colony, French citizenship, and thus civil rights, where only for Christians, mostly French emigres known as the Pied Noir, and the Algerian Jewish minority. This small group formed an apartheid system in Algeria where the vast majority Muslim population held no rights and where considered uncivilized until they became French. To secure land for the Pied Noir, and break up the tribal bonds in Algeria, communal landholding was abolished, and schemes meant to force small landholders into selling to the state, was adopted.10

The first resistance to French colonialism in Algeria, excluding the initial struggles, began by Algerian Muslims demanding citizenship. When the influential Pied Noirs forced the French state into refusing their demands, out of fear of losing their privileged position, the Algerian cause became radicalized. Demands for outright independence overshadowed those calling for citizenship and during the early 1950’ies violence in the form of sabotage and riots began to spread across the country.11 Gradually this evolved into a guerrilla war for independence, fought between the French on one side, and a myriad of smaller factions on the other, the most prominent being the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) a socialist, Pan-Arab organization. While France remained militarily in control of most of Algeria throughout the war, the situation began to take its toll politically in France, straining the French fourth Republic to the breaking point. This culminated in a

9 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 25-31. 10 Miriam Lowi, Oil Wealth and the Poverty of Politics, Algeria Compared, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 47-48 11 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 37-39.

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short lived bloodless civil war in 1958, with a military coup of the French administration in Algeria, that ended with president de Gaulle returning to power in France and the end of the fourth republic. The political strain upon France, as well as de Gaulle’s personal objections to the war, led to the Evian accords giving Algeria independence in 1962 as a democratic republic following public ratification in France and Algeria.12

However, the violence did not end with independence, as different communist and Berber socialist breakaway FLN factions began waging a war against the elected president and leader of the FLN Ahmed Ben Bella.13 President Ben Bella quickly centralized power in himself and employed the army to violently crush any signs of dissent, until the army turned on him and minister of defense Houari Boumediene seized power in 1965. Boumediene disbanded the parliament and the constitution, ruling absolutely through a revolutionary council, turning Algeria into a one-party state. Boumediene also seized control of the economy and made it subject to government five-year plans. During the Boumediene period Algeria stabilized somewhat and the government began to promote heavy industries and infrastructure projects, funded by the nascent hydrocarbon industry.14 Boumediene also sought to define what it meant to be Algerian by taking control of the public discourse to promote his idea of the national identity, based in Pan-Arabism, Socialism and secularism, while violently suppressing Berbers and Islamists. Boumediene also managed to position Algeria as one of the leading countries in the Non-Aligned movement, while still maintaining a close relationship with the Soviet Union. During this period Algeria was seen as a leader of the Pan-African and the anti-colonial movements. When Boumediene died in 1978, he had reintroduced an elected parliament with oversight functions, and a constitution two years prior, with him being elected president with 95% of the vote.15

Following Boumediene’s death, a power struggle to choose his successor began within the FLN and the army. The civilians in the party preferring a reformer that could move the country away from the strict socialist principles of the Boumediene era, and the army seeking to continue Boumediene’s policies. In the end a compromise candidate was chosen, and colonel Chadli Benjedid became president in 1979. During his reign the power struggle between the army and the party continued, as Benjedid began opening the economy and initiating ascension talks with the World Trade Organization (WTO). The economic liberalization resulted in the officers and the politicians jostling for control with the former state enterprises now made private, resulting in a growing class of oligarchs aligned with either the army of the party. Benjedid also abandoned the former focus on heavy industry and instead used the government’s growing hydrocarbon revenues, to invest in light industry, small infrastructure and the agricultural sector. When the price of oil

12 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 71-72. 13 Ibid, 72-76. 14 Lowi, Oil Wealth, 85-92. 15 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 85-97.

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crashed suddenly in 1986 it took the Algerian economy with it,16 the generous welfare state and government investments came to an end and in 1988 the Algerian youth took to the street in massive riots and demonstrations in early October, demanding an end to FLN leadership.17 Benjedid seized the moment, and made a new constitution in 1989, ending one-party rule in Algeria, making symbolic overtures the growing Islamist movement and excluded the army from the government. By far the most successful of these new parties where the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), who won more than 50% of the vote in the free 1990 municipal elections, as well as in the first round of the 1991 presidential election. The prospect of an Islamist government, and the path Benjedid had put the country on, was unacceptable to the military hardliners and on the 11th of January 1992 the army forced Benjedid to resign and handed power to the militarily controlled High Council of State, cancelling the second round of elections, dissolving the FIS and cracking down on its leadership.18

The 1992 coup was initially met with little resistance but gradually violence began to escalate and soon Algeria found itself gripped by a civil war, with the army and the FLN fighting first the FIS and later the more radical GIA splinter group consisting of returning Afghan mujahedin. This civil war, known as the Black Decade in Algeria first came to a gradual halt in 2002, with the presidency of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. During the decade of civil war, thousands of Algerian civilians were massacred, the war spilled over into France in the form of several terrorist attacks, and Algeria became completely isolated diplomatically and economically. Initially, most Western countries where apprehensions about which party to support in the civil war, the Islamists had democratic credentials, and this was before the war on terror had made the West and the Islamist movement enemies, visible in the US support for the Taliban during the Afghan-Soviet war, and the FIS rival government being based in the US. However, as the war progressed, became more violent, the Islamists more radical and their terrorist attacks hit French soil, French and American support began flowing to the Algerian government, as it was feared what the FIS might do if in control of Algeria’s hydrocarbons.19 There is scholarly debate about how early in the war France began supporting the FLN, some arguing that they did so right from the beginning. During the war, the military allowed elections, placing a series of civilian figureheads in power, the most prominent being Liamine Zèroual from 1994- 1999, who restored proper civilian rule to Algeria and began to negotiate an end to the civil war.20

Following Zèroual, the diplomat Abdelaziz Bouteflika was chosen as yet a compromise candidate between the civilian government and the army. Bouteflika having previously served as Boumediene’s foreign minister as well as President of the United Nations General Assembly. Like Benjedid Bouteflika began a gradual

16 Lowi, Oil Wealth, 104-108. 17 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 128-138. 18 Elbadawi and Makdisi, eds, Democracy in the Arab World, 96-227. 19 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 138-149. 20 Ibid, 158-162.

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process of liberalization of the economy while gradually outmaneuvering the army, when he was elected to his second term in 2004, he had purged the government of military personal. Bouteflika is also credited with finally ending the civil war in 2002 through he amnesties program, and ending Algerian isolation, by making overtures to the US, France and the EU.21 To keep the FIS out of influence and stabilize the government, Bouteflika invited two legal Islamist parties to participate in his government, the Brotherhood affiliated Movement for Society and Peace, and the Islamic Renascence Movement. Incorporating these parties in his government, also ensured that Bouteflika’s FLN would have an absolute majority in parliament, creating an opposition consisting of small Islamist and Socialist parties.22 While Bouteflika maintained the façade of a democracy, the state owned tv stations, by far the most important in Algeria, has consistently devoted their electoral coverage to the FLN, opposition parties and international observers also accusing the FLN of rigging elections resulting in continuous suspicious landslide government electoral victories throughout Bouteflika’s reign. This made voter turnout for elections, and not electoral victories, the main indicator of government legitimacy, causing anti-regime opposition parties to promote boycotts of elections, and the Algerian regime to spend significant resources promoting voter turnout, to little avail, voter turnout for presidential elections dropping from 76 % in 1995 to 39% in 2019.23 In 2006 prime minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem announced an end to presidential term limits allowing Bouteflika to stay on past his second term,24 by 2006 he was 69 years old and suffering from stomach cancer, that left him hospitalized in France for long periods of time. This led to speculation that Bouteflika was nothing more than a front figure for the oligarchic government, certainly government corruption and rent financed clientelism continued under Bouteflika, with oil prices now high, giving his government agency. This the government used when the Arab Spring spread to Algeria in early 2011, giving massive economic concessions increasing government spending by 25%, announcing the end to the 1992 emergency laws, the establishment of consultative council to propose democratic changes to the constitution and employing a massive police presence at all demonstrations in the capital. While smaller localized protests concerning more social issues continued the strategy payed of and the government managed to quell the protests, later only implementing very minute symbolic changes to the constitution.25 During his third and fourth term until 2019 Bouteflika became gradually worse, rarely seen in public, wheelchair bound and unable to speak it became more and more clear, that Bouteflika was not in charge of the government. In Algeria it became common knowledge that Bouteflika’s younger brother and the “three Bs” where running the country on behalf of the pouvoir, the

21 Ahmed Aghrout, Algeria in Transition, (London: Routledge, 2004), 197. 22 Ibid, 203-206. 23 “Algeria,” IDEA. Accessed 16/12-2019. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/97/40. 24 Aghrout and Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform,” 70-79. 25 Ibid, 67-73.

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three Bs being the president of the parliament Abdelkader Bensalah, Prime Minister Noureddine Bedoui and Interior Minister Tayeb Belaiz.26

When Bouteflika announced his intention to run for a fifth term in the April 2019 elections from his hospital bed in Switzerland, it sparked widespread protests in Algeria. Unlike the demonstrations in 2011, these could not be easily quelled, representing a much more political and ethnic diverse group of people, and being present in all major cities. During March of 2019 the demonstrations grew in size and began to be supported by the different opposition parties, when a general strike was called. Bouteflika began to promise the same concessions he had done in 2011, though this time it wasn’t enough, and when the army came out in support of the protesters Bouteflika was forced to step down on April 2nd. Abdelkader Bensalah was elected interim president by the parliament and a new election date was set in July.27 This was not enough, and the demonstrators continued to occupy the streets with demands for the end of the regime, the resignation of the three Bs as well as the Army Chief of Staff, one of whom resigned on April 16th, namely Tayeb Belaiz. At the same time several people close to Bouteflika, including his brother and people from the intelligence service were arrested. As the July election date were opposed by the demonstrators the election was postponed indefinitely until the new date of December 12th, 2019 where put forward. This date was also opposed by the protesters, who viewed any election before the resignation of the regime, to be a diversion and a tool for the continuation of the current system.28 The election did go ahead on the December 12th, with all four candidates having close ties to the regime, the winner Abdelmadjid Tebboune being a former minister and prime minister in governments led by Bouteflika as well as having military backing. This is consistent with a worrying development, namely that general Ahmad Gaid Salah had been asserting himself prior to the election, threatening the protesters when they rejected the July and December elections.29 Not only does this hint at an undoing of Bouteflika’s work removing the army from political influence, but also an entrenchment of the regime, and a renewal of the alliance between the FLN and the army, but on the army’s terms.

26 Muriam Haleh Davis, ”Algeria: The army, the people, and the three Bs,” Al Jazeera, Accessed 26-11-2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/algeria-army-people-bs-190416162721661.html. 27 Rana Jawad,” Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika drops bid for fifth term,” BBC News, Accessed 26-11-2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47531917. 28 Francisco Serrano,” After 8 Months on the Streets, Protesters in Algeria Aren’t Giving Up,” Foreign Policy. Accessed 26-11-2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/03/after-eight-months-on-the-streets-protesters-in-algeria- arent-giving-up/. 29 Adam Nossiter, “Military’s Preffered Candidate Named Winner in Algeria Election,” The New York Times. Accessed 16/12-2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/world/africa/algeria-election-protest.html.

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3. Project Design We have presented our problem area and our problem formulation, which has then been backed up with a historical overview of Algeria’s since the independence until the recent revolt in 2019. This project is an interdisciplinary project, hence us combining the syllabus from Political Science and International Political Economy (IPE) by focusing on state involvement, state’s economic policies as well as how the power structures of a country govern the states population. IPE helps us look at state development, economic policies and how a state’s economic affair heads to political conflict. Next chapter will include the Methodology, where we will explain the methodological approach in the project. Here we will explain the data collection methods, our philosophical considerations, as well as state the ethical considerations and the limitations of the methods used. Our theoretical framework includes Dependency and Modernization theory which was introduced to us in the IPE syllabus. We will also look at the internal colonization which is backed by dependency theorist that includes the syllabus from Political Science. The syllabus helps us understand the way that a state is being governed and help us understand the reason for these revolts. By covering several approaches and debates we will position our project. Then we will analyze and discuss our secondary and primary, qualitative and quantitative findings then conclude and offer future ideas for relevant research into this subject.

4. Methodology This chapter will outline our project’s philosophical approach, explaining the Critical theory and its relation to our project. Further our ontological and epistemological considerations, as well as ethical ones, and limitations will be discussed.

4.1 Philosophy of Social Science

Critical theory is an outcome of the Frankfurt school of thought, formed by a group of German American sociologists and philosophers during the interwar period. It was formed due to discontent with the existing dominant systems of thought such as Communism, Capitalism and Fascism. Critical theory traces its roots Marxism, especially Marx’s theory of emancipation, however, instead of focusing on Marx’s critique of capitalist materialism, the focus of many critical theorists is on capitalism's influence on cultural values. The main thinkers of the Frankfurt School and critical theories are Adorno and Horkheimer, who believed that cultural goods such as the television, magazine and radio were a medium of ideological control in the

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capitalist system. The critical theory believes that we need to assess social phenomenon by looking at their historical context.30

Critical Theorists argues, that it is impossible for social science to maintain neutrality and objectivity when studying social phenomena, hence it uses an interpretative approach and sees itself as a form of critical hermeneutics. Hermeneutics consists of and understanding the social sciences from an appropriate scientific method, rejecting the unity of science and positivism, focusing on interpreting material, as humans always have preconceptions based on their experiences.31 Empirical studies are not common while using a critical theory and the work is often theoretical or meta theoretical, which is also why we base our analysis theoretically. The critical theory focuses on more qualified reflection while researching and the researcher should self-reflect due to the natural tendency to interpret existing social reality. This can also be described as triple hermeneutics. Single hermeneutics is an individual’s interpretations of themselves, their reality and the meaning they assign to this reality. Double hermeneutics is attempting to understand and develop that reality. Triple hermeneutics of the critical theory also encompasses the critical interpretation of the abstract concepts such as ideologies, power, power relations. In relation to politics states and state interests are seen as something shaped by state interactions and previous experience, meaning that states are not identical and subjective. Further that relations and identities are always changing and to change the world you must challenge the dominant social order.32

4.2 Research Approach

Critical theory is a fitting approach for our project due to its emancipatory aspect, as argued by critical theorists; the role of critical theory is transformative by means of changing the status quo so that once participants become aware of how oppressed they are, they can act to transform the world. As this project seeks to uncover underlying power structures suppressing the Algerian people and maintaining the authoritarian status quo, this project certainly has an emancipatory goal. We can use history as a tool to explain social phenomena’s in the critical theory, hence us looking at the colonial history with France as well as their autocratic persistence since the independence in 1962. Further as we are studying a region and a country plagued by preconceptions and prejudice in the West, and as we as Western students not integrated into an Arabic or Algerian context, it is valuable for our research and our project to remain aware challenge our self and our notions. Researches using the critical philosophical approach while conducting research

30 Douglas Kellner, The Frankfurt School. In George Ritzer (ed.), The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Theory, (London: Sage, 2005). 31 Liv Egholm, Hermeneutics. In Philosophy of Social Science, (Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2014), 88-101. 32 Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Critical theory. In Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research, (London: Sage, 2009), 2nd ed. 144-78.

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need to question and address everything in order to produce knowledge critically. Due to us being subjective unconsciously, triple hermeneutics states that we need to be critical of our own biases and assumptions while researching and define abstract concepts in the project. Therefore, we have sought to outline our preconceptions of specific abstract concepts relevant to the research below, one might argue for even more concepts to be included, for this to truly become triple hermeneutics. Lastly our analysis and chose of theory make used of Marxist inspired approaches, fitting well with critical theories own theoretical roots.

Democracy: Rule of the people, defined as when a broad section of society can directly and legally influence how the country is governed. The opposite of authoritarianism, corruption, factionalism and suppression.

Authoritarianism: When the broad sections of society cannot influence how the country is governed. Does not have to be blatant dictatorship but can also be maintained by power structures within ostensibly democratic governments.

Modern: Enlightenment values, democracy, secularism, individualism, capitalism.

Traditional: Long-established conservative beliefs or behaviors, often religious, that have not been altered.

Western World: Inherently modern, powerful, imperialistic, well-functioning, individualist, democratic, trivial, homogenous region.

Middle East: Extremely heterogenous, polarized, “collective,” authoritarian, Islamic, conflicted, violent, non-trivial, colonized region.

Revolution: Total overthrow of the current power and status quo.

Orientalism: Racist system of thought describing the Islamic World as exotic, uncivilized, traditional, violent and homogenous.

Islamists: People, groups and parties following Islamic ideologies with varying degrees of radicalism and revolutionary tendencies.

What we especially strive to be aware of, is not to employ orientalist tropes or over generalizations, though this is very hard, when standing outside of the region looking in from a Western perspective.

4.3 Methods While conducting the research for this project, we will make use of a critical realist ontology. Ontological Realism entails that there is a reality that exists, which is independent of our knowledge of it, however, the researchers cannot decipher this reality as they are subject to their own preconceptions and experiences.

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What the researches can do instead is interpret opinions and meanings.33 Due to us all having preconceptions from our past experience and the philosophical approach of this project, our epistemology for this project will be interpretivist. It is focused on understanding the human behavior and lets the researcher interpret the findings and be a part of the research. This is in line with a critical theory approach, rejecting that the researcher can be entirely objective.34

While writing the project we will have an inductive approach. While conducting the research, we will look at the patterns from the data that we find and theorize about them to answer our problem formulation. We will use inductive approach, as major part of our research data is qualitative as well as our project being a theoretical one. In order to investigate the roots of regime survival in Algeria, we will commit to a certain amount of theory building, inductively, which is a consequence of two things. Firstly, that we found a mayor theoretical flaw in the theory traditionally used to explain regime survival in hydrocarbon producing states, namely rentierism. This flaw is the theories basis in modernization theory, which we on normative as well as empirical grounds finds lack explanatory power. Therefor we will commit to building a more critical modified rentier-state theory, both incorporating some of the criticism made by several Middle East scholars in the past, as well as formulating certain modifications ourselves with a basis in dependency theory, the normative opposite of modernization theory. This is explored in depth in the theoretical framework and analysis chapters. Secondly, we attempt to add some structure and causality by employing concepts from Simon Mabon’s theory of identity incongruence to a theory often employed to investigate authoritarianism in post-colonial regimes, namely internal colonization. This is also explained in depth in the theoretical overview.

This form of theory building will help us add to the theory and help us build our own theory that is suitable for this project. An inductive approach also aligns with our philosophy as it states that researchers should have as few precomputations as possible but still allowing us to work with these preconceptions. However, inductive approach is normally parallel with empirical studies and positivism due to the goal of finding a specific conclusion or a form of absolute truth, however the critical theory expresses that there is no one ultimate truth. We also try to test the theories which has elements of deduction however our project is more focused on theory building.35

33 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, (Italy: Oxford University Press, 2016), 5th ed. 24-28. 34 Ibid. 35 Paul Birsch Olsen and Kaare Pedersen, Problem Oriented Project Work – A workbook, (Denmark, Roskilde University Press, 2008), 2nd ed, 88.

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4.4 Data and Limitations Our research primarily consists of secondary qualitative data in the form of previously conducted scholarly work. Following through with our critical theory philosophy, as stated earlier; to challenge our notions and preconceptions we seek to employ non-Western scholars, whenever possible. This is also a limitation since scholarly work in the Middle East, by Middle Eastern scholars, might not be translated to English, and neither of us understand Arabic or French. While many works in either language are translated, a certain amount of content is bound to be lost in translation, as the literary and academic context between the three languages are quite different.

Most of our data collection will be conducted via REX, which is the Danish online library system. Originally, our plan was to travel to Algeria using our network there to conduct primary research, however due to this plan failing, we will only use peer-reviewed articles and books. This will help us circumvent the absolute need for acquiring data through primary research ourselves.

To back the data up, we will also be using secondary quantitative data to support our analysis. Here we will look for trade statistics between the several EU states and Algeria as well as various other graphs. Various institutions have survey polls, trade statistics that are documented on a yearly basis. A major source of quantitative data is the Arab Barometer, a cross country poll conducted across the Arab World measuring attitudes towards things such as democracy and secularism. The poll is conducted by face to face interviews in the respondent’s home, which might limit the number of people willing to respond, while at the same time also limiting the number of respondents due to logistical reasons.

This project was written by two students who have previously worked extensively with the Middle East and North African region, both academically and practically, which is bound to influence our analysis due to our preconceptions. We are aware that these preconceptions can have an effect on the conclusion we reach. Due to time and resource constraints, we were hindered to follow through our initial plan to travel to Algeria and conduct primary research on the political situation that aroused earlier this year. There was supposed to be a Presidential election early July that we were to observe with a Danish Youth NGO called SILBA, however the election was postponed till December 12th, 2019. Had we attended this observation mission, we would have gotten interviews with the locals that voted as well as have access to interview NGO’s, human rights activists, journalists and politicians. This would have strengthened our project as then we would not have to rely only on secondary research. The use of secondary research can be biased or not useful for our project, as a researcher always has their own question they want to answer, and their own agendas that we cannot know.

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As we are researching countries whose main language is not English, most interviews or survey polls will be translated. This can create a bias as we will not know who has translated the piece. From our previous experience while researching the Middle East, we have come to find that the governments send different messages which varies on the language that is published.

Quantitative data such as opinion polls have limitations due to them being secondary. We do not know what conditions the survey was conducted at and there could be an improper representation of the target population. In a diverse population, it is hard to control the environment and the researcher might have run into some trouble. We are unable to know the time and resources put into the data collection which might not represent a large-scale research. This might have led to a limited outcome due to closed-ended questions and data analysis can be interpretive.36

5. Theoretical Framework In this chapter we will explain, critique and compare the four theories that we will employ in the analysis, as well as introduce important concepts. These theories are modernization theory, dependency theory, rentier- state theory and internal-colonization. The first three of which are theories of international political economy and development, that explores the connection between democratization and economic circumstances.

5.1 Modernization Theory While we are not employing modernization theory directly for our analysis, it is necessary to introduce as a counter position to dependency theory (see below) in order to illustrate why we employ dependency theory, rather than modernization. Further, modernization theory forms the basis for the original rentier state theory that we seek to develop further in the analysis, therefor it is necessary to understand its framework and arguments. Arguments specific for the Algerian case will be explored in the analysis.

Modernization theory was dominant in the fields of development studies, democratization and area studies until it became eclipsed and discredited in the 1960’ies and 1970’ies only to make a comeback with the neo- liberal Washington consensus37 in 1989. Today the theory is again the dominant one, within the school on structural causes for democratization. The framework of modernization theory seeks to explain two things,

36 Olsen and Pedersen, Problem Oriented Project Work, 88. 37 A set of neo-liberal economic principles for development in developing countries. Formulated in 1989 by the World Bank and the IMF, it represented a final shift towards a neo-liberal economic world order.

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first why some countries have become “modern” and why some remain “traditional.” Further, how traditional countries can become modern.

The most influential approach to modernization theory was formulated by Walt Rostow38 in 1960 and is known as the 5 stages of growth, outlining modernization theory’s evolutionary view on economic growth and societal development. In this seminal work Rostow defined five hierarchical stages of growth that a country must move through in order to go from a traditional to a modern one. A country progresses by improving their economy, thus by increasing living standards, adopting new technologies, industrializing, and effectively utilizing local resources.39 In order to improve one’s economy, it is argued by most modernization theorists including Rostow, that economic development should not be state driven, if it is to have a meaningful and lasting impact, but rather should happen through a free and open market system that encourages private initiative and market participation. Further that economic growth is the main conduit of economic development, and that the easiest way to achieve economic growth and industrialization is to focus on exploiting one’s comparative advantage. Namely that countries should export the goods, they can produce most efficiently compared to other countries, for developing countries, this is often natural resources, such as hydrocarbons.40

Rostow argues that as a country progresses its citizens will begin to adopt so called modern values, while moving away from their previous traditional ones. Modern values include individualism, secularism and what is called a post-Newtonian world view, namely the acceptance and understanding that the physical world is governed by natural laws, that can be modified by man. Traditional views in modernization theory is understood as opposites to modern ones, collectivism, a religious world view and superstitions. Not only will values and ideas in a country change as it progresses through the five stages, so will the character of the citizens. By encouraging free market initiative, while adopting modern values, citizens will become less lazy and move away from an apathetic view towards society, instead becoming active and entrepreneurial.41

This has led many modernization theorists including Rostow but most prominently Lipset and Diamond42 to argue that that this combined process of modernity will lead societies to develop politically and become more democratic, as economic growth promotes socioeconomic changes that will promote organization and political awareness in the middle class that will lead to democratization in the long run. However, if economic growth does not happen within a free market privatized framework a county can achieve high

38 Walt Rostow, The stages of economic growth, a non-communist manifesto, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1991). 39 Ibid, 4-12. 40 Ibid, 12-16. 41 Ibid, 4-12. 42 Larry Diamond, Democracy in developing countries: Latin America, (US: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 2nd ed.

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growth rates without achieving actual political development, as argued by Dillman,43 Lowi44 and Nield.45 This is because a state-controlled economy does not encourage the development of private initiative, whether political nor economical.

Modernization theory has been criticized on the basis of empirical as well as normative arguments, firstly there is limited empirical data proving modernization theory’s arguments, and the many outlier countries particularly in the Middle East makes the broad generalizations of the theory problematic. The theory has also been criticized as orientalist. This will be explored further in the analysis.

5.2 Rentierism Building on modernization theory, rentier-state theory, examines why countries whose economies are dependent on easily obtainable external revenues, are lacking in democratic development. This means that even countries with a high growth rate can be stalled on lower stage of development than other countries with a similar sized economy. Easily obtainable revenues, refers to incomes that does not require a large manufacturing sector to obtain, only employs a very limited number of workers to produce. This type of income is known as rents. Countries dependent on rents are known as rentier-states, their economies are occupied with consuming and redistributing the rent, rather than producing or manufacturing.46 The classical example of rents are hydrocarbons, in particularly oil, but minerals and different kinds of foreign aid are also considered rents. Rentier-state theory often being employed without a theoretical framework, the Middle East scholar, Michael L. Ross sought to give the theory structure, Ross’ studies being comparative, quantitative and positivist in nature, he developed three mechanisms, that establish the causal connection between rent dependency and persistent authoritarianism. The mechanisms formulated by Ross cover both a range of structural and agency related consequences of rentierism, they are; the rentier effect, the repression effect and the modernization effect.47

The rentier effect works by giving regimes more agency on one hand, while at the same time limiting citizens desire for democracy and creating complacency with the status quo. Through the wealth available to rentier-states, they are able to purchase legitimacy or at least passivity from their citizens, buy maintaining generous welfare states, investing in infrastructure, having job guarantees and keeping local industries afloat.48 On one hand, this removes socio-economic causes of dissidence and gives citizens a vested

43 Bradford Dillman, State and Private Sector in Algeria, (US: Westview, 2000). 44 Lowi, Oil Wealth. 45 Richard Nield, “Algeria Struggles to Adapt,” The Banker (2014). 46 Rex Brynen, Pete Moore, Bassel Salloukh and Marie-Jöelle Zahara, Beyond the Arab Spring, (London: Lynne Renner Publishers, 2012), 193. 47 Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics, 53 no. 3 (2001): 327-328. 48 Ibid, 332-335.

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interested in maintaining the status quo, thus limiting their desire to challenge the regime. Further, as rents are sufficient to maintain the finances of the state, taxation becomes redundant, thus the state ceases to represent the citizens, removing any demands of “no taxation without representation.49” Lastly, the economies of rentier-states are often state controlled, that the state is in control of finances allow them to cover up state corruption.50 These effects make the citizens apathetic towards the authoritarian behavior of the government, remove their incentives to challenge the status quo and reduce the citizens desire for democracy.51

The repression effect also works both structurally and by increasing regime agency. The regimes access to almost unlimited resources allows it to maintain a big, well-funded and loyal security apparatus, visible in the fact that rentier states spend a larger percentage of their GPD and also of their government budgets on defense than non-rentier states, according to Ross. This reduces the incentive to challenge the regime and increases the regime’s ability to suppress dissents.52

As the name reveal the modernization effect predicts that as an economy becomes more industrialized, diversified and capitalist, the citizens will become more supportive of democracy, and push the country on a gradual often non-violent path towards democratic reform. As easy access to hydrocarbon rents removes the need and incentives to develop local industries, and as it allows for the state to maintain a very high degree of control with the economy, rentier-states are able to become wealthy in terms of GDP per capita without developing their economies.53 As also argued by Dillman,54 that the state can create client rentier networks, causing the economic development to halt, also halting democratic development by making citizens and elites placid. This will make citizens less inclined to support democracy, and stop the development of an independent middle class, something instrumental in creating a democracy according to modernization theory.55

Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar employs a slightly different rentier-state theory, based on criticism of Ross. They propose three revisions to rentier-state theory, first the importance of historical context, such as colonial legacies and relations between rulers and elites. Secondly, regional conflict and security, the entrenchment of patronage networks and the role of the military in domestic politics. And finally, that different rents do not have the same effect, for example oil rents and aid rents are argued to have different

49 A popular slogan used by American revolutionaries during the Revolutionary War, refers to American dissatisfaction with paying taxes to the British Crown, without receiving the same representative rights in parliament that British subjects in the UK itself did. 50 Michael L. Ross, “Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring?” Foreign Affairs, 90 no. 5 (2011): 2-3. 51 Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” 332-335. 52 Ibid, 333-336. 53 Ibid, 336-337. 54 Dillman, State and Private Sector, 9-11. 55 Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” 336-337.

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consequences. Overall Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar conclude that rents themselves can explain very little, only in the context explained above do rent make sense as a variant in analyzing democratic development or lack thereof.56

As such the rentier-state theory of Ross, and to a certain extent Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar argues in accordance with modernization theory, that the consequences of rentierism, is that citizens of rentier-states become unproductive and limited their initiative, corrupting democratic development as well as economic. In the analysis we will demonstrate the problems of this theory and seek to modify it in accordance with dependency theory, to expand its explanatory potential.

5.3 Dependency Theory In opposition to modernization theory, dependency theory refutes both the causes for underdevelopment and the means to achieve development put forth in the section above. As argued by the father of dependency theory, Paul Prebisch states that developing countries are not underdeveloped as a consequence of traditional values or a lack of initiative, rather as a consequence of exploitation by imperialist Western powers. The neo- liberal Washington consensus and its focus on comparative advantage, is argued to be inherently flawed, and meant to protect Western interests in developing world, by keeping developing countries in a relation of dependency to the dominant countries in the West. Inspired by Marxism, Prebisch is still the dominant theorist within dependency theory.57

In dependency theory, the “world system” is divided into underdeveloped periphery states and developed core states, the periphery being economically and politically dependent on the core, this relationship is often between a former colony and former colonial power. The system is maintained in part by the neo-liberal economic order, as recommendations to export according to comparative advantage leads periphery states to export unprocessed raw materials and resources to the core, preventing them from developing their own industries. Instead periphery countries import expensive manufactured products, often manufactured versions of the raw material they exported themselves, from the core, making the core rich and maintaining poverty in the periphery.58 Prebisch argued that periphery countries should adopt a certain measure of protectionism and state control with the economy, to promote local industries in order to catch up to the core.59

56 Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahara, Beyond the Arab Spring, 208. 57 Georgio Secondi eds, The Development Economics Reader, (London: Routledge, 2008), 58-64. 58 Ibid. 59 Robert O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy, (UK: Palgrave, 2016), 5th ed. 222-226.

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Dependency’s consequence for democratization is explored further by the likes of Elmusa,60 Bollen,61 Albinyana and Estrada,62 Aghrout63 and Ferraro.64 Ferraro and Elmusa arguing that dependency is maintained voluntarily by the elites of dependent countries, these elites are often educated in the core states, and in former colonies, they will often seek to emulate the former colonial elites, reiterating the colonial regimes in their own countries. Not only does this mean treating their citizens as colonized uncivilized peoples, but also a maintaining of the colonial economy, selling cheap raw materials to the motherland. Apart from the core states, the beneficiaries of this system are the elites of the periphery states.65 Elmusa and Bollen argue, that as the elites behave like colonizers, they will not give up political power, creating a clientelist authoritarian system, funded by export incomes.66

In continuation of this authors such as Elmusa and Cavatorta,67 argues that in a dependent country, selling strategically important raw materials to the core, direct external influence from the core is more likely to ensure stability of the deliverance of the resource, for example hydrocarbons. This leads to direct political support for the status quo, and the maintenance of authoritarian regimes.68

Dependency theory has similar weaknesses to modernization theory, it is also constituted by broad generalizations, and the empirical basis of its arguments can similarly be argued to be just as shaky. Dependency theory’s Marxist roots and its emphasis on revealing suppressive power structures goes hand in hand with out critical approach.

5.4 Internal-Colonization While closely related to the arguments on democratization and authoritarianism made by the dependency theorists, the concept of internal-colonization is also employed by other scholars. Internal-colonization refers to two different interplaying processes, one is the reiteration of internalized colonial structures and ideas left

60 Sharif Elmusa, “Dependency and Industrialization in the Arab World,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 8 no. 3 (1986): 253- 267. 61 Kenneth Bollen, “World System Position, Dependency and Democratization,” American Sociological Review, 48 no. 4 (1983): 468-479. 62 Roger Albinyana and Aurèlia Mañé-Estrada, “Energy Interdependence. The Linkage of the Political Economy of Algeria´s Natural Gas With that of the Western Mediterranean Region,” (University of Barcelona, 2018). 63 Ahmed Aghrout, Algeria in Transition, (London: Routledge, 2004). 64 Secondi, Development Economics, 58-64. 65 Ibid, 58-64. 66 Elmusa, “Dependency and Industrialization,” 253. 67 Francesco Cavatorta, The international dimension of the failed Algerian transition, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 68 Elmusa, “Dependency and Industrialization,” 253.

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behind in former colonies, and the other a strategy of domination employed by regimes of former colonies, informed by the left-over structure. Internal-colonization is a vague term, escaping a clear definition.

Elbadawi and Makdisi,69 Volpi,70 Brumberg71 and Hill72 argue that colonial rule was maintained by fragmenting previous social structures and groups, promoting certain groups and suppressing others, thus pitting the colonized society against itself with the colonizers as the power brokers, and mediators. The active policy of internal-colonization refers to this method of domination being inherited by regimes of former colonies after independence, and resulting in the pitting of different ethnic, religious, political or class groups against each other, with regimes supporting some and suppressing others. This prevents the rise of a united opposition to the regime and creates a clientelist system between the elite and certain groups in society, either depending on regime support or fearing rival groups. Further internal-colonization entails the process of elites colonizing the economies of their country, creating a clientelist system of regime cliques in control of nominally private enterprises, and thus state control with the economy.73 Both processes strengthening regime control with their countries and weakening opposition thus challenging democratization.

Hill continue by arguing much along the lines of Elmussa and Bollen, that Western political and cultural ideologies and notions used to justify colonialism has been internalized in the elites and regimes of former colonies. These ideologies, especially “the mission to civilize,” is not only used to justify policies, but also inform them.74 “The mission to civilize” being the slogan for an ideology, painting non-Europeans as uncivilized barbarians unfit to rule themselves and their lands, until they had become civilized and as such European. This meant an adoption of the same so-called modern values, described by the modernization theorists. This entrenches the elites of former colonies as colonizers themselves, separate from their populations, and with a view of their citizens as unworthy to govern themselves, according to Hill.75

To give us a framework and a vocabulary to explain and investigate internal-colonization, we look to the scholar on international relations in the Middle East Simon Mabon. Mabon in his theory is the Incongruence Dilemma, formulated to explain the causes of inter-Arab conflicts, coining two concepts relevant for us. Mabon being a realist of the Montreal School.76 The first concept is identity groups, this term describes, social, ethnic, religious, class and political groups, with defined and strong identities. The second term is

69 Elbadawi and Makdisi, eds, Democracy in the Arab World, 11-41. 70 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab World, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), 326-338. 71 Ibid, 96-112. 72 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 31-35. 73 Elbadawi and Makdisi, eds, Democracy in the Arab World, 11-41. 74 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 1-4. 75 Ibid. 76 Realist scholars on the Middle East, refuting central realist concepts such as the rational state as a unitary and sole actor in the international system.

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ideological sovereignty, meaning the regimes control of the narrative of the national identity of the state and the people. Just as strong identity groups can challenge the territorial sovereignty of a state, in case they want to secede, they can also challenge the ideological sovereignty of regimes. Ideological sovereignty refers to the regime’s narrative of the state, its monopoly on the definition of the state, its national identity and its ideology, if an identity group challenges this, it challenges the survival of the current regime.77 This helps to explain why regimes support certain identity groups and suppress others, and how narratives, ideas and identities shape political outcomes and alliances. This allows us to explain why regimes support certain groups over others, in a process of internal-colonization.

The link between internal-colonization and the agency offered to regimes by rents we seek to illustrate in this project, as it has not been sufficiently examined yet, this will be done in the analysis.

6. Analysis As briefly covered in the theoretical framework, modernization theory has several weaknesses, these weaknesses have been inherited by rentier-state theory, as the theory’s basis in modernization theory causes it to reiterate these problems. We argue that rentier-state theory holds the greatest potential to explain the lack of democratization in Algeria, however not in its current state. This research gap we will attempt to fill by implementing some of the modifications made by Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar, as well as developing new modifications. These new modifications to the rentier-state theory will be based in internal- colonization and dependency theory as opposed to modernization theory.

As mentioned in our philosophical approach section, following a critical philosophy of science means de- emphasizing the necessity of empirical data as the foundation for the generation of knowledge. As such our analysis is based in theory, secondary quantitative data and rationalization. A critical and inductive approach is a good basis from which to conduct theory building, which will expand the explanatory potential of the rentier-state theory and answer our problem formulation in the process.

Adopting the predictions of modernization theory raises a question when discussing Algeria, as the country have experienced prolonged periods of economic growth based on comparative advantage exports, namely hydrocarbons, but still have not “progressed” politically, in that it has remained undemocratic.

77 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia & Iran Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East, (London: I.B Tauris, 2013), 8-21.

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Authors such as Kedourie78 and Barber79 deals with this anomaly by arguing that Islamic and Arab values are inherently anti-modern. This position also presents a take on modernization theory, in which modern values does not follow as a consequence of economic development but are rather a pre-requisite of development. Kedourie argues, that tribalism and Islamic resistance to secularism is not only inherent in Arab and Islamic populations, but that animosity towards the Western world, seen as representing modern values, have entrenched anti-modernism in the Middle East. Further that studies showing Arab support for democracy, are flawed as Arabs do not understand what is meant by the Western notion of democracy.

Authors such as Dillman,80 Lowi,81 and Nield,82 instead pointing to the persistence of rent financed state control with the Algerian economy, to explain the persistence of authoritarianism in the country. The period of socialist planned economy from independence in 1962 till liberalization in the late 1980’ies, being followed by informal state capitalism.83 The authors arguing that the Algerian economy is controlled by oligarchs who are also part of the regime, while being formally liberalized. That the state, instead of private initiative has directed economy development, is argued to have prevented the spread of modern values, private initiative and political awareness.84

The culture arguments made above, that Arab or Islamic culture should be opposed to democracy is refuted by most scholars of the Middle East today, as argued by Elbadawi and Makdisi,85 Yafi,86 as well as Cavatorta,87 on the basis that they are broad generalizations with no foundation in data, and that the qur’anic citations used to justify these arguments are handpicked.

However, we argue that the arguments made by the modernization theorists above, that a lack of economic development and privatization have made the Algerians, or other Arabs, apathetic and lethargic are similarly orientalist generalizations with no basis in data. This stand is strengthened by the empirical studies by Tessler, Jamal and Robbins.88 In their Arab Barometer, Tessler, Jamal and Robbins show overwhelming support for democracy understood as rule of the people, and secularism in the Middle East, particularly in Algeria, with 74% of Algerian respondents, stating that democracy is the best form of government despite its

78 Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture, (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994). 79 B. R. Barber, Jihad Versus McWorld, (London: Corgi Books, 2003). 80 Dillman, State and Private Sector, 9-11. 81 Lowi, Oil Wealth, 190-192. 82 Nield, “Algeria Struggles to Adapt.” 83 Ibid. 84 Dillman, State and Private Sector, 129-136 85 Elbadawi and Makdisi, eds, Democracy in the Arab World, 11-41. 86 Wissam Yafi, Inevitability of Arab Democracy New Realities in an Ancient Land, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 87 Cavatorta, The international dimension, 1-9. 88 Diamond and Plattner, Democratization and Authoritarianism, 45-54.

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problems.89 The arguments made by the like of Kedourie that Arabs do not understand democracy, and thus cannot answer the question properly, we argue to be an orientalist generalization. Modernization theory, and its notions of traditional values, further has problematic associations to the “mission to civilize” ideology which makes it particularly problematic to employ in a former colony such as Algeria.

As demonstrated above modernization theory is problematic at least when analyzing Algeria and the Middle East, these issues causes Ross’ rentier-state theory to have several major limitations and weakness, especially as we reject the argument that rentierism makes citizens less inclined towards democracy. This is since each round of the Arab Barometer has shown growing and overwhelming support in all Arab countries tested, for democracy particularly in Algeria.90 This turns the modernization effect and the more structural arguments of Ross invalid. Further it is necessary to understand that for Ross the only relevant rent is natural resources, in particularly oil. While this perception of rents might be to narrow when dealing with the Middle East in general, it makes sense in the case of Algeria, as the country does not receive economic aid of any significance, aid being another major source of potential rents. There is however one major difference between the Algerian case and the rentier-states in the Persian Gulf studied by Ross, namely that Algeria’s much larger population and relatively smaller quantities of hydrocarbons, maintains the need for taxation,91 invalidating a major aspect of the rentier effect, as described by Ross.

That Algeria is indeed a rentier-state in the periphery dependent on exporting hydrocarbons to the core, is visible in the fact that 97% percent of Algerian exports were constituted by hydrocarbons in 2017, this number remaining almost constant as far back as data was available in the UN COMTRADE database, namely to 1992.92 Further in the fact that the revenues of this hydrocarbon export make up around 20 percent of the Algerian GDP.93 And lastly that Algeria despite its massive exports of hydrocarbons are running a trade deficit, since it must import almost everything from abroad, due to the lack of domestic industry, the largest post being machinery and technologies of different kinds, all highly processes and manufactured products. Algeria’s largest export markets have since 1992 been EU countries, notably Italy, France and Spain, as well as the US. China overtaking the old colonial rulers in France as the largest importer of goods in 2013 while France still occupy the second place.94

We agree with the main argument made by Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar in their revised version of rentier-state theory, arguing that the effects of rentierism on democracy have very little explanatory power if

89 “Algeria,” Arab Barometer. Accessed 12/16-2019. https://www.arabbarometer.org/countries/algeria/. 90 Diamond and Plattner, Democratization and Authoritarianism, 45-54. 91 “Algeria,” Trading Economics. 2011. Accessed 11/18-2019. https://tradingeconomics.com/algeria/tax-revenue- percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html. 92 “UN COMTRADE,” United Nations Statistics Database. Accessed 12/17-2019. https://comtrade.un.org/labs/dit- trade-vis/?reporter=12&type=C&year=2013&flow=2&commodity. 93 “Algeria,” OPEC. Accessed 12/17-2019. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/146.htm. 94 “UN COMTRADE.”

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not put in a wider context, especially the existence of internal or international conflicts, the influence and goals of foreign powers and inherited colonial structures.95 That this is the case, is proven by the clear limitations of Ross’ structuralism as argued above, instead only his points based in agency, that rentier regimes can buy complacency from their populations, and have bigger and better security services than other authoritarian states appears as valid variables, and only if set in a wider context. In this case the context we emphasize is inherited colonial power structures, and interference by foreign powers.

This modified rentier-state theory, we dub: Dependency-rentierism. The mechanisms of our theory, being the modified rentier and suppression effects. Further adding two mechanisms of our own, based in dependency theory, rather than Ross’ modernization theory, and applicable only to former colonies who’s rents stem from resource exports, such as hydrocarbons. As such this theory is tailored to the Algerian case.

6.1 Modified Rentier Effect Rejecting that the Algerian regime can buy passivity and apathy towards the authoritarian rule of the pouvoir through welfare programs and government investments, is not the same as rejecting the effects of these programs. We argue that, rather than prohibiting the development of a politically aware and active citizenry, programs of generous government subsidies have instead created a clientelist system, in which large sections of the Algerian population are dependent on the survival of the regime. Further rent financed government subsidies, investments and welfare grants, have created a situation where the state can alleviate the social causes of uprisings to a certain extent, and buy off citizens to accept the political situation in exchange for subsidies or tax breaks. This is what Laabas and Bouhouche term the “authoritarian bargain.”96 It can also be demonstrated that both the 1988, 2011 and 2019 uprisings coincided with a significant drop in crude oil and natural gas prices a few years in advance. For crude oil in 1986, 2009 and 2014, and for natural gas 2009 and 2014.97 Once this drop in Algeria’s rent revenues took place in 1988 coupled with the results of the economic liberalization, the Algerian state was not able to uphold its part of the “authoritarian bargain” and the citizens therefor had no reason not to demonstrate against the regimes authoritarian behavior. However, it also appears as if the regime learned its lesson following the 1988 uprisings, creating one of the world’s largest oil funds, giving the regime agency to immediately give massive economic concessions to the demonstrators in 2011, increasing government spending with 25% in the 2012 budget in subsidies on things such as energy and food. This was according to Aghrout and Zoubir a main reason why the demonstrations in 2011 did not amount to much.98 In 2019 the Algerian economy was stretched to its limits, unemployment being at least at

95 Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahara, Beyond the Arab Spring, 208. 96 Elbadawi and Makdisi, eds, Democracy in the Arab World, 196-127. 97 “Crude Oil Prices – 70 Year Historical Chart,” Macrotrends. Accessed 12/17-2019. https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart. 98 Aghrout and Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform,” 70-79.

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35% and the cost of living have risen to the breaking point for many Algerians.99 One of the reasons for the relative political success of the 2019 protests, compared to those of 2011, might therefor be, that the regime has not been able to buy off protesters with economic concessions. This does however not answer why the Algerian opposition seem to be much more unified today than in 2011.

6.2 Modified Repression Effect During the 2011 demonstrations in Algiers, the police presence significantly outnumbered the protesters according to Aghrout and Zoubir,100 further Algeria has by far the biggest military spending of any African nation, being the biggest spender in the Arab region as well, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, its military budget increasing rapidly in 2011. Algeria’s defense spending in 2018 reaching 9.5 billion dollars out of a GDP in 2018 on 178.3 billion dollars.101 Algeria’s ability to finance its security services with this amount of money, is due to its rent wealth, without which this would not be possible. This is quite significant and gives the Algerian regime significant agency in repressing uprisings, as seen during the Berber Spring uprisings of the 1980’ies, the civil war of the 1990’ies and during 2011.

A main point of Ross’ repression effect is that regimes can buy loyalty from the army. In Algeria the army’s loyalty towards the civilian government has always been dubious and in periods the army has been outright disloyal taking control of the country. However, as the army and the FLN party regime is intertwined and integrated into each other through Algeria’s oligarchic economy, the pourvoir regime has remained the same, despite coups and superficial presidential changes. In relation to the 2019 protests, it is interesting to observe that army support for the demonstrators was instrumental in president Bouteflika’s resignation in April 2019. However, the rest of the regime is still in power, supported by the army, and the army chief general Ahmad Gaid Salah acting as the country’s de facto leader since Bouteflika’s resignation, supporting the December 2019 elections boycotted by the protesters.102

6.3 Foreign Intervention Effect The foreign intervention effect, that the existence of strategically important resources encourages foreign intervention in support of the status quo, to ensure the stability of the deliverance of the resource, if the status quo is favorable to foreign powers. This interplays with dependency theory, as the foreign powers with the

99 “Algeria economy: Where has all the money gone?” Al Jazeera. Accessed 12/17-2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2019/03/algeria-economy-money-190323072227306.html. 100 Aghrout and Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform,” 70-79. 101 “Algeria Military Expenditure,” Trading Economics. 2011. Accessed 12/17-2019. https://tradingeconomics.com/algeria/military-expenditure. 102 “Military’s Preferred Candidate Named Winner in Algeria Election.”

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most incentive to intervene are the core states the rentier periphery state is dependent upon. Further it builds on Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar’s arguments, that the goals and influences of foreign powers directly influence democratic development in the rentier-state.

Daguzan103 in his article, tracks and analyzes the French relationship with their three former North African colonies, and French democratization efforts. Here Daguzan argues, that French policy in the first 30 years after Algerian independence was characterized by a reluctance to engage and challenge the Algerian government in relation to democratization. This was caused by what Daguzan deems the French intelligentsias’ sympathy for the Algerian cause, a feeling of guilt following the Algerian liberation war, that French presidents wanted to make a model example of a working relationship between a former colonizer and colony, in order to encourage other former French colonies to engage in closer cooperation. And finally, that France had come to depend on Algerian natural gas. This led to French policy makers ignoring the authoritarian and oligarchic behavior of the Algerian state, in trade and aid deals, contrary to French policies for their Sub-Saharan African former colonies, allowing authoritarian rule to take hold in Algeria unopposed. Daguzan further argues that in the early stages of the Algerian civil war, the French stance was ambiguous, but when the civil war spilled over into French territory, with a string of terrorist attacks, French support shifted gradually towards the Algerian government.

This ambiguity towards the Algerian civil war was also held by the United States, who initially allowed the FIS to set up its rival government in the US.104 In this context it is important to remember that the FLN government had been closely aligned with the USSR and had been a leader of the Non-Aligned movement together with Communist China.105 This was still fresh in memory as the civil war began the same year the USSR collapsed, similarly just a few years after the US had supported the Taliban in its struggle against the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, a war that had vitalized the international Islamist movement, and in which many of the militant branch of the FIS had participated.106 However as explored by Cavatorta French and American support for the Algerian government during the civil war was vital, if not the cause of the gradual government victory.107

Following the civil war, during the early presidency of Bouteflika, France and the US helped reestablish Algeria’s legitimacy on the world stage, facilitate its integration into the liberal global economy, and France as a gatekeeper to the EU, aided Algeria in acquiring free trade agreements with the block.108 Especially after the beginning on the war on terror, where Algeria became one of the most essential US allies against Al-

103 Jean-François Daguzan, “France, Democratization and North Africa,” Democratization, 9 no. 1 (2002): 135-148. 104 Ibid. 105 Aghrout, Algeria in Transition, 197. 106 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 138-149. 107 Cavatorta, The international dimension, 133-140. 108 Daguzan, “France, Democratization and North Africa,” 135-148.

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Qaeda. Since the country’s vital oil and gas fields are found in the vulnerable south of Algeria, did direct Western military aid and support begin to flow to the Algerian regime. This was too sure the regime up against the FIS threat, facilitate the conflict against Al-Qaeda in the Sahara Desert and protect vital oil and gas fields in the south of the country.109 This international recognition and support have not only strengthened the regime in material terms, it has also given it legitimacy in the eyes of the world and internally in Algeria.110

It can be reasoned that if Algeria had not been in control of massive hydrocarbon reserves, foreign support for the authoritarian regime would never have as extensive. This is however muddied, as the foreign support is also ascribed to Algeria’s strategic location, close to Europe and occupying a vast section of the Sahara Desert.

6.4 Internal Colonization Effect Most importantly for our modified theory is the internal-colonization effect. The economies of former colonies at the time of independence, where geared solely towards the export of resources to the colonizing country. As argued in dependency theory, this economic structure has remained largely the same, as countries in a dependent and dominant relationship are often former colonies and colonizer.111 Apart from the colonizing country, small colonial elites in the colonies where the beneficiaries of this economic system.112 Today the elites of the former colonies are continuing this trend, behaving as the former colonial elites did, exporting resources to the former colonizers in exchange for rents, that they employ to strengthen their rule, and weaken every potential opponent. This results in an amplification of the effects of internal- colonization as well as enhancing the tools that rentier-state regimes can employ in their internal- colonization schemes.

Hill tracks how certain ideas and political structures where created by, and as a reaction against, French colonial rule in Algeria. And how this informs the political arena in Algeria today.113 Hill tracks how the two central ideas that informed French colonial policy has shaped the Algerian regime behavior today. Firstly, the French concept that were used to justify the European colonization of Africa and Asia, “the mission to civilize.” The goal of civilizing the Algerians, by making them give up their religion, tribal connections and embrace French and the French way of life was the central policy of the colonial regime in Algeria. This idea is visible in the many policies designed to break up tribes, by outlawing communal property holding and

109 Yafi, Inevitability of Arab Democracy, 47-57. 110 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 138-149. 111 Elmusa, “Dependency and Industrialization,” 253. 112 Secondi eds, Development Economics, 62. 113 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 1-4.

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denying civil rights to non-Christians, allowing a largely French émigré community to establish a religiously based apartheid system in Algeria.114 This elite became known to ordinary Algerians as le pouvoir – the power. Visible in the fact, that the elite is still known as the pouvoir,115 is that the new elite that inherited Algeria from the French behaved in accordance with the principles of the colonial elite. French speaking, educated in the West and in control of both the economic and political power in Algeria, Hill argues that the pouvoir has continued to view the poor rural parts of Algeria, and its conservative, tribal and Berber population as an uncivilized medieval people, needing to learn civilization before they can be allowed to participate in the political process.116

The pouviour internalizing the French idea of civilization, secularized, French speaking and nationalist, nationalism being the second concept informing French colonial policy. This has left the FLN party to define “Algerianess” as secularism, nationalism, Arabism and socialism, with itself at the core. Any attempts to challenge this definition of Algeria, has been met with harsh suppression, and exclusion from the political arena, out of fear that even the slightest dissent to these internalized French values, would challenge regime legitimacy or ideological sovereignty.117 As such Berbers, tribes and Islamists have been suppressed, and kept out of influence since independence,118 and apart from symbolic moves under the precedency of Bouteflika,119 they still are, exactly as they were by the French.

As such the Algerian elite, not only reiterates the values of the colonial regime, but also the power structures, the agency offered to the pouvoir by hydrocarbon rents have allowed them to do so more pervasively than they otherwise could. The massive state corruption, plaguing the country further moves the Algerian rent wealth into the hands of the pouvoir rather than those of ordinary Algerians, almost like colonial regimes siphoning wealth back to the mother country. This process has been unchanged even through the restructuring of the Algerian economy. Until the early 1990’ies when Algeria began to privatize their economy, as part of a yet incomplete ascension process to the WTO, the economy was dominated by state owned enterprises, and Algeria’s economy was run by the state as a planned economy. However, with the privatization and limited liberalization of the economy a new class of military-political business people arose, with politicians and military officers becoming CEO’s of nonminimally private companies, colonizing the Algerian economy further, and ensuring that hydrocarbon rents remain firmly within the control of the pouvoir. Today the economy is still kept within the control of the pouvoir, laws being set up to tightly control foreign investment, and prohibit rival companies from competing with those of the pouvoir. More directly the company extracting and exporting hydrocarbons in Algeria, namely SONATRACH is state

114 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 1-4. 115 ”Algerian demonstrations: What they mean for the future of the elite and the country.” 116 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 196-201. 117 Ibid, 78-79. 118 Ibid, 102-103. 119 Aghrout and Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform,” 74-79.

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owned.120 This oligarchic linkage between the regime and the economy is also made visible by Transparency International, measuring corruption in the public sector across the globe. In their 2018 analysis, they rank Algeria as the 105th most corrupt state, out of a total of a 180, further government corruption was a main motivation behind the 2019 uprisings. That the economy is so closely controlled by the regime, gives them greater agency in using economic tools as well as suppression to promote or demote certain groups in society, as described above, and in the sections on the rentier and repression effects.121

By suppressing some identity groups, the Berbers and the Islamists, and supporting, the French speaking elite and the secular middle class, the regime has played these different groups out against each other, leaving themselves as the only political actor, viewed as legitimate by more than one sector of the population, and as the mediator between the different groups, necessary for the stability of the country.122 This has forced the middle class to support the regime out of fear of the Islamists, the Arab nationalists out of fear of Berber separatism, and the tribes out of fear for each other.123 In the end this has resulted in the prevention of a rise of a unified opposition to the regime, as argued by Ahgrout and Zoubir, was the main reason the 2011 uprisings did not amount to much. As this policy of domination was the tool employed by colonial regimes, it is clear that post-colonial elites reiterated it in accordance with the values and structures they also inherited. This suppression or support are carried out by both means of force of violence, by economic incentivizes or by access to media and public discourse.124

In the case of Algeria, this process is visible in the late 1980’ies and early 1990’ies when the Islamist identity group seriously challenged the pouvior elite’s ideological sovereignty and were as such harshly suppressed. This came about as a consequence of the liberalization of Algeria following the 1988 riots, where the Islamist FIS party won the elections, challenging the regime directly, resulting in the army reestablishing the status quo, maintaining the ideological sovereignty of Algeria within pouvoir control. This resulted in a civil war between the regime and the Islamist identity group. This process is also visible today, where the regime has coopted certain tame Islamist movements, inviting them into the broad government coalition, while still suppressing any attempt by other Islamist movements to enter the political arena and the public discourse.125 Further by the introduction of the Berber Tamazight language as a national language of Algerian in 2016, as an overture to the Berber Kabyle region, that has traditionally been a hotbed of government opposition, as during the Berber Spring riots of the 1980’ies then faced with harsh suppression.126

120 Nield, “Algeria Struggles to Adapt.” 121 Lowi, Oil Wealth, 124. 122 Elbadawi and Makdisi, eds, Democracy in the Arab World, 11-41. 123 Aghrout and Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform,” 67-70. 124 Elbadawi and Makdisi, eds, Democracy in the Arab World, 11-41. 125 Aghrout and Zoubir, “Algeria’s Path to Reform,” 74-79. 126 Ibid.

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While internal-colonization promotes regime survival in the short run, it might make countries more prone to civil war or revolution, as it maintains an extremely polarized situation, where different groups are constantly pitted against each other, and where certain groups does not view the government as legitimate. It can almost be described as a situation of cold civil war. Indeed, former colonies in Africa and Asia, where policies of internal-colonization are prevalent, seems to be more prone to revolutions and civil wars than other countries. Thus, it can be argued, that internal-colonization is actually bad for regime survival in the long run, but this is not a definitive pattern as some of the most persistent and long running authoritarian regimes are also to be found in former colonies.

7. Conclusion In this project we attempted to explain How the interplay between inherited colonial power structures and rent dependency challenge democratization in Algeria? To answer this problem formulation, we took an inductive and critical approach and sought to develop a theory to fill the research gap we had identified, and to answer our problem formulation. This research gap stemmed from the widespread use of Modernization theory to explain the lack of democratization in the Middle East and Algeria. Due to the dominance of Modernization theory, the theory we found to have the most explanatory potential, namely rentier-state theory, also took its basis in Modernization theory. We demonstrated that Modernization theory is problematic, stemming from empirical as well as normative issues, therefor we substituted it for Dependency theory, as the basis for a new rentier-state theory; Dependency-Rentierism. First detailing how Algeria as a periphery state is dependent on core states in Europe, both culturally and politically, through its export of hydrocarbons to Europe. Employing elements of the original rentier-state theory by Michael L. Ross while also constructing some of our own based in Dependency theory and the theory of internal-colonization. This we argue extended the explanatory power of the theory significantly. In the process of theory building we attempted to answer our problem formulation.

We created the modified rentier effect, detailing how rents has allowed the Algerian regime agency and resources to create a clientelist system that has made the Algerian populace either economically dependent on the regime, or at least allowed the regime to buy off protesters with economic concessions. With the modified repression effect, we looked at how rent revenues have allowed the Algerian regime to maintain a strong well-funded military and police force, giving them agency to suppress protesters and discourage civil disobedience.

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Further we established the foreign intervention effect, detailing how French and American direct political, economic and military support had strengthen regime survival as well as legitimacy, to ensure the stability of Algeria’s hydrocarbon exports to the European core states. Finally, through the internal-colonization effect, how rent revenues and the dependency relationship on France caused the Algerian elite to assume the role of a colonizer in their own country, using rent financed agency, to suppress their populace and keep them out of political influence, based in an ideology delegating them to uncivilized traditional peoples, an ideology inherited from colonial France. Similarly, how rents had allowed the Algerian elite to play out different sections of society against each other, maintaining the regime as the strongest power in the country, and preventing the rise of a unified opposition.

Dependency theory, expressing that the regime is dependent on their export of hydrocarbons as well as Algeria being dependent on their former colony. This is also why we have decided to focus on the effect foreign intervention has on Algeria’s democratic development. The foreign powers also have the incentive to intervene in the state’s politics such as France on the case of Algeria. Inter-colonization effect, expressing that the Algerian Elite are emulating the French by calling their own population for uncivilized and acting as if they are inherited colonizers of their own state. These four mechanisms go hand in hand, while discussing the interplay between the inherited colonial power structures as well as rent dependency on why Algeria has been challenged democratic development.

8. Reflection and Discussion If we had used other methods as well as other philosophical considerations, our project would have no doubt looked differently. As critical theory states that it is impossible to find the definitive truth about a phenomenon, had we adopted a more positivist philosophy this approach would have been radically different, prevent us from having such a theoretical, speculative and rationalizing analysis. The use of more primary data would have been very interesting as a qualifier of some of our rationalizing arguments. Had we had more time and resources on our hands, it would have been interesting and fruitful for our analysis to expand Dependency-rentierism, by looking at the effects of inter-regime conflict between the army and the FLN party, the roles of regional conflicts, such as the Western Sahara situation or the Islamists insurgencies in the Sahel and the Sahara. Further it would have been validating for our research if we had been able to use more time and space validating the causal relationship between the economic arguments of dependency theory with the democratization arguments of internal-colonization.

As asked in the introduction it is interesting to question why the 2019 demonstrations have seemingly developed differently than those of 2011, with much more serious political concessions being given to

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protesters than previously. Using the Dependency-Rentierism effects we developed in the analysis we can investigate this difference.

Looking through the lens of the modified rentier effect, in 2019 the Algerian economy was stretched to its limits, unemployment being at least at 35% and the cost of living have risen to the breaking point for many Algerians.127 One of the reasons for the relative political success of the 2019 protests, compared to those of 2011, might therefor be, that the regime has not been able to buy off protesters with economic concessions. This does however not answer why the Algerian opposition seem to be much more unified today than in 2011.

For the modified suppression effect, in relation to the 2019 protests, it is interesting to observe that army support for the demonstrators was instrumental in president Bouteflika’s resignation in April 2019. However, the rest of the regime is still in power, supported by the army, and the army chief general Ahmad Gaid Salah acting as the country’s de facto leader since Bouteflika’s resignation, supporting the December 2019 elections boycotted by the protesters.128

For the foreign intervention effect, it is interesting to note that no foreign state entity has seriously positioned itself either for the regime or the demonstrators apart from symbolic declarations of support for the demonstrating youth, and some autocratic countries support for the regime. It can be reasoned that if the situation devolves into one threatening the basic stability of Algeria, and there for the stability of hydrocarbon exports, the international community might change its relatively neutral attitude.

Regarding the internal-colonization effect, and why the opposition appears much more unified than usual, one should keep in mind that the protests are led overwhelmingly by youth, who constitute more than 60% of the Algerian population.129 The youth don’t remember the violence of the Berber Spring in the 1980’ies or maybe not even the civil war of the 1990’ies. They are not Islamists, and neither are they Socialist, the two main opposition blocks. Thus, the regime has not been able to divide them along ethnic or ideological lines, at least not to a degree where their shared economic and political interest cannot bind them together. Of course, these arguments are somewhat speculative, but none the less they are an interesting afterthought.

127 “Algeria economy: Where has all the money gone?” Al Jazeera. Accessed 12/17-2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2019/03/algeria-economy-money-190323072227306.html. 128 “Military’s Preferred Candidate Named Winner in Algeria Election.” 129 “Algeria economy: Where has all the money gone?”

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