Iraq in the Context of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy Nikolai Zlobin

Iraq in the Context of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy Nikolai Zlobin The relationship between Moscow and Baghdad, like Russia’s foreign-policy relationships throughout the Persian Gulf region during the post-Soviet period, is a prominent example of the problems, contradictions, and conceptual meanderings of Russian policy since the collapse of communism. Russia’s policy toward Iraq is the result of a combination of many different factors, domestic as well as foreign. These include the Kremlin’s periodic attempts to formulate a new foreign policy doctrine, its desire to play an international role for which it has neither the economic nor the political capacity, its dis- like of America’s unilateral policies, its desire to maintain its influence in the Persian Gulf region while simultaneously integrating with the West, its need to retain former Soviet republics under its control, and its geopolitical nostalgia. All these factors result in a Russian foreign policy defined by unpredictable zigzags. At the same time, Russia’s own domestic processes, its comprehensive and contradictory evolution, the trying shift in both the elites and the system of values, and the internal struggle for power have had a direct influence on policy choices, including foreign policy. Foreign policy was often hostage to the Kremlin’s internal struggles, and its course was monopolized by spe- cial interest groups or sold off to various lobbies. Russia in Search of a New Foreign Policy Strategy The numerous factors that directly influence the formation of Russian foreign policy all played a role during the Iraqi crisis. First, in many ways the Nikolai Zlobin is director of Russian and Asian studies at the Center for Defense Information in Washing- ton, D.C., and the executive coeditor of Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/mediterranean-quarterly/article-pdf/15/2/83/322093/mq015-02-08-zlobin_fpp.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 84 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2004 Russian elites continue to base their ideology on an understanding of the world formed during the Cold War. Even though President Vladimir Putin periodically speaks about global economic interests, the main emphasis of the country’s foreign policy institutions continues to be national security and the safeguarding of the country’s territorial integrity, in the military sense of the word. That is how the overwhelming majority of Russian diplomats and politicians view the contemporary world. One Russian expert writes, for instance: “For Russia, the issue is security in all its aspects and dimen- sions—global, regional, and national, as well as political, economic, social, ecological, and informational. The main strategic task of Russia’s foreign policy institutions consists of securing a safe and stable environment.”1 This is a typical statement. Such an approach, more appropriate for a department of defense than a department of foreign affairs, creates a conceptual gap between Moscow and many other states and is one of the contradictions of Russia’s foreign policy behavior. Second, Russia still has not formed a coherent position toward the world’s sole superpower, the United States, or for that matter toward the West as a whole. The thesis about the inevitability of the improvement in relations between Russia and the United States turned out to be misleading. Relations between Russia and the United States could not be improved, because they had been created for another political and international reality and were, by definition, unimprovable. The countries should instead build completely new bilateral relations, based on a qualitatively new strategic and conceptual foundation. One cannot indefinitely keep improving the steam engine— at some point you need to switch to something fundamentally new, like a gas engine or an electric motor. Neither Moscow nor Washington tried to make that leap. Both sides lost a decade by trying to improve the steam engine, and as a result, they presently do not have a defined policy toward each other, and given their size and power, this cannot help but have a negative influence on world developments. While the criticism toward the Bush administration’s foreign policy is jus- tified, it must be said that in the Iraqi crisis Russia lost a lot more in its 1. K. Gadjiev, “From Bipolarity to a New Configuration of Geopolitical Power,” Foreign Policy and the Security of Contemporary Russia 1 (Russian) (1999): 70. Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/mediterranean-quarterly/article-pdf/15/2/83/322093/mq015-02-08-zlobin_fpp.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Zlobin: Iraq in the Context of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy 85 relations with the United States than it could afford. Its position was far from pragmatic and thus directly contradicted the major foreign policy principles as proclaimed by Putin. This cannot be attributed only to the American unilateral approach toward international relations, or to the series of unfriendly steps toward Moscow, ranging from protectionism and the Jackson-Vanik amendment to pushing Russia out of Afghanistan, Georgia, and Moldova. When President Putin declared his full and unconditional support of the United States on 11 September 2001, the move was seen as a strategic choice made by the Russian leadership, corresponding to the interests of both countries. But a few months later, Russian-American relations began to worsen once again. Without absolving the United States of blame for its own mistakes and miscalculations in its foreign policy, it must be said that the fault for not implementing any follow-up to the strategic choice lies largely with Moscow. In the past three years, the Kremlin has not bothered to explain what Russia’s “strategic choice” for the West means in reality, to justify the choice to the Russian society and political elites, or even to take any steps toward realizing that choice. Subsequent Russian foreign policy has lacked the necessary economic and organizational resources, as well as the required political will, for coherence, much less success. The conflict over Iraq became the conceptual bankruptcy of the model of Russian-American relations created over the past ten years, especially after 11 September. It became obvi- ous that if there is no fundamental basis to the relationship, and no understanding of strategy, then conflicts like Iraq can seriously influence the dynamic of the relationship. This is what happened in 2003. Third, over the past decade the Russian elite have been attempting to achieve two important goals simultaneously. On one hand, they want to ensure the country’s national security and territorial integrity, and, on the other hand, they want to gain back the influence possessed by the USSR as one of the leading powers of the world. The Russian establishment strongly feels that “Russia cannot help but be a great power simply because it holds a unique place in the global geopolitical structure.”2 But these goals to a large extent contradict each other. Russia today is unable to independently ensure its own security and also contribute to 2. Ibid., 69. Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/mediterranean-quarterly/article-pdf/15/2/83/322093/mq015-02-08-zlobin_fpp.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 86 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2004 global stability. For that, it needs tight bonds of partnership with the United States as well as economic and military assistance from the West. When national security became America’s foremost priority, it seemed Russia had gained the most powerful of allies. But that is the very obstacle to Russia’s conduct of an independent foreign policy. In other words, Moscow wants to regain its lost international authority, which it has traditionally done by opposing Washington. This, naturally, damages the possibilities of a strategic partnership and decreases Russian security and its capacity for protect- ing its national interest and territorial integrity. Fourth, the system of international organizations created after World War II guaranteed Russia an important role in international relations and an influential place in all the major international structures. A permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, coupled with a nuclear arsenal, guaranteed it parity with the United States in the second half of the twenti- eth century, making it one of the capitals of the world, without whose partic- ipation practically nothing could be undertaken in international relations. Today, that seat on the Security Council is the last important instrument that allows Moscow to assert its influence in the world, without which Russia risks ending up on the political sideline, which is completely unacceptable to the Russian elite. Moscow is extremely wary of any attempts to revise the foundation of the Yalta system of international relations. The Kremlin is constantly proclaim- ing the leading role of the UN, but almost completely avoids the problem of its ineffectiveness.3 In the Iraqi crisis, Moscow steadfastly supported the idea of keeping the UN as the leading world organization, since Russia could never play a role equal to the United States in any new system of international organizations. Moscow is also well aware that the battle with international terrorism and the war in Iraq could become the beginning of the UN’s long decline in its present form, which corresponds to historical logic but also, to a large extent, to the desires of U.S. leadership. Any reforms of the UN will inevitably lower Moscow’s status even more, a development it will try to prevent. In demand- 3. Igor Ivanov, “International Security in an Era of Globalization,” Russia in Global Affairs 1 (Janu- ary–March 2003): 47. Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/mediterranean-quarterly/article-pdf/15/2/83/322093/mq015-02-08-zlobin_fpp.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Zlobin: Iraq in the Context of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy 87 ing that any issues dealing with Iraq be passed over to the UN, Russia was attempting not only to internationalize them while decreasing the role of Britain and the United States but to increase the role of the organization in which it plays a leading role.

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