DOCSLIB.ORG

The Secretary General's Annual Report 2011

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Secretary General's Annual Report 2011 The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2011 Foreword any will remember 2011 as a year of flexibility. European Allies and Canada took the lead; the austerity. But it has also been a year of United States provided critical capabilities; and the NATO hope. The international community united command structure unified all those contributions, as well as in its responsibility to protect. Much of the those of our partners, for one clear goal. In fact, the operation MArab world took a new path forward. And the European opened a completely new chapter of cooperation with Allies showed they were willing and able to lead a new our partners in the region, who called for NATO to act and NATO operation. then contributed actively. It was also an exemplary mission of cooperation and consultation with other organizations, For NATO, 2011 was one of the busiest years ever. From including the United Nations, the League of Arab States, and Libya to Afghanistan and Kosovo, from the Mediterranean Sea the European Union. Throughout, NATO proved itself as a to the Indian Ocean, the Alliance was committed to protecting force for good and the ultimate force multiplier. its populations and active in upholding its principles and values. We enabled the Afghan security forces to start taking These achievements give me great confidence as I look the lead for security for over half of the Afghan population. forward to 2012. Clearly, economic challenges are likely to We successfully concluded our training mission which has remain a dominant factor and decisions taken today may contributed to improving Iraq’s security capacity. 2011 was shape our world for decades to come. Our task is to make also a benchmark year for reforms. We took significant steps sure we emerge stronger, not weaker, from the crisis we to further streamline our structures, enhance our effectiveness all face. But we can draw great strength from an enduring and reduce our costs. At the same time, we strengthened our source: the indivisibility of security between North America capabilities in many areas, including the prevention of cyber and Europe. NATO is a security investment that has stood attacks. And we enhanced our connectivity by increasing the test of time for over six decades and continues to deliver cooperation with our partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic real returns for all Allies, year after year. area, the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, as well as with many other countries across the globe. This is a 2012 will be marked by our Chicago Summit in May. transatlantic Alliance that, despite the economic crisis, This will be an opportunity to renew our commitment to has once again demonstrated its commitment, capability the vital transatlantic bond between us and to redouble our and connectivity. efforts to share the burden of security more effectively. We will take important decisions to keep NATO committed, In 2011, our new Strategic Concept was put to the test. This report – the first of its kind – shows that we capable and connected. successfully met that test. Afghanistan remains by far our largest operation, with At the start of the year, few would have imagined NATO over 130,000 troops as part of the broadest coalition in would be called to protect the people of Libya. But on history. 50 Allies and partners are determined to ensure 31 March, NATO took swift action on the basis of the the country will never again be a base for global terrorism. historic United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. Afghanistan is moving into the right direction and transition We saved countless lives. And seven months later, we to Afghan security lead is on track to be completed by successfully completed our mission. When I visited Tripoli the end of 2014. As Afghan security forces grow more on 31 October, Chairman Jalil of the National Transitional confident and capable, our role will continue to evolve Council told me, “NATO is in the heart of the Libyan people.” into one of support, training and mentoring. But the Chicago Summit will show our commitment to a long-term Operation Unified Protector was one of the most remarkable partnership with Afghanistan, together with the whole in NATO’s history. It showed the Alliance’s strength and international community, beyond 2014. 2 At Chicago, we will also take measures to improve our successfully and I expect the initial components of the capabilities. During our operation in Libya, the United States system to be in place by the time of the Chicago Summit. deployed critical assets, such as drones, precision-guided munitions and air-to-air refuelling. We need such assets NATO has invested heavily in its network of partnerships. to be available more widely among Allies. In the current Continued NATO-Russia cooperation is vital for the economic climate, delivering these expensive capabilities security of the Euro-Atlantic area and the wider world. will not be easy. But it can be done, and it is critical if we Twenty-two partner countries have troops or trainers on are to respond effectively to the challenges of the future. the ground in Afghanistan. And our successful operation The answer lies in what I call “smart defence”: doing better to protect the people of Libya could not have taken with less by working more together. In Chicago, we will place without the political and operational support of our deliver real “smart defence” commitments, so that every partners in the region and beyond. At Chicago, we will Ally can contribute to an even more capable Alliance. recognize the contribution made by our partners who are willing and able to share the security burden with us. NATO’s missile defence system to defend European Allies’ populations, territory and forces against the growing threat Chicago is about delivering important commitments. of ballistic missile proliferation is “smart defence” at its best Personal commitment, too, has been key to the Alliance’s and it embodies transatlantic solidarity. We have already made considerable progress. Along with a prominent and success. Dedicated civilian and military staff are working phased US contribution, a number of Allies have made in operational theatres and in headquarters to protect our significant announcements, including Turkey, Poland, 900 million citizens. They work under demanding and Romania, Spain, the Netherlands and France. These dangerous conditions. This report is a tribute above all to different national contributions will be gradually brought their sacrifice, bravery, and professionalism. together under a common NATO command and control system. Key elements of it have already been tested ■ Anders Fogh Rasmussen NATO Secretary General 3 4 progress andprospects progress operations – NATO ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment. environment. of types all in operations naval and air ground, complex managing continents, three on missions NATO-led the provision of security for Afghanistan. ISAF conducts conducts ISAF Afghanistan. for security of provision the remains (ISAF) Force Assistance Security International NATO-led UN-mandated, the of focus main The Afghanistan crises such in intervene to able and equipped prepared, is Alliance the that showed which Libya, to commitment NATO’s by marked however, was, 2011 date. to commitment operational significant most Alliance’s the constitutes Afghanistan T through to Europe and the East for the global economy. economy. global the for East the and Europe to through waterway vital a protect to helping efforts, counter-piracy to contribution significant a making is Alliance the Aden, of Gulf the in and Africa of Horn the Off region. Balkans Western entire the of stability the in role key a playing is and Kosovo, in security and peace provide to helping also is NATO over 140,000 military personnel are engaged in in engaged are personnel military 140,000 over Today, 1990’s. early the in interventions military first Alliance’s the since considerably increased have operations NATO of diversity and tempo he – and must continue to be able to do so. do to able be to continue must and Number of Incidents - 150 150 250 350 450 - 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Jan 08 Feb 08 + Mar 08 52 Apr 08 % May 08 Jun 08 Jul 08 Aug 08 S e 200 Sep 08 p - N Oct 08 8 o Nov 08 v Dec 08 Enemy-initiated attackscountry-wide E Jan 09 n e m Feb 09 A + tt y - 59 ack Mar 09 Ini t Apr 09 % s i a May 09 t e Jun 09 d Jul 09 Aug 09 S e 200 Sep 09 p - N Oct 09 9 o v Nov 09 Dec 09 In Y c ea Jan 10 r ease r Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). In parallel, ISAF ISAF parallel, In (NTM-A). Mission-Afghanistan Training NATO the through force police and army Afghan the up build help to continued has ISAF operations, security conducting to addition In security. with them providing in lead the take to beginning police and army their saw population the half over 2011, In forces. Afghan to troops ISAF from country the of security the for responsibility of transition gradual the commencing and country, the of south the in especially strategy, insurgency counter- ISAF’s with 2010 in made achievements the reinforcing consolidation, of year a been has 2011 terrorists. for haven safe a becomes again never country the that ensure to is presence ISAF’s for reason fundamental The future. democratic and stable secure, Afghanistan’s to commitment international unwavering the of measure true a – ISAF in participating are countries world’s the of quarter a than more Currently, Police. National Afghan the and Army National Afghan the training including structures, and Forces Security National Afghan of development the in assists and (ANSF) Forces Security National Afghan the with coordination in operations security Feb 10 B + e 94 Mar 10 f f o r o r Apr 10 % e m May 10 Jun 10 Jul 10 Aug 10 S e 201 Sep 10 p - N 0 Oct 10 o v Nov 10 Dec 10 D Y ec Jan 11 ea r ease Feb 11 r - B 21 Mar 11 e f f o % Apr 11 r r o e May 11 m Jun 11 Jul 11 Aug 11 S e 201 Sep 11 p - N 1 Oct 11 o v Nov 11 Database, as of 16 Dec 2011.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Jude Akuwudike
    www.hamiltonhodell.co.uk Jude Akuwudike Talent Representation Telephone Madeleine Dewhirst & Sian Smyth +44 (0) 20 7636 1221 [email protected] Address Hamilton Hodell, 20 Golden Square London, W1F 9JL, United Kingdom Television Title Role Director Production Company Delroy Grant (The Night MANHUNT Marc Evans ITV Studios Stalker) PLEBS Agrippa Sam Leifer Rise Films/ITV2 MOVING ON Dr Bello Jodhi May LA Productions/BBC THE FORGIVING EARTH Dr Busasa Hugo Blick BBC/Netflix CAROL AND VINNIE Ernie Dan Zeff BBC IN THE LONG RUN Uncle Akie Declan Lowney Sky KIRI Reverend Lipede Euros Lyn Hulu/Channel 4 THE A WORD Vincent Sue Tully Fifty Fathoms/BBC DEATH IN PARADISE Series 6 Tony Simon Delaney Red Planet/BBC CHEWING GUM Series 2 Alex Simon Neal Retort/E4 FRIDAY NIGHT DINNER Series 4 Custody Sergeant Martin Dennis Channel 4 FORTITUDE Series 2 & 3 Doctor Adebimpe Hettie Macdonald Tiger Aspect/Sky Atlantic LUCKY MAN Doctor Marghai Brian Kelly Carnival Films/Sky 1 UNDERCOVER Al James Hawes BBC CUCUMBER Ralph Alice Troughton Channel 4 LAW & ORDER: UK Marcus Wright Andy Goddard Kudos Productions HOLBY CITY Marvin Stewart Fraser Macdonald BBC Between Us (pty) Ltd/Precious THE NO.1 LADIES DETECTIVE AGENCY Oswald Ranta Charles Sturridge Films MOSES JONES Matthias Michael Offer BBC SILENT WITNESS Series 11 Willi Brendan Maher BBC BAD GIRLS Series 7 Leroy Julian Holmes Shed Productions for ITV THE LAST DETECTIVE Series 3 Lemford Bradshaw David Tucker Granada HOLBY CITY Derek Fletcher BBC ULTIMATE FORCE Series 2 Mr Salmon ITV SILENT WITNESS: RUNNING ON
    [Show full text]
  • In Defense of Cyberterrorism: an Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks
    IN DEFENSE OF CYBERTERRORISM: AN ARGUMENT FOR ANTICIPATING CYBER-ATTACKS Susan W. Brenner Marc D. Goodman The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States brought the notion of terrorism as a clear and present danger into the consciousness of the American people. In order to predict what might follow these shocking attacks, it is necessary to examine the ideologies and motives of their perpetrators, and the methodologies that terrorists utilize. The focus of this article is on how Al-Qa'ida and other Islamic fundamentalist groups can use cyberspace and technology to continue to wage war againstthe United States, its allies and its foreign interests. Contending that cyberspace will become an increasingly essential terrorist tool, the author examines four key issues surrounding cyberterrorism. The first is a survey of conventional methods of "physical" terrorism, and their inherent shortcomings. Next, a discussion of cyberspace reveals its potential advantages as a secure, borderless, anonymous, and structured delivery method for terrorism. Third, the author offers several cyberterrorism scenarios. Relating several examples of both actual and potential syntactic and semantic attacks, instigated individually or in combination, the author conveys their damagingpolitical and economic impact. Finally, the author addresses the inevitable inquiry into why cyberspace has not been used to its full potential by would-be terrorists. Separately considering foreign and domestic terrorists, it becomes evident that the aims of terrorists must shift from the gross infliction of panic, death and destruction to the crippling of key information systems before cyberattacks will take precedence over physical attacks. However, given that terrorist groups such as Al Qa'ida are highly intelligent, well-funded, and globally coordinated, the possibility of attacks via cyberspace should make America increasingly vigilant.
    [Show full text]
  • Crack Troops Or Bloody Killers? States, Political Parties, and Mercenaries 1805-2017’
    Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies (NASP) Graduate School in Social, Economic and Political Sciences, University of Milan ‘Crack Troops or Bloody Killers? States, Political Parties, and Mercenaries 1805-2017’ Supervisor Prof. Alessandro Colombo Ph.D. Director Prof. Matteo R.C. Jessoula Ph.D. Candidate Matteo C.M. Casiraghi 1 Contents Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................. 4 List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................... 5 List of Figures ..................................................................................................................................... 6 Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... 9 Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 10 The journey of the anti-mercenary norm ........................................................................................ 12 Political parties, mercenaries and security contractors ................................................................ 24 The path ahead ............................................................................................................................... 28 Chapter II: Theory, Mechanisms, Dimensions ..............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Media and UN "Peacekeeping" Since the Gulf War Stephen Badsey
    Document généré le 29 sept. 2021 19:03 Journal of Conflict Studies The Media and UN "Peacekeeping" Since the Gulf War Stephen Badsey Volume 17, numéro 1, spring 1997 URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/jcs17_01art01 Aller au sommaire du numéro Éditeur(s) The University of New Brunswick ISSN 1198-8614 (imprimé) 1715-5673 (numérique) Découvrir la revue Citer cet article Badsey, S. (1997). The Media and UN "Peacekeeping" Since the Gulf War. Journal of Conflict Studies, 17(1), 7–27. All rights reserved © Centre for Conflict Studies, UNB, 1997 Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d’auteur. L’utilisation des services d’Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d’utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne. https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/ Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit. Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l’Université de Montréal, l’Université Laval et l’Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. https://www.erudit.org/fr/ Vol. XVII No. 1, Spring 1997 The Media and UN "Peacekeeping"Since the Gulf War by Stephen Badsey Stephen Badsey is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and a Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for the Study of War and Society at DeMontfort University. INTRODUCTION 1 The changes in United Nations (UN) "peacekeeping" operations within the last five years have been both dramatic and multifaceted. This article attempts to show that the media (particularly those of the United States, which are dominant within, and may under most circumstances be taken as virtually identical to, the international media) have in all their aspects become, and remain, critical elements in determining the success or failure of these operations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of WMD in Shaping U.S. National Security Strategy
    BRIEFER No. 15 ⼁April 7, 2021 August 16, 2018 Definitions Matter: The Role of WMD in Shaping U.S. National Security Strategy Natasha E. Bajema Introduction To develop its national security strategy, the U.S. government typically formulates a set of agreed definitions and concepts about the current threat environment to help delineate top priorities. Once established, these impose clarity on mission spaces, shape the delegation of tasks and operations, justify budgets and the distribution of resources and personnel, and influence organizational structures. The notion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has long served as one of these key defining concepts that shape U.S. national security strategy. The two most common characteristics used to define WMD are mass casualties and mass destruction, as indicated by the U.S. Department of Defense’s definition.1 These characteristics were intended to clarify why the U.S. places top priority on WMD in its national security strategy; they are capable of significant damage in terms of destruction, casualties, and strategic impact.2 Within the U.S. context, concepts about the threat environment tend to evolve incrementally with changes in administration and the emergence of new technologies and threats, or specific events that dramatically alter threat perceptions. However, the longer certain threat perceptions survive the political wrangling of opposing interests, the more likely they evolve into threat paradigms—i.e., patterns or standard models of behavior, against which any new ideas about emerging threats are thoroughly tested. In such cases, a major catalyzing event must occur to produce dramatic change and reorganization of national security priorities.
    [Show full text]
  • 2009 Helping-Pakistan-Defeat-The
    © 2009 Institute for Social Policy and Understanding All Rights Reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues. The views presented here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its staff, or trustees. ABOUT THE AUTHOR H A IDER A LI H USSEIN M ULLICK , ISPU F ELLOW Haider Ali Hussein Mullick is a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), a senior fellow at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), and conducts research on American foreign policy toward South Asia and the Middle East. During his career, he has focused on American-Pakistani relations and broader issues of security; socio- economics; and the geopolitics of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia. He is the author of a forthcoming book-length monograph: Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies. In addition, Haider has conducted research at the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Studies (U.S.-Pakistan Relations), the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Pakistan’s Political Economy and Reviving Failed States), and the Hudson Institute’s Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World (Madrassa Education and Links to Islamist Militancy). Haider’s editorials have appeared in Newsweek, The Washington Post, Foreign Policy Magazine, The Nation (Pakistan), The Daily Times, The News International, The Times of India, Indian Express, Gulf News, and Pakistan Link.
    [Show full text]
  • The Media and UN "Peacekeeping"Since the Gulf War
    Vol. XVII No. 1, Spring 1997 The Media and UN "Peacekeeping"Since the Gulf War by Stephen Badsey Stephen Badsey is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and a Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for the Study of War and Society at DeMontfort University. INTRODUCTION 1 The changes in United Nations (UN) "peacekeeping" operations within the last five years have been both dramatic and multifaceted. This article attempts to show that the media (particularly those of the United States, which are dominant within, and may under most circumstances be taken as virtually identical to, the international media) have in all their aspects become, and remain, critical elements in determining the success or failure of these operations. It points to three principal areas of current practice regarding the media which have contributed to the failure or partial failure of recent UN "peacekeeping" missions. One of these is a failure of understanding of the media exhibited by the government and military forces of the United States, as the result of doctrine established before the end of the Cold War. Another is the failure of the UN or its constituent members to respond effectively to anti-peacekeeper propaganda, especially that promulgated by political authorities in target countries for "peacekeeping," and including their ability to exploit the international media for propaganda purposes. The third is the failure of the UN to develop "peacekeeping" doctrine which takes the value of the media into account. The article calls for advances in international relations theory in this field as an aid to further understanding.
    [Show full text]
  • Carmen Du Sautoy Photo: Faye Thomas
    Paddock Suite, The Courtyard, 55 Charterhouse Street, London, EC1M 6HA p: + 44 (0) 20 73360351 e: [email protected] Carmen Du Sautoy Photo: Faye Thomas Height: 5'8" (172cm) Eye Colour: Hazel Weight: 9st. 6lb. (60kg) Hair Colour: Light/Mid Brown Playing Age: 56 - 65 years Hair Length: Mid Length Appearance: White Voice Character: Engaging Nationality: British Voice Quality: Melodious Other: Equity Stage Stage, Gwendolen Fairfax, The Importance of Being Earnest, UK Tour, Lucy Bailey Stage, Countess Irene, Mind Milly For Me, Haymarket Theatre, Peter Hall Stage, Herodias, Salome, Royal National Theatre/Phoenix/NY/World Tour, Steven Berkoff Stage, Cleopatra, Antony & Cleopatra, Mermaid Theatre, Bernard Miles Stage, Lady Macbeth, Macbeth, Old Vic for USA, Stuart Burge Stage, Myra, Hayfever, Albery Theatre, Alan Strachan Stage, Abbie, Desire Under the Elms, Greenwich Theatre, Patrick Mason Stage, Miss Leighton, Once In A Lifetime, RSC Stratford/Aldwych/Piccadilly Theatre, Trevor Nunn Stage, Lyia Vivian, Peace in Our Time, Touring Partnership, Wyn Jones Stage, Eliena, Children of the Sun, RSC/Aldwych, Terry Hands Stage, Princess Of France, Love's Labour's Lost, RSC/Stratford/Aldwych, John Barton Stage, Mrs Fainall, The Way of the World, RSC/Aldwych, John Barton Stage, Madelaine, Piaf, RSC/The Other Place, Howard Davies Stage, Lady Cummings, Captain Swing, RSC Other Place/Warehouse, Bill Alexander Stage, The Courtesan, The Comedy of Errors, RSC Aldwych Theatre, Trevor Nunn Stage, Hippolyta, A Midsummer Night's Dream, RSC Stratford/ Aldwych Theatre
    [Show full text]
  • Youth, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
    United Nations A/C.1/74/L.48 General Assembly Distr.: Limited 21 October 2019 Original: English Seventy-fourth session First Committee Agenda item 98 General and complete disarmament Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and United States of America: draft resolution Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation The General Assembly, Recognizing that young people in all countries are key agents for social change, economic development and technological innovation, Reaffirming the important and positive contribution that young people can make to the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, Noting that engagement with young people can provide opportunities to benefit from their views, insights and ideas, Bearing in mind its resolution 73/59 of 5 December 2018, which highlights the need for disarmament and non-proliferation education, particularly among youth, Recalling its resolution 73/46 of 5 December 2018, in which it reaffirms that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is one of the essential factors for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, Recalling also relevant General Assembly and Security
    [Show full text]
  • Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies
    Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies John Yoo* Dramatic advances in weapons technology over the past two decades have led to a revolution in military affairs. Robotics and cyber weapons have used real-time information and communications to produce precision that has reduced casualties and blurred the line between war and peace. Critics fear that these developments will encourage nations to resort to force more often; they call for international agreements to ban the new technologies. This Essay argues that efforts to limit the use of such weapons are both misguided and counterproductive. New military technologies will advance humanitarian aims by reducing civilian casualties and the overall destructiveness of war. A rationalist approach to war even suggests that these weapons will create more opportunities for the settlement of international disputes with less use of force. Introduction .................................................................................................... 444 I. New Military Technology and the Laws of War ......................................... 449 A. New Military Technology ............................................................ 449 1. Air ........................................................................................ 450 2. Land ....................................................................................... 452 3. Sea ........................................................................................ 454 4. Cyber ....................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Air University Review: July-August 1964, Vol XV, No. 5
    NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF NAT0...F-102 OPERATIONAL TRAINING. OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUGHT JULY-AUGU ST 1964 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW STATES AIR FORCE Nuclear Forces and the Future of NATO...............................................................................2 Brig. Gen. E. Vandevanter, Jr., USAF (Ret) F-102 Oper a t io n a l Training.......................................................................................................... 9 Brig. Gen. Robert W. Bums, USAF A Philosophical Guide for the Armchair Strategist.......................................................................24 Coi. Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF T he USAF jn Britain...........................................................................................................................28 Kenneth Sams O v E R K IL L AND U .N D E R T H O U G H T ......................................................................................................................................................................3 7 Capt. Thomas C. Pinckney, USAF MATS R ole rs C ombat Air l if t ..........................................................................................................49 Maj. Henry L. Walker, USAF Re TENTION—A V lE W FR O M TH E B O T T O M ............................................................................................................................................. 5 8 Capt. Henry D. Steele. USAF Air Operations in Viet Nam T he .Air Force Civ il Encineer’s Role in Counterinsurgency............................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence 293
    THE QUIRKS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 293 The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence Andrew Brown and Lorna Arnold Abstract From 1945 to 1949 the USA was the world’s only nuclear power. Although the nuclear arsenal was overestimated both in terms of size and readiness by the US military in its war plans, atom bombs came to be seen as the essential counter to conventional Soviet forces. The USSR constructed its own bombs in turn, and for decades the analysis of nuclear deterrence was almost exclusively concerned with the two superpowers. In the twenty-first century, the nuclear world no longer displays that mirror-image symmetry and can now be viewed as unipolar, regional, multipolar or stateless. Nuclear deterrence that seemed such an established technical reality during the Cold War should be recognized as a psychological construct that depends on threat perception and cultural attitudes, as well as the values, rationality and strength of political leaders who themselves have to mediate between groups with vested economic or military interests. As the number of nuclear weapons states increases, the logic of nuclear deterrence becomes less obvious and it should not be casually invoked as a general security factor without regard to a specific context. Nuclear weapons have become emblems of geopolitical power under the guise of deterrence. We argue that nuclear deterrence is meaningless against extremist terrorists. Our survey of its quirks leads us to believe that nuclear deterrence is a far less foolproof and reliable global security mechanism than many assume. Keywords: Cold War, deterrence theory and evolution, nuclear deterrence, nuclear history, nuclear terrorists, nuclear weapons, regional nuclear rivals Deterrence is ubiquitous in the natural world, where potential preys employ a variety of defences against would-be predators.
    [Show full text]