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Air University Review: July-August 1964, Vol XV, No. 5

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Air University Review: July-August 1964, Vol XV, No. 5 NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF NAT0...F-102 OPERATIONAL TRAINING. OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUGHT JULY-AUGU ST 1964 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW STATES AIR FORCE Nuclear Forces and the Future of NATO...............................................................................2 Brig. Gen. E. Vandevanter, Jr., USAF (Ret) F-102 Oper a t io n a l Training.......................................................................................................... 9 Brig. Gen. Robert W. Bums, USAF A Philosophical Guide for the Armchair Strategist.......................................................................24 Coi. Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF T he USAF jn Britain...........................................................................................................................28 Kenneth Sams O v E R K IL L AND U .N D E R T H O U G H T ......................................................................................................................................................................3 7 Capt. Thomas C. Pinckney, USAF MATS R ole rs C ombat Air l if t ..........................................................................................................49 Maj. Henry L. Walker, USAF Re TENTION—A V lE W FR O M TH E B O T T O M ............................................................................................................................................. 5 8 Capt. Henry D. Steele. USAF Air Operations in Viet Nam T he .Air Force Civ il Encineer’s Role in Counterinsurgency............................................. 64 Lt. Col. Francis E. Torr, USAF The Science Frontier T he Past Seven Yea r s ln Aer o dyn a mics.................................................................................................. 73 Alfred C. Draper Books and Ideas An Army Hist o r ia n s “R econsideration” ............................................................................................92 Dr. Robert F. Futrell T he Contributors .....................................................................................................................................................................................1 0 2 lhe cover Address manusrript* to the Editor. Air Uni- Operational nnits of the Air Defense Command verutij Recíetc, Aerospace Studies Institute, now get combat-ready F-102 intereeptor pilots Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Printed hy the through the highly professionalized training by Government Printing Office, Washington, D C. the 4780th Air Defense Wing (Training) at Copie* are available from the Air University Perrin Air Force Base, Texas. Brigadier Gen- Bonk Department, Maxwell Air Force Base. eral Robert W . Bums discusses this "D euce" Ala. single topy, 75 eents. yearly snbst ription, training, whieh relieves combat units of tran- •3.50. USAF necuRitiNC p u b l ic a t io n 50-2, sition flying responsibility and enables thern to concentrate on the business of air defense. Vol. XV No. 5 J uly-Aucust 1964 NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF NATO B rigadier G en er a l E. V andevanter, J r ., USAF (R et) OR M ORE than a year now, strategists Second, a European community deterrent and policy makers have carried on a would have little purpose if its use were subject F cross-Atlantic dialogue over the merits to a United States veto. Confidence in the of the American proposal for a combined nato American ability to provide active strategic multilateral nuclear force ( mlf ). Protagonists deterrence is now waning because Europeans on both sides of the ocean continue to hold doubt that the United States would, in many divided opinions as to what is at stake. Is the cases, take action that might risk the devasta- mixed-manned mle a vital necessity to smooth tion of America. This is no reflection on our relations with our European colleagues, or is it, bravery—or our integrity. Rather, Europeans as some have maintained, more apt to divide regard their own suspicion as an acknowl- than unite the alliance? In either case, if the edgment of our propensity for making rational mlf should have to be scuttled because of lac-k decisions in such matters. In anv event, if Euro- of allied enthusiasm, what are the altematives? peans think we inay hesitate to come to their The area of maneuver for the strategic aid, their concern would not seem to be allaved nuclear strike force issue is hemmed in on three by an arrangement that includes an American sides by hard, seemingly immovable restric- finger on the “safety catch.” tions. First, France is bv now bound and deter- But a third factor—fear of possible ungov- mined to have her own independent force de emed German resurgence—generates demands frappe. In retrospect, one can now guess that for some type of control mechanism which de Gaulle was almost certain to refuse the would prevent unilateral national use of the Nassau o£Fer.° Even without de Gaulle, France component parts. Not only the Soviet and satel- could, and probably would, press its nuclear lite nations would strenuously object to an program to completion. independent, nuclear-armed West Germany; even neutrals and most of our allies would op- pose such a course. ° The Nassau formula of a •Incidentally, some American* still argue incorrectlv that the French "tumed dowu our offer of nuclear weapons." As “Most ohjectors are less emphatic in their opposition than far as is known, the Nassau proposal representcd no change in the hrir apparent to the role of British Prime Minister, Mr. the United States position regarding nuclear weapons sharing. Harold Wilson. Britain’s Labour Partv leader. He is reported to According to the Nassau communiqué. the proposal involved have said: “We are completely, utterly, and unequivocally op- “Polaris missiles I without warheads).’’ in the French view, thís posed, now and in all circuimtances, to any suggestion that was hke refusing to throw a life linc to a tired swimmer but Germany, West Germany or East Germany, directly or indireetly, telhng him you wouJd have a scotch and soda ready if he madc should have a finger on the nuclear trigger. .” Laurence W. it ashore. The French needed warheads, not missiles, as de Martin, “ ‘Honest Brokers’ in the Nuclear Muddle,” The Repórt- Gaulle emphasized in his rcply. er, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2 Jamiarv 1964), p. 21. NATO Conference, Ottatra. 22-24 May 1963 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW multinational Polaris armada, with each nation As usual, the prime issue revolves around “who allowed to determine for itself the circum- will pull the trigger” and “who will guard the stances under which it could withdraw its con- safety catch.” With so little enthusiasm for the tribution for independent national use, could project, deliberations over these complex pro- not, in the opinion of allies and opponents alike, cedures could be dragged out interminably. be applied to the German Federal Republic. Many have questioned the wisdom of the The one course most likely to shatter nato American policy. They wonder if a contrived vvould be acquiescence in loose or ineffectual community endeavor represents the only solu- Controls over West German nuclear armament. tion. Professor Henry Kissinger, for one, main- Faced with these contradictions, what tains there is a better alternative.2 He favors policy should the United States pursue? One a course of encouraging the French and British course would be simply to let matters work to form a European strategic force independ- themselves out. But this course, too, has its ent of the United States. Through the natural dangers, for, left to themselves, the energetic course of events he believes the most affluent Germans might ultimately take matters into European nation, Germany, would be drawn their own hands, either by repudiating their into this consortium, thus satisfying her yearn- commitment not to manufacture nuclear weap- ing for strategic power. This proposal does not ons or by acquiring them from other sources. really come to grips with the matter of how The mlf proposal was an attempt to head off to govern the German contribution. Could the unilateral German action by tying the Federal British and French, having for years insisted Republic into an unbreakable, mixed-national- on the sovereign right of nations to defend itv association with Britain and the Continental their own vital interests, reverse themselves by have-nots. asking for restraints on Germanvs employment But Europeans have hardly waxed ecstatic of its component? Many observers feel that over the American suggestion—in fact, some Kissinger vastly underrates the grass-roots op- seem downright skeptical about its practical position to such a semi-independent German value.1 They boggle at the cost to them of pro- nuclear rearmament. viding what would amount to only a tiny frac- Another pragmatist, Hans Morgenthau, tion of the U.S. unilateral nuclear delivery takes a pessimistic attitude.2 He predicts that capacitv. They note that the characteristics of a separate French national striking force would the Polaris missile are such that the force would mean that “the alliance will for all practical be confígured for a “counter-cities” role. Yet purposes be dissolved.” Since the force de the surface fleet proposed by the Americans frappe appears inevitable—or is alreadv in ex- would not ensure the degree of survivability istence, if we take the French word for it— against a pre-emptive enemy attack that a the dissolution of nato may soon be upon us. “counter-cities” force must possess in order to A logical question might therefore be, Is the add
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