NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF NAT0...F-102 OPERATIONAL TRAINING. . . OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUGHT

JULY-AUGU ST 1964 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

STATES AIR FORCE

Nuclear Forces and the Future of NATO...... 2 Brig. Gen. E. Vandevanter, Jr., USAF (Ret)

F-102 Oper a t io n a l Training...... 9 Brig. Gen. Robert W. Bums, USAF

A Philosophical Guide for the Armchair Strategist...... 24 Coi. Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF

T he USAF jn Britain...... 28 Kenneth Sams

O v E R K IL L AND U .N D E R T H O U G H T ...... 3 7 Capt. Thomas C. Pinckney, USAF

MATS R ole rs C ombat Air l if t ...... 49 Maj. Henry L. Walker, USAF

Re TENTION—A V lE W FR O M TH E B O T T O M ...... 5 8 Capt. Henry D. Steele. USAF

Air Operations in Viet Nam T he .Air Force Civ il Encineer’s Role in Counterinsurgency...... 64 Lt. Col. Francis E. Torr, USAF

The Science Frontier T he Past Seven Yea r s ln Aer o dyn a mics...... 73 Alfred C. Draper

Books and Ideas An Army Hist o r ia n s “R econsideration” ...... 92 Dr. Robert F. Futrell

T he Contributors ...... 1 0 2

lhe cover Address manusrript* to the Editor. Air Uni- Operational nnits of the Air Defense Command verutij Recíetc, Aerospace Studies Institute, now get combat-ready F-102 intereeptor pilots Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Printed hy the through the highly professionalized training by Government Printing Office, Washington, D C. the 4780th Air Defense Wing (Training) at Copie* are available from the Air University Perrin Air Force Base, Texas. Brigadier Gen- Bonk Department, Maxwell Air Force Base. eral Robert W . Bums discusses this "D euce" Ala. single topy, 75 eents. yearly snbst ription, training, whieh relieves combat units of tran- •3.50. USAF necuRitiNC p u b l ic a t io n 50-2, sition flying responsibility and enables thern to concentrate on the business of air defense. Vol. XV No. 5 J uly-Aucust 1964

NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF NATO

B rigadier G en er a l E. V andevanter, J r ., USAF (R et)

OR M ORE than a year now, strategists Second, a European community deterrent and policy makers have carried on a would have little purpose if its use were subject F cross-Atlantic dialogue over the merits to a United States veto. Confidence in the of the American proposal for a combined nato American ability to provide active strategic multilateral nuclear force ( mlf ). Protagonists deterrence is now waning because Europeans on both sides of the ocean continue to hold doubt that the United States would, in many divided opinions as to what is at stake. Is the cases, take action that might risk the devasta- mixed-manned mle a vital necessity to smooth tion of America. This is no reflection on our relations with our European colleagues, or is it, bravery—or our integrity. Rather, Europeans as some have maintained, more apt to divide regard their own suspicion as an acknowl- than unite the alliance? In either case, if the edgment of our propensity for making rational mlf should have to be scuttled because of lac-k decisions in such matters. In anv event, if Euro- of allied enthusiasm, what are the altematives? peans think we inay hesitate to come to their The area of maneuver for the strategic aid, their concern would not seem to be allaved nuclear strike force issue is hemmed in on three by an arrangement that includes an American sides by hard, seemingly immovable restric- finger on the “safety catch.” tions. First, France is bv now bound and deter- But a third factor—fear of possible ungov- mined to have her own independent force de emed German resurgence—generates demands frappe. In retrospect, one can now guess that for some type of control mechanism which de Gaulle was almost certain to refuse the would prevent unilateral national use of the Nassau o£Fer.° Even without de Gaulle, France component parts. Not only the Soviet and satel- could, and probably would, press its nuclear lite nations would strenuously object to an program to completion. independent, nuclear-armed West Germany; even neutrals and most of our allies would op- pose such a course. ° The Nassau formula of a •Incidentally, some American* still argue incorrectlv that the French "tumed dowu our offer of nuclear weapons." As “Most ohjectors are less emphatic in their opposition than far as is known, the Nassau proposal representcd no change in the hrir apparent to the role of British Prime Minister, Mr. the United States position regarding nuclear weapons sharing. Harold Wilson. Britain’s Labour Partv leader. He is reported to According to the Nassau communiqué. the proposal involved have said: “We are completely, utterly, and unequivocally op- “Polaris missiles I without warheads).’’ in the French view, thís posed, now and in all circuimtances, to any suggestion that was hke refusing to throw a life linc to a tired swimmer but Germany, West Germany or East Germany, directly or indireetly, telhng him you wouJd have a scotch and soda ready if he madc should have a finger on the nuclear trigger. . . .” Laurence W. it ashore. The French needed warheads, not missiles, as de Martin, “ ‘Honest Brokers’ in the Nuclear Muddle,” The Repórt- Gaulle emphasized in his rcply. er, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2 Jamiarv 1964), p. 21.

NATO Conference, Ottatra. 22-24 May 1963 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW multinational Polaris armada, with each nation As usual, the prime issue revolves around “who allowed to determine for itself the circum- will pull the trigger” and “who will guard the stances under which it could withdraw its con- safety catch.” With so little enthusiasm for the tribution for independent national use, could project, deliberations over these complex pro- not, in the opinion of allies and opponents alike, cedures could be dragged out interminably. be applied to the German Federal Republic. Many have questioned the wisdom of the The one course most likely to shatter nato American policy. They wonder if a contrived vvould be acquiescence in loose or ineffectual community endeavor represents the only solu- Controls over West German nuclear armament. tion. Professor Henry Kissinger, for one, main- Faced with these contradictions, what tains there is a better alternative.2 He favors policy should the United States pursue? One a course of encouraging the French and British course would be simply to let matters work to form a European strategic force independ- themselves out. But this course, too, has its ent of the United States. Through the natural dangers, for, left to themselves, the energetic course of events he believes the most affluent Germans might ultimately take matters into European nation, Germany, would be drawn their own hands, either by repudiating their into this consortium, thus satisfying her yearn- commitment not to manufacture nuclear weap- ing for strategic power. This proposal does not ons or by acquiring them from other sources. really come to grips with the matter of how The mlf proposal was an attempt to head off to govern the German contribution. Could the unilateral German action by tying the Federal British and French, having for years insisted Republic into an unbreakable, mixed-national- on the sovereign right of nations to defend itv association with Britain and the Continental their own vital interests, reverse themselves by have-nots. asking for restraints on Germanvs employment But Europeans have hardly waxed ecstatic of its component? Many observers feel that over the American suggestion—in fact, some Kissinger vastly underrates the grass-roots op- seem downright skeptical about its practical position to such a semi-independent German value.1 They boggle at the cost to them of pro- nuclear rearmament. viding what would amount to only a tiny frac- Another pragmatist, Hans Morgenthau, tion of the U.S. unilateral nuclear delivery takes a pessimistic attitude.2 He predicts that capacitv. They note that the characteristics of a separate French national striking force would the Polaris missile are such that the force would mean that “the alliance will for all practical be confígured for a “counter-cities” role. Yet purposes be dissolved.” Since the force de the surface fleet proposed by the Americans frappe appears inevitable—or is alreadv in ex- would not ensure the degree of survivability istence, if we take the French word for it— against a pre-emptive enemy attack that a the dissolution of nato may soon be upon us. “counter-cities” force must possess in order to A logical question might therefore be, Is the add stability to the strategic balance. alliance worth attempting to preserve under Overactive American sponsorship could these conditions? generate hesitations among those who must participate, some of whom are naturally unen- thusiastic and some of whom might drag their O biginally, we are told, the feet in familiar bargaining techniques. One North Atlantic Treatv was conceived solely as should expect active opposition from the Scan- a means of guaranteeing a prostrate Europe dinavian countries, and the Southern Europe- that America would not leave it undefended ans have little wherewithal to back up their against Soviet aggression. If this purpose is no aspirations. Belgium, the Netherlands, and longer served, what is the value of the eoali- Italy appear to be going along reluctantly in tion? Actually the very factors which have order to exert some control over the Germans. caused the loss of strategic significance seem NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF NATO 5

to have increased the necessity for common tween the terms strategic and tactical, a useful defense. If .America, with a reduced nuclear distinction can be made if one does not carry superiority and itself now vulnerable to attack, it too far. For our purpose, it helps to consider can no longer offer the same degree of protec- one interrelation between these descriptive tion through strategic deterrence, does it not terms: strategic forces are deterrent because become more important that the Continentais they dissuade the Soviets from going to war be able to provide a larger measure of their by the threat of devastation to the motherland; own defense? tactical forces are defensive because they The nato association has demonstrably would be used to stem a Soviet invasion. A strengthened both the physical and psycho- slight oversimplification is allowable here, for logical security posture of Europe. VVithout the statement differentiates the two ways in the backing of the other alhes, it is hardly which the threat of American strategic nuclear íikely that, a few vears back, little Norvvay— power could be lashed to the defense of or, more recently, Greece—would have felt able Europe. The first way we have just discussed: to reject insolent Soviet demands. Without the through an independent European community ailiance as a médium for consultation, nego- or national strategic commands. The basic tiation, and reconciliation, it is doubtful that premise here assumes that the deterrent effect the Free World could present a common face of even a small force will be magnified by to the Communist bloc on any matter. And Soviet and American fear that first use of the finally, without the nato militarv organization, European force would trigger a worldwide the Europeans could hardly have accomplished general nuclear war. the buildup to a formidable composite military The second linkage, somewhat more tenu- force that has taken place in the past deeade. ous, would threaten the involvement of Ameri- Beyond doubt, nato is a valuable asset can strategic forces through escalation. Tacti- well vvorth striving to save. But nato is onlv cal nuclear weapons integrated into the nato an ailiance, an association of States which shield complete the potentiallv escalatory Cir- moves fonvard only when all members are cuit. interested in the same course of action. Each Let us look more closely at this arrange- nation must view natos programs from the ment, for it may offer a partial solution to our utilitarian standpoint of what policies would dilemma. Muçh of the firepower would be de- best further their own interests. What does the livered by American units assigned to or ear- United States seek from the ailiance? marked for nato use, the rest by European Militarily, the ansvver to this question tactical forces. Weapons for European army, stems from two complementary functions: de- navy, and air force troops of the nato “shield" terrence and defense. Some still see the ailiance are stored and maintained by American teams in the original context: as a manifestation of at dispersed locations. In case of hostilities, intent by all the allies to unite in opposition when the release order is given, the Americans to aggression in Europe. Others place more would turn over the nuclear weapons to the tac- emphasis on the role of wekling the individual tical troops, who would carry them to launch- national potentials into the most capable fight- ing positions, mate them with delivery vehicles, ing machine. But in either case there are im- and fíre them as directed by nato authorities. portant qualifications. Americans would reject Conceptually, the system has served a any commitment so binding that it could take vital need, but in practice it has obvious draw- them into war without a decision on their part; backs. It places a heavy drain on American nor would they accept any restriction which manpower for technical and custodiai person- precluded their following a forceful, independ- nel. Yet it does not give Europeans the feeling ent course in non-NATO areas like Cuba, Tai- of ownership they would like to have. Natu- wan, and África. rally, some Continentais will always be reluc- Between deterrence and defense, as be- tant to relv completely on weapons which are 6 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW not under their sole jurisdiction to use as they were actually theirs to dispose of in a manner see fit. Higher nato commanders and staff decided by the international network. planners have chafed in the past under U.S. Hints of such an impending arrangement legal restrictions which obstructed their access have been widely circulated. The Nassau com- to essential information about how the war- muniqué spoke of an interim plan for “sub- heads would aet and how many were available scribing” nuclear delivery forces now in Europe where. The recent decisions to provide ad- to nato. Since units in Europe are already ditional information may well alleviate this “assigned" to nato—heretofore the highest situation. category of commitment—there must have The system is not all bad, however. In- been an intention to create a new order of deed, some of the so-called weaknesses could dedication. To many observers, the new status also be considered advantages. Weapons are could only mean a greater c-orporate sharing probably better guarded and cared for in the of weapons. custodiai sites than they would be if scattered The United States should not feel obliged throughout the taetical units. The storage to subscribe all taetical weapons in Europe to teams function as valuable safeguards against nato, for that would undercut one of the pri- unauthorized fíring, since both the European mary advantages of the present system. The taetical commander and the U.S. custodian weapons now located in, say, Italy or Germany must agree that the proper release order has are still American. If hostilities should deterio- been received. rate to a condition in which local troops and Moreover, the system could be improved Americans were fighting side by side in a des- without change in the basic pattern. American perate situation, nuclear weapons would prob- legal restrictions (or our interpretation of them) ably be used if both countries wanted to, could be eased. In this connection, one should regardless of the attitude of other nato mem- note the reported search for electronic locking bers. This feature is one of the reasons the devices which would, if developed, make re- Germans have been content with the present mote control procedures more effective.' Some arrangements. The same feature would prob- of the provisions which have kept Europeans ably be lacking in a common strategic force, out of the planning and control functions are and the Germans have already tabled their ob- anachronisms left over from the days of atomic jections to any voting system that would re- scarcity. The barriers have recently been low- quire unanimous consent of all members to ered, but just how much is hard to say. Two of engage the multilateral nuclear force. the measures agreed to in the spring of 1963 at Thus, those who want to be sure the weap- the Ottawa meeting (namely, non-American ons are readily available for use are relativelv representation in Omaha and a non-American well satisfied with current taetical arrange- deputy for nuclear matters at sh a pe) would ments. At the same time, those who worrv have been meaningless under previous limita- about impetuous use also feel that the nato tions. process interposes reasonable precautions Europeans would be pleased if certain against premature release. weapons now in Europe could, without leaving U.S. physical custody, be fully committed to nato. Such a pool would form the taetical T he obvious question then arises: equivalent of the warhead reservoir contem- VVill the taetical arrangement with minor mod- plated under the multilateral nuclear force. ifications ( to make the command and control The United States would retain the same veto more truly international) satisfv the aspira- right as other nations, so that nuclear war could tions of responsible Germans and eliminate the not be initiated without U.S. concurrence. But need for a strategic command? Only time can Europeans would receive an important psycho- tell. A few years ago the equipping of the logical boost from the fact that the weapons Bundcswchr with taetical atomic weapons was NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF NATO 7

the ultimate goal of only the most militant Paradoxically, the vital issue of general nuclear German rearmers and far beyond the desires war might hinge more importantly on how of the moderates. Even Strauss stopped there. the Western allies handle battlefield and other Chancellor Adenauer reluetantly swung over tactical weapons than on how shrewdly they to the support of tactical weapons only after manipulate the threat of strategic attack. having sensed the opposition to large conven- Yet the American reticence to grasp the tional armies. thorny problem of sharing tactical nuclear German public and offieial opinion toward weapons is still consistent: it stems from the nuclear arms, originally characterized by pas- Administrations fundamental desire to widen sivitv, has been growing more active with time. the gap between conventional war and gen- There is nothing at present, however, to sug- eral nuclear war. In the Administrations view, gest a widespread desire for strategic power. frontline nuclear weapons in non-American True, Bonn has been the staunchest European hands are antithetic to that aim, for diffused advocate of the mlf, which it seems to recog- control could shorten the fuse between a con- nize as the best way to ease the Federal Repub- ventional spark and the combustion of a lim- lic into strategic activities. This attitude does ited nuclear war—and limited nuclear war in not represent a self-generated campaign to Europe (if such a condition is possible) could insist on a strategic role; it is more a considered easilv escalate into full-scale war. Washington selection in response to the choices offered her. wants to “preserve the options,” including the Many observers feel that German concem option to fight a large conventional campaign. is still directed primarily at the battlefield. Unhappily, an elaboration from one side of the Germans live with the constant knowledge water sometimes merely confirms previous sus- that they, of all the allies in Central Europe, picion on the other side. American proposals are most exposed. In spite of recent reassuring for conventional defense reinforce the anxietv estimates of overall allied troop superiority, that limited war means “limited to Germany.’’ most Germans still believe that a European Bonns arguments in favor of integrating nu- conventional war would be fought in Germany, clear weapons in troop units stationed near the with much of the country being overrun. Anv frontier lead Administration strategists to fear apparent Western reluctance to use nuclear that a minor conflict in Europe could flare inad- weapons from the outset might tempt the vertentlv into a general-war nuclear holocaust. Soviets to bite off a piece of territory and then Oddly enough, the present patchwork Sys- negotiate as to how much they should give tem seems to come as close to a workable com- back. Therefore, the prime German objective promise as any scheme yet suggested. As has been—and still is, in the eyes of many— explained, it offers some advantages that a to weave nuclear weapons inseparably into the more clean-cut arrangement could not dupli- forward defense at the Iron Curtain. This aim cate. In deciding to emphasize the tactical overshadows any incipient desire to engage network in lieu of a separate European stra- in strategic deterrence. tegic deterrent, the United States would have Why then the American desire to deal several factors working in its favor. primarily with strategic problems? At the First, the impetus would be coming from Ottawa conference the other allies made plain elsewhere. All Europeans, not even excluding their preference for improving the machinery the French, have an interest in tactical nuclear for planning and control of tactical nuclear weapons. The British in particular, while not weapons. Many Americans, too, feel that the enamored of a hair-trigger nuclear response, delicate issues of tactical control present the favor an immediate emphasis on nuclear sup- really criticai problems. As limited wars be- port for the shield, for in this endeavor they come more likely, the chances for misuse of could make the greatest contribution at a time nuclear weapons multiply—more quickly with when they sorely need bargaining material. less rigorously controlled frontline weapons. Second, the modifieations which would 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

make the system more attractive to Europeans but which do not unduly alarm the Soviets or in general, and to Germans in particular, are the allies, could they not provide with less modest and politically feasible. They vvould political friction the same firepower now con- depend mainly on changes in American atti- templated for the surface missile ships of the tude and some legal refinements. The latter MLF? process might be time consuming, but this does not necessarily represent a disadvantage. W orkinc through the established framework, On the debit side, one must admit that i.e., remodeling the tactical procedure and ex- focusing on tactical issues might merely post- panding the force, will tend to solidify nato. pone a fínal reckoning vvith the Germans on Military officers of all nations want to have a the matter of strategic power. But the chances voice in nuclear weapons planning. Non- are more than negligible that the Germans vvill American commanders want to be guaranteed be permanently content with the close tactical that weapons will be available to them; they tie to American strategic power. Even if the want to be assured that their influence will solution proves only temporary, a delay vvill decide how these weapons are to be used. probably be beneficiai. All indications point Arrangements for increasing the participation to a vvillingness on the part of the Erhard of the nato staft and non-American command- government to approach matters of politico- ers will add enormously to the solidarity and military strategy with an open mind. esprit of the international network. Advocates of the multilateral nuclear I have argued that the multilateral nuclear force have consistently opposed the mobile force is not a sine qua non for sharing nuclear mid-range ballistic missile ( mmrbm) for Euro- weapons in nato. The mixed-manned surface pean forces as being militarily unnecessary. fleet was a worthwhile gamble, one which Yet this weapon could be integrated easily into would solve many a sensitive political issue the forces of Allied Command Europe with- if it could ever be brought safely into port. out creating a fractional part of the political It may yet succeed in spite of its deficiencies. dilemmas involved in the mlf. The central But the point is that we need not pin all our problem is one of control. mmrbms could be hopes on the mlf successfully negotiating installed under the jurisdiction of the Supreme the reefs ahead. The tactical nuclear apparatus Allied Commander, Europe, whose command also represents a useful vehicle for improving and control arrangements have so far provided the sharing and control arrangements with our the only workable formula. If such weapons allies. Our course should be planned with can be supplied to German forces under con- enough flexibility to allow us to shift emphasis ditions of control which satisfy the Germans as the situation unfolds. Washington, D.C.

Notes 1. Drew Middleton, “ NATO Fleet Plan Is Opposed in 3. Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Crisis in the Western Alli- Panei of European Union,” New York Times, 5 December 1963. ance,” Commentarxj, Vol. 35, No. 3 (March 1963), pp. 185-190. p. 1, col. 6. 4. See Klaus Knorr, A NATO Nuclear Force: The Problem 2. Henry A. Kissinger, “NATO’s Nuclear Dilemma," The of Management (Princeton, New Jersey: Center of International Repórter, Vol. 28, No. 7 (28 March 1963), pp. 22-37. Studies, 1963), p. 10. F-102 OPERATIONAL

TRAINING B rigadjler G en er a l R obert W. Burns N 1961 the ballistic missile threat became To the existing program, Air Defense so urgent that Air Defense Command Command added an intensive mission-oriented I vvas com pelled to p lace one third of its qualifícation training phase including academ- force on alert status. In assuming this posture, ics and extensive flying training in adc mission it became painfully apparent that tactical profiles. Using tactical squadron procedures as squadrons could no Ionger tolerate a signifi- a foundation, the command instituted realistic cant percentage of non-combat-ready pilots. training, conducted in an air defense environ- The work week for operationally ready pilots ment by experienced F-102 instructor pilots. —consisting of alert duty as well as instructing The result of this expanded and standard- pilots not operationally ready—was stretching ized training program is an annual production into the 90-hour categorv. While under some of 120 new combat-ready F-102 interceptor conditions a 90-hour work week could be an pilots who require only a local area check ride acceptable way of life, the prospects as a mat- at their new home base to be fully qualified to ter of routine in “peacetime” were not likely stand alert. to encourage long tenure among the officer per- There are other products of the school, sonnel or many re-enlistments among the air- all aimed at filling the interceptor cockpits men. with qualified, operationally ready pilots. Some Further, the lack of standardization in the 50 “turnabout” and F-101 conversion pilots are transition and checkout processes among all graduated annually. These are qualified jet the fighter-interceptor squadrons in the com- pilots retrained in the F-102 interceptor in an mand made the concentration of combat-crew accelerated program. The school also provides training at a central location appear not only some 50 F-101 “lead-in" pilots annually for the desirable but the only feasible solution to the Voodoo interceptor school at Tyndall afb. problem. Since successful training in an air defense To this end Air Defense Command environment requires a high degree of profes- acquired Perrin Air Force Base, Texas, in inid- sional experience, Air Defense Command went 1962 from the Air Training Command, which to the field for the school s instructor force. had initiated F-102 pilot training there two Experience minimums call for 1000 hours’ total years previously. The base, its 4780th Air De- time, of which 200 must be in the F-102. The fense Wing (Training), and facilities were present 100-man instructor force averages far assigned to tlie 73d Air Division, headquar- above this levei. The average instructor pilot tered at Tyndall afb, Florida. The 73d, with possesses in excess of 650 hours of combat- its usaf Interceptor Weapons School and newlv qualified F-102 time and more than 7 years created F-101 and F-106 combat-crew train- of rated, commissioned service with the U.S. ing school, became Air Defense Commands Air Force. The combined weight of this expe- “school-teaching division," responsible for all rience adds considerable polish to the training adc interceptor pilot qualifícation. program and ensures a maximum degree of Under Air Training Command the F-102 professionalism and individual approach to the school at Perrin already had adequate academ- flying training given each student. ics and flying programs to accomplish the To ensure complete understanding of the transition mission. Training, however, stopped F-102 training program, each instructor is re- at the checkout point, and new interceptor quired to take the basic “long course on assign- pilots sent to tactical squadrons required fur- ment to Perrin and annually take a refresher ther mission-oriented training. This was the course, primarily in the academics phase. Most heart of the problem. instructors also attend initial academics classes F-102 OPERATIONAL TRAIN1NC 11

\vith assigned students to get the feel of the of hours in the T-33 on mission flying and tar- instructional pace and individual student prob- get flying. lems. Flying safetv is stressed throughout the The training, constantly under change to course, as are emergency procedures. Simula- lceep it current, is a preciselv balanced com- bination of academies, simulator, and flying training. Eaeh phase dovetails into the next to ensure continuity and standardization. Training Days Morning Schedule Afternoon Schedule Qualification training, constituting the final 1-5 Pre-lnlerceptor Pre-Interceptor half of the training time, has built-in flexibilitv (Classroom) (Classroom) to allow addition of new material. 6-9 T-33 Flying T-33 Flying The so-called long course is the primarv (Instruments) (Instruments) function of the school. This is a 26-week (108- 10-18 T-33 Flying Link (Instruments) 19-22 T-33 Flying F-102 Engineering dav) combination of academies and flying, (Basic Academies) calling for 130 classroom hours and 146:30 fly- 23-27 Simulator F-102 F-102 Engineering ing hours (93 sorties). Flying training also (Basic Academies) includes an additional 293 ground hours in 28-36 Simulator F-102 T-33 Flying briefing, debriefing, and simulator. (Procedures-Target) The aceompanving chart shows the 37—40 F-102 Transition (Open) (Flying) training-day sequence and interlocking train- 41-45 F-102 Transition (Open) ing phases. (Flying) The F-101 lead-in course parallels the long 46-54 Basic Radar F-102 Transition course through the 90th dav, when students (Academies) (Flying) move to Tvndall af b for F-101 B interceptor 55-63 Basic Radar Advanced Radar training. The parallel exists again in the F-102 (Flying) (Academies) tumabout course, although the latter is of a 6 4-67 Simulator Basic Radar (Flying) shorter duration. 68-72 ADC Indoctrination Basic Radar Students in the F-101 lead-in course are (Academies) (Flying) provided a minimum of 83 flying hours, 275:30 73-81 Basic Radar Basic Rodar ground hours (simulator and briefing), and (Flying) (Flying) 113 academic hours. The cutoff point is at the 82-86 Qualification Training Advanced Rodar qualification training phase. (Academies) (Flying) The tumabout course, calling for 60:30 87-90 Simulator F-102 Advanced Radar (Flying) flying hours, 221:30 ground training hours, and (Cutoff point for F-101 lead-•in course) 130 academic hours, totais 63 training days. It 91-99 Alert Hangar Qualification Training is designed to qualifv rated pilots who have 100 Briefing/Tyndall AFB Deployment/Firing been previouslv qualified as interceptor pilots 101-108 Qualification Training/Toctical Evaluation/ in single-place fighters as operationally readv Graduotion F-102 pilots. The F-101 conversion course of 36 train- ing days qualifies operationally ready F-101 B pilots as operationally ready F-102 pilots. Fly- tor rides often exceed the minimums, and in ing training includes 27 hours on 18 sorties, most cases students will log more than the 106:30 ground hours, and 82 academic hours. minimum hours in flying training. Data link Early emphasis in all courses is on instru- missions are flown, when possible, in time divi- ment procedures. Since the student inputs in sion data link (TDDL)-modified F-102 aircraít the long course are all recent flying school based at Perrin. Perrin operates a ground- graduates, this is a reíresher in academies and controlled interception ( CCi) facility for radar an opportunity to log a considerable number mission training. 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Probably the most unusual “final exam” proved its value in increased combat capability in the command is the deployed flight firing among adc F-102 tactical units. Reactions mission to Tyndall afb, some 800 miles to the throughout the command prove conclusively east. Student and instructor aircrews posted that combat-crew training at a central location to fire the mission brief and preflight on an is a feasible and most satisfactory solution to alert status. After take-off, they fly to the Gulf the adc aircrew qualification problem. of México range offshore from Tyndall afb, The programs success in its present State fire live air intercept missiles ( aim’s ) against can be attributed to three major factors: the Ryan-built Q2C Firebee drone target, and • A precise and balanced course of in- recover at Tyndall. This training affords maxi- struction oriented in an air defense environ- mum realism in navigation, fuel management, ment cci procedures, and recovery procedures. If • A high degree of experience and all goes according to plan, the mission, flown mission-oriented ability in the instructor staff generally on the lOOth training day, terminates • Strict adherence to standardization in the same day at Perrin. transition and checkout processes. Air Defense Command s experience with a Consolidated flying training program has Hq 73d Air Division

In classroom study at the F-102 school, the students get a general knowledge of the armament load their airplane will carrtj and of the MG-10 fire control system that Controls the armament. Primary armament for the F-102A is the Falcon air intercept missíle shown. The students learn its propulsion and guidance system during the lmsic radar instruction that precedes the flying-training phase. The school s aca- demic program is individualized as much as possible to mcet the necds of each stu- dent, and additional instruction in any phase of the training is always availahle. Transition to Combat-Ready

The 73d Air Division is responsible for Air Defense Command’s interceplor pilol qual- ification. It takes pilots graduated by Air Training Comniand, gives lhem transition training in the Interceptor Pilot Training School at Perrin AFB, Texas, and climaxes their training with live firing at drone targets over the Culf range offshore from Tyndall AFB, Florida. The transition is to the delta-winged supersonic F-102 inter- ceptor, backbone of the .Air Defense Command’s interceptor force since 1956. Capable of speeds in excess of 800 miles an hour, the F-102 Delta Dagger can fly combat at altitudes above 50,000 feet. It carries the Falcon radar- or heat-guided air intercept missile (AIM ) in its closed armament bay. When pilots have mastered this inter- ceptor and weapon, they are ready for combat alert status in the Air Defense Comniand. TllUXll-j

. Itu r SiMfilfrM i ••>,»»■ v . . i. j .«A lVA l i m , / 1 ONlKHVii KXlAXtl «imSilMM hoiii *v»í*5in •*, *«.. ni-, A studenfs initial exposure to the supersonic F-102 comes in the two-seat trainer, TF-102, used in earhj transition phases of fltying training. De- spite its bulging cockpit, it flies and shoots like its speedier single-place counterpart, which the student will take on after qualifying in the TF-102. The trainer is equipped with radar instrumenta- tion, allowing the instructor to work flrsthand with his student in radar intercept tactics, which are a basic part of the 26-week training program. . . . The commund post of the 4780th Air Defense Wing (Training) is the nerve center of F-102 training activity. All flight operations are moni- tored round-the-clock by staff personncl repre- senting the wing commander. The command post is much like those at ADC bases assigned to alert du ty . . . . T h e sn o w - c o v e r e d T ex as cou n tr y sid e lies beyond the flight line and the F-102’s poised to take student pilots aloft for training in the art of manned interceptor flying. These combat- ready aircraft have a secondary mission, to sup- port the Nations air defense system in time of emergency. From Perrins old control towcr the view takes in the new tower opened earltj in 1904.

Like F-102's on air defense alcrt, those used to train new pilots require regular maintenance. At Perrin the heavtj load uf student and instructor missions necessitates precise scheduling to ensure adequate maintenance. In Januanj a record eight inches of snow temporarihj hampered mainte- nance and fiying. ... An F-l 02 fuselage gets a thorough checkout hetween training missions. Because of the number of sorties required to sup- port the vast pilot training program, these inter- ceptors are given meticulous care bij aircrews and maintenance crews alike. Into the cavity goes a J-57 jet turbine engine. . . . The walkaround ritual, a must before every flight, is performed by the instructor pilot and student on a TF-102 preliminary to a transition training flight. A com- prehensive knowledge of the aircraft, its Systems and armament, and of Air Defense Command missions and procedures is required of a student before he is certificd combat-ready and graduated from ADCs Interceptar Pilot Training School.

The final stop before take-off is the personal equipment section. Parachate and survival equip- mcnt that have heen fittcd to the pilot are stored here, and technicians keep constant check on the condition of equipment to ensure its readiness. . . . Operations desk, source of information for every mission-bound pilot, is orie of the busiest spots in the two student training squadrons at Perrin. Here instructors and students file flight plans as they gct set for a training sortie. One hundred experienced F-102 pilots staff the two squadrons that have sole responsibility for the flying training of all new ADC interceptor pilots. The blackboard shows flight pairings, take-off and recovery times, tail numbers, and other pertinent data. . . . “Hand” flying is part of the postflight bull sessions. The instructor and the student get down to cases on the rights and wrongs of interceptor flying in the ADC manner. Individual attention by instructors to their assigned students ensures thorough knowledge of procedures and tactics of the manned interceptor air defense mission. Air Defense Command gets more than 120 qualified F-l 02 interceptor pilots annually from the training program conducted at the school. . . . In the postflight playback the instructor and his student watch the Signal Data Recorder, a mag- netic tape recording of the actuàl radarscope dis- play that the pilot saw during the mission. This unique machine not only shows whether the stu- dent got a hit or a miss but also enables the instruc- tor to determine where any mistake was made, so that he can instruct the student accordingly. This is part of the individual attention that the more than 200 students per year receive during the flying training phase of ADC pilot training. The Signal Data Recorder replaces the sometimes-faulty gun camera film that was used in World War II.

When the scramble horn blows, aircrews and maintenance crews sprint for their F-102’s. In seconds the deadly interceptors are readij for flight. . . . The added power of the afterburner whips the delta tving skijward. Simulated com- bat-alert exercises give the student pilots realistic air defense expcrience. . . . Hypersonic Falcon missiles streak frotn the armament rails of an F- 102 as a pilot goes through his final examination. After completion of the fhjing training at Perrin, students deploy to Tyndall AFB for this day of live firing. . . . Target of the Falcons is a simu- lated encmy, the Q2C jet-powered drone. Built by Ryan, this fast and versatile craft can be either air or ground launched. It flies a con- trolled “racetrack" course over the Gulf of México range near Tyndall. The interceptors attack in ADC mission profile, and electronic systems score the success or failure of each missile fired.

Manual intercept controllers at the “Monday” radar site at Tyndall AFB electrunically guide the student interceptions flown as the clímax of the transition flight course of the 4780th Air De- fense Wing (Training). Much of the success of a rnission depends upon the abilitij of the controller and pilot to coordinate their information and instructions. Vnder these conditions the student fliers get realistic combat experience designed specifically to orient them to the Air Defense Command rnission. . . . Like fighter base rarnps almost anywhere, the Tyndall ramp packed with hardware is the first sight to greet the deployment flights from Perrin arriving for live firing. After successfully completing this firing, students fhy back to Perrin for graduation to full combat- ready status in the Air Defense Command. • • t A PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDE FOR THE ARMCHAIR | STRATEGIST • ■ ■ ■ • V ■ . V i r4

Jl ■

.

C oloxel Robert N. G in sbu bg h é f » .

ITH the increasing impact of mili- tarv affairs on our dailv lives since WWorld War II, the discussion of military strategy lias become a favorite parlor game. Since the rules of the game are not so well defined as those of the great American game of football, the armchair strategist is much less constrained than his close relative the Monday morning quarterback. Although excessive constraints on the armchair strate- A PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDE FOR THE ARMCHAIR STRATEGIST 25

gist are probablv undesirable, the game of At stake are the lives of our people, the health strategy would probablv prove more interest- of our economy, and the existence of our ing and worthwhile if several general rules countrv. were more regularly observed bv the partici- • The third rule is that the strategists pants. As a start, it seems to me that the fol- should communicate with each other. The tra- loving seven rules could be quite useful. ditional ploy of the militarv man who limited • The first rule is that anyone can play. his argument to an affirmation of his profes- Although strategy in the narrow sense is sim- sional judgment has been generally discred- plv the art of generalship, interest in militarv ited. Those who continue to rely on statements strategy is not limited to the generais or even which begin “In my professional militarv to the militarv. Although the influence of the judgm ent.. .” are bound to find themselves lay strategist has increased markedly in recent relegated to playing solitaire. On the other years, it was recognized long before World hand there has come into vogue another ploy YVar I that wars were too important to be that is equally unfair and unfruitful in encour- left to the militarv. The militarv plaver who aging intercommunication. This ploy, favored tries to ignore this rule is likely to find himself by some lay strategists, begins: “I have a study playing a game of solitaire that has no rele- which proves ....’’ There is ample room for vance to the key problems of current military both military judgment and analytic study in strategy. Similarly the lay strategist ought to problems of military strategy, and all partici- recognize that the study and discussion of pants would do well to become more familiar militarv strategy are also a proper concern with the capabilities and limitations of each. of the militarv man, whose professional ex- As a start, the military professional should pertise extends beyond the mere implementa- become better versed in the techniques of Sys- tion of strategy. It seems an overlv ambitious tems analysis. Actually the military Services project—and probablv a futile one—to trv to have given tremendous impetus to the devel- establish rules delineating the proper roles of opment of techniques of systems analysis and the militarv and the civilian strategists. Never- opportunities for using it. They have also given theless it seems worthwhile to observe that substantial moral and financial support. Never- while the various aspeets of national security theless there are many military professionals are closely interrelated thev are also roughlv who have not been directly exposed to Sys- identifiable and to some extent separable into tems analysis in their normal assignments and categories for expert consideration. who have no appreciation of the usefulness of • The second rule is that the object of this technique. Their attitudes may range from the game is to maximize our national interests. belligerency to skepticism based on ignorance Observance of this rule requires first a general of the process and antagonism toward the agreement on national interests, although it is civilian analyst who has presumed to study not necessarv to specify these interests in de- military problems. Instead of hostility it would taiL The participants should also recognize be more fruitful for the military strategist to that this rule involves a relative concept. Com- learn more about the tools of analysis in order plete security can never be 100 per cent attain- to apply them to his own studies and in coop- able. Furthermore the object is not simply eration with the civilian analyst. maximizing security but also maximizing na- On the other hand the systems analyst, tional interests. In some cases the maximiza- whether civilian or military, should recognize tion of national interests may not produce the the limitations of his tools and should not maximum national security that could be presume too much about the validity of the achieved if militarv security were the only conclusions. Ultimately, the output of an ana- object. We must also never lose sight of what lytic study can be no better than the input. is really at stake. Although we talk in game While the input will involve many facts, it terminology, we are not dealing in poker chips. must necessarily also involve certain assump- 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tions and opinions. The civilian analyst who its supporters may advocate for a variety of refuses to listen to the professional military different and sometimes conflicting reasons. It man ought to recognize that he is merely is helpful, therefore, in trying to synthesize substitnting his judgment for military judg- current policy, to have an appreciation for the ment—vvhich will not necessarily produce a national strategic policy-making process and more objective scientific study. This is not to the relationship of the policy-formulating in- say that the military assumptions should be stitutions and personalities. accepted uncritically by the civilian analyst, • Rule five requires that the partici- but as a minimum one should take note of pants use the same time frame. It is neither how the differences in assumptions will affect fair nor productive to pit the friendly forces the outcome of the studies. of today against the enemy forces of tomorrow In addition to increasing professional mil- or the friendly forces of tomorrow against the itary participation in the analytic approach, enemy forces of today. Similarly, strategic it seems that there is still a role for the more concepts must be in phase with weapon Sys- intuitive approach to strategy. By the intuitive tems. A strategy for tomorrow is of little value approach I mean the intuitive application of without tomorrow’s weapon systems and force the traditional principies of war to particular leveis to support or implement it. Participants strategic problems. The greatest failing of this should appreciate the factor of lead time, the traditional approach to strategy is its highly time needed to translate an idea or a techno- subjective nature, varying according to differ- logical advanee into operational hardware in ences in intuition and having no objective test the hands of organized military units. Lead of validity. Despite its shortcomings, some time may also be a factor in the assimilation appreciation for historical examples can give of strategic concepts as well as in the produc- a greater appreciation for the irrational factors tion of weapon systems. It takes time for the of war and a feeling for the limits of objective human mind to adjust to new situations and analvsis. It mav also produce strategic hypoth- to develop methods for dealing with them. eses that can then be usefully subjected to the It may take even longer to gain general accept- more rigorous tests of systems analvsis. ance of these ideas, which is necessary if the • Rule four requires that the partici- military organizations are to exploit them ef- pants start with some appreciation of current fectively. Finally the strategist, as well as the strategy, friendly and enemy. The start is not tactician, must appreciate the interrelationship ahvays as easy as it might at first seem. Na- of time and distance. Reserves, for example, tional military strategy may not be explicitly must be capable of being transported to the stated. The responsible national military strat- battle area in sufficient time to affect the out- egists may intentionally withhold public expo- come of the battle. This time concept is im- sition of strategy because of their desire to plicit in the old maxims: “Git thar fustest with keep the enemy—or even their friends—guess- the mostest” and “Bring superior forces to ing. Perhaps equally important is the fact that bear at the decisive point at the decisive time the military strategy of great modern nations • Rule six is also concerned with the is not monolithic. Current military strategy, time factor: the future. Because strategy is whether American or Soviet or other, seems to concerned with future actions, it must deal represent a compromise among the various in uncertainties. While the strategist must preferred strategies of a variety of individual make some attempt to predict the future, he or institutional policy-makers. Thus strategy would do well to recognize the range of un- tends not to be completely consistent logically. certainties involved. First he must recognize Instead we find at any one time what Schell- that his intelligence about the enemy s capa- ing has called various “strands of policy.’’ The bilities and intentions cannot be perfect. Even resulting national strategic consensus tends to the enemys knowledge of his own capabilities represent some kind of a compromise which and intentions is undoubtedly not perfect. The A PHILOSOPHICAL GU1DE FOR THE ARMCHAIR STRATEG1ST 27

strategist must also appreciate the fact that game. A good strategist will seek to preserve over a period of time there are various alter - the maximum freedom of action to cope with native aetions open to his opponent as well the enemy while restricting the choices avail- as to himself. Furthermore he should realize able to him. To achieve this objective one that there is an interaction between himself should devise a strategv that will take maxi- and his opponent in the selection of alterna- mum advantage of national strengths, mini- tives. Not only do choices change, but over a mize the adverse effect of national weaknesses, period of time objectives and strategic thought and restrict the enemys ability to do the same. pattems may also change. Since strategy requires implementation to be The strategist, however, cannot afford to effective, it must be explained—at least in its wait until the changes have been completed broad outlines—to those who will have to im- and the future has become the present. If he plement it. The exposition of strategic con- is to cope with future situations, he must make cepts should, however, avoid excessive slo- decisions on the basis of imperfect knowledge ganeering. Descriptive phrases are useful in so that time will be available to him to create exposition, but their repetitive use like adver- weapons and forces to deal with the expected tising slogans is no substitute for strategic future situation. General Marshall used to thinking. emphasize that WHEN to make a decision was frequently more important than what U xdo ubtedl y additional rules which strat- decision to make. Thus strategv must be pre- egists would find useful could be devised. dictive, but it must also be sufficiently dynamic These seven are merely suggested as a start- and flexible to adjust to new situations as ing point for obtaining more useful discussions they evolve in unpredicted ways. of strategy. As in any game, the need for addi- • Under rule seven are collected some tional rules would probablv become obvious miscellaneous suggestions for the play of the after further experience. Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. THE USAF IN BRITAIN

Kenneth Sams

* ERHAPS nowhere in the world has a How has the Air Force managed to inte- foreign operating environment been grate itself so well into the British environ- Pmore congenial to peacetime Air Force ment, and in what ways is this reflected in operations than that in the British Isles. And in operational efficiency? Is there a value in the few places could there be less doubt about de- current relationship which might prove useful pendability in time of crisis. The United States in later years when the world strategic pattern Air Force has been operating from the British might have ehanged? These are questions wor- Isles for 20 of the last 22 years. In that period, thy of studv in terms of planning for the fu- which has included hot-war and cold-war con- ture utilization of overseas bases by the U.S. ditions, praeticallv every type of aircraft in the Air Force. usaf inventory at one time or another has used An important reason for the cooperative a usaf base in Britain. Several politically sensi- environment enjoyed by the usaf in Britain ti\’e weapon systems, suc-h as the Thor missile today is the reputation of the Air Force during and the RB-47, have been introduced. One of World War II. Clearly etched in the minds of three stations of the Ballistic Missile Earlv Englishmen today are memories of those un- Waming System ( bmew s) was vvelcomed bv forgettable war years—crippled American the British on their soil. Today the four tactical bombers and fighters landing at East Anglia wings based in Britain are among the most ef- bases, earlv morning formations of B-24’s ficient overseas, and the strategic rotational taking off on bombing missions, care-free units, though being phased down, have for American airmen in Norwich, Cambridge, manv years carried an extremely heavv deter- London. The unique camaraderie that onlv rent role. wartime can produce planted deep roots which The acceptability of Americans and their nourish an excellent relationship today, a gen- air bases to the British people is as great as it eration later. ever was. The Air Force was invited to Britain To an air-minded British public it was the informally in 1948 by a Labour prime minister, Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Force and it has staved under four successive Con- with their devastating raids over Germany servative prime ministers. For the first four which brought the w ar to an end. Three years years of its presence, there was not even a after the w?ar, Britain, under conditions of se- written agreement. While political opposition vere austerity, had the understandable desire has reached serious proportions at times, never to put the thought of w^ar behind her. Yet after has the opposition party formally questioned trouble threatened in Berlin, Britain offered the value of the usaf presence. Debates on the its raf bases to the U.S. Air Force in July 1948. usaf have frequently occurred in the House of Those bases were already prepared for support Commons, but these usually centered on the of B-29’s in just such an emergency, as the problem of control and generally followed par- result of an informal and secret agreement ticular situations, such as the shooting down of reached in 1946 between Air Marshal Sir the RB-47 in 1960 and the introduction of Thor Arthur Tedder of the raf and General Carl missiles in 1958. Actually the blue-suited Amer- Spaatz. As far as U.S. military activity is eon- ican has come to be accepted as almost a nor- cerned, Britain has been almost a second home mal part of British life, and Americans in for the usaf since 1948. Over 96 per cent of the Britain know that thev are really welcome. The total U.S. military strength in postwar Britain best indication of this is the high degree of in- has been Air Force. tegration into the economy and social frame- There are numerous other nonstrategic work of the 65,000 American servicemen and reasons why Britain has proved to be an ideal their families in Britain. Some 75 per cent of spot for usaf operations. The common lan- them live off base, shopping in British stores, guage, history, legal system, and traditions of attending local churches, joining communitv our people, the dose industrial relationship clubs, and generally moving about almost as which has brought manv American commercial freely as they would in the States. products into Britain, the sharing of nuclear American airmen in Britain have moved into already-crowded communities such as King’s Lynn, Norfolk, which is near the USAF installation at Sculthorpe.

responsibilities, and that special relationship which still exists in defense and foreign affairs —all these contribute to the easv integration of Americans and their bases into British life. The long record of successful postxvar op- erations from Britain is also partly due to the excellent reputation established by over half a million American servicemen and their families who have done postwar tours in Britain. As Anglo-American rapport is sustaincd ordinary people from all strata of our society, h\j gestores like those of the USAF thev gave the British their first look at real airmen at Lakenheath in aiding vic- tims of the 1953 Kings Lynn flood. American life, helping to break down the stereotvped image of Americans built up by American movies, popular fiction, affluent tour- ists and businessmen just passing through, and by the ci’s of World War II. The relative ease with which these postwar servicemen fit into British life is perhaps best exemplified in the marriage rate of single airmen. Since 1948 an average of 3000 airmen a vear have married British girls. American families in Britain do not live in “golden ghettos” but move about easily in British shops, theaters, restaurants, garages, barber shops, and pubs without the restraint evident in some other European coun- tries. These American families have managed to create a good impression despite the fact that often thev are living in crowded areas. /\ i sn contributing to success of Many a relic of the USAF “invasion" of Brit- the usaf mission is the close operational rela- ain during World War II can still he seen tionship which has existed between the usaf at bases in the United Kingdom. Air Force folk art like “C.l. Gremlins” of 1944 vin- and the raf, two of the worlds most sophisti- tage adorned numerous Nissen hut canteens. cated air forces. These two organizations have worked so closelv together over the years that thev have come to regard each other as more than allies. This special relationship probably applies more to the two air forces than to any other phase of defense. The $300-million usaf network of bases in Britain was built jointly by the usaf and the Air Ministry, the British providing land and facihties free and paying part of the costs. Prior to 1951 the raf made its own stations available for sa c bomber units rotating in and out every 90 davs. When administration of these bases was tumed over to the Americans in 1951, the British retained title to the installations, naming them raf stations. To each base, even though it was taken over exclusively for Ameri- can use, was assigned a Royal Air Force Liaison OflBcer, who also served as the raf commander of the base. This proved to be a highlv useful arrangement. The Royal Air Force Liaison Ofíicer, or raflo as he is commonly called, has a variety of functions, but thev all boil down to the big job of fitting the American military operation into its English environment. The raflo, in a % sense, provides the oil that lets the Air Force 3-, machinery run smoothly in Britain. As adviser ' , .1 to the U.S. base commander, he helps on such matters as customs clearances, raf air traffic control procedures, compliance with British regulations on ammunition storage. At the quite a few in recent years), it is the raflo, not same time he has close ties with all local British the usaf base commander, who rneets the authorities, including government, Service, and groups, and he rneets them as raf commander civilian people. Any time there is friction be- of the base. When an East Anglian farmer re- tween the base and the local community. the centlv fired a shotgun into the air close to a raflo is on the spot to eliminate it. And it is the usaf airman standing near a jet engine test raflo at Third Air Force headquarters who is stand because he objected to the noise, he was called upon to provide the answers to questions met at his home by the base raflo, who ex- raised in the House of Commons about usaf plained as tactfully as he could the serious im- operations. This he does in consultation with plications of such an action. Complaints about usaf officials. aircraft noise and sonic boom are handled by There are many instances where this inter- the raflo, with the main objective of exonerat- cession by the raflo has proved valuable. ing the usaf whenever possible. He moves When nuclear disarmament demonstrations tactfully into sensitive friction arcas such as occur outside usaf bases (and there have been usaf security practices regarding British em- As far back as 1951, USAF and RAF planes were practicing in-fiight refueling together. Here a USAF KB-29 refuels three RAF Gloster Meteor plovees. After several widely publicized cases fighters in flight. The British developed the where alert and armed usaf air police stopped “probe and drogue" system used by the USAF. British workers in security areas, the raflo, working with the base commander and the unions, devised a system satisfactory to both countries for allowing British workers access to sensitive areas with unarmed escorts. More important in terms of operational ef- fectiveness is the way in which the raflo ar- ranges for a linking of usaf military activities with the British military activities. The raflo at Third Air Force headquarters, for example, as a member of the Third Air Force com- “City of Turlock,” a Strategic Air Command B-52, lands at Brize Norton on a routine train- manders staff, recently arranged for usaf ing mission to Britain. The United Kingdom fighters and reconnaissance planes to fly close has based B-47's primarily but has also been used by USAF B-36, B-52, and B-58 aircraft. THE USAF IN BRITAIN 33

support missions with British Artny units ma- notably the 60 Thor missiles until recently neuvering on Salisbury Plain. Although this based in East Anglia. With the Thor operation, was a radical departure from existing British the raf controlled the actual missile base while Army/RAF training policy, usaf F-100’s and the usaf was responsible for the warheads. F-101’s in Britain were given a chance at valu- Successíul tests were carried out in 1961 in able training for their conventional warfare which raf tankers refueled usaf íighters and mission. This type of exercise requires close usaf tankers refueled raf aircraft in mid-air. coordination between the two Services, includ- The giant bmew s station in Yorkshire is jointly ing the use of usaf controllers on the ground operated by the usaf and the raf. The two with Army units. The RB-66s of the lOth Services share the use of each other’s installa- Tactical Reconnaissance Wing also fly sorties tions. The raf station at Northolt near Third against Royal Navy ships in British waters. In Air Force headquarters in London, for exam- ground support exercises, the RB-66’s take ple, is jointly used by the usaf and the raf for photos and fly them to their base, where they administrative and support aircraft. are picked up by British Army planes for use On several occasions the British have gone bv fíeld commanders. to great lengths to accommodate the usaf The raj- wing commander at Third Air wdien it ran into difficulty. In 1959 w'hen Gen- Force headquarters, Wing Commander eral de Gaulle refused to allow atomic weapons Thomas Stafford, has done much to get usaf on his soil, the British agreed to accommodate people together with their raf counterparts. two additional usaf tactical wings in the British He has introduced usaf operations training of- Isles. Early this year after the French severely ficers, intelligence officers, and many other restricted low-level flying by usaf aircraft, ar- staff people to their raf, Army, and Navy coun- rangements were made through the raflo at terparts, usually during visits to British instal- Third Air Force headquarters to permit more lations. He arranged for the Third Air Force of this type of flying in Britain. commander to tour the headquarters and se- lected bases of the raf’s Bomber Command, Fighter Command, Transport Command, and T he close relationship between Coastal Command and Royal Navy headquar- the two Services is evident in many other ways. ters. This not only familiarizes usaf officers The Exchange Program run between the two with the British military organization but al- Services provides an excellent opportunity for lows them to make use of it in performance of the raf and usaf to get to know each other the mission which the usaf and raf have in better. A few years ago the present usaf com- common. mander at raf Bentwaters was the commander There are many other wavs in which the of No. 1 Squadron, Royal Air Force, under the British military establishment is placed at the Exchange Program. usaf officers under this disposal of the U.S. Air Force to make its opera- program hold actual command or staff posi- tions more effective. Bombing and gunnery tions in the raf, and the same holds true for ranges manned by raf personnel are made raf officers assigned to the usaf. There are available for usaf units. A distress frequency presently some 80 usaf people in raf positions Service operated by the raf helps usaf pilots and 80 raf people on assignment to the usaf. when they need to get an immediate naviga- At least one usaf officer is enrolled at all times tional fix. Air traffic control for sa c aircraft in the raf staff colleges at Bracknell, Berkshire, operating in the Oxfordshire area is provided and Andover, Hampshire. Presently there are by the Royal Air Force. The raf provides air six assigned to these courses, and one to the defense and air-sea rescue Services for all usaf Joint Services Staff College at Latimer, Buck- units based in Britain. inghamshire. There have been numerous occasions Apart from the operational side, Britain as wrhen the raf and usaf have jointly controlled an operating base has certain advantages from the operation of certain weapon systems, a personnel standpoint. A highly efficient civil Radomcs of USAF’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning System dominate the Jandscape of F ylingdales M oot, England. Their high-potvered radar constantly scans northern approaches, to warn both the United Kingdom and the United States of attack.

Service establishment is available to the usaf. munity. They get Americans into local clubs, At one time over 6000 United Kingdom civil- arrange visits to British families, carry out tours ians were vvorking for the usaf, but this figure for British groups on usaf bases, arrange is down to about 3000 today. These U.K. civil- Anglo-American social functions, and do every- ians are extremelv useful not only because they thing possible to make Americans feel at home. speak the same language but because of their The program is headed by a retired air marshal high skills and training, their knowledge of the of the raf. U.K. environment, and their excellent adminis- The Air Ministry, the Third Air Force, and trative abilities. the U.S. Embassy in London have been work- United States personnel vvorking in the ing closely together the past ten years to make hospitable English environment enjoy a high Americans feel at home in Britain and to make State of morale vvhich contributes tovvard an their presence accepted. Every year the Am- effective operational mission. The re-enlist- bassador personally presents awards to the ment rate for usaf personnel in Britain is usaf bases vvhich have the best records in com- among the highest in the world, and the inci- munity relations. dent rate is among the lowest. Many usaf fami- Excellent Communications and logistics lies are in Britain on their second tour by support from British resources is available to choice. There is practicallv none of the so- the usaf. The British telephone and postal Sys- called “cultural shock” often experienced by tem, British railvvays, port facilities, pipelines, Americans in other areas. The increasing pros- and many other elements of this highly indus- perity of the country in recent years, coupled trialized country are at the service of the usaf. with the common language and similar way of Britain s experience in aircraft production and life, makes it easy for Americans to adjust. its large numbers of skilled aircraft vvorkers To make assimilation easier, the Air Minis- are used directly on a contract basis. When a try, at its own expense, has placed a Commu- major maintenance or modification project is nity Relations Officer on eaeh major American required for usaf planes, British firms are base. These cro’s , usually girls in their 20’s, sometimes contracted to do the job by sending help bring Americans into the life of the com- maintenance teams to the base. In the old davs THE USAF IN BRITAIN 35

this work was done by huge usaf overseas the criticai years of the Korean War when a depots maintained at considerable expense. little-publicized usaf deployment was carried What all this adds up to is the fact that the out. At that time there was a danger that Stalin U.S. -\ir Force is more than just a foreign mili- might take advantage of U.S. involvement in tary force on British soil. It is a force closely the Far East to move against Western Europe. linked operationalJy to the air force of one of To preclude this, the usaf in 1950 placed about the three atomic powers in the world today. It half of the effective strength of the Strategic can draw upon the ser\’ices of an efficient, up- Air Command on bases in Britain. It was these to-date militarv organization with which it has bombers, not the fledgling nato and not the strong and long-time links and which has de- American military complex on the Continent, veloped along lines similar to those of the usaf. which have been credited with preventing a And usaf people quickly sense the hospitalitv Soviet move. Sir Winston Churchill called at- of Britain to them as individuais and the under- tention to the role of these bombers on several standing and sharing of their mission. occasions, and he also pointed out the great Today the British Isles may not be as im- risks which Britain took by allowing their pres- portant to usaf operations as they vvere during ence in his country.

“Ban the Bombers” demonstratiom have been staged outside USAF bases, but they are generally ineffective and well controlled by British police. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

This 1950 deployment was a real test of much more is involved. The current com- the unique Anglo-American partnership in air mander of Third Air Force, Major General povver, but this partnership was also put to the R. VV. Puryear, and the sa c commander of the test on several other occasions in later years. 7th Air Division, Major General Charles M. The Intlo-China crisis of 1954, when British Eisenhart, command units which have been on and American policies were at odds, did not alert “frontline” status since 1951. Their units affect the presence of the usaf. Nor did the enjoy a high morale and a high combat effi- Suez crisis in 1956 and the nuclear disarma- ciency, largely because of long-time familiarity ment campaign which reached its peak in 1961. with the operational environment and the abil- In the big 1961 Campaign for Nuclear Dis- ity to use that cooperative environment to ad- armament march on usaf bases, the British vantage. Secretary of State for Air and the Chief of the If there is a military equivalent to that Air Staff of the Royal Air Force personally goodwill upon which industrv places a mone- took part in planning to meet the threat and tary value, then the U.S. Air Force in Britain were on hand at the usaf base at raf Wethers- has something which goes bevond its imme- field when the demonstrators arrived. This was diate year-to-year needs. Certainlv the political mainly to eliminate any doubt in the minds of picture in Britain and the military situation in usaf officials about the British Governments Europe have changed a lot since the usaf re- attitude toward the demonstrators. The dem- turned in 1948. The prosperous, booming Brit- onstration was a failure, with only a few thou- ain of today is a far cry from the austere, battle- sand marchers instead of the expected 50,000. damaged Britain of the late Forties. Still, the The present status of the usaf in Great basic threat of Communism which welded the Britain is, of course, based primarily on mutual air forces of Britain and America into an effec- British and American involvement in the North tive fighting machine is still with us. There is a Atlantic Treatv Organization, although the tremendous value in that relationship which is presence of sa c bombers, the bmew s station, worth taking into account in planning for fu- and a Polaris submarine base indicate that ture military contingencies in Europe. Hq Third Air Force OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUGHT

C aptain Thomas C. Pin c k n ey

N THE last few months opposition to the survivors, permanently mutilated by ge- certain national security policies has ap- netic injury, to scratch out a miserable and Ipeared in a still fairly localized but par- savage existence from the radioactive rubble ticularly virulent form known as “overkill.” of our civilization. Recently this argument has been the subject of Several subsidiary propositions follow comment by several senators, Secretary of De- from these views. Since the overkiller believes fense McNamara, General Taylor, General that such a catastrophic outcome of any nu- LeMay, and numerous members of the aca- clear war is inevitable, he feels that logicallv demic-scientific-strategic community. Thus it our military planners will concentrate on pro- seems appropriate at this time to review the ducing larger and dirtier nuclear weapons in overkill position, consider its implications for order to deter war more effectively. Likewise, national security, and arrive at some conclu- since neither side could benefit from such a sions regarding its validity.1 holocaust, the overkiller sees deterrence of total war as the only legitimate objective of strategic the overkill argument nuclear forces. For exactly the same reason, Dr. Sevmour Nlelman of Columbia Uni- both sides—contemplating such assured catas- versity defines overkill as . military power trophe—will be deterred. In other words, deter- sufficient to kill a population more than once.”- rence will work because it must.4 Its fundamental supporting assumptions are If one accepts the above reasoning, certain that in any nuclear war cities will be the pri- conclusions follow naturally. Most important mary targets and that the objective of each an- among these is that the United States should tagonist will be to maximize total enemy cas- build only a minimum or finite deterrent/' One ualties. The logic of these two premises leads overkill author speaks approvingly of a force the overkiller1 to visualize a nuclear war as an of “200 relatively secure missiles.” Inseparable uncontrolled spasm of politically pointless from this faith in finite deterrence is disdain for death and destruction which quite likely would a counterforce strategy." The overkill argu- destroy the human race or at best would leave ment against counterforce is based upon sev- 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW eral assertions regarding its infeasibility. Dr. many military targets to cities. An important Melman writes, “Counterforce has been made and difficult choice of alternatives faces an technically obsolete bv the development by the opponent wishing to execute a counterforce at- Soviet Union of ‘hard’ missile locations and tack. If he strikes all American strategic mili- submarine carriers . . .”7 and . . there is no tary targets, U.S. leaders may not be able to basis for assuming the feasibility of construct- discern any difference between his intended ing reliable defensive systems. . . ,”s counterforce attack and a “devastation” blow Finally, the overkill argument is rounded against both military and population targets. out by four supposed characteristics of nuclear Presumablv, once his attack was detected, he war, all of vvhich are designed to help disprove would communicate his intentions to the Presi- the need for larger or modernized strategic nu- dent in an attempt to avoid misunderstanding clear forces. First, because present offensive and retaliation against his cities, but it is quite forces are so effective against cities and defense possible that in the confusion of the moment he impracticable, no such strategic improvement would not be believed. To avoid consequent of our force is required. Second, thus the static American countercity retaliation, the potential nature of strategic military technology is im- aggressor might elect a second altemative: to plied. Third, the spasm characteristic and dis- destroy all strategic military targets clearly astrous results of a total war supposedly ob- separate from cities but ignore those close to viate any requirement to provide either de- population centers. However, the cost of allow- livery systems or warheads for multiple strikes.9 ing sanctuary to a significant portion of U.S. Lastly, thev imply that an enemv first strike forces probably would rule out such a strategy. could not seriously degrade our retaliatory A third alternative might take the form of a capability.10 compromise between the first two. That is, the enemv could target “overlapping” objectives cities as targets with only one weapon ( rather than the two or more usual for reliability) and with the small- Having reviewed the overkill position est effective warheads. The great majority of without comment, I shall now consider it in such targets are air bases or other soft installa- more detail. First, note the contention that tions vulnerable to low overpressures. There- cities will be nuclear targets, as reflected in the fore, with improved missile accuracy the at- following quotations: tacker could destroy all aircraft on the ground Our military leaders do not assume that cities with low-kiloton warheads and fallout-mini- will not be attacked. Indeed, the whole ra- mizing airbursts and rely on his slower but tionale and the nature of nuclear war make it more accurate manned aircraft to crater the inevitable that cities will be attacked. . . . runways and so prevent the airfield s being . . . Cities and populations will die in any case used as a turnaround base. —in any massive nuclear attack—for this is the Of course a State which feels itself the pos- nature of the weapon. . . . Such is the ethos of sible recipient of a nuclear attack can facilitate the thermonuelear bomb. . . .,1 its enemys choice of a strictly counterforce Note the appealing simplicity of the assertion. strategy by clearly separating its strategic—and Cities must be the targets because of some in- preferably nonstrategic—military targets from herent characteristic of the nuclear weapon, cities. Assumedlv this is a lengthy process, since something in its “nature,” its “ethos.” There ap- such installations are far from cheap. Yet the pears to be only one grain of substance in these rush of technology leads one to expect that assertions: that since a single thermonuelear even the normal replacement of obsolescent weapon can destroy an entire city, this option systems could make appreciable differences in is now open to a belligerent whereas it never the relatively short term, say fíve to ten years. was previously. The “counterforce” perspective has been ren- Perhaps the strongest support for the over- dered implausible by the development on the killers’ line of argument is the proximity of Soviet side of the same sort of “hard missile OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUC.IIT 39

locations and submarine carriers for missile potential of technology to lessen the dangers launching as developed by the U.S. . . to a States population and economy from a nu- clear war. Against a 100-psi target, improved This quotation at least makes a gesture toward accuracy permitted a decrease in the warhead supporting evidence, but it is interesting how yield of 99.7 per cent. If such an improvement the author selects for acknowledgment only is applied across the board to an attack with an those technological improvements which favor expected total yield of 50,000 megatons, the his argument and ignores those which weaken total yield necessary to accomplish the same it. Hardening and submarine-launching plat- counterforce target destruction with the same forms do make counterforce more difficult to probability of success is reduced to 105 mt. The achieve. Dispersai, more effective warning Sys- implications for maintaining control of the con- tems, improved active defenses, and any mo- flict and for survival are enormous. bile systems at all—not only missile submarines The serious military student cannot arbi- —have like results. Yet is is quite a jump from trarilv choose those developments which suit such truisms to the statement that these de- velopments have created conditions in which a him and his favorite strategy but ignore all the rest. He must consider conscientiously all de- counterforce strategy “has no military reality.” There are at least three developments velopments ( doctrinal and political as well as technological) and attempt to evaluate their which would tend to validate counterforce: a unilateral, highly effective active defense; reli- impacts objectively. Attempting to do this, I able intelligence regarding enemv target loca- conclude that the requirements for effective tions; and greater missile accuracy. Although counterforce have become and will continue to the first is perhaps most desirable, it is the least become more stringent but that present and likely for the foreseeable future.13 News media anticipated improvements in accuracy and ob- have reported that the Air Force has been or- servation meet these criteria. Dr. Lapp himself states that by 1965 missile accuracy will be biting observation satellites for some time and that their information is as precise as were the “one mile or less.”,,; Counterforce remains tech- U-2’s pictures.14 Similarly, both superpowers nically feasible. On the other hand, technically are trying energetically to improve missile ac- feasible does not mean perfect. Counterforce is curacy, and their efforts have been far from not offered as a panacea for all strategic prob- unsuccessful. A concrete illustration of the in- lems, and todav probably the knottiest techni- teraction of two of these factors, hardening and cal problem faced by counterforce advocates accuracy, may be helpful.1’ Assuming an ac- is antisubmarine warfare. Of course even this curacy of two nautical miles and an airburst, a problem is not insurmountable. Improved 37-megaton warhead has a 50-per-cent prob- sonar, hunter-killer submarines, nuclear-pow- ability of destroving a target hardened to with- ered destroyers, satellite-facilitated Communi- stand an overpressure of 100 pounds per square cations, and the memory banks of special com- inch; with an accuracy of a quarter mile and puters may offer significant improvements in airburst, 78 kilotons are required against the asw. In fact the United States is currently same target. Changing terms of reference, as- spending over $2 billion a year on asw.17 suming 3 psi overpressure is required to in- capacitate a soft ic bm, with a 5-mt airburst we require an accuracy of only 9.06 nm. With the morality and self-interest ^Sàme-size warhead airburst but with the target Once cities are no longer considered the hardened to 1000 psi, a .32-nm accuracy is only appropriate targets for strategic nuclear necessary. Obviously, one development can weapons, serious questions arise regarding any offset another. Thus hardening a target from targeting doctrine which seeks to maximize soft to 1000 psi can be countered by an in- enemv civilian casualties. The generally ac- crease in accuracy from 9.06 to .32 nm without cepted moral view in the West is that the use of increasing warhead size. The first comparison force is legitimate only to counter an aggressive is more interesting, however, for it clarifies the use of force against oneself. Even then two 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

limitations act upon the defender’s use of force: arm the enemy. Nevertheless, once hostilities it must be proportionate to the need, and it begin, the weaker side cannot afford to invite must be directed against the immediate partic- utter destruction by initiating a countercity ex- ipants in the aggression. Granted, these moral change. Instead, it is faced with the unpleasant considerations are Western, not Communist; choice of surrendering immediately, of par- but fortunately self-interest also cautions ticipating in a few strikes as evidence of its against indiscriminate countercity retaliation. determination and then attempting to nego- YVhether (1 ) a future general nuclear war has tiate a settlement at an obvious disadvantage, escalated from some more limited action to the or, finally, of beginning negotiations before the point where one side or the other is faced with strategic nuclear exchange has begun. Yet this the choice between a large counterforce or is not to imply that physical survival is the ulti- countercity attack, or (2) the same choice is an mate motive of either side. Our leaders are outgrowth of limited strategic war,18 or (3) dedicated to the body of political, spiritual, and someone is contemplating a premeditated sur- economic principies we refer to as the Judeo- prise attack, it is most difficult to envision cir- Christian-democratic ethic, and Soviet leaders cumstances in which unrestrained countercity are presumably convinced of the benefits of- action vvould be desirable, either as an initial fered by Communism. On the other hand it act or as a response.ly Both the initiator and re- must be recognized realistically that few gov- taliator are interested primarily in their own emments have considered it their duty to allow people, economy, power, etc. Neither is inter- the utter devastation of their people and terri- ested merely in the unrestrained slaughter of tory when any alternative short of uncondi- the enemy population for revenge.20 Of course, tional surrender was available, and the uncon- vengeance may be one motivation, but the sur- ditional surrender of neither side is likely to be vival of your own state demands that this mo- sought. If no or only a few small strikes have tive be relegated to a secondary position at best. been exchanged, even the weaker state retains Some assert that revenge is not the only an ability to punish its enemy severely. The motivation for attacking the enemy’s cities. stronger will wish to decrease the chances of Perhaps his forces can be immobilized by such its antagonist becoming desperate enough to an attack. This is a conceivable though unlikely initiate countercity strikes by offering a real result. After all, the types of forces most de- basis for negotiation rather than an ultimatum. pendent upon urban areas are a states land The govemment which finds itself at a disad- armies and reserve units, which rely heavily vantage may face the loss of an ally or satellite upon transportation nets. Constantly alert stra- or may pay some form of reparations (rebuild- tegic nuclear forces are highly independent of ing the enemy’s damaged city or cities, donat- any support for at least several days, during ing a large sum to the United Nations), but which the issue of an unlimited general war surrender will probably not even be suggested. would probably be decided. Therefore, coun- The stronger side also finds it advanta- tercity attacks to destroy war industries, à la geous to strike counterforce rather than coun- World War II, seem irrelevant. tercity. The stronger can hope virtuaUy to dis- It is especially to the advantage of the arm its opponent or at least to place a relatively weaker side21 to restrict the war to counterforce low ceiling on the damage the weaker side in any situation where the anticipated destruc- can inflict. (Obviously the exact levei cannot tion in both countries is neither total nor bal- be specified because it will depend upon many anced at some lower levei. If such melancholy variables unique to each situation, such as symmetry is expected and if an unlimited gen- warning, intelligence, decision time, command eral war does oceur, it is equally advantageous and control arrangements, firing and launch to both participants to avoid countercity at- times, active and passive defenses, etc.) Never- tacks. But otherwise, before the war the weaker theless neither side will resign itself to losing side must rely on a ileclaratory policy of coun- even its four or five largest cities unnecessarily tercity deterrence, since it cannot hope to dis- and will probably sublimate its revenge in- OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUCHT 41 stincts rather than ensure such a blow by pro- those issues already discussed. Yet insofar as voking the opponent with countercity attacks. the number of weapons is bound up with the Thus the overkillers’ vision of a nuclear Arma- question of counterforce or finite deterrence, geddon, vvhile possible, is not the only form of it is important. It may be agreed in principie nuclear war, not even the most likely. that for any chosen strategy, target list, set of Typicallv, the overkiller views strategic enemy countermeasures, and weapons mix nuclear forces as having only the mission of there exists a specific number of warheads deterring war, for he feels that no one can beyond which no further expansion is required. benefit from a nuclear war. Certainlv no one Assumedly some production would always be anticipates that any States immediate, post- necessary to replace warheads lost or ruined nuclear-war standard of living would exceed due to accidents, wastage, obsolescence, etc. or even equal its immediate prewar standard. However, we do not know how, when, or where In fact it would probably be considerably a war might start, how it will progress, or what lower for some time. But an argument based our options may be. Considering these formid- on a prewar versus postwar comparison is able areas of uncertainty, our decision-makers largely irrelevant. While a potential aggressor would probably find it impossible to decide on is interested in the absolute prewar and post- the exact number of warheads needed, even war relationship, he is presumably muc-h more theoretically. concerned with the comparison of his postwar On the other hand the overkillers go be- position and wrhat he anticipates his position yond obvious considerations based on tangible to be at some future time if no nuclear war planning factors and make assertions regard- occurs. Obviously, if he only considered the ing the deterrent or destabilizing impact of prewar versus postwar relationship, there stockpiles. “And a build-up of an unlimited would never be an intentionallv initiated stra- stockpile of nuclear weapons only tends to tegic nuclear war. On the other hand it is easy eonvince an enemy that he is in mortal danger to posit situations in which one side might and must strike fírst.”22 There is a certain, os- prefer the expected postwar world to the an- tensible logic in this quotation if one ignores ticipated future non-nuclear-war world. For its unspoken assumption. The key word is example, if the Soviet Union had undergone “build-up.” The implication is that if one side a series of sharp political, economic, and lim- starts from a position of inferiority or relative ited military reverses during which she had equality and attempts to create, not of course lost several of her satellites as well as the eco- an “unlimited” stockpile but rather one of def- nomic ability to maintain her side of the arms inite, perhaps overwhelming, strategic supe- competition, her leaders might foresee the riority the enemy government may decide to complete and inevitable failure of Communism pre-empt. But the United States is not today in a future without general war. Therefore, in a position of strategic inferiority or relative they might decide to stake everything on a equality. On the contrary the United States nuclear strike. Their pertinent calculation enjoys a large, decisive strategic superiority. might well be between “no chance of success As a consequence, the Soviet Union cannot without war” and “a 10 per cent chance of make a rational decision to pre-empt based on success with war,” rather than between “a the relationship of strategic forces. William standard of living of 137 in 1970 if no war” VV. Kaufmans classic article, “The Require- and “a standard of living of 89 in postwar ments of Deterrence,”23 discusses three aspects 1970.” of credibility requisite to successful deterrence: capability, costs, and intentions. As noted numbers of weapons above, the United States certainly has the Although overkillers make a major point capability to act, and our retaliation would in- of the number of warheads and delivery Sys- flict damage far beyond the range of any pos- tems the United States maintains, this question sible advantages which might accrue to the seems to be of only secondary importance to U.S.S.R. Therefore, it is only by discerning, 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

or thinking he discerns, a weakness in our de- Whether a large civil defense program termination to use our forces that the enemy signifies an intention to launch a first strike is could launch a preventive or (falsely) pre- debatable. To some extent the impression cre- emptive attack. ated depends upon the manner in which the One of the best ways to weaken the firm- program is implemented. If the United States ness of our intentions, in an opponent’s esti- suddenly began a $5-billion annual effort, the mation, is by proclaiming that a nuclear war Soviet Union might well take alarm, but judg- is insane under any circumstances and would ing by the negative history of cd in this country, lead to the ultimate catastrophe. Such state- such a contingency is, at best, highly improb- ments assumedly refer to a countercity war, able. The most likely type of accelerated cd for, as we have seen, that type of strategy program, barring some major crisis, is in the maximizes damage to the vital fiber of the range of $1 billion a year or less. An effort of States involved. But there are circumstances this size would take so many years to provide in which the United States would participate adequate protection for the entire population in a nuclear war, even circumstances in which —or even for only the most vulnerable portion she might initiate a nuclear exchange. We are —that the Soviet Union could hardly regard it committed to protect Western Europe, and our as anything more than insurance against fail- political leaders have repeatedly afíirmed our ure of deterrence, not as a sign of aggressive resolve to honor these commitments. Yet the intent. point at issue is not what we know we will do. Another aspect of civil defense that is The relevant question is whether Soviet lead- singled out for criticism is evacuation. The un- ers believe we will act if provoked. It seems stated assumption seems to be that in case of reasonable to presume that the more we pro- a surprise enemy attack, there would be no claim an action irrational, the less convinced time for evacuation of metropolitan areas. But they become of our determination to so act. surely a “bolt-from-the-blue” attack, though possible, is only one way—and probably the least likely way—in which a nuclear war might civil defense begin. No State is apt to take such a momentous The question of civil defense produces step without an overriding and immediate mixed reactions in various members of the provocation. Much more probable is the esca- overkill school. Dr. Lapp States, “From the lation of some lesser conflict or initiation after birth of the atomic bomb, I have been an advo- a period of increasing tension. Either of these cate of civil defense.” But Melman writes, contexts would provide days, weeks, or pos- “. .. the civil defense concept is technically sibly months in which evacuation and other faulty and is politically dangerous. . . . a major measures might be carried out. If a total war civil defense program announces an intention occurred, prompt and proper actions during to strike first.”24 According to data presented the preceding tension period might save mil- in Kill and Overkill,2* 30-psi shelters would lions of lives. Another and equallv important protect anyone more than 5 miles from ground aspect is that such preparations can also serve zero of a 100-megaton explosion, while every as an indication to the enemy of determination wooden house within 30 miles, and presumably and of the degree of seriousness the Govern- the people in them, would be destroyed. De- ment attaches to the situation.26 Simultane- riving the area of the circles prescribed by ously our vulnerability is reduced. Thereby these two radii, 5 and 30 miles, we find that such actions can serve to avoid the war. The 30-psi shelters reduce the area of blast lethal- difficult question remains: How provocative ity from 2826 square miles to 78.5 square miles is evacuation? There is no definite answer, but or by 97.23 per cent. Just why such effective- my opinion is negative. Once again an enemy s ness is “technically faulty” is somewhat diffi- interpretation of American actions may de- cult to understand. pend in large degree upon how they are con- OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUGHT 43

ducted. A relatively slow evacuation program World War II, the United States has spent scheduled over several weeks, perhaps inoving more than $600 billion in quest of military school children first, then the least essential security, yet it cannot be said that security has workers and families, etc., would be less pro- come any closer than before.”28 The author vocative than a total evacuation planned for continues, “What was overlooked was that completion in 24 hours. In any event, such nuclear weapons introduced a new scale of cavalier dismissal of a potentially important weights and measures which demolished old program is, at best, unfortunate. doctrines and gave an entirely new aspect to defense.” Both statements are true. Yet both give the impression that we can and tcould be a matter of understanding more secure if only we had taken certain other OverkilJ advocates repeatedly betray a actions, not specified but presumably some lack of appreciation for even the most basic form of disarmament. The author ignores at facts of intemational relations. For example, least one thing. Not only have nuclear weap- consider the following statement. “Winston ons “introduced a new scale of weights and Churchill, the early Champion of deterrence, measures” but so have delivery systems. In acknowledged that it could not guarantee the Thirties and Forties, for instance, it was peace.'’ It is merely repeating a truism to point simply impossible for any state to attack our out that nothing can guarantee peace in a heartland. But today because of the march of human society. Similarly, “the policy of deter- technology we are and apparently will remain rence .. . has generated an endless arms race infínitely less secure than during the pre-iCBM, and created increasingly dangerous forces of intercontinental-bomber era. From a somewhat instability.”27 We might question whether this more theoretical point of view, in a human so- is an accurate interpretation or whether nu- ciety security is an ideal state impossible to at- clear technology has merely transformed an tain. Security cannot be absolute. A state is not arms race (made inevitable by an aggressive, either secure or insecure. As long as any state militant Communism) from an entirely con- exists with sufficient incentive and resources ventional to a partially nuclear sphere. Also, to compete with us, the U.S. will remain only focusing the competition in the nuclear area relatively secure. Security must be measured may have a less undesirable impact on our with reference to many factors, among the economv and on our political institutions in most important of which is the military threat the long run than a similarly prolonged con- posed by intercontinentally delivered nuclear ventional arms competition. The human and weapons. It is only in this complex context material resources devoted to a lengthy con- that numbers of weapons have significance. No ventional arms competition promise to equal, thinking military man maintains that strength if not exceed, those we are using in the present lies in simple numbers, but what many military contest. Moveover the technical and educa- men do suggest is that maintenance of a suf- tional skills acquired by the jet engine me- ficient second-strike counterforce capability chanic or missile maintenance technician are (which usually requires numbers of weapons more assimilable into the civilian economy considerably larger than those of the enemy) than are those of the infantryman or tank will provide a greater degree of security than driver. Finally, a case can be made that nuclear any other presently suggested alternative weapons have brought about less instability strategy. than would have existed in a nonnuclear cold Neither do the overkillers exhibit a bal- war. For example, if it were not for our nuclear anced appreciation of domestic affairs. One capability, how much more aggressive might instance is exhibited in the unthinking autom- Communist China be? aticity they attribute to our decision-making. A similar lack of understanding is evi- denced when overkill advocates affirm, “Since . . . Computers tell them that, under certain cir- 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

cumstances, we could score a “win” in a nuclear terrence. Thus, the overkillers’ own logic in- war. Unhappily, the Computer arrives at this creases chances for the unlimited war they so result only because it has no feelings. . . . If wish to avoid. Country A loses 30 million dead and 27 percent of its economy, whereas Country B has 90 mil- the omniscient polemicist lion dead and 68 percent of its economy de- stroyed, the Computer pronounces Country A Thus far where I have disagreed with the the winner. One wonders how much consola- overkillers, the difference has been largely a tion this would be to Country A.-9 matter of value judgments revolving around intangible considerations ( for example, the Anyone who has followed the Administration’s future impact of technology). In such areas handling of recent crises would never infer one feels his opponents’ position to be in error that the political decision-makers are aban- but understandable. Unfortunately there is doning their duties to computers. The passage another, less appealing side to the overkillers’ suggests the U.S. would start a nuclear war if argument. In certitude of the correctness of the computers forecast a “win,” but the author their views they repeatedly betray a remark- ignores the salient point: If the other side able lack of perspective and imagination, a brings about the war, either through a nuclear penchant for flat, unsupported polemics, and attack directly against the United States or by implicit claims of omniscience. a massive attack in Western Europe, it is highly One of the cherished goals of the overkill desirable to know how to limit the results to camp is a great reduction in defense expendi- 30 million dead and 27 per cent of our economy tures, and a favored means is to reduce outlay destroyed in preference to 90 million dead and in military research and development. One 68 per cent of our economy laid waste. Natu- author recommends a decrease from $7.2 bil- rally either result would be an unprecedented lion to $200 million, a proposal which implies catastrophe repugnant to any rational person, a basically static technology and no competi- but such computerized war games are used tion for technical military dominance. Another to find means of saving the difference of 60 makes a mocking statement: million lives and 41 per cent of our economy. There seems also to be a misunderstanding For both offense and defense there remains the ultimate comic-strip weapon—“death rays.” of the willingness of States to attack in the face General Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force Chief of superior power. According to Lapp: of Staff, has made known that the Air Force is . . . because the advantage of the first strike is so not overlooking the possibility of “beam-di- great, the policy of deterrence through superior rected energy weapons” which would “strike power is essentially self-defeating. The policy with the speed of fight” and neutralize any works to prevent war only when both sides are missile.32 convinced that the other will never strike first. It seems bizarre for a contemporary scientist ... as the race to outbid each other in deterrent to ridicule a Service chief for stating that his power goes on, and as tension builds up, the organization is investigating a promising new temptation to try to avoid doom by striking the scientific application. Additionally, two of the opponent first with a knockout blow becomes same authors bases for considering an anti- more and more compelling. . . .30 ic bm defense impracticable are the brief time He fails to explain just how the U.S.S.R. with available for counteraction and the danger of a force inferior on the order of three or four the defenderas suffering damage from the ex- to one could possibly hope to strike “the oppo- plosions of both defending missiles and inter- nent first with a knockout blow.”31 In fact, his cepted warheads. It does seem worth investi- conclusion only has validity when relative gating any new system, no matter how fantastic parity of strategic forces exists. Somewhat by current or past standards, which may over- paradoxically, parity would be the result of come both these disadvantages. the overkillers’ preferred strategy, finite de- Everyone interested in strategy is prop- OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUGHT 45

erly concerned with the allocation of our large aspects of the subject: “ic bm’s compress the but limited national resources. This overkill time scale of war to a point that allows no time interest is not under question. What is being for hesitation or deliberate thought and opens scrutinized is a set of argumentative techniques the door wide to global destruction.”35 First, which proceeds from a simplistic view of ex- this is an excellent argument for continuing tremely complex problems, goes on to implv a force of bombers as a vital portion of our incompetent perverseness on the part of any deterrent force. Bombers may be flushed out who disagree, and ends with implicit claims of harms way, allowing the President time to to omniscience. Unfortunatelv for the over- ascertain the exact nature of, say, the bmew s killers’ own cause, such convictions lead them targets before making a decision. Second, dis- into using obviously fallacious supporting persai, hardening, mobility, and numbers tend data. An outstanding example of this occurs to achieve the same end for the ic bm force in a passage intended to prove this increasingly ( though perhaps not with the same degree of adverse impact of defense expenditures upon certainty). The more convinced the President the national economy: “The typewriter indus- is that our ability to retaliate in strength will try in the U.S. as recentlv as 1948 supplied survive regardless of enemy action, the more virtually all U.S. requirements. It now only he can afford to wait until a provocation is supplies 60x of the typewriters that are sold absolutely unequivocal before responding with here each vear. The remainder are imported, nuclear weapons. Third, the quoted passage mainly from European factories.”33 All the seems to assume the impossibility of creating quote really shows is that in 1948 U.S. manu- an invulnerable second-strike force. Yet such facturers had a virtual monopoly of the do- a force is exactly what the advocate of finite mestic market as a result of World War II and deterrence must have to make his strategy that today they must meet vigorous competi- rational. Since overkillers propose finite deter- tion. By omitting criticai factors, the author rence, their argument appears somewhat in- attempts to draw the reader to invalid con- consistent. clusions. Not surprisingly, the overkiller is given to Another quotation illustrates a similar lack pejorative language. “We have no recourse but of perspective and imagination: “On the offen- the hard one of untangling the skein in which sive side, destructive capability, having already we are all enmeshed—of finding a way out to gone far beyond the overkill mark, calls for rationality. For even in its own terms .. . the no further improvement on military grounds.”34 strategy of enforcing peace through terror is This view ignores the highly desirable im- shot through with fallacies and contradic- provement of observation and accuracy capa- tions.”36 Notice that the overkill argument is bilities previously discussed, improvement here equated with rationality, and the oppo- which, other considerations remaining equal, sition with terror. Yet it is the overkillers them- makes possible a tremendous decrease in the selves who prefer a strategy that bases its required size of warheads and consequent re- entire rationale upon an awesome threat to duction in the number of noncombatants obliterate the enernys centers of population. killed. Similarly it fails to consider the com- One might fairly ask whether this strategy, petitive nature of the strategic conflict. Third, finite deterrence, or its primary competitor, it ignores the constant and continuing need counterforce, is more aptly termed a strategy for replacements to and modernization of our of terror. Moreover we must distinguish be- force. Finally, it implies that our nuclear forces tween peace through terror and peace through can be brought to bear without signifícant en- strength. Peace through strength is the raison emy degradation of our effort. Yet in many clêtre of domestic police forces. Peace through possible circumstances we seem likely to have strength is “fallacious and contradictory” only to absorb an enemy first strike. in a Utopian state where every member of The same author fails to consider vital society is trustworthy and of beneficent intent. 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

To rely on disarmament (as distinct from arms cessity of a quid pro quo to deter a series of control) as a means to preserve peace is to sur- possible nonaccidental enemy accidents, and render society into the hands of the unscrupu- (2 ) that six hours, say, were allowed for the lous, degenerate, and anarchistic. evacuation of a specified target city, it seems The overkiller may retort that his concern unlikely that the Soviet Union would misin- lies exactly in the imperfect nature of mankind. terpret our one-city retaliation as the prelude Thus he sees American decision-makers and to an all-out attack or would feel constrained military officials no less fallible than those on to escalate the situation. the other side, and he foresees the temptation Such questionable argumentative tech- to use a counterforce capability if we build it. niques seem more cajculated to convert than The rebuttal is obviously a matter of value convince, to inspire than inform. They add judgment. It is as impossible to prove the little and detract much from the value of the overkillers’ points “wrong” as it is for them overkill position. to prove themselves “right.” A countering argu- ment could proceed along the following lines: (1) Although some individuais might be T he overkill argument is not convincing. It tempted to use nuclear forces illegitimately, decries peace through terror and yet prefers the pressures of the American political and to target noncombatant populations rather military selection system have the effect of than the enemy’s military forces. It posits a eliminating those men given to impetuous de- nonexistent moral symmetry between the lead- cisions. (2 ) The overkillers’ argument implies ers of the two sides and tries to reduce the a moral symmetry between the two sides of uncertainty of war to a precise accounting of the strategic conflict. In my judgment no such the number of required weapons. It vividly symmetry exists. The leaders of one bloc are portrays the possible horrors of a nuclear war schooled in the dictum that the end justifies but makes almost no attempt to ameliorate the means. The West denies that this is so. them. Its preferred strategy would prove dis- (3) Vast efforts are being made to ensure that astrous, by its own admission, if implemented. no individual can fire a nuclear weapon with- It repeatedly exhibits a lack of understanding out authorization. And (4) in any event we of the basic facts and attitudes of international cannot wish away the existence of nuclear mil- relations. In order to convince their readers, itary technology. W e live in the age of the overkillers consistently underrate the advance atom and must meet its problems realistically. of technology and its possibly positive impact Idealism is essential, for the idealist prevents upon counterforce feasibility. Given to polem- the realists becoming a cynic. But the realist ics as much as to objective inquiry, the over- keeps the idealist from becoming a corpse. killers’ argument is weakened by a remarkable Peace through strength is preferable to either choice of those facts which strengthen their anarchy through weakness or destruction argument and by a tendency to disparage the through terror. abilities and inotivations of their opponents. Regarding their pretense to omniscience, This article is designed to dispel the over- consider this unqualified statement: “It would kill implication of self-possessed omniscience. take a high degree of self-control to ‘absorb’ It is not primarily a case for counterforce, the demolition of an American city without but many of the points are reverse sides of killing a Soviet city in return. And yet retalia- the same coin. Although some of the overkill tion would certainly escalate into a general arguments might be more valid if the United war.”37 No such certainty exists. Of course it States were in a position of strategic nuclear is possible for retaliation to escalate into gen- inferiority or parity, such is not the case. We eral war; but if we assume (1 ) that such presently possess a gratifying degree of strate- retaliation were preceded by clear statements gic advantage. The United States security will that our action was based only upon the ne- be maximized by maintaining and refining OVERKILL AND UNDERTHOUGHT 47

that superiority while simultaneouslv improv- ment as the source of our follow-on weapons, ing our capabilities in the less-than-total por- both offensive and defensive. tions of the eonfhct spectrum. It is particularly vital to concentrate on researeh and develop- United States Air Force Academy

Notes 1. Space allows only a condensed presentation of the over- cates "want” a nuclear war. This is not true. Their position is kill position. In such a situation one leaves himself open to that in spite of our best efforts such a war may occur (after all eharges of paitisan selectivity and quoting out of context. In an we no longer enjoy a monopoly of nuclear weapons) and that effort to avoid such failures I shall cite my sources frequently so we must be prepared for this undesirable eventuality. They that the reader with further questions may examine these au- deny the minimum-finite deterrence position that deterrence is thors’ positions for himself. perfectible. 2. Seymour Melman, “How Much Military Power Is Perhaps the fundamental disagreement between the Enough?” A Strategy for American Security ( Lee Service, Inc., minimum-finite deterrence school on the one hand and the distributor, New York: 1963), p. 1. counterforce school on the other is that the former prefers to 3. For convenience I shall use the term "overkiller” as an reduce the probability of nuclear devastation by strengthening abbreviation of the ungainly phrase, "person who believes that prewar deterrence while the latter believes it possible and pref- we presently possess an overkill capability.” erable to simultaneously strengthen prewar and intrawar deter- 4. Ralph E. Lapp, Kill and Overkill (New York: Basic rence and our war-fighting ability. This difference leads to the Bnoks. Inc., 1962), pp. 8, 64. 90, 97. 120, 140. familiar dispute about targets ( countercity vs. counterforce) and 5. I use the differentiation between these terms specified force struetures (finite vs. superior). by Herman Kahn in On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Prince- 7. Seymour Melman, "Military Power and Money," Satur- ton Universitv Press, 1960 >, pp. 8, 14-17. That is, minimum day Re vicie, 4 May 1963, p. 11. (Not again referred to) deterrence is the simple view that any State possessed of a "suf- 8. Melman, A Strategy for American Security, p. 3. Also ficient” number of thermonuclear weapons and means of deliv- see Lapp. pp. 109-117. ery has an adequate deterrent force. The essential features of 9. Melman, p. 3. this strategic view are: that only a very few (for example, 50) 10. For example, throughout his paper Melman’s calcula- weapons are’ enough; that no State would be willing to risk the tions posit losses of 30% or 50%. Yet it is common knowledge loss of even a small number of its largest cities; and that there- that only half of SAC’s bombers are on ground alert. The non- fore a stable balance of terror has been established. This view alert haíf probably would be destroyed by an enemy surprise is epitomized in the statement, "Nuclear war is unthinkable." attack, and some of the alert force would be destroyed by Although in vogue a few years ago, minimum deterrence has enemy defenses. We are building our missile force to ride out now been largely supplanted by the more sophisticated finite an attack and can expect heavy losses here also. deterrence. The basic difference between minimum and finite 11. Lapp, pp. 120, 140. deterrence is that the latter allows for credibility, making the 12. Melman, p. 3. use of one’s deterTent appear believable. Thus although there is 13. Yet promising developments appear possible even in little or no unanimity, believers in finite deterrence typically see this diificult field. See J. S. Butz, Jr., “ 'Super' Guns for Misssile a requirement for forces larger than those felt necessary by Defense," Air Force and Space Digest, November 1963, pp. advocates of minimum deterrence. Two hundred weapons de- 50-56. livered on target might be considered characteristic. But the 14. “U.S. Intelligence: Is lt Cood Enough?” U.S. News phrase "delivered on target” includes several significant stipu- and World Report, 9 September 1963, pp. 66-67. lations. First, one’s deterrent must be a “second-strike” force; 15. Source of formulas for the following data is The that is, it must be able to absorb and survive an enemy surprise Effects of Nuclear Weapons, AFP 136-1-3, prepared by the attack. Such a capability may be achieved in various ways: Department of Defense, published by the Atomic Energy Com- increasing the size of your force, mobility, dispersai, hardening. mission (Washington: USGPO, June 1957), pp. 107-111. concealment, early waming combined with quick reaction, and 16. Lapp, p. 78. Even this statement is apparently pessi- active defense. But this is only the first step. mistic. As originally planned, the Atlas missile was to have a Next the force must be able to penetrate enemy active maximum range of 6325 miles, reliability of 50%, and an accu- defenses. Techniques helpful at this stage include decoys, elec- racy within 5 miles of the target. By November 1963 the Atlas tronic countermeasures, saturation, evasion, and multiple types had reached targets up to 9000 miles away; 70% of its develop- of attacking vehicles, directions, and tactics. Each of these alter- mental launches were successful ( most failures occurred in early nativos or any preferred combination imposes penalties in the tests, so that present reliability is well above 70% ); and average form of costs and smaller sizes and numbers of warheads deliv- accuracy has been less than a mile. "Atlas Missile More Accu- ered. Certain of them also pose political requirements, for rate than Required,” Denver Post, 6 November 1963, p. 36, col. 1. example, to obtain foreign bases or for support of certain other 17. “Intensive ASW Research Effort,” Interavia, XVIII, weapons (CW -BW ) and unorthodox tactics ( countercity target- 3 (March 1963), p. 324. For discussions of the current U.S. ing). Finally, the deterrent force must be able to destroy its ASW effort and future prospects, see ihid., pp. 321-322. and targets. Required technical capabilities at this point include Vice Admirai John W. Thaeh, "The ASW Navy of the Sev- correct intelligence data, accurate delivery, adequate warhead enties,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Januarv 1963, pp. size, sujficient numbers of weapons delivered, and, for fast- 57-65. reacting targets, speed and coordination of attack. However, 18. Either contingency seems much more likely than the rapidly reacting targets are not a consideration in either mini- "bolt from the blue” attack with which we have been so con- mum or finite deterrence, which in their “pure” versions only cemed for years. For a much more complete discussion of lim- target cities, in the hope that the honor of the result will pre- ited strategic war, see Klaus Knorr, ed., Limited Strategic War vent occasion for their use ever arising. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962). 6. The term “counterforce” is used in various ways by 19. Some cities might also be vital military targets and different authors. Kahn defines it as any means, offensive or consequently legitimate counterforce targets. Such military defensive, active or passive, used to counter the enemy’s use cities, however, would certainly be the exception and presum- of force. (Kahn, p. 16n) In a somewhat nanower use, counter- ably would be limited to the most essential communication force is any strategy or application of military force against and nuclear weapon produetion centers. Because of the brief military force—at any levei of the conflict spectrum. A third and duration of this initial and decisive phase of such a war, the perhaps the most common contemporary usage signifies a strat- necessity to attack even such cities is open to serious question. egy for general nuclear war. In this sense a counterforce If certain targets are considered vital ( perhaps an 1CBM strategy assumes that the best detenent is an acknowledged plant), it would probably be wise purposely to restrict the ability to strategically disarm a potential enemy. Secondary warhead to the minimum size necessary. assumptions are that such a strategic force is technically and 20. It may be objected that a revenge-oriented retaliatory economically feasible. Moreover, counterforce believers main- force is exactly what France is presently building. The answer tain that it ii possible by proper planning to ameliorate the may lie in the evolution of strategic thought which nuclear- impact of an uniimited general war to the extent that the United armed States seem to undergo. The general line of development States could survive as a viable, powerful State and impose appears to be an initial fixation on the sheer power of the favorable ( though probably not unconditional) peace terms newly acquired weapons and a resultant emphasis on countercity upon the enemy. deterrence. As weapons and delivery systems become more There is a common misconception that counterforce advo- plentiful and larger (in efforts to perfect their deterrent capa- 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW bility), the strategic problem appears to be solved and attention 24. Lapp, p. 121. Melman, p. 4. tums to the major remaining area of difficulty, limited war. 25. Lapp, pp. 50-51. Theorists then stress the efficacy of smaller nuclear weapons 26. For a discussion of bargaining techniques and inter- against concentrated formations of the enemy’s ground forces, national communication, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy and technical development responds in the lower end of weap- of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), espe- ons engineering. At about this point, though, it becomes evident cially pp. 3-80. It is also published in paperback by Oxford that nuclear sauces apply equally to enemy geese and friendly University Press, New York, 1963. ganders. Thereupon, continuing problems in both unlimited 27. Lapp, pp. 91-92. and limited areas of strategy are recognized, and more sophis- 28. Ibid., p. 139. ticated conflict theories are developed to solve them. 29. Ibid., pp. 95-96. For an interesting. unclassified dis- 21. By “weaker side” is meant the State suffering a sig- cussion of several strategic war games, see Richard Fryklund, nificant numerical disadvantage in the weapons it can deliver 100 Million Livcs (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962). on target. Assuming equal teehnologies and simultaneous launch 30. Lapp, p. 107. ( very doubtful assumptions), this is reflected before the war in 31. Alastair Buchan in NATO in the 1960’s (rev. ed.; relative numbers of weapons possessed. If one side has a highly New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 177, estimates effective active defense, it may have fewer offensive weapons Western ICBM’s in early 1963 at 450-500, Soviet at 75, and but nevertheless be the strategically stronger State. It is im- Western long-range bombers (over 5000-mile range) at 630, possible to specify how many deliverable weapons comprise Soviet at 200. enough of an advantage to qualify one country as the “stronger” 32. Lapp, p. 117. without a detailed analysis of each specific situation suggested. 33. Melman, p. 5. 22. Lapp, p. 10. 34. Ibid., p. 3. 23. WilUam W. Kaufman, “The Requirements of Deter- 35. Ibid., p. 78; also pp. 83, 133-34. rence,” Military Policy and National Secvrity (Princeton: 36. Ibid., p. 22. Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 12-38. 37. Ibid., p. 132. s

1AN5P0RT SERVICE ll.S.AIR FORCE

Major Hen r y L. W alker

HE Military Air Transport Service ma t s mission as directed by the Secretary of originated with consolidation of the Air Defense in May 1948 clearly illustrates this T Forces Air Transport Command and point: the Navys Air Transport Service on 1 June mat s vvill be responsible for . . . the transporta- 1948. ma t s vvas placed under the command and tion by air of personnel (including the evacua- direction of the Chief of Staff, United States Air tion of sick and wounded), materiel, mail, Force. The purpose of the nevv organization strategic materiais and other cargoes for all was to bring components of the long-range agencies of the National Military Establish- ment and as authorized for other govemment airlift forces of the Air Force and the Navy agencies of the United States... .The responsi- together under a single command. bilitv for air transportation for the National ma t s was originally envisioned as a non- Military Establishment does not include re- combatant airlift organization. The original sponsibility for the tactical air transportation of 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

airborne troops and their equipment, [or] the aircraft are now entering ma t s’ inventory that initial supply and resupply of units in forward do have this capability. The C-130E, which is ma t s combat areas. . . . responsibilities will in- now in use by ma t s, and the C-141A, which clnde participation in the development of “all made its maiden flight in December 1963, are weather” transport flight teehnique, but will not include responsibility for the operation or two aircraft with the required characteristics. development of either transport type aircraft or Both have long range with a large payload procedures employed in the air transportation plus the required airdrop and assault landing of airborne troops in tactical operations. . . . capability. The CX-4 heavy transport (de- [Italics supplied.] scribed later) is now in the planning stage as a possible future addition to the versatility The noncombatant mission of ma t s was based on the concept of military airlift divided of the ma t s airlift force. It will have long range into two broad categories: long range (strate- with huge payloads. It will have the capability gic) and short range (tactical). This concept to airdrop both personnel and all fypes of envisioned two distinct and separate airlift equipment, and it will operate effectively from rudimentary airfields. organizations, one for long-range airlift and Secretary of Defense McNamaras recent the other for short-range airlift. In time of war testimony before House Armed Services Sub- or other emergency, strategic transports would committee further supports the contention airlift fighting forces (both personnel and that airlift concepts are changing. equipment) to staging bases in the rear of the combat area. Tactical airlift would then be The distinction between troop carrier and responsible for delivery of the forces to the strategic airlift operations based upon differ- combat area by airlanding or airdropping. The ence in equipment will no longer be significant major premise of this concept of airlift em- onee the C-130E’s and C-141’s are acquired. ployment is that no single type of airplane Both of these aircraft are suitable for either has the required versatilitv to perform both mission. Admittedly, the two missions require different training, but there does not seem to be categories of airlift. The verv characteristics any serious obstacle to cross-training the ma t s that enable a transport airplane to fly long dis- crews. It may also prove desirable to increase tances at high speed tend to preclude the short, the rate of utilization of the troop carrier forces. rough-field operation that is required for air- These measures would greatly increase the lift into the combat area. Aircraft design fea- flexibility of our transport forces for both mis- tures which enable high-speed operation are sions. not readilv compatible with those required for Indeed, the C-141 may open up entirely airdropping at low speeds and low altitudes. new vistas in troop carrier operations. For ex- From an operational standpoint it is cer- ample, it might prove to be entirely feasible taíilly desirable to have the capability to de- to load troops and their equipment in the United States and fly them directly to the battle liver forces across long distances directly into area overseas, instead of moving them by stra- a combat area without the need for interme- tegic airlift to an overseas assembly point and diate staging bases. The delivery of forces then loading them and their equipment on directly to the objective area is a major con- troop earriers. Thus, the line of demarcation sideration in contingency planning. Obviously between the strategic airlift mission and the an airlift force with this capability has the troop carrier or assault mission may, in time, flexibility to move large forces to an objective become less important. area if required for a show of force or other General Joe W. Kelly, ma t s Commander, reasons. in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee also punctuated the concept of air- lift as an entity, not to be divided into strategic changing airlift concepts and tactical forces. General Kelly stated that While it has been true in the past that no the words strategic and tactical should not be single aircraft could perform both missions, used to describe airlift. Rather, terms such as MATS ROLE IN COMBAT AIRLIFT 51

deployment, employment, assault, and resup- In that year two C-124 troop-carrier wings ply are more descriptive of the role of airlift were transferred to mat s in a move to consoli- in combat. date heavy transport aircraft under a single Since the initial organization of mat s the agency. These units were already qualified in trend has been toward more recognition of the formation flying and airdrop at the time of the capability of mat s to perform the entire spec- transfer. An Air Force-directed study recom- trum of airlift including all phases of combat mended that the requirement for these units airlift. This trend has been strengthened by to fly formation be dropped. The requirement mat s acquisition of more modem aircraft to maintain proficiency in actual drops of per- which increase this capability. sonnel and equipment was retained, however. Air Force Regulation 23-17, dated 9 July To provide adequate airborne training for the 1963. States the current organization and mis- Army and drop training for the troop-carrier sion of mat s. The following excerpts from this wdngs, they were allocated 1100 flying hours regulation outline the present concept of the per month of joint airborne training time. The extent of mat s participation in combat airlift. Army units involved were the lOlst Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentuckv, and the Over-all Mission: The mission of ma t s is to maintain, in a constant State of readiness, the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North milítary airlift System necessary to perform all Carolina. This time was flown almost entirely airlift tasks under emergency conditions as- at the convenience of the Army, the training signed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in approved of the ma t s troop-carrier crews being a by- war plans and appropriate jcs and Air Force product. guidance documents. . . . To insure the ability Subsequent to the acquisition of the two to perform emergency airlift tasks, ma t s will: troop-carrier wings, ma t s C-124 crews in air (a) Train and equip its airlift forces in all transport wings were required to become pro- airlift tasks, consistent with the capabilities of ficient in computed air release point ( carp) the aircraft assigned. Mobility and flexibilitv procedures. The carp system is an attempt to will be inherent in these forces. determine scientifically the proper release O O O O point in the air for dropping personnel or (c) Develop detailed plans with appropriate equipment in order for them to land at the agencies in support of approved jcs plans for desired impact point on the ground. Such vari- deployment and employment airlift. ables as parachute ballistics, wind velocity, air- (d) Participate in joint exercises and air- craft velocitv, rate of fali, and human delay bome training with the forces which ma ts is factors are applied to solve for the exact carp required to support to insure capability to exe- point. The air transport crews were trained cute specific plans... . in carp procedures using miniature parachutes The term airlift as used in the context above thrown from the aircraft by hand rather than is defined as: dropping actual personnel and equipment. All procedures incident to an actual drop were The air movement of troops, cargo, special íollowed to ensure maximum training. These equipment, military impedimenta, passengers, crews were not required to fly formation. patients, and mail in either a wartime or peace- Based on revised Department of Defense time environment to and from areas requiring such airlift; inciudes the aeríal delivery of planning, the Air Force in 1962 directed ma t s troops, equipment, and supplies. to qualify all its C-124 crews, both troop- carrier and air transport wüngs, in formation This mission statement is in marked contrast and airdrop. Qualification criteria w'ere estab- to the original charter given ma t s. lished and training was begun. Because of the urgency of the requirement and the magnitude of the training task, the airdrop requirements MATS acquires combat airlift mission continued to be met, in the interim, by quali- mat s combat airlift role began in 1957. fying aircrew's in carp procedures using mini- 52 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW ature parachutes. No actual drops were re- integration of new equipment into the ma t s quired. By the end of the year the training force. vvas com pleted. ma t s made the first formation Several prime objectives were explicitly drop at Fort Campbell in September 1962, stated: when 2100 paratroopers were dropped. • To fully qualify all aircrews in units In the midst of the aircrew qualification possessing aircraft with airdrop capability in program, the Cuban crisis erupted in October all phases of combat airlift. 1962. The scope of ma t s involvement in this • To place greater emphasis on aircrew operation was tremendous. Missions included combat readiness, including actual drops of a series of airlifts of essential battle equipment, personnel and equipment for initial qualifica- ammunition, and supplies to Florida. This was tion and currency. followed by a massive 48-hour airlift of battle- equipped Marines from the West Coast to • To take other actions required to en- Guantanamo. In addition, large numbers of sure that ma t s is capable of performing all dependents were evacuated to the U.S. main- phases of combat airlift, limited only by in- land by air. Although the decision had been herent limitations of the equipment. made earlier to qualify all C-124 crews in for- A program was established on 1 April mation Hying by September 1963, the Cuban 1963 to qualify all aircrews of units possessing situation demanded that the project be expe- aircraft with airdrop capability in all phases dited. The formation training was given a high of airdrop, including actual drops. This pro- priority, and within a 20-day period 305 air- gram requires aircrews to maintain currency crews were qualified. Concurrently it became by making actual drops annually. A target date evident that special equipment required for was set for qualifying the entire ma t s force. dropping equipment from C-124’s, which had To date, the program is essentially on schedule. been scheduled for delivery later in the year, More stringent operational readiness in- was needed immediately. ma t s had no alter- spection ( ori ) criteria have been developed native but to institute a self-help program to and approved by Hq usaf to better evaluate provide the aircraft with this vital equipment. the combat readiness of ma t s units. Actual air- The solution was to fabricate it from ma t s drops are now required as part of readiness resources. Mass-production methods were em- inspections. ployed round the clock, and the equipment ma t s has changed the unit training stand- requirement was met within 20 days. ard ( uts ) for C-124 and C-130E units to better align the training standards with the combat airlift mission. In addition to airdrop training required for C-124 and C-130 aircraft, the C-130 units are required to train for assault Applied Tactics Group landing operations on improved and unim- Headquarters ma t s on 1 January 1963 proved fields. At present assault operations are formed the Applied Tactics Group. The char- limited by lack of complete tests on the C-130E ter of this provisional division required it to aircraft. evaluate the eurrent combat airlift status of ma t s, establish the immediate requirements to Joint Airborne Training Program improve ma t s combat airlift capabilities, ex- amine future requirements for equipment and To enable ma t s units to accomplish the techniques, and develop combat airlift doc- additional training and currency requirements, trine. The Applied Tactics Group has worked an expanded joint airborne training program closely with other divisions to develop a co- has been initiated at Fort Campbell and Fort herent program of combat airlift crew quali- Bragg. This program requires Eastern Trans- fication and currency, equipment require- port Air Force ( ea st a f ) to provide three air- ments, improved employment tactics, and planes five days a week at Fort Bragg and MATS ROLE IN COMBAT AIRLIFT 53

Western Transport Air Force ( westaf) a like tions, ma t s has recently taken action to provide number at Campbell to qualify crews and an aerial port squadron in each ma t s air trans- maintain currency by flving formation and port wing. Thus ultimately these wings will be low-level navigation, making personnel drops, able to provide the necessary support for uni- and making heavy-equipment drops for the lateral drop training, for all airdrops in which Army. The 1100 hours’ flving time allocated for the Army is not involved ( e.g., Operation Deep joint airbome training is used for this program. Freeze in the antarctic), and for other airdrop The Transport Air Forces ( taf) rotate crews or airlanding operations that are conducted as required to ensure that maximum utilization exclusively by the Air Force. is realized from this training program. It serves not only to train ma t s crews but also to pro- Project CLOSE LOOK vide the airbome training required for the Armv airbome units and to train ma t s and tac Throughout the entire history of airdrop- combat control teams which provide required ping, there have been serious limitations to support activities on the drop zones and land- accurate en route navigation, drop zone loca- ing zones. tion and identification, and drop accuracy. Although the joint airbome training for Airdrop operations have been restricted to the huge ma t s airlift force requires a tremen- visual weather conditions. Some factors which dous amount of support from the Army, the limit capability are inadequate navigation program is for the mutual benefit of both forces. equipment, poor Communications equipment, The Army must also support the airdrop re- unknown parachute ballistics, inability to de- quirements for tac in addition to those for termine drop zone winds, and cumbersome, ma t s. The combined requirements of tac and inflexible tactics. Suitable drop scoring equip- ma t s exceed the training requirements of the ment has not been available to assess ade- Army. To provide the remainder of the train- quately the results of training or new tech- ing, ma t s wings are taking action to provide niques and procedures. Consequently troop- unilateral airdrop training. For this purpose carrier effectiveness has not significantly in- drop zones have been established at Camp creased since World War II. To overcome Stewart, Geórgia, Fort Lewis, Washington, these deficiencies and to devise improved tech- and on Molokai Island in Hawaii. Although niques, tac initiated Project close look, located on Army establishments, these drop Phase I of which was actively pursued during zones are used for ma t s training only. Both January and February 1963. Phase I involved heavy equipment and miniature parachutes a comprehensive review of eurrent tactics, are dropped. Whereas the Army performs the techniques, and problems connected with parachute repacking for joint airborne train- troop-carrier and airborne operations. Revised ing, the ma t s aerial port squadrons perform tactics were devised and tested for use in air- this Service for the unilateral training drops. drop under visual conditions, marginal visual One of the ma t s troop-carrier wings has conditions, and instrument conditions. Some an aerial port squadron which includes a com- of the recommendations from Phase I were bat control team and the capability for para- that a revised type of formation involving low- chute repack and other functions required to level, in-trail flying replace eonventional for- support airdropping and airlanding. The other mation and that further development of equip- troop-carrier wing has only a combat control ment required for unlimited if r airdrop be team. The ma t s air transport wings have air continued. Two ma t s officers participated as terminal squadrons capable of performing air full-time working members during the entire terminal functions such as cargo handling and Phase I. Some of the actions taken by ma t s aircraft loading and unloading. The air termi- to implement the recommendations of Phase I nal squadrons have none of the capabilities are discussed later. Subsequent phases of required to support airdrop activities. To pro- Project close look will further investigate re- vide better support for combat airlift opera- quirements for new equipment for a complete 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW if r drop capability. ma t s also furnished a five- participate in the writing of manuais and man team of officers to Air Force Project new other publications from which ma t s had for- light, organized to provide the Air Force re- merly been excluded. For example, a basic sponse to the Army Howze Board proposals. manual which is the “bible” of joint airborne The group was tasked to design test plans to operations is presently written jointly by U.S. demonstrate that the Air Force, with its own Continental Army Command and Tactical Air aireraft, could give the Army airlift and tac- Command. This manual, designated usconarc tical air power -superior to what the Army Manual 110-101-1 and tac Manual 55-2, pro- could furnish itself with Army aireraft. vides operational procedures for joint airborne operations. ma t s has recommended to Air Force that this manual be updated, standard- specialized training ized, and rewritten with Army, Navy/Marine, for staff officers and Air Force participation and designated a ma t s has obtained quotas for key staff triservice manual. This request is being staffed officers to receive Army parachutist training by Hq usaf, and informal information indi- at Fort Benning, Geórgia. This training will cates the idea is being favorably received. Earlier in 1963 tac Manual 50-2 was rewritten enable ma t s to meet with the Army on more equal terms during conferences and in the as an Air Force publication. This manual pre- scribes procedures for combat control team field. It also gives ma t s officers an opportunity to appreciate further the airdrop operations training and standardization. Since ma t s has problems of the Army and to evaluate more combat control teams, a ma t s officer partici- effectively the quality of the Service that the pated in the rewrite. ma t s has several manuais, Air Force is providing. Twenty-two officers such as ma t s Manuais 55-1 and 55-4, which relate to combat airlift matters that fali entirely from ma t s headquarters and the two transport air forces had successfully completed the pro- within the purview of ma t s. gram by 1 December 1963. Because of the tangible benefits already derived from this training, an expanded quota will be requested airdrop competition in the future. To stimulate further interest among ma t s Quotas have also been obtained for ma t s aircrews, an annual airdrop competition is staff officers to attend the Combat Operations held. This competition, popularly referred to Course of the usaf Air Ground Operations by aircrews as the “carp Rodeo,” gathers to- School. The school is located at Eglin afb, gether ma t s aircrews from around the world. Florida, and is operated by the Tactical Air The objective is to select the ma t s aircrew Command. The Combat Operations Course is that best demonstrates the ability to perform designed to train officers of the armed forces the combat airlift mission. For scoring purposes in jointly approved concepts, doctrines, tech- an elaborate evaluating system has been de- niques, and procedures for integrating the vised. Each crew makes several actual airdrops joint combat effort of the Services. Subjects of personnel and cargo. One or more referees covered include close air support and joint accompany each flight. The final evaluation airbome operations. The latter encompasses considers such factors as drop accuracy; start- combat airlift. This school provides a médium ing, taxiing, taking off, and dropping on time; for officers of the different Services to meet face flving safety; crew coordination; general pro- to face, thereby gaining a clearer understand- fessionalism; and missions aborted for what- ing and appreciation for each others problems. ever reason. The competition is keen and con- siderable prestige goes to the winner. This pro- gram has generated so much interest that plans standardization of airlift manuais are under way to establish an Air Force-wide Since ma t s is participating more in joint event in the future that will be open to all Air airborne activities, action is being taken to Force commands with an airdrop mission. MATS ROLE IN COMBAT AIRLIFT 55

future of combat airlift vfr weather conditions. Although conventional Considerable effort is currently being di- formations of transport aircraft have a limited ability to penetrate bands of weather, such rected tovvard future requirements for the com- formation flving is essentially a vfr proposition. bat airlift mission. Included is the requirement Formations flown at low levei to avoid enemy for improved equipment and techniques of em- detection are completely dependent on vfr plovment. Significant advances are now being imade in improving techniques of employment, conditions. This places a severe limitation on the effectiveness of the airdrop mission by re- iand such transport aircraft as the C-141A and ducing flexibility. The planning and execution ;CX—1 will revolutionize combat airlift. of a mission depend on vfr weather being fore- C-141A. The Lockheed C-141A is a high- cast and realized. Therefore a pressing require- speed, long-range jet transport airplane. It is ment exists to improve the flexibility of airdrop destined to become a workhorse of the ma t s operations by the development of an all- force. Designed within the current state of the weather airdrop capability. This requires new art, it is an austere airplane, primarily for techniques and improved equipment, particu- cargo-carrying but with a capacity of over 100 larly electronic equipment. ma t s has formally troops. It can carry a payload of 80,000 pounds stated a requirement to fully equip the CX-4 over 3000 nautical miles and a payload of for accurate all-weather airdrop capability. 33,000 pounds over 5000 nautical miles. It has complete airdrop capability and can operate from moderately short fields, requiring less IFR drop techniques and operational requirements than 2000 feet for landing ground run at maxi- ma t s is experimenting with improved air- mum landing weight. The C-141A made its drop techniques and is fostering development first flight 17 December 1963, and deliveries of the missing electronic equipment that ex- will begin in fiscal year 1965. perience reveals is necessary to airdrop under CX-4. Although the C-141A will provide if r conditions. a significant increase in the present ma t s com- In-Trail Formation. A new technique for bat airlift capability, it does have limitations on airdrop was developed in Project close look the size cargo that can be carried. Large (out- for both vfr and if r application. It involves an size) cargo is now being airlifted by ma t s in-trail type of formation flown at high speed C-133’s and to some extent by C-124’s. How- and low levei over hostile territorv. The in-trail ever, the C-133 fleet is aging and plagued with formation can also be flown at high altitudes maintenance difficulties. The CX-4 heavy for fuel economy or other reasons. Spacing be- transport aircraft is proposed as replacement tween aircraft (for C-130) is five seconds be- for the C-133. The CX-4 is not yet an approved tween each airplane of a three-plane element program or a firm design, but most of the de- and thirty seconds between element leaders. sired capabilities and characteristics have been Airspeed is 250 knots. This type of formation defined by ma t s. The CX-4 will be a tremen- has almost as much maneuverability as a single dous airplane by anv standards. Maxim um aircraft. The low levei permits operations un- gross weight will probably be between 500,000 der much lower weather conditions than per- and 700,000 pounds. Despite the huge size and mitted by the standard V formation. With the capacity, it will be a surprisingly agile airplane, addition of the specialized electronics dis- capable of operating from relatively small air- cussed later, it may be possible to fly the in-trail fields. Additionally, the CX-4 will have all- formation with extremely large numbers of air- weather airdrop capability for maximum flexi- craft under complete if r conditions. bility. Tbis airplane will offer such an increase in ma t s airlift as to stagger the imagination. Pop-Up Maneuver. The in-trail formation can be flown as low as 300 feet or less over the terrain. The low-level portion is flown at high all-ueather drop capability speed (250 knots). Minimum drop altitude is MATS airdrop capability is contingent on about 1000 feet, and maximum drop speed is 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

125—130 knots. A pop-up maneuver was de- oping a satisfactory system is fairly good. veloped to reduce airspeed while simultane- Terrain-Following Radar for IFR Drop. ously climbing to drop altitude. At about five A second electronic equipment requirement for minutes from the drop zone all airplanes of a true if r drop capability is for terrain-following three-plane element climb rapidly to drop alti- radar. Terrain-following radar must enable a tude while reducing airspeed to 125 knots. This pilot to fly at 300 feet or lower under all increases the time between aircraft to 10 sec- weather conditions. As with the station-keeping onds although the distanee between them re- equipment, the desired method of presentation mains the same. Alter the drop is completed is a pictorial display that duplicates what the the element descends to the lower altitude and pilot would see if he were flying vfr. T o be increases airspeed for the return flight. Each effective for long low-level missions, terrain- succeeding element follows the same proce- following radar should have the capability of dure. The result is a steady stream of airplanes being coupled directly to the autopilot so that over the drop zone at 10-second intervals. The the airplane can automatically fly at a prese- pop-up maneuver used in conjunction with the lected altitude. Considerable development of in-trail formation enables vf r airdrops under terrain-following radar has taken place over less favorable weather conditions than is pos- the past few years. It is believed that the equip- sible with conventional formations flown at ment required is within the state of the art. higher altitudes. Terminal Guidance System for IFR Drop. These two techniques are still considered To complete the if r drop package, a self-con- experimental, but tests to date are very en- tained terminal guidance system is required. couraging. Both ma ts and tac are eonsidering This means a system capable of navigating an the latter technique as an alternate airdrop airplane to within 100 yards of a predetermined method. Ultimately it may completely replaee geographical point without visual reference or the conventional formation. Although these any equipment outside the airplane. Naviga- new formation techniques lend themselves tion with this degree of accuracy is a fairly readily to if r operation, improved electronics routine matter if adequate ground-based radio are required before this ultimate goal will be equipment is available. However, achieving attained. such accuracy with only self-contained equip- Station-Keeping System for IFR Drop. ment constitutes a formidable task, probablv Three distinct navigation requirements must the most diffieult if r drop requirement to sat- be met without visual reference to other aircraft isfy. No equipment now in Service has the re- or the ground before true if r drop capability quired accuracy, but the outlook for its devel- can become a reality. First, for flying formation opment is promising. Meanwhile, limited if r under if r conditions, a station-keeping capa- drop can be realized by means of station-keep- bility is essential. if r station keeping must pro- ing, terrain-following, and the current naviga- vide the pilot, through electronic means, in- tion equipment augmented by prepositioned formation on the location, speed, heading, and ground equipment for more precise navigation. altitude of other aircraft in the formation. This By means of a Qualitative Operational Require- information must be furnished to the pilot in a ment ( qor) to Hq usaf, ma t s has formallv form which is readily usable with a minimum stated the requirement for station-keeping, of interpretation. Ideally, it should give a pic- terrain-following, and self-contained terminal torial display closely approximating what he navigational equipment for C-130s and would see under vfr conditions. It would also C-141’s. Provided Air Force validates the re- be desirable to have the option of automatic quirement and development is begun, true all- formation flying by coupling the station-keep- weather if r drop should become a reality ing equipment directly to the automatic pilot. within the foreseeable future. Thus the plan- Several approaches to station keeping are cur- ning and execution of airdrop activities in the rentlv being evaluated. The Outlook for devel- future will be much less dependent on weather MATS ROLE IN COMBAT AIRLIFT 57

conditíons. The effectíveness of airdrop as a mobility exercises, and other combat airlift combat tool will materially increase as a direct areas. Continuing emphasis is being placed not result of this increased flexibility. only on crew qualification and currency but on the development and perfection of improved employment techniques that will better enable changing role of MATS ma t s to perform the full spectrum of airlift, The mission of ma t s has been continually from loading troops at bases in the U.S. to de- changing since the command vvas established livery in the combat area. in 1948. At first ma t s was limited to a “military A high priority is being given to the de- airline” txpe of operation, operating on a pre- velopment of new equipment to permit even dominantly scheduled basis and with no com- more flexibility of operation than is now pos- bat role. Gradually the realization has dawned sible. Included in the new equipment now that this massive airlift force does have a being developed or planned is the C-141A, the significant capability for combat airlift. As new CX-4 heavy transport, and the special elec- aircraft with increased flexibility have entered tronics essential for all-weather formation and or been programed to enter the ma t s inven- airdrop. torv, this realization has crystallized, and posi- The present concept of providing greater tive action has been taken to exploit this capa- air mobility for the Army in Air Force aircraft bility. is putting increased emphasis on ma t s combat For the past three years, and particularly airlift capability. This emphasis also projects for the past year, the trend has been awav from ma t s further into the overall Defense Depart- a purely logistic mission for mat s to increased ment airlift mission, exploiting the full spec- concentration on joint airbome training, air trum of ma t s aircrew and aircraft capability. Hq Military Air Transport Service RETENTION - A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM

C aptain Hen r y D. Steele

HORTLY after General LeMay be- sis on retention, this might seem to be an came Air Force Chief of Staff, he wrote unjust accusation. San article for Air Force and Space Let us then study the seed of this problem Digest which began: and follow its growth to the present, vvhere it encounters the same difficulty—apathy. What is the Air Force’s most criticai need? Space Systems? More Missiles? Advanced manned weapon svstems? All are high priority in the begintiing items, but there is one need that consistently After World War II and the Korean con- outranks them in importance. And until ma- flict, the Air Force found itself in somewhat chines can think creatively this vvill continue to head the list: PEOPLE.1 the same situation as the old lady who lived in a shoe, with “so many children she didn’t With this cue, our subject of discussion know what to do.” The personnel glut was so is people, specifically Air Force rotc officers great that eventually the Air Force, despite and why they are leaving the Air Force. Al- the many voluntary separations, had to resort though there is a constant need for increased to “riffing" the excess.2 Further proof that re- pay, better living conditions, and greater pres- tention was not a problem is found in the Air tige, there is a continuing and more subtle University Periodical Index. Not one article problem area. Basically we already have the on retention appeared between 1949 and 1956 solution: the usaf Officer Career Motivation in any of the magazines listed. There is noth- Program. ing in the alphabetical listing between "Rest Admittedly, this program is not a panacea Rooms” and “Retirement.” for the Air Forces retention ills, but its phi- However, retention studies were under losophy is an improvement over past efforts. way. In 1949 Louis N. Ridenour warned that At least it serves to make our young officers the personnel situation was “deteriorating feel they belong, that someone is sincerely in- and that only “immediate and urgent ’ action terested in their welfare and their careers. would prevent the now infamous “hump and Why then is retention still a major problem? trough” effect.2 Unfortunately his a d vice was Because a majority of our officers do not ap- ignored, and it was 1956 before any active pear to be sincerely interested in solving the attempt was made to stem the outgoing tide retention problem. With all the visible empha- of young officers. RETENTION—A V1EW FROM THE BOTTOM 59

This attempt, the Officer Career Manage- pointed out to a House Subcommittee study- ment Program ( afr 36-23), had little effect. ing fy 63-64 appropriations, “increased pay, It was similar to the previously tried and promotion, and proficiency pay aren’t every- isuccessful airman retention program, which thing for officers.”7 He further stated that the Idistributed “kits" explaining the various bene- personnel picture, although improved, is no fits of an Air Force career. This modified pro- cause for optimism or self-congratulation: igram proved to be an ineffectual and half- Nonrated retention is up to 15 per cent and hearted gesture unsuited for officers. Retention rated retention has jumped to 45 per cent. But figures did not improve. he warned that these gains are misleading, for Less than 20 per cent of all rated afrotc the Air Fo rce forecasts a loss of “72% of all graduates eligible for separation in 1957 chose afrotc graduates at their five-year Service the Air Force as a career.4 Yet those men were point.”8 eaming as much as or more than their civilian The prediction is even more ominous in contemporaries. The nonrated picture was view of the prospect of over 30,000 retirements even grimmer, for retention of young nonrated in the next five years. The situation is further afrotc officers continued at a dismal 10 per complicated by the termination of Officer cent.5 Candidate School. Hoping to discover the causes of poor For 21 years ocs supplied the bulk of our retention, Headquarters usaf distributed officers. But present policies are aimed toward questionnaires designed to find the answer. creating a college-educated officer corps One predominant and disheartening reason through the academies, afrotc, and Officer appeared: money. This became the battle crv Training School. Since ocs has been discontin- of military personnel planners in debates over ued, ots becomes the principal commissioning the need for the Armed Forces Compensation source and hopefully will supply a career- Act of 1958 and the amount of raises needed. motivated force of college-educated officers. Eventuallv the bill passed and the Services However, the retainability of these officers is received their pay raise. Retention rose, undetermined, for the first graduates are just sagged, and steadied at its previous levei. now completing their commitments. Realizing it c-ould not hope to compete Retention of an ots graduate is not a with industry on an income basis, the Air foregone conclusion as it was with the career- Force sought other career inducements. Hous- motivated, prior-service ocs product. Although ing, educational opportunities, prestige and there is no lag betwreen commissioning and responsibility, and retirement benefits became active duty for an ots graduate, he is still the the focus of recruiting and retention cam- same type of person. He is a college graduate, paigns. But retention still did not increase just as his afrotc brother is. He has been ex- satisfactorilv. posed to the same “antimilitary” environment, [An] officer on his first tour of duty is con- and he usually possesses a degree which can fronted with negative career inducements. be as useful ( if not more useful) in a nonmili- Early retirement, excessive emphasis on leave, tary career. oversold “fringe” benefits, and the standard Thus our retention programs must be line that the Air Force “way of life” must be aimed at both groups, regardless of their com- accepted as it is are not inducements for a missioning source. Todays college graduates lifetime career. The professional person is can expect to receive larger salaries as civil- alienated .. until he is convinced by personal ians, yet our Air Force scientists and engineers experience that he has the opportunity to make do not list this as a major reason for separation. worthwhile and satisfving contributions.6 The retention problem exists not for lack of the present studv and recommendations, not for lack of the concepts of programs to correct known causes, As Major General H. G. Thorne, Jr., but for lack of adequate and aggressive actions Director of Personnel Planning, dcs/p , tjsaf, which effectively deal with the problem.9 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW one succeeds ...... where others fail

To counter the accusation that the Air Headquarters usaf recognized the value Force was not sincerely concerned with the re- of these policies in 1961 and created an Air tention problem, General Bernard A. Schriev- Force-wide program styled after afscs, the er, Commander, Air Force Systems Command present usaf Officer Career Motivation Pro- (then ardc), created a dynamic “people-to- gram ( afr 36-20). However, the program did people” program aimed directly at young not produce the desired results, as General officers.10 Junior officer councils, actively sup- Thorne pointed out in his testimony before ported by General Schriever and his center the House subcommittee in 1963. The Air and division commanders, encouraged young Force is still unable to retain the desired 51 officers to identify irritants and suggest pos- per cent of its qualffied young officers. sible Solutions. Those Solutions which proved The failure is not in the philosophy of the to be practical vvere adopted as quickly as program but in the attitudes of its adminis- possible, and those which did not lie within trators, the officer-managers. The ideas are afsc’s power but warranted further study went sound, as afsc demonstrated, but approach on to higher leveis with General Schriever’s and support are not the same. Other com- indorsement." mands viewed this program as a wearisome From these steps officers within afsc task or as squares to be fílled on counseling gained a new sense of responsibility and be- reports. Such attitudes have plagued the Air longing. Nor was this new philosophy allowed Force since its first retention program. to die of complacency. In late 1960 an ad hoc In 1956 for example, 65 per cent of the committee, composed of two junior officers lieutenants who had completed their required from each base in the command, met in Wash- Service had not received counseling or advice, ington. General Schriever directed them to prior to separation, on the advantages of an identify the major irritants and suggest ways Air Force career.15 By 1959 an Air Force to improve retention. Besides higher pay, survey showed that 52 per cent of the first increased job opportunities, and promotions lieutenants and 65 per cent of the second based on “quality rather than seniority,” the lieutenants had not been made aware of career committee stressed the need for more realistic management programs.16 and personal career counseling.13 Despite the emphasis on retention, com- As a result, General Schriever created the manders still failed to counsel young officers. Personalized Officer Career Motivation Pro- In October 1961, 60 to 69 per cent of the gram. In his letter to commanders about this lieutenants interviewed could not comment program, he said: upon the effectiveness of the Air Force Career Analysis of usAF-wide facts indicates the pri- Management Program because 50 to 75 per mary cause for loss of the junior officer is his cent of those with four years or less service concern about assignment and utilization. To had not seen or heard about it.17 Yet at that counteract this loss, each commander and su- time lieutenants listed counseling as the most pervisor must utilize a more personalized significant factor that would motivate them approach to the management of young officers. toward an Air Force career.18 It is suggested that a reading list of books on Obviously the report published in October industrial relations, sociology, and executive 1961 did not fully reflect the effectiveness of training be fumished each supervisor.13 a program initiated in March of the same year. The people-to-people and personalized To obtain more accurate data reflecting the approaches, coupled with command interest use of this new program, in mid-1963 I con- and dynamic support, produced results. As of ducted a survey of 100 officers at the Squadron January 1963, afscs retention rate had risen Officer School who had less than six years’ from eleventh to eighth place among com- service. Because of the size and career inten- mands within the United States.1* tions of the group, the survey dealt principally RETENTION-A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM 61

with the program s administration rather than satisfied in American society. Yet from study- its effectiveness. ing the previously inentioned surveys, we see that the human element is lacking and the need for a feeling of belonging, first among uhy they failed the remaining needs, has not been satisfied. The first evidence produced by the survey Too often the human element in the manage- was noncompliance with the regulation. Con- ment system is ignored, and it is assumed that trarv to the stipulated requirement for annual people will continue to take care of themselves counseling of both career and noncareer and work well without someone taking an officers, over 50 per cent of those interviewed interest in them.2" Or as the report of the ardo had not been counseled. Of the remainder, 26 ad hoc committee put it, “apparently retention, per cent had been counseled once, and 23 per while talked about, has not really been estab- cent had been counseled twice. lished as a goal by lower levei leadership.” Of those counseled, half stated that their This attitude cannot continue if the Air counselor was indifferent, incompetent, or un- Force wishes to motivate its best officers to- informed. The remainder reported that their ward a Service career, and the new career counselor was sincere and competent. In other motivation program of 1961 specifically rec- words, approximately 25 counseling sessions ognized this fact. out of a possible 100 had the personal touch. The first five years of a young officers career It is interesting to note that afsc had the best are the criticai ones. During this period he is record among those interviewed. fonning permanent impressions which will de- But does the personal touch affect reten- termine whether or not he will make the usaf tion? Does the attitude of the counselor a career. . . . The personal touch intended to actually make a difference? For the answer let make the officer feel at home and of snme sig- us turn to A. H. Maslows theory of the five nificance to the Air Force is the guiding princi- fundamental human needs: pie in the new program.21 1) Basic physiological needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc.) Here lies the difference between the in- 2) Safety from externai danger ( attacks by creased retention rates of afsc and the rest man or beast) of the Air Force. All the other commands 3) Love, affection, and social activity (be- adopted this program, and all stressed the per- longing and love needs) sonal touch, the need to make the young 4) Esteem and self-respect (\Vhat do my officer feel that he belonged. For it is well peers think of me?) known that young officers have been “influ- 5) Self-realization (living up to one’s capa- enced as much by the fact that someone was bilities). concerned about them as by the benefits they Professor Keith Davis, in his book Human stood to gain.”22 Relations in Business, applies Maslow’s basic Yet Air Force retention rates have not needs to the problems of contemporary life: shown a marked improvement since the in- ception of this program. W e have failed to Management sometimes has felt it could meet retain our young officers because of our own all human need satisfaction by providing wages disinterest, not because our personnel policies and letting the employee then use the wages do not stress interest in retention. Our efforts to acquire his own satisfactions. This “Eco- must be full-time and sincere, for as afr nomic Man” concept does not hold up when 36-20 points out, “all career officers .. . are analyzed in terms of the five basic needs, be- cause money is primarily useful in meeting expected to contribute to the success of this only the first two of them.19 program.”23 Last-minute efforts to convince a man to seek an Air Force career will not work.24 These five needs are the key to human It is only by creating this feeling of proud motivation, and the first two are fairly well belonging that we can interest a greater num- 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ber of officers in a Service career. We cannot copies at each base would not be prohibitive. motivate a man by simply publishing a regula- Some recommendations for improvement tion. of the existing regulation: • Command support of jo cs needs to in the future be increased. Currently, base eommanders The solution to retention problems is have the prerogative of stopping council rec- simple, yet difficult. All career officers in the ommendations at their levei. To avoid this, all Air Force must demonstrate the same sincere jo c recommendations should be sent forward, interest in retaining young officers as did Gen- with the eommanders comments to follow. eral Schriever and the officers of afsc. Their Admittedly, jo c s all too often concem personal support, from counseling to junior themselves with such minor irritants as club officer councils, would be required. This can dues and showing dependent id cards at the be done within the existing regulation by the commissary. To avoid annoying higher eche- following methods: lons with these complaints, councils should be (1) First, ensure compliance with the pres- hand-picked and consist of the brightest young ent regulation, especially in providing well- officers available. A dull, plodding council is qualified, highlv tnotivated career officers to just as ineffective as an incompetent counselor. administer the program. An “incompetent • To avoid improper and incompetent counselor” was a prevalent complaint among counseling, yearly refresher courses in human many of the officers interviewed. relations should be established for all officers (2) Providing continuous counseling is in supervisorv positions. These courses would equally important. This should not be restricted not onlv stress the personal touch but also to once or twice a year, nor should attempts emphasize motivating highly qualified young to motivate officers be limited to noncareer as officers, rather than merely trving to retain opposed to career officers. W e must strive any officer. daily to create an atmosphere that will moti- • A second means of creating an atmos- vate young officers. phere of belonging would be the establish- (3 ) Junior officer councils must receive the ment of a “Big Brother Program.” This would full support of their eommanders. Command- be an expansion of the present sponsor pro- ers within afsc are required to attend jo c gram for new arrivals on a base. It is not meetings. Many officers from afsc have stated intended to create a 1984 “big brother is that their eommander s presence lends cre- watching vou” climate, but rather a “big dence to the program and stimulates the mem- brother is interested in vou” atmosphere. bers of the council. This is another complaint This program would be designed espe- of many young officers. Some eommanders cially for the second lieutenant entering active either do not attend or else openly express duty. The “big brother” should be an out- their disbelief in the eífectiveness of the coun- standing lieutenant or captain, preferably from cil and refuse to support it. This atmosphere the same office or section as the “shavetail.” defeats the whole purpose of the council and There should be no set time when this man hardly lends itself to creating a feeling that is no longer concerned with the welfare of “someone is interested in us.” his protégé. There is a mistaken tendency to (4) Another failing is the lack of publicity assume that, once settled in, the young officer for the jo cs. Such publicity might encourage no longer requires advice and counsel. Neither active support of the council by the junior is it true that an academy or ots graduate is officers themselves. In many cases where the more knowledgeable than the afrotc entry councils exist, no one knows what they are and therefore does not require as much help. doing. A remedy for this situation is to pub- Thus the career “big brother" can offer con- lish a “joc; Newsletter” and distribute it to all struetive criticism, help the young officer with junior officers. If full support is intended, then his minor problems, and above all encourage the cost of mimeographing a few hundred and motivate him. RETENTION-A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM 63

• A final solution to providing the per- no radical departure from any known fact or sonal touch is the creation of a base-level existing retention program. The problem lurks career guidance officer. His primarv duty in what might be the hardest area to correct, would be to answer questions on assignments, our own attitude. career progression, and Air Force personnel Important as pay, housing, and education policies. He should also have the responsi- are to increased retention, we are still faced bility of dealing with all malassigned officers with the subtle necessity of making a man feel and the authoritv to recommend transfers he is needed and wanted. Our efforts to sat- after 18 months for those officers seriously af- isfy this inner need are the weakest part of fected bv malassignment. He would work career motivation. directly under the dcs/p at the base to which The human factor is the most unreliable he is assigned. of all the elements in the usaf Officer Career If manpower restrictions prohibit this, I Motivation Program. Until we shake our suggest the establishment of a career guid- apathy, not only will we, the officers respon- ance office at major command levei to provide sible, appear to be paying lip Service to all the same Service. However, this alternate solu- retention programs, but so will the United tion does not allow for the same personal States Air Force. touch provided bv a base-level career guid- The Air Force cannot direct its officers ance officer. to be sincere and interested any more than it can order a man to be happy. The success of our retention efforts must come from In retrospect, this study of retention, some within, stimulated by the strong support of of its faults, and some possible Solutions offers commanders and supervisors at every levei. Officer Truining School

Notes 1. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, “Our First Priority: People," 14. "World Wide Career Motivation Congress Meets. Air Force and Space Digerí, September 1961, p. 44. Demands Refused,” Air Force Times, 12 January 1963, p. 18. 2. Maj. Donald E. Harrawood, lecture, "Personnel Prob- 15. Air Force Survey, Analysis of the Career Plans and lems—Current and Projected,” to Class 63-B, Squadron Oificer Attitudes of Non-Career Reserve Officers Derived from 100% School, 7 June 1963. Survey (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 29 3. ARDC, Report of Ad Hoc Committee on AFROTC November 1956), p. 13. Lieutenants (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 3. 16. Air Force Personnel Report, Charactcristics and Alti- 4. Dr. Eli S. Flyer and Dr. Abraham Carp, "The Officer tudes from Sample Surveys, IV (Washington, D.C.: Headquar- Retention Dilemma,” Air University Çuarterly Review, IX, 2 ters, Comptroller of the Air Force, October 1959), 35. (Spríng 1957). 61. 17. Ihid., VI (October 1961), 21. 5. "Big Hangar," Air Force Times, 20 December 1958, 18. Ihid. p. 8. 19. Keith Davis, Human Relations in Business (New York: 6. ARDC. Report of Ad Hoc Committee, p. 7. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950), p. 39. 7. House of Representatives, Hearings before a Subcom- 20. Flyer and Carp, p. 2. mittee on Appropriations, FY 1963-64, p. 273. 8. Ihid., p. 288. 21. TIG Brief, “Motivation Today—A Quality Air Force 9. ARDC, Report of Ad Hoc Committee, p. 3. Tomorrow” (Washington, D.C.: 17 March 1961), p. 4. 10. Ihid., p. 12. 22. "Full-Time Retention," Air Force Times, 20 May 11. "Lieutenants Tell ARDC How to Boost Retention,” 1961, p. 12. Air Force Times, 12 November 1960, p. 1. 23. AFR 36-20, Officer Career Motivation Program (Wash- 12. ARDC. Report of Ad Hoc Committee, p. 91. ington. D.C.: Department of the Air Force. 6 March 1961), p. 1. 13. AFSCM 36-1, Personalized Officer Career Motivation 24. Air Force Personnel News Lettcr, “People Make the Program (Washington. D.C.: Air Force Systems Command, 31 Difference in Retention, Too" (Washington, D.C.: Department August 1962», p. 8. of the Air Force, August-September 1958), p. 9. Air Operations in Viet Nam

THE AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER’S ROLE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Francis E. T orr

N A Special .Air Warfare situation the civil wet-season construction problems, but often these I engineer is involved with all the usual engi- methods require extremely costly and complex neering problems—weather, material availability, equipment that is not available to local construc- manpovver, and the ever present problem of ob- tion organizations. The terrain features of Viet taining funds. Added to these are transportation Nam run the gamut from the rice paddies of the to the site and working under constant or threat- delta country to the rugged, densely tree-covered ened harassment by insurgent forces. upland mountains reaching altitudes of over 8000 Using Southeast Asia, more specifically the feet. Construction problems in the mountainous Republic of Viet Nam, as a locale for describing areas revolve around accessibility, availability of the Air Force civil engineer s role in counterinsur- skilled labor, and the ever present threat of ambush gency, one of the primary factors is the weather or surprise attack. and its accompanying effeets. The climate of South Viet Nam breaks down roughly into two seasons: airfields the hot rainy season and the hot dry season, each Airfield sites that meet minimum standard lasting approximately six months. Construction design criteria are difficult to find. There are very work on airfields is generally limited to the dry few large, flat areas in the mountain territory which season, for during the rainy season most flatland allow construction of runways of adequate length areas become seas of viscous mud. Stateside con- with unobstructed approaches. Airfield construc- struction methods could overcome many of the continued on page 68 Airfields At Can Tho Airfield, the plowed and wind- rowed subgrade of the parking apron dries prior to regrading, as the work of runway re- habilitation progresses in the background.

Pierced Steel planking is moved by fork lift and loaded into a C-123 at Da Nang Air Base, South Viet Nam. It will be flown to Aloui and assembled for an auxiliary airstrip.

The heavy Vietnamese rainfall creates drainage problems. A ditch inside the earthen dike at Soc Trang Airfield carries the water to pump at far end, which empties it over the dike. Buildings

In December 1961, when it was decided to send USAF personnel to South Viet Nam, civil engineering specialists were rushed from Clark Air Base, Philippines, to arrange for needed accommodations. Facilities had to be constructed immediately at Tan Son Nhut AB near Saigon and at bases in Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Pleiku, and Nha Trang. At first tents were set up (like those at Da Nang AB above) to house incoming Air Force person- nel. Later the Civil Engineering Directorate arranged for construction of needed operational facilities, improved billets, roads, recreational facilities, mess halls, and water and electrical distribution Systems. Among the most important construction projects, from a personnel viewpoint, were the semipermanent quarters for airmen at Tan Son Nhut (below ), Da Nang, and Bien Hoa, along with mess halls, base exchanges, and recreational facilities. Construction, as shown, is usually done by Vietnamese con- tractors and labor, under supervision of engineering personnel of the 2d Air Division. Vietnamese workers complete the brick understructure of a masonnj barracks.

The finishing touches. Roads and walkways will follow.

One of many rows of barracks at Bien Hoa Air Base. The Bien Hoa huts, unlike the masonry quarters at Tan Son Nhut, are built of prefabricated Steel sections. 68 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW tion in the low, flat Mekong-Bassac River delta Steel planking as soon as the dry season starts anc area presents a different problem. The delta area plowing up the subgrade material. This matéria is covered by very soft, silty clay, hundreds of is then wind-rowed for drying. After drying out feet deep in some areas. Upon becoming saturated the material is graded and compacted, and the during the rainy season, this material becomes an straightened runway planking is then relaid. Thi: unmanageable, plastic mass, with practically no method leaves a portion of the runway available bearing quality whatsoever. for minimum operation during the entire mainte With the vveather and terrain factors and their nance period. The rehabilitated runway barel) effects in mind, the stage is set for planning the lasts through the rainy season, after whieh the construction of a typical Speeial Air Warfare air- process must be repeated. field. In the Republic of Viet Nam the types of At another airfield, Soc Trang, a dike was con aircraft that must be accommodated are the T-28, strueted around the airfield to keep out the surface C-123, A-1H, B-26, and L-19A, plus other Service water of the delta area. Immediately inside thi: types whose vveight and flight characteristics fali dike a large ditch was dug. This ditch slope: within the criteria of the aircraft mentioned. First, toward opposite ends of the airfield so that one to provide a fully operational, all-weather field half of the surface water run-off from the airfielc for Speeial Air Warfare missions, a runway at is carried to each end. Two large diesel-powerec least 6000 feet long is required. This runway must pumps empty the water from these points ovei have a designed load capacity of 25,000 pounds the dike, thus draining the airfield area and mini- on a single vvheel having a constant tire contact mizing infiltration of water into the runway, taxi- area of 100 square inches in a tricycle gear con- way, and apron base courses. The native laterite figuration. material was used to fill the voids in the crushed In Viet Nam the civil engineer’s problem of rock subsurface, and a double-penetration asphalt siting needed airfields had, for the most part, been surface was applied. This surface has held u{ done for him. Airfields constructed by the Japa- through one rainy season reasonably well. nese and the French during their occupancy still Many safety features enjoyed by pilots flying existed. Complete rehabilitation, enlargement, and out of Stateside bases do not exist at Vietnamesc additions, however, were generally needed before airfields, mainly because crushed rock and lateritt these airfields could support the mission require- are unavailable at the sites. The construction ma ments of Speeial Air Warfare operations. terials that did find their way into the delta arei The rehabilitation was no easy task. Pierced had to be barged in or trucked overland. Th< Steel plariking, the standby of World War II, was meager highway system with its hundreds o) pressed into Service to provide a surface over the bridges provides excellent opportunities for insur old laterite® paved runways, whieh were slowly gent ambush. For these reasons present airfielc sinking into the delta mud or being washed away layouts are limited in length, lateral clearancei by the torrential rains in the mountains. But this and parking facilities. If more airfields are to b< provided only stopgap relief, as the bearing qual- constructed in the delta area, the engineers con| ity of the subsurface material was reduced to template hydraulic dredging of river-bottom sand practically nothing during the rainy season. At one The sand will be pumped to the nearby shore anc such field, Can Tho, a planned maintenance pro- dried. Then it will be spread like a thick blanke gram of regrading and compacting the subsurface over the silty clay site of the airfield. After thi I material has been put into effect. This program blanket settles, it will provide the stability rei involves taking up a portion of the runway pierced quired for the construction of an asphalt-surfacec runway, taxiway, and apron system. Gradual set i tling of airfields constructed by these methods i °A soil-type material produced by weathering or decay of expected. Thus, planned maintenance will hav« underlying rock. This material is developed through a process known as laterization, whieh oceurs in tropical areas due to high to be performed at least once every two years tt temperatures and high moisture conditions. The resultant mate- rial, whieh is a lumpy, crusty substance, has a high content of “lift” the airfield above the water table. Prelim íron oxide and hydroxide of aluminum and a low proportion of silica. It is an easy material to work with and when applied, inary cost estimates for the construction of sucl bladed, watered, and rolled provides a hard, stable surface with good bearing quality. an airfield average about $4.5 million. This amoun Roadways Before the spring of 1963 the roadway between lhe Joint Operations Center and hangars at Tan Son Nhul Air Base was frequently a precarious mixture of mud and gravei. Since lhen the road has been effectively black-topped, though the methods used were some- times rather primitive. The roadbed was prepared mainly by hand labor—picks, shovels, etc.—and the tar used for final surfacing was melted down in barreis over open fires. Water Supply A new water well was drilled in 1962 to supply the Air Force cantonment or permanent quarters area at Tan Son INhut Air Base, Saigon. The water in this region is soft, has little mineral content, and is potable without treatment. Drilling to a depth of 115 feet required five days, and the job was completed in 25 days by the Vietnamese branch of a U.S. Corporation. With erection of the water tower, water can now be piped under pressure. AIR OPERATIONS IN VIET NAM 71

will provide only the ininimum runway, taxiway, prevents further leaching of effluent from septic and apron and does not include the structures tanks; therefore, when the ground areas become necessary for aircraft maintenance, operations, or saturated during the rainy season, surface over- personnel billeting. flowing of septic systems becomes a major problem.

electricittj buildtngs The production of electricity is one of the In providing the support facilities for a Spe- most serious single problems with which the Air cial •■Vir Warfare airfield, the engineers problems Force civil engineer must contend. Only at large are not overly complex in the construction of installations, such as Tan Son Nhut near Saigon, buildings. Wood for flooring and framing is avail- is commercial power available in quantity. More- able locally, and corrugated asbestos roofing in over the available power not only is unreliable easy-to-handle 3x5-foot sheets is readily available but is 50- rather than 60-cycle alternating current. to all parts of Viet Nam. Since there is no extremelv Most of the electronic equipment designed to pro- cold weather, wooden buildings with louvered vide the needed Communications for the Tactical sides provide the shelter required. Vietnamese Air Control System for Special Air Warfare oper- workers can erect them. Because they were rapidly ates on 60-cycle a-c. Power for this equipment constructed to replace tents at Bien Hoa Airfield, and for isolated navigational aids and innumerable this type of structure became known as the “Bien other Air Force facilities must be generated by Hoa hut.” Larger, more permanent facilities are means of portable gasoline or diesel-powered gen- generally provided through the Militarv Assistance erators. Generators ranging from 3.5 to 150 kvv Programs. These more complex structures are de- output in 8 configurations, manufactured by over signed and constructed by a Navy Construction 20 different firms, found their way to Viet Nam Agency, with guidance for functional design pro- to satisfv the usafs increasing demand for elec- vided by usaf counterparts of the Vietnamese tricity. These machines, designed for use as using agency. Owing to the large buildup neces- “emergency” generators to provide short-term sary to support other Service missions at airfield power while the prime source of power is being sites, considerable coordination must be accom- repaired, were pressed into Service as primary plished by the .Air Force civil engineer to preclude sources of power. siting conflicts and duplication of effort and to The high-speed engines in Air Force portable provide for maximum use of available real estate. generating equipment have a short life-span and dependability factor, which is acceptable if their normal usage is to be for periods of short dura- water and waste disposal tion. When these units are called upon to operate Potable water in Viet Nam is obtained from continually from one oil change until the next, a wells. Frequently in the delta area, wells must high breakdown rate is experienced. Since so many be drilled to a depth of 500 feet before a desi rabie makes and models are involved, a supply of parts stratum is reached. At a cost of roughly $15,000 for needed repairs is hard to come by. An extremelv each, wells are considered a more economical tight control over generator usage and mainte- means of obtaining water than processing the nance must be effected if any appreeiable depend- polluted, muddy river water. In the up-country ability is to be obtained. In order that a highly areas, solid rock must be penetrated before a mobile, packaged generator can provide a maxi- water-bearing stratum is encountered. These prob- mum output, electrical control is accomplished by lems of providing potable water do not appear to sophisticated internai systems. The high skill levei be difficult to overcome until it is realized that required to troubleshoot these systems is not usu- modem well-driÜing machinery is practically non- ally found amorig power-production specialists existent in Viet Nam. within the afsc 543X0 career field. The continued Sanitary disposal of waste matter is accom- successful use of this type of unit requires an im- plished by means of septic tanks with leaching proved parts supply system and higher-level train- fields. The clay soil, upon reaching saturation. ing of power-production specialists. 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW needed improvements ais available. Local national contract forces could The problems mentioned, while presenting a be assembled and deployed to the various sites to constant challenge to the Special Air Warfare engi- perfonn the construction. This method would re- neer, can by no means be allowed to occupy his full place the present svstem of providing civil engi- time. Programing, budgeting, and acquiring man- neering capability individually to each deployed povver must still be accomplished in accordance organization. The present method is considered by with peacetime methods. In a fast-moving situation, some to divide the total engineering capability in which the engineer in counterinsurgency often available in the overall area below the point of finds himself, these methods will not suffice. Spon- maximum efficiency. Peacetime methods of pro- taneous requirements must be met instantly with viding construction funds for a Special Air Warfare operation through annual programing add an ob- construction authority, funds, materiel, and man- staele for the Air Force coin engineer. In many in- ning in order to stay ahead of the enemy in a coun- stances the need for support construction is im- terinsurgency situation. mediate. If standard items of construction could be Several studies are in the process of being predesigned for the geographical area concemed, evaluated at various leveis of authority which have package funding to cover the cost of planned num- as their purpose increasing the effectiveness of civil bers of facilities could be accomplished for budget engineer support. One of these studies recommends purposes.0 Upon receipt of the budget authoriza- the organizing and equipping of special civil engi- tions and funds, the engineer could continue neer squadrons. These squadrons, especially trained throughout the year to provide required support to be self-sufficient in a Special Air Warfare situa- without reprograming, reducing scope to keep with- tion, would have complete packaged equipment to in funds available for a specific project, or compro- erect prefabricated buildings of sizes and shapes mising design standards to stay within dollar au- predetermined to fit the requirement. Equipment thorization leveis. would include portable generators and sufficient It is hoped that this presentation of the prob- tools and supplies to operate and maintain them. lems in the civil engineering role has provided Upon exhaustion of certain prepackaged materiel, thought-provoking suggestions which may lead to replacement packages could be provided from the improvement in the capability to support Special nearest hard-eore base to keep the squadron fully Air Warfare. equipped for its mission. Hq 2d Air Division Another study recommends that all design capability be centralized in one industrial area in °W e already have a book of in-country standard designs, the Special Air Warfare locale. Required items and when these are not used, site adaptation of design from other bases is used. There is very little special design now being could then be designed in accordance with materi- used in Viet Nam. The Science Frontier

THE PAST SEVEN YEARS IN AERODYNAMICS

A lfred C. D raper

t APPROXIMATELY 0439 EST on 18 Sep- times that of sound. The Apollo program, with its A _ tember 1963 the world’s first lifting entry supporting unmanned technologies, should dem- vehicle, a sset , was successfully launched into onstrate such flight within the next three years. olear 76° weather from the Atlantic Missile Range. Let us take up where Bonney left off and Some 21 minutes later and 1000 nautical miles review our progress from the standpoint of theoret- down range when the vehicle touched down into ical development, facility símulation, and actual the ocean north of the Virgin Islands, lifting glid- flight achievement. The field of aerodynamics ing flight for re-entry became a reality rather than during the past seven years has seen some highly just a concept. In retrospect. it is interesting to significant accomplishments and breakthroughs, note that seven years ago, in the spring of 1957, generally encompassing the entire velocity spec- Walter T. Bonney, then of the National Advisory trum from very low to hyperbolic® speeds. There Committee for Aeronautics, vvrote an article for have been some rather excellent contributions in the Air University Quarterly fíeview entitled “The the lower speed regimes of flight particularly with Shape of Aerodynamics.”* In it he proved to be the use of such techniques as laminar flow control extraordinarily perceptive and prophetic. The ( lfc) by suction, which has shown substantial clarity of hindsight also shows that Bonney was improvements in the lift-to-drag characteristics in fact somewhat conservative though in his fore- and consequently in the range capability of future cast of the expectations for high-speed flight, aircraft. The objective here, of course, is to inain- since we are now at the threshold of manned re- tain a laminar boundary layer00 rather than per- entry into the earth’s atmosphere at velocities 40 •Volocities in excess of the parabolic or escape velocity, i.e., greater than 36,000 fps. ®°A thin layer closc to the hody where friction plays an •Vol. IX. No. 2 (Spring 1957), 48-60. essential part. ASSET (for Aerothcrmodynamic-Elastic Structun Systems Environmental Tests), fxrst lifting entr vehicle, was successfully fired and tested along th Atlantic Missile Range on 18 Septem ber 196i

mit transition to turbulent flow with the accom- panying rise in drag. The lfc suction is applied through a series of carefully configured slots in the wing. The use of variable-sweep wings for aircraft has also proved to be not only an attrac- tive but also an equitable solution between the supersonic cruise constraints and low-speed land- ing constraints. With the wings extended, we obtain low wing loadings, span loadings, and improved aerodynamie characteristics, thereby increasing the low-speed efficiency of the aircraft. With the wings folded back, a substantial increase in the supersonic efficiency can occur. Yet probably the greatest technological ad- vances have occurred relative to problems asso- ciated with high-speed flight. We have in mind here the subchsciplines of hypersonic aerodynam- ics and aerothermodynamics. The reason for this THE SCIENCE FRONTIER 75

Itrend is that the largest knowledge voids existed lifting re-entry glides of the asset and Dyna-Soar in these areas, thus spurring our scientists and types. These two vehicular concepts were limited engineers into obtaining at least design Solutions. to re-entry from close-proximity or low-energy It also might be observed that, since so little was orbits with initial velocities in the order of the (known, any accomplishment necessarily attracts circular orbital velocity, i.e., 25,600 fps. A com- attention. Bonney recognized the importance of prehensive series of analytical and experimental the newly emergent discipline of aerothermody- efforts was pursued through 1960 to define the namics, and indeed its criticality has become para- aerodynamic, aerothermodynamic, and perform- mount since it has been, in essence, the criterion ance characteristies of these types of configurations, whieh has most seriously challenged man in his with particular emphasis on the lifting body or conquest of higher flight velocities. wingless type during the later portions of this time The basic work in these nevv disciplines began period. to receive impetus in mid-1957, initially concen- These lifting body configurations appeared trating largely on manned and unmanned ballistic particularly attractive at high velocities, for they re-entry. A considerable effort was directed toward generated essentially equivalent aerodynamic effi- delineation of aerodynamic configuration for such ciencies with a superior volume of payload capa- purposes as the Mercury program and various bility. In addition these “flying bath tubs,” as weapon delivery concepts. Relative to the latter some call them, offered significant growth poten- objective, initially most work centered around the tial for even higher re-entry velocities where the H. Julian Allen blunted nose concept as a heat winged glider was essentially limited to circular sink,0 but subsequent advances in ablative thermal orbital speeds. Consequently in 1961 a natural protection schemes essentially permitted an ad- evolution was made to these lifting bodies for vanced generation of lower-drag vehicles. In late re-entry at superorbital velocities (around 36,000 1958 a defimte change was made in an effort to fps) such as those whieh would occur during solve the problems associated with first-generation re-entry from high-energy orbital or lunar return missions. Various classes of these lifting bodies •The use of high-pressure drag coefficients by employing blunt shapes to dissipate a large fraction of the heat. were analytically and experimentally evaluated 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW through velocities of approximately 33,000 fps. lessons learned from such programs as Fire will Although this large concentration of effort has be of immeasurable value in the more vital na- been directed toward the lifting type of configura- tional prestige efforts like Apollo. tion, considerable work has also been focused on During the latter part of 1962, again a marked ballistic shapes for superorbital or high-energy change in emphasis occurred in the technology, re-entry as evidenced by the nasa Project Fire, the particular attention being directed toward the first of which was launched in April of this year. high-volume air-breathing hypervelocity configura- This is a ballistic configuration which will enter tion. This trend, we believe, is particularly note- the earths atmosphere at approximately 37,000 worthy, for not too many years ago it was rather fps and measure the heat experienced at sueh pessimistically assumed that the air-breathing vehi- velocities. The heat problem is particularly severe cle had fairly well reached its limit for high-speed when the vehicle traveis at superorbital speeds, flight, around mach 4, and that the rocket would for, in addition to the normal convective or aero- probably be the primary propulsion mode for dynamic heating, a new phenomenon occurs which future high-speed flight vehicles. Recent advances has been termed radiative heating. The shock in high-speed induction Systems, for both subsonic layer siirrounding a vehicle emits a high radiant and supersonic combustion applications, have, energy flux at these re-entry speeds, and this radi- however, encouraged optimism as to the extension ant flux may equal or exceed the convective heat- of air-breathing systems. There have been even ing in magnitude. It is readily obvious that the more drastic changes in the technology since 1962,

Ttjpicai lifting bocly and toinged glider tested through mach number 20 The Sortie, a lifting superorbital entrij vehicle studied by USAF

A Fire vehicle mounted in the Langley thermal structure tunnel

80 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

Perhaps one of the primary factors in determining It is perhaps interesting to note that the aero- whether the boundary layer vvill remain stable dynamicist has also not played national favorites in the laminar sense is the Reynolds number.0 in selecting his base-line tools for developing the On straight wings the Reynolds number is con- hypersonic prediction schemes. The work of Sir sidered vvith a characteristic length parallel to the Isaac Newton has proved partieularly helpful, and flow. But as mentioned previously, the most sig- the various postulates outlined in the Principia nificant case is that of the swept wing, where Mathematica have been expanded in many direc- another criticai Reynolds number which signifi- tions and combinations to give us useful design cantly affects the stability of the boundary layer approximations for estimating the aerodynamic was determined to be the cross-flow Reynolds characteristics of hypervelocity vehicles. In the number.00 Vastlv improved methods for computa- quest for alternate approaches, techniques have tion of the stability characteristics of these bound- been developed which closely parallel in part the ary layer profiles on swept wings, along with the work being performed in the Soviet Union by con- appropriate suction distributions to ensure laminar temporary scientists such as V. V. Sychev and P. I. flow, represented the major problem which was Chushkin. successfully attacked within this time period bv Originally a great deal of attention and con- Dr. W. Byron Brown and Dr. Werner Pfenninger. cern was given to what is termed rarefied gasdy- Once this phenomenon had been delineated, namies or superaerodynamics,0 such as free mo- Pfenninger continued to make further advances in lecular flow problems. It has now been generallv the understanding of complexities associated with accepted that although such problems undoubtedly boundary layer flow. He essentially capped the exist, they can be reasonably considered as second- research when he postulated the mechanisms asso- ordered in that they do not normally influence the ciated with the understanding and control of design of advanced vehicles to a significant extent. spanwise turbulent contamination of swept wings. Despite the elassical significance of many theoret- It was this latter accomplishment which was em- ical endeavors, if they do not materially contribute ployed in achieving laminar flow on the inboard to the understanding of design problems on an portions of the wing of the X-21. engineering basis, then their main value is aca- Hypersonic Flow Fields. In considering the demic. It is then vitally important to direct atten- tion to those problems which criticallv challenge analytical achievements made in hypersonic aero- our ability to design practical flight vehicles. In dynamics one should realize that the theoretician has worked in close cooperation with the experi- the final analysis we must be able to analvze and predict their performance if we are ever truly to mentalist in defíning the nature of hypersonic flow understand the complexities and potentialities as we know it today. Until quite recently ground associated with high-speed flight. facilities were generallv lacking to simulate the Along these lines an especially comprehensive hypervelocity environment adequately. Conse- effort has been devoted to developing a broad quently it quite often fell to the theoretician to base of scientific knowledge for understanding the lead the way in postulating the mechanisms for vast and complex flow phenomena associated with hypersonic, high-temperature flight. We have, as hypersonic entry or sustained flight vehicles. Many do all scientific disciplines, our outstanding theore- detailed programs conducted by both usaf and ticians—such men as Van Dyke, Cheng, Vaglio- nasa have significantly contributed to defining Lauren, and Gibson—but some of the outstanding the problems of orbital and superorbital re-entry. work in developing practical techniques for day- The a sset project—and the Dyna-Soar even in by-day application has been accomplished by cancellation—have made excellent contribufions in lesser-known members of the aerodynamic com- advancing the State of the art in aerodynamic/ munity working on aetual flight-test hardware. aerothermodynamic disciplines. The data obtained from a sset will materially add to the overall tech- “Reynolds number is an important dimensionless similar- ity parameter for viscous or boundary layer flows and is defined nology on hypersonic aerodynamics, since it ob- as the product of the density, veloeity, and characteristic length divided hy the coefRcient of viscosity. “Simply the aerodynamics at very high altitudes, where ““Based on a local veloeity component parallel to the the molecular nature of the gas, rather than the gas only as a wing’s leading edge. continuum, must be considered. Wind-tunnel models of hypervelocity configurations

tains data over the entire velocitv range from sub- niques are currently used in the design of hyper- sonie to near orbital speeds. velocity configurations. Although there has been a substantial ad- Many of these techniques, although admittedly vancement in the simulation capability of ground not alvvays completely theoretically rigorous, have test facilities in the past three years, there is still proved to be quite satisfactory at hypersonic a criticai requirement to increase the velocitv range speeds. The various Newtonian approximations from 16,000 to 36,000 fps. (More vvill be said of and modifications, as well as patched techniques0 this in the next section.) Experimental investiga- such as those developed by Creager, are used with tions have been made to verify the theoretical and a fairly high degree of confidence for configurations analytical prediction methods and to assist in the with simple geometries, especiallv when combined development of empirical relationships to predict with skin friction predictions such as those based the aerodynamic and stability characteristics of on Professor Ernst Eckerts reference methods.00 hypersonic configurations for the mach number But in order to understand more completely the range 0 to 22. Methods have been developed for flow phenomenon at hypersonic speeds over ad- estimating pressure distributions, local flow prop- •Combining various theories into one prediction techniquo. erties, skin friction drag, and aerodynamic forces M. O. Creager of NASA combines Newtonian, viscous, and blast «ave or violent expiosion Solutions. and moments on simple geometries. These tech- O0Employed for calctilnting skin friction effects. 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW vanced vehicles, the usaf has pioneered, through A particularly large emphasis has been de- the Research and Technology Division, research voted to formulating the design criteria for hyper- in “exact” dimensional flovv field programs based sonic re-entry configurations. Generalized families upon the method of characteristics0 and for real of both winged and nonwinged lifting body con- gas flows.® 0 figurations have been subjected to criticai analyses. The initial work obviously did not include Tests have been conducted from low subsonic to the viscous or boundary layer effects, but recent hypervelocity speeds to define the aerodynamic, analytical breakthroughs have enabled coupling of performance, stability, control, and landing char- these viscous effects in terms of three-dimensional acteristics of simple configurations in both Govern- attached boundary layers. It is particularly inter- ment and industrial facilities. The problem of esting to note that this was made possible largely boundary layer transition and interacting flow because of the previously discussed basic bound- fields, which are now being c-ritically analyzed to ary layer work performed by Dr. Pfenninger. In determine their influence on the design and de- other vvords, this significant piece of work by lineation of flow regimes from continuum to free Pfenninger has, through the intuition of our engi- molecular flow, is continuously being reviewed and neers, found application to both the laminar How updated as information from ground and free- control problem and the hypersonic “exact” viscous flight tests becomes available, to ensure that no characteristic methods. major effects in the teehnology have been over- looked. °A method for exact stepwise numerical calculation in Additional work in hypersonic aerodynamics supersonic Bows. °°Considers effects which are neglected in ideal-fluid theor>’. has been concerned with extending the state of the

Shock-wave formations at mach number 21 over a hypervelocity configuration at an angle of attack. These tests were performed in Cornell Aeronautical Laboratorys 48-inch shock tunnel. Direct measurements were made of the hypersonic skin friction. THE SCIENCE FRONTIER 83

art to sustained hypersonic flight and superorbital hicle the heat is either absorbed by the heat ca- lifting re-entry. This requires extensive investiga- pacity of a thick shielding material such as copper tion of the local flow field properties, complex or beryllium or is dissipated by ablation of a sur- geometries, boundary layer transition, and non- face coating. In the latter case the kinetic energy equilibrium flow effects. The very strong influence of the vehicle is absorbed by the Iatent heat during of viscous drag on aerodvnamic performance has the change of phase which occurs when the surface been vividly illustrated both analytically and em- material is vaporized and carried away by the pirically. Programs are being conducted to measure airstream or charred as in the case of the newer skin friction drag directlv through mach number ablators. 20 and through large angles of attack. This rep- The re-entry of the lifting or gliding type of resents a significant advancement, since until re- vehicle involves much less severe heating rates cently data were limited to mach numbers below than for the ballistic type (tens of Btu/ft- sec), 8. These data will greatlv assist in the design of but the total heat transfer quantity can actually high-performance vehicles. Investigations are be- be greater because of the extremely long period ing conducted for the high mach numbers on of time in re-entry flight (tens of minutes). In this hvpervelocity air-breathing configurations with case the re-entry path angle is relatively small com- various interfering geometries, and comprehensive pared with the ballistic mode angle, and normally analyses are being made of the associated high- radiation-cooled structures are used, although re- speed inlets on induction systems for both sub- cently ablation techniques have been investigated sonic and supersonic combustion applications. for practical application. In the radiation applica- These inlet-airframe configurations are thus being tion, since the vehicle is exposed to high heating studied to determine the most favorable location for such long periods, a steady State is reached of the inlet on the configuration with respect to in which the incoming aerodynamic convective aerodvnamic, performance, and stability charac- heating equals the outgoing radiation, resulting in teristics as well as to the total integrated systems. an equilibrium temperature of the surface. This As mentioned earlier, a considerable amount temperature is maintained below the limit of the of work has been directed toward the aerodvnamic surface material (approximately 3500°F) by care- and stability problems for lifting re-entry at super- fully designing the vehicle shape and designating orbital speeds. A number of candidate configura- flight paths that will avoid the criticai heating tions have been analyzed throughout the entire regions. These problems associated with lifting range of mach numbers, and tests have been con- entry have received considerable attention because ducted at velocities as high as 33,000 fps. of their complexity, and we shall review some of Aerothermodynamics. The most significant the principal accomplishments. contributions, bowever, have been made in the Present winged-type configurations are rela- field of aerothermodynamics. The rate of heat tively simple shapes with swept surfaces and transferred from a boundary layer to the surface blunt leading edges and noses, while the lifting has become significant only with the flight of high- body vehicles are also normally simple shapes. supersonic aircraft and criticai with the advent of These noncomplex geometries facilitate analysis ballistic vehicles and true hypersonic flight. The of the heating of this class of vehicles. It must be design of hvpervelocity re-entry or sustained flight realized that as research programs improve the vehicles is vitally dependent upon the heat trans- capability of high-temperature structural mate- fer rates and temperatures which occur at criticai riais and cooling techniques, more sophisticated points on the vehicle. designs will evolve which require more detailed Two modes of re-entry are of primary interest: analyses—in fact they are beginning to appear the ballistic or high path angle re-entry, and the now. lifting or gliding vehicle. To determine the degree of aerodynamic In the ballistic re-entry, the heating rate is heating, the environment through which the ve- intense (thousands of Btu/ft- sec) for a short hicle will pass must be known; hence the flight period of time (tens of seconds), and the re-entry path or trajectory must be determined. A number path angle is relatively large. In this type of ve- of different prediction techniques have been 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW formulated ia the last few years, generally based oped for both laminar and turbulent flow. The upon the work of James Fay and Frederick Riddell reference methods are quite useful for these prob- and the reference theories pioneered by Eckert. lems. The stagnation region usually experiences the Speeifically, prediction techniques are avail- highest rate on any hypersonic vehicle. Of the able to evaluate the heating and flow fields about many available methods for predicting laminar simple shapes such as spheres, cones, cylinders, stagnation point heating rates, perhaps the approx- etc., and, as well, the interaction effects due to the imate method developed by Lester Lees of the resultant configuration synthesis so long as second- University of Califórnia has proved most useful. ary shock systems are not formed. Secondary shock It closely parallels the more exaet methods of Fay systems such as those occurring from fins or con- and Riddell and greatly facilitates calculations. trol surfaces may be grossly evaluated, or at least Techniques have also been developed for the dis- their effects may be bounded. Passive cooling tributions in this region. (surface reradiation), as indicated earlier, may Leading-edge heating is the next most impor- be provided for in the design. However, active tant problem area to be considered. This analysis cooling, such as transpiration or film ejection, of must necessarily deal with the effects of angle criticai areas has been only superficially reviewed. of attack. Analysis of the region aft of the leading Calculations are presently based on real gas flows. edge also must follow, and this region is generally The effects of Chemical nonequilibrium have not treated as a Hat plate. Methods have been devel- been redueed to engineering application, though

Arnold Engineering Development Centers 50-inch Hotshot hypervelocity facility THE SCIENCE FRONT1ER 85

nonequilibrium effects for orbital entry are not about aircraft has been of considerable importante considered to be adverse to the design. since the inception of the Science of aerodynamies. Superorbital entry vehicles that are inore so- These facilities have been used both for the experi- phisticated than the Apollo (e.g., lifting configura- mental verification of analytical theory and, as tions) may be construcied, but sueh designs are well, to give the engineer an insight into complex based only on the present gross knowledge of the flow mechanisms for which direct analysis is not flow fields and heating. These probleins are in possible. The goal of the experimental facility, the stage of active investigation, and competency then, is to duplicate the induced flow conditions will increase rapidly in the next several years. found in íree flight. This goal is seldom achieved, Work relative to the previously discussed radiative however, and today, with the rapid advances in heating by such researchers as Lees and Benneth vehicle speeds, direct duplication of all quantities Kival has proved most useful, but because of is not yet possible. This failure to simulate fully facility limitations only a small percentage of the the flight environment results from our incom- phenomena can be simulated. This situation is plete understanding of the interrelationships of hampering present studies in the superorbital area. flow variables and has led to the design of “partial simulation” facilities. facility simulation The most important quantities to be achieved The use of relatively small-scale experimental in the simulation of aerodynamic data are the local facilities to simulate full-scale flow phenomena Reynolds number on the body, the total energy

Winged glider at mach number 8 in aeroballistic range X-15’s established both speed and altitude records in 1962.

of the flow, and the mach nnmber of the stream. 4500° the pebble-bed heater concept is used. In Our efforts are generally directed toward accom- this concept the refractory pebbles (either alumina plishing these achievements through various tech- or zirconia) are heated by a propane/oxygen niques. mixture, and then the test gas is blown through Basicallv there are only two facility concepts: the heater to absorb the heat energy. For still (1) continuous flow facilities and (2) the impulse higher temperatures, the electric arc heater is em- type of facility which directs a short-duration test ployed to heat the test gas. This arc facility can slug of gas past a model for a matter of several correctly simulate the temperatures reached during milliseconds by means of a controlled explosion. hypersonic flight; however, gas chemical difRcul- Both these facility concepts have been perfected ties are apparent in the use of the arc tunnels to the point that they will yield acceptable aero- when proper Reynolds number simulation is at- dynamic data, and the merits of one concept over tempted. “Shock tunnels” and “Hotshot tunnels” the other are resolved according to the type of are names given to the impulse facilities. These use test to be conducted and the economy of opera- either cold or heated light gas drivers or, as in the tion. Most continuous facilities today heat the air Hotshot, use an electric arc to heat the test gas only sufficiently to avoid air liquefacdon in the directly in a confined region. The principal diffi- test section, but few attempt to achieve proper culty in the development of these facilities has enthalpy® simulation. A variety of air heaters is been in the instrumentation, which must be capa- used, according to the temperature requirements. ble of millisecond response. Now that such instru- For temperatures less than 2000° the electric re- mentation has been developed, many detailed sistance heater is commonly used. Examples are measurements may be made in these facilities. tunnels A, B, and C at the Arnold Engineering Pressures, forces, heat transfer, direct skin fric- Development Center. For temperatures up to tion measurements, and the actual sampling of

°Sum of the pressure and the internai energies. gas constituents in the flow field are some of the An advanced high \V/C,>A ballistic re-entry vehicle

measurements that have become available to the nique holds promise for future high-speed simula- experimentalist in these facilities. tion. A final class of simulation devices is con- cemed with nonconventional methods of obtaining flight achievements hypersonic velocities. These facilities inelude the use of ballistic ranges where the models are pro- We have discussed some of the accomplish- jected through a quiescent gas; the coupling of a ments in the fields of aerodynamics and aerother- ballistic range with a shock tunnel to achieve still modynamics, but there still remains the question higher velocities, around 43,000 fps; and the new as to what has been demonstrated by actual flight, class of facility schemes which employ a linear for when all is said and done this is the prime accelerator in place of the conventional supersonic reason for all such research in the flight Sciences. nozzle to accelerate the gas. The first two modes In reviewing the achievements since 1957 we suffer from the lack of accurate local measurements have quite a task, for coincidentally on 4 October on the model under study, since all model-borne in that year the worlds first man-made object instrumentation must be telemetered to the ob- ever to orbit the earth was successfully launched. servar. These facilities at present generate data In his 1957 article Bonney suggested that the X-15 through the optical “tracking” of the model and would be considerably faster than the X-2. This surveys of the shock laver by photographic means. was indeed the case, for on 17 September 1959 the The linear accelerator, or “magneto-gasdy- first powered flight of the X-15 was made, and namic” acceleration technique, requires a source during June and July 1962 it climaxed its numer- of high-temperature, partially ionized gas for the ous achievements with a speed record of 6020 fps accleration technique to operate on, and no facil- and an altitude record of 314,750 feet. Within ity using this concept has been constructed for this same time period, considerable advances were useful aerodynamic testing. However, this tech- being made with sustained flight aircraft, led by ASSET, mounted on a Thor booster ot Cape Kenncdy Re-entry configuration icith dual design ap- proach shouing contoured upper surface

the century-series airplanes. which established data capsides have been retrieved, thereby con- high-speed flight on a fairly routine basis. This tributing to the store of knowledge now associated trend has to date culminated in Hights of the A-l 1, with the aerodynamics of re-entry. Paralleling this as recently announced bv the President. The usaf work was the National Aeronautics and Space simultaneously was developing a whole new tech- Administrations development of the inanned tech- nologv focused on nose cone development for nology associated with the Mercury program. Of ic bm applications, and we have been privileged course here we saw the unmanned programs such to see outstanding aerothermodynamic accomplish- as “Big Joe” to test the heat-protection schemes, ments in the area of unmanned ballistie re-entry but the major achievement of the period was un- vehicle technology. doubtedlv the first manned suborbital Mercury This area of the technology produced many flight by Commander Alan B. Shepard, Jr., on firsts. During 19-58 the first data capsule was suc- 5 May 1961. This was surpassed only by the first cessfully returned and retrieved under the Mark 2 manned orbital flight of an American, Lt. Col. program for demonstration of a heat sink tech- John H. Clenn, Jr., on 20 February 1962. It is nique. In the spring of 1958 the first ballistie interesting to note that the Mercury configuration vehicle, the RVX-1, was snccessfully recovered, very eloselv resembles a shape tested by the usaf having tested various ablation concepts. Success in 1958. followed success, and during the sumrner of the During the time period from 1957 to 1960, next year the first high \V'/C„A0 ablating entry the prime concentration was undoubtedlv focused vehicle was recovered down range. These accom- upon exploiting this ballistie entry technology be- pfishments were essentially centered on improved cause of the national sense of urgency toward weapon delivery concepts, but it was an outgrowth developing an operational ic bm. Even during this of these ballistie jnvestigations that enabled the surge of what might be termed puie drag vehicles, fSAF to recover the first Discoverer from orbit however, a inoderate amount of work was pro- during August 1960. The historv of the Discoverer gressing relative to lifting entry vehicles. In Feb- program is generally well known.and many of these ruary 1959 from Pad 10 at the Cape an aero- ballistic vehicle glided successfully down the pcfinra a* the ballistie coefficient, usin^ wcight, drag coeflicient, and arra. Atlantic Missile Range. This vehicle, the Alpha- 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Draco, was the product of a relatively austere be aware of the nontechnical wind shifts and fac- program, but it graphically demonstrated the tors which the aerospace Sciences must face as a capability of a body to generate lift and to per- whole, for it is these latter influences which are form a controlled gliding flight. This entire con- subject to the more abrupt change. These factors cept is now being actively studied for advanced can significantly alter not only the plans and pre- applications, along with very advanced genera- dietions but also the growth of current concepts tions of ballistic re-entry vehicles. within the next decade. With this reminder that The major activities associated with lifting any prognosis is at best nothing more than a con- gliding flight were concentrated about the Air jecture, an effort will now be made to forecast Force’s a sset and recently canceled Dyna-Soar logical extensions in the technology. programs. The basic work on the a sset program Perhaps one of the more likely aircraft ad- was initiated during 1960 and, as previouslv men- vances to expect is the supersonie commercial tioned, resulted in a completely successful flight transport. If this vehicle does not employ variable of the first aerodynamic/aerothermodynamic test geometry for its wings, then certainly either the vehicle on 18 September 1963. The significance F-lll or a comparable system will. In any event of this flight should be clearly understood, for considerable work will have been directed toward in essence it has established an entirely new era the sonic boom problem as it relates to the super- of lifting, maneuvering flight. sonie transport. Specifically, efforts will have been Another flight achievement which contrib- made to configure the aircraft so as to minimize uted to the technology and base of knowledge the ground overpressure. This overpressure is pri- associated with sophisticated flight vehicles was marily a function of atmospheric variables and the first successful launching from a B-52 of an aircraft volume and weight, flight path, and con- air-launched ballistic vehicle down range from the figuration. By giving careful consideration to the Cape just prior to the cancellation of the program volume and lift effects, supersonie aircraft most early in 1963. This, to a limited degree, demon- likely will be designed with improved overpressure strated the coupling of two reasonably complicated leveis. If positive results are obtained from the cur- Systems at least from the standpoint of the launch- rent eíforts in laminar flow control, then we also ing phase, which can be aerodynamically criticai can expect to see long-range aircraft taking full as to separation and pull-up problems. advantage of this technology. Also, as planned, An especially appropriate way to perform the X-15 will be augmented to 8000 fps. the final assessment of our flight achievements is There most certainly will be a demonstration against the backdrop of booster technology, for program in lifting and maneuvering re-entry, most it was the success of this particular endeavor that probably employing a vehicle with a moderate enabled these subsequent advances in ballistic, lift-to-drag ratio and the capability of performing lifting, and space vehicles. This chronology of a conventional horizontal landing. The concept booster system development is particularly note- which appears most likely for initial tests would worthy, for it was just seven years ago, in 1957, be a vehicle whose lower surface and leading-edge that our first real successes with the Júpiter, Thor, geometries are designed for the hypersonic con- and Atlas Systems were experienced. Within two straints but whose upper surface is deliberatelv years the first of the Titan series was launched, contoured for low-speed aerodynamic efficiency. and on 1 February 1961 the Minuteman also In other words, a dual design approaeh. It is felt became a reality. Thus our knowledge of the that eventually this lifting vehicle will be upgraded stability and control of such Systems was signifi- to very-high-performance systems with hypersonic cantly increased. lift-to-drag ratios in the order of 3.5, thereby guar- anteeing an arbitrary recall capability from any orbital condition. As a result our knowledge of the prognosis total hypersonic viscous problem, including skin When any prognosis or forecasting of a tech- friction, will be greatly enlarged. nology is attempted, it is necessary not only to Superorbitally, aside from the Apollo and consider the specific technical items but also to Fire programs, we can expect a demonstration THE SCIENCE FRONT1ER 91 of lifting entry with unmanned vehicles at veloc- ourselves to this question of a recoverable booster, ities near 36,000 fps, since both nasa and the usaf however, we can anticipate formidable problems, have quite actívely investigated the problems as- for it is not an easy task to define either the con- sociated with this vehicular technology. We can figuration or the propulsion mode. Perhaps the anticipate that our knowledge of both the mecha- initial concepts may be merely rockets with lift- nisms and magnitudes of the heating problems will ing and control surfaces to negotiate a noncatas- increase immeasurablv. In postulating the expec- trophic return, but eventually as more knowledge tations for advaneed weapon delivery concepts, is obtained it is felt that these vehicles most prob- we might indicate that highly maneuverable ve- ably will take full advantage of the dividends hicles will eventually be used and that, despite associated with air-breathing flight and in this way the tenacious problems involved, considerable great advances will be made in understanding the progress will be made in anti-iCBM technology. complexities of hypersonic inlet technology with The aerodynamic and performance techniques for particular emphasis on boundary layer and real evaluating such a vehicle obviously must be up- gas phenomena. graded. Finallv, we might suggest, with a reasonable degree of confidence, the development of a high- Bonney, in 1957, demonstrated an uncanny abil- volume air-breathing cruise vehicle at a mach ity to predict the course of aerodynamics. It will number perhaps as high as 10. It is also not im- be interesting to note in 1971 whether this author plausible to suggest that such a vehicle might will have demonstrated equal perception in fore- eventually perform a dual role not onlv as a hyper- casting the shape of aerodynamic technology. In sonic cruise vehicle but also as an orbital launch the language of a profession considerably sênior platform or recoverable booster. In addressing to aerodynamics, “Thats a tough act to follow!” Air Force Flight Dynamics Lahoratory Books and Ideas

AN ARMY HISTORIAN’S “RECONSIDERATION”

D r . R obert F. F utrell

F VOU will only let experiente be your teacher,” Greenfield has sought to draw upon liis experiente I General Orvil A. Anderson once observed, as the dean of Army historians and provide a svn- “you can have anv damn lesson you want.’1 The thesis and interpretation of American strategv in experiente of World War II was so broad that it World War II. Dr. Greenfield has good qualifica* can be mustered to support almost any conclusion tions for this task. Called to militarv Service from that appears appropriate. By way of example, academic life as Chairman of the Department statements of operational experiente made by such of History at Johns Hopkins University, Colonel high-ranking commanders as Generais Ornar Brad- Greenfield served as wartime Chief, Historical ley and George Patton were gravely cited in 1946 Section, Army Ground Forces. After the war he as proof that the Army had a continuing reqnire- served in civilian status as Chief Historian, Office ment for horse cavalry.- The very volume of the of Chief of Militarv History. Department of the writings on World War II makes it difficult to Army, until his rerirement in 1958. In his present determine exaet lessons of consequence to the volume of lectures, Greenfield acknowledges heavy future. The task of synthesizing and refining this reliance upon the work of his former colleagues. vast body of historical source material has not yet whom he directed in the preparation of the many- been adequately aecomplished. volume (99 were originally planned but not all In a series of lectures delivered at Memphis have been published) history of the U.S. Army in State University in October 1962 and now pub- World War II. lished in a small volume,0 Dr. Kent Roberts On a lecture platform, many historians have

°Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in \\ orld War ll, A Rcconsideration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, $4.50), viii and 145 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

been known to shade cold historical fact for the lished Services.” (p. 85) This admission appears sake of stimulating the thought of their listeners. appropriate, for in earlier writings and lectures There is undoubtedly some tendency to “provoke Greenfield at times left his objectivity concerning the audience” in Greenfields four Memphis State air power somewhat in doubt. In lectures delivered lectures, but for the most part he is content to re- in 1953 and published under the title The Historian port history as he believes that it was. His first lec- and the Army, for example, Greenfield stated that tnre eoncerns the major strategic decisions of World the Army and Air Force had been effective part- War II and the relationship of Anglo-American po- ners at leveis of coequality, but he charged that litical objectives and military strategv. His conclu- at working leveis this had not been true: sion here is not ver>' startling: “Military considera- tions consistently prevailed. (p. 23) In his seeond The air and ground forces of the Army of the United States did not develop an effective lecture. Greenfield determines that differences in air-ground battle team in World War II. The American and British ideas of military strategv Marines did, in cooperation with naval aviation were less sharp than many have believed and that and their own. The Army Air Forces were too the differences were always successfully resolved. much preoccupíed with other interests and More “revisionist” than the other lectures, Green- goals: with strategic bombing; with freedom fields third lecture argues that on at least 22 from entangling alliances, in order to protect occasions President Franklin D. Roosevelt made the precious flexibilitv of their forces and per- major strategic decisions against the adviee of or mit shifting them quiekly; with independence over the protests of his military advisers. Except of any control but their own, except at theater for the case of China, where Roosevelts policies levei. Close-in support of the ground forces was orie of their missions, but the one given are said to have ended in “dismal failure,” Green- lowest priority. It was impossible to interest field asserts that Roosevelts strategic decisions them seriously in developing the equipment, made “military sense” and in fact gave “shape” to techniques or skills needed for genuine team- the Aaglo-American strategv that defeated the work in ground combat.3 .A\is in Europe and Japan in the Far East. Green- field passes over Roosevelt s decision for “uncon- Greenfield based this sweeping indictment upon ditional surrender” verv lightly: his thought is that a historical monograph, Army Ground Forces and this policy was a natural outgrowth of the type of the Air-Ground Battle Team, which he had written total defeat that the Allies had already pledged earlier after research in the record files of Head- themselves to inflict on the enemy. and he says that quarters Army Ground Forces, an agency that, it was “never vigorously opposed or even seriously by most reports, was almost entirely lacking in debated” during the war. This, of course, is a sympathy for independent air power ideas and vast oversimplification of a rather eomplex subject. objectives. Greenfield’s portrayal of Roosevelt as a great mili- In the lecture at hand on “Air Power and tary leader parallels the recent revisionist writings Strategy” Greenfield has happily lifted his sights that have attempted to show that President Lincoln and broadened the scope of his investigai ion. In rather than his military commanders was the chief regard to overall air power, Greenfield now con- architect of the Federal military victory in the cludes: “It cannot reasonably be maintained that American Civil War. air power was the decisive. in the sense of being In his fourth lecture, entitled “Air Power and the major factor, in the defeat of Germany and Strategv," Greenfield prefaces himself with the Japan. But that by its application in a nevv coin- observation: “It has been difficult, especially in bination with land and sea power, and in over- the United States, to be objective about the role of whelming force, it became a primary factor in the air power in World War II. . . . Objectivity was defeat of both is incontestable.” (p. 86) Even difficult for the young and ambitious leaders nf though he is willing to admit that Allied air power the American air forces. It was equallv difficult became a "primary factor” in the Axis defeat, even for historical observers like myself, who were Greenfield apparently still wonders whether the identified during the war with one of the estab- Allied emphasis (especially the American empha- 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sis) on air povver was vvise. He records that in ments in air-ground cooperation grew up “in the initial War Department planning in the summer of field.” Equally effective cooperation matured in 1940, the U.S. Victory Program called for a ground the Pacific, where Generais Douglas MacArthur army of 215 divisions and an air force of 84 groups. and George Kenney “combined to produce a most By the winter of 1942—43, hovvever, the U.S. Army cordial and effective air-ground partnership.” (pp. had changed its force plans to include 89 divisions 107-111) Although Greenfield notes that the and 273 air force groups. As Creenfield sees it, the Services learned to work together in combat, he American Army was reshaped to include “a long- observes that the “new practices would have reaching, heavy, and powerful air fist, and a com- worked sooner and better if the troops had been paratively small though compact ground fist.” trained beforehand.” (p. 110) He does not explain how troops could have been trained in tactics and This in tum [Greenfield continues] reacted on techniques that were learned “in the field” before the ultimate strategy of the coalition. In the they went into the field. spring of 1945, though in victorious pursuit of the Germans, the Americans could not deploy Just as he believes that tactical air command- enough ground combat strength in Europe to ers learned from their association with the ground adopt without grave risk Mr. ChurchilTs pro- commanders, Greenfield also observes that, ironi- posals for resolute opposition to the oncoming cally, “much of the most effective work in the stra- Russians, even had Mr. Roosevelt been con- tegic bombing of Germany was done while the vinced of the vvisdom of taking an open stand air forces were co-operating with the ground against them. In Asia, if we had had more divi- forces.” (p. 118) He asserts that the strategic air sions to deploy in 1944—45, we might not have commanders “reluetantly accepted” the need to felt it necessary to invoke the active support of bomb Germany’s transportation systems only be- Russian arrns to pin down the Japanese army in cause of General EisenhoweFs orders; in the end, Manchuria. For the same reason we lacked the however, these transportation attacks unhinged means, during those years, to contain or effec- tively oppose Mao Tse-tung’s Communists in Germany’s economy. At the same time, Greenfield China. (pp. 6-7) points out that the ground advance in France wrecked the enemy’s air-waming net and facili- Greenfield is apparently arguing that American tated the deadly effectiveness of the final bomber force goals failed to provide a “flexible response” assaults. The strategic bombing of Japan became to the full spectrum of the strategic problems of effective only after sea-air-ground offensives World War II. His readers should, of course, know brought the B-29’s within range of the Japanese that many of these “strategic problems” were not home islands and naval blockade had strangled completely recognized in the war period. Japans shipping and war economy. In World War Professor Greenfields discussion of air-ground II the Allied air forces were thus clearly unable to cooperation in “Air Power and Strategy” is much attain “the dream and ultimate goal of air war” more sympathetic than were his remarks in 1953. which Greenfield conceives to be “to produce sur- After telling the rather dismal storv of the failure render by air power with only incidental help from of U.S. air-ground systems in North África early other forces.” Stated once again, Greenfield con- in 1943, Greenfield now notes that cooperation im- cludes: “The defeat, then, both of Germany and proved markedly in Italv and underwent such a Japan, was inflicted by a combined team of Allied “transfiguration" in Europe that General Eisen- ground-sea-and-air forces.” (p. 120) howers Chief of Staff. Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell In final analysis, an Air Force reader may well Smith, could state in March 1945 that “the tactical wonder what the historical “reconsideration may coordination of air and ground forces has become have been in this essay on “Air Power and Strat- an instrument of precision timing.” Greenfield be- egy.” Most of the substantive ideas presented lieves, however, that this improvement was not the here have been previously presented in the official result of “organizational changes and high-level Air Force history, The Army Air Forces in World definitions of doetrine.” Through the good work of War II.4 Certainly Dr. Greenfield appears to have such Air Force leaders as Generais Gordon P. “reconsidered” the rather harsh portrayal that he Saville and Elwood R. (“Pete”) Quesada, improve- made of the Air Force in his 1953 lectures, but he BOOKS AND IDEAS 95

still manifests little sympathy for air power as a Air War Plans Division completed AWPD-1, predominant weapon. Writing in 1948 of the cam- Munitíons Requirements of the Army Air Forces, paigns against Germany and Japan, General Carl on 12 August 1941. This first major U.S. air war A. Spaatz observed: “No useful purpose would be plan visualized a strategie air eampaign against served now by refightíng these wars as the aimian Germany that would disrupt her electric power might have wished to fight them.”5 This admoni- system, her transportation network, her oil and tion doubtless still holds good, but Dr. Greenfield Petroleum resources, and would undermine the has opened the door and it may be worthwhile morale of the German people. The air planners to take another look at the role of strategie air estimated that the economic and social life of Ger- power in World War II. many was already strained by the war against Rússia, that an Allied land offensive against Ger- many could not be mounted for at least three years, and that if the air offensive were successful a land B ec a use the last war saw the offensive might not be necessary. The air planners weapons of all Services employed in profusion.” stated a strong requirement for new B-29 Super- General Spaatz suggested in 1948, “one may argue fortress bombers and asked for the development of the exact degree of contribution made by strategie a 4000-mile-radius-of-action bomber (the future bombing to the final decision.” As Spaatz saw the B-36). The strategie target system in Germany matter, independent strategie air power never re- quite closely approximated the optimum system ceived an adequate test in World War II since “the that the U.S. Strategie Bombing Survey would war against Germany was fundamentally an in- describe after the wars end. Long before Professor fantry war supported by air power, much as the Greenfield would have us believe that the strategie war against Japan was fundamentally a naval war air commanders “reluctantly accepted” the need to supported by air.’’6 The fact that the Allied war bomb Germany’s transportation, Air Force planners effort would be direeted by a surfaee strategy. had identified the importanee of this target system. which in the end would make it impossible to say AWPD-1 also visualized an “ultimate force” of 239 whether a strategie air strategy might not have air groups and 108 observation squadrons, an esti- been successful, was definitely not the fault of mate remarkably similar to the 269 tactical groups American air leaders and probablv not of the that the .Air Force would possess as its maximum British war commanders. strength during the war.8 Meeting in Washington in the first Anglo- The U.S. Army-Navy Joint Board accepted American war plans eonferenee early in 1941, AWPD-1 as a statement of Air Force requirements, British and American staff planners completed on but it would not aecept the idea that a strategie air 27 March a document usuallv cited as “American- offensive against Germany might eliminate the British Conversations No. 1,” or “ABC-1,” which necessity for a land eampaign. The board warned: contained a summary of strategie policies to be “Naval and air power may prevent wars from implemented if the United States entered the being lost, and by weakening enemy strength may war. The conferees agreed to eoncentrate the main greatly contribute to victory. By themselves, how- war effort against Germany. This Allied offensive ever, naval and air forces seldom, if ever, win im- would include blockade, a “sustained air offensive” portant wars. It should be recognized as an almost against German military power. early defeat of invariable rule that only land armies can finally Italy, and the preparation of forces for an eventual win wars.”!* Again on 15 December 1941, AWPD-4, land offensive against Germany. The agreement Air Estimate of the Situation and Reeommenda- visualized that as rapidly as possible the Allies tions for the Conduct of the War, recoinmended would attain “superiority of air strength over that that first priorities in produetion should be given of the enemv, particularly in long-range striking to the Air Force and that sea and ground force forces.”7 priorities should be allocated “in the light of their In response to a request by President Roose- contribution to the Air Force mission.” This air velt to know overall produetion requirements nec- plan was also unacceptable. Meeting in Washing- essary to defeat the Axis, the Army Air Forces ton beginning on 22 December 1941, the Anglo- 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

American Arcadia conference was unwilling to Allied objective of “uneonditional surrender” de- accept overriding strategic air priorities but instead manded absolute ground conquest of the enemy adopted a Victory Program calling for increases of nations.11 “The air weapon system,” General Lau- air, ground, and naval forces in a sequence of rence S. Kuter later observed, “was assigned a sup- limited schedules geared to successively approved porting role to facilitate the implementation of this operations.10 conventional surface strategy.”1 - Reorganization of the War Department moved Even though the Allied combined bomber strategic planning up to the War Department Gen- offensive against Germany was designed to pre- eral Staff Operations Division, thus effectively end- pare the way for a surface invasion of the Conti- ing unilateral Air Force planning. The last major nent, the buildup of American strategic bombers Air Force plan, entitled AWPD-42, Requirements in Europe was relatively slow, and, in the end, the for Air Ascendancy, issued on 9 September 1942, major weight of the strategic bombing attack fol- followed approved strategy and defined the air lowed rather than preceded the invasion of West- mission in terms of cooperation with a surface cam- ern Europe. In January 1943 the Army Air Forces paign. The missions vvere: an air offensive against had only 12 heavy bombardment groups deployed Europe to deplete the German air force, to destroy in theaters against Germany, and it did not attain construction sources of German submarines, and its maximum strength of 62 heavy bombardment to undermine German warmaking capacity; air groups against Germany until May 1944, less than support for a land offensive in Northwest África; a month before the invasion of Normandy on 6 June air support of land operations to retain the Middle 1944. The total of first-line B-17’s and B-24’s de- East; air support of surface operations in the ployed against Germany increased from 413 in Pacific and Far East to regain base areas needed January 1943 to a maximum of 5072 in March for a final offensive against the Japanese homeland; 1945.13 The Royal Air Force Bomber Commands and defense of the Western Hemisphere, including strength increased from a miscellany of 515 light, antisubmarine operations. Indicative of the shift to médium, and heavy bombers in January 1943 to a the support for a surface strategy, AWPD-42 de- total of 1609 Halifax, Lancaster, and Mosquito fined the priority targets in Germany as airplane bombers in April 1945.14 Of the total of 2,770,540 assemblv plants, aireraft engine plants, submarine tons of bombs dropped by aaf and raf aireraft yards, transportation, power, oil, aluminum, and against Germany, only 17 per cent fell prior to 1 rubber production facilities. There was another im- January 1944 and only 28 per cent prior to 1 July portant change in the revised planning: AWPD-1 1944.13 had expected that six months of intensified bomb- In common with air power critics, Creenfield ing against Germany vvovild begin in mid-1943, but repeats the fíndings of the U.S. Strategic Bombing AWPD-42 recognized that this all-out air cam- Survey which stated that prior to the summer of paign could not be undertaken until late in 1944. 1943 the Allied bombing effort had had “no appre- At the Casablanca Conference on 21 January ciable effect” on Germany s munitions output or 1943, the Anglo-American heads of state directed national economy and that, until July 1944, the the execution of a combined bomber offensive total armaments production of Germany steadily against Germany designed to secure “the Progres- increased. “The two strategic forces, the British sive destruction and dislocation of the German by night and the Amerieans by day,” Greenfield military, industrial and economic System, and the wrote, “had for two years been pounding Germany undermining of the morale of the German people with increasing mass, continuity, and violence. . . . to a point vvhere their capacity for armed resistance Yet when the United States Strategic Bombing is fatally weakened.” This air offensive, however, Survey made its searching study in 1945, it was was to be preparatory to a surface invasion: the found that before the summer of 1944, this huge Casablanca directive, for example, required the effort had produced far less effect than had been strategic bombers to give first priority to attacks supposed.” (pp. 112-113) As the bomb tonnage against German submarine bases and construction totais noted above indicate, the Allied bombing yards. Accepted as a result of President Roosevelts effort prior to July 1944 was hardlv huge. Green- insistence and without any military debate, the field, moreover, is only partly correct when he BOOKS AND IDEAS 97

concludes that the bombing effort had failed to mark. A close reading of Air Force correspondence reckon with the fact that German industry was of this time period reveals a confidence that .stra- incompletelv mobilized in 1942-43 and had a tegic bombers, employed in force, could still per- large cushion that could be employed to expand form their missions over Germany but that an early produetion in 1943-44. (p. 114) attainment of Allied control of the air was neces- As a matter of fact, most of the lack of positive sary if the overlord invasion in Normandy and the results attained bv the Allied strategic bomber of- an vil invasion in Southern France were to succeed fensive in its first year and a half lay in the relativelv in mid-1944.20 small number of bombers available and their com- “It is a conceded fact,” General Arnold told mitment to objectives selected in terms of the the Commanders of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air planned surface canipaign. From Januarv to June Forces on 27 December 1943, “that overlord and 1943, the strategic bombers were required to de- ANviL will not be possible unless the German Air vote their principal effort to attaeks against sub- Force is destroyed. Therefore, my personal mes- marine bases and pens, both of which were targets sage to you—this is a MUST—is to, 'Destroy the that were relatively invulnerable to bombs.16 In Enemy Air Force wherever you find them, in the June 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed air, on the ground and in the factories' ”21 Effective that first priority be given to attaeks against Ger- on 1 Januarv 1944, General Spaatz was given com- man fighter forces and the industry upon which mand of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe they depended. Lacking enough bombers to handle ( u sst a f ), a headquarters that combined control the German aircraft target svstem, the U.S. Eighth of the British-based Eighth Air Force and the Air Force chose to try to destroy a “long-chanee Italian-based Fifteenth Air Force. Between Octo- objective.” Back in Washington, General Henry ber 1943 and February 1944, the number of heavy H. Amold s Committee of Operations Analvsts had bombardment groups operating against Germany recommended that antifriction bali bearings were increased from 26 to 48. Equipped with externai a potential bottleneck in German war industry. fuel tanks, P-47 and P-51 fighters began to fly long- This committee—composed mostly of civilian range escort for the heavy bombers. At the end of industrialists and economists—believed that the December 1943, Field Marshal Hermann Goring destruetion of a few ball-bearing plants would tie (ignoring the basic fact of air fighting that when up German aircraft produetion.17 Although about aircraft of roughly equal performance meet, the 12,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germanv’s one who seeks to avoid combat commits suicide) ball-bearing plants after 17 August 1943. the U.S. issued orders to Luftwaffe fighters to avoid Allied Strategic Bombing Survey later reported “there is fighters and concentrate their attack on the bomb- no evidence that the attaeks on the ball-bearing ers. To take advantage of Gõring’s mistake, Allied industry had any measurable effect on essential fighters were allowed to take the offensive—to pur- war produetion.”13 sue and destroy enemy fighters—rather than to While seeking to destroy ball-bearing facto- provide position defense to friendly bombers. The ries, Eighth Air Force heavy bombers sustained Allied counter-air campaign took advantage of all large losses on long-range penetration missions to these developments. Begun on 20 February 1944 Schweinfurt and Regensburg on 17 August and on in the “Big Week,” the Allied air superiority cam- a retum mission to Schweinfurt on 14 October paign had virtually eliminated the effectiveness of 1943. The usual interpretation is that these heavy- the Luftwaffe by the time of the Normandy inva- bomber losses forced a reassessment of the U.S. sion. One of the major factors in the defeat of the strategic bombing effort. Creenfield States that the Luftwaffe was a centralization of control of Allied losses were “intolerable.” (p. 93) “The fact was,” air units. Although the U.S. Ninth Air Force had concluded The Army Air Forces in World War II, been designated as the support force for American that the Eighth Air Force had for the time being ground armies in Europe and it was busily engaged lost air superiority over Germany. And it was ob- in high-priority fighter-bomber training, General vious that superiority could not be regained until Spaatz was able to use Ninth Air Force fighters in sufficient long-range escort became available.”11' the air superiority campaign. “There was no diffi- Actually both of these interpretations miss the culty,” Spaatz said, “in using Ninth Air Force 98 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

fighters when we needed them. If we had a mis- policy. . . . Hence from the standpoint of air re- sion, we could always get them.”22 quirements, the Far Eastem operations may be In the months that followed the “Big VVeek,” divided into two phases: (1) Air operations in u sst a f strategic bombing capabilities were em- support of our land and sea forces to regain bases ployed in attacks against German V-weapon sites within striking distance of Japan___(2) Air opera- and in missions in support of Allied ground troops tions against Japan proper to destroy her war going ashore in Franee. Even though General making capacity.” Spaatz was permitted to begin attacks against Ger- At the Quadrant Gonference in Quebec during many’s oil resources on 12 May 1944, it is fair to August 1943, the Anglo-American Combined State that a massive sustained air eampaign against Chiefs of Staff approved advances toward Japan strategic air targets in Germany did not begin until both through the Central Pacific and along the New after D-Dav, when Allied ground troops were safely Guinea-Philippines axis. Air Force planners fa- ashore in Normandy. By December 1944, German vored the Central Pacific route as being likely to reserves of fuel were insufficient to sustain effec- give B-29 bases at the earliest date. In the autumn tive military operations. Undertaken intensively in of 1943 following Quadrant, U.S. joint staff plan- September 1944, the strategic air eampaign against ners sought to prepare an overall plan for the de- Germanys transportation was later described as feat of Japan. The initial draft of this paper stated “the decisive blow that completely disorganized that it had been clearly demonstrated in Europe the German economy.” Contrary to the intention that air forces were incapable of decisive action of early aaf planners, the German electric power and that surface invasion of the Japanese home system was never a principal target. “Had electric islands would be necessary to conclude the war. generating plants and substations been made pri- The best that the Air Force representative could mary targets . . . , ” the U.S. Strategic Bombing do in the way of getting this statement changed Survey stated, “the evidente indicates that their was to secure a new statement to the effect that a destruetion would have had serious effects on Ger- preliminarv air offensive against Japan would be manvs war produetion.” Under the full force of essential to the ultimate invasion of the home strategic bomber attack and with war requirements islands. At the Sextant Gonference in Cairo during multiplving more swiftly than produetion could December 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff handle, the economic life of Germany virtually authorized the beginning of B-29 attacks against collapsed by December 1944. “The German expe- Japan from bases far in the interior of China by riente." stated the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, May 1944 and from bases in the Mariana Islands “suggests that even a first-class military power— before the end of the year.24 rugged and resilient as Germany was—cannot live Because the B-29 wings would mount the long under full-scale and free exploitation of air strategic air offensive against Japan from bases weapons over the heart of its territory.”21 located in several different theaters of operations, General Arnold secured agreement permitting the Twentieth Air Force to be established in Wash- Ix the Pacific the pattem of Allied ington directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operations and commitment of forces was different control the XX Bomber Command in China and the from that employed in Europe, but the strategy XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas. As set relative to the employment of air power was essen- forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. the mission of tially the same. Because of Japanese expansion in the Twentieth Air Force was: “To achieve the Pro- the first two years of the war, Air Force planners gressive destruetion and dislocation of the Japa- recognized that even the very-long-range B-29s nese military. industrial and economic svstems and would be unable to reach the Japanese homeland the undermining of the morale of the Japanese until the enemv’s perimeter had been reduced. people to a point where their capacity for armed “Our armed forces in the Far Eastem Theater,” resistance is decisivelv weakened.”25 General Ar- stated AVVPD-42, “are not within effective striking nold s Committee of Operations Analysts recom- distance of the vital sources of Japanese military mended that B-29 attacks be directed against BOOKS AND IDEAS 99

Japans merchant shipping, Steel production, urban Discounting the possibility that Japan would sur- industrial areas, aircraft plants, andfriction bearing render without invasion, the Joint Target Group in factories, and electronics industries. Japan’s Steel Washington recommended that emphatic priority industry appeared to have a “long-chance target: be given to the destruction of Japan’s air power it depended upon coke produced in onlv a few and that the urban attacks and antishipping opera- ovens at sites in Manchuria and Kyushu. The tions be delayed.29 operations analvsts also pointed out that Japan s After postponements caused by bad weather urban areas housed manv small factories and were and limited facilities, Major General Haywood S. very vulnerable to incendiary attack.20 Hansell, Jr., sent the XXI Bomber Command on VVith the exception that the Japanese armv high-level attacks against Japan’s aircraft-produc- and navy air forces had alreadv suffered grave tion factories beginning on 24 November 1944. losses of experienced personnel, the early opera- Japanese fighters and antiaircraft artillery were not tions of the Twentieth Air Force s XX Bomber very effective against the high-flying B-29’s, but, Command from bases in China were not unlike in the months that followed, the precision-bombing early Eighth Air Force operations from Great effort did not appear to be very successful. Bad Britain. The XX Bomber Command represented a weather scattered formations, obseured targets, piecemeal commitment of too little capabilitv; it and reduced bombing accuracy. The long flights was also based in a remote area. far from all indus- to Japan and the need to lift heavy bomb loads to trial targets, and where logistical support was diffi- 25,000-foot bombing altitudes strained engines and cult to obtain. The China-based B-29’s attempted caused substantial losses of aircraft at sea. Impa- to destroy the “long-chance” coke-oven targets, but tient with the XXI Bomber Command, General they had very little success in the effort.27 As time Amold moved Major General Curtis E. LeMav to passed, it was more and more obvious that the bur- its command on 20 January 1945, but neither the den of the strategic air campaign against Japan new commander nor the commitment of a seeond would have to be flown by the Twentieth Air B-29 wing to the Marianas appeared to give much Force’s XXI Bomber Command, whieh was pre- better results. Actually, Japanese aircraft produc- pared to go into operation as soon as bases were tion had dropped substantially because of the B-29 built in the Marianas. Construetion of these new attacks and a high degree of confusion produced airfields began only a few days after Admirai when the Japanese attempted to disperse the air- Chester Nimitz’ forces invaded Saipan on 15 June craft plants.30 1944, but the airfield work did not get overriding As late as 6 March 1945, General LeMay priority, since Nimitz also required new fleet bases considered that the XXI Bomber Command had to support surface invasions of Iwo Jima and Oki- not “reallv aceomplished a hell of a lot in bombing nawa and the planned invasion of Japan.28 results.” With the arrival of a third B-29 wing in During the summer of 1944, Twentieth Air the Marianas, however, General Arnold issued a Force target planners beeame skeptical of the high new target directive on 19 February whieh con- priority given to Japans Steel industry as a target tinued aircraft factories in first priority but moved System, and General Amold asked the Committee incendiar)' attacks against urban industrial con- of Operations Analvsts to submit a fresh target centrations into a strong seeond priority. Although study based on altemative assumptions that Japan the fire raids were desired and ordered by Wash- might be defeated solely by air attack and sea ington, General LeMay kept his own counsel on the blockade or by these plus a surface invasion. Under tactics to be employed on the great Tokyo fire raid the first altemative, the operations analvsts recom- when it was mounted on the night of 9/10 March mended a general air campaign against shipping, 1944. LeMay ealled for a stream of bombers from attacks against aircraft industries, and saturation the three wings to come in low (4900 to 9200 feet) bombing of six urban industrial areas. Under the and drop their incendiaries on fires started by path- seeond altemative, they recommended priority at- finder crews. Fearing that gunners unused to night tacks against the aircraft industry, with secondary attack might shoot at each other’s planes, LeMay effort against urban industrial targets and shipping. ordered both guns and gunners removed from the 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

B-29’s. The weight saved by the removal of arma- tion that Japans ground defenses would still be ment and the low altitude of attack permitted the able to inflict enough casualties on Allied surface B-29's to carry exceptionally heavy loads of incen- invaders to win a negotiated peace.33 diaries. Over the target in a steady stream in the The revolutionary employment of nuclear air early morning hours of 10 March, the B-29’s sus- weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the tained moderate losses as they kindled fires whieh Soviet Unions declaration of war on 8 August destroyed about one fourth of metropolitan Tokyo. tended to obscure the contribution of the sustained General LeNlay had staked his career on his deci- air offensive to the victory when Japan s condi- sion to operate the bombers at low levei. “This tional offer to surrender was accepted on 12 August decision, combining technical acumen vvith bold- 1945. “Without attempting to minimize the appall- ness of execution,” General Hansell later said, “was ing and far-reaching results of the atomic bomb,” one of the elassic air decisions of the war.”31 Green- General Arnold wrote, “we have good reason to field observes: “General LeMav could be satisfied believe that its actual use provided a way out for that he had shovvn vvhat independent air war can the Japanese government. The fact is that the do.’’ He suggested, however, that LeMay’s “ambi- Japanese could not have held out long, because tion to do so” had led him to take a “grave risk.” they lost control of their air. They could not offer (pp. 120, 137) effective opposition to our bombardment, and so In March 1945 the Japanese government be- could not prevent the destruction of their cities and gan to take serious steps to end the war. Top-level industries.”34 Based upon detailed investigations officials in Washington knew of Japans desire to within Japan, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survev end hostilities, but in September 1944 the Com- reported that “certainly prior to 31 December bined Chiefs of Staff had committed the Anglo- 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November Americans to the seizure of “objectives in the in- 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the dustrial heart of Japan.” At Yalta in February 1945, atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if this surface strategy was reaffirmed, and the Soviet Rússia had not entered the war, and even if no Union obtained territorial concessions in return for invasion had been planned or contemplated.”33 protnises to join the war against Japan. In April, American soldiers and marines began bloodv battles to take Okinawa, and in support of this in- If history is to be considered as nothing more vasion General LeMay was required between 17 than the cold recording of accumulated experience, April and 11 May to divert 75 per cent of the XXI Professor Greenfield is entirely correct in his con- Bomber Commands capability to attaçks against clusion that in World War II Allied air operations eriemy airfields on Kyushu and Shikoku. In the did not attain the “dream and ultimate goal’ of waning weeks of May and the early days of June producing surrender with only incidental help from 1945, however, the XXI Bomber Command con- other forces. He is equally correct when he says: tinued to burn Japan s principal industrial areas. “The defeat, then, both of Germany and Japan, When Arnold visited Guam early in June, LeMay was inflicted by a combined team of Allied ground- told him that 30 to 60 of Japans cities and every sea-and-air forces.” But the greater strategic lesson industrial target would be destroyed by 1 October. of World War II may well be that the Anglo- Never successful against night-flying B-29’s, Japa- American heads of State and war commanders nese fighters made their last effective opposition never fully grasped the revolutionary potentialities against a davtime B-29 attack on 5 June, and, of a strategic air offensive. Had the war leaders thereafter, the Japanese air forces elected to save been willing to trust air power’s capabilities as an their remaining planes for kamikaze attacks against independent force, the strategic air offensives the expected Allied invasion forces.32 On 20 June, would have been properlv designed to prepare for Emperor Hirohito told his council that it would be such exploitative ground occupation as might have necessarv to have a plan to close the war at once, seemed proper. The selection of strategic target but Japans militarists argued against unconditional Systems for an independent air campaign, niore- surrender. These militarists clung to the expecta- over, would have been quite different from those

The Contributors

B ricadier Gen er a l Elliott Vaxdevanter, J r . ( USMA; M.A., George Washington University) retired from the United States Air Force for physical disability in 1960 and now serves as a consultant to the RAND Corporation. He specializes in writing studies about NATO and Europe, where he has ser^ed as Chief, Plans Division, SHAPE. During World War II he was a B-17 pilot in the Philippines-Java campaign (1941-42) and commanded the 385th Bomb Wing in Europe (1 9 4 3 -4 4 ). Other assignments have neen as a planner in Headquarters USAF (1945-47), SAC (1948-50), and SHAPE (1955-59). From 1951 to 1954 he commanded the 305th Bomb Wing during the period of its conversion to B-47’s. General Vandevanter is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College.

B ricadier Gen er a l Robert W. B ir n s (B.S., Mississippi State Teachers College) is Commander, 73d Air Division, Tyndall AFB, Florida. After receiving his wings in 1939, he served in the Canal Zone and Guatemala and at Geiger Field, Washing- ton, until May 1943, svhen he went to England as Deputv Commander, 351st Bombardment Group, Eighth Air Force. He flew 24 combat missions and became group commander hefore returning to the States in May 1945. Postwar assignments have been as Commander, 63d Air Base Unit, Hq Second Air Force, Colorado Springs, to 1946; Sênior Instructor, 118th Fighter Group (Air National Guard), Nashville, Tennessee, to 1949; as DCS/Personnel and DCS/Development, Head- quarters USAF, to 1952; Deputv Chief, later Chief, JUSMAG, Greece, to 1954; Deputy for Operations. 25th Air Division (Defense), McChord AFB, Washington, to 1957; and Director of Operations, later Assistant DCS/Operations, Hq Air Defense Command, from 1958 until his current assignment in July 1962. General Btims is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College.

C olonel Robert N. G lnsburch (USMA; Ph.D., Harvard University) is currently an Air Force Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Rela- tions, Inc., New York. During World War II he was a battery officer in Field Artillery units, 1944-45, and staff officer, USASCOM-C and GHQ Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, 1945-46. He was an instructor and assistant professor in social Sciences, U.S. Military Acad- emy, 1948-51. Other assignments have been in the Office of Legislative Liaison, OSAF, 1951-55; Plans Officer, AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 1955-58; Programs Officer, Air Proving Ground Center, Eglin AFB, Florida, 1958; Deputy Director, Office of Public Services, OASD (Public Affairs), 1959; and Assistant Executive to the Chief of Staff, USAF, 1959-62. Colonel Ginsburgh has attended the Field Artillery Basic Officers Course, Air Tactical School, Air Command and Staff College, and National War College and by correspondence has gradu- ated from the Air War College and the Armed Forces industrial College. He has contributed to various military and other publications. M ajoh Hen r y L. W alker (M .S., North Texas State University) was Developments Officer, Applied Tactics Group, Hq Military Air Transport Service, when this article was written. He enlisted in the Air Force in 1946, a year later entered flying training, and was commissioned in 1948. After a year of flying with MATS, he participated in the Berlin Airlift with the Troop Carrier Com- mand. During the Korean War he served 18 months with the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron and the 315th Air Division. After another tour of flying regular MATS missions, he became a Transport Control Officer in the Philippines in 1955. In 1962 he was assigned to the Requirements and Developments Division, Hq MATS, and on 1 January 1963 he moved to the newly formed Applied Tactics Group. In December 1963 he was as- signed to the Air Force Institute of Technology to study for a Ph.D. in mathematics at the University of Texas.

C aptais- T homas C. P in c k n ey (M.A., Syracuse University) is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, USAF Academy. .After graduation from the Citadel and completion of flying training in 1952, he ser\-ed as an all-weather pilot with the 4th and 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons on Okinawa, 1953-54, and with the 4l3th and 82d Fighter Interceptor Squadrons at Travis AFB, Califórnia, 1955-57. During his four years at the Air Academy he has taught Political Science, De- fense Policy, American National Government, Contemporary Foreign Governments, International Relations, Public Adminis- tration, Formulation of Military Strategy, and use of the Stra- tegic Planning Carne. He is responsible for publication of the 4-volume USAFA Readings in Defensc Policy.

Mn. Ken set h Sams (B.A., University of Califórnia at Los Angeles) was Command Historian, Third Air Force, England, until his recent assignment as Air Force historian in Viet Vam. During World War II he participated in the invasions of Kwajalein, Saipan, Tintan. and Iwo Jima as a member of the 4th Marine Division and the V Amphibious Corps. He has worked for the Air Force as a civilian since 1951 and has served with SAC, AMC, and USAFE in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Mr. Sams has written a number of studies and ar- ticles on USAF activities in Europe and in 1956 re- ceived the Vleritorious Cívilinn Service Award for his studies on USAF-British relations. He has also written over 50 half-hour documentary radio pro- grams for the British Broadcasting Corporation’s Overse.is Service, primanly on the subject of twen- tieth-century Science.

C aptais Hi . sry D. S teele (B.A., Hobart College) is Flight Training Officer, Officer Train- ing School. Lackland AFB, Texas. Other assignments have been at Malden Air Base, Missouri, 1938; at James Connally AFB. Texas, 1959; as Information Officer, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, Califórnia, 1960, and as instructor in Effective Communication, Officer Training School, Lackland AFB, Texas, 1961-64, in which assignment he was chair- man of the Junior Officers Council. Captain Steele is a gmduate of the U.S. Army Information School, the Air Force Instructor Training School, and the Squadron Officer School. i

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Francis E. T orr is Director of Civil Engineering, 2d Air Division ( PACAF), stationed at Saigon, South Viet Nam. Commissioned in 1942 upon completion of \j0 2tM)tv pilot training, he flew B-24's in the European Theater and P/CtviL spent 13 months in a German prisoner-of-war camp after being [NÓIHÍHINÜ shot down by flak. Colonel Torr’s postwar assignments have been in civil engineering at base, major eommand, and Hq USAF leveis.

■

A lfred C. D raper ( B.S., Indiana University) is Assistant for Research and Tech- nology in the Flight Mechanics Division, Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Before beginning his work as an aerodynamicist at Wright-Patterson in 1952, he was employed at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, Silver Spring, Maryland, in connection svith programs in supersonic aerodynamics. Mr. Draper is cochairman of the aerodynamics panei of the Joint NASA-USAF Com- mittee on Hypersonic Airbreathing Vehicles and has written numerous papers on aerodynamics, configuration design, and flight mechanics.

D r . R obert F. F utrell ( Ph.D., Vanderbilt University) is Professor of Military History, USAF Historical Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University. See Air University Review, XV, 2 (January-February 1964) for more complete biographical data. EDITORIAL STAFF

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Ken n et h F. G antz, USAF, Ph.D., Editor L ieu t en a n t Colonel Harmon H. Harper, USAF, Executivo Officer J ack H. Mooney, M.A., Managing Editor, English Edition J ohn A. W est c ot t , J r ., Art Director and Production Mauager Ancel dL. Medina , D r. Fil., Associate Editor, Foreign Language Editions E dmund O. B arker, Associate Editor, Plans ò Projects W il l ia m J. De Paola, lllustrator

Editorial Project Officers: L ieu t en a n t Colonel Geor ge J. Sudermann, USAF. M.A.; M ajor Robert G. Spa r k ma n , USAF. M.A.

A D V 1 S E R S

Colonel Wil l ia m J. M c G in t y, Hq Air Force Systems Command; C olonel Geor ge Schenkein, Hq Tactical Air Command; Colonel Raymoxd L. T owne, Hq Militarv Air Transport Service; L ieu t en a n t Colonel James F. S underman, Hq Pacific Air Forces; Lieu t en a n t Colonel Jack Rose, Hq United States Strike Command; L a V er ne E. W oods, Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories; Harry A. H a berer , Hq Air Force Logistics Command.

ATTENTION

Air Universily Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning the development and employment of aerospace forces. Its contents reflect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its editors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW -w --* AIR UNIVERSITY

J t I ev iew

Persepolis UNITED STATES STRIKE COMMAND - STATESIDE AND GLOBAL...EXERCISE DELAWAR, USSTRICOM AND MATS

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1964