This Truck Saved My Life! LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MRAP VEHICLE PROGRAM MRAP PROGRAM EVENTS AND MILESTONES 2006 February: Initial USMC I MEF UUNS issued for 1,169 MRAP Vehicles (not approved) May: Multi-National Force-West Commander requests 185 MRAP vehicles July: Multi-National Force-West Commander requests 1,000 MRAP vehicles November: USMC sole-source contract awarded for up to 280 MRAP vehicles MRAP Vehicle Program initiated with staff of less than ten government and contractor personnel ASN (RD&A) appointed as program MDA AMCB calls for 4,066 MRAP vehicles to support Service requirements USMC issues first MRAP Vehicle Program RFP December: FY 2006 funding $170 million 2007 January: USMC awards ID/IQ production contracts to nine companies (includes $36 million for 36 test vehicles) February: JROC approves joint requirement for 1,185 MRAP vehicles MROC validates USMC need for 3,700 vehicles ASN (RD&A) approves MRAP Vehicle Program Milestone C starting production First two production orders authorized for 395 vehicles ($246 million) MRAP Vehicle Program designated as an ACAT II (major) program First test vehicles arrive from FPI and Phase I developmental testing initiated April: Procurement of additional 1,000 MRAP vehicles authorized First MRAP vehicle fielding by MRAP Vehicle Program in Iraq May: JROC validates need for 7,774 vehicles SECDEDF designates MRAP Vehicle Program #1 DOD acquisition program DOD MRAP Task Force stands up Procurement of additional 1,214 MRAP authorized; total to date 2,853 vehicles JROC approves MRAP vehicle CPD defining MRAP vehicle requirements ASN (RD&A) establishes the Joint MRAP Vehicle Program June: DX Rating approved Procurement of 912 MRAP vehicles authorized; total to date 3,765 vehicles Initial threshold testing of MRAP vehicles completed July: Procurement of 1,925 MRAP vehicles authorized; total to date 5,690 vehicles August: Procurement of 725 of MRAP vehicles authorized; total to date 6,415 vehicles September: JROC validates requirement for 15,374 vehicles USD (AT&L) designates the JMVP as an ACAT ID acquisition program and appoints Commander, MCSC as the JPEO October: Procurement of 2,400 MRAP vehicles authorized, total to date 8,815 vehicles JPO MRAP Forward established in theater December: Procurement of 3,126 MRAP vehicles authorized; total to date 11,941 vehicles. MRAP II test vehicle procurement authorized FY 2007 MRAP funding $5.4 billion 2008 February: First MRAP vehicle fielded in Afghanistan March: Procurement of 2,270 MRAP vehicles authorized; total to date 14,211 vehicles JPO MRAP Test Team receives NDIA Test Team of the Year award Continued on inside back cover. This Truck Saved My Life! LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MRAP VEHICLE PROGRAM D | CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 1 THIS TRUCK SAVED MY LIFE! LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MRAP VEHICLE PROGRAM Dr. Norman Friedman PhD Principal Investigator/Historian Dr. Scott C. Truver PhD Senior Editor Captain Dennis R. Dean USN (Retired) Colonel Richard Owen USMC (Retired) Technical/Operational/Program Advisors Edward Feege Jean C. Tullier Research and Editorial Managers Glenn Gemmell Graphic Design and Production Andrew Walden Program Manager Prepared by DELTA Resources, Inc. Gryphon Technologies, LC For the Joint Program Office Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected Vehicles December 2013 THIS TRUCK SAVED MY LIFE | I Table of Contents Author’s Foreword v End Notes 1. This Truck Saved My Life! 1 7. MRAP Production 109 End Notes Five Vendors MRAP 1.5 2. Leading Up to the MRAP Solution 11 MRAP Improvement Program The “Poor-Man’s” Threat MRAP II Countering the Threat Further Production Defeating Under-Body Attack AMS Vehicles Countering the EFP End Notes How Much is Enough? End Notes 8. “Test a Lot!” 127 No Simple Solutions 3. Crisis! 31 Innovative MRAP Testing “Left of the Boom” Setting Up the Test Program Transformation? Real-World Feedback Rapid Agility Beyond the 80-Percent Program End Notes Defeating the Explosion The Proof is Lives Saved 4. Mine-Resistant Vehicles 41 End Notes South African Vehicles 9. SECDEF “Top Cover” 143 An Urgent Request Gates and the IED Threat Defeating IEDs Making it Personal Common Threat…Different Approaches MRAP Task Force End Notes DX Priority Getting Scarce Resources 5. The Marines’ Program 63 “Virtual” MRAP PM Jump-Starting MRAP Vehicle Production End Notes Building a JPO 10. Running the Program 159 Synchronized Approach Key People A Multi-Service Framework A Synchronized Approach End Notes Keeping Track 6. The MRAP Vehicle Competition 81 Management Issues Vendors and Vehicles Multi-Service…Joint… BAE-GSD : RG-33 Transfer Fund Flexibility GDLS-C: RG31 End Notes IMG/Navistar Defense: MaxxPro 11. Outfitting for Netted Ops 173 FPI: Cougar and Buffalo Vital Technology Armor Holdings (BAE-TVS): Caiman Air Force Challenges The Others Critical SPAWAR Support ii | TABLE OF CONTENTS Ramping Up Deliveries Spiral Development OEM Outfitting Procurement Courage Configuration Control Aegis Provenance End Notes World War II Parallels The Key to Success 12. From the Factory to the Field 195 End Notes SPAWAR Charleston Was Crucial Airlift 17. How Did the Program Succeed? 267 Strategic Sealift, Too Acquire, then Require In-Theater Processing Supply Agility End Notes A “Victory Program” in All-But Name Lean, Courage Outsiders 13. Sustaining in Theater 203 Explicit Priorities Initial Logistics Support Plan Lessons Learned A Hybrid System End Notes Burgeoning Variants Supply Support 18. Transition 279 In-Theater Sustainment Four COAs Sustainment in Afghanistan USD AT&L Direction “MRAP U” End Notes Dealing with Rollovers 19. JVMP Legacy 291 Readiness-Based Operations End Notes End Notes Appendix A. MRAP Vehicle Characteristics 297 14. MRAP International Programs 221 JPO International Appendix B. Interviews Conducted 332 MRAP FMS Cases Other International Mechanisms Appendix C. LRIP Contract Awards 324 Excess Defense Articles Appendix D. Bibliography 329 Continuing International Interest End Notes Appendix E. Glossary 340 15. MRAP Vehicles and M-ATVs for Afghanistan 231 Appendix F. Project Team 344 Third-Gen MRAP Vehicle MRAP List of Figures Contenders Figure 1. IED Threat Vectors 4 M-ATV Contract Award Figure 2. Operational Demand Signals 7 Three Factors Figure 3. USMC MRAP Vehicle Program M-ATV Production Office – 2006 73 End Notes Figure 4. SECDEF 2007 DX Memorandum 95 16. Procurement Success! 245 Figure 5. Joint MRAP Vehicle Program Office – 2009 168 The DOD Procurement System Figure 6. Compared to the “Legend” 261 Taking a New Course Figure 7. MRAP Joint Program Office – 2013 287 THIS TRUCK SAVED MY LIFE | iii Author’s Foreword he subject of this book, the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected Vehicle Program, was unique in many ways. “MRAP” meant a vehicle that could survive in the face of the mines, roadside Timprovised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes the enemy mounted throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. The program moved with lightning speed—one member of the team described it as “MRAP Speed”—not seen in large defense programs since World War II. It produced a flood of vehicles on such a scale that it was the largest single defense acquisition program in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010—an amazing fact given that the program did not even exist in FY 2006. Now that the MRAP program has produced its final vehicle and the Joint Program Office (JPO) that directed the program stood down on 30 September 2013, and JPO responsibility for MRAP vehicles officially ended on 19 December 2013, several questions are worth answering: 1. Did the MRAP program matter? 2. How did it move so fast, when most Defense programs move much more slowly? 3. Does the MRAP program carry lessons that can make the overall defense program more agile? What is the price of agility, and is it more important now during a period of increasing fiscal constraints? This book is written to answer these questions by providing a history of the program. To deal with the fundamental questions, that history has to be told in thematic terms. So much happened in parallel that a chronology would be misleading. It would fail to convey the special character and achievements of the MRAP program. The answer to the first question is simple. The MRAP program mattered enormously. It dealt with the enemy’s most effective weapons: mines and roadside bombs IEDs. The MRAP vehicle was far from the only counter the United States deployed, but it was particularly significant because it was the one that convinced the troops on the ground that they were protected, hence that they could go about their main job of dealing with the enemy. The answer to this question demonstrates the significance of the second question. Had the MRAP vehicles been absolutely wonderful, but had they not been produced in sufficient numbers fast enough, they would not have mattered. The engineering was excellent, but those running the program and delivering the “goods” got them to the troops soon enough to matter. iv | AUTHOR’S FOREWORD Much of this book is about how the MRAP program ran. It helped enormously that Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates recognized the program’s importance and made it the number-one Defense Department program, with the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) highest-priority DX rating. Without his initiatives, the flood of vehicles could never have been produced, because it took a Secretary of Defense to deal with many of the resource issues and “rice bowls” involved. In that sense the MRAP program may be the clearest example of what a strong Secretary of Defense can achieve. However, the Marine Corps project management team had already set much of the shape of the program, and much of the internal culture that made it successful, in the fall of 2006. Without the Marines’ program, Dr. Gate’s initiatives would never have happened. Without Dr. Gates, no one but Marines—in addition to a handful of Navy SEALS—could have ridden in MRAP vehicles, and they would not have had the impact they did.