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Foreign Policy Gear Change View from Beijing Subscribe Share Past Issues Translate international cool masks renewed policy deadlock at home; Xi mourns a reform hero while digesting setbacks to his own agenda view in browser cp.leads 27 July 2015 foreign policy gear change view from Beijing The pending prosecution of Ling Jihua 令计划 and the fall of Zhou Benshun 周本顺, who until last week was Hebei Party secretary, should, declare state media, end claims the anti-corruption campaign has cooled off. But Ling’s is an old case, and Zhou Benshun’s is but a final installment of the Zhou Yongkang 周永康 saga. More to the point, Xi’s broader agenda, proclaimed in the 3rd and 4th Plenums, is running harder to stand still; central power accumulated via the ‘tiger hunt’ has yet to translate into policy traction. The early success announced for judicial reform pilots convinces few rank- and-file legal professionals; the massive intervention in the stock market has led even the China-friendly IMF to warn of negative repercussions for RMB internationalisation; SOE reform is, to put it mildly, diluting market disciplines; and the crackdown on lawyers undermines remaining faith in ‘rule of law’ among those most dedicated to it. Little is found these days of the excitement and anticipation marking the heyday of reform in the 1980s and 90s. Well might Xi mourn the passing of popular rural reformer Wan Li 万里, a risk-taker who with Xi’s own father helped save Deng’s reforms (see Leaders on the Move). current opinion click titles for bilingual texts why China’s foreign policy changed gear Li Jiang 李江 | Aisixiang Since Xi took office, foreign policy has changed gear from ‘low’ to ‘assertive.’ Attributing this to shifts in the global power structure leads to self-fulfilling misjudgement. This platitude-free op-ed finds that while China’s international security environment has deteriorated, domestic factors trump: issues of economic development, political stability and ideological change are what press leadership buttons. Developing the analysis of Yue Jianyong 岳健勇, Li Jiang worries the economy faces ‘technology-less industrialisation’; sources of social and eventual political instability are legion. Ideological hollowing is answered by stepped-up patriotism and nationalism; the public finds solace, surveys reveal, in things going China’s way globally. The tough and aggressive tone thus traces to the imperative of deflecting domestic pressures. China must be understood in the context of its historical experience and current reality. The China of Western imagination—not least the Beltway notion of a re-run of imperial Germany—is a dangerous simplification. how should ‘BRICS standards’ be built? Pan Xiaoming 潘晓明 | The Paper The BRICS Bank features a council, board of directors, and management, in a three-tier system. The low-cost board will not, as in standard development bank models, be a standing body. The bank will likely diversify from its narrow capital base in the long term, accepting commercial capital and investment from other multilateral development agencies. It might learn from the China Development Bank, not least the ‘resources for projects’ investment model, where host countries collateralise natural resources in exchange for investment in infrastructure projects. Existing multilateral development banks, says the author working in Shanghai’s BRICS Research Institute, should cooperate with the likes of the BRICS bank. They might also study the mixed record of China’s ‘project system’. leave EU-bashing to others Wang Yiwei 王义桅 | Global Times China should abstain from EU bad-mouthing, placing it instead in the context of its strategic significance. The US, Europe itself, and Russia deprecate the EU for their own reasons; China follows them to differing degrees, in disregard of its own interests. Wang Yiwei, formerly director of the EU-funded China-Europe Academic Network, is alive to the EU’s many non-economic functions—peace, social stability, global influence, and regional identity—as well as being China’s largest trading and technology transfer partner, a main market and tech and funding source. Not least, the EU is ‘an important arena in which to promote our soft power and global image’. Drop me a line… 保持联系吧! David +86 10 6417 2551 in the spotlight Yue Jianyong 岳健勇 | London School of Economics Political Science Department Experienced in both academia and business (9 years working for SOEs, and service as a Beijing rep of multinationals), London-based Yue generates unusual influence domestically. Widely reprinted on left-wing media like the Utopia website and Global Times, as well as liberal ones like Aisixiang and Consensus Net, Yue draws less on Mao or Marx than on modern political economists. China’s rise is a mixed bag, he argues, its sheer speed coming at the heavy cost of ‘technology-less industrialisation’. In a number of institutional areas linked to economic transformation and self-development—protection of civil rights, promotion of social justice, curbing of corruption and protection of intellectual property rights, etc.— China’s government was, he finds, the opposite of a strong state; indeed indistinguishable from a failed one. Wang Yiwei 王义桅 | China Renmin University Institute of International Affairs Among many posts in the IR world, Wang has been director of the China- Europe Academic Network. His writings go beyond standard expertise in US and European affairs. An article in hawkish Global Times entitled ‘Preventing the US from declining too rapidly’ placed him in a contrarian minority. But he sings in key as well, distinguishing ‘the China Dream’ from such Western values as constitutionalism, human rights or democracy. It actually means, he says, ‘Sinifying Marxism by taking into consideration China’s national condition, opening up the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ Shanghai International Studies Institute | 上海国际 问题研究所 Founded in 1960, SIIS is a major think-tank providing counsel for the central government and Shanghai on economic, security and strategic issues. A respected regional think- tank, it stands comparison with anything in Beijing. Its strong faculty includes dignitaries like Yang Jiemian 杨洁勉, brother of State Counsellor Yang Jiechi 杨洁篪, and Zhou Wenzhong 周文重, former ambassador to the US. Its influential academic publications include World Outlook, a leading geopolitical journal. Echoing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s grand initiatives, SIIS is developing new centres for Belt and Road, BRICS Bank and AIIB studies. leadership on the move On 18 July 2015, Zhang Gaoli 张高丽 visited Hanoi, where he met Communist Party of Vietnam General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng, reciprocating recent fence-mending visits by Vietnamese leaders to Beijing. The redeployment of China’s Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in June 2015 may have provided points for discussion, as well as Vietnam’s growing rapprochement with the US; not least Nguyễn’s upcoming visit to Washington. Wan Li, a former Politburo member who played a crucial supporting role in then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s 邓小平 reform program in the late 1970s and 80s, passed away on 15 July 2015. Xi Jinping, together with the rest of the Politburo Standing Committee, as well as former top Party leaders Jiang Zemin 江泽民 and Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, attended his funeral on 22 July. Paying homage to Wan’s standing as a reformist, Party media drew analogies with Xi’s ‘deepening reform’ agenda. Commentary noted however that Xi is yet to show Deng’s skill and pragmatism in selecting people of the calibre of Wan Li— and Xi’s own father, Xi Zhongxun 习仲勋—whose support of reform saved an economy on the brink of ruin. in case you missed it… cp.leads—geo-strategic trends China-style PPP to support Belt and Road waving on down the Belt and Road cp.signals—domestic policy movement migrant workers: next-gen entrepreneurs? anti-monopoly targets foreign IPR holders cp.focus—exploratory analysis anyone for ‘valuism’? megafootball: the Chinese state tackles the people’s game cp.observer—monthly roundup june: blowing bubbles dreaming big but acting practical cp.positions—audit of shifts across policy sectors end july: regional coordination imperative mid july: pulling out all the stops Copyright © 2015 China Policy, All rights reserved. © Copyright 2015 Unsubscribe.
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