An Empirical and Qualitative Assessment of Terrorism Sentencing Decisions in Canada since 2001: Shifting away from the fundamental principle and towards cognitive biases (forthcoming in the UBC Law Review) Michael Nesbitt, University of Calgary Faculty of Law* Robert Oxoby, University of Calgary Department of Economics Meagan Potier, University of Calgary Faculty of Law * Corresponding author:
[email protected] 2 An Empirical and Qualitative Assessment of Terrorism Sentencing Decisions in Canada since 2001: Shifting away from the fundamental principle and towards cognitive biases Introduction Today, the spectacle of terrorist acts anD terrorism trials has become unfortunately rather commonplace, with over 50 prosecutions in CanaDa in the last fifteen years.1 Prior to 2001, a “terrorism offence” DiD not exist in CanaDa, at least not accorDing to the Criminal Code.2 It was not until the 9/11 terrorist attack on the WorlD TraDe Centers that CanaDa passeD in a matter of months, the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”). 3 The grounD-breaking ATA incluDeD the very first of the terrorism offences that are now founD in Part II.1 of the Criminal Code.4 The ATA also DefineD the terms relieD upon by the Part II.1 offences, incluDing elusive phrases such as “terrorism offence”, 1 For an overview of the prosecutions to Date, see Michael Nesbitt, “An Empirical StuDy of Terrorism Charges anD Terrorism Trials in CanaDa between September 2001 anD August 2018,” Crim LQ (Forthcoming Winter 2019). [Nesbitt, “Empirical StuDy of Terrorism Offences”]. 2 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code]. InDeeD, through most of CanaDa’s history, criminal prosecutions did not Delve into whether an act was terrorist in nature at all.