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ween WASHAGO nine of lled to a here s Charges laid TERRORIST ACTIVITY: GUN OFFENCES: TRAINING: RECRUITING: EXPLOSIVES All 12 men were charged The three men were Nine men were charged The four men charged Six men were charged under terrorism provisions charged with two offences with training for the under this provision of with intent to cause an of the Criminal Code for each concerning the purpose of terrorist Criminal Code are alleged explosion at the direction LLIA knowingly participating in smuggling of guns for activity. Training is alleged to have either recruited or of or in association with a or contributing to, directly terrorist activity. They to have taken place trained others for the terrorist group. Maximum or indirectly, a terrorist face sentences from up to between Nov. 27, 2005 purpose of terrorist sentence is life 12 group, activity or 10 years to life. and Dec. 31, 2005. activity. Maximum imprisonment. facilitating a terrorist Maximum sentence is 10 sentence is 10 years. activity. Maximum years. sentence is 10 years. Fahim Ahmad 11 Zakaria Amara Asad Ansari Shareef Abdelhaleen Qayyum Abdul Jamal Mohammed Dirie Yasin Abdi Mohamed Jahmaal James Amin Mohamed Durrani Steven Vikash Chand Ahmad Mustafa Ghany imcoe Saad Khalid g Scarborough father rented the car that 400 Dirie and Mohamed were driving when they were arrested in 2005. Mohammed Dirie, 22: Arrested with Mohamed for Zakaria Amara, 20: bringing Married to Ghany's wife's sister, he weapons into attended Meadowvale Secondary Canada, he's Mississauga’s also serving a School with Saad Khalid and Fahim Meadowvale Ahmad and transferred to another two-year Mississauga high school with Secondary School: sentence. Ahmad. He attended the Ar- Three of the suspects were close Rahman Islamic Centre. Allegedly friends for their early years in purchased the ammonium nitrate school. In later years, Saad Khalid Yasin Abdi Mohamed, 24: for the bomb plot. formed a club known as R.A.C. In jail serving a two-year (Religious Awareness Club) sentence for attempting to where he’d preach Islam bring weapons from the U.S. to during lunch hours in the Canada. school’s drama room. Saad Khalid, 19: Gun smuggling: Went to Meadowvale Steven Vikash Chand, 25: Secondary School On Aug. 13, 2005, suspects where he was close Prayer group: Ali Dirie and Yasin Abdi Mohamed When Chand converted to friends with Amara. Six of the suspects were were stopped in Fort Erie after Islam he began using the name He is one of the six drawn to the Al-Rasham Islamic crossing the Peace Bridge and arrested Abdul Shakur. He attended the suspects accused in Centre where they would pray, play for smuggling guns and ammunition into Salaheddin Islamic Centre and the bomb plot. sports and discuss Islam with one of Canada. They pleaded guilty in October knew at least one of the youths the volunteer leaders, Qayyum Abdul and received two-year sentences now now charged, who was also a Jamal. Jamal, 43, who has not been being served in a Kingston penitentiary. recent convert to Islam. Just charged with training or recruiting, Sources say Fahim Ahmad rented the recently he began working at a did raise the suspicion of the local white Buick the men were driving. All shawarma shop. community for his fiery three men are now charged with speeches and influence on acquiring weapons for a terrorist activity. Qayyum Abdul the youths. Jahmaal James, 23: Jamal, 43: Attended Pakistan A bus driver with recently and sources outspoken Wahhabist Scarborough say it will be alleged views, the married suspects: that he went there to father of four sons find a training camp. volunteered at the Ar- Two of the accused, Steven Vikash His friends refute the Rahman Islamic Centre Chand and Jahmaal James attended the claim and say he went in Mississauga where he Salaheddin Islamic Centre. The mosque has to get married. sometimes led prayers. been closely watched by security services since it was discovered that reputed Al Qaeda financier Ahmed Said Khadr prayed there in the 1990s. Khadr was killed in October 2003 by Pakistani forces and his children, who are not incarcerated, still Amin Mohamed Ahmad Mustafa Durrani, 19: Ghany, 21: frequent the centre. Amin Mohamed It's alleged he knew A health sciences Durrani, 19, attended the same high school where the five the unidentified graduate from McMaster youths who have University whose father, a unnamed youths went to school. been charged and doctor, emigrated from who attended the Trinidad and Tobago in same Scarborough 1955. Ghany attended the high school. Ar-Rahman Islamic Centre. Shareef Abdelhaleen, 30: Asad Ansari, 21: 401 An unmarried computer Not much is known about d programmer who came to Ansari, but he was part of the Canada at a young age from group of six who often attended 401 Egypt. He is charged in the the Mississauga centre to pray, bombing plot. learn about Islam and play 2 sports outdoors. DVP LEGEND 407 Suspect's residence Other places of interest TOORONTO O MEADOM ADDOWVW ALE MISSISSAUGAAUU 427 Shareef Abdelhaleenaleenle QayyumQ Abdul Jamal Asad AnsariAn ari Ar-Rahman Islamicsslam Centre Meadowvale High Schoolcho Lake Ontario Zakaria Amarara 404 3 401 QQEW Saadad KhalidKh Ahmadhmad Mustafafa Ghany BRIAN HUGHES/TORONTO STAR.
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