The Toronto 18

Official account

On June 2, 2006, Canadian counter-terrorism forces raided homes in and around the resulting in the arrest of 15 people,1 which with the addition of three others detained earlier or later, comprised what became the “Toronto 18”. The large majority of the detainees were in their early twenties or in their late teens, all of them Muslim men. Their names were as follows (in descending age sequence):

Abdul Qayyum Jamal, 01-Apr-63 Pakistan/ (Abdelhaleen), 01-Jan-76 Egypt/Canada Steven Chand aka Abdoul Shakur, 02-Mar-81 Canada/Canada Yasin Abdi Mohamed, 06-Nov-81 Ethiopia/Canada Jahmaal I. Francis aka Jahmaal James, 16-Apr-83 Canada/Canada , 10-Aug-83 Somalia/Canada , 10-Aug-84 Afghanistan/Canada , 27-Sep-84 Canada/Canada Asad Waqar Ansari, 08-Mar-85 Pakistan/Pakistan , 18-Aug-85 Jordan/Canada Amin Durrani, 17-Jun-86 Pakistan/Canada , 12-Aug-86 Saudi Arabia/Canada Ibrahim Alkhale Aboud, 15-Sep-86 Iraq/unknown Saad Gaya, 17-Nov-87 Canada/Canada Nishanthan Yogakrishnan, 12-Jan-88 Sri Lanka/Canada Zakir Ahmed Mohiuddin, 19-Jan-88 Saudi Arabia/unknown (Source: Wikileaks) Suhaib Asrar Mohammad, 22-Nov-88 UAE/UAE (Source: Wikileaks) Nikhil Kirtikumar Sarhad, 04-Jul-90 Malaysia/unknown (Source: Wikileaks)

The men were suspected of planning a large-scale terrorist attack in southern that included the detonation of truck bombs at least three locations, and opening fire in a crowded area. They also were accused of planning to storm various buildings such as the Canadian Broadcasting Centre and the Canadian Parliament building, and take hostages. Law enforcement authorities identified other targets, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Parliamentary Buildings' Peace Tower, the , a military base and power grids.

The suspects were charged under anti-terrorism legislation passed by Canadian parliament in December 2001, in the wake of the mass-murder of September 11, 2001.

The main evidence adduced by the government against the men included more than 82,200 intercepted phone calls, email communications and secretly recorded conversations among the suspects; testimonies of two covert informants who infiltrated the group; video evidence that the men participated in two training camps within Canada; a purchase order of 3 tonnes of fertilizer intended for the construction of truck bombs and the possession by a suspect of a remote-control detonator, that he constructed by himself. In the 10 days following the arrests, at least 4,710 articles appeared in media outlets including CNN, BBC News, Al-Jazeera, The Bangkok Post, The Sydney Morning Herald, and The New York Times.2 Questions arose almost immediately about the seriousness of the plot. Friends and family members of the suspects expressed disbelief regarding the seriousness of the accusations, particularly because most suspects had no previous criminal record. Questions were raised whether the government agents who infiltrated the group had encouraged the young men to transform their exalted jihadi talk into real action. The government kept a large veil of secrecy about the case, which was only partially lifted during the trials of the suspects.

Prior surveillance by Canadian intelligence and police

(1) According to Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Fahim Ahmad, one of the alleged leaders of the “Toronto cell”, was monitored by the CSIS since 2002, “when intelligence agents monitoring extremist chat rooms on the internet spotted him talking up jihad with someone in Calgary.” His friend Zakaria Amara “didn't appear on CSIS radar screens until somewhat later”.3 The actual blogs that allegedly contained “jihadi” discussions, were never released. The websites on which the posts allegedly appeared do not exist anymore. It was not revealed when the surveillance of these two individuals actually began and how intensive it was. The CBC article reveals that Amara was at one point put under “24-hour visual surveillance” and that the phones of several other group members were wiretapped, their workplaces and cars bugged, and their internet accounts hacked into.4 Again, the authorities did not reveal when such surveillance began and whose communications were monitored. According to the article, the “blanket surveillance was so comprehensive that sometimes it seemed the police were spending more time in Amara's apartment than he was.”

(2) On March 2005, two wannabe jihadists traveled from (Georgia) to Toronto by bus to meet Fahim Ahmad and Jahmaal James, two members of the “Toronto cell” and at least one additional, unidentified, person. A month before they arrived, CSIS agents visited Ahmad. He admitted to them that he was visiting extremist websites, but reportedly said “It was not the right time” for him to do jihad.5

(3) Weeks later, when the Atlanta men were in Toronto, CSIS agents again visited Ahmad. This time he reportedly admitted to posting radical messages online and participating in jihadist conversations.6

(4) After the visiting jihadists returned to Atlanta, CSIS agents continued monitoring Ahmad. On June 27, 2005, an agent reportedly noticed that Ahmad and three associates disappeared into a wooded area from where a “loud bang, louder than a firecracker” was heard.7 It was not revealed what action the CSIS took upon this evidence.

(5) In late August 2005, CSIS agents visited Zakaria Amara. It was not revealed why CSIS visited Amara and what they discussed.8

(6) On November 17, 2005, CSIS advised the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) that Fahim Ahmad posed a threat to the security of Canada.9

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(7) In December 2005 the “Toronto cell” spent 12 days in “training” for jihad in a wooden area near Washago (Ontario). Ten adults and four youth participated in this camp. The trainers were informant and Steven Chand, a convert whom Ahmad had recruited. A team of more than 200 officers from the Department of National Defence and of the Emergency Response Team – the paramilitary tactical police arm of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) – watched the wannabe jihadists round-the-clock from the ground and from the air, with planes and helicopters.10 According to journalist Christie Blatchford of the Globe and Mail, the authorities asked residents of the nearby village of Washago not to tip off the “terrorist suspects” that they were aware of the camp’s presence.11

(7) According to an affidavit released in the Atlanta trial of and Ehsanul Sadequee and revealed in April 2006 by Associated Press, the “Islamist extremists” they had visited in Toronto in March 2005, were at the time “subjects of an FBI international terrorism investigation”.12 Fahim Ahmad and his friends were thus not only monitored by Canadian intelligence but also by the FBI.13 On April 25, 2006 Shaikh read to Ahmad from a Toronto Star article about the FBI arresting two men from Atlanta on terrorist charges. The article referred to the men as having been in Toronto to meet with at at least three Islamic extremists. Ahmad said he was “very, very, very tight” with one of the men arrested, and that the two men had stayed at his home for two weeks. Ahmad expressed concern, saying, “I know jail time is so close” and “my days are numbered.”14

(8) Weeks before the “Toronto cell” was arrested, some of its members worried that police were onto them and that they were "going to jail any day.“15 The group’s alleged leader said in wiretaps that he had been referred to in media reports as a "terrorist" and feared he was a "sitting duck" for police. But despite worries, the group embarked on a second training camp for its elite members.[…] "They're gonna nail us all," one of the accused said.16

The nonchalance of the plotters, who continued to develop their murderous plan whilst aware of being watched by the authorities, has puzzled many an observer. Did the plotters really believe that they could conceal their preparations and outsmart the authorities? Or were they given hints by agents that they should not worry? Little was revealed about the repeated contacts between CSIS and the alleged leaders of the plot prior to their arrest.

Pathetic heroes

Conspicuous

When the group exercised in the woods near Washago, it was bitter cold, prompting the members of the group to repeatedly visit a nearby Tim Hortons kiosk to warm up, drink coffee and use the toilets. They all wore army fatigues, drawing inevitable attention to their training.17

Merely weeks before his arrest, Fahim Ahmad was reported handing out jihadi videos outside the Salahaddin Mosque in Scarborough.18 One would imagine that a person planning a grand terrorist operation would refrain from drawing public attention to his extremist views. Was there a particular purpose behind his conspicuous conduct?

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Blabbering

Cautious terrorist plotters do not blabber. But Fahim Ahmad reportedly said to the participants in the Washago camp: “We’re not officially Al Qaeda but share their principles and methods.” He made this statement in 2005, when merely hinting sympathy for Al Qaeda could lead to one’s arrest. He also delivered a fiery campfire speech that was videotaped, in which he urged attendees to wage war on the West.19 In his verdict, the judge wrote: “Ahmad was by all accounts no disciplined or meticulous. He made highly inculpatory statements to Shaikh at their first meeting. […] Despite warnings, he made many explicit, ill-advised comments over the telephone.”20

Bombastic

Amara was determined to capture on camera the exploits of his fans at the Washago camp. The home video showed masked men in winter camouflage marching through the snow in an Ontario forest, shouting "Allahu Akbar" while waving a black flag. Mubin Shaikh, the covert agent who infiltrated the group, admitted in court that he had "choreographed" some of the scenes, arranging the campers to perform for the camera in a militant fashion upon the instruction of Zakaria Amara who did the filming. The bombastic video, accompanied by martial Islamic singing, was intended to resemble jihadi videos periodically shown on television as proof of the militancy of Muslims. It is posted on http://www3.thestar.com/ static/toronto18/index.3.html.

Pathetic

While trying to act as tough combatants for the camera, the young men trekked off to Tim Hortons several times a day for coffee runs and washroom breaks.21 Some of the youths complained and wanted to return home. When a field mouse ran into a tent, they got hysterical. Their leader, Fahim Ahmad, “nearly set himself ablaze trying to add fuel to the campfire.” Shaikh, who taught the group how to handle guns, described the whole thing in court as a "potty training" exercise22 or as a comedy of errors, where the alleged jihadis melted holes in the soles of their running shoes, locked one vehicle’s keys in the car, almost set a sleeping bag on fire and – instead of keeping a low profile – did doughnuts in a parking lot. He said the so-called military training consisted of getting the campers to march up and down a road to keep warm. He said that when an illegal handgun was used for target practice, the youthful campers were “freaked out” by the noise. He summed up the Washago adventure with these words: “Nobody knew what they were doing … Idiocy seemed to be a constant theme.”23

Paid undercover agents

The Canadian authorities paid two Muslim adults substantial sums to infiltrate the group around Fahim Ahmad and Zakaria Amara. The question arose shortly after the arrest of the suspects, whether the undercover agents had entrapped the suspects by goading them into illegal action that they would not have undertaken otherwise. The agents denied that they did so, claiming that the conspirators had already been determined to plan terrorist attacks in Canada and would have done so without the agents’’ intervention.

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Mubin Shaikh, the first undercover agent

The first known undercover agent, briefly mentioned above, was Mubin Shaikh. He was born in Canada in 1977. Shaikh’s first contact with Canadian intelligence (the CSIS) went as far back as 1997, when he was 20 years old. He then reportedly alerted the agency an inflammatory pamphlet he was given at a Toronto mosque from a group calling for the creation of an Islamic state through jihad.24

After the arrest of the “Toronto cell” in June 2006, Mubin Shaikh went public and gave numerous interviews in which he described his background, life, religious beliefs and motivations for infiltrating the “Toronto cell.”

On July 15, 2006 Linden McIntyre interviewed Mubin Shaikh for the Fifth Estate Show (CBC).25

In an interview conducted by Michael Friscolanti in 2007, Shaikh provided further information on his life. He said he had been a partier, a pot-smoking tough guy who liked to drop LSD. After high school, though, he quit cold turkey and rededicated himself to Islam. He travelled the world, visiting Egypt, Israel and other Mideast countries26 before dwelling between 2002 and 2004 in Syria.27 According to a court document one reason for going to Syria was to learn Arabic. He also undertook there a formal study of Islam at a university level.28

According to a detailed report about the “Toronto cell” case by journalist Isabel Teotonio, Mubin Shaikh was a former Canadian army cadet, “with a firearms licence, and extensive military and martial arts training.”29 This was confirmed in a court document. Shaikh participated in the Canadian army cadets for six years since he was 13-years-old, which involved attending two days a week, one weekend a month and during the summer months military training, including firearms training.30

Shaikh said that when 9/11 occurred, he was working for an unidentified company “that contracts for the federal government” and that he felt at “that stage […] ready to go to Chechnya...go to Afghanistan.“31 He said he wanted to do “some jihad-oriented thing”, but was lucky that he was exposed to people “who, you know, who I could talk to, who could, you know, correct my understanding.”32

He said he contacted CSIS in March 2004 after returning from Syria. At the time he was also doing what he described as “ethno-cultural religious awareness with the Toronto police […] just to let them know […] different things that could be of use to them […]”33 He continued: “I met with the CSIS guys, and they were very interested in me now. So basically, you know, they put to me the prospect of working with them, giving information on people, certain groups, getting to leaders of certain groups, talking to them, seeing what kind of view they had and reporting on those views because I am convinced that I’m the best guy for them to have to comment on the different groups, because I have a solid foundation in Islam, you know. I’m born and raised here.”34

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In November 2005 Shaikh was handed over from CSIS to the RCMP who hired him for $77,000 to infiltrate the “Toronto cell”. Eventually the fee increased to $300,000.35 Shaikh was shocked that people were questioning his motives. While visiting a local falafel shop, one woman berated him for aiding the enemy. "I said: 'Enemy? Police are your enemy? So if somebody comes and robs your store, who are you going to call? Taliban? Bin Laden?'"36 He said "I was alone. I got back into my old friends, and I started doing s--t again."37 He said he bought “a couple thousand dollars" worth of cocaine over a six-month span, and before long, a few casual snorts had ballooned into a full-blown habit. "There were a couple of times when I got real scared because my heart rate started blasting up and I had to call an ambulance," he says. "I started realizing: 'Oh my God, what have I gotten myself into?' " He finally phoned his RCMP handlers and told them the truth. They checked him into rehab.38

On April 3, 2007, Shaikh was charged by Toronto police with two counts of assault and one count of uttering threats in a case that involves two 12-year-old girls. These criminal charges were not the first notch on his rap sheet. In August 2000, he was accused of assault, and five months later police charged him with uttering threats. Both counts were later withdrawn.39 The circumstances surrounding the 2000 and 2007 charges were not disclosed.

Edward Sapiano, a lawyer representing Yasin Abdi Mohamed, one of the members of the “Toronto cell”, commented: "It provides extreme motivation for [Shaikh] to fabricate. A cocaine addict, what does he need? Cocaine. What does he need for cocaine? Money. What's this guy getting from the police? Money. Based on what? The quality and the size of his information."40

The readiness of Shaikh to give multiple interviews, including on television, has given rise to the question whether he was not afraid of risking thereby his safety for having “sold out” his fellow Muslims that he had deceived. "People know where I live," he said. "But I'm not afraid of anybody. I'm from the T-Dot, born and raised, and I ain't going anywhere."41 He runs a web blog and welcomes emails and while condemning terrorism, has openly declared his opposition to Western intervention in Afghanistan.

Shaikh claimed in court that he did not entrap anyone but admitted the following:

• He said in court that he played a pivotal role in setting up a winter-training camp for the alleged conspirators and buying weapons for the group. Shaikh told Ontario Superior Court that the group's leaders had no idea about what was needed to survive outdoors in the winter, nor any money to pay for the necessary supplies. "Payment was totally myself.“42 Shaikh said he helped maintain a cover story that the camp was a religious retreat.43 • He provided one of the vehicles used to transport the participants to the training camp in December 2005. The vehicle was secretly wired to record conversations.44 • He acknowledged that he purchased a .22 calibre rifle and ammunition and put a down payment on another weapon.”45 • He choreographed some of the exercises that were videtaped. • He taught members of the group how to safely handle a 9-mm handgun.46

Shaher Elsohemy, the second undercover agent

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Elsohemy studied and graduated in agricultural engineering and spent much of his early life in Cairo, Egypt, but returned to Canada in 2000, where he started a five-year career as a flight attendant for Air Canada. He also was reported to have started various rather unsuccessful businesses, loved to travel around the world and eat well.47 An unidentified friend said that Alsohemy tried after Christmas 2005 unsuccessfully to convince him about the quality of one of his favorite restaurants in the world. Failing to convince him, he decided on the spot to take his friend to that restaurant, in South America. His friend said in an interview: “We had an amazing time.” He added that Elsohemy “doesn’t get lost anywhere he goes. It feels like he knows his way around.”48

Around the time of the arrests, Elsohemy and his family vanished from their home. It transpired later that they were placed into a federal witness protection program.49 His friends and business partners had no idea why he vanished, for his identity as a government agent was not revealed until years later. They noted, however, that his debts were suddenly being paid.50 According to friends, he had a fairly liberal worldview but about four years before the arrests, he began adhering to a more fundamentalist version of Islam. He grew a beard and began espousing jihadi views. One business partner commented, “I almost thought he was Wahhabi.”51 On the other hand, an unidentified member of the Toronto Muslim community said that Elsohemy only “pretended to be religious in order to get close to these people [the suspects].”52

CBC News published in 2010 a detailed account of the fees Elsohemy negotiated with the RCMP for his infiltration of the “Toronto cell”. Initially he requested $15 million but after a long period of negotiation, he and the RCMP reached an agreement that he would receive up to $3.99 million to cover costs of beginning a new life somewhere, to cover debts and as fee.53 While facing criticism for his alleged greed, he defended this agreement by pointing out that his covert operation would endanger his security and forced him and his family a costly relocation and the loss of business opportunities. He testified in court that his participation in the police operation wasn't motivated by money, but by a desire to be a moral, responsible Canadian citizen.54

Other mysterious characters

The trial has revealed two further mysterious characters. One is a self-described fraudster identified in court only as Talib. He explained, in a conversation recorded by police, how his team of cocaine addicts used stolen identities to defraud banks in small cities like Kitchener. The second figure was a man identified in court last week as Qari Kifayatullah, a former taxi cab driver. According to Shaikh, Kifayatullah was the man who advised defendant Amara about the virtue of truck bombs. Shaikh said that it was from Kifayatullah that he first heard mention of ammonium nitrate, or fertilizer.55 The existence of this third man was also reported in the Toronto Star. Shaikh testified that days after infiltrating the group in late November 2005, the alleged leader (Amara?) arranged a meeting for them with a man named Qari Kifayatullah, who explained that truck bombs were more destructive than firearms, such as AK-47s. “How many people can you kill with AKs?” Shaikh recalled Kifayatullah asking. “‘You can kill more people with truck bombs.’ That was the first time I heard about ammonium nitrate.”56 Who was Kifayatullah and why didn’t he testify in the trial?

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Talib and Kifayatullah were, as far as has been revealed, not been arrested, charged or interviewed by police. There is no record, for instance, of the RCMP moving to shut down Talib’s ongoing and apparently lucrative bank fraud schemes.

Sentences

In 2007 charges were stayed against the three youngest members of the “Toronto cell” group - two of whom signed peace bonds for terrorism-related offences. Their names were not published at the time.

On April 15, 2008 charges were stayed against four members of the “Toronto cell” group, three of whom were required to sign peace-bonds.57 These were Qayyum Abdul Jamal, 45, Ahmad Mustafa Ghany, 23, and , 21. The fourth, Yasin Abdi Mohamed, 26, did not sign the peace bond, but had also his charges stayed. A peace bond allows the court to impose strict conditions on an individual if it deems there are reasonable grounds to believe a terror-related offence will be committed. Some of the conditions include not associating with co-accused, surrendering their passports, abiding by a curfew and not possessing any firearm or explosive substance. The defence and the Crown agreed that in signing the peace bonds the men were not admitting to any wrongdoing. The following persons were, however, sentenced to lengthy imprisonment:

• Shareef Abdelhaleem was sentenced on March 4, 2011 to life in prison without parole. • Zakaria Amara plead guilty on October 8, 2009 and was sentenced on January 18, 2010 to life in prison without parole eligibility for 10 years. • Saad Khalid plead guilty and was sentenced in May 2009 to 20 years in prison • Saad Gaya plead guilty in September 2009. Upon appeal he was sentenced to 18 years in prison. • Fahim Ahmad was sentenced on October 25, 2010 to 16 years in prison. • Steven Chand was convicted in June 2010 to 10 years in prison. • Amin Durrani plead guilty in January 2010 and was sentence to 7½ years in prison. • Jahmaal James plead guilty and was sentenced in February 2010 to 7 years in prison. • Ali Dirie plead guilty in September 2009 and was sentenced to 7 in years prison. • Asad Waqar Ansari was sentenced in June 2010 to 6½ years in prison • Nishanthan Yogakrishnan was sentenced on May 22, 2009 to 2½ years in prison, which was already served. He was released in May 2009 although he was given 2 years probation and a 10-year prohibition against owning weapons.

Remorse expressed by the accused

Zakaria Amara

At his sentencing Amara read an open letter to Canadians expressing his regret. It said, “I have no excuses or explanations. I deserve nothing less than your complete and absolute contempt [...] Give me a chance that one day I will be able to pay the moral debt I still owe.” Amara told the court he had been "naive and gullible" and had a simplistic way of viewing the world. He said that he was locked into an extremist position that caused him to isolate himself from the real world.58 He said that he was glad he was arrested before he could do

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any harm and that he gradually changed in prison, particularly after he was released from solitary confinement and could interact with other prisoners.

The judge was not impressed. He pointed out that this apparent repudiation took far too long to come out. Amara only made this apology after four years’ incarceration, when he faced a life sentence. The judge submitted that Amara “was willing, able and eager to plot the cruelest sort of atrocity against other people, without qualm. [...] Everything about this offence -- the intention, the motivation, the preparation and the potential consequences -- cried out for keeping the appellant under permanent penal supervision."59

On his website, Mubin Shaikh commented on the judgment: “I do agree that Mr. Amara is very remorseful but that’s only because he got caught. He not only dragged the process through the courts unnecessarily but deceived the public while doing so - trying to quote Plato and the like to show how smart he was. He lied to everyone for YEARS - put his family and community through traumatic events...Oh yeah, almost forgot: Mr. Amara is lucky he is not in a Muslim country - he would have been executed a long time ago.”60

Fahim Ahmad

In his judgment, Judge F. Lawson wrote: “It also seems to me that his expression of a change of religious views and expression of remorse is worthy of consideration, although I also say at once that it is difficult to readily accept such assertions from someone who has recently advocated hatred of non-Muslims and justified terrorist acts on a religious and political basis.”61 Ahmad did not apparently express his remorse in public.

Saad Gaya

Saad Gaya apologized in court for his “shameful crime” and asked for leniency. Addressing the court at the end of his sentencing hearing on December 23, 2009, Gaya said he was “extremely grateful” the scheme “did not progress any further”. “Some people believe that I must have been driven by a dark ideology of hatred, nihilism and destruction,” said the member of the so-called Toronto 18, requesting people not brand him a “terrorist.”62

He also said: "What I was a part of was absolutely wrong. [...] Not only have I let myself down, but I have also let down everyone whom I have ever been associated.“ Apologizing "for my irrational decision," he told Mr. Justice Bruce Durno: "I should have realized I was playing with fire. I was young and politically naive."63 The prosecution argued Gaya was a willing participant and should have known a plot involving three tonnes of explosives would have caused serious harm or death — and if not, he was willfully blind.64

Steven Chand

Before the judgment was rendered, Steven Chand, one of the accused, read from a prepared statement asking the judge to sentence him to time served. “I’m ready to reintegrate and become a productive member of society,” Chand told the court, adding he wants to build a “successful future” and “live harmoniously.” Chand said he has “no intentions or desires or

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motives to be involved in any criminal activity, nor to participate in anything that has even a hint of terrorism […] I do not see any legitimate justification to commit acts of terrorism against Canadian society or to perform some type of corrupt interpretation of militant jihad against our communities.“ He ended with a poem, or rhyming lyrics, which he delivered as a rap.65

The judge saw it differently: “Mr. Chand was ideologically committed to the cause… He was serious,” said Dawson. Dawson also noted that Chand’s refusal to admit any wrongdoing to a psychiatrist, who had prepared a pre-sentence report, was either “outright deception” or demonstrated a “shocking lack of insight.”66

Shareef Abdelhaleem

Abdelhaleem didn't fit the stereotype of an Islamic terrorist -- he drank alcohol, took cocaine, led a party lifestyle and didn't regularly attend mosque, the judge said.67 His interest in the operation arose when he discovered that by bombing the stock-exchange he could enrich himself.68 Abdelhaleem was alleged to have planned to profit from the attack by short-selling stocks in the days before the bombings.69 The agent, Elsohemy, testified in court that Abdelhaleem was obsessed with every aspect of the plot, from how to store the fertilizer to how to profit from the explosion. “Shareef went to a library and checked the stock market situation after Sept. 11th,” he testified. “He said our money could be increased seven times.”70 Abdelhaleem and his defense team did not challenge this testimony. To cover-up this greed, Abdelhaleem attempted in a later prison interview to depict his support for the operation as a result of his political views.71

"I'm unconditionally sorry," Abdelhaleem said in court, insisting he knew violence was wrong and "had no intention of causing injury or bodily harm."72

In handing down his sentence, the judge ruled that Abdelhaleem “was the antithesis of a credible witness.[…] The accused demonstrated he was quite cunning. The evidence contains many instances where he advanced the bomb plot."73 Judge Dawson dismissed Abdelhaleem’s apparent remorse: ”Mr. Abdelhaleem exhibits no genuine remorse or insight into his behaviour. […]"[He] has so far not accepted responsibility for his dangerous actions.”74

Conclusions

Court records and other evidence indicates that at least two members of the “Toronto cell” were induced on ideological grounds to plan deadly terrorist operations in Canada and took action in preparation of this plan. They were designated as the plot’s leaders. Additionally, a number of hangers-on or followers agreed to assist their very young leaders in this operation although not all of them knew the deadly details of the planned operation. .

What emerges from this case is the ease with which young Muslims in Canada have been induced to espouse extremist views and engage in what they believed were covert operations. Most of these young people had only a sketchy knowledge of Islam, but appear to have felt a strong sense of grievance against what the West is doing against Muslim countries, such as

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Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, etc. By playing on these feelings, they could be motivated to engage in illegal activities.

One can appreciate that the feelings of grievance of these young people have been genuine and mostly well grounded. The support given by the West to the State of Israel, which has systematically oppressed the Palestinian people for decades in violation of virtually all international norms and the two wars of aggression perpetrated by the West alliance against Afghanistan and Iraq, are no figment of youthful imagination. While young people may dream of violent action to vindicate the dignity and rights of the Muslim world, they almost never possess the means and the skills to translate their grievances into counter-measures that would effectively stop Western aggression. While public authorities attempt to exaggerate the threat emanating from such youthful zealots, they must certainly know that even the most committed jihadis cannot dent Western military and economic power. It is at this juncture that the question arises why these young people were helped to take further steps towards their own demise.

The Canadian authorities knew for a long time that the group of exalted young Muslims around Ahmad and Amara were discussing violent jihad. As mentioned above, Fahim Ahmad, one of the alleged leaders of the “Toronto cell”, was monitored by the CSIS since 2002, “when intelligence agents monitoring extremist chat rooms on the internet spotted him talking up jihad with someone in Calgary.” Who ran these “extremist chat rooms” and ensured that young people, such as Fahim Ahmed – 18-years old in 2002 – would be drawn to jihad? Who financed and hosted these websites? The secrecy regarding the circumstances under which Fahim Ahmad was led to espouse extremist views, suggests that the Canadian authorities are unwilling to disclose the identities of those who ran and hosted these websites. Was Ahmad “nurtured” by intelligence services to become a “jihadist”?

According to journalist Keith Jones, even senior ministers in the Canadian government admitted to having been made aware months before the arrests of a police-intelligence operation agains the Toronto group. Public Security Minister Anne McClellan and Defence Minister Bill Graham were reportedly apprised on this operation at the latest by December 2005.75 The authorities not only knew about the group but contacted repeatedly its leaders Ahmad and Amara long before they began their preparations for a terrorist attack. At these occasions the visiting agents could have warned these hotheads that they might be soon arrested should they translate their zeal into acts. Did they warn them? Probably not, for the government did not produce evidence of any such warnings. On the contrary, the authorities had their agents pushing the plot forward and attempted to conceal their surveillance from the plotters.

Instead of seeking to convince these exalted young men of the futility and danger of their plans, or making it clear to them that their every move is being watched, the authorities infiltrated into the group adult agents, who had a clear financial incentive to lead them to perdition. One agent proposed to teach them military skills and obtain weapons for them. The second agent, motivated by an even greater monetary reward, proposed to obtain for Amara large quantities of fertilizer, so his group could build powerful truck bombs.

It has been revealed that the authorities allocated more than $4 million for infiltrating the two agents into the group. It has also been revealed that hundreds of officials were involved for

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many months in the surveillance of the group. Arresting and bringing the 18 suspects to trial cost Canadian taxpayers another fortune.

It might be argued that it was necessary to let the Toronto plot ripen to a point where the criminal intent could be clearly demonstrated to the public as a real threat: “See here; this is the result of playing around with jihadist fire!” The arrests would be thus construed as a necessary warning to all those who in the future might entertain similar ideas.

If one accepts the above reasoning, one might even argue that by sentencing the participants, they were saved from their own folly and might ultimately be thankful for having been stopped before undertaking their deadly operation.

One might, however, counter this reasoning by asking: What if the infiltrators had disclosed to the plotters that the authorities knew everything about their plot and that they would arrested within 24 hours, if they did not abandon their foolish enterprise? Had the infiltrators provided such a clear and unambiguous warning, and had the plotters continued their operation, they could not have blamed anyone except themselves for their fate. Their claim of entrapment would be easily dismissed in court and they would possess a greater incentive to confess the crime early on. The authorities would have saved taxpayers large sums. Had they, however, heeded such warning, the infiltrators would not have been able to cash on nearly $4 million and the respective security authorities could not trumpet a historic success in the “war on terror”, since 9/11 a substantial cash-booster for these agencies.76 They might have, however, saved the young plotters from a tragic fate and would have created good-will among Canadian Muslims.

But the infiltrators and the authorities were not apparently moved by the public interest or the interest of the young zealots. By helping the young men continue their plot, the Canadian authorities intended to manufacture legal grounds for arresting the mindless plotters, so they could “prove” to Canadian society that home-grown Islamic terrorism is a serious threat, force through parliament “big-brother” legislation and justify Canadian support for imperial policies led by the United States.

NOTES (the numbers following the “=” sign refer to the author’s own archive) 1. News reports on June 3, 2006 mention the arrest of 17 people, adding that two of them were already in prison. It appears, therefore, that only 15 people are actually arrested on June 2, 2006 2. Isabel Teotonio, “Four have terror charges stayed”, The Toronto Star, April 15, 2008, =155 3. Bill Gillespie, “The case against Canada's plotters”, CBC News, October 14, 2009, =139 4. Ibid. 5. Isabel Teotonio, “Soldier of Allah”, The Toronto Star, (2000. no exact date), =143 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. R. v. Ahmad, 2010 ONSC 5874, October 25, 2010, item [4] 10. Isabel Teotonio, “The Mujahideen in Washago”, The Toronto Star, (2000, no exact date found), =144 11. Keith Jones, “Why did Canada’s security agencies allow the alleged terror plot to grow?”, WSWS, June 10, 2006, =125

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12. Stewart Bell, “Terrorists met in Toronto to plot U.S. attacks: FBI”, National Post (Canada), April 22, 2006, =153 13. Timeline [on the Toronto terror cell], The Fifth Estate, CBC, no date found, =140 14. “Toronto 18 terrorism case - Youth trial verdict”, Court file no. YC-07-1587, Ontario Superior Court of Justice September 25, 2008, §100, =160 15. Melissa Leong, “Terrorism suspect feared he was 'sitting duck,' trial hears ‘Toronto 18'” , National Post, June 7, 2008, =148 16. Ibid. 17. “Informant says militant training camp was 'potty training' exercise”, CBC News, June 11, 2008, =154 18. Timeline [on the Toronto terror cell], The Fifth Estate, CBC News, no date, =140 19. Isabel Teotonio, supra n. 5 20. “Toronto 18 terrorism case - Youth trial verdict”, Court file no. YC-07-1587, Ontario Superior Court of Justice September 25, 2008, =160 21. Isabel Teotonio, “Four have terror charges stayed”, The Toronto Star, April 15, 2008, =155 22. “Informant says militant training...”, supra n. 17 23. Thomas Walkom, “Police mole paints altered picture at terror trial”, The Toronto Star, June 17, 2008, =159 24. Isabel Teotonio, “The Infiltrator”, The Toronto Star, (2000. no exact date), =141 25. Linden McIntyre, “Interview with Mubin Shaikh, Part II”, CBC News - The Fifth Estate, July 15, 2006, =157 26. Michael Friscolanti, “The Mounties’ man in the Toronto terror bust admits a cocaine habit”, MacLeans, September 10, 2007, =156. According to Isabel Teotonio (“The Infiltrator”), supra n. 24, Shaikh did not visit Israel but Palestine. 27. Linden McIntyre, supra n. 25 28. “Toronto 18 terrorism case - Youth trial verdict”, Court file no. YC-07-1587, Ontario Superior Court of Justice September 25, 2008, [135], =160 29. Isabel Teotonio, “The Infiltrator”, supra n. 24 30. “Toronto 18 terrorism case - Youth trial verdict”, [136] supra n. 28 31. Linden McIntyre, supra n. 25 32. Linden McIntyre, supra n. 25 33. Linden McIntyre, supra n. 25 34. Linden McIntyre, supra n. 25 35. Michael Friscolanti, “The Mounties’ man...”, supra n. 26 36. Michael Friscolanti, “The Mounties’ man...”, supra n. 26 37. Michael Friscolanti, “The Mounties’ man...”, supra n. 26 38. Linden McIntyre, supra n. 25 39. Michael Friscolanti, “The Mounties’ man...”, supra n. 26 40. Michael Friscolanti, “The Mounties’ man...”, supra n. 26 41. Michael Friscolanti, “The Mounties’ man...”, supra n. 26 42. “Youth in terror case as `sheep': informant”, The Toronto Star, January 30, 2009, =132 43. Ibid. 44. “Canada: The Cell Next Door”, Frontline World, PBS, aired on January 30, 2007 (reported by Linden McIntyre), =135 45. “Former cabbie spoke of truck bombs”, The Toronto Star, June 11, 2008, =151 46. “Informant says militant training...”, supra n. 17 47. Omar el Akkad and Colin Freeze, “Police had second mole in terror plot”, Globe and Mail, October 14, 2006, =127 48. Ibid. 49. Michael Friscolanti, “The four-million dollar rat”, Macleans.ca, February 7, 2007, =118 50. Omar el Akkad and Colin Freeze, “Police had second mole in terror plot”, supra n. 47 51. Ibid.

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52. Ibid. 53. “Toronto 18 informant asked RCMP for $15M”, CBC News, January 19, 2010, =124 54. Ibid. 55. Thomas Walkom, “Third Mole Surfacing in Toronto Terror Trial?”, The Toronto Star, June 21, 2008, =149 56. Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto targets picked, terror trial told”, The Toronto Star, June 10, 2008, =150 57. Isabel Teotonio, “Four have terror charges stayed”, supra n. 21 58. “Toronto 18 co-leader apologizes to Canadians”, CBC, January 14, 2010, =174 59. “Court to hear 'Toronto 18' ringleader's appeal”, CTV News, September 20, 2010, =172 60. Mubin Shaikh, “Toronto 18 bomb plot leader Zakaria Amara appeals life sentence”, Mubin Shaikh website, September 21, 2010, =171 61. R. v. Ahmad, “Reasons for sentence”, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No. CRIMJ(F)2025/07, =175 62. Isabel Teotino, “Oakville man apologizes for role in terror plot”, The Oakville Beaver, January 1, 2010, =163 63. Ian Robertson, “Toronto terrorist pleads for leniency”, The Toronto Sun, December 24, 2009, =162 64. Isabel Teotino, supra n. 65. Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18 fundraiser delivers rap at sentencing”, The Toronto Star, November 26, 2010, =164 66. Ibid. 67. Patt Hewitt, “Toronto 18 menber Shareef Abdelhaleem sentenced to life”, The Canadian Press, March 4, 2011, =177 68. “Toronto 18 informant asked RCMP for $15M”, CBC News, January 19, 2010, =124 69. Michael Friscolanti, “A star informant resurfaces”, MacLeans, January 12, 2010, =169 70. Ibid. 71. Mary Garofalo, Brennan Leffler, Gaïa Willis-Owen, An exclusive jailhouse interview with one of the Toronto 18, convicted terrorist Shareef Abdelhaleem”, Global BC, June 3, 2011, =165 72. Iran Robertson,”Toronto 18 member sentenced to life in prison”, CNEWS, March 4, 2011, =170 73. “Toronto bomb plotter not entrapped: Judge”, CBC News, February 16, 2010, =176 74. Patt Hewitt, “Toronto 18 menber Shareef Abdelhaleem sentenced to life”, The Canadian Press, March 4, 2011, =177 75. Keith Jones, “Why did Canada’s security agencies allow the alleged terror plot to grow?”, WSWS, June 10, 2006, =125 76. Greg Fyffe, “The Canadian Intelligence Community After 9/11”, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, Issue 3, Spring 2011, =173

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