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The Toronto 18 The Toronto 18 Official account On June 2, 2006, Canadian counter-terrorism forces raided homes in and around the Greater Toronto Area resulting in the arrest of 15 people,1 which with the addition of three others detained earlier or later, comprised what became the “Toronto 18”. The large majority of the detainees were in their early twenties or in their late teens, all of them Muslim men. Their names were as follows (in descending age sequence): Abdul Qayyum Jamal, 01-Apr-63 Pakistan/Canada Shareef Abdelhaleem (Abdelhaleen), 01-Jan-76 Egypt/Canada Steven Chand aka Abdoul Shakur, 02-Mar-81 Canada/Canada Yasin Abdi Mohamed, 06-Nov-81 Ethiopia/Canada Jahmaal I. Francis aka Jahmaal James, 16-Apr-83 Canada/Canada Ali Dirie, 10-Aug-83 Somalia/Canada Fahim Ahmad, 10-Aug-84 Afghanistan/Canada Ahmad Ghany, 27-Sep-84 Canada/Canada Asad Waqar Ansari, 08-Mar-85 Pakistan/Pakistan Zakaria Amara, 18-Aug-85 Jordan/Canada Amin Durrani, 17-Jun-86 Pakistan/Canada Saad Khalid, 12-Aug-86 Saudi Arabia/Canada Ibrahim Alkhale Aboud, 15-Sep-86 Iraq/unknown Saad Gaya, 17-Nov-87 Canada/Canada Nishanthan Yogakrishnan, 12-Jan-88 Sri Lanka/Canada Zakir Ahmed Mohiuddin, 19-Jan-88 Saudi Arabia/unknown (Source: Wikileaks) Suhaib Asrar Mohammad, 22-Nov-88 UAE/UAE (Source: Wikileaks) Nikhil Kirtikumar Sarhad, 04-Jul-90 Malaysia/unknown (Source: Wikileaks) The men were suspected of planning a large-scale terrorist attack in southern Ontario that included the detonation of truck bombs at least three locations, and opening fire in a crowded area. They also were accused of planning to storm various buildings such as the Canadian Broadcasting Centre and the Canadian Parliament building, and take hostages. Law enforcement authorities identified other targets, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Parliamentary Buildings' Peace Tower, the Toronto Stock Exchange, a military base and power grids. The suspects were charged under anti-terrorism legislation passed by Canadian parliament in December 2001, in the wake of the mass-murder of September 11, 2001. The main evidence adduced by the government against the men included more than 82,200 intercepted phone calls, email communications and secretly recorded conversations among the suspects; testimonies of two covert informants who infiltrated the group; video evidence that the men participated in two training camps within Canada; a purchase order of 3 tonnes of fertilizer intended for the construction of truck bombs and the possession by a suspect of a remote-control detonator, that he constructed by himself. In the 10 days following the arrests, at least 4,710 articles appeared in media outlets including CNN, BBC News, Al-Jazeera, The Bangkok Post, The Sydney Morning Herald, and The New York Times.2 Questions arose almost immediately about the seriousness of the plot. Friends and family members of the suspects expressed disbelief regarding the seriousness of the accusations, particularly because most suspects had no previous criminal record. Questions were raised whether the government agents who infiltrated the group had encouraged the young men to transform their exalted jihadi talk into real action. The government kept a large veil of secrecy about the case, which was only partially lifted during the trials of the suspects. Prior surveillance by Canadian intelligence and police (1) According to Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Fahim Ahmad, one of the alleged leaders of the “Toronto cell”, was monitored by the CSIS since 2002, “when intelligence agents monitoring extremist chat rooms on the internet spotted him talking up jihad with someone in Calgary.” His friend Zakaria Amara “didn't appear on CSIS radar screens until somewhat later”.3 The actual blogs that allegedly contained “jihadi” discussions, were never released. The websites on which the posts allegedly appeared do not exist anymore. It was not revealed when the surveillance of these two individuals actually began and how intensive it was. The CBC article reveals that Amara was at one point put under “24-hour visual surveillance” and that the phones of several other group members were wiretapped, their workplaces and cars bugged, and their internet accounts hacked into.4 Again, the authorities did not reveal when such surveillance began and whose communications were monitored. According to the article, the “blanket surveillance was so comprehensive that sometimes it seemed the police were spending more time in Amara's apartment than he was.” (2) On March 2005, two wannabe jihadists traveled from Atlanta (Georgia) to Toronto by bus to meet Fahim Ahmad and Jahmaal James, two members of the “Toronto cell” and at least one additional, unidentified, person. A month before they arrived, CSIS agents visited Ahmad. He admitted to them that he was visiting extremist websites, but reportedly said “It was not the right time” for him to do jihad.5 (3) Weeks later, when the Atlanta men were in Toronto, CSIS agents again visited Ahmad. This time he reportedly admitted to posting radical messages online and participating in jihadist conversations.6 (4) After the visiting jihadists returned to Atlanta, CSIS agents continued monitoring Ahmad. On June 27, 2005, an agent reportedly noticed that Ahmad and three associates disappeared into a wooded area from where a “loud bang, louder than a firecracker” was heard.7 It was not revealed what action the CSIS took upon this evidence. (5) In late August 2005, CSIS agents visited Zakaria Amara. It was not revealed why CSIS visited Amara and what they discussed.8 (6) On November 17, 2005, CSIS advised the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) that Fahim Ahmad posed a threat to the security of Canada.9 2 3 2 (7) In December 2005 the “Toronto cell” spent 12 days in “training” for jihad in a wooden area near Washago (Ontario). Ten adults and four youth participated in this camp. The trainers were informant Mubin Shaikh and Steven Chand, a convert whom Ahmad had recruited. A team of more than 200 officers from the Department of National Defence and of the Emergency Response Team – the paramilitary tactical police arm of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) – watched the wannabe jihadists round-the-clock from the ground and from the air, with planes and helicopters.10 According to journalist Christie Blatchford of the Globe and Mail, the authorities asked residents of the nearby village of Washago not to tip off the “terrorist suspects” that they were aware of the camp’s presence.11 (7) According to an affidavit released in the Atlanta trial of Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Sadequee and revealed in April 2006 by Associated Press, the “Islamist extremists” they had visited in Toronto in March 2005, were at the time “subjects of an FBI international terrorism investigation”.12 Fahim Ahmad and his friends were thus not only monitored by Canadian intelligence but also by the FBI.13 On April 25, 2006 Shaikh read to Ahmad from a Toronto Star article about the FBI arresting two men from Atlanta on terrorist charges. The article referred to the men as having been in Toronto to meet with at at least three Islamic extremists. Ahmad said he was “very, very, very tight” with one of the men arrested, and that the two men had stayed at his home for two weeks. Ahmad expressed concern, saying, “I know jail time is so close” and “my days are numbered.”14 (8) Weeks before the “Toronto cell” was arrested, some of its members worried that police were onto them and that they were "going to jail any day.“15 The group’s alleged leader said in wiretaps that he had been referred to in media reports as a "terrorist" and feared he was a "sitting duck" for police. But despite worries, the group embarked on a second training camp for its elite members.[…] "They're gonna nail us all," one of the accused said.16 The nonchalance of the plotters, who continued to develop their murderous plan whilst aware of being watched by the authorities, has puzzled many an observer. Did the plotters really believe that they could conceal their preparations and outsmart the authorities? Or were they given hints by agents that they should not worry? Little was revealed about the repeated contacts between CSIS and the alleged leaders of the plot prior to their arrest. Pathetic heroes Conspicuous When the group exercised in the woods near Washago, it was bitter cold, prompting the members of the group to repeatedly visit a nearby Tim Hortons kiosk to warm up, drink coffee and use the toilets. They all wore army fatigues, drawing inevitable attention to their training.17 Merely weeks before his arrest, Fahim Ahmad was reported handing out jihadi videos outside the Salahaddin Mosque in Scarborough.18 One would imagine that a person planning a grand terrorist operation would refrain from drawing public attention to his extremist views. Was there a particular purpose behind his conspicuous conduct? 3 4 3 Blabbering Cautious terrorist plotters do not blabber. But Fahim Ahmad reportedly said to the participants in the Washago camp: “We’re not officially Al Qaeda but share their principles and methods.” He made this statement in 2005, when merely hinting sympathy for Al Qaeda could lead to one’s arrest. He also delivered a fiery campfire speech that was videotaped, in which he urged attendees to wage war on the West.19 In his verdict, the judge wrote: “Ahmad was by all accounts no disciplined or meticulous. He made highly inculpatory statements to Shaikh at their first meeting. […] Despite warnings, he made many explicit, ill-advised comments over the telephone.”20 Bombastic Amara was determined to capture on camera the exploits of his fans at the Washago camp.
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