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Limiting Democracy for the Sake of Itself: Fighting Extremism with Extreme Measures

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Limiting Democracy for the Sake of Itself: Fighting Extremism with Extreme Measures Limiting Democracy for the Sake of Itself: Fighting Extremism with Extreme Measures by Lucy Liza Viola Saunders A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Masters of Law (LL.M.) Graduate Department of Law University of Toronto © Copyright by Lucy Saunders 2009 Limiting Democracy for the Sake of Itself: Fighting Extremism with Extreme Measures Lucy Saunders Masters of Law (LL.M.) Faculty of Law University of Toronto 2009 Abstract In response to terrorism as one of the major challenges of our time, developments in anti- terrorism law have led to laws that infringe on democratic rights. The author addresses two key questions in relation to such legislation, namely how the development of such laws is influenced by rights instruments, and whether such laws can be justified as a proportionate response to the terrorist threat. The examination focuses on the key rights of expression and association. It takes place within a comparative jurisprudence structure, considering the treatment of these rights in the UK, Canada, Australia and the USA. The assessment is undertaken in the context of the definition of terrorism and in particular reflects on the thought/act distinction, and whether the motive element of the definition leads to a normative response that is justified or is particularly severe to these democratic rights. ii Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................................... III INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................... 1 LIMITING DEMCRACY .......................................................................................................................................................1 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION....................................................................................................2 MILITANT DEMOCRACY...................................................................................................................................................5 THE COUNTRIES CHOSEN FOR COMPARISON.......................................................................................................6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS..........................................................................................................................................7 CHAPTER 1 DEFINITION.................................................................................................................................... 8 THE NEED FOR A DEFINITION......................................................................................................................................8 THE DEFINITIONS AT ISSUE .......................................................................................................................................10 MOTIVE.................................................................................................................................................................................14 OTHER DEFINITIONS......................................................................................................................................................17 THE PROGRESSION FROM A MOTIVE BASED DEFINITION TO CRIMINALIZING EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION.....................................................................................................................................................................20 CHAPTER 2 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK.....................................................................22 CHAPTER 3 THE UNITED KINGDOM ............................................................................................................30 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION THROUGH THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998...........................................30 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION .......................................................................................................................................35 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION..........................................................................................................................................41 UK CONCLUSION...............................................................................................................................................................51 CHAPTER 4 CANADA.........................................................................................................................................54 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION UNDER THE CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS .......54 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION .......................................................................................................................................60 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION..........................................................................................................................................65 iii DEFINITIONAL ISSUES ....................................................................................................................................................65 PRE‐EXISTING OFFENCES AND HATE SPEECH AMENDMENTS ...............................................................................68 OTHER OFFENCES ...........................................................................................................................................................72 CANADA CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................................73 CHAPTER 5 AUSTRALIA...................................................................................................................................76 PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A CHARTER ....................................................................................................76 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION .......................................................................................................................................85 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION..........................................................................................................................................91 AUSTRALIA CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................96 CHAPTER 6 AMERICA .......................................................................................................................................99 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS......................................................................99 AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM ................................................................................................................................106 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ....................................................................................................................................108 IMMIGRATION LAW.....................................................................................................................................................113 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.......................................................................................................................................115 AMERICA CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................................119 CHAPTER 7 DOES A CHARTER MAKE A DIFFERENCE ......................................................................... 122 CHAPTER 8 THE PROPER NORMATIVE APPROACH ............................................................................ 132 IS TERRORISM A QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT CRIME REQUIRING A DIFFERENT NORMATIVE APPROACH? .....................................................................................................................................................................132 THE LINK BETWEEN DEFINITION AND CRIMINALIZING OF ASSOCIATION AND EXPRESSION ......................................................................................................................................................................... 137 THE CRIMINALISATION OF SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION ...........................................................................139 THE BOUNDARIES OF PROPORTIONALITY.......................................................................................................144 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................................... 153 iv 1 Introduction Limiting Democracy The challenge of terrorism has become rooted at the forefront of international legal consciousness. It is unprecedented in its complexity and scope. It has involved democratic governments and judiciaries around the world considering limitations on democracy in very real, concerned attempts to balance the needs and desires of the social and civic order with hard won human rights. This thesis examines the implications this challenge has had for the human rights of freedom of expression and association. It has both a positive and normative dimension: it charts the approaches of the UK, Canada, America and Australia to anti-terrorism legislation, focusing on the difficulties in approaching terrorism that arise from the attitude to the thought element of the crime. It will also consider the appropriate normative approach to Anti-Terrorism Law and address whether tackling thought
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