Countering Kremlin's Media Influence in Europe
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Countering Kremlin’s Media Influence in Europe Patterns of Anti-Democratic Messaging, Disinformation Responses, and Resilience Assets COUNTERING KREMLIN’S MEDIA INFLUENCE IN EUROPE PATTERNS OF ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MESSAGING, DISINFORMATION RESPONSES, AND RESILIENCE ASSETS A confluence of challenges has endangered democracy in Europe, including the rise of domestic extremism and populism, the penetration of social media, artificial intelligence and other digital technologies, and the proliferation of authoritarian-state driven influence operations. The report illuminates the patterns of Kremlin anti-democratic disinformation messaging in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Poland. The disinformation resilience capacity of the four EU member states is additionally evaluated along three main levels: governance and policy- making; civil society action; participation in and contribution to international initiatives. The study puts forward a policy agenda of multi-stakeholder action for protecting EU’s democratic discourse and digital information ecosystem from Russian media influence activities. The comprehensive analysis was the result of an interdisciplinary effort of a CSD team led by the authors Dr. Rumena Filipova, Research Fellow, and Ruslan Stefanov, Director at the Economic Program. Perspectives on the various dimensions of Russian media influence were provided by country contributors Veronika Krátka Špalková, Analyst, Kremlin Watch Program, European Values Center for Security Policy (Czech Republic), Marta Kowalska, President of the Board, Center for Propaganda and Disinformation Analysis (Poland), and Dr. Stefan Meister, Associate Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations. Editorial Board: Dr. Ognian Shentov Ruslan Stefanov Dr. Todor Galev Cover photo: Pixabay This publication has been supported by Civitates, a collaborative initiative of the Network of European Foundations (NEF). The sole responsibility for the publication lies with CSD and the content may not necessarily reflect the positions of Civitates, NEF or the Foundations contributing to the Fund. ISBN: 978-954-477-412-7 © 2021, Center for the Study of Democracy All rights reserved. ACKNOWLedGEMenTS he charting out of the similarities and differences of Russian disin- formation in Europe started with a roundtable debate held in Sofia in May 2019. The participation of experts from Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Republic, France as well as diplomats and media profession- Tals provided important insights into Kremlin media influence across Europe and established the foundations of a collaborative network for multi-stake- holder engagement. Russian disinformation narratives and tactics have been aptly itemized in cooperation with the EU’s East StratCom Task Force. Collaboration with the International Republican Institute’s Beacon Project, particularly Joanna Rohozinska, Brady Hills and Adam Lelonek, has helped CSD apply automated tools for media monitoring. The use of the innovative content tracking tool of the big data company Sensika has allowed CSD to glean additional insights into the possibilities of tracking state sponsored propaganda in Europe. Joining efforts with the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung’s Media Program Southeast Europe, the Center for European Policy Analysis, GLOBSEC (Slovakia), Political Capital (Hungary), China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) has proven essential for developing a cross-European as well as transatlantic framework for the analysis and response to authoritarian state-driven media influence. Dr. Gergana Dimova, Research Associate at Oxford University and Associate Lecturer at the University of Winchester, with her work on democracy, media and accountability, has also provided highly relevant insights. CSD cooperated closely with the Civitates Secretariat throughout the prepara- tion of the report. The constant support from and inclusion into the Civitates network made us part of a community of shared values and perspectives, en- abling a cross-European approach, which has remained sensitive to a variety of angles in studying the threats to a healthy information ecosystem as well as to the specificities in national viewpoints and vulnerabilities. We would like to extend our special thanks to Roy Virah-Sawmy, Program Manager at Civitates, and Léonie van Tongeren, formerly Fund Manager at Civitates. The elaboration of this comprehensive report has benefitted from discussions and research collaboration within CSD. Dr. Alexander Gerganov, Senior Analyst, Economic Program, and Goran Georgiev, Analyst at the Security Program provided important contributions towards better quantifying Russian disinformation. Over the course of the study’s implementation, Galina Sapundjieva, Communications Officer, provided technical editing to make the report complete. CSD interns Callum Kaye, Andreas Burkhardt, David Klotsonis, and Martijn Haas assisted in preparing background analyses and editing. Jennifer Green, Research Associate at CSD, worked scrupulously on the proofreading of the manuscript. Senior Analysts Tihomir Bezlov and Martin Vladimirov, as well as the Director of CSD’s Security Program Rositsa Dzehkova provided invaluable comments to earlier versions of the study. CONTenTS Executive summary .......................................................................................11 Introduction ....................................................................................................19 The Anti-democratic turn: key trends ............................................23 PatternS of Russian Anti-democratic disinformation ................................................................................................31 Commonalities of pro-Russian narration .....................................................31 Differentiations in pro-Russian narration ....................................................34 Intensity of narration of Russian-owned online and social media ...............................................................................................35 national specificities in the dissemination of pro-Russian narratives ................................................................................40 WeatherinG the storm? Best practices AnD gaps In tacklinG disinformation ....................................................................45 What nExT for the resilience of the European Information ecosystem? ............................................................................53 CEntral Europe In the Spotlight .........................................................63 Bulgaria ..............................................................................................................65 PolanD ..................................................................................................................77 The Czech Republic ........................................................................................87 Germany ..............................................................................................................97 AnnEx: Methodological Note .............................................................107 LisT OF FIGURes Figure 1. Kremlin’s influence power mix in Europe ......................................29 Figure 2. Pro-Kremlin anti-democratic discursive ecosystem in Europe ..........................................................................34 Figure 3. Intensity of coverage of President Putin in selected online media in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, and Germany .........................................................36 Figure 4. Facebook presence of Russian-owned outlets in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, and Germany .....................38 Figure 5. Official Russian diplomatic missions’ Facebook presence in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, and Germany .........................................................38 LisT OF BOXes Box 1. Moscow’s media influence toolbox ..................................................39 Box 2. Germany’s first mover attempt to regulate technology platforms and online market competition: netzDG and competition law ....................................48 Box 3. French best practices for tackling disinformation .........................50 LisT OF TabLes Table 1. Core resilience assets for successfully tackling (Russian) disinformation ...................................................49 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AfD Alternative für Deutschland (Germany) AI Artificial Intelligence ARD Association of Public Broadcasting Corporations in the Federal Republic of Germany BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BIS Security Information Service (Czech Republic) BnR Bulgarian national Radio BnT Bulgarian national Television BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party BSTV Bulgarian Free Television BTA Bulgarian news Agency ČT24 Czech Television 24 CEE Central and Eastern Europe CEM Council for Electronic Media (Bulgaria) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CNN Cable news network (United States of America) CSO Civil Society Organization DG Directorate-General (European Commission) DG nEAR Directorate-General for neighbourhood and Enlargement negotiations (European Commission) DSA Digital Services Act DW Deutsche Welle (Germany) EC European Commission EDAP European Democracy Action Plan EP European Parliament EU European Union FB Facebook G7 Group of Seven GDPR General Data Protection Regulation (European Union) GDR German Democratic Republic GRU Russian military intelligence agency IMF International Monetary