THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE IRAQ CRISIS: SHAPING THE CZECH STANCE
David Kr·l, Luk·ö Pachta
Europeum Institute for European Policy, January 2005 Table of contens
Executive Summary...... 5
1. Introduction ...... 7
2. The President 1. Constitutional framework ...... 11 2. Havel versus Klaus ...... 13 3. The Presidentís position on the Iraq crisis ...... 15
3. The Government 1. Constitutional framework ...... 21 2. Governmental resolution: articulation of the Czech position...... 22 3. Continuity of foreign policy ñ the Czech Republic and the ëcoalition of the willingí. . . . . 23 4. Political constellation within government ...... 26 5. Proposal of the Foreign Ministry ...... 27 6. Acceptance of the governmental position ...... 29 7. The power of personalities ...... 30
4. The Parliament 1. General framework...... 35 2. Debate and role of the Parliament before the initiation of the Iraqi operation ...... 36 3. The Chamber of Deputies ñ critique by the opposition ...... 38 4. The Senate debate ñ lower influence of the political parties, higher influence of personalities ...... 39 5. Parliamentary discussion during the Iraq crisis...... 42 6. Discussion on the dispatching of a field hospital to Basra ...... 43
5. The Political Parties 1. Czech Social Democratic Party (»SSD): Ambivalent workhorse of the Czech government . . 50 2. Antiwar resolution of the »SSD Congress: A blow for the »SSD in government...... 51 3. Smaller coalition parties: pro-American but constructive and loyal ...... 54 4. Civic Democratic Party (ODS): Clear position, weak critique of the government and conflict with Klaus ...... 55 5. Communist party (KS»M): Weak in influence but strong in rhetoric ...... 57
6. Conclusion ...... 59
7. Annexes...... (in Czech version only)
3 Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
David Kr·l has been the chairman of EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy since ■ The Czech government expressed political support for the general objectives of 2000 where he also serves as the director of EU policies programme. He also lectures at the United States and its allies on the Iraq issue. However, the Czech govern- the Department of European Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles Universi- ment decided not to participate directly in the US led ‘Iraqi freedom’ military ty in Prague. He graduated from the Law Faculty at Charles University. He is also a cer- operation because there was no UN mandate for such an operation. tified trainer in EU modules for public administration. During the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 ■ The unprecedented conflict between some EU member states and the Euro- he was a member of advisory groups of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Atlantic partnership put the Czech government in a very awkward position Minister. He is a member of the Board of PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Soci- where it did not want to cause ill will to either side in the international debate ety), gathering think-tanks and policy institutes from Central and Eastern Europe and over how to deal effectively with the Iraq question. Newly Independent States. His main areas of expertise in Europeum include the EU reform and Constitutional Treaty, EU enlargement, EU external relations, Common ■ The final government position adopted was the product of a complicated series Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. of internal discussions. This resulted in a compromise which attempted to con- ciliate the pro-American position of the foreign and defence ministers with the strongly pacifist faction in the ČSSD (main governing) party.
■ The outlook adopted by the office of President was influenced by the succes- sion of Václav Klaus who took over from Václav Havel in February 2003. Luk·ö Pachta studies at the Institute of International Studies at the Faculty of Social Klaus and Havel took clear and opposing public positions on the Iraq issue. For Science, Charles University. In 2003-2004 he studied at Sciences Po in Paris. In 2001 he both leaders their distinct positions reflected a long-term commitment to spe- became an editor of “Integrace” – a magazine on EU issues. From September 2001 until cific beliefs and goals. August 2003 he was working as the editor-in-chief of the Integrace magazine. His main areas of research encounter current political developments in the EU, the CFSP and ESDP ■ The role played by political parties such as the ČSSD was also complex. and Transatlantic relations. A majority of the ČSSD parliamentary party adopted an anti-war position. In contrast, members of cabinet such as Prime Minister Špidla and Deputy Defence Minister Skopek were supportive of the American position. These internal differences within the ČSSD were partly responsible for the contradic- tory and ambiguous statements made by the Czech government when expli- cating its position on Iraq.
■ Both of the main opposition parties, the ODS and KSČM had definite, clear and opposing positions on the issue of supporting a military strike on Iraq.
4 5 Executive Summary Introduction
■ All parties except the KSČM accepted the necessity of removing the regime of Saddam Hussein, which was typically described as being both brutal and dictatorial. The pro-intervention arguments often made special reference to the 1. INTRODUCTION Czech Republic’s own authoritarian legacy.
■ The position adopted by the Czech Parliament was largely based on the parti- This policy paper was undertaken within the framework of the ‘Transatlantic san divisions within the upper and lower chambers. Relations Research Project’ and in co-operation with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. ■ The official position adopted by the government of the Czech Republic can be The purpose of this research is to assess and analyse the formation of the considered the only sensible stance possible given the prevailing internal political Czech foreign policy position during the Iraq crisis. The Czech position has often divisions and the international conflict between the transatlantic partners. been portrayed in the media as being ambivalent, inconsistent and unclear. This study does not attempt to assess the Czech position in terms of the legality, legit- ■ The stance taken by the Czech government was a success in that it did not imacy or necessity of the US led military invasion of Iraq. The main focus here cause any immediate rift in relations between the Czech Republic and those will be to outline those factors which were important in determining Czech for- countries supportive of military action in Iraq or those who favoured a more eign policy on the Iraq issue. Furthermore an attempt will be made to place the peaceful resolution. However, the Czech government did fail to communicate Czech position on Iraq within the context of Czech foreign policy more general- its position in a coherent and consistent manner on the domestic and interna- ly. Was the Czech position on Iraq a credible one on the international stage? tional stages. What impact did the adoption of the Czech position on Iraq have on domestic politics and relations with other countries? This study will focus on a specific timeframe – autumn 2002 to spring 2003 – that is on the immediate pre-war and post-intervention phases. We accept that the events in Iraq and the position the Czech government adopted on this issue have had far reaching consequences. However, the key goal in this study is to outline the way in which the Czech position on Iraq evolved during this critical period where particular emphasis will be placed on the positions adopted by domestic political actors and their attempts to influence the government’s final position. There are additional reasons for looking back on the events of more than one year ago and addressing the issues which have arisen in their wake. In our opinion, the Iraq crisis was a very significant – perhaps unprecedented – event in the histo- ry of transatlantic relations and the Euro-Atlantic community. Such trans-national developments are we believe reflected in the considerations that underpinned the formulation and articulation of Czech foreign policy on Iraq. The Czech Republic has been a member of NATO since 1999 and has developed strong links to the United States and was in early 2003 on the cusp of joining the European Union (EU). From the Czech perspective, the conflict that arose between the United States and member of the EU over Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003 represents perhaps the greatest dilemma to face her foreign policy makers in the post-1989 era.
6 7 Introduction Introduction
The reaction of the Czech Republic to this important and unique situation was analysis, we have taken into consideration the constitutional role assigned to each determined by domestic political considerations. Domestic political actors had to of these actors in terms of competence to deal with foreign and security policy. Fur- come to terms with many important and complex issues whose consequences thermore, we have been critically aware of the activities and involvement of indi- were deemed likely to have lasting effects on the country in a variety of spheres. vidual actors on the Iraq issue and how these considerations have shaped their There were at least two factors that played a key role in the formation of the preference structure. In this respect we have attempted to assess both the degree of Czech position on Iraq. First, consideration must be made of the roles and goals consonance in the preferences of these ‘stakeholders’ and also the internal dynam- of domestic institutional actors who have been traditionally involved, for consti- ics lying behind the presentation of their various foreign policy proposals for Iraq. tutional reasons or otherwise, in the design and implementation of Czech foreign Of course a number of other factors and interests may have influenced the for- and security policy. Second, the unique and unprecedented circumstances sur- mulation of the Czech stance on the situation in Iraq too but these are only dealt rounding the Iraq crisis coincided with a complex domestic political environment with here to a limited degree. For example, a case could be made for a more within the Czech Republic. As a result specific domestic political actors and insti- detailed analysis of public opinion on military intervention in Iraq and the role tutions such as the parliament were able to play a key role in the formulation of that the public played in shaping government preferences. Similar consideration policy on Iraq.1 should also be made of other interested lobby groups such as those from the com- A primary objective of this study is to indicate which factors were most impor- mercial arena. tant in determining the outcome observed. This study will make use of the theo- The structure of this paper reflects the behaviourist approach within the study retical literature on foreign policy and international relations. Much of this of international relations and will therefore focus on the attitudes of specific polit- literature highlights the heterogeneity of domestic processes that are important in ical actors or stakeholders who had an interest in the Iraq issue. In the first part the formulation of an externally coherent foreign policy agenda. This approach is of the study we will examine the role played by the Czech executive. The exec- primarily associated with the behaviourist2 tradition or framework within the utive here refers to the holders of the office of President (Havel and Klaus), the international relations discipline and most especially with the work of James government and the Foreign Ministry. These three institutions are those primari- Rosenau3 and later developed and extended by Charles Kegley and Eugene Wit- ly charged under the Czech constitution with formulating and implementing for- tkopf.4 Rosenau divided the factors shaping a country’s foreign policy into five eign and security policy. categories: the influence of external environment and circumstances, the internal The second part of this study examines debates that took place in the Czech political and social situation, the constitutional and institutional framework for the Parliament. The Parliament normally performs a subsidiary role in foreign poli- foreign policy decision-making, the role of individual actors in the constitutional cy making generally restricting its activities to that of supervision. However given and administrative system and finally the influence of individual actors holding the fact that the Iraq issue was characterised by significant military and security relevant posts. considerations the Czech Parliament nonetheless played an important role in the The analysis developed in this study will use Rosenau’s broad explanatory articulation of the Czech Republic’s official position. The third and final part of typology following the motives and conduct of the main Czech political actors dur- this paper is devoted to the attitude of Czech political parties. Our examination ing the Iraq crisis. These actors maybe identified as: the government, the foreign will assess the role political parties played in the drafting of government resolu- ministry, the president, the parliament and political parties. In undertaking this tions. We will pay particular attention to the debate and amendment process and additionally the internal debates that took place within parties by examining 1) The realist tradition in international relations argues that the foreign policy of small countries is to a large extent determined by statements and resolutions issued. internal policy making considerations. 2) A seminal example of the behaviourist approach to international relations is Graham T. Allisonís The Essence of Decision: This study is based on an investigation of two types of publicly available Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, London, 1999 sources of information. First, an examination was made of official documents such 3) See, James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York, Nichols, 1980 and ìPre-Theories of Foreign Policy,î In: R. as resolutions emanating from government, parliament and political parties. Barry Farrell (ed.) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston (Ill.), Northwestern University Press, 1996. 4) Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy. Pattern and Process (5th Edition), New York, Saint Martinís Second we have utilised the evidence provided by unofficial documents. This Press, 1995, p.15. covers a wide range of material such as the minutes of parliamentary plenary ses-
8 9 Introduction The President sions, parliamentary committee meetings, newspaper and radio articles and inter- views. In addition, we undertook structured interviews with politicians, civil ser- vants, journalists and academics. Here we able to obtain additional information and informed opinion not presented in official documents or readily available 2. THE PRESIDENT through public information channels. In this respect we would very much like to thank all those who kindly provided us with their time and expertise and believe their contribution has greatly benefited this study. There are two factors that led to imprecise and often misleading perceptions It is our hope that this study will contribute to a better understanding of the of the position of the President of the Czech Republic in both the Czech and for- Czech Republic’s position during the Iraq crisis. We feel that our research strate- eign media on the issue of military operations against Iraq. The first factor is insuf- gy of addressing the Iraq issue one year after the events in question took place ficient familiarity with the competence and the constitutional role of the President using a variety of information sources and placing all such evidence within the in the area of foreign policy. The second factor is the radical shift of opinion appropriate context has been a sensible one. While this study deals with the spe- caused by the presidential change in February 2003, when Václav Klaus took the cific issue of the Iraq crisis and all its particularities we nonetheless feel that the office after Václav Havel. research undertaken here highlights the more general features of the Czech for- eign and security policy making process in the twenty-first century. 2.1 Constitutional framework The imprecise perception of the constitutional position of the President as regards formulating and articulating foreign policy was the first factor influencing the position of the president in connection with the attack on Iraq. This was caused by little familiarity amongst the Czech and foreign media and also within the public with the President’s competence in this particular area. If we want to understand the position of the Czech President in terms of foreign policy gener- ally and in the Iraq crisis in particular, we have to deal with his position as defined enacted within the Czech constitutional system. The executive power of the President is defined in Chapter III of the Czech constitution. If we consider the role of the President in the area of foreign policy, which is relevant for this study, his executive power should be distinguished from his position as the head of the state, which is a term dealt with by international law.5 By this we mean his symbolic role reflecting his personification of the Czech state and Czech sovereignty with respect to third countries. Apart from this pure- ly representative function it is necessary to mention his constitutional powers, enacted in article 63/1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. These consti- tutional powers define his competence with regard to foreign relations. Article 63/1 deals primarily with representation of the Czech state with other countries, the negotiation and ratification of international treaties, the receiving of the heads
5) Gerloch, H¯ebejk, Zoubek: ⁄stavnÌ systÈm »eskÈ republiky / The constitutional system of the Czech Republic. Prague: Prospektrum, 2002, p. 194.
10 11 The President The President of diplomatic missions and the appointing and recalling of the heads of Czech ments for a large-scale analysis and articulation of foreign policy. The Presiden- diplomatic missions abroad. These powers are known as counter-signature pow- tial administration primarily revolves around the Office of the President, which is ers, which mean that in order for these decisions to be valid, the signature of the not primarily an administrative body. It consists of only several departments, of Prime Minister or an authorised member of the government (that is of the For- which the protocol, press, political and possibly the security departments are most eign Minister as far as foreign policy is concerned) is required. As a result, the relevant in the domain of foreign policy. In addition there are advisors on single President of the Republic does not act as an autonomous constitutional-political issues whom are available to the President and these may include foreign-politi- actor on matters concerning foreign policy. These powers are unlike the Presi- cal matters. These advisors are selected at the discretion of the President. The dential office’s other powers that do not requiring a counter signature from a par- number of advisors is limited and generally does not exceed ten or so experts. ticular member of the government.6 Therefore, it is the government that is This presidential administrative capacity is incomparable with the governmental accountable for the execution of presidential powers in foreign policy. The gov- administration or the foreign ministry both of which have detailed expertise and ernment is directly accountable to the Parliament (i.e. to the Chamber of more extensive human resources. Consequently, the formulation of the opinions Deputies) through the counter signature provision within the constitution. by the president in foreign policy matters often stays at a general level and is to With regards to the constitutional definition of competence in the area of for- a large extent influenced by his opinions and political persuasion. Such a situa- eign policy there are three important points need to be borne in mind. First the tion underlines the significant role that the president’s personality may play when powers of the President to represent the state with respect to third countries is public comments are made on foreign policy issues. likely to be the most controversial of these constitutional powers. Such represen- tation is largely made up of activities such as media presentations, conference par- ticipation, participation at international forums and attendance at summits 2.2 Havel versus Klaus leading to decisions of a substantial nature typically involving the signing of inter- The third key factor that strongly influenced perceptions of the position of the national agreements. It is obviously not possible for the president to have the Czech President during the Iraq crisis was the change in the role of the office of approval of the prime minister or relevant government minister for all his speech- President with the foundation of the sovereign Czech Republic in 1993. The es, in which he acts as the head of the state. As a result, it may be difficult to dis- departure of Václav Havel and the election of Václav Klaus in late February 2003 tinguish (especially for foreign people not familiar with the Czech constitutional represented both symbolic and substantive changes. Václav Havel was not only system and its operation) speeches, in which the president articulates his person- a symbol of the Velvet Revolution but also the most significant symbol of conti- al opinions, and acts, which are of a binding nature for the Czech Republic (or nuity of Czech constitutionalism since 1989, especially with regard to the ‘Velvet the government in particular). The coordination of the positions taken by the Divorce’ of January 1 1993. He was the longest serving constitutional actor dur- President and the government can therefore appear as problematic, especially if ing the relatively short existence of the Czech Republic and he effectively became both of the political actors come from opposite sides of the political spectrum or an incarnation and personification of the Czech Republic at many international if these persons have completely different opinions on certain matters regarding fora. His retirement from the office of Czech President may therefore be seen as international relations. As we will demonstrate shortly with the cases of Václav marking the end of an era. Havel’s tenure in office with regard to foreign policy Havel and Václav Klaus, this happened several times in the past. Furthermore, it may be characterised as being predicated on five key goals – (1) Efforts toward should be noted that the President is not accountable for his performance in promoting a common responsibility for our planet; (2) Promotion of internation- office, to the government or to the Parliament.7 al cooperation in the solution of global issues; (3) Elimination of differences Second, with regard to the restricted role of the president in foreign policy, it between north and south across the globe; (4) The projection of moral values and should be noted that the President does not have sufficient administrative instru- human rights into international relations; (5) Highlighting the impact on multi-lat- eralism and the role of international organisations. Simultaneously Václav Havel
6) Article 62 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. proved to be a strong “Atlantist”. In many speeches he emphasised the values 7) Article 54/3 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. shared by democracies on both shores of the Atlantic. Havel also stressed his
12 13 The President The President belief in NATO as the main structure engaging transatlantic partners. The NATO a reflection of the Czech Republic’s true foreign policy that is the sole pre-requi- summit organisation in Prague in November 2002 was a particular demonstration site of government. The office of President under Václav Havel was strongly of Havel’s attitudes in this respect. shaped by his personality and all indications are that this same principle applies Havel’s successor, Václav Klaus was elected President in February 28, 2003. equally well to the presidency of Klaus. There are of course noticeable differences Klaus is by common consent a very different personality to that of his predeces- in the articulated foreign-policy positions of both Presidents Havel and Klaus. sor. Klaus took over the presidential office after a decade in active politics, hav- With regard to the articulation of these positions – unless they are the positions ing served in two key constitutional positions – Prime Minister and Chairman of of binding nature requiring the consent or counter signature of the government – the Chamber of Deputies. In this respect, being elected to presidential office is there is continuity in that both presidents express their own opinions that are a crowning point in his political career. Briefly speaking Klaus’ fundamental for- informed by their own personal political and moral orientations. However, it is eign policy orientation may be defined in terms realism and pragmatism. Fur- clear that in the expression of these opinions, they are not fixed and exhibit a cer- thermore, Klaus is a priori against the institutionalisation of international tain fluidity or at the very least can be rhetorically adapted. This was evident in cooperation. Between 1993 and 1997 Klaus ‘coexisted’ with President Havel as the case of President Klaus during the Iraq crisis. Prime Minister. Both Havel and Klaus were familiar with each other’s foreign- policy positions mainly because on many foreign issues their respective positions were different. They are widely known to have had differences over cooperation 2.3 The Presidentís position on the Iraq crisis among the four Visegrád countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slo- The position of the President before and during the operation in Iraq must be vakia) and the role of the European Union in foreign policy of the Czech Repub- perceived in the light of the factors described in the previous section. A discrep- lic. Havel was one of the main supporters and initiators of Visegrád – he oversaw ancy between the Presidents’ and Czech governments positions on the key cur- the emergence of Visegrád cooperation as Czechoslovak President in 1991. On rent world events (such as the Iraq crisis) was underpinned by an unclear the other hand, Václav Klaus denied the need for a Visegrád framework that is perception of the constitutional role of the President. The public and media were a platform under which four of the Central European countries tried to coordi- probably misled into thinking that the statements made by President’s Havel and nate their approaches toward accession into the European Union and NATO. Klaus were binding in nature. Klaus emphasised instead the need for the Czech Republic to advance ahead of There is common agreement that Václav Havel kept a relatively low profile in its partners. Opposing the concept of Visegrád coordination, Klaus focussed the discussions over Iraq and did not take an important part in them. He did not more on building pragmatic forms of cooperation such as the Central European make any public media comments regarding the question of planned military Free Trade Area (CEFTA). He was one of the founders of this organisation. In strikes. The most likely explanation of this approach is the fact that at the moment short, Václav Klaus perceives the European Union as an organisation, which the the Czech government and other political leaders began to take clear positions on Czech Republic had to enter for pragmatic reasons in which there was no other the issue of a possible military strike, based on UN Security Council resolution alternative to accession. In contrast, Havel viewed EU accession as a return into No. 1441, Václav Havel’s mandate as President was about to expire. the civilised family of European democracies and a symbolic crowning of the The only ostentatious demonstration of Havel’s position on the future of Iraq Czech Republic’s transformation as a political community into a standard West was his signature of the “Letter of Eight”, addressed by the representatives of European country. eight European countries (Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, With the resignation of Havel and succession of Klaus as President of the Hungary and the Czech Republic) to the Wall Street Journal. This letter demon- Czech Republic there was a certain expectation of changes in the foreign policy strated support for an American military strike against Iraq. If we ignore for position likely to be adopted by this constitutional office. It is once again impor- a moment the content of this letter, it is important to reflect on one crucial fact. tant to point out that presidential policy positions are primarily based on the pres- Before Václav Havel had signed this public letter, seven prime ministers (repre- ident’s constitutional position. Such a position allows the President to espouse his sentatives of the executive) had already signed this document. Each of these own opinions or political orientation. Such policy pronouncements are not seven signatures could have been considered as constituting the real position of
14 15 The President The President the governments in question. In the case of Václav Havel, his position was nei- vious positions. In 1999, as Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies and leader of ther based on consultations with, or the approval of, the Czech government. the largest opposition party (ODS) he expressed a critical opinion of the NATO Therefore the ‘Letter of Eight’ cannot be regarded as the official position of the strike in Yugoslavia. Klaus further asserted that the US led coalition did not want Czech Republic. As a result, the Czech government distanced itself from primarily to destroy weapons of mass destruction. According to unofficial sources, Havel’s position and Prime Minister Spidla repeatedly pointed out that he doubted if Saddam Hussein’s regime had such weapons. Klaus felt that the Havel’s signature did not reflect the position of the Czech government. For this American’s key objective was to remove the Saddam Hussein’s regime.10 On reason also many Czech politicians condemned the name given to the letter pub- these grounds President Klaus condemned the strike as he considered the possi- lished in the Wall Street Journal as being the “Letter of Eight”. This is because bility of attaining substantial political change and the democratisation of Iraq Havel’s signature was an expression of his own personal opinion. On the other through military intervention to be unrealistic. Klaus also argued that Iraq was hand, it is not possible to ignore the fact that Havel signed the letter on January not the only inhumane and non-democratic regime in the world and that a war 30, 2003 while still holding a constitutional mandate.8 For these reasons, the for- primarily oriented toward regime change was an unprecedented development on eign media and some politicians (e.g. French President Chirac) assigned consid- the issue of Iraq. An important feature here is that the president, when formulat- erable significance to this gesture. ing his statements, assigned a big role to public opinion, which was on largely in The motives behind Havel’s signature of the controversial letter are not entire- the Czech Republic – as well as in the whole of Europe – against the war.11 He ly clear. It may be assumed that by attaching his signature to this letter he meant declared that he would make every effort to bring Czech political representatives to show the American administration that there was a segment within the Czech (including the government) in line with majority public opinion, as Klaus regard- political system that was favourable toward US plans for Iraq, despite the fact that ed the Iraq issue as being an absolutely fundamental one.12 a Czech government signature was not forthcoming. Havel was encouraged to The pre-emptive nature of Klaus’ attitude on Iraq was also reflected in his con- sign the letter by pro-American circles within the Foreign Ministry, most espe- flict with American ambassador to Prague, Mr. Craig Stapleton, – a conflict that cially the Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Vondra, a former ambassador to was watched relatively closely in the media. Although the exact details of the Washington and a close confidant. meeting between President Klaus and the American ambassador are not known When there was an escalation in the tensions over Iraq leading eventually to as it took place in Prague Castle behind closed doors, both of them after the meet- initiation of military operations against Iraq, Václav Klaus was by that time Pres- ing admitted differences in opinion.13 According to unofficial sources, the Presi- ident of the Czech Republic.9 His attitude to the US led military strike against Iraq dent asked the ambassador to send a clear message to Washington that the Czech was quite unambiguous. The President articulated his position in many public Republic was not a country that was supportive of the coalition. According to appearances, articles and interviews for the TV and radio in both the domestic other sources, Klaus went further and stated that he did not believe that the allies and foreign daily press. would find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. By making such a statement he President Klaus’s position on Iraq may be viewed as being based on a number was implicitly casting doubts on the official justification made by the American of factors. Firstly, his attitude toward Iraq stemmed from the idea, which was to administration for a military strike against Iraq. a large extent consistent with the long-term attitude of Czech diplomats during President Klaus considered the government’s position on the Iraq crisis as being the nineties – use of force in international relations is a strategy of last resort in appropriate and balanced.14 He declined to declare whether the Czech Republic times of crisis. This criteria according to Klaus, was not fulfilled in the case of Iraq. Klaus’ position on the matter of military strikes was consistent with his pre- 10) Interview with V·clav Klaus in Hospodarske noviny of March 21, 2003 11) In early February 2003 the US led military strike was supported by only 22% of Czech citizens. More than two thirds of citizens 8) The letter was published in the Wall Street Journal on January 30, 2003. The presidential mandate of V·clav Havel expired on were against. Public support for the war was even lower if the UN Security Council did not approve this strike. Source: CVVM, February 2, 2003. 2003. 9) In this respect it is necessary to note that V·clav Klaus was only elected President on February 28, 2003. Therefore after the 12) ëJak vidim tuto valku / War in my eyes,í The article published in Mlada fronta Dnes, March 25, 2003. expiration of Havelís mandate there was quite a long intermezzo. Presidential powers during this ëintermezzoí period passed 13) Interview with Craig Stapleton for Cesky rozhlas Radiozurnal, December 11, 2003, www.rozhlas.cz pursuant to the Czech Constitution to the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies respectively. 14) ëJak vidim tuto valku / War in my eyes.í This article was published in Mlada fronta Dnes, March 25, 2003.
16 17 The President The President was taking the side of the USA and Great Britain, that is the leading countries of a governmental resolution. However, as soon as the government accepted a com- the war coalition, or the side of France and Germany, the strongest objectors to the promise position, the president supported it, because in his opinion this compro- military intervention. He clearly declared this in a statement on a visit to Berlin on mise reflected the consensus among political representatives and was also April 10, 2003. He stated that the Czech Republic had its own position, the goal acceptable to public opinion. Another example is the conflict with the American of which was assistance in averting a humanitarian disaster in Iraq. On the other ambassador to Prague when Klaus expressed his reservations of the American hand the Czech Republic’s endeavoured to bridge the divisions within Europe and administrations position on Iraq. However, on March 31 he sent a letter to Presi- redress the weakening of the transatlantic link. By making such statements Klaus dent Bush,15 in which he stressed Czech support for the coalition (notwithstanding articulated the fears of a considerable number of Czech politicians, who felt the fact that it took place within the Enduring Freedom operation). Such support uncomfortable in being confronted with the necessity of having to make a choice was given within the spirit of the Czech governments resolution and the parlia- between both sides. Klaus’s position is consistent with his personal opinions of the mentary mandate given. Furthermore support of the position of the American Czech Republic’s foreign policy goals. According to Klaus, Czech foreign policy administration was linked to Czech Republic being a strong supporter of NATO must be autonomous enough to protect national interests and this is especially true and her fellow ally the USA. in the case of smaller countries such as the Czech Republic. In the case of the Iraq If we are to assess the President’s role based on the experience of the Iraq crisis crisis, the Czech interest was not to show clear support for the war coalition or to in the field of foreign policy generally, it can be said that two key factors played side with the objectors. However, Klaus strongly condemned those voices that their part. First, the constitutional definition of the President requires him to coor- intentionally hesitated in making a choice between both sides. dinate any binding agreements he might support with that of his government. This With these opinions Klaus confirmed his wider political agenda of supporting does not mean that he has to be in consent with it on all the main matters of for- the independent role of the national state and the necessity of protecting the eign policy. In the case of the Iraq crisis, the president and government were in Czech Republic’s national interests. For Klaus, the national state is still the pri- agreement, however in many other cases, this was not the case. For example, dur- mary arena for the realisation of individual freedom and is the fundamental unit ing the war in Iraq a strong conflict arose between the President and the govern- in international relations. In this respect, Klaus implied that small countries ment (the Foreign Minister) regarding discussions on the future of Europe in the should not be forced to accept the positions adopted by larger countries. final phases of the Constitutional Convention. This disagreement almost grew into If we are to assess the position of the Czech President during the Iraq crisis, a media battle between these two constitutional actors. The second key factor was several conclusions may be made. First, Václav Klaus was a dominant person in the personality of the President. This factor strongly influences his role in foreign every respect who often made statements on the international situation. In con- policy. Because the head of the state is a personification of the state and its sover- trast, Václav Havel, having signed the “Letter of Eight”, did not express any opin- eignty, he receives ceremonial tributes, as well as space in media. The President is ion on the military strike on Iraq, not even later in a private capacity. Klaus’ allowed to articulate his opinions on foreign policy relatively freely as he is not opinions were consistent during the whole of the crisis. The President did not accountable de jure for his performance in office. This may cause some confusion deviate from his previously articulated attitudes, for example in relation to the among the public or the media, which in many cases consider presidential state- NATO strike in Kosovo. ments as binding statements on government. This confusion was apparent in the Second, Klaus’ statements on the Iraq crisis were basically consistent with both case of the Iraq crisis too when Havel’s signature of the “Letter of Eight”, although governmental and parliamentary statements (which he repeatedly emphasised) as it was completely personal and symbolic, was often wrongly regarded as the posi- well as with the prevailing opinion of the Czech public. It is, however, necessary tion of the Czech government. The government thereafter had to distance itself to admit that Klaus’ opinion evolved – minimally in a rhetorical way – during the from Havel’s position and to explain its strategy to foreign partners. crisis. This can be demonstrated with at least two examples. Klaus adopted an obstructionist position at a meeting of the State Security Council toward the pro- posal of the Foreign Ministry for the Czech Republic to get support for the ‘Iraqi Freedom’ operation. Klaus probably feared that this proposal might be turned into 15) See appendix for details of letter sent by V·clav Klaus to President Bush of March 31, 2003.
18 19 The President The Government
3. THE GOVERNMENT
3.1 Constitutional Framework The position of the Czech Republic during the Iraq crisis and in the matter of the intervention in Iraq itself was for the most part determined by the govern- ment’s attitude and the partisan composition of government. These two factors are important because the government is responsible for the formulation of for- eign policy in accordance with the Constitution of the Czech Republic and pre- vailing political conventions. According to Article 67 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (Ústava České republiky) the government is “the supreme body of the executive” a position which also applies to foreign policy. In the Czech Republic the government also shares its powers with another body of the executive – the President. However, the powers of the President are very limited. The Czech President can, and often does, dele- gate many of them (e.g. conclusion of international treaties) to the government.16 Unlike the president the government manages many administrative bodies enabling the formulation and implementation of the country’s foreign policy. The government is also accountable to the democratically elected lower House of Par- liament, which is important as regards democracy of country’s foreign policy. Let us start from the fact that the government is responsible for country’s for- eign policy. During the Iraq war the hands of the government were more tightly bound than in other matters of foreign policy. The military character of the Iraq crisis forced it to act in concert the parliament, which, pursuant to the constitution, has to decide on whether the country dispatches its soldiers abroad and whether foreign military forces are allowed to be present in the country’s territory. Competence is divided inside the government too. The Foreign Minister is responsible for the field of foreign policy pursuant to the Competence Act, which relates to the establishment of ministries and other central authorities of state administration in the Czech Republic.17 In short, within the constitution the For- eign Ministry is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and coordina-
16) This was true during the relatively long presidency of V·clav Havel (1989ñ2003). 17) Act of CNR No. 2/1969 Coll. (amended 45 times, last in 2000) on the establishment of Ministries and other central authorities of state administration in the Czech Republic.
20 21 The Government The Government tion thereof (it is the bearer of continuity in the country’s foreign policy). In the by itself in preceding resolutions (i.e. mainly the one of January 2003).20 The con- case of the war in Iraq because of the military nature of the crisis it was not pos- tent of the government’s resolution of March 19, 2003 can be summarised as fol- sible to omit the defence minister, who is responsible for the defence and securi- lows. (1) The government of the Czech Republic regretted that it was impossible to ty of the country with respect to other countries. solve the crisis through peaceful means but it attributed the responsibility for the The Prime Minister, who is the strongest actor under within the Czech consti- culmination thereof to the absence of cooperation on the side of the Iraqi regime. tutional system, plays a very specific role. The prime minister holds a dominant (2) The government understood the case for the use of force against Iraq however position in the country’s Security Council, which is an executive body of govern- as a new mandate from the United Nations Security Council had not been ment dealing with national security and which mostly consists of the members of obtained, the Czech Republic would not directly participate in the military action. the government and the President of the Republic.18 The government is a collec- (3) However the Czech Army battalion specialising in radiological, chemical and tive body that makes decisions on the principle of majority voting where all votes biological protection dispatched to Kuwait earlier within the Enduring Freedom are equal. The prime minister’s word de facto prevails over all other ministers. The operation, was set to intervene in Iraq if use was made of, or there was reasonable government remains in office so long as the prime minister retains his position. suspicion of, the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians or the coali- Once a prime minister resigns the government is also dissolved. Generally speak- tion forces. The government further expressed its will to provide Iraq with human- ing the prime minister is the chairman of the largest governmental party. itarian aid and participate in the post-war reconstruction of the country. With respect to the constitutional system of the Czech Republic it is natural that This resolution for many people both in the Czech Republic and abroad did the greatest responsibility during the Iraq crisis was put on the shoulders of the gov- not illustrate a consistent position.21 During this period there was never-ending ernment, and above all of on the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence speculation on whether the Czech Republic was, or was not, a part of the war Minister. It is important to note here that most governments in the Czech Repub- coalition. The apparently inconsistent position adopted was a result of the diffi- lic are multiparty coalitions. Consequently, the views and interests of the political cult negotiations in the Security Council and within government itself. In formu- parties within the coalition are debated inside government. At the same time it is lating this official position three key features of Czech foreign policy are evident. necessary to find – in the field of the government – a compromise in the interests Firstly, there was an attempt to provide continuity in the foreign policy position of the Czech Republic. In the Czech political system it is important to note that the of the Czech Republic. Secondly, the resolution reflected the prevailing political Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (at the time of the Iraq crisis the Vice-Prime partisan divisions in the government and in the Chamber of Deputies. Thirdly, Minister as well) often come from different political parties. This was the case dur- specific political actors in key posts played a strong role. Their influence was ing the Iraq crisis. For this reason, decision-making in the government of Vladimir strengthened by the crisis situation surrounding the Iraq issue. Now, let us take Spidla was quite different from that which would have taken place in the preceding a look at each of these three key factors in more detail. Although each of these single party cabinet of Milos Zeman. However, in terms of the Czech political sys- factors played a different role they nonetheless all had an impact on the position tem the cabinet of Milos Zeman was a rather exceptional one. adopted by the Czech government on the Iraq crisis.
3.2 Government resolution, articulation of the Czech position 3.3 Continuity of foreign policy ñ On the eve of the initiation of the operation against the Saddam the Czech Republic and the ëcoalition of the willingí Hussein’s regime the Czech government adopted a resolution (March 19, 2003),19 In discussing the continuity in Czech foreign and security policy it is necessary in which it expressed the Czech Republic’s position while keeping to the limits set to discuss the primary documents underpinning policy making in this arena, name-
18) Constitutional Act No. 110/1998 Coll., on the security of the Czech Republic. 20) Governmental resolution No. 66/2003, January 13, 2003. See appendix. 19) Governmental resolution No. 286 of March 19, 2003. This resolution relayed the reaction of the government in connection with 21) However, some experts refer to the fact that foreign policy ìhas the rightî to be inconsistent. Taking a clear position in the the US led invasion of Iraq (see the appendix for the whole wording). complex context of international relations is very difficult, especially for a small country.
22 23 The Government The Government ly Concept of the Czech Republic’s Foreign Policy,22 and the Czech Republic’s Security biggest military power in the world, which, moreover, assumes certain securi- Strategy.23 Both of these documents define the long-term framework of the govern- ty guarantees for its allies. As a Foreign Ministry official confirmed, the Czech ment’s foreign and security policy. It is not the purpose of this section to examine Republic has always benefited from the link with the USA and nobody else has to Czech foreign policy and these specific documents in detail. In considering the ever offered a better alliance. Iraq crisis it is appropriate to stress some important aspects of these policy docu- Given these underlying assumptions and the current practice of the Czech ments. Both of these documents take as their starting point the geopolitical position Republic’s foreign and security policy, it is not surprising that the Czech Repub- of the country, its integration into international structures as well as the current lic felt it necessary to be on the list of those who support American policy international situation. It is typical that countries of a similar size to the Czech against Iraq. Another reason for the Czech Republic’s indirect and limited sup- Republic emphasise international cooperation through peaceful means, multi-later- port of the war in Iraq was Czech political representatives sympathy for aspira- alism and international law.24 When we look at the main priorities of Czech Repub- tions to overthrow the authoritarian regime in Iraq, albeit through the use of lic’s foreign and security policy, formulated in the documents cited above, we see force. In Czech politicians’ speeches and statements (most especially in the case a focus on EU membership, active NATO membership and the fight against ter- of Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda) there were many references to the fact that ror.25 More generally the transatlantic link is considered to be one of the main pil- the Czech Republic had its own historical experience of dictatorship and should lars of Czech Republic’s foreign policy. Another key pillar is participation in the therefore support efforts to overthrow this type of regime in Iraq. According to European Union and good relations with neighbouring states. However, the some sources close to the foreign ministry, there was a strong feeling in the for- transatlantic link is considered the most important pillar for Czech security policy. eign ministry that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction and It is possible to argue that the Czech Republic, based on the above-men- this represented a real threat to the western world. tioned concepts, prefers the solving international crises through diplomatic Declaring a clear pro-war position and engagement in the war against Iraq, the means and within the UN. However, when the moment of truth comes it is Czech government acted within a spirit of continuity in foreign policy and in ready (with respect to these long-term priorities) to join the side of its transat- compliance with the acts of former Czech governments. This continuity of Czech lantic allies both within NATO and the EU. When there exists no consent in foreign policy in relation to Iraq can be demonstrated with several examples: NATO and the EU as during the Iraq crisis the Czech Republic – in view of its real interests and priorities in foreign and mainly security policy – is likely ■ Czechoslovakia actively participated in the first war in the Persian Gulf. to support the position of the United States as the leading country of the ■ The Czech Republic participated in the Iraq matters for the whole of the transatlantic alliance. This results from the historical experience of the country nineties (e.g. the Czech Republic was a member of the UN Security Council and the prevailing “Anglo-Saxon orientation”.26 Such factors are foremost in during 1994-1995). This “interest” of the Czech Republic in Iraq was based the minds of most of those charged with creating and implementing foreign on efforts by the Czech Republic to enter NATO and the European Union. and security policy for the Czech Republic and furthermore are typically seen There were also previously close, mainly commercial, relations between Cze- as key elements in analyses of real-world events. The USA represents the choslovakia and Iraq. Czech companies have had in the past strong export links to Iraq. One salient example was agricultural equipment such as Zetor farm tractors that have been manufactured in Brno for the export market 22) Conceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, 2003 ñ 2006, announced in a policy statement on August 5, 2002 and adopted by the Czech government on March 3, 2003. For an unofficial outline in English see, since 1946. According to Foreign Ministry sources, the Czech Republic had http://www.mzv.cz/servis/soubor.asp?id=4670 a strong motivation to support the US led attack on Iraq in order to continue 23) The most recent amendment to the Czech Republicís Security Strategy was made on December 10, 2003. previous strong commercial links to potentially one of the richest countries in 24) Conceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, 2003 ñ 2006: Part II ñ Starting points for the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic. See especially subsection 2.3 ñ Principles of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic. the Middle East. 25) Ibid. Part III ñ Foreign Policy Priorities of Czech Republic, and Part IV ñ Tasks of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic. See ■ The Czech Republic expressed its solidarity with the USA following the attacks especially subsection 4.2 ñ Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic in the Security Area. 26) This orientation is based on the fact that many members of the Czech decision-making elite were educated at American and of September 11 and immediately offered the USA help in the fight against ter- British universities or received training with the British Army. ror. The Czech Republic dispatched a specialised radiation, chemical and bio-
24 25 The Government The Government
logical protection battalion to Kuwait,27 and a field hospital to Afghanistan public opinion, or opposition of President Klaus to giving explicit support for the within the Enduring Freedom operation.28 war in Iraq.30 The over-riding factor underpinning the Czech Republic’s position ■ Not long after September 11, 2001, the Czech government informed the USA was the political divisions inside Vladimir Spidla’s government, which reflected that one of the terrorist leaders of September 11 attack, Muhammad Atta, had the political composition in the Chamber of Deputies, and the important fact that stayed in Prague for some time and had even met some Iraqi representatives. the government had a majority of one single vote in the Chamber of Deputies. This later turned out to be a red herring. But some analysts argue that this event Spidla’s coalition cabinet was divided on the Iraq issue. On the one hand, influenced later Czech cooperation with the USA in the Iraq crisis because it there were two small coalition parties – the KDU-ČSL, whose chairman Mr. Cyril was the Czech Republic that “gave” the USA the red herring and it was the Svoboda was the foreign minister, and the US-DEU, which advocated for explic- Czech Republic who was to blame. This flawed evidence for the justification of it support of the war coalition. Furthermore, they advocated that the Czech the war in Iraq through the establishment of the existence of connections Republic become involved in military operations in Iraq. This position was con- between the Iraqi regime and Al-Qaida proved to be controversial. sonant with a resolution proposal that came from Czernin Palace (the Czech For- ■ The Czech Republic was the NATO summit organiser in Prague in November eign Ministry, MZV). More will be said about this proposal in the next 2002. This meeting had a significant influence on strengthening the future anti-Iraqi sub-section. On the other hand, there were some Ministers in the main govern- coalition. Czech politicians met face-to-face the leaders of the future anti-Iraqi coali- ing party, the ČSSD, who held completely opposing positions. tion and basically promised that the Czech Republic would support them. ■ The Czech Republic allowed for the presence of the coalition forces on the ter- ritory of the Republic and gave permission for flights of the allies’ planes 3.5 Proposal of the Foreign Ministry through Czech airspace and extended the mandate for the deployment of a bat- Foreign Minister Svoboda defended a resolution proposal in the talion to both Turkey and Israel (see, the governmental and parliamentary res- government’s meeting on March 19.31 This proposal had been formulated in the olution of January 2003).29 On the eve of the war in Iraq the Czech Republic main by officials in the Foreign Ministry’s (MZV) security department (practically deported some Iraqi diplomats from the country as personae non gratae. the only department of the Ministry that dealt with the matters of Iraq). This MZV section came under the authority of deputy foreign minister charged with security matters, Alexander Vondra. This proposal assumed involvement of the Czech 3.4 The political constellation within government Republic in the Iraqi Freedom operation on the basis of previously adopted UN res- The evidence presented in the previous sub-section indicates a strong argu- olutions (mainly Resolution 1441). These UN resolutions allowed, according to the ment as to why the Czech Republic should have joined the coalition led by the MZV interpretation, a mandate for operations against the Iraqi regime. It is appro- USA and Great Britain in the Iraqi Freedom operation. The logic of these argu- priate to note here that there was general sympathy and support among MZV offi- ments corresponded with the points made in the foreign ministry’s statement (see cials for the strategic and long-term concerns of America in the war in Iraq.32 sub-section 3.5). In this respect, the foreign ministry may be seen as the main The foreign ministry position depended on the use of Czech soldiers in the “patron” of continuity in Czech Republic’s foreign policy. The non-involvement Iraqi Freedom operation. Such a strategy went, according to a majority of mem- of the Czech Republic in the Iraqi Freedom operation was not a result of antiwar bers of the country’s Security Council and the government, beyond the frame-
27) Dispatching a battalion to Kuwait was of major importance to the United States. This troop deployment assumed an even 30) According to a poll undertaken by the CVVM agency on March 26, 2003, 71% of the citizens of the Czech Republic were greater importance on the eve of the war in Iraq. Kuwait stipulated in its consent for allowing the US Army and its allies to against the war in Iraq, which had just begun, and only 22% supported the war. Other researchers reported similar results. have a base on its territory that the coalition forces provide effective security and protection for Kuwaiti citizens against The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister emphasised that they would not be led by the public opinion, as it was the weapons of mass destruction. government that was responsible for the decisions made on behalf of the country. Minister Svoboda admitted ìthere would 28) This deployment happened one year later on the basis of the governmental resolution of September 11, 2002 and the be something wrong in the Czech state if citizens wanted the warî (interview on Cesky rozhlas 1, March 18, 2003). following resolution of the Parliament. 31) It is an internal document, which is not available. 29) Governmental resolution No. 66/2003 of January 13, 2003, see appendix. 32) Information derived from interviews with the MZV officials.
26 27 The Government The Government work of the parliamentary resolution of January 17, 2003.33 The January 17 reso- the negotiations inside the parliament became lengthy due to the articulation of lution allowed the possibility for Czech units to be engaged in operations con- a large number of opinions stemming from the wide range of opinions evident nected with the enforcement of previous resolutions and the disarmament of Iraq within the parliament. under the conditions of a new UN mandate. The MZV, when arguing about the factual existence of a UN mandate for the intervention in Iraq, was probably based on the following sentence in the January 17 parliamentary resolution: 3.6 Acceptance of the governmental position “Whether, or not, the UN mandate is given shall be decided by a government res- After strenuous negotiations in the Straka Academy (the seat of the Czech gov- olution based on a new act passed by the UN Security Council”. According to the ernment) resulting from the conflicts within the cabinet, government ministers MZV, if the UN Security Council did not pass a new resolution, the government were eventually prevailed upon on the basis of their duty to provide responsible could still determine whether, or not, a mandate had been given. government to reach a common position as quickly as possible. All the ministers The proposal submitted by the Foreign Ministry was not adopted by the gov- voted for and then defended the eventual compromise – the government’s reso- ernment in the end due to the strong opposition of some ČSSD Ministers, who, lution of March 19. according to some sources, came with some kind of antiwar counterproposal.34 According to this resolution, the Czech Republic de jure remained outside the Conflicts within government were not based primarily on the nature of the Iraqi Freedom operation and its units were not allowed to enter the soil of Iraq.37 military engagement that might be undertaken by the Czech Republic (and its However, thereafter there were several discrepant interpretations of the resolu- financial implications, which was fixed by the Czech Republic’s capacities and tion among members of the government. Prime Minister Spidla stated in the assets). The nature of the Czech Republic’s military participation was determined Chamber of Deputies on April 15 that the battalion was entitled to participate in in advance by a specific request of the American government. The US requested a strike into Iraq if weapons of mass destruction were used.38 Opposing this, the services of the Czech army’s specialised anti-chemical and anti-bacterial war- deputy defence minister Jaroslav Skopek asserted on March 26 in the Foreign fare battalion.35 The problem was the political consequences of the Czech gov- Committee of the Chamber of Deputies that the Czech battalion was allowed to ernments position. Whether or not the Czech unit was allowed to enter Iraq and enter Iraq regardless of such special circumstances.39 become part of the Iraqi Freedom operation (albeit without a new Security Coun- Eventually Czech military units did enter Iraq within the framework the cil mandate) or whether it participated only in the Enduring Freedom operation. Seventh field hospital was sent to Basra. This medical unit was assisted by a sec- It seems appropriate to mention here that, the USA and its allies as well as its tion of the Anti-chemical and biological warfare battalion based in Kuwait. The opponents did not assign much importance to this nuanced position. Czech government decided on dispatching the field hospital to Basra on April 1, As mentioned earlier, most members of the government did not want to exceed 2003 following a request from the representatives of the city of Basra and the Bri- the limits of the mandate set by the parliament (resolution of January 17, 2003), tish Army Headquarters in southern Iraq. The government decided to accede to which, in their opinion, stipulated Czech participation in the military operations in this request without delay and there were no significant internal conflicts unlike Iraq on the basis of a new mandate from the UN Security Council. Therefore the the situation during adoption of the resolution in March. In this case, there was parliament would again have to decide on the dispatching of soldiers to Iraq at ple- a UN mandate, for the provision of humanitarian aid in post-war Iraq, which, nary meetings of both houses. However, with the rapid sequence of events the gov- moreover, was binding on the government because of the resolution adopted on ernment lacked sufficient time to complete this process.36 In addition, March 19.40 The Czech hospital in Basra should have been under the direct con-
33) See appendix. 37) This is why the Czech-Slovak battalion ñ established by the unification of the Czech and Slovak battalion in Kuwait ñ had 34) According to some sources, the Vice-Chairman of the government, Pavel Rychetsky, threatened with his resignation if the to be split. This division resulted because the Slovak battalion had a mandate from its government to enter Iraq whereas MZV proposal was adopted. the Czech battalion did not. 35) The USA requested this through the ambassador to Prague, Craig Stapleton, in January 2003. 38) Minutes of the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of April 15, 2003. See, www.psp.cz 36) It should be noted here that the start of the military operations came quickly as the ultimatum given to Saddam Hussein by 39) Minutes of the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies Foreign Committee of March 28, 2003. the American President expired early that night, following almost directly after the Czech governmentís meeting. 40) UN Security Council Resolution No. 1472 of March 28, 2003.
28 29 The Government The Government trol of the Czech government and placed under the mandate of the leadership of governments and parliaments resolutions.43 It is therefore difficult to guess what the Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom operations (CENTCOM). Czech units might have happened if the Iraq war crisis had occurred during Milos in Iraq were technically allowed to cooperate with the command structures of Zeman’s term of office (i.e. 1998-2002) when Jan Kavan was foreign minister. these military operations. In the time of the Iraq crisis, deputy foreign minister for security, Vondra was a key figure in developments at Czernin Palace, the Czech foreign ministry head- quarters. In fact, it was Vondra who had convinced Václav Havel to sign the 3.7 The power of personalities “Letter of Eight” – a letter that the government refused to endorse.44 Havel signed The third factor that determined the government position and foreign policy this letter right at the end of his mandate and as a private person, but abroad, and toward the situation in Iraq was the role played by individual personalities with- especially in the USA, Havel’s signature was perceived as being the official posi- in the government and various ministries. As noted earlier, the influence of tion of the Czech government because of the respect that the holder of Czech individual actors increased as with the growing salience of the Iraq issue on the presidency enjoys. For this reason the Czech Republic was placed on the US State public agenda. Department’s list of countries supportive of the war in Iraq. This situation existed Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla played a key role when the governmental because the Czech government did not take any clear position on the Iraq issue resolution was being debated. He found himself in the position of “arbiter” and from the outset. was de facto the author of the final compromise. Being a pacifist he was well Alexander Vondra was the ‘godfather’ of the previously mentioned govern- aware that the Czech Republic had to satisfy her allies in some manner, but at mental resolution proposal of March 19. This resolution was formulated within the same time this did not mean setting to one side the parliamentary mandate the foreign ministry and was introduced by foreign minister Svoboda initially to given to the government on January 17.41 While the position adopted was con- the (Czech Republic’s) Security Council and later to a crucial government cabi- trary to his own personal opinions, he eventually pushed forward what was in net meeting. Vondra himself was the main champion of this resolution during the his view the best stance for the Czech Republic. Spidla made comments to this meetings of both bodies. This proposal for participation of the Czech Republic in effect and in fact this was how the de facto governmental position was described. the Iraqi Freedom operation was generally in line with previous Czech foreign When answering some journalists’ questions, about which chair the Czech policy. But its clear pro-war and pro-American wording was to a large extent Republic was sitting in (meaning whether the Czech Republic was taking the a result of Vondra’s influence. It should be noted that Vondra is a former ambas- pro-war or anti-war side) the Prime Minister replied that the Czech Republic sador to the United States and was a government plenipotentiary at the NATO was sitting in the Czech chair.42 summit in Prague in November 2002 and may be regarded as a convinced The influence of key actors who were directly involved in the situation must “Atlantist” and a champion of American foreign policy. “Vondra’s proposal” may also be taken into consideration. These actors had competence arising from the have been rejected by the government but it was widely discussed in media. This constitutional basis of their executive power. These key actors may be identi- is because deputy minister Vondra did not hesitate to outline his own political fied as Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda and his Deputy Foreign Minister for position on the Iraq issue. Security Alexander Vondra, Defence Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik, the Czech Less clear was the position of Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda. Although he Republic’s ambassador to the USA, Radim Palous and Czech ambassador to eventually accepted “Vondra’s proposal” as his own position, advocating in Kuwait, Jana Hybaskova. favour of it in government, he retained certain reservations toward the proposal The conduct of these influential officials persuaded the anti-Iraqi coalition – reservations based primarily on his own personal opinions. The foreign minis- countries and others that the Czech Republic was de facto a full member of the US led coalition although such a position contradicted the wording of the Czech 43) As a result of these representations by Palous and Hybaskova, the Czech Republic was invited to negotiations on the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. Participation in such negotiations left open the possibility that Czech companies might be awarded some of the lucrative reconstruction contracts. 41) Information provided by a source close to the former Prime Minister. 44) Prime Minister Spidla, in the light of what has been reported here, did not wish to lend his endorsement to this statement but 42) BBC, V·clav Moravec, March 24, 2003. he did not protest in any way that someone else had done it ìon behalfî of the Czech Republic.
30 31 The Government The Government ter was hampered in getting full support for the war coalition for a number of rea- reconstruction of Iraq. She, for the most part, coordinated her effort with defence sons. First, there was his “belief” in importance of international law and the key minister Tvrdik and deputy foreign minister Vondra and not so much with her role of the United Nations in international relations. Second, there was the nega- superior, foreign minister Svoboda.45 tive attitude to the war by the Catholic Church that was important given his posi- It is necessary to take account of these three factors when assessing the contra- tion as leader of the Czech Republic’s Christian Democrat party (KDU-ČSL). dictory statements made and their contribution to what in the end was the only Third, Svoboda’s “pro-Europeanism” combined with the fact that the Czech pragmatic position possible for the government. It was the continuity in foreign pol- Republic was at the time of the Iraq crisis only a few months before an EU acces- icy that motivated the Czech Republic to join the group of countries who support- sion referendum made an ardent pro-war stance difficult. For these reasons, it was ed the anti-Iraqi coalition. The domestic political situation resulted in the Czech easier for Cyril Svoboda to accept the final draft of the government’s resolution, Republic’s adopting a position where deputy foreign minister Vondra felt (using which expressed the support of the allies but did not make the Czech Republic a footballing metaphor) that the Czech Republic did not want “to play on the right an active participant in the fighting in Iraq. Svoboda himself expressed a variety wing, but only wanted to be a supporter on the sideline”.46 However, the influence of personal attitudes in the media toward the Iraq crisis. He maintained that the of particular officials led the Czech Republic to be “more active” in the framework Czech Republic did not want war on the one hand, but when the war broke out, of the anti-Iraqi coalition than it might have seemed possible on basis of the gov- he made the argument that it was obvious that the Czech Republic would take the ernments and parliaments resolutions where many countries even regarded the side of her allies and not that of Baghdad. Czech Republic as a country directly involved in the war in Iraq. It is also important to consider the influence of two people right at the centre of events – Defence Minister Tvrdik and Czech ambassador to Kuwait Jana Hybaskova. Both of them were generally supportive of the war in Iraq and this position influenced the position adopted by the Czech government. The leading supporter of Czech military participation in the war in Iraq was Mr. Jaroslav Tvrdik who was in charge of the defence ministry. This ministry was in close contact with the headquarters of the Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom operations (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. CENTCOM was of course the command centre for the Czech battalion based in Kuwait. The defence minister was basically a communication channel between the Czech government and the American leadership. His influence on putting forward the image that the Czech Republic was an uncompromising ally to the USA was therefore very significant. The Czech ambassador to Kuwait, Jana Hybaskova was also important as she was in touch with the American military based in Camp Doha, Kuwait. Hybasko- va gave the coalition units and local leadership in Kuwait the impression that the Czech Republic was an unambiguous ally to the coalition in the war in Iraq. Even before the war she had been lobbying the Czech government to send the spe- cialist battalion, then based in Kuwait, to Iraq. Later once operations against Iraq had begun with the deployment of the field hospital to Basra she also took part in negotiations on the establishment of the interim Iraqi government in Nasirija 45) This may have had an influence on the governmental decision to call her off in November 2003. The official reason was her open (Nasiriya). Furthermore, she was the key person (in cooperation with MZV) coor- critique of the governmentís decision to withdraw the field hospital from Iraq. dinating the government’s effort to involve Czech companies in the post-war 46) Interview with the BBC, March 24, 2003.
32 33 The Government The Parliament
4. THE PARLIAMENT
4.1 General Framework As explained in the previous chapter, the formulation and implementation of foreign policy is constitutionally primarily the responsibility of the Czech gov- ernment. The parliamentary control over foreign and security policy is exercised through standard government-parliament relations, such as the collective respon- sibility of the government before the parliament or the right of interpellation of individual ministers. However, a particular nature of the Iraqi crisis where a pos- sible involvement in the military operation and deployment of Czech soldiers were at stake, this gave the Parliament a much stronger say over the whole issue than is normally the case on most foreign policy issues. Pursuant to article forty-three of the constitution of the Czech Republic, the parliament has the right to determine matters concerning issues connected with security and defence aspects of foreign policy. In particular, these powers are evident in declarations of war, the fulfilment of the obligations of mutual (com- mon) defence, participation in the defence systems of international organisa- tions, the deployment of military forces outside the territory of the Czech Republic and provisions dealing with foreign military forces being based on the territory of the Czech Republic. In certain cases these decisions may be reserved to government if the units are dispatched for a period shorter than sixty days or if, for example, if such foreign military forces are request permis- sion to over-fly or pass through Czech territory.47 Nevertheless, in these cases the last word is also reserved to the parliament. The government must inform the parliament without delay of such a decision and a negative vote of only one of the houses of parliament is enough to overturn the government’s decision. A key aspect of parliamentary decision-making on such matters is the quorum. If any of the above-mentioned decisions is to be approved, it requires an absolute majority of the members of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate that is over half of all of the members of both houses of parliament. This gives the Czech Parliament quite a strong position vis-a-vis the gov- ernment which is not a standard case in many Western countries and is a cru-
47) Article 43 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic.
34 35 The Parliament The Parliament cial factor in keeping the democratic control over security and defence. On the how, it was possible to get this specialist unit involved in a new operation, other hand, in some cases this can become slightly cumbersome when the where the goal was the disarmament of Iraq. It was evident that in order to international situation requires forthwith action but the government still has to become involved in the Iraqi Freedom operation the unit would have to ask for a parliamentary consent. This was also case of the Iraq crisis in the receive a new parliamentary mandate. Czech Republic. The government’s decision of January 13, 2003 on the mandate of the unit As we will demonstrate in the subsequent section, the parliament used its pow- of became the basis for parliamentary discussion.49 Effectively, this decision ers to a considerable extent and perhaps went even further by pushing the gov- was a response to a request from the US government for support in the Iraq ernment to change its position on Iraq, albeit more rhetorically than substantially. crisis in January 2003. This decision dealt with among other things, the posi- It proved that it can be a powerful player on foreign and security policy issues tion to be taken regarding a possible military strike. The Senate and the Cham- and that the government cannot count on it to give a ‘carte blanche’ automati- ber of Deputies debated and voted on the government’s resolution during cally. This can become an important precedent for crisis of similar nature in the January 16-17, 2003, when they adopted a key resolution.50 In this resolution future. the parliament gave their consent to the presence of the military forces partic- ipating in possible military operations on the territory of the Czech Republic and with flights of the allies’ planes through Czech air space. In this way they 4.2 Debate and the role of the Parliament confirmed the government’s position, which signalled support for the future before the initiation of the Iraqi operation anti Saddam Hussein coalition. Furthermore, it was decided to strengthen the The parliamentary debate on the Czech Republic’s position in case of a pos- battalion located in Kuwait with an extra four hundred personnel and to sible military strike against Iraq was for the most past determined by the con- extend its areas of possible deployment to Turkey and Israel following stitutional competence of the legislative body in the foreign-defence area and a request or granting of consent by these countries.51 circumstances preceding the military operation itself, and naturally by the The question of Czech involvement in the Iraqi Freedom operation was stances of political parties as well as individual personalities represented in both predicated on the existence of a UN mandate. This was the most controversial chambers. As we will see, the party affiliation was more important in the lower point during the parliamentary debates on the Iraq issue. The existence or chamber (Chamber of Deputies) than in the Senate. absence of such a UN mandate for a military strike was of course a controver- To understand fully the nature of parliamentary debates during the crisis, we sial point in the UN’s Security Council itself. The USA and Great Britain main- have to look at the previous discussions and resolutions relating to events ulti- tained that this mandate was given in Resolution No. 1441. In contrast, France, mately linked with the events in Iraq in the period covered in this paper. the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan, and President of the UN General The previous government of Milos Zeman only decided on the participa- Assembly (in late 2002), Jan Kavan stated that it was necessary to approve tion of the specialist radiation, chemical and biological protection battalion a new mandate for a possible military strike. When the Parliament was nego- of the of the Czech army in the Enduring Freedom operation in 2002. tiating the government’s resolution UN weapon inspectors were still on their Zeman’s government also despatched the Czech army’s sixth and eleventh mission in Iraq and it was not clear what conclusions they would come to. field hospitals to Afghanistan.48 In this way it demonstrated its intention to At the same time there was a large body of opinion in the Czech parlia- become part of the anti-terrorist coalition. The unit based in Kuwait was ment that felt that a military strike was not a fait accompli and that the UN ready to intervene anywhere within the framework of that particular opera- Security Council should adopt another resolution confirming any possible tion. This mandate was valid for a total of 22 countries. In January 2004 the military operations. mandate was extended to Turkey and Israel. However, the unit was not allowed to intervene in the territory of Iraq. The key question was if, and 49) Government Resolution No. 66 of January 13, 2003 on measures connected with the situation concerning the Republic of Iraq. 50) Resolution of the Chamber of Deputies of the 9th meeting of January 17, 2003 to the government proposal on the measures connected with the situation concerning the Republic of Iraq. 48) Government Resolution of the Czech Republic, No. 866 of September 11, 2002. 51) See appendix: Government Resolution No. 66/2003 of January 13, 2003, www.vlada.cz
36 37 The Parliament The Parliament
to his amendment it would be the Czech government who would decide on 4.3 The Chamber of Deputies ñ critique by the opposition whether or not Iraq had complied with the UN’s resolution. This was the pre- The debate in the Chamber of Deputies was very spirited and lively. Repre- requisite for participation in any military operations. However, the Czech gov- sentatives from all the main political parties represented in the lower house of ernment’s final decision on deployment was to be based on a new UN Security parliament made speeches. The discussion reflected the attitude of the parliament Council resolution. With this amendment the lower chamber was stating that who regarded the whole issue as a very fundamental one and wanted to take there was no UN mandate for military action in Iraq – a new UN resolution was a position. In the debates the main ideological positions of the parliamentary required. When this debate was taking place many chamber members expect- political parties were evident. The KSČM members of the Chamber of Deputies, ed the UN Security Council to adopt a new resolution. If the UN did not issue who vociferously expressed their opinions in the discussion on the govern- a new resolution the Czech government would not have been free to endorse ment’s resolution, saw the resolution as a resulting from pressure from the Amer- any deployment of troops under UN Resolution No. 1441. In adopting Deputy ican government on the Czech Republic. They believed the Americans wanted Kasal’s amendment the Czech lower chamber substantially restricted the gov- to gain Czech support for a possible attack and wanted active support from the ernment’s freedom for manoeuvre in sending troops to Iraq. However, the gov- Czech unit based in Kuwait for any operation in Iraq. The Communists refused ernment was empowered to use the Czech military to engage in humanitarian to give the government a ‘carte blanche’ for participation in any military opera- and rescue missions or if Iraq began to deploy weapons of mass destruction. tion unless it came clearly under the auspices of a new UN Security Council res- This mandate however only applied to the specialised Czech battalion based in olution, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and was supported by the UN northern Kuwait. weapons inspectors report from Iraq. In this way a few KSČM members in the Chamber of Deputies (i.e. Václav Exner, Jiří Mastalka, Miloslav Ransdorf) sub- mitted amending proposals to the governmental resolution. All of these tabled 4.4 The Senate debate ñ lower influence of the political parties, amendments were rejected. higher influence of personalities The ODS represented mainly by Deputy Petr Necas focussed less on the argu- The significant differences in perceptions of the Iraq issue between both of ments in the chamber debate and concentrated instead on criticising the govern- houses of parliament came to the fore when the government resolution was dis- ment and its coalition partners for not putting forward a united position. Necas cussed in the Senate. The whole issue seemed to be much less controversial in the even tried to assert that there was a crisis in government and asked the prime min- upper chamber. This difference may have been partly due to four main differ- ister to tie the government’s resolution on Iraq with a confidence vote.52 ences between both houses of parliament. Firstly, there was a much lower repre- Deputy Jan Kavan (ČSSD) who was then President of the fifty-seventh Gener- sentation of communists (only three senators) in the Senate in early 2002. It was al Assembly of the UN made particular efforts to separate his personal opinions this party which opposed the governmental position most actively. Second, the and those statements made as a UN official. He stressed that the deployment of Senate had a generally liberal right wing composition, which implied broad sup- Czech troops to Iraq should only take place with a UN mandate which could only port for the government proposal. Furthermore, senators unlike the members of be given after the weapons inspectors in Iraq had finished their task. the Chamber of Deputies are much less bound by the constraints of party whips Deputy Jan Kasal (KDU-ČSL) made significant contributions to the debate and can articulate their opinions much more autonomously. Third, Senators are, in the lower chamber. In a similar manner to his colleagues in the coalition par- due to a different electoral system, elected more as personalities than as members ties he emphasised the necessity for a UN mandate, respect for international of individual political parties. Fourth, the Senate is less open (visible) to the pub- law and the need to take account of the position taken by the European Union lic than the Chamber of Deputies; therefore senators do not have to pay so much and the papacy. Kasal went further and proposed an amendment to the gov- attention to consistency of their statements. ernment’s proposal which sought to clarify it’s meaning and intent. According The government resolution was first dealt with by the Foreign, Security and Defence Committee, which recommended approval of the government resolu- 52) Minutes of the ninth meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, January 16, 2003. See, www.psp.cz tion by eight votes to two.
38 39 The Parliament The Parliament
When discussing the matter within the plenum, the vast majority of senators a different position. It was Deputy Jan Kasal’s (KDU-ČSL) proposal noted earli- approved of the governments position. Senator Jaroslav Doubrava (KSČM) was er which set the stipulation of a new UN mandate as the basis for the movement one of the main objectors to the government’s resolution. He argued that the gov- of the Czech battalion (based Kuwait) into Iraq. The senate’s acceptance of ernment’s position was a result of the aggressive and militaristic policies of the Kasal’s amendment set the stage for an interesting constitutional debate – Which USA and the pressure the American government was putting on the Czech statement was binding on the government – the original governmental resolution Republic to participate in the military operation. He argued in a similar way to or the resolution adopted by the Chamber of Deputies? As events transpired, the his colleagues in the Chamber of Deputies. However, Senator Richard Falbr government did not consider this constitutional question and neither did it alter (ČSSD) also took a similar position in his speech. Later Richard Falbr became its position with respect to the resolution passed by the Chamber of Deputies. The one of the most emphatic critics of the military operation and was an ideological government argued that it was the parliament’s task to approve of Czech military leader of the antiwar declaration, which was adopted in late March at the ČSSD participation in any operations. However the parliament was not entitled to inter- congress that condemned the military strike against Iraq.53 These two Senate fere with the executive in the performance of its duties by amending its propos- speeches were however the exception rather than the rule. Most Senate speeches als. A similar question also arose with the dispatching of a field hospital to Basra supported the government’s position although there were some slight differences (see sub-section 4.6). One argument made which tried to reconcile the govern- of opinion. Some upper chamber members emphasised the role of the interna- ment and chamber positions was that the resolution passed by the Chamber of tional community regarding the possible military strike (e.g. Josef Zieleniec ODS, Deputies clarified the government’s position but did not in any way challenge the Petr Pithart ČSSD, President of the Senate). Others, such as Jan Ruml (leader of position of the government. the US party and Vice-Speaker of the Senate), considered the existing UN man- On the one hand, the Parliament’s resolution of January 17 approved date (Resolution 1441) as sufficient for the initiation of the military operations and (although in quite a complicated manner) the government’s position and reflect- argued in favour of the government supporting such an operation. In contrast, ed the reality of Czech foreign policy, for which the government is primarily Senator Jaroslava Moserova (ODA) exhibited a relatively pragmatic attitude by responsible. One the other hand, the differences observed between the govern- arguing that the Czech government’s decision was not a matter of war and peace ment and parliament related directly to differing constraints. The government felt (which according to other senators was beyond the powers of the Czech Parlia- compelled to provide a prompt response to the United States having been ment and government). She pointed out that what was being discussed was pri- requested to do so. In contrast, the parliament being a forum for discussing mat- marily a matter of expressing (limited military) support for a possible war ters in detail naturally took a longer time to make decision and illustrated coalition and this was a relatively easy choice. a greater range of views. Furthermore, as the Iraq issue clearly involved the Par- On the whole, the issue of whether or not Iraq represented a major threat to liament’s mandate for the deployment of troops, the Chamber of Deputies took the international community dominated the discussion. There were more speech- a relatively independent position on this issue. As a result, the government’s room es condemning the regime in Iraq than those aimed at elimination of weapons of for manoeuvre was restricted because the Chamber made a new UN resolution mass destruction. Condemnation of the regime became the dominant feature of a conditio sine quo non for any deployment of Czech troops to Iraq. the Senate debate. In the end, the senate approved of the government’s resolu- In this respect the Iraq parliamentary debate demonstrated that the govern- tion by an overwhelming majority – 70 (for), 3 (against) and 3 (abstained). In this ment could not automatically count on the Chamber of Deputies “rubber stamp- respect, it is worth noting that the Senate was the first House of Parliament to ing” a fait accompli. In fact, the government was reproached during the debate by approve of the government’s resolution on January 16, 2003. This fact may have some of the members of the Chamber of Deputies for attempting to employ such influenced the dynamics of the debate in the Chamber of Deputies. Another a strategy. The final votes in parliament reflected the differences in the debates in important point to note is that although the Senate approved the both houses. In the Chamber of Deputies, the debate was much longer and much government’s resolution without amendment, the Chamber of Deputies adopted more heated. In contrast, the debate in the Senate was less heated and it was pos- sible to find a consensus on the governments resolution rather quickly. Under 53) See appendix. these circumstances it might have been possible to secure an even stronger man-
40 41 The Parliament The Parliament date for the government in the Senate where the deployment of Czech troops to in fact approved this list and this may have caused some resentment in the Cham- Iraq may have been possible. However, such a proposal would have been impos- ber of Deputies because they had not been sufficiently well informed or consult- sible to ratify in the Chamber of Deputies because of strong opposition from the ed on the issue. In addition, there seems to have been some unhappiness in the Communist Party (KSČM) and significant divisions within the ruling Social Chamber of Deputies about the ambiguity over the participation in military Democratic Party (ČSSD). action, where the Czech Republic did not take an active role; and support for the US led coalition, which did the Czech Republic did endorse. The question of possibly extending the mandate of the Czech battalion based 4.5. Parliamentary discussion during the Iraq crisis in Kuwait or the more general issue of the Czech Republic participating in the The parliament returned to discussions on the situation in Iraq in late March Iraqi Freedom operation was not discussed during deliberations in the Foreign following the government’s statement on Iraq on March 19 that directly preced- Affairs Committee. In fact, no member of the Chamber of Deputies made any ed the start of the military operations.54 The government’s statement did not seek attempt to push for a change in the government’s position favouring active mili- to enlarge the mandate of the Czech battalion although there was a discussion on tary participation in Iraq. Even the generally pro-American ODS party decided this matter within government. not to propose a stronger mandate allowing military action. In the end, the posi- The government and parliamentary resolutions made on January 19 defined tion adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee was a reactionary one to the state- the mandate for the Czech battalion in Kuwait. Consequently, the discussions in ment made by the government. This position appeared to confirm once more the March focused on the situation as it existed at that point and possible Czech con- dominant role played by the cabinet in the formulation of foreign policy. In this tributions of humanitarian aid in the event of military action. respect, the parliament did not discuss in plenary sessions the In March parliamentary discussions on Iraq by took place within committees. government’s immediate pre-war statement because the prime minister and cab- In the Chamber of Deputies the discussions took place within the Foreign Affairs inet insisted that the government was abiding by the resolution passed by parlia- Committee, while in the Senate the discussions took place in the Foreign, Securi- ment in January and consequently no discussion was necessary. ty and Defence Committee. The government made representations to both of these committees through Deputy Foreign Minister Vondra, Foreign Minister Svoboda (the Chamber of Deputies) and Deputy Defence Minister Skopek (the 4.6 Discussion on the dispatching of the field hospital to Basra Senate). As was the case in January partisanship proved to be a strong element in The final occasion in which the Czech parliament discussed possible Czech the discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Communist Party as involvement in the Iraq crisis came with the government’s decision to deploy the expected adopted a clear and strong position. For example, Václav Exner pro- Czech army’s seventh field hospital to Basra.56 This decision came after the prime posed a resolution, which would have condemned the US led attack because it minister received a request from Mr. Khallafa al Mansandi, a representative from the violated international law, while Miroslav Ransdorf cast doubt on the legality of city of Basra. Although the government deliberated on dispatching the military hos- previous UN Security Council resolutions as a basis for military intervention in pital any such a move was for constitutional reasons subject to the consent of parlia- Iraq.55 ment. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Vladimir Lastuvka (ČSSD) In accordance with the government’s resolution and the interpretation given also took quite a critical position regarding military intervention in Iraq. For to the Chamber of Deputies by the prime minister, the field hospital was not to example, during the Committee discussions, he indirectly refused to accept that be a part of either the Enduring Freedom operation or the Iraqi Freedom opera- the Czech Republic was part of the US State Departments list of the “coalition of tion. The field hospital in Basra was to remain under Czech leadership. Howev- the willing”, i.e. allies of the US led coalition against Iraq. The government had
56) Government resolution No. 328, April 1, 2003. This resolution was amended by resolution No. 328 of April 15, 2003. 54) See, the Czech governmentís statement on Iraq, March 19, 2004. See, www.vlada.cz. 55) Minutes of the twelfth meeting of the foreign affairs committee, March 30, 2003. See, www.psp.cz. 57) Minutes of the fourteenth meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, April 15, 2003. See, www.psp.cz.
42 43 The Parliament The Parliament er, the hospital was to coordinate closely with the leadership of the Iraqi Freedom war coalition and indirectly the Czech government (by allowing coalition flights operation.57 The main purpose of the mission was to avert imminent humanitari- through Czech airspace and coalition forces to be based on Czech territory) were an disasters in the south of Iraq. According to the arguments used by the govern- mainly to blame. In spite of the fact that the Communists did not doubt the neces- ment, UN Security Council Resolution No. 1472 was the legal basis for sity of humanitarian aid, the Communists were of the opinion that humanitarian dispatching this hospital to Basra.58 The arguments put forward by the prime min- aid should be provided by civilian doctors and medical staff under the direction ister, foreign and defence ministers in the Chamber of Deputies were made pri- of international organisations such as the Red Cross. marily on the basis of defending a humanitarian mission and they highlighted the This matter was subsequently discussed in the Foreign Affairs and Security potential role which the UN and other international organizations bodies might Committees of the Chamber of Deputies.60 These committee debates were car- make in the post-conflict territory. ried out in a similar manner to those in chambers plenary session. Some mem- The discussion resulting from the governmental proposal to send an army hos- bers of the Chamber of Deputies sought a more detailed explanation to some pital to Basra, led to strong and lively debates within the Chamber of Deputies technical aspects regarding the dispatching of the field hospital.61 Jan Zahradil and within the foreign affairs and security committees. Such a polarised reaction of the ODS repeated the three conditions outlined earlier by Petr Necas in was in large part a product of partisan divisions over the Iraq issue. In contrast, order for the government to gain ODS support for its proposal. Václav Exner, debate in the Senate was much less acrimonious and consensual and this fact was a communist member of the Chamber of Deputies, proposed an amendment to reflected in the final vote in the upper house. the resolution where humanitarian aid would be distributed by means of inter- The governments proposal to send a field hospital to Basra became the object national humanitarian organisations. This proposal was rejected. Another ini- of critique for both of the opposition parties, the ODS and the KSČM, in the tiative submitted by the chairman of the foreign affairs committee, Mr. Chamber of Deputies. Petr Necas, a former chairman of the security committee, Vladimir Lastuvka (ČSSD) asked that the government in despatching the filed presented the views of the ODS. He expressed support for the government’s pro- hospital should cooperate closely with the other activities of the international posal with three conditions: (1) effective use of the field hospital, which should be community including the UN. Notwithstanding these rather limited efforts to based in southern Iraq and not in Kuwait. (2) protection of the hospital through emphasise the primarily humanitarian and military role of the mission, both its own resources, i.e. with Czech troops and (3) ensuring transparency in the committees recommended that the Chamber of Deputies should approve of the financing of the field hospital. Although all of these conditions were in Necas’ government’s resolution. opinion being met by government (with some small reservations), he nonetheless The discussion in the Senate differed from that held in the Chamber of criticised the overall performance of the government during the Iraqi crisis. Most Deputies and moreless reflected the previous patterndiscussed earlier in section especially Necas criticised a statement made by the ČSSD Congress, where he 4.4. A distinct feature was an active participation of the Senate in the debate. argued that Czech foreign policy had become the victim of the interests of the This was especially true in the case of the foreign, defence and security com- ČSSD (i.e. the largest coalition) party. Another key objection made by Necas was mittee. In fact, the Senate considered possible enlargement of the mandate for the rather late timing of the operation. According to the ODS, the field hospital the Czech battalion enabling it to operate within the territory of Iraq. Such con- should have been sent to the south of Iraq at least one week earlier.59 siderations were made even before the government adopted the first resolution In contrast, the Communists, whose position was articulated by KSČM leader on the dispatching of the field hospital on April 1, 2004.62 Through its resolu- Miroslav Grebenicek in the Chamber of Deputies, attacked the government. He tion of March 26, 2003, the foreign, defence and security committee called argued that by dispatching a field hospital to Basra the Czech government was accommodating the occupation administration of the USA and Great Britain. 60) Detailed minutes for the security and defence committee meeting are not available. With regard to the humanitarian disaster, Grebinicek contended that both the 61) For example, Lastuvka wanted to know who had first proposed sending a field hospital to Basra, how such deployment would fit in with the Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom operations. In addition, Lastuvka inquired about the financial and operation details of the proposed hospital deployment. 58) See appendix. 62) See, speech of Senator Josef Zoser (SNK klub ñ HNHRM), fifth meeting of the Senate, April 15, 2003. The foreign, security and 59) Speech made by Petr Necas, at the fourteenth meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, April 15, 2003. defence committee examined enlarging the mandate on March 26 and April 7.
44 45 The Parliament The Parliament upon the government to specify the mandate for the Czech battalion in Kuwait something different yet again, it was likely that the government would accept nei- and to allow the battalion to become involved in the humanitarian operations ther proposal from the upper or lower house. According to Prime Minister Spid- in Iraq. According to deputy defence minister Jaroslav Skopek, the Czech bat- la in such a situation the government would be forced to adopt a new resolution talion could not operate within the territory of Iraq as it had been deployed in order to be in compliance with the opinion of the parliament. Otherwise it within the framework of the Enduring Freedom operation. Another UN Secu- would not be possible to regard the enlarged mandate of the senate as an rity Council resolution was required to allow Czech troops enter Iraq.63 By approval of the government’s decision. In fact this is what happened in the end. adopting such a position the senate committee tried to put pressure on the gov- The cabinet met the day after the Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution ernment to clarify the mandate of the battalion and possibly enable the deploy- identical to the one adopted by the Senate and modified it’s original resolution.67 ment of the unit in Iraq.64 In a subsequent meeting on April 7, the foreign, The Prime Minister assured the senators that he considered the government-sen- defence and security committee went even further by recommending the exten- ate proposal very reasonably but could not change the government’s position sion of the mandate for the Czech battalion in Kuwait for the purposes of assist- himself because of the principle of collective cabinet responsibility.68 It is inter- ing humanitarian operations and providing medical aid to Iraqi civilians. esting to see that a similar situation did not occur as regards Kasal’s amendment Practically speaking this involved an important logistical step of helping to to the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies in January 2003. As we have men- transfer food, medicines, and technical assistance in the decontamination drink- tioned earlier Kasal’s amendment only represented a clarification and not ing water sources in Basra.65 This step was very significant mainly because the a change in the government’sposition. Senate managed to reach a consensus and reassessment of the The main critique outlined by the ODS senators during the discussion of the government’s position. On the basis of this work in the Senate the government field hospital issue in the plenary meeting of the senate, focussed on the govern- adopted a new resolution although it originally had no intention of changing the ment’s dilatoriness when seeking parliamentary approval for dispatching the mil- mandate.66 itary hospital and insufficient consultation with parliament. According to the The Senate’s alternative proposal was also important for constitutional rea- Vice-chairman of the Senate, Mr. Premysl Sobotka, the government was effec- sons. It raised the question of whether or not the parliament has the power to tively only allowing the parliament to make a decision on a fait accompli. He change a resolution of government. Senators Jaroslav Kubera (ODS) and Jiri Sto- argued that having decided on the departure date for the field hospital without dulka (KDU-ČSL) when questioning Prime Minister Spidla during the plenary putting pressure on parliament to place this issue further up on its agenda left discussion in the Senate on April 15, 2003 raised this important question. Both insufficient time for a proper discussion.69 Another criticism of the government senators pointed out the fact that there was a discrepancy between the govern- was that it delayed despatching the field hospital in a last minute attempt to secure mental resolution and the statement of the Senate as elaborated by the foreign, UN approval. Lastly there was criticism of the government in both houses of par- defence and security committee, on the extension of the mandate for the Czech liament for expressing insufficient support for the US and its allies. In this respect, battalion in Kuwait. According to the Senate’s Rules of Procedure it is not per- Senator Jiri Liska (ODS) asserted that the Czech government did not effectively missible to submit alternative motions to governmental resolutions as these might explain or communicate its position to the media or the public. be interpreted as interfering in the actions of the executive. However, if the The vote in both houses of parliament reflected the partisan divisions evident Chamber of Deputies did not approve of the Senate’s resolution, but adopted during the various debates. In the Chamber of Deputies all forty-one Communist Party (KSČM) members and one KDU-ČSL member (Hovorka) voted against the 63) Minutes of the foreign, defence and security committee of the Czech Senate, March 26, 2004. See, www.senat.cz. dispatching of the field hospital to Basra. Three chamber deputies abstained (Faj- 64) It is interesting to note that Prime Minister Spidla maintained in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies, April 15, 2003 that the mon – ODS, Holan and Kasal – both KDU-ČSL). The remaining one hundred battalion was entitled to strike into Iraq if the Iraqiís deployed weapons of mass destruction. Such evidence confirms that there was no single official position on this important matter. 65) Senator Jiri Pospisil (ODS) tabled this amendment to the governmentís resolution. 67) Government resolution, No. 382, April 15, 2003. This amended resolution No.328, April 1, 2003. See appendix. 66) During the senate debate there was debate as to whether or not it was possible for the upper chamber to propose changes to 68) The senateís proposal was defended by Defence Minister Tvrdik on behalf of the government. The minister was criticised by a government proposal, and if so, would such an amended resolution be binding on government if it was ratified by the lower Senator Kubera because the vote in question did not relate to a decision taken by government. chamber. In the end the government adoped a new resolution on the basis of the amended resoluitions passed in both chambers. 69) Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Senate, April 15, 2003.
46 47 The Parliament The Political Parties and thirty-three members voted for the proposal. Within the Senate, seventy mem- bers were present for the roll call. Sixty-five voted for the government’s proposal and there were five abstentions (three Communist Party senators – Doubrava, Matykiewicz and Harazin, along with Jiri Skalicky of the ‘Club for Open Democ- 5. THE POLITICAL PARTIES racy’ (Klub otevrene demokracie) and Josef Novotny an independent. This vote on the Basra field hospital deployment demonstrated not only the strong opposi- tion of communist party members in the Chamber of Deputies to the proposal but The positions of political parties (this study focuses on parliamentary parties) also their high level of party discipline. In contrast, in the Senate, where the issue obviously evolved during the Iraq crisis in line with their particular ideologies. appeared to be much less controversial during the discussion, it is significant that Yet Iraq presented an unprecedented and complex problem for Czech parties. not one single senator voted against the government’s proposal. Czech parties did not have the informational resources to analyse the Iraqi situa- The position adopted by the parliament during the Iraq crisis demonstrated tion. Consequently, Czech political parties formulated purely political statements that its role as legislative body is primarily one of providing a forum for discus- (that did not arise from an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi problem). Even the task sion. Furthermore, the parliament is seen to hold the constitutional mandate to of issuing political statements proved to be very difficult for some parties because approve measures relating to the security and defence of the Czech state. The par- of the variety and contradictory opinions within specific parties. The existence of liament applied these rights during the Iraq crisis and this resulted in open dis- contrasting attitudes among political parties abroad (e.g. British Labour Party or cussions on fundamental political and constitutional issues. The debates within the French right wing) was an additional complicating factor. Czech political par- the Chamber of Deputies proved to be much more partisan and polarised than ties like their counterparts in other countries had to take account of public opin- those which occurred within cabinet. The Iraq crisis also highlighted the different ion as well. Within the Czech Republic approximately two-thirds of public roles played by the executive (i.e. government) that is compelled to forge a con- opinion was against the war. sensus quickly and act decisively during times of crisis. Playing this role effec- The complexity of the Iraqi situation led Czech political parties to adopt sim- tively is of course somewhat more difficult for coalition governments. The role ilar positions to the ones they adopted during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. As was played by parliament is somewhat different because the emphasis is on represen- the case five years earlier Czech political parties’ divided into two camps. Centre- tation giving all shades of opinion a forum for airing their views. It is worth high- right parties generally supported the war in Iraq while left wing parties con- lighting at this point that the system of government in the Czech Republic is demned the war. It is important to state from the outset that that the division somewhat unique in giving to parliament competences in the areas of security between these two camps was not based on the government coalition being pit- and defence, which are reserved in most other states to the discretion of the exec- ted against the opposition. The pro and anti-war division arose within the largest utive. Quite often parliaments are only allowed to debate on such issues and sig- governing party (ČSSD). This fact had of course some serious consequences. nal their views to government who in the end make the final decision. During the If a comparison is made between political parties and state institutions, we can Iraq crisis the parliament showed itself to be a self-confident actor within the see that in the case of the former the primary goal is represent a broad range of Czech political system where it forced the government on two separate occasions political opinions while for the latter there are more constraints as statement made to clarify or even change its position. At present it is not clear to what extent the relate to policy. Political parties statements on Iraq tended to be ‘policy-driven’ in Iraq crisis represents a departure in Czech foreign policy making. What is clear being strongly related to the overall ideology of the party concerned and ‘office-dri- is that this crisis did create an important precedent in the relationship between the ven’ in reflecting public opinion. Similar policy and office seeking motivations were legislative and executive branches of Czech government in the important evident in the statements made by specific political actors during the Iraq crisis. domains of security and defence and fostered significantly the democratic control One of the key factors which helps explain the position adopted by Czech of Czech foreign policy making. political parties was whether or not a particular party was participating in gov- ernment. When taking their positions on matters connected with Iraq, the gov- ernment coalition parties (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU) held an informational
48 49 The Political Parties The Political Parties advantage over parties by virtue of being in office. But the coalition parties had Defence Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik and to a certain extent also Interior Minister to resolve a dilemma where on the one hand they felt compelled to act on the Stanislav Gross (who incidentally did not intervene too much in the debate). The basis of their own partisan ideology and on the other had felt a strong obligation influence of the ČSSD on the formation of the Czech Republic’s position on the war to pursue the long-term goals of Czech foreign policy. Moreover, the government in Iraq could be described as a double-edged sword. On the one side the strongest parties were faced with a responsibility for acting “on behalf of all” and were voice in government was Prime Minister Spidla who made major contributions in thereby compelled to find common government positions, so as to pursue Czech the search for consensus in governmental positions.70 On the other side, conflicts national interests on the international stage. As far as the main government party within the ČSSD made it difficult to attain consensus within government resulting (ČSSD) was concerned this dilemma had one important consequence. The Iraq in perceptions of executive ambivalence on the Iraq issue. What is more within the issue caused a sharp polarisation within the party. As a result, there emerged an Chamber of Deputies and parliamentary party meetings, government positions incongruity in the positions of the ČSSD dominated cabinet and the position were more frequently undermined (because of misinterpretations – deliberate or adopted by a majority of the ČSSD parliamentary party members. otherwise) by ČSSD members than by opposing ODS representatives. In this In contrast to the ČSSD, life was much easier for the opposition parties (ODS, respect, the chairman of the foreign committee of the Chamber of Deputies, KSČM) during the Iraq crisis. The opposition parties were not constrained by gov- Vladimir Lastuvka (ČSSD) was the most vocal critic of the government. Lastuvka ernment responsibilities. Yet as parliamentary parties they took part in the decision- objected to the Czech Republic being listed as a member of the US State Depart- making process where Czech soldiers were dispatched abroad. Not being bound by ment’s “coalition of the willing”.71 He asserted that it was not possible even on the the constraints of government responsibility resulted in public statements being less basis of a government resolution to make such a claim. Moreover, he maintained ambiguous than those of the government parties. On the contrary, the Iraq crisis that the Czech Republic’s position was in fact closer to that of France or Germany became a welcome opportunity for opposition parties to express their ideological rather than that of the USA and Great Britain.72 He was probably referring to the opinions on world events. This offered them the chance to gather political points fact that both the government and the parliament always referred to the UN Secu- with the electorate. Unlike the government parties, inside the opposition parties the rity Council mandate for any possible war in Iraq. However, Lastuvka’s interpreta- Iraq crisis had the effect of crystallising their opinions on global issues. tion contrasted strongly with what his cabinet colleagues and fellow co-partisans The goal of this study is to assess the role of various Czech political actors dur- deputies said about government’s position. They emphasised that the Czech ing the Iraq crisis. With regard to political parties, it is natural to divide the analy- Republic supported the use of force against Iraq. This mainstream ČSSD interpre- sis of their influence on the formulation of the Czech Republic’s official position tation was based on the wording of the government’s resolution. Such a position did into two parts. First, we will examine the governmental parties whose influence not of course apply to the positions adopted by France and Germany. was more significant because they had direct access to the levers of power. Second, we will look at the opposition parties and what contributions they made to the public debate and the policy making process. 5.2 Antiwar resolution of the Congress: A blow for the »SSD in government The resolution adopted at the thirty-first ČSSD party congress (March 28 – 5.1 Czech Social Democratic Party (»SSD): 30, 2003) marked the sharpest attack from the within the ČSSD on the govern- Ambivalent workhorse of the Czech government ment’s position on the war in Iraq.73 The resolution adopted at this congress The main government and parliamentary party, the ČSSD had undoubtedly the expressed its “disapproval of the war led by the USA and Great Britain against most important influence on the formation of the government’s position on Iraq as well as on the parliamentary vote regarding the deployment of soldiers. At the same 70) It should be noted that the former Spidla the ëgodfatherí of the compromise leading to the government resolution of March 19, time its position was the most complicated. The social democrats were internally 2003, which expressed the official Czech position on the war in Iraq. 71) Minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of March 20, 2003. divided on the Iraq issue as the opinions of most parliamentary party members 72) See, Lastuvka: Mluvi jenom pro sebe / They speak only for themselves, Pravo, January 31, 2003. were different from key ČSSD ministers namely, Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla, 73) See the appendix for full wording.
50 51 The Political Parties The Political Parties
Iraq, which was initiated without the consent of the international community tone about any military action in Iraq and these were consonant with the (i.e. through the UN) and was therefore, in the opinion of the congress, a vio- party’s long-term policy programme.76 This programme envisages fighting ter- lation of international law”. The resolution pointed out furthermore that the dis- ror by means of economic and social progress, not through the use of military armament of Saddam Hussein’s regime could have been achieved through means. The ČSSD’s long-term policy platform also emphasises other threats peaceful means. Deputy Jan Kavan (ČSSD, President of the fifty-seventh UN besides terrorism such as environmental disasters, uncontrolled globalisation general assembly), Senators Richard Falbr (ČSSD) and Vladimir Lastuvka and the pauperising of the South by the North.77 Furthermore, this programme (ČSSD) were authors of this resolution, which gained the support of most stresses the “Europeanism” of the ČSSD, which espouses clear support for Congress delegates (in fact, the votes against were not even counted). building a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) within The resolution was a clear venting of an “anti-Spidla mood” inside the ČSSD a framework of strengthening Europe’s role in the world.78 Ironically reactions although the chairman of the party eventually defended his stance at the to the Iraq crisis did little to further this goal. Congress. The resolution adopted highlighted the left wing orientation of the Deputy Jan Kavan’s attitude (one of the three initiators of the anti-war res- majority of ČSSD members and could be interpreted as giving such a signal to olution) is worth considering in greater. Kavan believes in system of collective the electorate. According to some sources close to the ČSSD, the memory of the security, international law and the key role of multilateral international organ- violent suppression of the Prague Spring in August 1968 may have been a moti- isations, most especially the UN. On the basis of these beliefs he criticised the vating force of the antiwar position adopted by many social democrats. American attitude to Iraq and endeavoured, as President of the fifty-seventh Most ČSSD ministers abstained from the party congress vote on the govern- UN general assembly, to avert war in Iraq.79 For these reasons Kavan partici- ment’s resolution. Prime Minister Spidla declared that the position of the gov- pated in the formulation of an anti-war resolution at the party congress. It is ernment would not change as this congress resolution was in no way binding on however worth remembering that he took an opposite stance at the social the ČSSD members of government. Libor Roucek, a former cabinet spokesman democrat party congress five years earlier. As foreign minister, he put his sig- and subsequently leading ČSSD candidate for the European Parliament elections, nature to a ČSSD congress letter on April 18, 1999, which condemned NATO was one the most vocal objectors to the congressional resolution. Roucek a con- military action against the Milosevic regime as “confusing”.80 However it is vinced “Atlantist” came up with an alternative proposal for the ČSSD congress clear that Kavan was personally against any war with the Milosevic regime that where he effectively tabled the government’s own resolution. Another delegate did not have a UN mandate. He tried to express these feelings by being one of Jan Trgina of central Bohemia also spoke against the resolution adopted by the the instigators of “the Czech – Greek initiative”, which proposed a peaceful ČSSD congress. He argued, “a bad peace is worse than a preventive war”. His solution to the crisis at a time when Belgrade and other Yugoslav towns were speech created a storm of protest within the congress meeting.74 under bombardment. According to some commentators, this initiative harmed In contrast, Richard Falbr was one of the sharpest critics of the war among the Czech Republic’s position within NATO, an organisation that the Czech ČSSD members. He spoke of the necessity of condemning American aggression Republic had just joined. The ‘Czech-Greek’ initiative came to naught but did and reiterated comments made in a Pravo newspaper interview a few days earlier attract the interest of domestic and foreign media. It may be argued without by stating, “It is necessary for the [ČSSD] congress to do it (condemn the war in too much exaggeration that Jan Kavan’s vacillation personified the inherent Iraq). Either they are socialists or they are not. Either they believe in the Ameri- contradictions of the Czech Social Democrats’ positions on the wars in Koso- can babble on the preventive war or they believe in a collective security system vo and Iraq. which has been built over decades”.75 There were also more conciliatory opinions expressed at the ČSSD party 76) See, www.cssd.cz congress. However, in the main most of the views expressed were negative in 77) Long-term programme of the CSSD, Chapter 4.1 ñ Bezpecna Evropa a svet bez valek /A safe Europe and warless world. 78) Ibid. Compare with statement made by Eva Novakova (CSSD, member of the Foreign Committee of the Chamber of Deputies): Evropska Unie a valka v Iraku/European Union and the war in Iraq, April 17, 2003. Available at, www.cssd.cz 74) Sjezd odsoudil valku v Iraku / The Congress condemned the war in Iraq, Pravo, March 31, 2003. 79) Note, interviews given to the BBC on September 13, 2002 and March 26, 2003. 75) See, Pravo, March 25, 2003. 80) See, Pavel Tigrid, Glosy o »eskÈ politice / Notes on Czech policy, Prague, Radioservis, 2000, p.145.
52 53 The Political Parties The Political Parties
He asserted that terrorism could not be overcome by means of military force.82 5.3 Small coalition parties: Kasal also underlined the necessity for a clear UN mandate for the war in Iraq or pro-American but constructive and loyal at the very least a unanimous agreement within NATO. He referred to the opinions The two smaller government parties, the Christian Democratic Union – Cze- of the European Union (although there were not that many) and to a certain extent choslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) and the Union of Freedom – Democratic of Vatican too. Kasal is also important because he was an author of the amendment Union (US-DEU), had a much clearer and much less problematic position con- in the Chamber of Deputies prior to its resolution of January 17, 2003. This tabled cerning the war in Iraq. Both parties as minority members of the coalition pushed amendment gave the government less latitude for action toward Iraq by making ref- the government into providing unambiguous support of the war coalition. erence to a future decision of the UN Security Council. The Christian democrats adopted a clear political position on the war toward The smallest party within the government coalition, the US-DEU, took a sim- Iraq. Such a position stemmed from good organisation and discipline within the ilar position to the ODS.83 This is hardly surprising as the US-DEU is a splinter party and allowed the party to speak with one voice in public. In the main, chair- of the ODS and is ideologically closest to the main opposition party. The US- man Cyril Svoboda, who also served as the foreign minister, expressed opinions DEU, however, defended the war against Iraq in government and the Czech par- on behalf of the KDU-ČSL. The relative ease with which the party was able to ticipation in such a war. However, the party was bound by government adopt a unified position also resulted from the fact that the main electoral support responsibility and was forced to agree to the government’s consensus position and base of the KDU-ČSL (i.e. rural citizens living mainly in Moravia) had little inter- defend this consensus in public.84 est in matters connected with Iraq. The KDU-ČSL supported the war in Iraq for ideological reasons. American religious motives for the war in Iraq as a fight of “good against evil” struck 5.4. Civic Democratic Party (ODS):Clear position, a chord with them. Within party documents it is possible to read expressions weak critique of the government and conflict with Klaus that belief in God does not mean endless tolerance but a determination to face Having analysed the positions of the governmental parties we now come to the up to evil and protect the values of the western (Christian) civilisation.81 How- opposition parties – the ODS and KSČM. While opposition parties do not par- ever regardless of such a political and ideological orientation, the KDU-ČSL ticipate in government, their activities were mainly evident in the parliament. The was not a clear champion of Czech involvement in the Iraqi freedom operation opposition parties had, unlike the government ones, a relatively small influence without a UN mandate. For this reason the Christian democrats supported the on foreign policy making during the Iraqi crisis. Yet they used their parliamen- government’s position. tary mandate to the full in the mandatory debates and roll calls on government Nonetheless, there was some conflict within the party, which remained more plans to deploy Czech soldiers to Iraq. The effect of the opposition parties was or less latent in nature. The attitude of the Catholic Church in the Czech Repub- primarily determined by their weight in parliament. lic (as well as of Vatican) was anti-war. But this moral-political dilemma did not The ODS held a clear pro-American position in relation to Iraq.85 The opin- have much significance inside the KDU-ČSL. Containment of this potential ions of its key representatives (i.e. Petr Necas, shadow defence spokesman, Jan source of discord may again be attributed to effective organisation within the Zahradil, shadow foreign affairs spokesman and Jan Vidim, chairman of the com- party as well as to the fact other Christian Democratic parties in Europe, e.g. Ger- mittee for defence and security in the Chamber of Deputies) corresponded with man CDU, did not support the war in Iraq. the positions adopted by deputy foreign minister Vondra and (former) president The vice-chairman of the KDU-ČSL, deputy Jan Kasal, articulated most of the “alternative approaches” to the position adopted by the Czech government. Kasal 83) Petr Mares US-DEU Chairman (from January 19, 2003) said in an interview that he had pushed support for military action in essentially argued that the American strategy in the fight against terror was wrong. both parliament and government regardless of a UN mandate. See, report in Respekt, by Jaroslav Spurny published on March 24, 2003, Vlada zkousi byt i nebyt / The government tries to be and not to be. 84) See article by Jan Marsalek entitled Ceske politicke strany a valka v Iraku / Czech political parties and the war in Iraq, in Britske 81) See article Cim je krestanska demokracie/What is a Christian democracy, Novy Hlas (KDU-CSL newsletter), 6/2003. listy, March 27, 2003. 82) See interview entitled ëTerror moves in a different than American generals expect,í Pravo, September 7, 2004. 85) Ibid. See, press release of the ODS for January 17, 2003. Available at www.ods.cz
54 55 The Political Parties The Political Parties
Václav Havel. For example, the ODS fully supported Havel’s decision to sign the agreed with the president on the fact that weapons of mass destruction were not “Letter of Eight” although there had been huge controversies between the ODS the primary objective of military action against Iraq, the key goal was in fact the and Havel throughout the nineties over domestic policy.86 overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime.88 The key contradiction The ODS, the second largest party in the lower chamber and main opposition between the ODS party and the president was that the latter did not see this goal party basically ensured that the government resolutions were given a smooth pas- as a legitimate grounds for war. sage through parliament. Such support gave a psychological boost to the mini- mum winning coalition (101 votes out of 200) led by the ČSSD who were threatened with defection by some deputies, although in the end such threats 5.5. Communist party (KS»M): came to nothing. Also the opposition of the numerous KSČM members of the Weak in influence but strong in rhetoric lower chamber to the government’s proposals was not inconsiderable given their The KSČM had perhaps the smallest influence on the Czech Republic’s posi- strong party discipline. By voting for the pro-government proposals at key stages, tion on the war in Iraq. Nonetheless it was the most vocal party in the lower the ODS exercised some influence on the final position adopted. chamber and in the media. The KSČM expressed unequivocal opposition to the To a large extent the ODS identified with the government’s efforts to support war in Iraq and set itself against all government actions in relation to the situation and to be involved indirectly with the war coalition in the Gulf. ODS criticisms in Iraq. This opposition started with criticism of Czech participation in the Endur- of the government on the Iraq issue were unusually moderate. In practice criti- ing Freedom operation in 2002 and continued up to the dispatching of the field cism was mainly levelled at the “inconsistency and ambivalence” of the govern- hospital to Basra in April 2003. None of the communist members of both houses ment’s position, which, according to the ODS, gave evidence of a “crisis within of parliament ever supported any of the government’s proposals for Iraq. government”. Civic Democrats in principle supported the government’s propos- Moreover, KSČM members of the upper and lower houses proposed alterna- al on the dispatching the field hospital but did not refrain from making reproach- tive though politically unrealistic proposals in committee meetings and plenary es on the tardy and vacillating manner in which the government handled the sessions. For example, they condemned American aggression against Iraq and issue.87 On the whole, the ODS did not make too many statements on the issue demanded that the financial funds set aside for the field hospitals be given to of Iraq but confined itself in the main to criticising government. international humanitarian bodies.89 This ODS reserve on criticism of the government’s position on Iraq was to The strident position adopted by KSČM on the war in Iraq represented con- a certain degree a consequence of the fact that the founder and the long-time tinuity with the party’s previous policies stemming back to the days of the com- chairman of the party and at that moment also the President of the Republic, munist regime. The party was also deeply critical of the NATO strike in Kosovo Václav Klaus, clearly supported the government’s position. In fact, President in late March 1999. According to an official party document entitled The Klaus did not hesitate to praise the official position as an important compromise KSČM’s position toward ensuring the Czech Republic’s Security, the Czech commu- of all opinions across the Czech political spectrum. nist party sees NATO membership itself as a key security risk for the Czech The ODS had on an earlier occasion experienced a similar “problem” with Republic.90 Klaus. During the Kosovo crisis the ODS party strongly supported the NATO Within the rhetoric of communist criticism of the war in Iraq it is possible to strike whereas Klaus did not. The ODS had some difficulties when trying to make decipher a more intellectual basis for opposition to the war in the statements comments on the Iraq crisis following the initial disapproving attitude of the pres- made by Miroslav Ransdorf. Significantly, his position was not that different from ident. The ODS somehow had to reconcile Klaus’s opposition with their support for US led military action in order to avoid public embarrassment. The ODS 88) Note interview with Mirek Topolanek: Evropa nemuze mit jinou zahranicni politiku nez USA / Europe cannot have a different foreign policy from the USA, Pravo, January 17, 2004. 89) Note especially comments made by V·clav Exner. See the minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Committee of the Chamber of 86) Radio Praha, February 14, 2003. Deputies of March 20, 2003 and April 15, 2003. 87) Speech of ODS vice-chairman and shadow defence spokespersons Petr Necas at the 14th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies 90) See, Part: I/1 ñ Bezpecnostni zajmy a bezpecnostni rizika CR / Security interests and security risks of the Czech Republic, available at; on March 15, 2004, www.psp.cz www.kscm.cz
56 57 The Political Parties Conclusion that adopted by left wing members of the ČSSD. This stream of opinion within the KSČM condemned the war in Iraq as a violation of international law, noted that the weapons inspectors were not allowed to complete their work and the gen- erally anti-war sentiment evident within Czech public opinion poll results.91 Fur- 6. CONCLUSION thermore, this line of criticism adopted a pacifist orientation and condemned the war itself and stressed that a war was an inappropriate instrument to fight terror. For example, Václav Exner, a member of the foreign affairs committee in the Any attempt made to assess the position adopted by Czech political actors dur- Chamber of Deputies, represented a second more orthodox attitude (he is close ing the Iraq crisis must take account of the tense situation that prevailed among the to chairman of the party Miroslav Grebenicek and the views of a majority of international community and most especially within the transatlantic alliance. Fur- KSČM members). This attitude may be characterised as being a realpolitik cri- thermore the somewhat unusual and unexpected positions adopted by the main tique of the USA, where the United States is condemned for its “aggression” in its political actors outlined in the main part of this study resulted from traditional inter- goal to secure a monopoly over Iraqi oil.92 nal divisions (i.e. along the left-right dimension) and the very public rift in the The views on Iraq expressed by political representatives in the Czech Repub- transatlantic alliance. lic were as in most other countries diverse in nature. The parliamentary parties We have however endeavoured to highlight the political reality that the only true did exercise direct influence on Czech policy making during the Iraq crisis. This official position of the Czech Republic was that promulgated by the government and influence stemmed from political parties participation (or non-participation) in supported by parliamentary vote in January and April 2003. However this is not to government and their legislative weight within parliament. Almost all of the par- suggest that the Czech government always gave a clear signal of its position to the liamentary parties identified with the position adopted by government to one international community, the media or its own citizens. In this paper for the sake of degree or another. Some parties such as the KDU-ČSL completely agreed with clarity we have defined the Czech position as being that adopted by the government. the government’s stance, others such as the ČSSD did so partially due to internal This position maybe summarised as follows. The Czech government expressed divisions as did the ODS who moderated its support so as to perform at least political support for the general objectives of the United States and its allies on the some form of opposition role. The KSČM was unique in completely rejecting the Iraq issue. Furthermore, the Czech government continued its commitment to the US position adopted by the government. This was not that surprising as it is opposed led ‘Enduring Freedom’ operation (a Czech chemical warfare unit remained in to the long term goals of Czech foreign policy which places the Czech Republic Kuwait before, during and after the invasion of Iraq). However, the Czech govern- among the allies of the United States. ment decided not to participate directly in the US led ‘Iraqi freedom’ military opera- tion because there was no UN mandate for such an operation. In short Czech support for the military intervention in Iraq effectively stopped at the Iraqi border. The inherent logic and consistency of the Czech position adopted on Iraq may be viewed from two distinct positions. First, it may be assessed in terms of the key strate- gic documents related to official thinking on foreign policy and security strategy. Second the final Czech position may be considered in terms of the positions adopted by the main political actors within the government and foreign policy making system. It can be argued that the final government position did not abandon the medi- um term objectives set out in the official policy document ‘Concept of Foreign Pol- icy, 2003-2006’ approved by the Czech government on March 3, 2003.93 91) See the record of the press conference of March 27, 2003, available at www.kscm.cz; Note also comments made by Zdenek Marsicek (a KSCM member of the Chamber of Deputies) in ëJsem proti valce v Iraku/I am against the war in Iraq,í available at, www.kscm.cz 93) See, ëConceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, 2003 ñ 2006,í sub-section 2.1 ñ Objectives of the foreign 92) Statement of the Central Committee of the KSCM on the war against Iraq, March 24, 2003. See, www.kscm.cz policy Czech Republic.
58 59 Conclusion Conclusion
Significantly this announcement came immediately prior to the escalation of this learning process can be seen in the most recent amendment in the Czech the conflict in Iraq and subsequent military intervention by coalition forces. This Republic’s ‘Security strategy’ and also in the foreign and security policy pro- key foreign policy document envisaged Czech external relations being executed gramme declaration. In both of these documents the Czech government aspires within the framework of the European integration process and the Euro-atlantic toward ensuring for itself a greater degree of latitude and flexibility in all future alliance. The key point here is that the ‘Concept of Foreign Policy’ document international crises. assumed that there would not be conflict between the EU and Euro-atlantic pil- Another key reason why the Czech government did not militarily support the lars in its foreign policy framework. Furthermore, this document did not elabo- “coalition of the willing” in Iraq is evident in the ‘Concept of Foreign Policy, rate which pillar was to have priority in foreign policy making. The Czech 2003-2006’ policy framework which is predicated on the twin principles of multi- government’s position was further complicated by the fact that the EU did not lateralism and respect for international law. These two principles championed by adopt a unified position on the Iraq issue as shown in the common position adopt- Václav Havel have been the cornerstones of Czech foreign policy since the Vel- ed by the European Council on February 17, 2003.94 In any case, the Czech gov- vet revolution. Part of the logic underpinning these principles is that small or ernment did not have the option or obligation of adhering to a common medium sized states have a greater influence in an international system with European position, as it was not a member of the EU in early 2003. a multilateral format than one primarily characterised as a “concert of powers”. The unprecedented conflict between some EU member states and the Euro- Consequently given the large divisions within the international community in late atlantic partnership put the Czech government in a very awkward position where 2002 and early 2003 (and unlike the situation with first Gulf War in 1991) the it did not want to cause ill will to either side in the international debate over how Czech government felt it was more appropriate to adopt a cautious approach in to deal effectively with the Iraq question. Such a dilemma implies a priori under view of the ambiguous legality and legitimacy of the case made by the “coalition the logic outlined in the ‘Concept of Foreign Policy, 2003-2006’ that any future of the willing” for military action. conflict of interest between the EU and United States and its allies will always If we consider the logic underpinning the position adopted by individual polit- place the Czech government in a very uncomfortable position. Within these cir- ical actors we must see these as being distinct from the official stance taken by the cumstances the Czech Republic has tended to engage in such divisive debates government. The outlook adopted by the office of President was influenced by only to the degree absolutely required by circumstances. Thereby the govern- the succession of Václav Klaus who took over from Václav Havel in February ment hopes to cause as little offence as possible and keep a “clean slate” with the 2003. Klaus and Havel took clear and opposing public positions on the Iraq issue. EU, the United States and her allies. For both leaders their distinct positions reflected a long-term commitment to spe- Some Foreign Ministry (MZV) officials acknowledge that the ‘Concept of For- cific beliefs and goals. For example, in the case of Klaus his position on Iraq was eign Policy, 2003-2006’ policy framework is predicated on a more normalised sys- in line with this refusal to support a NATO strike on Kosovo in 1999. More gen- tem of international relations and not the situation which prevailed during the erally, strong international media attention was placed on the Czech Presi- Iraq crisis. If international relations were to be defined by antipathy between the dent’s stance on Iraq. This position ranged from Havel’s support for the EU and the United States such a foreign policy strategy would clearly not be in disarming of Saddam Hussein’s regime with his signature of the ‘Letter of Eight’ the best interests of the Czech Republic.95 (January 30, 2003) to the anti-war declarations made by Klaus. The strong inter- It is important to note, that from some Foreign Ministry (MZV) officials per- national media focus on the Czech presidency was to some degree based on little spective some valuable lessons were learned from the Iraq crisis. The results of real familiarity with the actual powers of this office in the foreign affairs arena. This situation is understandable given the strong reputation, which Václav Havel developed on the international stage during the nineties. His legacy may have 94) The conclusion of the extraordinary European Council of February 17, 2003. See, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs /cms_Data /docs/pressData/en/ec/74554.pdf given the inaccurate impression that the Czech President is generally responsible 95) Not anticipating the development of such an antipathy between key institutions cannot be considered as a fault of the Czech for foreign policy as is the case in the United States. foreign policy strategy. Foreign ministry officials argue more generally that foreign policy cannot a priori assume the non- functioning of key institutions and structures. Abandoning such assumptions would have the political consequence of The final government position adopted was the product of a complicated undermining the operation of these institutions and structures. series of internal discussions. This resulted in a compromise which attempted to
60 61 Conclusion Conclusion conciliate the pro-American position of the Foreign and Defence ministers with ister Skopek were supportive of the American position. These internal differences the strongly pacifist faction in the ČSSD (main governing) party. Nonetheless it within the ČSSD were partly responsible for the contradictory and ambiguous state- can be argued that the government did not deviate in any effective manner from ments made by the Czech government when explicating its position on Iraq. Sig- the stance adopted in its resolution of January 13, 2003. While this resolution was nificantly both of the smaller coalition parties (KDU-ČSL and US-DEU) did not endorsed by parliament there were some accusations in the media that individual experience such intra-party division. Consequently, these smaller coalition parties ministers did not adhere completely to the government’s avowed position.96 In generally stayed loyal to the final government position. Nonetheless it should be many cases the apparent disharmony among government ministers stemmed noted that the KDU-ČSL did face the potential dilemma of having to reconcile its from contradictory statements made prior to final agreements being made at the Christian creed with support for war. Lastly it should be noted that the US-DEU cabinet table. The situation was not helped by misunderstandings and misinter- was much more pro-American than the government as a whole. pretations made by the media. Admittedly, there were a small number of Both of the main opposition parties, the ODS and KSČM had definite, clear instances where ministers and high-ranking civil servants did interpret the official and opposing positions on the issue of supporting a military strike on Iraq. With government position in different ways.97 regard to the ODS it is worth noting that this party did have to resolve a minor The position adopted by the Czech Parliament was largely based on the parti- conflict between the anti-war position adopted by President Klaus – the founder san divisions within the upper and lower chambers. In the lower Chamber of and long time chairman of the ODS – and the party’s own pro-war stance. While Deputies communist (KSČM) and pacifist oriented social democrat (ČSSD) mem- the ODS is generally the loudest critic of the current ČSSD led government bers such as Vladimir Lastuvka and Jan Kavan articulated stronger anti-Ameri- (2002- ), it nonetheless ensured that government proposals on Iraq were given can positions than that espoused in the Senate. Overall, the parliament followed a smooth passage through parliament. For its own part the ODS restricted itself the position taken by the government; sometimes the parliament’s position was to criticising the government on the Iraq issue for being unclear and ambiguous ambiguous however on other occasions it provided clarification of the official in expressing the official position of the Czech Republic. position. It is however important to note that the parliament could not be said to The KSČM rejected the military strike against Iraq and called it an act of aggres- have given the government ‘carte blanche’ on the Iraq issue where there were no sion, which violated international law. There were no polarising divisions within the debates or controversies. In fact the evidence suggests that the parliament inter- party though there were some small detectable differences in the statements made vened in the debate over Iraq in a manner that exceeded its usual input into for- by communist members in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. eign policy issues and this intervention was perhaps more extensive than that In the arguments put forward by those Czech political actors who favoured observed in other European countries. some form of military action against Iraq the key objective was to overthrow the The role played by political parties such as the ČSSD was also complex. The regime of Saddam Hussein. Speakers from all parties except the KSČM accepted Social Democrat party as the main partner in the governing coalition was faced with the necessity of removing this incumbent regime typically described as being both the problem of reconciling what could be described as ‘schizophrenic’ differences brutal and dictatorial. The pro-intervention arguments often made special refer- within the party. A majority of the ČSSD parliamentary party adopted an anti-war ence to the Czech Republic’s own dictatorial legacy. However some political lead- position. This opposition to the war was formalised in a party resolution. In con- ers, such as President Václav Klaus, opposed the war on the grounds that military trast, members of cabinet such as Prime Minister Špidla and Deputy Defence Min- action was an inappropriate means to achieve this objective. On this point it is important to note that the rhetoric surrounding support for a war in Iraq in Czech 96) A good example of this occured in an interview with Cyril Svoboda, Jaroslav Zverina and Petr Uhl on the Spona programme Republic made little or no reference to the threat of weapons of mass destruction broadcast on April 12, 2003 by Czech television (»T 1). In this interview, Petr Uhl, a journalist with the left-wing Pravo or any alleged links between the Iraqi regime and the (Al Qaida) terrorist network. newspaper, accused Cyril Svoboda (Foreign Minister) of being disloyal to the government. This accusation was based on Svobodaís alleged criticism of a plan to increase the number of weapons inspectors in Iraq before it had been introduced onto Such public rhetoric and media commentary was primarily focussed on historical the cabinetís agenda. factors and the resonance of such historical arguments within the Czechsociety. 97) See the different interpretations made by Prime Minister, VladimÌr Spidla and Deputy Defence Minister Skopek regarding the possibility of an anti-chemical warfare force being allowed to strike Iraq where it was suspected that weapons of mass However, this rhetoric was not based on any especially accurate or prescient destruction might be used. insights provided by the Czech Republic’s various intelligence services.
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This type of debate proved to be a fortunate one for the Czech government. If consideration is made of the future of Czech relations with the main objec- When it proved impossible for the coalition forces to show definitive proof of the tors to military intervention in Iraq (i.e. France and Germany) the consequences existence of weapons of mass destruction or links between Baghdad and the Al are as yet unclear. One plausible inference is that France and Germany probably Qaida network the Czech government avoided much of the embarrassment felt took the Czech position much more seriously because of EU accession in May by other governments such as that of Tony Blair in Britain. Lack of emphasis on 2004. According to some political sources the position adopted by the Czech these two issues in the Czech case meant that there was little public debate or crit- Republic during the Iraq crisis was judged to be an unreasonable one in the icism during the post war phase unlike the scenario that developed in Britain minds of French and German political and diplomatic elites. Such elites were seen leading to the Hutton Inquiry (August 2003 – January 2004). to judge the Czech position as being a typical example of the “New Europe” and The arguments made by Czech politicians may be interpreted as being far- all the negative connotations this term evokes in certain quarters. sighted. This begs the question – how far-sighted was the position adopted by the In conclusion, the official position adopted by the government of the Czech Czech government during the Iraq crisis? Any assessment of the impact of the Republic can be considered the only sensible stance possible given the prevail- Czech strategy in ameliorating or attenuating relations with the main camps in ing internal political divisions and the international conflict between the transat- this international dispute is difficult. A key reason is that it is still too early to pro- lantic partners. The stance taken by the Czech government was a success in that vide a consistent and comprehensive evaluation of the long-term effects of the it did not cause any immediate rift in relations between the Czech Republic and Czech government’s strategy. Suffice to say at this point the arguments stressing those countries supportive of military action in Iraq or those who favoured the advantages and disadvantages of the official Czech position exhibit equal a more peaceful resolution. However, the Czech government did fail to com- merit given the evidence currently available. On the one hand it has been municate its position in a coherent and consistent manner on the domestic and argued that while the Czech government expressed clear support for the US led international stages. coalition the Czech Republic did not participate in military operations. There- fore, unlike Poland who did send troops to Iraq, the United States may have per- ceived the Czech Republic as an untrustworthy ally in times of crisis. Such a negative US predisposition may be evident in the future during the allocation of re-construction contracts in Iraq or in the continuance, or abolition, of visa requirements (or fees) for Czech citizens travelling to the United States, etc. On the other hand, the fact that the US led invasion of Iraq was not undertaken with the imprimatur of NATO or the United Nations Security Council forced the Czech government to find the most appropriate diplomatic solution possible. This was a key imperative given the domestic political situation and the strong efforts of the government to respect the democratic mandate of the Czech par- liament. From this rather complex and contextually driven perspective the offi- cial position propounded by the Czech government on Iraq fulfilled the expectations of the Americans by allowing coalition units into the Czech Repub- lic and to over-fly her airspace. In addition, the Czech government confirmed its willingness to send troops to protect Kuwait, which was a key stipulation in Kuwait’s support for allowing coalition forces to use Kuwait as a base for an assault on Iraq. Politically the Czech Republic made a contribution to the Amer- ican cause through its public expressions of support for the pro-war position without however having the costs of sending troops to Iraq.
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