California State University, Northridge

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

The Proliferation of Far-Right Politics in the Czech Republic: Dissension to Globalization and Cosmopolitanism

A graduate project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master

of Arts in Political Science

Luc LeFrancois

August 2019

The thesis of Luc LeFrancois is approved:

______Dr. Alexandra Cole-Macias Date

______Dr. Tom Hogen Esch Date

______Dr. Maria Garcia-Acevedo Date

California State University, Northridge

Table of Contents

SIGNATURE PAGE ii

LIST OF FIGURES iv

ABSTRACT v

INTRODUCTION 1

REVIEW OF GLOBALIZATION AND PARTY SYSTEM LITERATURE 3

REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON CASE OF CZECH REPUBLIC AND EUROPE 12

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 15

CONCLUSION 23

REFERENCES 24

iii

List of Figures

Figure 1 :Eurobarometer Report on Feelings About Immigrants From Outside of EU 21

Abstract

The Proliferation of Far-Right Politics in the Czech

Republic: Dissension to Cultural Globalization

Luc LeFrancois

Master of Arts in Political Science

Since its independence in 1992, the Czech Republic has established itself as a thriving and politically stable central European nation with substantial party competition. Though, within the last four years, the Czech Republic and the surrounding European Union nation states have also experienced a more visible rise in Euroscepticism, anti-immigrant, anti-Islam and anti- minority sentiments that were solidified and even legitimized because of the 2015 refugee crisis.

These conflicts between the larger European public and the incoming refugees depends on the facets of globalization as it relates to the greater perceived threat of immigration into

Europe. Furthermore, this rise in far-right groups who voice anti-immigrant fervor has occurred because of the influx of refugees and immigrants during the refugee crisis who see these immigrant populations as an iteration of illicit globalization that is perceived to be both harmful to the country’s national security and homogenous cultural landscape.

This paper will analyze the role of immigration via immigration policy put forth by the

European Union and European nation state governments. In addition, the reactions by far-right groups and the public who are in opposition to the trend of immigration through Europe are also of focus where in addition to the Czech Republic’s outright opposition to the importation of immigrants, these views have also spawned iterations of the far-right in the country and an outright dissension toward the European Union immigrant quotas because of the 2015 refugee crisis.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is defined as a contemporary structural change that allows for a greater connectedness vis-a-vis various communication, economic, production, occupational and political sectors for more open interactions among the several international actors (Swank and

Betz 2003, 216). The spread of the globalization phenomenon has contributed to the integration of economic and cultural activities, the expansion of trade networks and the dissemination of ideas. As a result, globalization has contributed to shortened distances between interacting international actors, which has facilitated the dissemination of ideas and exchange of values across continents.

At the same time, globalization has provided significant economic and cultural benefits to the development and expansion of various developed states. Many Europeans have become more frustrated with their states’ seeming lack of concern for national interests. As a result, the role of the European Union (EU) in instituting migrant policies has led to dissatisfaction from anti- establishment and anti-globalist segments of the population. Euroscepticism has erupted as a formidable platform that embodies nationalism and isolationism as seen from right populist and far-right parties who oppose the effects of globalization related to the EU’s influence.

Euroscepticism is defined as a reactionary criticism of the European Union, European integration and its various machinations that exist as an authority for its member states. In the case of the Czech Republic, a report from the European Council for Foreign Relations (2013) adds that the growing Eurosceptic sentiment in recent years has remained attributed to the Czech

Republic’s perception of the EU as a ‘marriage of convenience’ and only intended to maintain prosperity and security between member states (ECFR 2013). Therein, the resounding criticism of the EU is in fact a response to their perception that the European Union is neither effective nor cognizant of state interests. 1

Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic as with Euroscepticism in its other variations across Europe, has arisen out of dissent for EU asylum seeker distributive policies. For the Czech

Republic, proponents of Eurosceptic initiatives seek to separate from the European Union as an effort to establish themselves as a sovereign nation apart from the supranational institutions that do not favor Czech Republic’s state interests.

The far-right’s xenophobic platform and increasing success of right-wing leaning parties has amplified the scrutiny of globalization by a segment of the European population. This has provided the landscape for extremist parties to capitalize on anti-migrant and anti-institution sentiment throughout the European region. In the case of the Czech Republic, the right-wing political parties (RWPP) embody the frustrations from the population who perceive that this

Central European state is held hostage by the European Union; along with the forces of cultural globalization, this is made tangible with the rise in immigration as evidence by the 2015 migrant crisis. For supporters of these RRWPs, they hold that the influx of migration poses imminent threats to national security and pan-European culture, while also seen as disenfranchising the

European population at the expense of European Union quotas which seeks to accept non-

Europeans for the sake of expanding the states’ employment gaps and other economic ventures.

The phenomenon of undesirable forces entering a particular country or state via migration, arms and human trafficking, transportation of weapons across borders, and incompatible ideals from incoming migrants, for example, is asserted by Peter Andreas (2011) and his theory of illicit globalization. This paper argues that cultural globalization has influenced the recent rise in the

European far-right backlash politics which seeks to maintain or preserve their sovereignty and

European cultural values among the citizenry. The research question is as follows: How does illicit globalization via migration and cosmopolitanism fuel the rise of backlash far-right politics in the Czech Republic? 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON PARTY LITERATURE

Herbert Kitschelt (1995) discusses the formation of party systems cleavages under post- communist democracies, an interpolation of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) whereby post-industrial societies have created four prominent cleavages: 1. Centre/periphery; 2. Religious/secular; 3.

Urban/rural/; and 4. Capital/labour that have remained instrumental in the manifestation and subsequent establishment of a European party system that meets the demands and interests of any one country’s electorates (Kitschelt 1995, 447). In regards to the relationship to the far-right and the cleavages posited by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and Kitchselt (1995), urban/rural cleavages are pertinent to the far-right, reinforcing traditionalism vis-a-vis the maintaining of national identity and preservation of Western values, thereby operating against an urban populace which favors policies that value multicultural and cosmopolitan values via immigration.

In the establishment of the post-communist party systems, new voters often ascribe to parties because of their sympathy with the party’s particular candidates, or the charismatic interpretation of that candidate’s perspectives on any given platform; secondly, expected personal and selective tangible and intangible advantages that would manifest with the success of that party; and lastly, whether the production of indirect advantages in the form of any collectivization of goods would be more accessible if that party of choice does in fact win the election at that given time (Kitschelt 1995, 449). Furthermore, through these considerations posited from the populace’s interests that then manifest in their support in a party, three types of parties arise as Kitschelt (1995) writes, occur in the form of the charismatic, clientelistic and programmatic parties that arise and to in turn, garner support from the public based on these precepts or demeanors ascribed to the given parties.

The pertinency of Kitschelt‘s (1995) presentation of post-communist party systems is in relation to the far-right in the Czech Republic, where the charismatic authority and personality of these extreme party leaders and representatives garner public support by placating to the public emotions or sensibilities of a good leader. The various extreme party leaders during the election campaigns and into their election often appear as charismatic leaders that can address their concerns with efficiency, even if their radical platforms and policies are radical. These behaviors from the extreme yet charismatic leadership from far-right parties demonstrate instability because these leaders require non-trivial or tangible policies that are manifestable and efficient for the given electorate. The rise of the far-right party’s support from the greater electorate is as a result of the selective incentives that many of the post-communist state electorates seek to solve issues of security and stability from the state (Kitschelt 1995, 449).

The relationship to the far-right and the establishment of programme-based party politics in the post-communist systems is with the intention of introducing and propagating policies that are in the interest of the state’s populous (Kitschelt 1995, 449-450). These are often established and complicated from the facets of ethnic and pursuit for political pluralism that result in political party cleavages; post-communist parties that are affiliated with the far-right populism is established with the intention of attempting to represent the underprivileged majorities in the former regions of the Soviet Union (Kitschelt 1995, 465, 468). In the case of the Czech Republic, the rise of far-right populism has occurred and garnered more political legitimacy despite its communist or authoritarian past. The public’s search for security during crises like the 2015 refugee crisis or during threats to national security or sovereignty often demonstrates the opportunities for far-right parties to emerge, even if a country has experienced bouts of subjugation from the state or other authoritarian leaders in their recent history.

Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker (2011) contextualize and analyze the origination of political behavior attributed to the communism-based legacies and transition-era legacies. For example, Pop-Eleches and Tucker posit that these legacies should have a lasting effect on the belief that the citizen is able to confidently express discontent and protest to influence political developments (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011, 380). Likewise, post- communist attitudes toward political parties exist as a positive consequence of singular party- rule, one in which those who lived in communist-rule who did not have an interaction with party competition or party pluralism are more inclined to support movement parties instead of an established party (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011, 382).

Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield (2007) posit that party representation in newly democratized post-communist states is denoted by three criteria that intend to represent the populace such as 1. policy, coherence, responsiveness; 2. policy alternatives; 3. programmatic coherence; and 4. policy responsiveness (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007,

1134-7). Firstly, in accordance with the first factor, parties must offer viable policies, policy stances must be linked to parties’ other programmatic goals and party positions must correspond to voter preferences (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007, 1135). Second, policy alternatives should be provided to voters in the form of referendums or the adoption of programmes according to the party‘s platforms. Third, programmatic coherence denotes that cleavage-based accounts of parties stress that preexisting divisions are in fact important; the connectedness of issues positions across policy domains increases the governability of nations and conflicts with policies primarily occur between the parties and their constituencies. Finally, policy responsiveness entails the congruency of party positions and voter preferences by leading the mass public according to the public’s interests vis-a-vis their party policies.

For the post-communist state, Petr Kopecký (2006) posits at the outset of the work that parties have become more dependent on the state, both for their resources and for their party legitimacy. This is demonstrated by the use of categorization of party organizational types be it electoral-professional parties, parties as business firms, cartel parties, and modern cadre parties, all emphasizing a linkage to the state (Kopecký 2006, 252). The third-wave of democratization has led to political parties‘ weak anchoring in society but has maintained a strong penetration of the state which conforms to other party systems elsewhere (Kopecký 2006, 252). Additionally, political parties in post-communist Eastern and Central Europe often have a relatively weak position within civil society which is as a result of legacies that were forced upon the electorate, coupled with the extensive mobilization under communism, which attributes to citizens being unlikely to engage with existing and conventional politics that contributed to subjugation or coercion. In Kopecký (2006), conventional politics takes the form of partisan symbols and party ideologies. Additionally, parties in the post-communist state have a pronounced linkage with the state because parties rely on material resources in the absence of strong roots in wider society posing a consequence, and is a cause because once a party possesses state resources, parties feel less compelled to engage in party-building tactics based on ideals like popular mobilization and extensive organizational development (Kopecký 2006, 253).

Parties in Eastern Europe have remained perfectly positioned to capitalize on the state for their interests. Kopecký (2006) adds that this is because most parties in the Eastern European region and continue to originate even in the present, as elite groups within parliaments and governments rather than social movements outside of the political establishment. As a result,

Kopecký (2006) posits that public offices are housed by people who live from politics rather than for politics; as parties in post-communist states are prescribed with rebuilding and reestablishing the state from prior collapse, Kopecký (2006) states that parties in the post-communist state are 6

more capable of reshaping their political environment based on their individual interests at a civil level (Kopecký 2006, 253). This is indicative of the pluralist system that favors various platforms that range from social democratic parties to the far-right populist parties that have both garnered success in recent legislative elections.

In regards to the origination of post-communist political parties and their platforms according to James Toole (2007) describes the significance of communism’s collapse as being a bearer of political change that often fosters political and ideological pluralism absent from the communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe (Toole 2007, 541). Toole (2007) interpolates

Lipsett and Rokkan (1967) to demonstrate that the former Czechoslovak lands‘ political system infrarstructures produced various parties that were partly in response to the centre-periphery and urban/rural party cleavages, leading to agrarian parties that strived to represent more rural populations for both ethnic Moravians and other minority ethnic groups such as Germans and

Jews in Czechoslovakia. Likewise, Toole (2007) writes that the role of ethnic minorities in post- communist Central and Eastern Europe were well-established with countries consisting of more than 5% of the state’s population, often contributed to a more pluralistic political interests from various segments of Czechoslovakia‘s population (Toole 2007, 549-550). Toole (2007) adds that, for example, Czech lands in the post-communist era of Central and Eastern Europe saw an interest of ethnicity-inspired nationalism from Moravians via the Movement for Self-Governing

Democracy/Society for Moravia and Silesia in the 1990s, exceeding more than the 5% parliamentary threshhold, and as a result leading to the Moravian population and their political interests to be of more interest after communist rule (Toole 2007, 555).

REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON GLOBALIZATION

David Held (1999) explains the development of economic and cultural globalization. In

Held (1999), the author introduces the premises that globalization has presented the state with series of layers of governance based on the features of the new era of global or cosmopolitanism, where the rise in globalization has also been argued as a contributor to a seamless flow of crime in the via drug smugglers, terrorists, illicit capital flows and illegal immigration, which has grown in recent years (Held 1999, 483, 489). The growing and uncontrollable movement of risks to security and Czech national identity is perceived to be attributed to a rise in crime from outside forces throughout Europe. Likewise, these fears of unknown forces are also perceived as the cultural or security risk to the Czech Republic by anti-globalist forces; this is because of the

2015 refugee crisis and perceived influx of Islamic or Eastern influence in Western and Central

Europe.

For these RRWP, newly arriving refugees throughout Europe are a malevolent force to

European culture and political harmony. This is then demonstrated in the RRWP and

Eurosceptics’ need to protect their countries from these potential risks that originate from various non-European countries who perceive refugees as the enemy of their state’s security and culture.

David Held’s previous work “Democracy and Globalization” (1997) references the conception of the “friend” vs “enemy” binary (Held 1997, 260). As it relates to the contemporary case of the Czech Republic, the European Union immigration quotas, which is defined as a series of programs by the EU which ensures the relocation and subsequent asylum status for swathes of refugees, whereby all EU-member states should take in migrants like their neighbors. These quotas or the refugee crisis were not presented in the discussion of national security at the time of Held (1997) but is indicative of a greater trend of far-right or nationalism that is in reaction to this binary of friend vs enemy binary between the RRWPs and far-right against the refugees and 8

European Union. Held (2001; 1997) writes that the growing dependence on diverse, or politically pluralistic powers to determine the validity and effectiveness of the integrated global institution can be deemed a threat to national sovereignty for post-communist states like the Czech

Republic. Czech Republic’s rise in far-right sentiment is in direct reaction to the development of the varied and pluralistic institutions that has metastasized into an interdependent European region that eliminates the necessity for singular state interests. Therein, the larger European

Union institution is the interdependent European institution that determines the legitimacy and priority of a states’ own interests (Held (2001; 1997).

The prominence of global forces affecting the state’s autonomy in the larger global system. The results of this is an environment where the state is skeptical of its status and potential for following its policies. The states’ interests thus become less significant when compared to the interests within the international sphere as policies like migration. Within Peter

Andreas’ (2011) work, Andreas writes that the effects of transnational crime and the rise of underlying threats to national security are often linked to the openness of the globalized system that includes the wide flow of goods or services across state borders. Furthermore, the author posits that the risk of undermining or completely disregarding international law can often pose inherent troubles for countries that may result in conflict or tension within the realm of international polities.

Andreas (2011) adds that the origin of the illicit trade or distribution of prohibited commodities are attributed to the liberalized of trade and global systems that unknowingly move across state borders without detection or apprehension. The rise and incentivized intentions of participating in transnational crimes are the major concerns felt by the far-right who are concerned about threats to them from various outside forces entering their countries. As the international trade of illicit goods continue to be a concerning challenge to the state, whereby 9

many states are inclined to view these activities with complete scrutiny and careful investigations of the information or trade at their borders. As a result, the effects of cultural globalization have contributed to an increased scrutiny of the European Union and a reinforcement of the citizen’s national identity.

Satoshi Machida (2012) writes about the inferred implications of globalization as seen by ethnocentrism. Machida (2012) discusses the probability of contention among cultures as a result of deeper and nuanced cultural identities in a state. Strong ethnocentrism can develop as cultural autonomy in a state when confronted with the newly arrived migrant populations (Machida 2012,

456-7). As Machida (2012) posits where cultural conflicts as a result of cultural globalization appeared to be a likely scenario, the proclivity for inclusion by European natives to incoming refugees during the 2015 refugee crisis prompted the rise of the far-right in presence and political legitimacy as migration represented a perceived east-and-west conflict of culture and cultural hybridization and homogenization that occurs with the integration of foreign recipients into a particular country at any given time (Machida 2012, 457).

Although the integration of outsider cultures does not inherently contribute to open dissension with flows of migration or non-native cultures, Machida (2012) concludes that it is still essential to position this perspective among other globalization frameworks. In other words, the role of ethnocentrism and the imposing power of globalization are not necessarily causal.

Though, the phenomenon itself is in fact enough to bring about dissension by far-right groups, when these perceive themselves to be at the behest of an unstoppable global force of the

European Union.

In the case of Czech Republic, Duane Swank and Hans Georg-Betz (2003) write that the electoral support for the far-right is a reaction to globalization, and international the integration, or the transnational flow of trade, capital and people has contributed to the success of far-right 10

wing (RRWP) parties in Europe. Swank and George-Betz write that post-industrialization and the decline of manufacturing employment are instrumental in the formation and success of

RRWP as open global systems contribute to employment disenfranchisement and decrease in economic opportunities for Western or Central Europe’s population, and the influx of industrialized European city centers. As countries in Europe often rely on the mechanisms of globalization to look elsewhere to employ processes of international economic integration through foreign immigration, so do the rise of anti-globalist entities who respond negatively to the changing political and social landscapes of their countries via right-leaning party seats and representation (Swank and Georg-Betz 2003, 657). Although the article argues that the presence of the far-right is attributed to globalization, Swank and George-Betz also posit that the

European welfare state is argued as one of the potential forces that would thwart the electoral support for the far-right parties, especially in Western Europe.

The effects of cosmopolitanism vis-a-vis the forces of globalization are thus associated with the rise of the far-right. Furthermore, the reactionary right’s contention with incoming flows of migration, a lack of state sovereignty and integration of non-traditional cultures or schools of thought are also instrumental in its rise. When referring to the context of the far-right’s anti- migrant policy, the authors posit in their argument that economic globalization, in this case, opting for policies that value open labor markets, also often harm the native workers’ potential for the same work. In turn, economic displacement as a result of economic globalization has lessened the economic or occupational benefits for natives, which occurs as a country accepts newly arrived workers from outside of Europe into the European or Western employment sectors.

Christine S. Lipsmeyer and Ling Zhu (2011) write that immigration has remained a crucial issue for the welfare of European states through economic integration vis-a-vis 11

globalization, which has existed as a crucial and notable issue that has influenced government employment policies within the various European Union members. Specifically, employment benefits and the prospect of economic integration for newly arrived immigrants can be defined as either burdens or assets to a country’s occupational market, which is dependent on whether that country yearns for migrants to participate. Therefore, countries that are more inclined to accept those who could be a viable force for the country are more interested in accepting immigrants for their economic viability (Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011, 648; 660). Shifts in employment from non- native citizens or peoples, also reveal a clear indication that unemployment policies will adapt to reflect the newly unemployed members of the population because of the tenets of economic globalization that value open labor and laissez faire migrant policies throughout Western and

Central Europe (Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011, 648; 660). The framework of economic integration and its relationship to migration to Europe is to be reflected and interpolated to reflect the sentiments of the far-right who form in reaction to the lack of employment benefits for native workers, the view that migrants are social, political and economic burden that influence various nationalistic policies.

Similarly, Michael Goodhart (2001) writes that the impact of globalization on affluent

European democracies is tied to maintaining state sovereignty. The effects of globalization in all its forms, according to Goodhart, are less pronounced and prevalent at the time that the work was written. In turn, the article is to be positioned among the other works who present various reactions to economic and cultural globalization in the early 20th century; Goodhart posits that globalization’s own consequences are deep-ceded and detrimental to democracy, and more entangled in the norms of the state (Goodhart 2001, 542). From this perspective, the forces of globalization have undermined the role of the state and can in fact lead to a shift that intends to

stray away from interdependence with the global marketplace or government vis-a-vis the

European Union.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND EUROPE

David Brady, Jason Beckfield and Wei Zhao (2007) attributes the difficulties faced by

European welfare states and the affluent Westernized democracy to economic globalization vis- a-vis an influx of incoming migrants who seek employment opportunities from native European workers. Brady, Beckfield and Zhao posit that the emergence of economic globalization has in fact contributed to transnational governance. According to Djelic and Sahlin-Anderson (2006), suggests that states are one type of actor among other participating actors, embedded in larger geopolitical structures that envelope a series of multiple institutional webs that govern other entities (Djelic and Sahlin-Anderson 2006, 3-4). In turn, transnational governance suggests a lesser prioritized state to foster neoliberalism and further globalization, with the development of further inequity among manufacturing sectors of employment in affluent and democratic regions

(Brady, Beckfield, Zhao 2011, 329).

The Czech Republic’s history is both complex and unique for its peaceful transition from communist satellite state to a unitary parliamentary constitutional republic from the USSR after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. According to Gordon Wightman’s article entitled “The Collapse of Communist Rule in Czechoslovakia and the June 1990 Parliamentary Elections” (1991), after forty years of power, was in the midst of losing its power after only marginal (13.5%) support in the 1990 elections. Likewise, as the Communist Party continued to exercise power, dissension from outside of the establishment bellowed out in the form of political unrest due to a declining economy (Wightman 1991, 95), as well as the human rights violations instigated by an existing police state that saw the persecution of the country’s citizens and other dissidents against the

Communist Party’s policies. In turn as a reaction to the growing dissension against

Czechoslovakia’s influence and relationship with other nearby Communist satellite states, the refuge of thousands of East Germans and the revolution in Berlin saw a fragmented communist 14

power susceptible of unrest and disorganization from outside of the existing political establishments (Wightman 1991, 96).

Civil unrest set the environment for the Velvet Revolution, which took place on two anniversaries — the Soviet invasion on August 21st and the foundation of Czechoslovakia in

October. The revolution itself sought to bring an end to the 42 years of Communist Party rule

(Wightman 1991, 97). With the growing distrust of the Communist Party and the cohesion of opposition on a grand civil level, attempts to organize a coalition government by the then Federal

Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, would only retain three-quarters of the seats and prompted an unwillingness to accept some of the Civic Forum’s (Občanské fórum, OF) nominees, a major political movement formed in the midst of the Velvet Revolution and formed by Vaclav Havel.

The OF movement arose out of further dissent against communists as Adamec opposed non-

Communist representation in the government.

A new 20-member Government of National Understand was sworn in on December 10,

1989, containing only nine Communists. Seven of the remaining posts were given to Civic

Forum and The Public Against Violence, and two seats to parties that had survived one-party rule by the satellites of the Communist Party (Wightman 1991, 98). This formation of a new government effectively ended the Communist Party’s monopoly of political power and tradition of leading to their leading role in society. Communist Party influence was not restricted to the government level. Between December 1989 and the end of February 1990, the domination of three parliaments — the Federal Assembly and the National Councils in the Czech and Slovak

Republics was brought to its end. Czechoslovakia thus became the first country in the Eastern

European region to which the organization of free and competitive parliamentary elections were not dictated by the ruling Communist Party (Wightman 1991, 97-8). The Czech Republic’s

interest in preserving the state’s interest is in relation to their reaction to incompatible actors such as incoming asylum seekers.

Bruce Katz and Jeremy Nowak (2017) describe the anti-globalist platform regarding demographic shifts from migration, one in which is demonstrative of populist or ethnocentric nationalist platform sentiment (Katz and Nowak 2017, 54). With the influx of refugees into

Europe, sovereign states strive to preserve their borders considering international and domestic threats and attacks; Katz and Nowak’s (2017) define the sentiment across Europe of populist political movements and sentiments that have become legitimized as a result of these fears of lessened national security and identity. Combined with economic insecurity, these fears are in reaction to the mechanisms of cultural globalization vis-a-vis a borderless European region.

Likewise, Clara Hendrickson (2018) writes that European populism and specifically,

Euroscepticism is a reaction to migrant policies from the refugee crisis and terrorism on an international scale in both the U.S. and across the European region, which has given rise to a shift in support toward anti-globalist and protective leadership throughout Europe as a whole

(Hendrickson 2018, 43). For the segments of the population who seek protection from cultural vulnerability or threats to national insecurity, populist parties and similar sentiments by other political figures are able to identify with these concerns. For those who have become disillusioned by the current European system, these electorates resort to voting as a backlash to the liberal mainstream, often comprised of those who seek to contribute to creating a multicultural and unsafe Europe (Hendrickson 2018, 43-4).

To further the assertion that Czech Republic’s demographic makeup strives to continue as a European nation, can be acknowledged through the country’s ethnic breakdown. According to the Czech Statistical Office’s (2011) report about the demographics of ethnic groups in the

Czech Republic, Czechs consist of 63.7% of the population or 6,732,104 persons in total; 16

Moravians are second-most with 4.9%, or 521,801; Slovaks consist of 147,152 persons in the

Czech Republic; and Ukrainians are the fourth largest population with 53,253 persons, respectively. Likewise, according to the Government Council for National Minorities in accordance with the Government of the Czech Republic, the country recognizes fourteen national minorities which include Belarusian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Hungarian, German, Polish,

Roma, Ruthenian, Russian, Greek, Slovak, Serbian, Ukrainian and Vietnamese, respectively; additionally, each of these recognized minorities nominates up to two representatives for their respective ethnic group for dutiful and equal representation among its minorities (Government of

Czech Republic). Furthermore, according to the Centre for Integration of Foreigners and an interpolation of data provided by the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, as of July 2012, there were 437,928 legally residing foreigners in the Czech Republic; a majority of foreigners, nearly 40%, primarily reside in Prague and the second biggest share of immigrants reside in

Central Bohemia (Centre for Integration of Foreigners 2012). As a result, parties continue to capitalize on the share of immigrants that are perceived as threat to the fundaments of their country via the Freedom and Direct Democracy party.

The Freedom and Direct Democracy’s (SPD) platform according to the SPD policy program, the party is defined as a political movement that promotes fundamental constitutional and legislative changes that is aimed at defending freedom and democracy in the Czech

Republic. Issues such as direct democracy and the broad involvement of citizens in the governance of a country to the fundamental principle of ‘democratic defense.’ Likewise, the party looks to end the ‘false games’ of political parties on both side of the political spectrum that has contributed to issues such as high debt, high taxes and crises. The party deems itself to be a patriotic and democratic movement that opposes the European integration project that intends to create a European super state (European Union). This project is linked to the weakening and 17

liquidation of nation states and nations of Europe, thereby advocating for divorcing from the EU in a referendum.

Additionally, the SPD opposes the existing European project that the party perceives to be a threat to freedom and democracy in Europe, and in turn, also advocates for controlled

Islamization of Europe. Ongoing immigration is viewed as the initial phase of the conflict which ultimately threatens freedom, democracy and the very existence of the Czech Republic and the nation. The party holds that it does not claim hatred for any hatred for any nation, race, culture or region. It strives to preserve the society’s national traditions based on its Jewish roots, ancient and Christian cultures and civilizations. These are deemed to be foundation of democracy, freedom and human rights, which the party deems the ongoing Islamization of Europe countries to be incompatible with these values (Freedom and Direct Democracy 2017).

The party outlines its platform as defined by ten issues: (1) advocate for a radical change in the political system with direct democracy, an EU referendum and a revocability of politicians; (2) personal, material and criminal liability of politicians in response to longstanding corruption in the Czech Republic; (3) the SPD advocates for a law that proves the origin of acquired property; (4) an end to raising taxes that would advantage families with three or more children while also simplifying the tax system; (5) creating new jobs, therein supporting entrepreneurs and foster economic growth; (6) enforcement of laws that is against usury loans;

(7) pursue reforms and changes in government that favors a functional, economical and democratic state where citizens receive their rights and demand adequate responsibilities from the citizenry while also building sustainable social, educational and health system, protect freedom, family values and the security of citizens; (8) reforming an expensive and dysfunctional social system by supporting all decent people like seniors, families with children, disabled people and children at risk of poverty; (9) enforcing a constitutional debt brake that manages and 18

balances debt and state budgets; (10) SPD opposes being an EU province and wants to develop and defend a sovereign Czech Republic such as strict conditions of Czech Republic’s immigration policy that would limit inadaptable immigrants or the arrival of religious fanatics, enforceability of churches’ activities under the Churches Act, and effective border control to monitor Islamists supporting jihad and sharia law (Freedom and Direct Democracy 2017).

PRESENTATION OF DATA ON THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS

In the case of the Czech Republic, during the peak of the 2015 refugee crisis, the country only accepted 12 of the 2,691 refugees. The Czech Republic was expected to be relocate refugees and potential asylum seekers throughout the 2015 EU Emergency Relocation Scheme but were instead distributed to countries like Greece and Italy, who received the bulk of migrants from the various conflict zones in the Middle East and North Africa.

Asylum holders are recognized as having originated from a country that poses significant threats to their health and life; refugees are perceived as individuals who escape persecution but not protected by the Czech Republic, whereas subsidiary protection holds a similar definition but is also defined as temporary (CICPraha 2010).

Since the beginning of the migrant crisis, restrictive migration policies in the Czech

Republic have continued to garner significant support from the Czech electorate, even as the country continues to receive fewer than any country in the European Union institution.1 Therein, the Czech far-right’s pursuit to preserve Czech sovereignty, to maintain an autonomous nation state to conserve their fading European identity is based on the skepticism and fears of multiculturalism seen in neighboring countries within the region. In this contemporary and multicultural Europe, the Czech Republic’s policy is a unique rejection of cultural globalization and cosmopolitanism, present in other European countries who adamantly accepted 108,882 at the peak of the crisis and continued to take in nearly 1.3 million into other countries across

Europe for three years (Le Gloannec 2017, 146).

1 Amnesty International. 2018. “Czech Republic 2017/2018.” Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/czech-republic/report-czech-republic/ (November 27, 2018). 20

Similarly, in response to the crisis, European countries remained at the behest of the

European Union laws vis-a-vis migrant integration quotas per country; EU states were, in turn, unprepared and perplexed by the amount of assistance needed to assuage those who were fleeing their countries and led to disappointment and overall dissatisfaction with the migrants and the institution itself (Le Gloannec 2017 146-7). Migrant quotas and the authority of the EU continues to a contribute to greater disconnect between the institution of the European Union and the issue of state-centered interests which demonstrates a complete rejection of the tenets of cultural globalization via migration, even at a time of crisis as migrant integration would be expected to take place (Le Gloannec 2017, 147).

As an ethnic group, or a nation in the case of the Czech Republic where both are synonymous, the rise of populism or a rejection of cultural globalization arose out of a need to reject the European institutions at hand; in the case of the Czech Republic, whose primary interest is to reject the migrant quotas set forth by the European Union Commission. Therefore, the Czech Republic’s disinterest in following the EU law demonstrates that they are not concerned with relying on the norms and rules of the larger European authority for the sake of

European solidarity (Katz and Nowak 2017, 47-8; Hendrickson 2018, 43-4). In order to maintain its own national and cultural security, the Czech Republic finds that the European Union quotas and rulings to import more migrants works against the interests of Czech authorities and its peoples, where as a country, it understands its role as trying to defend its cultural and national characteristics from migrants and maintain its autonomy as it attempts to disassociate from the

EU (Katz and Nowak 2017, 48).

In regards to cultural proximity and the precepts of cultural globalization that may fuel one’s anti-native sentiment, Machida (2012) asserts that the ‘heterogenization’ and homogenization of culture under globalization, where polarization and ethnocentrism may in fact 21

be indicators of cultural behavioral shifts; this can in fact be demonstrated via the 2015 refugee crisis throughout Europe; although Machida does not explicitly conclude that ethnocentrism is a consequence of cultural or social globalization via migration or an increase in open flows of markets or interactions, the rise in populism is clear and prevalent among European political climates, as the effects of the crisis on the region since 2015 can be argued as being indicative of close proximity relationships or interactions between Europeans and non-European migrants within the region (Machida 2012, 456).

With regards to low-skilled labor via migration during the 2015 refugee crisis, Peters

(2017) emphasizes the role of migration and globalization in developing labor sectors and expanding the dependence on low-skilled labor for a particular state that may warrant a negative reaction from persons or groups who harbor anti-immigrant sentiments (Peters 2017, 4); therein, through Peters (2017), the nativist perspective is reflected by the extent of dependence on migrant labor that can participate in intensive production processes and garner support from the populous for its economic viability through the various trade sectors in a nation state.

With this reliance on migrants or compulsory importation of migrants into a state, xenophobic or anti-immigrant sentiments only permeate and become politically legitimized as economic dependence through trade and labor becomes the priority for a state and presents few opportunities for the native populations, thereby contributing to a political and economic dilemma in the region (Peters 2017, 3-4).

For citizens of the European Union states such as Lichtenstein, Switzerland and Iceland, for example, these incoming foreigners do not require a residency permit and are only obliged to inform the police about their residence if they intend to stay longer than one month. For countries outside of the European Union (third-party nationals) can only reside with a long-term visa, long-term residence permit or permanent resident permit, while others can stay under 22

international protection (asylum holders or subsidiary protection); these third-party nationals, according to International Treaties, there are two different forms of protection provided by the

Czech Republic — asylum and subsidiary protection (CIC Praha 2010 and EMN 2017).

From 2000-2010, according to CICPraha (2010), the average number of recognized asylum seekers was 158. From September 2006 to December 2010, 491 applicants got subsidiary protection. In 2010, 125 applicants received asylum status. Overall, there remains a decline in applications and therefore, also in the number of new recognitions of asylum statuses (CIC Praha

2010). According to report from the EMN Annual Report in accordance with the Ministry of the

Interior of the Czech Republic, European Migration Network and European Union Asylum,

Migration and Integration Fund (2017), on a year-by-year basis, there was a 6.1% increase in the number of foreign nationals in the Czech Republic.

In September 2017, according to the European Union Commission report on behalf of the

Czech Republic’s government, a deadline was proposed for asylum applicants to qualify for the relocation mechanisms of the EU, by which the temporary measure by the two decisions of the

EU Council in September 2015 aimed to redistribute a total of 160 thousand applicants for international protection while being relocated from Greece and Italy. For the Czech Republic, this relocation quota sought to relocate 2,691 persons to the Czech Republic, and as part of the relocation program, the Czech Republic received 12 people from Greece due to issues with security screening paperwork from applicants from Italy (EMN 2017).

In September 2017, the deadline for asylum applicants As a result, in 2017, the European

Commission referred the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the EU Court of Justice for non-compliance with their legal obligations to relocate migrants from Greece (16,000) and Italy

(24,000) to other member states who are deemed capable of relocating in their respective countries, leading to contention from the Czech government and citizens who were opposed to 23

the EU’s overreach and policies that did more consider the importance of state-centered decisions (EU Commission 2017).

As of December 2017, 526,811 foreign nationals were staying legally in the territory of the Czech Republic, defined as a period longer than 90 days. The countries with the strongest presence during this period was Ukraine (117,480), Slovakia (111,804) and Vietnam (59,808), which accounted for more than half of the foreign nationals with residency permits in the Czech

Republic. Likewise, in 2017, the Czech Republic received 1,450 cases applying for international protection was reduced by 28 from the previous year.

The main source of applicants was from Ukraine (435), Armenia (129), Georgia (129),

Azerbaijan (127), Vietnam (82), Syria (76), Cuba (68), the Russia Federation (57), Iraq (52),

Kazakhstan (38) and Turkey (32), respectively. In turn, the Czech Republic only granted asylum for 29 cases; most originated from Ukraine (8), with others originating from Myanmar (4),

Azerbaijan (1), Syria (1) and Turkey (1), Belarus (1) and Russian Federation (1), and 1 each from Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq and Morocco (EMN 2017), demonstrating the Czech Republic’s rejection of European Union migrant relocation policies, thereby prioritizing state interests in the number of migrants it wishes to receive during periods of migration and its origins of these incoming asylum seekers.

PRESENTATION OF DATA ON PUBLIC OPINION

Europe’s growing trend of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiment, and greater dissension toward Europe’s interdependence on the European Union has surged in backlash to

Europe’s complicated cultural landscape after the 2015 refugee crisis. While many citizens have expressed empathy and open-mindedness toward refugees who are entering their countries, significantly large segments of Europe’s population have also conveyed their disillusionment and outright opposition to migrants via quotas and integration policies set forth by the European

Union.

According to a 2014-2018 Eurobarometer report (See Figure 1) on citizen reactions to the 2015 refugee crisis, nine out of the eleven countries felt that the presence and acceptance of migrants presented a significant risk to their national security and contributed to potential economic burdens in their respective countries (Wilke 2016).

The Eurobarometer dataset demonstrates that less than 40% perceive the immigration of people with positive reception as presented with the blue line, whereas nearly 50% from 2015 to

2018 continue to perceive immigration into the Czech Republic with skepticism and negativity as indicated by the yellow line.

Figure 1 : Eurobarometer Report on Feelings About Immigration From Outside of EU

The report reveals that many Europeans were and continue to be consistently concerned with the presence of refugees since the time span of the 2015 refugee crisis. The influx of newly imported migrants, according to Czech residents, presents the countries with substantial security and economic repercussions. These suspicions by European residents believe refugees are complicit in committing crimes and acquiring benefits at the cost of those who lived in Europe and no longer capable of reaping occupational and social benefits upon the arrival of refugees into the countries.

As indicated by the figure, closer to 50% of Czechs do not view migration as a positive attribute of their country, in addition to an opposition to diversity from outside of the European

Union. For many of those who oppose migration, interacting with new cultures or ideas can also be a factor in the formation of far-right sensibilities that then translate into party support of parties like the Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD). In turn, Europeans who continue to be suspicious of diversity, deeming multiculturalism as a blemish on the reputation of their statehood and as an imminent threat to their national security and culture pursue parties that represent these exclusionary views.

PRESENTATION OF FREEDOM AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY PARTY

One of these parties espousing anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiment saw the rise in the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party in the 2017 Czech Republic legislative election, which platformed on the anti-refugee policies that was in contention with the European Union. which garnered 538,574 votes and was the fourth-most popular party during the 2017 campaign, according to a report by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE) on the

Parliamentary Elections in October 2017 (OSCE 2018, 21). The anti-refugee sentiment and fears of EU power via migration quotas have contributed to the recent rise in Czech far-right populism, which was subsequently legitimized by the garnering of 22 out of the 200 Chamber of

Deputies seats during the 2017 Czech legislative election for the Freedom and Direct Democracy

(SPD) party led by Tomio Okamura, which garnered 10.6%, thereby surpassing the party’s goal of surpassing 10% for greater representation in the Chamber of Deputies. In turn, the 2017 election exists as most recent and most significant success for an upcoming far-right populist party in the country.

This is in contrast to the previous 2013 legislative election, where the SPD’s predecessor,

Tomio Okamura’s Dawn party only won 14 seats or 342,339 popular votes, existing as 6.88% of the vote, indicating that the electorate’s interests are shifted toward nationalistic platforms that intend to address migration and the European Union’s power at hand, and its implications of

EU’s power on the Czech Republic‘s politics.

Therein, growing from the sixth-most popular party to the tied-for-third party indicates a growing success for a party whose platform began as a Eurosceptic party to one that continued as one in reaction to the recent immigration crises across Europe. Parties like the SPD or Dawn party have demonstrated that anti-immigrant politics are both popular among the public and the

incoming legislative powers who fear the imminent threat of terrorism and population shifts from non-European persons.

Parties like the SPD operate to thwart the rise of cosmopolitanism in their respective countries, which often manifests in the form of refugee quotas that are imposed upon the population by the forces within the European Union. Therein, the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment and the support of far-right parties see the forces of immigration that is a concern for many of the Czech electorate who are unable to coexist with incoming foreigners.

During both the 2013 and 2018 elections, the Czech Republic’s support for the far-right was mostly non-existent outside of the support for the Dawn and Freedom and Direct Democracy parties during both elections. The most popular parties during the 2013 election consisted of various parties such as the leading Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) which is a social democrat and pro-European party with 20.45% or 50 seats in the Chamber of Deputies; the second-most popular party was the ANO party, a centrist, populist political party led by Andrej

Babiš, a media conglomerate owner, garnering 47 seats and 18.65% of the popular vote; third- most popular was the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia led by Vojtěch Filip, received

14.91% of the vote and 26 seats out of the 200 total available Chamber of Deputies seats (Czech

Statistical Office 2013).

In the 2017 Czech election, the leading party that received the most votes and seats in the

Chamber of Deputies was the ANO party led by Andrej Babiš, which garnered 78 seats, receiving 29.6% of the vote and 1,500,113 for the popular vote. The second-most party included the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), an economic liberal party led by Petr Fiala, a university political science professor; the third-most popular party is the Czech Pirate Party led by Ivan

Bartoš, which emphasizes the role of e-government and government transparency, and received

22 seats in the Chamber of Deputies — tied with the SPD, with the Czech Pirate Party garnering

546,393 of the popular vote (Czech Statistical Office 2017).

Anti-immigrant rhetoric also extends to the integration and allowance of foreigners into the Czech Republic in recent years. For many who believe that migration and asylum-seekers to be harmful to the homogeny of the country based on the premises that they are choosing to live in the Czech Republic at the behest of its citizens. Specifically, according to a March 2019 report by the Center for Public Opinion Research of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of

Sciences of the Czech Republic (CVVM), two fifths or 40% of Czech citizens surveyed believe that there are too many foreigners in the Czech Republic, and more than three quarters of respondents or 77% hold that foreigners should only be able to stay in the Czech Republic under certain conditions such as college or work; in addition, 74% of Czechs hold that foreigners should abide by Czech habits or culture as one of the conditions for remaining a resident in the country (CVVM 2019). According to a Spring 2018 Standard Eurobarometer report, 58% of

Czechs view immigration as the most important issue facing their state, the second among 21 EU member states. In the Czech Republic, 48% also considered terrorism to be another major concern for their country (EU Barometer 2018).

CONCLUSION

Cultural globalization via the influx of migrants during the 2015 refugee crisis has presented various debates on European immigration policy and the role of the institution in determining the rightful number of migrants for any one country or nation-state in the region.

Based on this paper’s research question, “How does illicit globalization via migration and cosmopolitanism fuel the rise of backlash far-right politics in the Czech Republic?”, illicit globalization and the forces of the European Union has presented the EU member states and the region with significant political and cultural conflicts that question the role of statehood and cultural identity in a contemporary and developing multicultural Europe.

Whether this paper has answered any existing questions about the role of statehood and significance of European identity, is in turn, according to current research that continues to evolve with the legitimization of European far-right, anti-migrant rhetoric and rise in

Euroscepticism throughout Europe. Therefore, European citizens have continued to fuel a debate on the European political mainstream and rise of migration restrictions in reaction to the 2015 migrant crisis, leading to widespread and contentious platforms from right-leaning populists who advocate for concessions from the EU institutions, or a complete exit from the European Union various iterations.

As the Czech Republic’s rise in far-right and right-leaning populist parties continue to permeate the country’s politics, Euroscepticism as a result of the refugee crisis continues to be at the forefront of party platforms and public discourse. Where the refugee crisis has inspired dissension to globalization, curtailing migration and the institutions attributed to open borders across EU member states, the Czech Republic continues to express resounding opposition to being policed by a governing body from outside of their nation. Likewise, the negative public perception of the refugee crisis in the Czech Republic not only originates from fears of terroristic 30

attacks from outside forces, but also skepticism and contention of cultures between natives and migrants.

As observed from the Czech Republic’s post-communist past, the rise in far-right populist parties has been attributed to their divisive history with institutions such as the European

Union, where for Czechs, the EU is one iteration of an authoritative institution that presents itself as an authority that does not reflect the Czech Republic’s interests. This is evident in the EU’s decisions to institute asylum seeker policies that operate against the interests of the countries that are in dissent toward population changes and fears of terrorism that have become throughout other European countries who have received thousands of migrants. Likewise, with the 2015 refugee crisis and the country’s post-communist past, the far-right continues to rise in reaction against an authoritative European Union that has spawned both Eurosceptic platforms and anti- migrant sensibilities across the Czech Republic.

Furthermore, the rise of these Eurosceptic and far-right populist parties continue to permeate the Czech Republic to respond to the EU member state’s economic dependence on migrants that has spawned movements across Europe who fear the presence of low-skilled labor and entrance of new asylum seekers to be a threat to national security as a whole.

Though, these debates on a country’s economic dependence, reliance on low-skilled labor, multiculturalism and national security continue to exist as pertinent and controversial issues that are determiners on the future of Europe for the far-right and other members of the

European nativist groups, those who fear the influence and imposition from the forces of cultural globalization via compulsory migration have set a precedent for European politics which strives to represent those portions of electorates who cannot coexist with migrants originating from non-

European members.

As an EU member state, the Czech Republic’s continuing restrictive migrant policies continue to favor previously communist states rather than those who originate from Middle

Eastern or African nations as is evident in the Eurobarometer dataset in the previous section.

Additionally, the preference of asylum seekers originating from post-communist European demonstrates a clear indication that the Czech Republic is concerned with maintaining a traditional European nation that is incapable of becoming altered by those deemed to be non-

European and undesirable according to Czech society.

With this growing dissension to migration and asylum seekers dispersed across Europe, nationalistic sensibilities continue to permeate in the establishment and legitimacy of right- leaning populist parties who advocate for restrictions on migration from continents outside of

Europe. Furthermore, Czech Republic’s interest in pursuing right-leaning populist interests to thwart the incoming migrants through the establishment of parties like the SPD.

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