OUTSIDERS, CRISIS, AND THE REMAKING OF URBAN COMMUNITY IN MEDIEVAL FRANCE 1348–1500

Adam S. Boss

A dissertation submitted to the Brown University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History May, 2015

© Copyright 2015 by Adam S. Boss

This dissertation by Adam S. Boss is accepted in its present form by the Department of History as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Date:______Professor Amy Remensnyder, Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date:______Professor Caroline Castiglione, Reader

Date:______Professor Tara Nummedal, Reader

ii CURRICULUM VITAE

Education  Ph.D. History, Brown University, to be conferred May 2015 Examination Fields: Medieval Europe; Early Modern Europe; Global Missions and Empires. Passed with distinction, 2011  A.M.History, Brown University, 2009  B.A. History, magna cum laude, Colby College, 2008

Fellowships & Awards

 Council on Library and Information Resources (CLIR), Mellon Fellowship for Dissertation Research on Original Sources (2012-2013): $21,000  Cogut Center for the Humanities Graduate Fellowship (2012-2013): $20,000 (Declined)  Peter Green Doctoral Scholar, Brown University Department of History: Fellowship annually awarded to two students fo exceptional achievement in the History Department : $4,000.  Charles T. Wood Dissertation Grant, Medieval Academy of America (2011-2012): $2,000  Church Fellowship for Pre-Dissertation Research, Brown University (2011): $ 2,500  Jonathan Barry Research Grant for Senior Honors Thesis Research, Colby College (2007): $1,400.  Jack D. Foner Prize, Colby College, 2008: Awarded to the outstanding Senior Honors Thesis in History. “A City at War: Daily Life and Society in Orléans, 1400-1429.”  Senior History Prize, Colby College, 2008  Junior history Prize, Colby College, 2007

Publications  “Collective Memories of a Foreign Menace: , 1419-1492,” in Wendy Turner and Christina Lee, eds. Trauma in Medieval Life. (Forthocming, Brill, 2016).  Review of David Green, A People’s History of the Hundred Years War (: Yale University Press, 2014). In Reviews and Critical Commentary (April, 2015). Invited Lectures  Invited speaker, Professor Cecilia Gaposhkin’s “” seminar, Dartmouth College (March, 2015)  Invited Lecturer, Colby College Bi-Centennial Alumni Lecture Series, “Crisis and Community in Medieval France,” (March 5, 2013)

iii Conference Presentations  Co-organizer for session, “The Composite City”, 49th International Congress on Medieval Studies, May 8-11, 2014. Presented a paper entitled “Facing the Forains: the Refugee Crisis in late medieval Rouen.”  Organizer for session “Crisis and Community in Historical Perspective” at the Council of European Studies Conference, “Crisis and States of Instability”, (June 2013). Presented a paper entitled “Outsiders, Crisis, and Community in medieval France”.  ”Women of Status but not of Honor”: Gender in crisis in fifteenth century France.” Presented at 47th International Medieval Congress, Kalamazoo, MI (May, 2012)

 “Information for Salvation: The Uses of Natural Knowledge in the Jesuit Relations.” Presented at 126th American Historical Association (AHA) Conference (January 2012)

 “The Meaning of Victory: Social Tension and Civic Identity in Orléans during the Hundred Years War”, Presented at the Medieval and Early Modern History Seminar, Brown University (September 2011), and at Fordham University Graduate Conference, “Urban Identities Reconsidered” (Fall 2011)

 "Daily Life in Orléans at the Time of the English Siege," 44th International Medieval Congress, Kalamazoo, MI (Spring 2009)

Teaching Experience Faculty Fellow, Brown University Department of History, Spring 2014 Designed and taught a research seminar entitled “Plague, War, Famine and Death: Crisis in the Late .”

Summer at Brown 2013–2015 Co-instructor with Wanda Henry for “A People’s History of War”. We designed and taught this intensive pre-college course on the social and cultural effects of war from 2013–2015.

Co-instructor for, “Evil: The History of an Idea.” This course, to be offered at Brown for the in the Summer of 2015, will give students a deeper understanding of shifting cultural and religious concepts about evil that shape modern societies and our everyday lives.

Teaching Assistant Brown University Department of History, 2009-2011; 2013 HI 1280: English History, 1529-1660 – Professor Timothy Harris HI 1040: The High Middle Ages –Professor Remensnyder HI 1020: Christians, Muslims, and Jews in Medieval Iberia – Professor Remensnyder HI 1030: The Early Middle Ages – Professor Amy Remesnyder HI 1670: History of Brazil – Professor James Green

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Editorial Experience Editorial Assistant, Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies, (September 2014–Present), a quarterly publication of Cambridge University Press. In this role, I edit and proof book reviews and articles, and coordinate with our editorial board to assign reviewers books to be evaluated in Speculum, the leading journal in medieval studies.

History Editor, Council of European Studies Online Journal, Review and Critical Commentary (2013–2015). Responsibilities include soliciting and editing book reviews and forum discussions, and editing and formatting content for online publication.

Research Assistantships Research Assistant for Professor Linford Fisher for his study of slavery and servitude in colonial New England during King Philip’s War (Spring 2011–Spring 2012), contributing to publication of “Dangerous Designes: The 1676 Barbados Act to Prohibit New England Slave Importation,” William and Mary Quarterly 71 (2014), 99-124. Served from 2006–2008 as Research Assistant to Professor Larissa Taylor for her study Virgin Warrior: The Life and Death of Joan of Arc (London: Yale University Press, 2009). Responsibilities included extensive translation and paleography work.

Service Media Coordinator, Brown University Department of History, 2014–2015. I currently manage the history department website and social media, and manage publicity for events and courses. Co-organizer, “Medieval and Early Modern Captivity: An interdisciplinary symposium”, held at Brown University, February, 2014. I collaborated with John Moreau of the Comparative Literature Department at Brown to organize this day-long event.

Planning Committee, New England Medieval Studies Consortium (NEMSC) 28th Annual Graduate Student Conference: “Reading Medieval Landscapes”, April, 2011.

Brown University History Graduate Student Association (HGSA), Administrative Coordinator (2009-2011). Responsibilities included conference planning, organizing meetings and language study groups, and orchestrating orientation events. I also helped to plan and organize successful interdisciplinary graduate student conferences including, “Tension in Society and Scholarship” (April, 2009), “Body and Society” (April 2010), “Borderlands and Meeting Points” (April, 2011).

Language and Paleography Training Read Proficiently: French, Latin, Old Occitan, Catalan, Spanish Spoken: French, fluently

v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this dissertation is a testament to the supportiveness and generosity of the many mentors, colleagues, friends, and family members who have helped me along the way. From the earliest stages in the process, I have benefited from the guidance and insight of the three remarkable scholars and teachers on my dissertation committee. My advisor Amy Remensnyder has been a continuous source of inspiration for me since my arrival at Brown, not only because of the brilliance of her own scholarship and teaching but also because of her dedication to illuminating why the

Middle Ages matter. When a preliminary trip to the archives in did not yield the materials I was expecting, Amy was instrumental in helping me to rethink my approach and follow the sources to the riches they had to offer on the subject of the

étranger. At every step of the project since then, she has helped me to make sense of my findings and articulate my ideas more cogently. I am particularly grateful for the faith she placed in me by encouraging my interest in conducting a broad comparative study when I was first planning the project, as well as the saintly patience she exhibited as I slowly worked to bring the disparate pieces from each of my three cities together in the writing stage. Her incisive comments on the dissertation and the many conversations we have had about this research have been critical to me in thinking about how my research fits into scholarship on identity, community, and “the Other.” Just as importantly, the unwavering confidence Amy has shown in me has always encouraged me to strive to meet the high standard she sets.

Caroline Castiglione and Tara Nummedal have also had central roles in my development as a scholar and in helping me to organize my research findings and ideas

vi into a more effective dissertation. Caroline’s advice on signposting my arguments more clearly has been tremendously helpful to me in understanding how to present my research, and her rigorous feedback has been and will continue to be an indispensable resource while working through revisions. Her rich knowledge of urban history has often prompted me to reconsider my interpretations of the evidence from municipal archives, and my conclusions are always more nuanced and sophisticated when informed by her insights. As both a dissertation reader and the advisor for my examination field in early modern Europe, Tara has helped me to develop my skills in breaking down complex arguments and understanding how they fit within the broader historiographical debates. I have consistently worked to put those skills to use as I have brought my findings from the archives together in the dissertation, but I am still always amazed and regularly profit from the connections she suggests for how my research relates to the most recent scholarship in other geographical contexts. Her consistent support, kindness, and dedication as an advisor, reader, and the Director of Graduate Studies in the history department has been vital to me throughout my time at Brown.

Along with the members of my committee, many other scholars in the Brown community deserve special recognition here for their contributions to this project.

Michel-André Bossy inspired my love of Occitan in my first year at Brown with his course on the troubadours, and generously took time away from his retirement adventures to help me to learn the language and to help me decipher passages from the Montpellier archives. The training I received from Beth Bryan and Bill Monroe in paleography and manuscript studies enabled me to work through a wide range of challenging scripts within municipal sources. John Moreau offered valued input on French translations, and

vii many suggestions for literary sources that opened my eyes to new avenues for future research. Lin Fisher introduced me to new methods of organizing and tackling research for a large project while I was working as a research assistant for his project on Indian slavery in early colonial America, and I have often benefited from his advice on professional development and writing. Among the many graduate colleagues at Brown who have helped me to grow as a scholar, Tom Devaney and Daphna Oren Magidor have been particularly influential, and the high standard they set in their own work has provided a model for me to emulate. The friendship, support, and kindness of Wanda

Henry, Danny Loss, Laura Perille, Alex Kunst, Sayema Rawof, and Michael Pierpoint made the long and often solitary process of researching and writing the dissertation much more enjoyable.

In a study on the treatment of outsiders in France, it is worth emphasizing that the welcome I received as an outsider during my research trips was a consistently warm one.

The archivists in , Montpellier, and Rouen were always generous in their efforts to ensure that I found what I needed. Michèle Dènes, Fatila Yacef, Pierre Joan Bernard,

Myriam Igouninc, and Christophe Coulet all went above and beyond to make my trips to the Montpellier archives enjoyable and productive, and their kindness in inviting me on a day trip in the Hérault made for one of the most enjoyable experiences of my research.

Similarly, my tour of the thirteenth century sculptures of Ethiopians concealed in the clerestory of the Lyon cathedral with Didier Repellin was one of the most rewarding memories of my time in France. I also benefited from the warmth of the lively communities of scholars that in the archives. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Claude

Bouhier for helping me to make sense of seemingly indecipherable passages within the

viii municipal council minutes in Rouen. Lucie Laumonier and Benoît Soubeyran shared their expertise and offered their friendship during my time in the municipal archives of

Montpellier. I also owe a special thanks to the wonderful host families I stayed with during my research trips. Since the semester I spent with them while studying at the

Université Paul Valéry in Montpellier in 2007, Catherine Defoort and her son Félix

Robillard of Montpellier have been family to me, and it was a joy to spend more time at my home away from home when I came back for research. I was also fortunate to find

Janine and Jean-Paul Fabulet of Rouen, who are among the most warm and giving people

I have ever met. Their company, kindness, and joie de vivre made every day I spent in

Rouen a pleasure and a privilege.

I cannot say enough to express my gratitude to the many friends and family members who have supported me as I have worked to finish this dissertation. My mother and father instilled a love of history in me at an early age by entertaining me with tales about Robin Hood, Sir Francis Drake, and Joan of Arc. They have always encouraged me to follow my interests wherever they lead me, and they have been there by my side to do anything they can to help me achieve my goals at every step along the way. Their enthusiasm for reading and commenting on lengthy chapters and drafts of this dissertation attests to the extent of their incredible dedication and generosity. My wife

Katie has been a steadfast supporter and cherished companion as we have each worked through the long and often challenging journey of graduate school together. In addition to my long absences for research trips to France, she has patiently tolerated more than a little absent-mindedness while I was mulling the finer points of late medieval municipal policy at home. She has always helped me to keep faith in myself and follow through on

ix my goals, while also encouraging me to keep things in perspective and find enjoyment in the opportunities I have had to pursue my research. My final thanks go to my “research assistant,” Clara Boss. What she lacks in age and experience, she more than makes up for in enthusiasm, and her arrival ten months ago has been a source of great joy for me and the rest of my family. This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to them all.

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Table of Contents

Curriculum Vitae……………………………………………………………………….iii

Acknowledgements.……………………………………………………………………..vi

Tables & Illustrations….….…………………………………………………………...xii

Abbreviations and Terminology……………………………………………………...xiii

Introduction:..……………………………………………………………………………1

Part I: The Boundaries of Urban Community in an Age of Crisis……………………...41

Chapter I: Defining the Limits of Community……………………………………….42

Chapter II: Managing migrations and migrants in an age of Crisis…………………116

Chapter III: Friends, Foes, and Frontiers of Community in an Age of War.……….181

Part II: Reaching out to Recovery ……..……………………………………………...246

Introduction to Part II:……………………………………………………………...247

Chapter IV: Commerce in Crisis: The Maintenance of Trade Networks in Late Medieval France………………………………………………………………………253

Chapter V: A Model of Urban Recovery: The Fairs of Lyon…………………….…300

Chapter VI: Models of Urban Recovery: Montpellier and Rouen…………………..350

Conclusion: …………………………………………………………….……………...402

Bibliography: …………………………………………………………….……………410

xi Tables and Illustrations

Fig. 1: Map of France, highlighting Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen, and key rivers

Fig. 2: Gallery of the Maison des avocats in Lyon. Author’s photograph

xii Abbreviations & Terms

Archives AML …………. Archives Municipales de Lyon

AMM ………… Archives Municipales de Montpellier

ADH …………. Archives Départmentales de l’Hérault

ADSM…………Archives Départmentales de la -Maritime

Monetary units and terminology

The principal unit at the foundation of the French royal monetary system was the silver livre, which was divided into twenty sous, or sols. These were worth twelve déniers each.

The royal gros, first minted under Louis IX, was also worth twelve dénier. The most widely circulated coins in late medieval France were minted in Tours, which was considered to have the most stable currency, but municipal treasury records also list sums in “sous parisis”. Other important monetary units included the écu d’or and the mouton d’or. The values of these gold coins relative to the more common silver based currency fluctuated significantly, but the former was very roughly worth 250 deniers (as of 1336), while the latter was worth approximately 300 deniers (as of 1354).

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Fig. 1. The three cities at the center of this study, with key rivers highlighted

xiv INTRODUCTION

How can openness towards the beneficial newcomer be balanced with efforts to ensure safety from the threatening stranger? This is a question that the leaders and citizens of modern nations around the world face as they work to maintain their security and cultural identities while adapting to a global economy. This question was just as pressing for the leaders and inhabitants of late medieval cities, who had to make difficult choices about whom they would welcome into their communities when they were struggling to navigate the challenges posed by epidemics, wars, famines, revolts, and economic decline. This study compares the policies that the leaders of three diverse urban centers in late medieval France implemented towards those who were outsiders to their cities as they worked to guide their populations through the immediate and long-term effects of crisis. 1 As hubs of commerce and industry, Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen attracted merchants, students, and pilgrims from all over France and beyond its limits.

For their economies to flourish, these cities needed to maintain a welcoming stance towards the diverse individuals who came to do business. Yet in times of turmoil, those who had once been trading partners or neighbors could threaten or seem threatening to local interests and the wellbeing of the wider population. Focusing on the treatment of

1 Throughout this study, I use the term outsiders to refer to the broad range of individuals who were distinguished by the fact that they were not among the ranks of the privileged, established members of an urban community —individuals who were described by terms ranging from estranger to alienus, gens de dehors, forin, and gens venus d’ailleurs, which will be analyzed more fully below. The term outsider is preferable to the term ‘stranger’ that is sometimes used in the English language scholarship referring to this category of individuals, as the latter not only has inherently negative connotations but also implies that an individual is unknown to the community. In many cases, those people who had come from somewhere else were nevertheless familiar to the inhabitants of the city, and remained separate from the local population because they were not indigenous and had not asserted their intention to settle down. I use the term ‘foreigner’ in very specific cases, when referring to those who were distinguished not only by the fact that they came from outside the city, but also because they came from another “nation estrange” or spoke a different language. I left untranslated those terms that had specific connotations for which there was not a clear equivalent in modern English.

1 those were seen as outsiders makes it possible to unravel the intricacies of what it meant to belong to an urban community in the tumultuous period between the Black Death of

1348 and the turn of the fifteenth century.

Cities in late medieval Europe were places of both privilege and obligation, defined by the rights and protections their inhabitants enjoyed and the duties they performed. To become a resident of a city was, at least according to the ideal, to win freedom from the bonds of serfdom. To gain the privilege of working and trading within a city was to gain an opportunity to enjoy access to lucrative markets. As lords and monarchs authorized the establishment of more and more municipal governments in the communal movement of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, members of urban communities also won the ability to offer their input on fiscal decisions, commercial policies, and craft regulations that shaped their daily lives. At the most basic level, cities offered the people within their walls security from soldiers and brigands – so long as they contributed time, money, and energy to ensure that their militias and fortifications remained effective. The numerous and enticing benefits of city life mean that municipal leaders often had decisions to make about who would be able to enjoy them, and how fully. Such decisions took on particular importance in the late Middle Ages, when crisis and prolonged insecurity drove people to seek safety and opportunity within walled cities. Though scholarship on citizenship in France has traditionally focused on the development of national institutions as a byproduct of the political centralization in the sixteenth century and thereafter, the concepts of citizenship and non-citizenship were

2 well-established at the municipal level and critical to the approaches that the leaders of late medieval cities used to address crises.2

The effort to delineate the privileges and obligations that separated established residents from outsiders was critical to maintaining order within urban communities afflicted by mortality, social strife, fear, and economic decline. The term crisis is used so freely in modern media that it seems to have retained little significance or clear meaning, but while precise definitions and applications vary, crisis invariably signifies suffering and upheaval so intense as to substantially disrupt the status quo of every day life.3 By this and any other measure, the inhabitants of cities in late medieval Europe endured more than their fair share. The disruptions not only took the form of the great death tolls and anguish inflicted by the combination of diseases, famines, and wars; the movements of women, men, and children who had been displaced from their homes also altered daily life within cities as established local residents found themselves living, working, competing with, and fighting along side unfamiliar neighbors and colleagues who had entered their communities in search of better prospects. In addition to the challenges posed by newcomers who sought refuge or financial opportunity, urban residents faced threats from foreign armies and who were fighting for the king of France, or their own personal gain. Nonetheless, most cities continued to depend on imported goods,

2 One of the best studies of citizenship in late medieval France is to be found in Guy Lurie, “Citizenship in Later Medieval France 1370-1480.” (PhD Diss., Washington D.C., 2012), which takes the critical step of shifting focus from discussions of the development of concepts of citizenship on the national level in this period to analysis of the meaning of citizenship within an urban context. Bernard d’Alteroche adheres to the trend of focusing on the development of national citizenship, but his work on the legal roots concepts of citizenship in French communes is indispensable. See, De l'étranger à la seigneurie à l'étranger au royaume XIème-XVème siècle, (Paris, 2002), as well as the more condensed version of this analysis, in “L’évolution de la notion et du statut juridique de l’étranger à la fin Moyen Age (XIV-XVe siècle)”, in Revue du Nord 2 (2002), 227-245. David Nicholas, The Later Medieval City: 1300-1500 (New York, 1997), 79-81, offers an invaluable review of the literature on concepts of citizenship and exclusion. 3 I am grateful to the members of my seminar course, “Plague, War, Famine, and Death: Crisis in the Late Middle Ages”, for the many insightful remarks they shared over a semester, which were instrumental in helping me to hone and rethink many issues, including my understanding of crisis.

3 and buyers who came from away to purchase local specialties. All of these individuals fell outside the category of manans, habitans, citoyens, or jurés— terms that were used within different cities to refer to established residents who performed duties and paid taxes, thus earning the full bevy of privileges that urban living could offer. Understanding the treatment of these outsiders is thus of critical importance to understanding responses to crisis in the Late Middle Ages.

Through an examination of municipal policies towards outsiders in late medieval

France, this study advances three key arguments, the historiographical significance of which I will explain in greater detail over the remainder of this introduction. First, I will demonstrate that municipal authorities’ efforts to regulate and monitor the men and women who were entering and leaving their cities were central to the strategies that they adopted to guide their populations through crisis. Outsiders could exacerbate the problems that urban communities faced during periods of hardship by taking up space and resources, spreading contagion, or sabotaging local defenses. But they could also contribute to the solutions that municipal authorities implemented to overcome demographic decline and emigration. Strategies for overcoming crisis thus depended on efforts to distinguish between those outsiders who could be helpful, and those who would be harmful. Communities approached the challenge of making this distinction differently, and came to their own conclusions about who to accept into their cities based on specific geographical, political, and economic factors. What remained consistent was the need to define outsiders not only or even mainly by where they came from, but by considering other attributes, such as personal wealth, skill, and occupation. Moreover, as municipal leaders worked to identify those who could be helpful to their recovery efforts and those

4 who would set them back, they also needed to find ways to welcome those whose business they relied on while deterring or controlling those who they feared as potential threats. As they did so, they had to account for both short-term needs and long-term strategic concerns.

In demonstrating that municipal authorities worked to make careful differentiations in the policies they implemented towards the various outsiders who came to their communities during times, I also advance the argument that they played the leading role in defining their own communities and adapting their policies to respond to their shifting needs. The power dynamics between the semi-autonomous, provincial cities known as bonnes villes and the French monarchy have been a central topic of discussion within scholarship on late medieval France since the publication of Bernard Chevalier’s seminal study on the subject in 1982.4 That the kings of France depended heavily on cities for military and financial support over the course of the Hundred Years War and after its conclusion is widely accepted.5 But within the now extensive literature on these issues, there has been far less analysis of who had the power to determine who belonged within in a city and what belonging meant. This was, however, a critical and at times fiercely contested issue. When we look closely at the negotiations between municipal authorities and the monarchy in different cities, we find that the kings of France and their advisors often deferred to local leaders, who had more ability to identify and implement policies that would best advance the interests of their communities. To be sure, the

4 Bernard Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe siècle (Paris, 1982), as well as Albert Rigaudière, Gouverner la ville au moyen âge (Paris, 1993). 5 Of course, the precise characteristics of the relationships between municipal and royal authorities remain the subject of much discussion. David Rivaud’s recent study, Les villes et le roi: Les municipalities de Poitiers, et Tours et l’émergence de l’état moderne (v. 1440-1560), (Rennes, 2007), which offers one of the most insightful assessments to date of the balance of power between municipal and royal authorities.

5 monarchy asserted and retained the authority to put in place laws and taxes that affected outsiders who came to urban communities, and in some cases this meant that kings issued ordinances and pursued policies that advanced the interests of the royal government rather than individual communities. But municipal authorities held much of the actual power to carry out those policies and to modify their implementation to meet their local needs. Furthermore, their relentless advocacy for their cities’ interests—in forms ranging from written appeals and gifts to royal advisors, to passive resistance and violent rebellion—played a pivotal role in shaping royal policy.

Finally, while emphasizing the preeminent role that municipal authorities played in delineating their communities and defining the status that different categories of outsiders had within their cities, I will make a sustained case for the value of employing comparative approaches to the study of societal responses to crisis, both in the Late

Middle Ages and otherwise. As I will argue throughout my analysis, local factors determined the ways that municipal leaders in late medieval France decided how to treat particular groups of outsiders, and it is only by identifying discrepancies between different communities and the particular local challenges they faced that the precise factors that led to those variations can be fully understood. It is for this reason that comparative analysis is so vital. The work of drawing connections and identifying variations between different locales should not be handed off to general surveys, as it so often is, but should instead be a central tool for analyzing the attributes that define individual communities. In addition to taking a comparative approach to the study of crisis, I will also emphasize the value of studying crises and their effects in broad terms— both chronologically and conceptually. Communities’ responses to hardship are defined

6 not only by how they respond during a crisis and its immediate aftermath, but also by how they think about, learn from, and process traumatic experiences as they deal with their memories and long-term consequences such as demographic decline. For this reason, it is essential to look not only at how urban populations responded during the most notorious episodes, such as the Great Famine of 1317, or the Black Death of 1348; we must also look at the quieter years between and after such calamities, as those who survived them tried to adapt to a changed world.

Historiographical Background

In recent years, scholars have devoted increasing attention to the ways that the religious and cultural distinctions between Jews, Christians, and Muslims living within the medieval Mediterranean region shaped their interactions and the identities espoused by members each faith group. Linguistic and ethnic markers have also begun to receive more sustained investigation as means of identification and sources of misunderstanding and social tension in the Middle Ages. But for many city dwellers in medieval Europe, it was the lines separating the privileged residents of cities from outsiders that were the most relevant to everyday life. When I began research for this project, I set out to compare the attitudes towards Christian heretics in Montpellier with views of the Jews and Muslims who came to the city to trade luxury goods or study among the famed physicians and surgeons who worked at the prestigious faculty of medicine. I found few sources that enabled such comparisons, in spite of the reputation

Montpellier had as a center of religious tolerance and an entrepôt for Mediterranean trade and the exchange of medical knowledge across faith boundaries. The records of the

7 municipal archives were filled, however, with references to estrangers, estranhas, and extranei, alieni and forains. The precise meaning of these terms was often left vague— they could be used alternately to refer to anyone from a refugee from another town in

Languedoc, to a from , to a merchant from Cyprus or even local Jews.

While their applications were broad and ambiguous, their significance in delineating the community and the advantages that established residents enjoyed was clear.

Through analysis of the ways crises altered the treatment of outsiders, this study illuminates a category of ‘Other’ that has only just begun to receive the attention warranted by its particular importance in the Middle Ages. In the introduction to The

Stranger in Medieval Society, a collection of papers from a conference held in 1994, the editors F.R.P. Akehurst and Stephanie Cain Val D’Elden remarked: “The stranger is a central issue in medieval studies. The subject can be found in the research of almost all medievalists: we all deal with cultures that include strangers in their midst, or with persons who go out into strange cultures.”6 Nevertheless, their volume of essays is one of very few works by Anglophone medievalists that takes relations between outsiders and local populations as the point of focus, which is surprising in light of the special significance these issues took on in the Late Middle Ages. Those studies that do explore this topic in medieval contexts tend to focus on the legal definitions and rights that distinguished citizens from foreigners on the level of kingdom, in the effort to identify the origins of the modern nation state. Particular attention has been to given to the

6 F.R.P. Akehurst and Stephanie Cain Van D’Elden, eds. The Stranger in Medieval Society (Minneapolis, 1994). Kathryn Reyerson’s contribution to the collection, “The Merchants of the Mediterranean: Merchants as Strangers”, is particularly pertinent for my study, as it offers an invaluable overview of the ways that the dynamics of interactions between foreign merchants and local populations shaped the conduct of maritime commerce. A similar and more recent collection of articles, that focuses mainly on literary depictions of ‘The Other’, is the collection Meeting the foreign in the Middle Ages, ed. Albrecht Classen (New York, 2002.)

8 complex and often vague vocabulary for citizens, inhabitants, and various categories of outsiders.7 Studies by Keechang Kim and Philip Daileader have done much to illuminate these issues, and their specific contributions are worth considering more closely.8

Kim seeks out the origins of distinctions between foreigners and citizens as he contests the notion that the emergence of personal status divisions between citizens and non-citizen was an inevitable by-product of political change. Kim instead uses an analysis of late-medieval English cities to argue that distinctions between the free and the servile prevailed under the tradition of Roman Law until the late Middle Ages. He also emphasizes that the principal distinction within medieval cities was between those who were franchised and those who were not. Divisions between foreigners and those who were subject to the king of England only emerged towards the end of the fourteenth century, and under this new legal framework, foreigners who had previously faced no extra legal limitations began to confront additional obstacles and discrimination. Kim sees these new divisions as essential to the creation of the modern state. Philip Daileader focuses more narrowly in his study of citizenship within Catalonian towns. Like Kim,

Daileader relies principally on documents that outlined the legal definitions of citizenship, such as municipal customs. A determined resistance to change dictated the limits of citizenship, and Daileader concludes that continued efforts to protect the rights of the citizens from encroachment by non-citizens shaped the dynamics within neighborhoods. In this context, Daileader examines ‘strangers’ insofar as they were excluded from the privileges of citizenship. Beyond the fact that they did not enjoy the

7 David Nicholas offers an invaluable review of work on this terminology in The Later Medieval City, 79- 81. 8 Keechang Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law: The Origins of Modern Citizenship (Cambridge, 2000); Philip Daileader, True Citizens: Violence, Memory, and Identity in the Medieval Community of Perpignan 1162- 1397 (Leiden, 2000).

9 full rights of membership within the community, however, he does not analyze who those strangers were and how that label affected how they were defined and treated.

The prominence of immigration as a political and social issue in France has driven a greater number French scholars to examine the historical status of the étranger.

Edited conference volumes and collections of essays have offered many focused studies of individual communities. Gérard Noiriel’s 1988 study Le creuset français helped to establish issues of migration and xenophobia as central topics of research, and other scholars have since contributed several invaluable collections of conference papers that address the history of foreigners in France over the long durée.9 The contributors to

Mosaïque de la France, and the second edition of this work, Histoire des étrangers et de l’immigration en France, emphasize the important role that foreigners played in the creation of French culture.10 In a collection of more than thirty papers exploring topics ranging from the depictions of black Africans in illuminated manuscripts to the conflicts between Puerto Rican and Italian immigrants in New York in the 1930s, the collection

L’étranger et sociétés offers a geographically and chronologically broad survey of relations between indigenous and immigrant populations.11 L’étranger dans la ville, a collection of essays presented at conferences in Paris in 1994 and Venice in 1996, offers similar breadth, while tying the scholarship on foreigners closely to the growing historiography on urban space.12 More recently, the collection Arriver en ville au moyen-

9 Gérard Noiriel. Le creuset français: histoire de l'immigration, XIXe-XXe siècles (Paris, 1988) 10 Yves Lequin, La Mosaïque, France: histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration (Paris, 1988), and Yves Lequin and Pierre Goubert, eds. Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France (Paris, 2006). 11 González-Bernaldo, Pilar, Manuela Martini, and Marie-Louise Pelus. Étrangers et sociétés: représentations, coexistences, interactions dans la longue durée (Rennes, 2008). 12 Jacques Bottin and Donatella Calabi, Les étrangers dans la ville: minorités et espace urbain du bas Moyen âge à l'époque moderne (Paris, 1999). Of particular relevance is the excellent study of the distribution of foreign merchant communities within London by James L. Bolton, “La repartition de la population étrangère à Londres au XVe siècle”, 425-437.

10 âge has assembled a wide and excellent range of focused studies of relations between newcomers and established populations around medieval Europe, pushing past the tendency to focus primarily on legal categories and the definitions of terms such as

“citizen”, to consider how locals and newcomers interacted more broadly.13

One of the most comprehensive studies of perceptions of and interactions with the

étranger is Laurence Moal’s study, the L’étranger en Bretagne au Moyen-Âge: Présence, attitudes, perceptions.14 Focusing on municipal, ducal, and royal policies and daily interactions between native Bretons and those they labeled outsiders, Moal avoids focusing too closely on the definitions of l’étranger laid out by the consuetudines or the views presented in ethnocentric chronicle sources. Though Moal draws on both, she relies primarily on administrative sources including judicial records, fiscal and diplomatic documents, and marriage contracts that present information about the daily interactions between Bretons and outsiders. Rather than grouping outsiders into one category in binary opposition with Bretons, Moal emphasizes the importance of evaluating attitudes towards merchants, travelers, soldiers, and neighbors more independently. Furthermore,

Moal does not focus exclusively on xenophobia and negative elements of interactions between Bretons and outsiders: though she demonstrates that an influx of immigrants helped to crystallize a sense of Breton identity, she also points out that foreign cultural elements were selectively integrated into Breton society. By analyzing negotiations over the status and definition of étranger, Moal illuminates how communities defined themselves and how outside influences shaped those definitions. Her focus on the shifting

13 Cédric Quertier, Roxane Chilè, and Nicolas Pluchot, eds., Arriver en ville: migrants en milieu urbain au Moyen âge (Paris, 2013). Dénis Menjot offers an outstanding historiographical essay on the latest research on the étranger within the introduction to this collection 14 Laurence Moal, L'étranger en Bretagne au Moyen Âge: présence, attitudes, perceptions (Rennes, 2008).

11 applications of the term étranger and variations in policies towards different groups of outsiders to have been influential to my own study.

By comparing how crises altered the ways that the leaders of different urban communities defined the boundaries that distinguished their privileged local populations from outsiders, I also draw on the approaches used by historians such as David Nirenberg and Jonathan Ray, whose studies of interactions among the religious groups of medieval

Iberia have emphasized the need to move beyond binaries of “tolerance” and

“persecution.”15 Drawing on theories pioneered within anthropology, their works instead focus on how exposure to the customs of the proximate “Other” forced groups and individuals to identify and affirm those attributes that were most critical to their own identities, so as to reinforce the distinctions and social boundaries that kept them separate from others. In cities in late medieval France, the lines that separated Christian outsiders from the established local populations could be especially blurry. Different accents and expressions would in some cases have been a giveaway that an individual hailed from another town or region; distinctive modes of dress or personal conduct could also serve as indicators that an individual was new in town. In other cases, there would have been little to distinguish a privileged local resident from a newcomer from away—simply being unfamiliar to the locals was enough to set someone apart. The records that survive within municipal archives tend to offer only rare glimpses of such interactions, with trial records supplementing the views and attitudes expressed in local chronicles as some of the most

15 See David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1996), Neighboring Faiths: Christianity, Judaism and Islam in the Middle Ages and Today (Chicago, 2014), and “Conversion, sex, and segregation: Jews and Christians in Medieval .” The American Historical Review, 107.4 (2002), 1065-1093. Jonathan Ray, “Beyond Tolerance and Persecution: Reassessing our Approach to Medieval ‘Convivencia’, Jewish Social Studies 11 No. 2 (Winter, 2005), pp. 1-18.

12 useful sources when they are available. But the rich and varied administrative records held in municipal archives illuminate the power struggles that determined which individuals were allowed in, what privileges they held, and how the leaders of different cities defined what it meant to belong to their commune.

The task of defining and preserving the privileges that members of the local populations of cities enjoyed most often fell to the municipal councils that directed their finances, institutions, and military defenses. In the enfranchised urban centers known as communes, charters from the monarchy granted municipal councils the authority to direct local finances and military defenses, regulate trade and industrial production. Although the organization of these institutions varied, they usually comprised wealthy men. The wealthiest came from families that maintained commercial interests in cities around

Europe; the more middling often came from the ranks of successful master craftsmen and artisans, who had risen to local prominence through their acumen and the respect they had earned from their colleagues. They ascended to their leadership positions through elections, although in most cases this meant that they were appointed by notables chosen by members of a general assembly of established local residents. Positions in municipal councils reflected prestige in the community, but they also brought great financial demands, as those who held them were often required to contribute their own funds to ensure the commune met its obligations and could afford important building projects.16

Thus, for the welfare of their personal finances and the preservation of their business

16 Although the workings of municipal governance have long been a point of focus for local historians, much work remains to be done to understand and contextualize the lives of those who held positions in the councils and communes of cities around France. In addition to Albert Rigaudière’s Gouverner la ville, David Nicholas, The Later Medieval City, 1-14 provides a useful survey of the differing composition of municipal administrations within different parts of Europe, as does Patrick Boucheron and Denis Menjot, La ville médiévale: histoire de l’Europe urbaine (Paris, 2011).

13 interests, those who held positions of municipal authority had ample reason to ensure that their communities would remain economically strong. As they negotiated the status and treatment of outsiders during times of crisis, they could ill afford to be superstitious or reactionary.

While they had good reasons to work to preserve the commercial ties that sustained their personal finances and the fiscal welfare of their cities, municipal authorities were also keenly aware of the varied and very real threats that outsiders could pose. Spies or saboteurs could undermine their carefully maintained defenses. Refugees and travelers could infect their populations with disease, or diminish their supplies of food and alms available for the local poor. Left unregulated, merchants importing exotic luxury goods could undercut the value of local specialties. To address frequently conflicting concerns, municipal authorities needed to enact judicious policies towards outsiders that would meet the shifting needs of their communities. The policies they put in place depended on a wide range of geographic and economic factors. Their deliberations were also shaped by negotiations and power struggles with the royal authorities they answered to, the populations they administered, and outsiders themselves. The kings of France, and the various dukes, governors, baillifs, seneschals and lieutenants who served as their deputies often claimed the power to weigh in on specific measures or override the rulings of local officials when royal interests or the welfare of the kingdom or region was at stake. To maintain stability within their communities, municipal authorities also had to consider the input of the various constituencies within their cities: powerful corporations of craftsmen and artisans; international merchants and local traders; and the masses of “common people” who

14 demanded food, work, and military and economic protection. The need to preserve commercial ties and diplomatic relations meant that city leaders also needed to consider the rights and interests of those individuals who hailed from other cities, duchies, and kingdoms.

In the relative peace and prosperity of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the charters that communes received from their rulers and the ancient regulations that governed their institutions played the greatest role in determining how outsiders would be treated. The combination of acute demographic decline and population movements that resulted from the crises of the Late Middle Ages disrupted that status quo, and reshaped the dynamics of negotiations over the status of outsiders.

The onset of the Hundred Years War in the and the Black Death of 1348 forced thousands of people from their homes in search of safety, food, work, loot, and economic opportunity. The protection and relative wealth that cities seemed to offer made them attractive destinations for the men and women who were driven from their fields and unprotected villages by pervasive insecurity. Recurring epidemics and famines, along with the emigration of individuals who had the means and desire to find better conditions elsewhere, left many urban communities needing wealthy, skilled and opportunistic individuals to help them rebuild. The process of population replacement in late medieval cities has often been treated as a simple question of labor supply and demand, but the arrival of a wide array of newcomers forced the leaders of urban communities to reevaluate the privileges that defined who could enter their cities and what rights they would enjoy.17 To ensure the security of their communities, municipal leaders needed to

17 The tendency to view population replacement in cities as a product of market forces has been most pronounced within the literature on the aftermath and consequences of plague in England, and the

15 identify the individuals who would be beneficial and distinguish them from those could endanger their populations. The ability to tell the difference was vital for the survival and recovery of their cities.

By examining the policies that municipal authorities implemented towards various groups of outsiders as they led their communities through the crises that afflicted their populations, this study not only advances scholarship on central issues within the historiography of late-medieval France and Europe, but also engages with wider debates on the social effects of disasters, the causes and characteristics of xenophobia, and the dynamics of urban community. The great population crisis that bouts of plague, famine, and war inflicted on Europe over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has long been a central topic of discussion not only for medievalists, but also for scholars of disease, demography, and economic history. But there is little consensus about the effects of late- medieval crisis on the social and cultural fabric of Europe. Following the accounts of contemporary chroniclers and clergymen, historians long argued that the Black Death of

1348 and subsequent outbreaks of plague unraveled bonds of kinship and community while deepening existing social rifts. David Herlihy’s classic lectures on the plague typified this view, highlighting the disruption of “customary ways by which society coped with the passing of its members”, and the divisions created “between the healthy and the sick; between those in the cultural mainstream and those at its margins, namely strangers, travelers, beggars, lepers and Jews.”18 Similarly, many scholars have focused

demographic circumstances leading to the increased demands of peasants that culminated in the revolt of 1381. Samuel Cohn Jr. offers nuanced critiques of these market explanations for revolts, and for the changing dynamics within urban communities in Popular Protest in Late Medieval Europe (Cambridge, 2004.) 18 David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Cultural Transformation of the West (Cambridge, 1997); another example can be found in Norman Cantor, In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World it Made (New York, 2001).

16 on those responses that attributed the great mortality to pervasive sin and God’s wrath, or the malevolence of Jews and Lepers.19

Much recent work has challenged the notion of a social breakdown by relying less heavily on the “colorful exaggerations” of the chronicle sources and focusing instead on the municipal records and medical treatises that reflect the ability of late-medieval communities to respond and adapt to successive bouts of crisis.20 While acknowledging the sweeping impact of the famine of 1317, William Jordan argues that previous food shortages promoted the development of coping strategies that helped to limit the detrimental effects of severe famines.21 In his work on the plague, Samuel Cohn Jr. acknowledges the widespread tendency among medieval authors to attribute the 1348 plague to the wrath of God, but he also argues that physicians and communities believed that the experience and know-how gained during the initial pandemic allowed them to control contagion more efficiently and maintain greater social stability during subsequent bouts of the disease.22 Relying on the rich body of notarial evidence from Bologna, Shona

Kelly Wray goes even further in her study, Communities and Crisis: Bologna During the

Black Death, by affirming that the bonds that held together families and neighborhoods

19 See for example Anna Foa, The Jews of Europe After the Black Death (Berkeley, 2000); Samuel Cohn Jr. “The Black Death and the Burning of Jews” Past and Present, No. 196 (August 2007): pp. 1-36. Malcolm Barber, “Lepers, Jews and Moslems: The Plot to Overthrow Christendom in 1321”, History 66: 1-17. Ann Carmichael, Plague and the Poor in Renaissance (Cambridge,1986). 20 Michael Vargas, “How a ‘Brood of Vipers’ survived the Black Death: Recovery and Dysfunction in the Fourteenth-Century Dominican Order”, in Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies 86.3, pp. 688-714. Vargas’ article provides a brief but useful review of recent literature on the effects of the Black Death, as well as references to general literature on trauma in modern societies. 21 William Chester Jordan, The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Fourteenth Century (Princeton, 1996). 22 See Samuel Cohn Jr. “The Black Death: The End of a Paradigm”, in The American Historical Review Vol. 107, No. 3 (June 2002): pp. 703-738. Samuel K. Cohn Jr., The Black Death Transformed: Disaease and Culture in Early Renaissance Europe (New York: Arnold Publishers and Oxford University Press, 2002). See especially Chapter 9, “Culture and Psychology”.

17 resiliently endured through the plague of 1348.23 Similarly, Daniel Lord Smail has used the notarial records from Marseille to illustrate the ability of societies devastated by plague to adapt to hardship and seek renewal in the aftermath of crisis.24 These and other local studies on disasters have nuanced the stark picture of social decay presented within so many older surveys on the effects of the “waning” Middle Ages.

Focused analyses of individual communities have demonstrated the resiliency and adaptability of societies confronted with persistent upheaval. But the image of late medieval societies as fundamentally superstitious, violent, and intolerant remains stubbornly persistent. Beyond the popular view that these backwards attributes were characteristic of all medieval societies, the scholarship on the Late Middle Ages has tended to perpetuate the view that the societies of that period were particularly insular and prone to irrational hatred of the ‘Other.’ This view has its foundation in the executions of Jews, Lepers, and Muslims who were accused of plotting to overthrow

Christendom in 1321 in the wake of a widespread European famine, and the pogroms against the Jews of Strasbourg and the Rhineland in the aftermath of the Black Death of

1348. These are among the most well-studied and oft-cited episodes in analyses of the reactions to the plague.25 These incidents cannot and should not be overlooked. They hardly tell the full story, however, and the focus on the most horrific and “hysterical” responses to the plague has led to the neglect of a much wider spectrum of responses to

23 Shona Kelly Wray, Communities and Crisis Bologna during the Black Death, (Leiden, 2009). 24 Daniel Lord Smail, “Accommodating Plague in Medieval Marseille,” Continuity and Change 11 (1996), 11-41. 25 See for example Anna Foa, The Jews of Europe After the Black Death (Berkeley, 2000); Samuel Cohn Jr. “The Black Death and the Burning of Jews”, 1-36. Malcolm Barber, “Lepers, Jews and Moslems: The Plot to Overthrow Christendom in 1321”, History 66: 1-17.

18 “the Other.”26 Just as the recent spate of research on specific local responses to late medieval crisis has emphasized the adaptive, rational measures that communities took as they learned to handle the challenges of food shortages, contagious diseases, and military readiness, closer examination of municipal policies towards outsiders in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries shows that the effort to develop pragmatic strategies for survival played the greatest role in defining the limits of urban communities.

Pragmatic is probably not one of the first words that comes to mind when considering societal responses to the “calamitous” Late Middle Ages. Yet is very often the most apt description of the measures that municipal authorities put in place as they worked to guide their communities through crisis and handle the influx of newcomers driven to their cities. Even as they worked to preserve the economic ties that allowed their cities to flourish, they remained keenly aware of the threats and hardships that outsiders could present for their populations, and they faced pressure from factions or broader unrest if their policies did not adequately defend the privileges and security of established bourgeois—particularly during troubled times. The task of identifying and monitoring those individuals who threatened the security of the population or encroached on the economic privileges of the commune was a major one that tested the strength and efficiency of municipal institutions and infrastructure. But the alternatives—whether excluding all outsiders, or allowing them free rein to do as they pleased—were almost never viable. Instead, municipal leaders needed to reevaluate their communities and their

26 As an example of this trend John Aberth, in his teaching reader, The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-1350, A Brief History with Documents (Boston, 2005), devotes an entire chapter to “The Pscyhe of Hysteria”, In her incisive critique of the historiography on the Black Death, Faye Marie Getz notes the tendency to focus on the most brutal and hysterical responses to the epidemic, at the expense of other, less spectacular reactions.

19 limits case by case and day by day, as the challenges their populations faced changed from one council meeting to the next.

A Comparative Approach to Communities in Crisis: Montpellier, Lyon, Rouen

This study relies on a thoroughly comparative approach in order to illuminate the local interests and factors that shaped the deliberations about the status of outsiders.27

Case studies of individual communities and their responses to late medieval crisis have done much to reshape our understanding of the period, but they have also called attention to the significant variation in the ways that different populations responded and adapted to extreme hardship. A comparative approach is now necessary to provide a clearer explanation of the variations between responses to crises in individual locales. The cities of Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen provide ideal cases for evaluating the factors that determined the impact of crisis on urban communities and the ways that they defined their social boundaries and reacted to outsiders. Several main considerations dictated the selection of these three cities. The prospect of choosing cities within different regions of

Europe or the Mediterranean was appealing, but the importance of analyzing communities within the same kingdom became apparent as the role that negotiations between royal and municipal authorities played in defining outsiders and their privileges became increasingly clear. Although the municipal political structures and institutions in each of these cities were distinctive, the fact that they were all within the same kingdom and thus subject to similar military, political, and financial pressures facilitates the process of identifying and analyzing the specific local and regional characteristics that

27 My comparative approach takes draws on and takes inspiration from David Rivaud’s comparison of Bourges, Tours, and Poitiers in Les bonnes villes et le roi.

20 shaped their strategies for dealing with crisis, and their approaches to the outsiders who came through their city gates.

In addition to choosing cities in the same kingdom to facilitate comparison, I also selected diverse commercial centers within three different networks of exchange, in order to illuminate the forces that sustained economic and intellectual connections, and the tensions that could threaten to break them down. During the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, Montpellier was one of the most important centers of trade in the western Mediterranean. Set back twelve kilometers from the coast but connected to the nearby ports of Lattes and Aigues Mortes by river and road, respectively, Montpellier offered a point of access to the markets of inland France and for merchants hailing from Pisa, Genoa, Barcelona, and as far away as Alexandria. The city was also the home to one of the greatest faculties of medicine in all of Europe. The Church of

Notre Dame-des-Tables—so named because of the tables that changers set up around it to facilitate commercial transactions in the city’s central square—was a major stopping point for pilgrims en route to Santiago de Compostela from northern and eastern France.

Lyon was situated at the intersection of the Rhône and Saône rivers, and only fifty kilometers distant from the Loire, and thus was connected both to the major inland markets of France, as well as and central Europe. The city was also located on a frontier between the , and the Holy Roman Empire, and thus became an important banking center for those who needed to change currencies from the French sous to the Imperial marcs, or the widely circulated florins as they traveled back and forth. Rouen, for its part, served as the gateway to the Seine River, controlling access

21 from ports around the Northern Atlantic to Paris and inland France. The Rouennais were also renowned throughout Europe for their fine cloth.

Because they were involved in such different networks, Montpellier, Lyon, and

Rouen attracted distinctive groups of individuals into their city limits. The routes of travel and trade cities were situated in and the roles they played within their respective networks of commerce not only determined who came into their communities, but how locals treated outsiders. Examining the policies that municipal authorities implemented in these three cities makes it possible to identify and interrogate the particular features and factors that shaped their decisions about who would be welcome within their communities and what privileges they would have while they stayed. Did municipal officials in

Montpellier offer a more welcoming stance to merchants who hailed from other kingdoms or practiced other religions than those in Rouen and Lyon, and if so, why?

Were the leaders of Lyon more cautious about who they allowed to pass through their community because they were situated on an important political frontier? Did the proximity of Rouen to the British Isles and the historic affiliations the city had with the kingdom of England affect the ways that the local council treated their merchants over the course of the Hundred Years War? Answering these questions allows us to gain a greater understanding of the roles that both shifting political and economic considerations and permanent geographical and environmental attributes had in structuring communities and shaping interactions between locals and outsiders during times of crisis.

Beyond taking a comparative approach, this project advances the scholarship on communities’ responses to the calamities of the Late Middle Ages by focusing on the cumulative trauma inflicted by disasters rather than the short-term impact of only one.

22 There have been many general studies of the social and psychological effects inflicted by the series of crises of the late Middle Ages, and the Black Death in particular.28 When studying specific communities, scholars have most often examined epidemics, famines, military conflicts, and revolts separately, even while acknowledging that each crisis compounded the severity of the others. This approach is not conducive to understanding the full impact they had on the lives and decisions of the people who experienced them. I focus not only on the ways that disasters caused or intensified one another, but also on the effects of the insecurity and mortality they inflicted together. In considering the cumulative effects of crises, it is important to evaluate both the immediate shock they inflicted, and their longer term repercussions. Modern research on individuals and populations subjected to prolonged periods of insecurity has shown a tendency to exhibit greater suspicion to outsiders and greater in-group solidarity.29 To determine whether such phenomena occurred in the Late Middle Ages, this dissertation considers a long period that allows analysis of initial reactions to epidemics, famines, and wars, as well as the long-term effects of demographic change and economic shifts. For this reason, I analyzed sources from a period spanning from the middle of the fourteenth century to the

28 See among others, John Aberth, From the Brink of the Apocalypse: Confronting Famine, War, Plague and Death in the Later Middle Ages (New York , 2000), which offer invaluable assessments of the historiography on each of these subjects. See also the impressively comprehensive study of the Black Death by O.J. Benedictow, The Black Death 1346-1353: the Complete History (Woodbridge, 2004). For a more popular take on the subject, see Norman Cantor, Wake of the Plague: the Black Death and the World it Made (New York, 2001), and among many others. Many of the arguments that David Herlihy made in the lectures compiled for The Black Death and the Cultural Transformation of the West have been superceded by more recent scholarship, but his broad and concisely stated vision of the period nevertheless offers an engaging and thought-provoking foray into the main questions about the social and cultural impact of the plague. 29 In one recent example, results from “World Values Surveys” demonstrated that a large majority of native Iraqis exhibited higher levels of suspicion towards foreigners and greater in-group solidarity during the deadliest years of the American war in Iraq. See Ronald Inglehart, Mansoor Moaddel, Mark Tessler, “Xenophobia and In-Group Solidarity in Iraq: A Natural Experiment on the Impact of Insecurity,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Sep. 2006), pp. 495-505.

23 end of the fifteenth, as populations started to return to the levels they had attained before the Black Death of 1348.

Moreover, while short-term societal responses to the disasters of the late medieval period have been studied extensively, the long-term recovery strategies implemented all over Europe have received much less attention. The tendency to depict the economic revival of the Renaissance era as a byproduct of population growth, better working conditions, individual intellectual achievements, or overseas expansion has obscured the role played by the leaders and inhabitants of individual communities who sought to stimulate recovery. Their initiatives to rejuvenate local economies helped to pave the way for the advances of the sixteenth centuries.

Comparison of Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen over a 150 year period enables analysis of discrepancies in the ways that crises impacted these communities, and the ways that those variations influenced decision-making about the status of outsiders and the roles they would have in renewal.

In Rouen, war and famine were the most consistent problems facing local administrators – though hardly the only ones. The position Rouen occupied as the gateway to the Seine River may have been the source of its size and importance as a hub of commerce and industry. But this location also made the city strategically vital from a military standpoint, since the forces that controlled the bridge and the waters that flowed beneath it could manage the flow of men and matériel into and out of inland France. For this reason, the Rouennais frequently found themselves caught in the middle of the struggle between the English and French monarchs during the course Hundred Years

War. As the largest walled city in the lower Seine region, Rouen became a center for

24 refugees from the countryside who were harassed and threatened by roving soldiers fighting on both sides of the conflict. These forains had been a source of contention from as early as the because their need for food and work brought them into competition with established members of the commune and corporations that controlled and regulated the production of goods ranging from bread and meat to fine hats and embroidery.

Debates over how to handle such newcomers continued well into the early fifteenth century, as Rouen became more entrenched in the war—culminating in its capture and occupation by the English from 1419-1449.

The role Rouen played as a center for refugees meant that local authorities were often faced with the possibility that the demands of the population could exceed available resources. The members of the municipal council verified that their grain supply could support an expanded population, and their efforts and shifting strategies on this front can be traced from the earliest surviving volume of municipal assembly minutes of 1389 through to the records of the early sixteenth century. Given the experiences of 1419, as well as the gradual demographic revival of the late fifteenth century, it is not surprising that the need to stock enough food to support the population during a prolonged siege became even more of focus in the assemblies that took place in this era. During the thirty year period of English rule, the municipal administration of Rouen was suspended, leaving us ill-informed about how the city was provisioned during this key period of the

Hundred Years War.30 Upon the resumption of the records of the minutes of their

30 Although there is no modern index of the minutes of the deliberations of the Rouennais council, the nineteenth century archivist Charles Robillard de Beaurepaire compiled a detailed of record of their contents, including transcriptions of select passages that he deemed of special interest. He also include information on the volumes of minutes themselves, and the history of the recording. Though much is omitted, it is nevertheless an invaluable aid and starting place for evaluating these records. See Inventaire Sommaire des archives communales antérieures à 1790: Déliberations (Vol. I). (Rouen, 1877).

25 deliberations, however, the conseillers quickly renewed efforts to ensure that their population was well-prepared for a crisis by stocking up on grain. Their meeting minutes include regular correspondences with local grain merchants from the Beauce region, who informed authorities about the going rates and the quality of produce available.

Depending on the status of the markets, they could decide to impose restrictions on the export of grain past their bridge. In some cases, such restrictions were instituted in response to popular upheaval over high prices on bread in the city; in others, shortages spanning the region pushed royal officials to hand down the order to impose tight regulations on exports.

Like their counterparts in Rouen, the consuls of Lyon regularly confronted the threat of warfare. Given the position Lyon held as a key outpost on the frontier with the

Holy Roman Empire, it is not surprising that the kings of France regularly emphasized the importance of the maintenance city’s fortifications. During the civil conflict between the and Orléanist branches of the Valois family in the first quarter of the fifteenth century, and when the Prince of Orange made forays into eastern and northeastern France in the 1420s and 1430s, Lyon acquired additional importance as a key military outpost and frontier.31 The dynastic and civil conflicts that ravaged so much of the kingdom never came directly to the walls and gates of the city, in spite of the anxieties that the leaders and inhabitants had about the possibility that they might be subjected to siege. But the raids carried out by the bands of mercenaries known as routiers took a heavy toll on Lyon and its environs in the latter half of the fourteenth century, and the unemployed warriors known as écorcheurs who roamed France after the

31 Jean Déniau, La Commune de Lyon et la Guerre Bourguignonne 1417-1435 (Lyon, 1934), remains an indispensable source for understanding the political and military situation within Lyon in the first quarter of the fifteenth century.

26 conclusion of the treaty of Arras in 1435 inflicted damage as well.32 Being subjected to the regular passage of soldiers and mercenaries forced the Lyonnais to adopt cautious approaches to unfamiliar warriors, and as war dragged on, they came to rely increasingly on their own wits and acumen to defend their city. While working to monitor and head off the threats posed by suspicious soldiers who were passing by or through their city,

Lyonnais officials also had to find ways to deal with the large numbers of refugees, poor travelers, and vagrants moving between nearby towns and adjacent kingdoms in search of safety and charitable aid.

From the position it held as a nexus of Mediterranean commerce in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Montpellier experienced a severe decline as a result of epidemics, persistent insecurity, and the deterioration of trade networks and local industry. There are no sources that can be used to determine exact toll that the first wave of plague took on Montpellier—in the entry for 1347, the local chronicler noted simply that it was, “the year of the mortality.” 33 This laconic assessment captures the sense of an epidemic so intense as to defy description, but tax assessments provide us with valuable details about the impact of subsequent outbreaks and the side effects they had for the local community. In 1367, there were 4,520 taxable households in Montpellier; by 1373, just six years later, that number had been cut in half to 2,300. By 1412, the number of

32 On the impact of both the routiers and the écorcheurs, see Philippe Contamine, Guerre, État et société à la fin du Moyen Âge (Paris, 1972), as well as Robert Boutruche, La crise d’une societé (Paris, 1947), whose study of the Bordelais region during the Hundred Years’ War remains today one of the finest regional studies covering the period of the conflict. 33 The Occitan reads, “L’an de la mortaudat.” Grasset St. Paul, P. Demaszes, F. Blanc, et al., Thalamus parvus. Le petit Thalamus de Montpellier, publié pour la première fois d'après les manuscrits originaux, par la Société archéologique de Montpellier (Montpellier, 1840), Unfortunately, many problems have been identified within the editorial strategies employed within this older edition of the Petit Thalamus. A team of researchers under the direction of Daniel Le Blévec at the Université Paul-Valéry in Montpellier have been working on and are nearing completion of a new translation and online version of the extant manuscripts of the text.

27 households had been reduced to a total of a mere 334.34 This precipitous decline in population was not only a result of the direct effects of disease, but was also a reflection of the exodus of wealthy individuals who departed from Montpellier and the kingdom of

France to find better economic prospects in the kingdom of or elsewhere. To reverse the dramatic population decline that had reduced the once great commercial center to an impoverished ghost town, the consuls who managed the city needed to think creatively about ways to bring those who had emigrated back in. They also needed to consider strategies for bringing merchants back into their markets to help restore their economy, even though their appeal and profitability was reduced by the decline and impoverishment of the population.

Differences in the policies that the leaders of Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen implemented towards outsiders were thus influenced not only by the geographical and economic attributes of their cities, but also by variations in the hardships that afflicted their populations. As they worked to help their populations survive and return to prosperity, municipal authorities needed to balance their efforts to respond to short-term threats with an awareness of the long-term political and economic concerns of their communities. Correspondences between municipal authorities and royal officials enabled a detailed analysis of the ways they negotiated and worked to achieve this balance. These documents contain rich details about the state of affairs within individual cities; they not only list the crises that were affecting the community, but also note specific economic challenges and military threats that they faced. In most cases, these exchanges related to issues of taxation. As the Hundred Years War dragged on, the taxes that the kings of

34 These figures are drawn from the eminent Montpelliérain scholar Alexandre Germain, Histoire du Commerce de Montpellier, antérieurement à l’ouverture du port de Cette (Vol. II), (Montpellier, 1861), who obtained them through the city’s well-preserved property cadastres known as compoix.

28 France imposed on communes in the form of tailles became an annual burden rather than an exceptional imposition, and municipal authorities vehemently defended their autonomy and economic privileges both by asserting their traditional exemptions and by seeking the sympathy of their sovereign. These correspondences show that the status and treatment of outsiders — both those coming from other parts of France, and those who were coming from beyond its limits — was a central topic of discussion for municipal and royal authorities dealing with the shifting dynamics in urban populations.35

Analyzing the correspondences between municipal and royal authorities that address the status of outsiders makes it possible to evaluate who had the power to define communities, and how the shifting balance of power between communes and their rulers dictated policies towards the range of outsiders who were driven or drawn into cities in response to crises. The period from the onset of the Hundred Years War to the beginning of the sixteenth century was a critical stage in relations between the enfranchised urban centers known as bonnes villes and the French monarchy. Because they provided a principal source of tax revenue, while also serving as military strongholds that protected key strategic positions against advances by the English and their allies, the bonnes villes were of critical importance to the Valois war effort. The kings had a vested interest in ensuring their economic strength, security and military preparedness, which in turn gave them reason to meddle in local affairs—such as the policies they implemented towards outsiders—more than they might have done previously. But municipal authorities were aware of the leverage that their importance to the monarchy gave them, and the increased defensive strength that they developed over the course of the war gave them greater

35 In addition to Rigaudière’s indispensable and meticulous work on municipal fiscal structures, Jean Favier, Finance et fiscalité au bas Moyen Age (Paris, 1971) provides a key reference for understanding the structures and modes of taxation within late medieval France.

29 power and will to resist demands that did not align with their own interests. This phase in municipal and royal relations has often been treated as another stage in the march towards a centralized, absolutist French state. Closer examination of negotiations over the status of outsiders demonstrates that municipal authorities continued to play the dominant role in defining their status and determining how diverse groups and individuals would be treated within their communities.

In making this case, I challenge some of the main arguments and approaches that scholars have advanced in studies of the étranger in France. In addition to identifying the fifteenth century as a key phase in the political centralization of the kingdom, scholars have also traced the origins of sentiments of French national identity to this period, often crediting the prolonged conflict with England for fostering xenophobic sentiments that in turn promoted greater solidarity among subjects of the French king. As noted above, focus on the combination of political centralization and burgeoning national identity has in turn promoted a focus on the development of institutions of national citizenship, and shifts in the legal status of the étranger in the Late Middle Ages. Relying on legal records, charters, and royal ordinances, Bernard d’Alteroche has conducted a throughout and invaluable study of the meaning of the term étranger in the Middle Ages, in his study

De l'étranger à la seigneurie à l'étranger au royaume XIème-XVème siècle. While he acknowledges the survival of definitions of the étranger that were based on the limits of the local community in the fifteenth century, he prioritizes those definitions that applied to individuals from beyond the limits of France. He devotes particular attention to the enactment of the droit d’aubain, which allowed royal authorities to seize the property of any individuals who died on French soil if they were naturalized in the French kingdom.

30 Although his analysis of the development and application of the droit d’aubain contributes much-needed context for the debates that have focused on the application of this royal prerogative in the sixteenth century, D’Alteroche’s almost exclusive reliance on normative sources does not allow for a full investigation of variations in the applications of the term étranger that did not conform to legal guidelines.36

Similarly, in her brief but rigorous analysis of the assimilation of the étranger in late medieval France, Claudine Billot examines the development of national institutions of citizenship, relying on lettres de naturalisation, which the monarchy granted to select individuals who came from outside the kingdom to settle permanently within its limits.

These documents furnish a rich portrait of the efforts to integrate foreigners into communities around France, and the processes that individuals needed to follow to gain the full legal protections of the monarchy and the rights of French citizens. Addressing the motivations that led the rulers of France to grant concessions to newcomers, Billot acknowledges that wealthy and technically skilled individuals often had a leading role to play in recovery efforts. But Billot’s dependence on the lettres de naturalisation granted by the monarchy and the the ordonnances that dictated the specific privileges bestowed on different groups of immigrants means that she does not give credit to the municipal authorities who were most proactive in offering outsiders incentives and protections in order to promote commerce and immigration as forms of economic stimulus.37 Philippe

Contamine offers more full consideration to a variety of regional and local variants in an

36 In addition to D’Alteroche’s work on the droit d’aubain in De l’étranger à la seigneurie à l’étranger au royaume, see the debate between Simona Cerutti, "À qui appartiennent les biens qui n’appartiennent à personne? Citoyenneté et droit d’aubaine à l’époque moderne." Annales 62.2 (2007), 355-383, and Peter Sahlins, "Sur la citoyenneté et le droit d’aubaine à l’époque moderne : Réponse à Simona Cerutti," Annales 63.2 (2008), 385-398. 37 Claudine Billot, “L’assimilation des étrangers dans le royaume de France aux XIVe et XVe siècles,” Revue Historique 270.2 (1983): 273-296

31 invaluable overview article on definitions of the étranger, and he takes the time to consider the significance and usage of that term and its equivalents within different communities. Nevertheless, like Billot and d’Alteroche, he ultimately highlights a progression from local to national definitions of the étranger over the course of the fifteenth century.38

I do not dispute that the consolidation of royal power and the formation of a national identity that centered around the king of France led to changes in the ways that communities defined and treated outsiders, and the ways that municipal authorities understood and protected the frontiers of their cities. But the focus on these developments has led to the neglect of parallel processes on the local level. In many cases, urban communities could not count on royal authorities and armies to protect them against the threats they confronted — indeed, in many cases, it was royal taxation or rowdy royal soldiers who posed the greatest threats. This often forced municipal authorities to turn inwards to handle the litany of crises that they were dealing with, and look for solutions in their own communities. This in turn led to the affirmation of local identities, and policies towards outsiders that developed out of specific local concerns. This is clearly borne out within municipal administrative sources. The focus on the development of centralized institutions of citizenship, along with the broader tendency to lean heavily on central collections held in the Archives Nationales and the Bibliothèque Nationale in

Paris, has led scholars working on the subject of the étranger in France to devote much greater attention to the records of the royal administration than those of individual communes. I draw extensively on the work that has been done on royal records by

38 Philippe Contamine, “Qu’est-ce que un étranger pour un Français de la fin du Moyen-Âge,” in C. Carozi and H. Taviani-Carozzi, eds., Peuples du Moyen Âge : Problèmes d’identification (Aix-en-Provence, 1996), 27-44.

32 scholars such as Billot, d’Alteroche, Contamine, as well as the research that Peter Sahlins and Charlotte Wells have conducted on the further development of the lettres de naturalisation and laws governing citizenship in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.39 But sources such as municipal council minutes, treasury accounts, property assessments, notarial records, local chronicles, and immigration records offer a much more complete and detailed picture of how communities actually responded to outsiders.

The municipal archives in Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier boast rich and well- preserved collections of medieval sources that illuminate the reasons for the policy decisions taken by the leaders of those communities. For Rouen, minutes of the meetings of the local administration survive from 1389 until the beginning of the English siege of the city in 1418, and they resume after the restoration of the council in 1449 and continue almost uninterrupted through the sixteenth century. These registers are supplemented by administrative records ranging from the massive volumes of notarial contracts known as tabellions to compilations of regulations governing the daily workings of craft corporations. In Lyon, minutes of meetings of the consulate survive with few gaps from

1416 through until the religious wars of the 1560s.40 Abundant and varied treasury records survive from the mid-fourteenth century and onwards; these include the specific amounts devoted to all manners of municipal spending, such as construction projects, gifts and bribes to royal officials, charitable donations, reimbursements for messengers’ visits to the royal court, and war preparations. In addition to the numerous

39 Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Régime and After (Ithaca, 2004), and Charlotte Catherine Wells, Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France (Baltimore,1995). 40 Helpfully, the minutes from the period 1416–1450 are transcribed in two volumes edited by the great local archivists M.C. and Georges Guigue, Les registres consulaires de la ville de Lyon (Lyon, 1882). The original manuscripts have also been digitized, and are available online at, http://www.fondsenligne.archives-lyon.fr/ac69v2/deliberation.php.

33 correspondences between the consulate and the monarchy, records of exchanges with dukes, lords, petty regional nobles, and municipal officials in other cities illuminate the workings of the city’s diplomacy with external powerbrokers, and the influence these negotiations had on outsiders who came to the city. The municipal archives of

Montpellier include, along with a wide variety of documentation concerning the day-to- day workings of municipal governance, negotiations over the status of merchants, as well as a series of immigration records known as droits d’habitanage, which authorized outsiders to establish permanent residence in the city.

The quality, quantity, and type of sources from the three cities in this study does not always align, creating challenges for comparative work. The most well-documented years in one may coincide with lacunae in the archives of another, and variable documentation and styles of record-keeping may create a distorted representation or misleading emphasis on different points. Taking a long view and evaluating a wide range of sources concerning over a period spanning more than a hundred and fifty years makes it possible to address these methodological challenges. Rather than comparing the experiences of and responses to the same individual crisis within each city—a task that would have been impossible due to imbalances in the source material—I focused on situating short-term approaches to outsiders in times of crisis within the long-term trends and shifts in municipal policies. Indeed, stepping back to consider each city over a greater time scale makes it possible to take them all on their own terms, and assess which events and developments were most significant and influential to the individuals living within them, instead of artificially homing in on particular event for the sake of a unified, one- to-one comparison. For example, the English invasion of 1415 posed a real and terrifying

34 threat to the people of Rouen, but was only a distant concern to their counterparts in

Montpellier. In other cases, the Montpelliérains faced epidemics, food shortages, and natural disasters such as earthquakes that had little or no impact on the inhabitants of

Rouen or Lyon. For this reason, it is preferable to follow the lead of the sources and look at the wider canvas of societal responses to crisis, in order to gain a more full and accurate rendering of how the specific challenges and hardships that communities faced determined how they defined their boundaries.

Furthermore, by evaluating a diverse array of source materials, rather than relying on one type of documentation across each of the three cities, this study furnishes a much more rich and accurate representation of the political and economic motivations that drove municipal policy within each locale. Each type of source fills out a different corner of the portrait of local factors that shaped municipal policy decisions. Exchanges between local, seigneurial, and royal authorities are most effective in illuminating the power dynamics that determined who had the authority to make decisions about who to allow into the community; varied municipal administrative sources, such as council minutes, are more instructive in showing how officials exercised and abused that authority, and where the limits of their powers actually lay when it was time to use them. Similarly, financial documents such as tax records and property assessments are helpful in explaining demographics and economic considerations that determined who municipal authorities would allow in and why, while prescriptions for the appropriate conduct of civic processions and descriptions of their enactment provide information about the integration or exclusion of outsiders within the local identity. Chronicles and other narrative sources, whether written by local clergymen or commissioned by municipal

35 officials, provide an important supplement that helps to contextualize and fill in the gaps of the administrative records, while providing insights into how particular events and developments were understood and translated into narratives within different sectors of a community.

Part I of this study outlines the challenges that outsiders posed to the leaders of

Lyon, Montpellier, and Rouen as they worked to deal with the litany of crises that afflicted their communities; it also illustrates the varied ways that municipal authorities addressed those challenges, and the centrality of efforts to manage the movements of outsiders to overall strategies for surviving crises. To provide the background necessary for understanding the policies outlined within municipal administrative records, the first chapter offers a detailed analysis of municipal charters and statutes that delineated the privileges and obligations of established residents, and the limitations and exemptions that governed outsiders. The charters of enfranchissements that kings granted to the populations of prominent cities around the kingdom of France from the twelfth through the fourteenth centuries authorized them to select councilors who would administer their daily affairs and finances, offered exemptions from certain taxes, and granted certain local monopolies. Because they served as the foundation for municipal autonomy, these documents were revered and regularly reconfirmed, so that their tenets would be carefully preserved. Even when faced with crises that dramatically disrupted daily life within their city limits and the demographics of their local populations, local authorities did not cast aside the principles that had ordered their cities aside lightly. Instead, they looked to their charters for guidance as they made decisions about the status of outsiders who were entering their communities. It is thus imperative to evaluate the development of

36 those charters and the reasoning behind individual principles, in order to understand why municipal councils sometimes compromised and broadened the privileges accorded to outsiders, and why they sometimes held their line and asserted their exclusiveness.

The second chapter builds on the foundation provided by the first, exploring the ways that population movements into and out of cities forced municipal authorities to reevaluate the privileges that defined their communities, and the meaning of membership within them. Moving beyond the reliance on normative sources and the focus on legal definitions of étrangers or forins that has been characteristic of work on the subject, this section instead focuses on fluctuations in the status of varied groups who were entering and leaving cities. Although municipal authorities were always keen to maintain boundaries that ordered their communities, those boundaries were both fluid and porous: decisions had to be made on a case by case basis about how outsiders would be treated according to the impacts that they were having on the community. In exploring how those decisions were negotiated, this chapter will also illustrate variations in the effects crises had within different communities and at different times. In Rouen, refugees who flooded into the community to escape advancing English armies and the marauding bands of mercenaries that ravaged sometimes strained the local supply of food and work. In other cases, their skills and labor were necessary for the survival of the diminished local population. The Montpelliérain consuls often protected and welcomed refugees and exiles who could help them overcome the economic decline inflicted by mortalities and emigration; but in return they had to insist repeatedly that the newcomers would meet their obligations as permanent residents. The consuls of Lyon, for their part, struggled to maintain the economic advantages that their position as a crossroads of

37 Europe afforded, while also warding off the threats posed by the circulation of contagious travelers and strange and unfamiliar soldiers.

The third chapter looks more closely at the ways that communities defined their identities in relation to the monarchy and the kingdom of France a whole as they confronted sustained and complicated military conflicts. This issue goes to the heart of what it meant to be an “outsider” within different cities during a period of sustained insecurity, and whether belonging was defined at the level of the nation or the local community in this period. The Hundred Years War has often been credited with promoting the development of national identities and patriotic sentiments that facilitated centralization of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century.41 I call this narrative into question by focusing on the challenges that the leaders and inhabitants of Lyon,

Montpellier, and Rouen faced as they tried to defend against the threats posed not only by

English armies and their allies, but by unfamiliar soldiers who were fighting for the

French kings, as well as marauding bands of unaffiliated mercenaries who were “living off the land”— i.e. pillaging. Persistent indiscipline among the companies of soldiers the

Valois rulers paid to fight for them was a source of significant tension among municipal and royal authorities, particularly when the latter imposed crippling taxes to help pay the wages of those responsible for so much damage. Indeed, the untrustworthy nature of soldiers fighting on all sides within the multifaceted conflict for control of France meant that urban communities often had to rely on their own wits and military strength to ensure that their safety. Rather than serving solely or even mainly as a unifying force then, war created tensions between local populations and outsiders who were ostensibly fighting on

41 See especially, Georges Minois, La Guerre de Cent Ans: Naissance de deux nations (Paris, 2008), and Colette Beaune, Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late Medieval France, trans. Fredric Cheyette (Berkeley, CA, 1991).

38 the same side—a fact which sometimes led municipal authorities to define their communities more narrowly and control access to their cities more rigorously.

Where Part I focuses on the challenges that outsiders could pose to urban communities, and the strategies that municipal authorities implemented to avert and staunch crises by addressing those challenges, Part II focuses on the central role that merchants and immigrants— including those hailing from other towns and regions of

France, and from foreign kingdoms—played in the survival and the recovery of urban communities that had been ravaged by crisis. Municipal authorities in Montpellier,

Rouen, and Lyon recognized the need to maintain vital commercial partnerships that brought in tax revenue and supported local industry. For this reason, the leaders of all three cities took active measures to protect their relationships with foreign merchants and preserve trade routes imperiled by insecurity. Nevertheless, as they tried to maintain a welcoming stance towards the merchants and intermediaries that their local economies relied on, they at times faced internal pressures from within their populations from those who feared the risks that outsiders could pose. While handling such concerns, they also needed to respond to royal authorities, who weighed in on the appropriate treatment and taxation of merchants who were coming from elsewhere in the kingdom, or from rival polities. The strategies that municipal authorities used to address these issues and preserve their commercial relationships directly informed the ways that they attempted to rebuild their cities. Having long seen the contributions of outsiders with skills and money as a pillar of local prosperity, their strategies for revitalizing their economies and restoring their populations after prolonged periods of decline focused on enhancing those contributions by encouraging trade and providing incentives for immigration.

39 Together, the six chapters of this study form a case for focusing on the local factors that shaped urban communities during times of crisis, and the complex rationales that guided policies towards varied individuals who fell into the category of outsider. As

David Nirenberg has argued so eloquently, if one simply dismisses persecution and outbursts of violence in the Middle Ages as examples of the irrationality and hysteria of the masses, “then there is no need to study the contexts within which violence occurred or look for the conflicts that might have caused it: the interpretive landscape becomes monotonously flat.”42 The imperative to understand the deeper motives behind specific policies and actions is even more apparent when considering the idiosyncrasies within the broad spectrum of societal responses to the immediate and long-term aftermath of the crises of the Late Middle Ages. Meeting minutes and correspondences between municipal and royal officials attest to the long, painstaking discussions that molded the ways that different communities treated outsiders. We may not always agree with the reasoning behind certain measures, or find much to admire in them. But it is clear that they were almost never implemented without forethought, after consideration of a wide range of political, military, economic, and religious concerns. We gain a much greater and more nuanced understanding of responses to crisis in the Late Middle Ages if we take those concerns seriously. We also learn to see this tumultuous period not simply as one of gothic horrors, upon which we can stare with morbid fascination and self-satisfaction at how far our modern society has progressed: instead, we find that there is much to be learned from communities that sought out a subtly nuanced and differentiating approach to outsiders, even while facing unimaginable hardships.

42 Nirenberg, Communities of Violence, 43.

40

PART I

THE BOUNDARIES OF URBAN COMMUNITY IN AN AGE OF CRISIS

41

CHAPTER I

DEFINING THE LIMITS OF URBAN COMMUNITY

The cataclysmic population decline inflicted by the combined crises of the late

Middle Ages has long been recognized as a driving force behind social and cultural changes that ushered in the early modern era. The movements of women and men who left their homes in search of security and opportunity typically have only an ancillary part within this narrative of mass mortality and upheaval.43 But migrations played a central role in overturning populations and reshaping communities during this period, and this was nowhere more true than in the cities in the kingdom of France. The onset and escalation of the Hundred Years War in the middle of the fourteenth century had pushed urban populations to devote more resources to building up and expanding fortifications to protect suburbs that had sprung up as their populations grew beyond the limits of old walled enclosures. As armies and companies of mercenaries and brigands swept through the countryside to campaign or pillage with increasing frequency, fortified cities became major destinations for those villagers and peasants seeking refuge from the travails of war. Bouts of plague and famine regularly pushed people towards cities either because they hoped to find safety and more abundant food or because their previous communities deemed them a threat or an unwelcome burden. Whatever reasons they had for leaving

43 One notable exception that has migration in the Late Middle Ages a topic of focus is, Alain Ducellier, et al. Les Chemins de l'exil: bouleversements de l'Est européen et migrations vers l'Ouest à la fin du moyen âge (Paris, 1991).

42 their homes behind, these outsiders presented an important challenge to the status quo within the communities they sought to enter. 44

To understand municipal authorities’ efforts to adapt to the changes affected by the crises of the Late Middle Ages, it is first necessary to understand the foundations on which they grounded their policies. The question of which newcomers would be accepted and how fully they would enjoy the privileges of membership within the community was one of central importance: not only did the answers define the limits of urban communities and relations between natives and newcomers, they also shaped strategies for enduring plagues, famines, war, and economic upheaval. The policies that determined the status of outsiders in late medieval France developed out of negotiations between municipal and royal authorities, the varied constituencies within urban populations, and the outsiders themselves. Established precedents provided the point of departure for these negotiations, whether they were inscribed in the statutes of municipal charters, articulated in the regulations of corporations of craftsmen, or derived from traditions that claimed such ancient extraction that there was no memory of any alternative.45 As will be shown in the second chapter, answers for how to handle the widely varying groups and individuals coming into cities could not always be found by reference to these tried conventions. But whether they were strictly followed, modified, or disregarded, precedents provided the framework of the discussion and the standard for evaluating the legitimacy of a policy decision. Understanding their form and content is thus of vital

44 Denis Menjot offers an invaluable survey of recent literature examining the impact of migration on medieval cities in the introduction for, Arriver en ville: Les Migrants en milieu urbain au moyen âge. 45 The dynamics of municipal and royal negotiations in relation to the treatment of outsiders will be explored in detail over the course of this dissertation. For a broader assessment of the factors shaping power relations between the communes and the French crown in the Late Middle Ages, see David Rivaud’s study, Les villes et le roi.

43 importance to evaluating the ways that urban communities handled the influx of outsiders who came to their cities in times of crisis.

By examining the array of charters, établissements, guild regulations, and royal ordonnances that defined outsiders and their status within three cities, this chapter analyzes how the lines of privilege between locals and outsiders were first established. A comparison of Montpellier, Rouen, and Lyon illustrates the distinctiveness of legislation and conventions concerning outsiders within different cities, while illuminating the range of factors that created discrepancies. The most obvious source of variation was geography, which in turn determined what networks these cities were involved in. All three cities rose to prominence as outposts within major commercial networks in medieval Europe. Differences in these networks and the cities’ respective roles within them shaped the interests that determined municipal policies for dealing with merchants and travelers. The availability of raw materials dictated what products cities relied on for sustenance and revenue. Efforts to nourish specialized local industries dictated who had the right to come to the city and work in a given craft, and which products could enter or leave and at what cost. Furthermore, Montpellier, Rouen, and Lyon were situated on frontiers of France, and were integrated into the kingdom at different times. They were thus subject to the influence of adjacent realms and the events and conflicts that took place within them. These external influences and events were among several critical factors in the development of urban communes. The structures of local governance that developed within these three very different milieux were crucial to the formulation of regulations concerning outsiders and the policies implemented later, in the face of upheaval.

44 Analysis of those structures of governance illuminates the great variation that the geographic features and economic attributes of different urban communities promoted in the customs, privileges, and laws that defined outsiders and their official status. Previous scholarship on regulations governing the étranger in municipalities in France has either neglected or glossed over variations between cities. By illuminating the variation in the precepts governing the treatment of outsiders within Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen, this chapter demonstrates the leading part that municipal authorities in these cities played in developing policies that would meet the evolving needs of their populations. Although geography often had a decisive role in promoting differences between these three economies, it would be misguided to see the various conventions governing the treatment of outsiders as pre-determined and inevitable products of economic and political circumstance. On the contrary, the written regulations that defined the boundaries of urban communities for generations were the product of much forethought, and extensive debate and negotiations between the leaders of urban populations and the rulers from whom they sought charters of enfranchisements. As they pushed to define the precise exemptions and privileges that they would receive from the monarchy, municipal authorities needed to prioritize their interests carefully, and advocate measures that would do the most to help their local economies and maximize their cities’ geographic attributes. The proven effectiveness of the measures they ultimately put in place—when buttressed by the force of tradition—gave the municipal authorities in Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen a powerful motivation to defer to the old standards implemented by their ancestors as they tried to respond to the new spate of hardships that afflicted France in the

Late Middle Ages.

45

Montpellier

Montpellier provides a convenient starting place for comparison of the local attributes and political developments that created disparities in the treatment of outsiders, as the Consuetudines that first laid out the privileges of the commune offer the clearest articulation of the official position that outsiders held within their city.46 In evaluating the ways that the bourgeois leaders of Montpellier formulated policies and defined what it meant to be a resident of their city, it is first necessary to understand the circumstances that solidified the primary role they played in deciding who belonged as residents in their community, and what belonging meant in terms of privileges and obligations. Having first appeared in the historical record in 985, Montpellier was a relatively new city by the standards of other major towns within the surrounding region, such as Nîmes, Arles,

Narbonne, and Marseille, all of which held prominent roles as administrative and commercial centers within Roman Gaul. The favorable location Montpellier occupied just ten kilometers off the coast of the Mediterranean helped it to overcome any disadvantage stemming from a lack of Roman heritage, and the city grew quickly in size, prestige, and economic clout.47 The inhabitants of Montpellier received official recognition of their privileges of self-administration in 1204, in the early stages of the wider communal movement that saw urban centers around Europe develop more autonomous municipal administrations.48 Although complex political maneuverings

46 An edition of the Consuetudines is available in Jean Martel, Thalamus parvus, 1-92. 47 Louise Guiraud, Récherches topographiques sur Montpellier au Moyen-Age: formation de la ville, ses enceintes successives, ses rues, ses monuments, etc. avec quatre plans (Nîmes : 2009) provides an indispensable guide to the arrangement of space and its impact on the political divisions within medieval Montpellier. On the origins of the city, see Cholvy, Histoire de Montpellier, 11- 15. 48 For the best recent overview of the progress of the communal movement within Western Europe and the scholarship on the subject, see, Patrick Boucheron and Denis Menjot, La ville médiévale, 292-333.

46 between local lords and King Peter II of Aragon paved the way for the charter granted to

Montpellier in 1204, the early development of a strong municipal government was ultimately attributable to the economic prowess of a bourgeois class with significant interests in Mediterranean trade—which in turn shaped the policies they established towards outsiders.

Until the mid-fourteenth century, Montpellier was politically divided between settlements situated on the two hills of Nôtre-Dame de Montpellier and Montpelliéret, which reached forty-nine and thirty-seven meters above sea level, respectively. The smaller of the two bourgs in both size and population, Montpelliéret was under the authority of the Bishops of Maguelone, whose fortified Romanesque cathedral looked out over Mediterranean beaches from the Maguelone peninsula some twenty kilometers to the south. The bourg of Montpellier was under the control of the secular lords of the city, the Guilhems, who established a chateau that served as a strategic base of power on the third, adjacent hill of Peyrou. Although politically distinct, there was little physical separation between these three hills. Over time, they became more and more integrated as the construction of city walls brought them together within a ring of fortifications that came to be known as the comuna clausura.49 This internal integration of the bourgs of

Montpellier closely paralleled the incorporation of the city into the kingdom of France as part of a lengthy, halting expansion that began with the Albigensian Crusade into

Languedoc the early thirteenth century and ended with the acquisition of the city by King

John II in 1349.50 Over the course of this process, seigneurial authority passed from the

49 Guiraud, Récherches topographiques, 3-20. 50 For a general account of the Albigensian Crusade and the integration of Languedoc into the kingdom of France, see Jonathan Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade (London, 1978). There have been several studies attempted of the role of Montpellier within the spread of Cathar heresy, but these are largely speculative

47 lords of Montpellier, to the kings of Aragon, and then to their cadet branch in Majorca before final consolidation by the French monarchy. Until the city’s integration into

France, the local population exercised almost complete autonomy, thanks in part to its distance from the central powers that held nominal control.

The significant independence that the bourgeois of Montpellier enjoyed meant that more localized concerns were the driving force in shaping policies on nearly all local matters, including the treatment of outsiders. The interests of the population were tied directly to the city’s location and the geographic attributes that shaped the economy. The area immediately surrounding Montpellier was dominated by rough terrain, with large outcroppings of limestone covered sparsely by low shrubs and bushes. These conditions were conducive to the cultivation of olives, grapes, and other Mediterranean staples, but they presented challenges for the large-scale production of grain. As a result, inhabitants of Montpellier came to depend on produce obtained through trade for sustenance, while relying on industry and commerce to support themselves economically. With ample natural reserves readily available from mines in the surrounding region, the metal- working trades, including silver-smithing, tin working, and chain-mail manufacturing became well-established specialties.51 Montpellier lacked the strong textile industry that was the cornerstone of many contemporary urban economies, but was a center for the dying of fabric and achieved prominence for the quality of its scarlet cloth. Dyed textiles and metal goods became principal exports within Mediterranean trade. Although

due to the dearth of source materials on the subject within the municipal archives. Michael Jas, Incertitudes: Les Cathares à Montpellier (Béziers, 2007), offers one of the less sensationalist treatments of the topic. 51 Cholvy, Histoire de Montpellier, 28-34; See also Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Histoire du Languedoc, (, 1988), 148-194 for an excellent overview of the broader economic development in the region in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

48 Montpellier was home to a well-established nucleus of skilled artisans and craftsmen, the role that the city played as an entrepôt for disembarking merchants was the greatest source of its economic and population growth.52

Merchants hailing from around the Mediterranean came to the city to exchange spices, silks, linens, and a wide variety of other luxury items and commodities. Through its prominence within in this network, Montpellier was a direct beneficiary and a perfect illustration of the widespread commercial revival that continued through the twelfth and thirteenth centuries across western Europe. The Montpelliérains reaped particular benefits from the establishment of the Crusader kingdoms, and the intensified trade with the

Eastern Mediterranean that resulted from their growth in the twelfth century. The

Guilhems were personally invested in the Crusades, as were the Counts of Toulouse, and these ties encouraged trade between Languedoc and the Eastern Mediterranean in the first half of the twelfth century. Proximity to the rising commercial powers of Genoa, Pisa, and Catalonia also promoted economic growth in Montpellier, and the ready availability of coinage from the nearby mint of Melgeuil facilitated the development of banking and financial infrastructure vital to trade.53 The rapid growth that allowed Montpellier to bloom into a major player in Mediterranean trade should not, however, be viewed simply as the product of an auspicious location. Given that Montpellier is not even situated directly on the coast, the fact that it became one of the major hubs of commerce in the medieval Mediterranean is in fact a rather surprising one that attests to the early efforts

52 Kathryn Reyerson provides an excellent introduction to the development of Montpellier as a commercial center in The Art of the Deal: Intermediaries of Trade in Medieval Montpellier (Boston, 2002), 48-77. See also the classic three volume study by Alexandre Germain, Histoire du commerce de Montpellier, which provides a blow-by-blow account of the history of economic institutions and policies in Montpellier, supported by an invaluable collection of transcribed documents. 53 See Reyerson, Business, Banking, and Finance (Toronto, 1985), 114; Mireille Cataing-Sigard, Monnaies féodales et circulation monétaire en Languedoc (Xe-XIIIe siècles), 20.

49 by its leaders to promote trade and encourage outsiders to come to their city to work and exchange merchandise.

Through the twelfth century, the port town of Lattes served as the link between

Montpellier and the sea, with the small Lez River inlet connecting the two over the seven kilometers that separated them. Lattes was gradually superseded as the principal port for

Montpellier after Louis IX acquired Aigues-Mortes in 1240 in order to diminish French reliance on the support of Italian maritime powers for crusading ventures. Situated twenty kilometers east of Montpellier, Aigues-Mortes became the principle port serving merchants and travelers heading back and forth from France and the Levant. A direct road facilitated travel between Montpellier and Aigue-Mortes, and the partnership between them invigorated commercial ties with the east while increasing the role that

Montpellier held as a link between the Mediterranean and the markets of France.54

Demand for the riches furnished by this trade remained stiff, and this promoted economic rivalries between coastal cities. Throughout the Middle Ages, Montpellier remained in competition with other well-situated urban centers such as Marseille and Nîmes.

Economic competition between these towns did not prevent some sporadic collaboration in long distance trading arrangements, but the desire to keep pace with the regional rivals in pursuit of trading partnerships was a persistent and driving concern for policymakers in Montpellier. The dramatic growth and success the city enjoyed owed much to the foresight they exhibited in implementing measures that would make Montpellier as attractive as possible not only for merchants, but for travelers, students, and new settlers.

To encourage trade, the Guilhems moderated tolls and tariffs on imported goods and encouraged immigration from the countryside. They also forged a series of lucrative

54 Germain, Histoire du Commerce de Montpellier, 43-45

50 trading partnerships, most notably, with the Latin colonies in Tyre and Saint-Jean-d’Acre during the Third Crusade in 1187-1192.55 In addition, they took steps to foster a general climate of tolerance and security that made the city a welcoming destination not only for merchants, but for travelers and students as well. In an ordinance issued in 1181,

Guilhem VIII affirmed that anyone, regardless of who they were or where they came from, could come and study at the already renowned faculty of medicine.56 One of his predecessors, Guilhem V, was less progressive, issuing a law forbidding Jews from serving as bailli – the chief judicial administrator - within the city. This restriction on access to positions of authority may be taken to suggests that members within the local

Jewish community had achieved a status that would bring them into consideration. The traveling rabbi Benjamin of Tudela bore witness to the diversity within Montpellier when he passed through the city in 1165, describing the city as “a place very favorable to commerce, frequented by all manners of Christians and Saracens and Arabs, along with merchants from Lombardy, Egypt, Gaul, Spain, England, Genoa, and Pisa.”57 This enthusiastic endorsement provides an illustration of the open climate for exchange that promoted the city’s rapid development.

Even as Montpellier achieved greater prominence as a center for trade, the city remained firmly under the influence of the Genoese, who dominated western

Mediterranean commerce during the twelfth century. As Genoese dominance over the city waned in the second half of the twelfth century, however, the merchants of

Montpellier gained increased prestige and greater influence within local affairs as they

55 Germain, Histoire du Commerce de Montpellier, (Vol. 2), 1-6 provides a discussion of the diplomatic accords that the Guilhem lords used to advance their commercial interests and consolidate power. 56 Germain, Histoire du Commune (Vol. 3), 74. 57 As cited in Ghislaine Fabre, Montpellier: La Ville Médiévale (Paris, 1992), 165.

51 took over roles in trading networks that their Italian counterparts had worked to establish.

Together with a growing corps of craftsmen and artisans and the members of an educated bureaucracy of notaries and lawyers trained at the local faculty of law, these merchants forced the Guilhems to offer them a much greater role within the administration of their local community. Already in 1143, they had won some concessions from Guilhem VI when he returned to Montpellier from Lattes to reassert his authority. Although he abolished the magistracy of consuls that had led the city during the revolt, his new administrative structure acknowledged their increased stature by offering roles to proshomes, boni homines, or probi homines. This group answered directly to the bailli, and the lords of Montpellier in turn. Representatives from the major corporations of craftsmen, which were known as scalas, served as administratores in a kind of public works department, which occupied itself primarily with the construction and maintenance of the city’s defenses and walled enclosure. A third body, ranging from ten to fifteen members, including notables form the other two groups, counseled the lords of

Montpellier in their decisions while working to ensure that the civic administration collaborated to attend the interests of the different factions within the city.58

The influence and power of these three bodies continued to grow over the course of the twelfth century, paving the way for the development of a more fully autonomous municipal administration after the line of succession of the lords of Montpellier broke down in 1203. When Guilhem VIII died in that year, he left the bourgeois council in charge of the city’s affairs during the minority of his son. Although the King of Aragon,

Peter II, usurped control over the city by marrying Marie de Montpellier, the daughter

Guilhem VIII had from his first marriage, this power grab faced resistance from the local

58 Lewis, “Development of Town Government”, 60-62.

52 population, and the bourgeois council was by no means willing to cede the extensive powers of governance they had enjoyed to a new, foreign overlord. To secure their compliance with his assent to power, Peter II agreed to confirm the privileges of their commune, as outlined in a charter that would serve as framework for the structure of municipal governance in Montpellier throughout the Middle Ages.59 In addition, the

Consuetudines issued in a charter in August of 1204 touched on nearly all facets of daily life while shaping the face that the city presented to the world. The principles enshrined in those articles reflect both values of the community that instituted them and the values and legal traditions that would continue to guide the Montpelliérains as they decided who they would welcome into their city in the centuries that followed.

Of the 123 articles included in the Consuetudines, more than thirty directly or indirectly defined the parameters of membership within the community. The prevalence of articles outlining regulations for a wide variety of issues involving exchange, jurisdiction, and the status of both recent immigrants and passing merchants and travelers indicate the prime importance of effective policy towards outsiders for a population that owed its prosperity to regional and international commerce. It is true that the articles of the charter confirmed in 1204 were often based on or even taken verbatim from earlier statutes that had been implemented during the reign of the Guilhems. This leaves some uncertainty about whether the policies they outlined derived more from seigneurial initiative, or the pressures and influence exerted by powerful bourgeois families and the wider community. But the two need hardly be viewed as mutually exclusive, since the lords of Montpellier needed to ensure the financial welfare of their subjects in order to

59 The most thorough account of the events leading to the Aragonese acquisition of Montpellier is available in Baumel, Histoire d’une seigneurie, 186-192.

53 maintain their own prosperity. For their part, the city’s bourgeois advocated strongly for their own interests, both through acts of resistance such as the revolt of 1141-1143, and from the increasingly prominent positions they gained within the local administration during the latter half of the twelfth century. The high degree of legalistic detail within their provisions also suggests extensive involvement or input from the corps of jurists trained at the faculty of law within the city. 60 Whoever originally formulated the language of specific articles, their reaffirmation in 1204 indicates the new municipal leaders’ belief in their merits.

The Consuetudines of Montpellier were at their foundation an agreement about power—about how the authority to make laws governing various aspects of the city’s affairs would be distributed and exercised. On the most essential level, the charter established the administrative framework of relations between the new sovereign lords of

Montpellier, the kings of Aragon, and a council of twelve of prud’hommes that the local bourgeois leaders selected to manage the city and represent the interests of the community. The articles were recorded in both Latin and the Occitan dialect used by the population of Montpellier, illustrating the guiding desire to balance observance of custom and deference to traditional sources of authority with the specific interests of a population with its own growing power and identity.61 The first article of the Consuetudines set the tone for the effort to achieve this balance by affirming the exclusive loyalty that the city’s inhabitants owed to the kings of Aragon, while explaining how they would implement the

60 Germain, Histoire du Commune de Montpellier (Vol. 1), 38-42 provides an excellent introduction to the Consuetudines, their origins and the circumstances surrounding the granting of the charter in 1204. See also, Baumel, 209-216; 230-238. 61 Thalamus Parvus, V-XV. The introduction to its edition of the Consuetudines retains value for the information it provides about the available manuscripts, but reveals deficiencies in the editorial strategies used to combine multiple versions into a single authoritative text. A new and much needed critical edition is currently in progress under the direction of Daniel Le Blévec.

54 rule of law. Of central concern was the selection of the bailli and the regulation of the ways that jurisprudence would be implemented within the city. The appointee for that role was to be selected by the king from the ranks of the wisest and most capable individuals from within the population of Montpellier, as advised and approved by its consul of twelve prud’hommes. The bailli would in turn appoint officers to help them fulfill the law. Together, the selected officials would offer a solemn oath in the presence of the assembled public that they would serve justice by rejecting bribery from parties involved in cases brought before the court.62

That the article outlining the process for the appointment and inauguration of the bailli and his officers was the first in the Consuetudines indicates the primary importance placed on the establishment of an effective judicial and administrative system. The bailli served as a link between the lords of Montpellier, who were regularly absent and occupied with foreign wars, and the consuls, who managed the vast majority of the city’s daily affairs. The subsequent acts regulating who was eligible to occupy the position of bailli are thus particularly notable, because they indicate who exactly was considered to be within the ranks of the population and who could be deemed to be worthy of the highest office. As noted above, a policy implemented under Guilhem V forbid Jews from serving as the chief judicial official within Montpellier. This policy was simply reaffirmed in the seventh article of the charter of 1204, but the regulations concerning eligibility for positions of power within Montpellier were more fully elaborated within the établissements of Montpellier. The établissements were effectively amendments that the consuls of Montpellier implemented when they felt compelled to clarify or expand on the precepts either within their established customs. Recorded exclusively in Occitan,

62 Thalamus Parvus, 3-5.

55 these modifications were authorized after presentation and consultation with a general assembly summoned by the sounding of the city’s bells. At least in theory, then, they embodied the collective will of the population, and for this reason they are a critical complement to the Consuetudines, as they reflect the efforts of local authorities both to clarify principles within their charter and adapt to the shifting needs of their community.63

An amendment issued in 1292 expanded on the original eligibility requirements for the position of bailli, while also clarifying the requirements for other officers of the court. The prohibition against Jews holding office remained in place, but the restrictions were also extended to encompass outsiders’ access to power. Within the revised provisions, only those who had either been born in Montpellier and its suburbs or remained in the city for a span of ten years could hold the roles of bailli, lieutenant bailli, and viguier. The restrictions on subordinate officers including judges and assessors were less strict, requiring that appointees had either been born in the city or resided there for five years. For those who were not natives but had met residence requirements, ascendance into roles within the judicial system required an oath of loyalty both to the lords of Montpellier and to the commune. Would-be officers also needed to demonstrate their knowledge of the local customs and prove that they were of good reputation.64

These regulations illustrate several key principles in evaluating eligibility for positions of power. Indeed, the same criteria used to determine whether an individual could hold office were critical in assessing who would be accepted within the city. Although many of the same standards were used to evaluate membership within other urban

63 Thalamus Parvus, xxvii-xxv. 64 Thalamus Parvus, 105.

56 communities, their precise terms and application varied depending on local factors that are worth examining in greater detail.

Within Montpellier, the first pre-condition for those who wished to enjoy access to power and the full privileges of membership within the community was adherence to the Christian faith. As a Mediterranean entrepôt with commercial ties in Iberia, North

Africa, and the Crusader colonies of the Levant, the city was a destination for Jews and more rarely, Muslims, who were operating within these trading networks. Montpellier was also home to a significant Jewish population in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Although the relative size of this community is impossible to determine, the number of legislative acts concerning Jews and the surviving vestiges of a synagogue and a mikveh

(a ritual bathhouse) attest to the prominence they held as important members of the commercial and financial infrastructure in this period. As stipulated by an article of the

établissements issued in 1258, the Jews of Montpellier were under the jurisdiction and servitude of the kings of Aragon, as was the case throughout their territories. The municipal council was forbidden from making any laws concerning the Jewish community, and this exceptional status solidified the Jews’ legal position as a people apart – for better and for worse.65 On a more concrete, physical level, the Jewish settlements were clustered in central locations within the city in the Castelmoton quarter, along side other well-heeled professionals such as mercers and silk merchants, reflecting the success and wealth they had achieved as members of the vibrant infrastructure.66 Yet

65 Thalamus Parvus,111. 66 Guiraud, Recherches topographiques, 122-123. The current names of the roads where they resided include, Rue de Ratte, Rue du Figuier, Rue de Vielle-Intendance, and the Rue de la Blanquerie. On the history of the Jewish community in Montpellier, see Carol Iancu, “Les Juifs à Montpellier du moyen age à nos jours”, in Carol Iancu, ed. Les Juifs à Montpellier et dans le Languedoc: Actes du colloque international centre regional d’histoire des mentalités et d’études juives et Hébraiques (Montpellier,1987).

57 other provisions within the Consuetudines and other local cartularies illustrate that Jews, as well as the Muslims, Arabs, and North Africans covered under the blanket label of

Saracen, remained socially marginalized as long as they held onto their religious beliefs.

As outlined within article 23 of the charter of 1204, to mock a Christian man or woman as a Jew or Saracen was as offensive as denigrating someone as a lowly serf or a traitor. The article specifically mentioned that using these terms for a person who had converted to Christianity was an equally serious offense. These insults were even considered to be on par with physical assault, and were among the only verbal injuries that warranted criminal charges.67 The thrust of the provision was to reify the boundaries separating Christians, Jews, and Muslims while also affirming the principle that non-

Christians could improve their lot and escape legal and social marginalization by choosing to convert. Similarly, the tenth article of the Consuetudines prohibited usurers from testifying in court. Although the text of the article did not explicitly mention Jews, their close association with the banking professions made them an implicit target of this exclusion within the judicial system. Non-Christians who came to Montpellier were also subject to discrimination under ecclesiastical regulations. Under a mandate from the

Bishop of Maguelone in 1249, Jews were forbidden from wearing attire resembling that of the Christian clergy in order to prevent confused Christians from showing them undue deference. Any Jew who disembarked on the beaches of Maguelone also paid the bishop a toll of three sous for entering the diocese. Any pregnant Jew or Saracen was forced to pay twice that sum.68 These exploitative measures cordoned off the domains under the secular and ecclesiastical authority of the Bisthops of Maguelone as spaces of distinct

67 Thalamus Parvus, 14. 68 Archives Départmentales de Montpellier, Cartulaire de Maguelone, Reg. C, fol. 195, as cited in Germain, Histoire du Commune de Montpellier, I, 62.

58 Christian preeminence, in which any who did not adhere to the accepted faith would be subject to humiliating financial penalties that signified their inferior status.

The pre-occupation with demarcating religious boundaries in municipal, seigneurial and episcopal legislation in Montpellier is an important background for understanding the ways that newcomers fit into the community. Just as their non-

Christian counterparts faced considerable financial and social pressures to convert,

Christians who were outsiders to Montpellier had strong incentives to take steps to integrate themselves fully into the community. But they were more often enticed by the carrot than goaded by the stick. Both the Consuetudines and the établissements that modified them carried on the Guilhems’ policy of using immigration to stimulate economic growth by encouraging outsiders who came to the city to settle down permanently.69 As seen in the eligibility requirements for officers of the court instituted in

1292, restrictions on access to positions of power were based on the duration of residency within Montpellier. In itself, this provision was not necessarily a strong motive for individuals to settle down. Positions within the judicial system and municipal administration could potentially bring those who occupied them respect and power, but they could also place unwanted burdens on their time and finances. However, the residence requirements do reflect the fundamental principle that outsiders could become completely integrated into the community and entitled to the full privileges of membership if they demonstrated their steadfast dedication to the city. The oaths of loyalty that non-native residents were required to make to the commune and people of

69 For quantitative analysis of the role of these policies in stimulating population growth see, Reyerson, “Patterns of Population Attraction and Mobility: The Case of Montpellier, 1293-1348”, Viator 10 (1979), 257-281.

59 Montpellier when assuming office served as the formal affirmation of a commitment already established by their long-term presence within the city.

Taken alone, the lengthy terms of residence required for judicial officers could be seen as indications of the difficulty of full integration into the community of Montpellier.

Yet other articles within the Consuetudines demonstrate that immigrants received significant advantages that eased the process of settling down. As soon as outsiders who came to Montpellier demonstrated a desire to remain permanently, the vows of homage they had made to their lords would be nullified on the condition that they relinquished any holdings within the domain of their former liege.70 In addition to long-term residence, outsiders indicated their intent to stay in Montpellier by marrying a woman from the city. Marriage was commonly used within urban communities as proof that an individual wanted to put down roots, but in Montpellier outsiders received special benefits for making that commitment. Those who married into the community were free for the span of a year and a day from all responsibilities in militias and lookout patrols.

These duties could be a significant burden. In times of relative calm, members of seven major clusters of craftsmen organized according to their trades took turns monitoring the comuna clausura and opening and closing the city gates in the mornings and evenings. 71

When enemy armies or brigands passed near the city, all able-bodied male residents took part in all-night patrols. The tense but tedious hours spent pacing the fortifications could force the participants to miss valuable work time in the following days. For this reason,

70 Thalamus Parvus, 48. 71 Reyerson, “Urban Development and Defense,” 95-114 provides an excellent introduction to the history of the institution of the Commune Clôture. A more comprehensive history of the militias and development of the Commune Clôture is found in the introduction to the inventory of its records, Maurice Oudot de Dainville and Marcel Gouron, Archives de la ville de Montpellier, Vol XII, Série EE. Fonds de la commune cloture et affaires militaires (Montpellier, 1974).

60 exemption from these military services could offer an economic advantage, in addition to providing a welcome respite from an unpleasant and potentially dangerous task.72

Outsiders who wanted to stay in Montpellier enjoyed other unusually generous provisions as well. Most notably, they had the right to practice their professions and peddle their wares unimpeded – so long as they did so in the locations designated for their specific trades and abided by the regulations of the gardes des métiers who verified the quality of their products. The nineteenth article of the consuetudines asserted that any extraneus who came to the city was free to work there, and ruled that no one could make any claims that contravened this privilege for any reason.73 This was a significant concession in an era in which tightly regulated corporations of craftsmen or guilds often dominated the workings of industry, particularly within northern Europe. In many cases, these corps of established craftsmen held monopolies that prohibited or significantly restricted outsiders from practicing their trades and selling their goods within a city’s limits. Such monopolies were often enforced by municipal authorities, who used protectionist policies such as tariffs and where and when outsiders could work in order to promote and maintain the prosperity of established industries – in which they frequently had a personal stake. Montpellier was not completely free of such regulation. In spite of the article that ruled against restrictions on individuals’ ability to work in the city, outsiders were prohibited from dying linens within Montpellier within article 110 of the

Consuetudines. They were specifically forbidden from scarlet dying, which was a carefully monitored and regulated local specialty. The article also ruled that they could

72 Thalamus Parvus, 42. 73 Thalamus Parvus, 12; 44.

61 only sell as much fabric as they could easily carry and display around their necks while walking through the city.74

Yet the restrictions on the dying and selling of linens were exceptional within a body of legislation unified around the guiding principle that free and open exchange was the source of the prodigious economic growth Montpellier had enjoyed in the twelfth century. Even those restrictions concerning scarlet-dying were loosened by

établissements issued over the course of the thirteenth century. A resolution issued by the consuls in 1226 allowed anyone who had either lived in the city for at least five years or been married to a woman from Montpellier for two years the ability to work in the dying profession. Under this policy, acceptance into the dying trade required that the individual swear an oath of allegiance to the lord of Montpellier while also promising to serve the consuls and fulfill military obligations of the comuna clausara. A subsequent act passed in 1251 offered yet another loophole, giving any foreign man, either married or unmarried, the right to work within the city if he possessed a fortune equivalent to 300 livres of the mint of Melgueil. To buy their way into the dying trade, outsiders needed to have resided in the city for just two years, but they also needed to commit to staying in the city for another ten years after they had purchased the right to work there. 75 All of these provisions reflect a preoccupation with economic growth that ultimately trumped concerns about where a person came from. Indeed, the charter of 1204 and subsequent legislation issued by the consuls of Montpellier over the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries attempted to provide outsiders with extensive assurances that would make it easier for them to come to work or trade.

74 Thalamus Parvus, 48. 75 Thalamus Parvus, 138-139. See also the section on the fabric dyers of Montpellier in Germain, Histoire du Commerce, 23-26.

62 Within wide-ranging Mediterranean networks, the merchants, brokers, transporters, and other intermediaries who made up the extensive commercial infrastructure that Kathryn Reyerson has so richly illuminated needed to be able to move freely in order to conduct their commercial transactions.76 Municipal authorities fully recognized this fact. The Consuetudines not only offered generous benefits to new residents who would settle down in Montpellier, but also gave people the ability to enter and leave the city as they chose. The twelfth article of the 1204 charter granted all men from Montpellier the right to sell their property and depart from the city with all of their earnings, unimpeded and even protected under a seigneurial safe-conduct. Individuals who wished to leave were able to transplant themselves and their families elsewhere as they saw fit, without being subjected to extra taxes as penalties for emigrating.77 These provisions facilitating departure from Montpellier were matched by equally liberal policies that offered outsiders who wished to conduct business or pass through the city the ability to do so freely and with peace of mind. Trust and security were the foundation for successful, long-term commercial partnerships. This was especially true in the sprawling networks of the Mediterranean, in which traders faced a multitude of threats from pirates, brigands, and warring armies—not to mention the ever-present risks posed by inclement weather—while relying on complex systems of credit to conduct lucrative deals over long distances.78 Importantly, it was not just the status that Montpellier

76 Reyerson’s Art of the Deal offers one of the most detailed accounts of the daily functioning of Mediterranean commerce, as it looks beyond the great international merchants to the innkeepers, brokers, transporters, and creditors who actually made the flow of merchandise possible. 77 Thalamus Parvus, 12. 78 Reyerson’s Business, Banking and Finance, provides an excellent analysis of the structure and function of networks of credit within the Mediterranean and Montpellier in particular. See especially Chs. 2 & 3, 41- 89. An invaluable survey of the issues within recent scholarship on Mediterranean networks of exchange is found in the collection compiled by Damien Coulon, Christophe Picard, and Dominique Valérian, Espaces et Réseaux en Méditerranée: VIe-XVIe siècle (Paris, 2007).

63 enjoyed as a premier Mediterranean hub that depended on the comfort outsiders felt in coming there. The merchants from the city who conducted their business in foreign ports could face the consequences of any mistreatment that their counterparts received when they came to Montpellier.

For this reason, efforts to cultivate an environment in which merchants could feel assured of both their own safety and the security of their goods were vital for

Montpelliérain commerce, both within the city and outside its limits. To appreciate the progressive nature of the measures that the consuls of Montpellier enacted to achieve this goal, it is worth noting that municipal, seigneurial and royal authorities often chose to exploit those who were forced to pass through their domains. Exorbitant tolls gouged those who needed to transport their merchandise up and down tightly controlled coastal ports or rivers and the rare bridges that allowed crossings. In many areas around the

Mediterranean, it was even customary for authorities to seize the goods of merchants who were shipwrecked in their domains.79 This possibility had to be close on the minds of seafarers in an era when coastlines served as a principle guide for navigation. During times of war, merchandise could be seized by officials invoking the right of reprisal against traders hailing from enemy territories. Outsiders accused of owing outstanding debts or committing crimes could be arrested and subjected to draconian measures for exacting justice or payment. 80 Those who died on foreign soil could have any property they had with them seized, depriving their families of the wealth and estates they had

79 Germain, Histoire du Commerce, 40-41. 80 Marie-Claire Chavarot, “La Pratique des lettres de marque d’après l’arrêts du Parlement (XIIIe-Debut XVe siècle),” Bibliothèque de l’école de chartes 149 (1981), 51-89.

64 accrued over a lifetime of travel and trade.81 It is true that Montpellier was not completely free from such impositions. For example, under the laws of the Consuetudines, the lord of the city could claim a third of the value of any stolen goods recovered by the local court if those goods belonged to an outsider.82

On the whole, though, the consuls of Montpellier instituted laws that provided reassurances to those who came to the city that they would be subject to fair and reasonable treatment. At the same time, the protections accorded to outsiders were counterbalanced by protections for members of the established community. The fear that someone could simply leave without paying a debt or vanish after committing a crime was a very real one for a population that had extensive dealings with foreigners participating in long-distance trade. The effort to achieve a balance between openness and self-protection shaped the city’s legislation. A clear illustration of these parallel aims can be found in article 32 of the 1204 charter, which provides one of the most comprehensive and important statements of the legal status of outsiders within

Montpellier. Under the provisions of this article, everyone—no matter who they were or where they came from—could come to Montpellier and stay there and leave on their own terms. For the duration of their time within the city, both their persons and all their possessions were to be protected from violence and secure from seizures. Critically, these protections would apply in times of both war and peace. Elaborating on this principle, the article further stipulated that individuals would not be held accountable for the crimes of others or any military disputes that Montpellier was involved in with their home

81 This policy, known in France as the droit d’aubain, is a focus of the work of Bernard d’Alteroche on legal definitions of l’étranger. See, D’Alteroche, De l’étranger à la seigneurie à l’étranger au Royaume. The droit d’aubain would become a principal subject of negotiations between municipalities and the French monarchy over the treatment of outsiders within Montpellier, Lyon, and to a lesser extent Rouen. 82 Thalamus Parvus, 12.

65 territories. Instead, they were only to be forced to answer for their own actions and any personal debts that they had in their name.83

These provisions represented valuable assurances for merchants and travelers conducting business in Montpellier, but there were limitations to their application. This very same article offering extensive protections to outsiders included a clause outlining the conditions for claiming and acting on the right of reprisal—a process that would allow Montpelliérains to recoup debts and seek justice against those foreign criminals who had fled the city. In this case, their first course of action would be to offer proof of the injustice in an appeal for justice to officials within the town or domain that the perpetrator came from. Those officials had plenty of incentive to respond to allegations against the individuals under their jurisdiction, because if they failed to do so, they stood the risk of bringing down repercussions on their other subjects. When this pressure still did not yield payment or justice, officers of the court in Montpellier were required to issue a warning to the perpetrator’s compatriots that they could leave with their possessions safely and securely. After this notice had been served and time to depart granted, creditors and victims of crimes could seek to seize and avenge their losses on anyone who hailed from the same place as the perpetrator. These measures establishing the right of reprisal served as an important deterrent to abuses within trading relations.

However, it is important to acknowledge that even while establishing this right, the article meticulously outlined the pre-conditions that needed to be met and the steps that had to be taken for the implementation of that right to be legally valid—a process that included a grace period for those outsiders from affected places to depart. The carefully

83 Thalamus Parvus, 18-19.

66 restricted application of the right of reprisal served to counterbalance the cooling effect that its implementation could have on trade if used indiscriminately.84

Moreover, within the overall legal framework established by the Consuetudines, reprisals were a last resort rather than a primary means of conflict resolution. While the provision for a right of reprisal created the possibility that entire corporate or national groups could be held responsible for the actions of one person’s misdeeds, most other legislation aimed to avoid this scenario by facilitating the quest for justice against individual outsiders. Indeed, it bears reiterating here that the very article establishing the right of reprisal emphasized that individuals should ordinarily be held accountable only for their own actions. Other articles within the Consuetudines continued this trend with the protections they gave to creditors and victims of crimes and the regulations they established for taking action against individual outsiders. Article 30 permitted the

Montpelliérains to take revenge on outsiders who had wronged them, but first demanded that they prove their grievance in court and swear an oath about the injustice that they had been subjected to. Article 33 affirmed that local creditors who had received judicial authorization could seize outsiders who owed them money and hold them indefinitely until they paid up. This provision even legalized limited punitive action against foreign clergymen. In a similar vein, article 35 gave creditors the right to hunt down their debtors, both within Montpellier and beyond, although this applied to both locals and outsiders. This law was reinforced by restrictions on seigneurial authority; not even the lords of Montpellier could permit an outsider to enter the city or offer safe-conducts to

84 Thalamus Parvus, 18-19.

67 debtors who wished to pass safely through their domains without suffering the sting of vengeance.85

Certainly, some of these policies were less than hospitable to outsiders. But the collective municipal legislation gives no indication that people were subjected to legal discrimination because they came from somewhere else or exhibited traits of foreignness.

Rather, the criminal and civil laws established in the Consuetudines or établissements show that there was much less focus on where someone came from than how transient individuals could be held accountable for their actions. As we have seen, those newcomers who abided by the law enjoyed an iron clad right to work within the city and generous privileges that would make life easier for them if they decided to settle down permanently. A ban on the imposition of seigneurial tolls made it easier for outsiders to come to Montpellier in the first place, and they also enjoyed certain guarantees about their rights once they arrived. Those who died in Montpellier could expect that their wills would be honored and their estates fairly distributed to their designated heirs.86 Whether they stayed or left property behind, their possessions were protected by law in times of war and peace. Even failure to pay the taxes known as leudes on properties in the city met with considerable leniency. Locals were forced to pay double any overdue sums. By contrast, outsiders who were not yet established members of the community received the benefit of the doubt that their delinquency was a product of honest ignorance of local policy. To return to good standing with the local authorities, they needed only to pay the exact amount of back sums they owed.87

85 Thalamus Parvus, 18-21. 86 Thalamus Parvus, 28. 87 Thalamus Parvus, 40-41.

68 In criminal matters, outsiders to Montpellier faced much less lenient treatment, but they still benefited from some limited protections under the law. Criminals who tried to skip town lost all rights if their accusers could seize them and bring them to court, but those who worked with the local judicial system at least had the opportunity to answer their charges.88 The Consuetudines also offered official recognition of the practice of taking temporary religious asylum. The pilgrimage site of Notre-Dame des Tables was a major stopping point en route to Santiago de Compostela from northern France, and so long as they were “motivated solely by devotion,” pilgrims retained the right to seek refuge within the renowned sanctuary if they were being pursued by Montpelliérain accusers.89 In spite of this provision that clearly aimed to prevent fraudulent claims by accused criminals desperately seeking religious asylum, the consuls and seigneurial authorities were eventually forced to impose greater restrictions on the practice in order to put an end to the inevitable abuses and resulting scandals. In other cases, commercial agreements offered mutual assurances to merchants traveling between the territories of signatory parties. To facilitate the extensive regional trade between merchants, the county of Melgeuil and Montpellier, authorities agreed that creditors would have to prove their case before the home court of the debtor. Similarly, the Pisans and Genoese were exempt from responding to claims within Montpellier, except when they were found culpable in cases of treachery against the city.90 Though quite limited in scope, such dispensations served to facilitate smooth interactions between Montpelliérain merchants and their most important trading partners.

88 Thalamus Parvus, 46. 89 Reyerson, “Flight from Prosecution: The Search for Religious Asylum in Medieval Montpellier”, French Historical Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Spring 1992), 603-626. 90 Thalamus Parvus, 20.

69 Together, the provisions from the Consuetudines and établissments examined above contributed to a climate of security within Montpellier while also laying a foundation for mutual trust. Outsiders could come to the city knowing that they would enjoy many benefits and protections if they chose to conduct their business honestly. For their part, local residents could be assured that they would have some means of recouping their debts and pursuing justice against those who were less than honorable. Through the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, Montpellier continued to grow and flourish as a result of the vibrant trade that thrived under the conditions of this municipal legal framework. The population also reaped the benefits of political changes in the region.

Regarded by ecclesiastical authorities as a pillar of Christian orthodoxy within a snake pit of heresy, Montpellier escaped the ravages of the Albigensian crusade that toppled its regional rivals in Languedoc, the Counts of Toulouse and Foix. While continuing to exercise significant autonomy over their daily affairs, the population of Montpellier also benefited from the patronage of Jaime II of Aragon, who resided there for much of a long reign lasting from 1213-1276. With his backing, the university of medicine continued to grow, receiving formal confirmation of its right to license physicians in 1220. The

Montpelliérains also participated in the Aragonese conquest of the in the

1250’s, and Jaime granted them generous privileges to encourage their immigration into his acquisitions.91 These new settlements enhanced the commercial influence of

Montpellier by providing new centers of operations for its merchants.

All of these developments helped to solidify the burgeoning status that

Montpellier enjoyed as a premier destination for merchants, scholars, pilgrims, and those seeking work and better economic prospects. Population estimates are notoriously

91 Reyerson, “Population Attraction”, 263.

70 unreliable for medieval cities, but the combination of hearth records and notarial registers offer evidence of prodigious growth driven by immigration into Montpellier. The total number of inhabitants topped off at a maximum of 40,000 in the years immediately preceding the Black Death of 1348, which placed Montpellier along side Barcelona as the two largest cities in the western Mediterranean.92 The bulk of the new settlers came to the city from nearby towns and the surrounding rural areas to find work as artisans and craftsmen. Smaller but still significant numbers of immigrants made the journey from northern France, Catalonia, and the shores of Italy.93 The faculties of medicine, law, theology, and liberal arts attracted scholars from all over Europe. Medieval universities rarely counted more than a few hundred individuals among the ranks of their faculty and students, and Montpellier was unexceptional in this respect. But while scholars may have made up only a small percentage of the total population, the presence of such brilliant foreign intellectuals as Arnaud de Villeneuve and Gui de Chauliac contributed to the prestige of the city. Municipal authorities in Montpellier were well aware of the prominent role that outsiders held in promoting the success of their town. In the face of royal or seigneurial meddling, they consistently showed themselves to be eager to uphold the laws and privileges that had cultivated the city’s role as a diverse commercial and intellectual center.

The greatest challenge to the municipal consuls’ ability to set policies for dealing with outsiders would come from the French monarchy, and the lieutenants they sent to take a more direct hand in the administration of their southern holdings. The success and

92 J.C. Russell, Medieval Regions and Their Cities (Newton, 1972), 161-166, as well as J.C. Russell “L’évolution démographique de Montpellier au moyen age,” Annales du Midi 74 (1962) 345-360. Reyerson is more conservative in her estimates, estimating that the figure was closer to 30,000. 93 Reyerson, “Population attraction,” 265-279.

71 growth Montpellier enjoyed in thirteenth century made the city a target for French expansion. After the monarchy purchased the episcopal quarter of Montpelliéret in 1293,

John II of France consolidated his control by buying the remainder of the city in 1349 from James III of Majorca, who desperately needed money to fund an ongoing war with his cousin, Peter IV of Aragon. With this new régime came new modes of governance, with new hierarchies, new taxes, new political conflicts, and new ordinances dictating where the boundaries of communities should be drawn. From the outset of this relationship, municipal officials in Montpellier proudly asserted the importance of outsiders for their community. In letters to the new monarch in 1356 the consuls explained that their city “was founded on merchandise, and more than two thirds of the inhabitants are from strange lands, some Catalans, the others Spaniards, Genoese,

Lombards, Venetians, Cypriots, Provençals, Germans, and others of many strange nations.”94 In the decades that followed, local authorities’ ability to sustain this diversity and maintain the networks that allowed Montpellier to flourish would be tested. The merging of municipal and royal standards for the treatment of outsiders coincided with the onset of a series of crises and prolonged hardship that would devastate the city’s population and economy. The combination of these two developments forced a reevaluation of the laws and conventions that had defined who belonged in Montpellier.

Rouen

In contrast to Montpellier, the city of Rouen had long been under the thumb of the

French monarchy and its vassals by the time the first waves of plague and invading

English armies swept through the region in the middle of the fourteenth century. Philip

94 Archives Municipales de Montpellier, Armoire Dorée, Liasse 9, 14.

72 Augustus had captured Rouen and wrested control of Normandy from King John I of

England in 1204. As a result of this conquest, and the city’s relative proximity to the

Parisian capital, the French monarchy came to exercise direct power and influence within the affairs of Rouen much sooner than in Montpellier. But the fact that the Rouennais were integrated into the kingdom of France at this earlier date did not mean that they adopted a standardized set of royal policies towards outsiders any more quickly. On the contrary, the co-existence of multiple sources of political authority within Rouen created a matrix of different definitions of what it meant to be a resident of the city and a member of the commune. Royal, ducal, municipal, and ecclesiastical institutions produced an array of charters that outlined the privileges of the inhabitants of Rouen and who would be entitled to enjoy them. Together, these provided a legislative framework that helped to determine what kind of welcome merchants and travelers would receive when they tried to pass through the city or conduct business there. Other factors beyond legal tradition helped to draw the limits of community in Rouen as well. The placement of walls and the arrangement of space held particular significance for determining an individual’s claims to the privileges of the city. The interests of corporations of craftsmen and merchants also played a role in determining where forains could work and market their goods.

To make sense of the overlapping and sometimes conflicting concepts of community that developed out of this mix of legislation and local tradition, it is first necessary to understand the geographical attributes of Rouen and the background of the institutions that governed its population. The location of the city played a central role in determining who wanted to come there and the treatment they could expect when they arrived. Situated on the northern bank of the Seine River, approximately 80 kilometers

73 from the coasts of Normandy and 110 kilometers from Paris, Rouen served as a gateway between the northern Atlantic and inland France. This advantageous position shaped the dynamics of interactions between royal and municipal officials and the policies that they chose to implement in regards to outsiders who wanted to use the river to transport goods in and out of the kingdom. Any merchants traveling in seafaring ships were forced to stop in Rouen to transfer their cargo into smaller vessels that could more easily navigate the bends and shallows on the river and pass beneath the bridges sporadically interrupting its length. This gave the Rouennais the ability to control traffic on one of the most important commercial routes in northern Europe. 95 The fertile Beauce region just to the south served as the breadbasket for much of the north of France and an important source of supplementary grain for populations elsewhere in northern Europe. With the continued growth of the wool trade between England and the markets of Flanders and the Low

Countries in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Rouen achieved even greater commercial prominence through its role as both a point of connection and a lucrative market in its own right.

The formation of the Hanseatic League of urban trading centers around the Baltic and North Sea in the thirteenth century encouraged growth in Rouen, which linked this network to France. In addition, the political ties between England and Normandy helped to make Rouen a key trading post for merchants traveling to France from the British Isles.

By the twelfth century, at the latest, these connections had made Rouen the largest urban center within Normandy in terms of the size of its fortified enclosure and the population

95 For an introduction to the geographic situation of Rouen and its role in shaping the city’s economy, see the excellent survey from the Privat series, Michel Mollat, Histoire de Rouen (Toulouse, 1979), 5-11; Ernest de Fréville, Mémoire sur le commerce maritime de Rouen: depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu’à la fin du XVIè siècle (Rouen, 1857), 68-84.

74 that lived inside its confines. As such, the city served as the capital of the duchy of

Normandy, which put Rouen right in the middle of the fraught relationship between

France and England, both politically and geographically. After William’s conquest in

1066, heirs to the English throne vied for control of the duchy of Normandy. In these struggles, the support of the bourgeois of Rouen became an invaluable asset as a powerful aristocracy of wealthy merchants continued to accrue power and influence over the course of the twelfth century through their participation in invigorated international trade. After Geoffrey Plantagenet received a warm welcome from the Rouennais during a war with his wife Mathilda’s cousin Stephen, he granted them the first charter outlining the city’s privileges in 1144. His son Henry II confirmed and expanded on these privileges when he assumed control of the duchy in 1150 in a charter that provides important details about the constraints imposed on outsiders who wished to enter or pass through Rouen. Notably, this charter did not formally recognize or create a municipal administration; power over the city’s affairs remained concentrated in the hands of the duke and his subordinates. It did, however, acknowledge certain limitations on their power while guaranteeing special dispensations to the Rouennais on questions of jurisdiction, taxation, commerce, and property.96

In this way, the privileges bestowed on the inhabitants of Rouen in 1150 began to set out a formal definition of the meaning and practical significance of membership in the community. The exemptions that Henry and his father granted from financial obligations

96 Archives Départmentales de Rouen, 3E1 U1 Folio 6r-8v contains a vidimus of the 1150 charter. On the political background to the foundation of the commune of Rouen and leading to the confirmation of the charters of 1144 and 1150, see Alexandre Chéruel, Histoire de Rouen pendant l’époque communale 1150- 1382, Vol. 1 (Rouen, 1844), 16-18; 241-246; A. Giry, Les établissements de Rouen: études sur l’histoire des institutions municipales (Paris, 1883), 25-27; E. Le Parquier, L’organisation municipale de Rouen: Le XIIè siècle jusqu’en 1449 (Rouen, 1932).

75 in the form of tailles and aides provided the Rouennais with tangible, long-term economic advantages for the support that they had offered in the conflict with Stephen.

Another key provision guaranteed that they would not be forced to quarter soldiers for

Henry or his vassals. This exempted them from the burden of feeding extra mouths and putting up with notoriously unruly soldiers. It also granted implicit autonomy over the city’s defenses and thus diminished reliance on external help—a point that would become critical later in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as foreign mercenaries took on a greater role in military conflicts. Other provisions more explicitly delineated boundaries that separated the Rouennais from outsiders by explaining the particular advantages that they enjoyed over those who were not from the city. In matters of commerce in particular, local merchants were the beneficiaries of restrictions on rivals’ ability to conduct their goods freely up and down the Seine from markets in France and abroad.

One regulation forbid any extraneus from disembarking in the city with goods from overseas unless they were conducting a transaction with a resident. Any who violated this prohibition paid a penalty equal to half the value of their merchandise to the duke, while paying the remaining half to Rouen. Similarly, outsiders were expressly forbidden from storing wine in cellars or houses in the city in preparation for resale, putting up yet another logistical hurdle for any who wished to vie for a place in this lucrative local market.

Even more restrictive was a provision that stated that only merchants from Rouen could conduct merchandise past the city on the Seine river, with a royal deputy known as the Vicomte de l’eau monitoring fluvial traffic and levying aides and gabelles for imports

76 of wine and salt.97 This regulation served to solidify the importance of the local markets while giving the Rouennais effective control over international trade along one of the principal arteries of France. They also received privileges that gave them a firm grasp over trade in the British Isles. Merchants from Rouen who brought their goods to market in London were exempt from all duties except those levied on wine and fish. They also received exclusive trading rights in the port of Dungeness, in Kent, as well as a monopoly on trade between Normandy and Ireland. Although the number of ships traveling to and from France and Ireland in the late twelfth century appears to have been rather small, numbering only a few per year on average, the imports of timber, furs, wool, and hides provided invaluable resources for the construction of boats and buildings and raw materials for local craftsmen. Furthermore, merchants of the ‘ghilde’ of Rouen who traveled within the realms of Henry II received assurances that they would only be tried in their home city if they were accused of wrong-doing. 98 Much like the Montpelliérains, inhabitants of Rouen could also track down any debtors to demand compensation and justice. Such judicial protections provided security for members of the commercial infrastructure of Rouen that served as a foundation for their economic strength and growth over the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. These regulations were modified as new rulers came to power, but they continued to serve as a baseline that ducal and royal authorities used to assess and adjust the privileges of the city’s inhabitants.

The regulations in the 1150 charter also helped to develop a long-term framework that would shape the dynamics of interactions between locals and outsiders who came to

97 The institution of the Vicomté de l’eau would come to have important jurisdictional privileges over foreign merchants traveling on the Seine; unfortunately, very few of its records have survived. See Charles de Beaurepaire, De la vicomté de l’eau de Rouen et de ses coustumes au XIIIe et au XIVe siècles (Evreux, 1856). 98 Archives Départmentales de la Seine-Maritime (ADSM), 3E1 U1 Folio 6r-8.

77 the city to work and trade. The provisions giving the merchants of Rouen exclusive rights over trade between Normandy and London and Ireland promoted the establishment of strong commercial networks across the channel. From Dungeness, the Rouennais enjoyed the right to board any ship embarking for France, which greatly facilitated travel from

England. For their part, English merchants benefited from their sovereign’s strong political ties with Rouen, and they regularly came to trade their wool in the city. The

French conquest by Philip Augustus in 1204 temporarily halted this relationship.

Although the new sovereign confirmed the vast majority of the privileges that his predecessors had bestowed when he seized control of the city, it was not within his power to grant the commercial rights to trade in English ports. The Rouennais thus became subject to the same tolls and restrictions as other foreigners when they arrived in

England. But the economic benefits were too great on both sides for this commercial partnership to be subdued for long, and by 1207 the Rouennais were at least receiving safe conducts to ensure their security as they began to renew their commercial activities in England. Of course, war between the French and English erupted sporadically throughout the Middle Ages and into the early modern period. Even when such conflicts reduced or temporarily halted the exchanges between Rouen and the ports of southern

England, proximity, historical ties, and the promise of wealth ensured the speedy revival of trade when hostilities abated. But while promoting trade between Rouen and England, the regulations of the 1150 charter also provided a foundation for discriminatory treatment against outsiders from neighboring towns and regional rivals who could potentially challenge their dominance over commerce on the Seine.99

99 Giry, Etablissements, 31-39.

78 By giving the Rouennais control over international commerce and navigation along the lower Seine, their commercial privileges encouraged the development of a long-running rivalry between the guild of merchants that operated from Rouen and the

Parisian corporation, known as the Compagnie Française, that had exclusive rights over its upper limits and the area around the capital. According to regulations instituted by authorities in Paris in 1192, the merchants of the Compagnie Française were to go no further down river than Mantes, which would also serve as the upper limit of the area under the control of the Rouennais. Based on these boundaries, the rival companies monitored and defended their territories from encroachment, asserting their cases on the basis of their longstanding rights. After they were unified under the French crown following the conquest of Normandy by Philip Augustus, both sides began seeking and receiving royal dispensations to stretch their own boundaries to tap into the lucrative markets controlled by their rivals. The level of hostility between the companies operating out of Rouen and Paris should not be overstated, since they did need to collaborate when they wished to conduct exchanges that crossed the limits of their territories.100 At the same time, disputes over where those territories should end would lead to the implementation of strict policies at the municipal level that could lead to harsh treatment as local authorities in both cities worked to protect their economic interests. Similar tensions existed between the Rouennais and other traders in Normandy, both from small sub-urban towns such as the nearby Martainville, Oissel, Bihorel, and Darnétal and from the larger regional rivals such as . Inhabitants of these communities chafed at the restrictions imposed upon their movements along the Seine. For their part, the Rouennais

100 The conflict between the merchants of Rouen and the Compagnie française is detailed in Fréville, Mémoire sur le commerce de Rouen, 193-195; 212-218.

79 sought to deter those who would violate their lucrative monopoly. 101 Before they could do so, however, they needed their own institutions of municipal governance.

The charter of 1150 had left many important matters of local administration unresolved, and this fact contributed to the passage of additional legislation and the creation of municipal institutions that addressed the changing needs of the community soon afterwards. The power struggles between Henry II, the French, and the ecclesiastical establishment within his domains served as a catalyst for the concession of more expansive privileges to the Rouennais. The bishop and canons affiliated with the cathedral of Rouen and the French royal abbey of Saint-Öuen held significant wealth and influence within the city throughout the Middle Ages. The former held territorial control and jurisdiction over a large swath of territory along the Seine River that included the Île de Nôtre-Dame, while the monks of the abbey of Saint-Öuen claimed the area around the

Bihorel hill to the northeast. The power that these institutions held was regularly contested by the local aristocracy, with the clergy’s willingness to grant asylum to foreign merchants who violated the city’s commercial privileges standing out as one of the principal sources of contention. The bourgeois of Rouen found a welcome ally in their resistance to ecclesiastical authority in Henry, who was all too happy to chip away at the temporal power of the Church by granting greater municipal autonomy in return for support against Louis VII and his campaign to bring Normandy under French control.

After the inhabitants of Rouen demonstrated their loyalty to Henry in the successful defense of the city against a French siege in 1174, they received confirmation of their privileges in a charter that also included the first official acknowledgement of their

101 The tensions between the Rouennais and regional rivals are reflected across the pages of the Déliberations du conseil de la ville de Rouen, ADSM 3E1 A1-A12, covering the period from 1389 through the early sixteenth century, which will be in detail later on.

80 municipal administration. The date and circumstances surrounding the foundation of the various institutions within that administration remain obscure, but the établissements of

Rouen illuminate their organization and development as well as the principles that structured the commune.102

Instituted sometime in the second half of the twelfth century—most likely between 1160 and 1180—the établissements served as a constitution for the municipal administration of Rouen, as well as a template for communes in Normandy and elsewhere in France. The provisions they outlined complemented rather than replaced the privileges granted within the charters issued to Rouen by Geoffrey and Henry II, and it is probable that in many instances they merely formalized entrenched local customs. All extant exemplars of the établissements lack the formulas traditionally associated with the concession of administrative privileges by royal or seigneurial authorities, indicating that they were the work of Rouennais officials seeking to define the roles of specific institutions and the values and priorities of the community.103 They seem to have been devised in two phases, with the first 29 articles most likely established well before the conquest of Normandy by Philip Augustus in 1204, and the final twenty six added shortly after this date. Critically, in laying out the guidelines for the basic administrative organization of the commune of Rouen, the first ten articles effectively confirmed the power of a narrow elite that consisted of some twenty families of wealthy international merchants. A corps of 100 peers drawn from the ranks of the city’s notables would select three prud’hommes to be presented to the king, who would choose one of them to serve as the maire: the ability to make this selection gave the monarchy direct influence within

102 Chéruel, Histoire de Rouen à l’époque communale, 38-53. 103 Le Parquier, Organisation municipale de Rouen, 10-19.

81 the municipal governance of Rouen. To advise the royal appointee, the peers would elect

24 representatives, half of whom would serve as échevins, with the other half serving as conseillers. The maire and the échevins were to meet twice weekly to discuss the affairs of the city. In matters of controversy or special importance they called upon the conseillers to contribute their opinions.104

The établissements included measures that aimed to prevent corruption, absenteeism, and abuse of power by this nucleus of local power brokers, indicating that such issues were already an acknowledged source of controversy at this early stage.105

The provisions instituted to moderate or at least regulate the power of this municipal elite ultimately failed to do enough to mollify the petty merchants, craftsmen, and artisans who resented their lack of input in the management of the city’s affairs. As will be seen later when evaluating responses to the crises of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, conflicts between and within the various factions of merchants and craftsmen within

Rouen and power struggles among municipal, royal, and ecclesiastical authorities remained a persistent feature of the city’s politics.106 The divergent interests of these groups often meant that they had sharply differing perspectives on the roles that outsiders should have in the community and the privileges and protections that they should be entitled to. The établissements provided a framework for these debates. Without explaining the origins or content of an oath of loyalty to Rouen, they show that there was a clear and important division between those who had sworn their allegiance to the

104 Giry, Établissements, Vol. 1, 1-23 provides an excellent introduction to the manuscripts of the établissements that survived as of publication in 1883, and the discrepancies between them. Giry also provides an invaluable analysis of the ways that the établissements were adapted and modified within the communities of Falaise, Pont-Audemer, Verneuil, La Rochelle, Saintes, Oleron, , Tours, Niort, and Poitiers, among the many towns where they served as a communal constitution. Volume 2 offers a parallel edition of the manuscripts in Latin, Provençal, and Middle French. 105 See for example, articles 7, 9, 10, in Établissements, 15-17. 106 Chéruel, Histoire de Rouen à l’époque communale, 97-100; 195-205.

82 commune and those who had not. Referring to anyone who had taken the required oath as a “juratus” of Rouen, these articles outlined the rights that the committed members of the community were entitled to both in their dealings with one another and in their interactions with individuals who had not yet sworn to defend the city and uphold its values. In the most serious case of the murder of another juratus, the condemned would be turned over to the justice of the king; the homes of those who fled would be razed to the ground. But for less severe crimes, punishments for members of the community consisted of fines or time in the pillory.

In the event that a juratus was sentenced to the pillory for acting in violation of the établissements, fellow members of the community were explicitly forbidden from insulting the condemned or acting in any way to increase their humiliation. Those who did would themselves be placed in the stocks, a provision that reflects an emphasis on keeping the peace among neighbors. When an outsider wronged a juratus and failed to answer for the offense, however, the établissements dictated that the community should completely sever ties with the perpetrator. No one in the city was allowed to offer shelter to foreign offenders, and they were not to conduct any business with them whatsoever – whether buying or selling goods or offering loans. Any juratus who breeched this restriction would be subject to penalties adjudicated by the mayor and his échevins. By delineating such firm legal boundaries, this policy served to assert that the Rouennais would stand together against external affronts. Within a legislative framework that placed such emphasis on local solidarity and discrepancies in the liberties enjoyed by the jurati and outsiders, the ability to identify who belonged took on particular importance. Of course, determining an individual’s identity with complete certainty was no small

83 challenge in a large medieval city. Valentin Groebner’s illuminating study Who are you? offers a rigorous analysis of the methods used to determine identity in societies around pre-modern Europe, and explains that physical features such as scars or birth marks were commonly used to verify that someone was really who they said they were.107 There is no record of the use of such methods within Rouen, which does not mean that they were not used. Nor is there evidence—at least, there is none that survives— of any form of documentation concerning who took the oaths of loyalty to the city and when.

The reason for this may well lie in a reliance on acclamation as the principal means for determining membership within the commune, as suggested by Article 20 of the établissements. This statute explained that when there were any doubts what an individual’s claim to be a juratus of Rouen, that person would need to find two fellow jurati who would verify their assertions.108 Those who failed to produce the local supporters to meet this burden of proof faced tight restrictions and eventual expulsion from the city in accordance with article 30 of the établissements. Based on analysis of internal textual clues and a comparison of the surviving manuscripts, this statute was very likely among those put in place in the early thirteenth century; its addition may suggest that municipal authorities felt compelled to assert the practical importance of the oath of loyalty, or simply that they had failed to articulate a well-established principle the first time around. Whichever was the case, the text of the amendment offers a clear explanation of the consequences of failing to commit fully to the commune. As was the tradition within so many other medieval towns, residence of one year and one day was used as a key marker in assessing a person’s intentions to remain permanently in the

107 Valentin Groebner, Who are you? Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe (New York, 2007). 108 Article 20, Établissements, 28-29.

84 community. Within Rouen, however, this term also served as a cut-off point; if any person had not yet sworn their oath to the city by then, they were expressly prohibited from staying any longer. Furthermore, during that initial tenure of a year and a day, they could not enjoy any of the privileges of the Rouennais. After this time had passed, they could finally gain full membership in the community and access to the liberties that this afforded, but they first needed to make their commitment clear by taking the oath of loyalty in front of both the mayor and the échevins.109

The regulations on those jurati who wished to break their allegiance with the commune and leave the city were similarly restrictive. All those who expressed a desire to abandon Rouen forfeited their claims to its liberties, and they were immediately forced to depart; they were not to show themselves in the city again until the span of a year and a day had passed. Anyone who had a change of heart after making the momentous decision to break from the commune could only return if they swore their oath again. The second time around, they had to make their pledge of loyalty in front of not only the maire and the échevins, but the entire corps of the city’s peers.110 These regulations on leaving and rejoining the commune of Rouen reflect the tremendous emphasis the

établissements placed on loyalty. Not only were there strict requirements for re-entry into the city, but there were also stiff penalties for those who refused to swear their allegiance.

Any inhabitants of Rouen who would not pledge themselves to the commune were to be arrested, put in chains, and sent to prison until expressing willingness to take the oath.111

For sedition, the testimony of two jurati was enough to bring down a condemnation, which could bring sentences ranging from steep fines, to time in the stocks, or corporal

109 Article 30, Établissements, 30-31. 110 Article 38, Établissements, 42-43. 111 Article 47, Établissements, 48-49.

85 punishment according to the judgments of the maire and the échevins about the seriousness of the offense. Merely speaking against the commune was a punishable offense as well. If such an insult was witnessed by two échevins, their word alone would be enough for a conviction; if two jurati witnessed the incident, their testimony under oath could be sufficient. The accused could only exculpate themselves by finding six men who were willing to attest to their faithfulness to the community under oath. Furthermore, failure to perform military duties or refusal to loan horses and other supplies for the defense of the city could be considered a punishable affront to the commune.112

These provisions of the établissements served to articulate a vision of what it meant to be a member of a commune that would have lasting influence both in Rouen and in cities including Bayonne, Niort, Poitiers, and Tours, among others, where they were later adopted or used as a template. That vision not only delineated a clear boundary between the jurati and outsiders who had not taken an oath, but also established the concept that membership within the community was contingent upon performances of loyalty and fulfillment of duties that went beyond a simple residence requirement or a birthright automatically bestowed on all Rouennais. In laying out these parameters, the

établissements clarified and refined the provisions within the charters issued by Henry II and his successors by providing more specifics about who would be entitled to the privileges they bestowed on the commune. With their emphasis on commitment to the commune in both word and deed, the établissements also buttressed the authority of the maire and the échevins and the influence of the handful of wealthy bourgeois families that filled these positions of leadership within the municipal administration. The introduction of these standards in the late-twelfth century did not prevent the corporations

112 Article, 46, Établissements, 46-47.

86 of artisans, and craftsmen that operated under the authority of the municipal and royal institutions in Rouen from continuing to implement and abide by their own additional rules about who would be excluded or marginalized within their ranks because of their status as forains. By definition, these corporations relied on exclusivity and the strength of the monopolies they established. By enacting tight regulations on who could trade, work, or sell within the city, they could ensure that the members of their groups would enjoy distinct advantages in local, regional and international markets.113

To understand the central role the corporations played in shaping the dynamics of community within Rouen, it is first necessary to appreciate the prominent place that they occupied within the city’s economy and civic culture. Though the Rouennais elites who managed local affairs mainly earned their wealth in the commerce of wool, wine, and luxury goods for their wealth and influence, industrial and agricultural production were the foundation of the local economy. From the fertile countryside surrounding Rouen, the city received produce and livestock, and the waters of the Seine and the Atlantic provided abundant supplies of herring, bass, salmon, and eels, along with a wide variety of shellfish. Bakers, butchers, and fishmongers provided the staples of the local diet, and their importance to the population allowed them to develop considerable influence within municipal politics. The building trades were also well-represented, with the construction of the celebrated cathedral of Notre-Dame that began in the early thirteenth century providing ample work for masons and carpenters. In addition to these most essential producers and tradesmen, there were numerous specialized craftsmen who operated within the confines of the city. Provided with wool both from England and the Pays de

113 See both Etienne Martin Saint-Léon, Histoire des corporations de métiers (New York, 1972) and Charles Ouin-Lacroix, Histoire des anciennes corporations d’arts et métiers et des confréries reglieuses de la capitale de la Normandie (Rouen, 1850).

87 Caux to the north and aided by the presence of the Robec and Aubette tributaries that brought clear and gently running water through the city to the Seine, dyers, weavers, and felters achieved primary importance within the urban economy. By the early thirteenth century at the latest, the fabric that they produced had become a principal export, and the corporation of drapers had become one of the most important and powerful within

Rouen.114

The stained-glass window that the draperie dedicated to the cathedral in honor of

Saint Joseph attests to the role the corporations played in focusing the religious activities of their members through confraternities. The rich array of colors that stream through their panels provides enduring visual evidence of the burgeoning confidence that craftsmen felt in the worthiness of their contributions to the city. The tanners, fishmongers, and masons donated windows as well, and it is entirely plausible that other donor windows are among those that have been destroyed or replaced. In addition to displaying scenes that honored and told the stories of the patron saints of each of the respective donor corporations, these windows also included panels depicting the craftsmen hard at work in the daily activities associated with their professions. Such scenes serve to illustrate the emergence of distinctive group identities centered around these corporations and their products—a development that both reflected and contributed to the implementation of clear lines delineating who could enter those groups.115 Over the

114 On the history of the drapperie of Rouen, see Jean-Louis Roch, “Le drapier médiéval. L’exemple Rouennais.” Revue Historique, T. 302, 3-31 (2000), as well as Alain Becchia, ed. La draperie en Normandie du XIII au Xxème sieclès (Rouen, 2004). 115The significance of trade windows in the stained-glass programs of Gothic Cathedrals has been a subject of much debate among art historians, with those in Chartres and Bourges as focal points of the discussion. In the most recent assessment of the program at Chartres, Jane Welch Williams takes a Marxian approach in evaluating internal clues within the representations of the craftsmen in the trade windows as propaganda promoting the dominance of the Church over city-dwellers. See Jane Welch Williams. Bread, Wine, and Money. The Windows of the Trades at Chartres Cathedral. (Chicago, 1993). The traditional view that the

88 course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the various corporations within Rouen sought out royal and municipal approval of the statutes and regulations that defined the conditions for membership within their professions. Many of the réglemens des corps des métiers that they established have survived in their original versions or been passed on to us in copies that confirmed or modified the first sets of regulations. They mainly formalized long-established standards in order to preserve them if they were challenged by encroachment from outsiders or meddling by local or royal officials. In this way, they provide insight into both the internal organization of the corporations and authorities’ roles in regulating their activities. 116

The exact terms and organization of these statutes varied according to the specific needs of a given profession, but they all addressed issues of training, mastery, and quality control. Maintaining high standards of production was of course critical to upholding a strong reputation that would allow the corporation to stay competitive within regional and international markets and fairs. Goods such as bread and meat that provided the base of the Rouennais diet were also subject to particularly careful monitoring by municipal and royal authorities, who controlled access to the local mills and set standards for the size, weight, and composition of loaves. In order to limit pollution and contagion, they also decided where butchers could slaughter animals and dump their offal. In addition to setting stringent requirements for training and quality assurance, the Réglemens des corps des métiers invariably imposed additional restrictions on who could become a member of the corporations in order to preserve the privileged status and protect the economic well-

representation of craftsmen within the windows reflected the growing wealth and pride of the craftsmen who donated them is most convincing when viewed within the context of the wider socioeconomic and intellectual currents of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 116 The Réglemens des corps des métiers are mainly compiled in ADSM 3E1Anc., Boite 15, 16, although one occasionally finds a vidimus scattered within other forms of municipal documentation.

89 being of established members. These restrictions were directed at forains, or gens de dehors—broad and ambiguous terms applied to anyone who was not an established member of the community. In practice, however, they usually referred to people from nearby towns or villages in Normandy who came to Rouen hoping to peddle their goods in the region’s largest urban center. The presence of these competitors could present a direct threat to carefully preserved monopolies. Because the corporations within Rouen were monitored both by municipal and royal authorities and internally by gardes des métiers who conducted regular visitations, outsiders who had not been subjected to the same rigorous standards could also threaten the reputation of the merchandise sold in the city by diluting its quality.

Furthermore, membership in a corporation and residence in Rouen not only afforded privileges and protections but also entailed certain responsibilities and obligations. These included dues, tailles to the king, contributions to municipal fortification efforts, and service in the local militias. In the eyes of members of the corporations then, forains and gens de dehors could have an advantage within the

Rouennais markets because they were not subject to these costs and could thus undersell their local competitors.117 For this reason, the corporations sought official approval for strict regulations prohibiting forains from selling their goods in the city. They also established guidelines outlining how outsiders could gain admittance into their ranks.

While the requirements for admittance varied depending on the profession, the standard prerequisite was that a forain needed to have lived within the city for the span of a year and a day before beginning a term of apprenticeship with a local master. In theory, this

117 ADSM, 3E1 Anc. U2 68r. -77v. outlines efforts by craftsmen to reduce military requirements in 1389 on the grounds that they lost valuable work time because of their efforts.

90 did offer a path towards membership and the full privileges of the corporation and the

Rouennais, but in practice this would have been a tremendous obstacle for most newcomers. Without the right to work and sell their goods freely in the city, they would have needed a personal fortune to support their efforts to settle themselves and their families within Rouen. After they had met this prerequisite, they would still have needed to serve a local master or mistress as an apprentice for several years, with the length of their training depending on the level of skill demanded for a specific craft.118 In some cases, the term could be shortened if the individual could produce letters verifying that he or she had received equivalent training in a ville de loi – a city that had received the communal privileges that allowed municipal authorities to monitor local craftsmen.119

Even with such verification, however, forains still needed to pass a test of mastery that would satisfy officials of the corporation. After this standard had been attained, admittance typically required the payment of a fee known as a Hanse of sixty sous- tournois. The formal obstacles to entry into the corporation were thus considerable. This is to say nothing of the distinct possibility that established masters may have shown preference for relatives and locals when seeking apprentices, or been especially rigorous when assessing the chefs d’oeuvre of potential entrants into their corporation – we have no way of knowing for sure. For forains who wished to sell their goods in Rouen without suffering through this lengthy process and contending with the assorted challenges involved, there were alternatives. Of course, there was always the possibility of simply trying to circumvent the power of the corporations by selling goods discretely in the city limits, but those who did so faced the possibility of arrest and punishment by municipal

118 For example, embroiderers needed to perform 6 years of service. 3E1 Boite 15.2 119 ADSM 3E1 Anc. Boite 15; 16. Réglements des corps des métiers.

91 authorities. Instances of such violations and discussions over how to handle them appear sporadically within the minutes of the deliberations of the municipal council.

Alternatively, the forains could work around the restrictions imposed on them. In addition to storefronts on streets that they shared with craftsmen of the same profession, members of the corporations of Rouen sold their goods along side the city’s merchants in stands in designated markets in squares outside the Cathedral and Saint-Öuen, as well as the great halls managed by the municipal authorities. Although their access to these most privileged and lucrative spaces was tightly restricted, forains could cheat the system by peddling their goods just outside the city, at the ends of the bridges, just beyond the gatehouses, or further into the suburbs.120

Of course, the effects of this competition hardly went unnoticed, since the forains could sometimes offer less expensive alternatives to the goods sold in Rouen. Disputes between corporations and the forains about where and when they could sell their goods became increasingly frequent in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as crises drove greater numbers of outsiders to seek work and refuge in the city. The written regulations of the corporations provided a frame of reference for municipal and royal authorities as they debated the merits of the claims made by the conflicting parties. The particular emphasis that the statutes placed on the privileges that the corps des métiers held within different areas and market halls of the city reflects the importance that the arrangement of urban spaces had both for the economic organization and social composition of Rouen.

Finding a way to honor established regulations governing trade while adapting to the

120 The activities of forains, particularly the butchers and bakers in particular who sold their goods at the southern end of the bridge over the Seine remained a point of contention through the fourteenth century and on through the fifteenth century as the demand for staple goods mounted with the growth of the population. These debates will be examined further in Chapter 2.

92 changing urban landscape had long been and would remain a central challenge for authorities. The economic and population growth of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had demanded the creation of new market halls. A conglomeration of merchants and craftsmen purchased the property to establish the first great stone market hall on the rue

Saint Eloi in 1186. By 1266, two new halls were constructed next to the Vielle Tour in order to meet growing demand. With the creation of new markets came new questions about who could use their space, because they were not covered under the old monopolies and prohibitions against forains. These matters were often complicated by contested claims of jurisdiction, as markets were so often situated near or within the ecclesiastical territories of the Nôtre-Dame cathedral and the monasteries of Saint-

Öuen.121

Even beyond the complexity of the questions over the privileges and monopolies of local corporations within new market spaces within Rouen, there were other thorny matters surrounding the role that the shifting placement of the fortifications had in defining the boundaries of the expanding community. Walls served as an imposing reminder of the benefits offered by city life. Fortifications not only provided protection from enemy armies and marauding bands of brigands; they also served as an embodiment of the autonomy of the commune and the privileges of its members because they gave them the ability to protect themselves against seigneurial and royal military oppression.122

For this reason, military leaders who successfully captured cities by siege often took the

121 Mollat, Histoire de Rouen, p. 56. 122 On the importance of walls to the development of civic identity, Martha Howell and particularly, “Urban space and urban identity in late medieval Europe”, in Shaping Urban Identities, ed. Marc Boone and Peter Stabel, (Leuven: Garant Publishers, 2000), as well as Albrecht Classen, ed. Urban Space in the Middle Ages (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), which offers an extremely detailed historiography of recent work on the subject of urban space on in the Middle Ages.

93 step of razing their walls, both as a symbolic abolition of municipal autonomy and as insurance that the population would not be able to easily resist future demands. Philip

Augustus took this measure after his successful siege of Rouen in 1204, even though he eventually restored the privileges of self-governance the population had previously enjoyed in 1207.123 Over the remainder of the thirteenth century, municipal authorities within Rouen worked to restore and extend the fortifications that protected their population. The walls would need to be repeatedly expanded and continuously updated and modified as conflict between the French and English in Normandy intensified in the first quarter of the fifteenth century. Each time authorities in Rouen extended the walls to protect more of the growing population, they had to make decisions about which neighborhoods to include within the enclosure and which sub-urban settlements would remain outside the city limits.

We can find plenty of information about the costs and logistical challenges of building fortifications in late-medieval Rouen in the records of the deliberations of the municipal administration, but we have few details about how the distribution and social composition of the population may have influenced their decisions about where to build them. Regardless, records of the deliberations of the municipal council indicate that inhabitants of the city who were established within the limits of the ancien cloison invoked their residence as evidence of longstanding membership within the community and entitlement to all of its privileges. Implicitly, those who could not make this assertion of heritage had inferior claims to the tax exemptions and commercial liberties afforded by membership in the city. The assertions made in 1455 by residents of the ancien cloison that they should enjoy privileged status over inhabitants of the expanded areas of the

123 Chéruel, Histoire de Rouen à l’époque communale, 96-101.

94 enclosure will be examined more fully later on when assessing efforts to stimulate population growth and urban renewal in Chapter 6. But their claims of superiority are worth mentioning here because they serve as evidence of the long-standing importance that the placement of walls had in shaping the ways that members of the Rouennais population defined outsiders.124 From them, we see that the limits of the community were defined not only according to the terms of charters and legal regulations imposed by municipal and royal authorities, but also by entrenched notions about the meaning of space and the physical boundaries of the city. By driving thousands of refugees from all around Normandy to seek shelter in Rouen, the crises of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries caused convergence and conflict among these multiple definitions of community as the different power brokers and factions within the population debated what rights newcomers would have.

Lyon

By the time the Black Death swept through France and the rest of Europe in 1348, the inhabitants of Montpellier and Rouen had already enjoyed privileges of self- administration for approximately 150 years. As we have seen, the laws and conventions that had been established in this time provided these communes with a framework that helped their members determine how the outsiders who came to their gates would be treated during periods of crisis. Lyon, on the other hand, had just recently gained a modicum of independence from the archbishops that had governed their city since the mid-eleventh century. Integrated into the kingdom of France in 1292, it was only in 1320 that the Lyonnais finally received authorization to take a direct hand in the management

124 ADSM, 3E1 Anc. Tiroir 245.

95 of their finances and defenses. Even this relatively late charter of municipal privileges was limited in scope in relation to those issued to Montpellier and Lyon. Moreover, the

“Charte Sapaudine” that authorized the creation of the commune—as well as the later charters and acts that amended and expanded on the privileges that it issued in the first quarter of the fourteenth century—included few provisions detailing how outsiders should be defined and treated. This was not because Lyon was especially insular or lacking for diversity or appeal to newcomers, although it was not yet on par with

Montpellier or Rouen in these areas. Lyon was situated at a crossroads of western

Europe, with the adjoining Saône and Rhône rivers providing one the most direct connections between the North Sea and the markets of the Mediterranean. The Rhône also served as a frontier between France and the Holy Roman Empire, a fact which promoted the development of a banking industry that brought in foreign merchants changing currency as they traveled between realms.125

The explanation for the relative deficiency of legislation on outsiders lies elsewhere then —namely, in the long conflict between the archbishops and canons who ruled the city and the population of merchants, artisans, and craftsmen who spent much of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries trying to gain greater autonomy over their commercial affairs. Their struggle shaped the institutions of governance within Lyon, while determining where the limits of the community would be drawn and who had the authority to adjust them during a period of crisis. In the early stages of this conflict, the lack of power the inhabitants of Lyon held meant that they were in no position to focus

125 For an introduction to the history of medieval Lyon, see the collected articles of Jacques Rossiaud, in Lyon 1250-1550: réalités et imaginaires d’une métropole (Seyssel, 2013). The older history of Lyon by Alexandre Kleinclausz, Histoire de Lyon (3 vols.) (Lyon, 1939-1952) is well documented and retains value for the references it provides.

96 their energies on defining the differences between members of the established population and newcomers. Rather, they were subject to the will and policies of the archbishops, and their formal definitions of community first took form within the parameters that this régime established and the society that developed under their dominion. That is not to say that the inhabitants of Lyon merely accepted their lack of authority over their affairs without complaint. On the contrary, the communal movement in Lyon had roots dating back to the late twelfth century, with the citizens pushing for and finally receiving a limited series of privileges in 1193 that allowed them at least the legal ability to gather to discuss their own affairs. Already by this date, the tolls imposed for entering and leaving

Lyon and the rights of the city’s inhabitants to manage their own military defenses had become principal points of contention for a population that had increasing commercial ambitions and hopes of greater autonomy.126 The claims by the archbishops and canons of Saint Jean to both secular and spiritual jurisdiction were another point of contention. A charter issued in 1206 offered a formal explanation of the rights that the Lyonnais held on these points and articulated the regulations that they and the outsiders were subject to under archepiscopal rule.

Under the consuetudines outlined by the charter of 1206, we see that the established members of the community enjoyed few privileges that distinguished them from extranei who wished to enter or pass through their city. The first article of the consuetudines explains the tolls that the Lyonnais and outsiders were to be subjected to, and the fines for anyone who evaded them. The archbishops relied on tolls on merchandise passing through the city as a source of revenue, and they were careful to

126 M.C. Guigue, Cartulaire municipal de la ville de Lyon: priviléges, franchises, libertés et autres de la commune recueil formé au XIVe siècle par Etienne de Villeneuve (Lyon, 1876), 375.

97 assert their authority on this matter over merchants who chafed at the burdens these tolls imposed. Regardless of citizenship, anyone who tried to sneak past the toll-collector at night would be forced to pay a fine of 60 sous for each package of merchandise that they brought with them. Upon returning to the city, inhabitants of Lyon who were accused of failing to pay their tolls could prove their honesty by producing witnesses or swearing a solemn oath. This acceptance of credibility seems to have been one of the few areas in which the Lyonnais possessed an advantage over counterparts who were coming to the city from somewhere else. When it came to leaving the city by day, both the Lyonnais and outsiders could leave at their leisure if they paid the required tolls honestly. If they were caught trying to evade them, however, they would incur the larger charge applied for leaving the ban or seigneurial domain of the bishop. Ordinarily, the Lyonnais were not supposed to be subject to this charge for leaving the ban, but the charter still reserved the archbishop’s right to impose an additional aide for those who refused to pay when circumstances demanded the levying of a tax.

Some of the advantages the cives of Lyon received were more concrete. For example, they were not subjected to taxes for importing wine and hemp to the city from their rural holdings. To facilitate commercial activities, they also received the right to keep their own scales and measures, so long as they followed the local standard - a privilege that was explicitly denied to outsiders. 127 These limited privileges were hardly enough to satisfy the citizens of Lyon for long, especially because their terms were not always respected by the archbishops. In 1208, just two years after receiving the charter of their consuetudines, the citizens of Lyon initiated a violent conflict by setting up their own communal administration and hunkering down in fortifications they established

127 Cartulaire municipal, 103-106.

98 across the Saône river from the cathedral. The bloody struggle that ensued was only settled after Innocent III intervened and issued a papal bull that chastened the

Archbishop Renaud for violating the citizens’ privileges, while ordering the rebels to stand down and renounce their newly established commune. The rebellion did succeed in extracting from Renaud the concession that the citizens had the right to form and swear allegiance to corporations of merchants and craftsmen. The 1208 treaty halted the momentum towards the creation of a municipal administration, but the ambitions of the

Lyonnais remained strong, and would continue to mount as the commercial and industrial endeavors of the population began to not only bring in wealth but also keep it in the city.128 This economic development set up an inevitable confrontation between the citizens of Lyon and the local ecclesiastical establishment.

Lyon had already become an important point of passage in the twelfth century.

The city provided a convenient stopover because of its placement at the intersection of the Saône and Rhône rivers and the central position it held between France and the Holy

Roman Empire, the Low Countries and Italy. After 1190, crusaders departing from

Northern France to fight in the Holy Land and in the campaign against heretics in

Languedoc passed through Lyon first as they made their way south. Pilgrims journeying westward to Santiago de Compostela, or south to and east to Jerusalem took advantage of the numerous hospices that cropped up both in Lyon and in the surrounding region to meet the demand – as many as 100 existed by 1300. In spite of its role as a crossroads and staging area, Lyon did not achieve prominence as an international commercial hub until the early thirteenth century. The construction of a sturdy bridge over the Saône in middle of the eleventh century initiated the first stages of economic

128 Jean Déniau, Histoire de Lyon et du Lyonnais (Paris, 1951), 39-40.

99 revival by facilitating local and regional production and trade. Set down in the valley of its two adjoining rivers and fenced in by the Alps and the Massif Central, Lyon was not located in an area of any great agricultural prosperity, although the Beaujolais region just to the northwest provided plenty of wine for the local markets. The game of the forests and the hides of livestock pastured in the valleys of the two rivers provided the raw materials needed by the tanners and furriers who constituted the oldest corporation of craftsmen established in the city. Along with the standard array of food producers, including bakers, fishermen, and a powerful corps of butchers, manufacturers of textiles and hemp products constituted the largest industrial groups represented in Lyon.129

It was only after the completion of the bridge over the Rhône River begun in 1183 that Lyon became the most convenient crossing point for merchants heading north from

Italy and the Mediterranean. Prior to its construction, alternative passages through the

Alps or across the Rhône diluted the flow of merchandise. The completion of this bridge allowed the population to reap the benefits of the great fairs of that had their heyday in the late-twelfth and thirteenth centuries.130 The fairs’ importance in promoting the development of the Lyonnais population and economy in this period were critical in motivating municipal authorities’ campaign to create new fairs in Lyon itself to bring in wealthy merchants and immigrants to restore the population and economy in the fifteenth century. Italian merchants en route to the six events in the Champagne region each calendar year regularly passed through Lyon, and records of tolls from the end of the thirteenth century show that diverse products including silk, a wide array of spices, silver, alum and textiles were being transported through the city by the end of the thirteenth

129 Kleinclausz, Histoire de Lyon, 162-165. 130 Francois Bourquelot, Études sur les foires de Champagne, sur la nature, l’étendue et les règles du commerce qui s’y faisait aux XIIe, XIIIe, et XIVe siècles (Manoir de Saint-Pierre de Salerne, 1970).

100 century. The revival that Lyon enjoyed as a result of this invigorated trade helped to attract new immigrants while supporting the overall demographic growth. Around 1300, the total number of inhabitants was somewhere around 20,000, which left Lyon with only about half as many people as Rouen and Montpellier had in the same period. Within this population, a patriciate of twelve powerful families held sway within efforts to push the city towards the foundation of a commune, with most of them having derived their wealth and influence through involvement in international trade and finance.131

As Lyon came into its own as a nexus for commerce and industry, a parallel process unfolded as the city continued to develop into a second capital for the western church. The conflicting interests of the ecclesiastical establishment and the corps of merchants and craftsmen in the city may have made confrontations inevitable, but the privileged status that Lyon came to hold within the Church also played a role in the economic growth of the city and the diversification of its population. Situated on the west bank of the Saône river on the French side of the frontier with the Holy Roman Empire, the cathedral of Saint-Jean served as the seat of the archdiocese of Lyon, which extended its influence over dioceses including Autun, Langres, Chalon-sur-Saône and Mâcon. The canons of the chapter of Saint-Jean also exercised secular jurisdiction over an area that reached well beyond the limits of their spiritual domain, thanks to an 1167 treaty that brought them control over the county of Forez. The revenues from these territories helped to bring additional wealth to canons of the chapters of Saint-Jean and Saint Just, who jockeyed for influence with one another and at times came together to contest the power of their presiding archbishop. The chapters also became a center for the study of canon and civil law, and many scholars trained in their schools went on to prestigious careers

131 Guy de Valous, Le Patriciat Lyonnais aux XIIIè et XIVè siècles (Paris, 1973).

101 within the church, including the future Gregory X and Boniface VIII. In addition, an array of religious houses flourished within Lyon during the twelfth century, including the Benedictine brothers of Saint Martin-d’Ainay and the sisters of Saint-Pierre, which controlled much of the property on the Presque’île. The military and mendicant orders had a strong presence as well.132

With this robust ecclesiastical establishment and its extensive ties with Rome,

Lyon was a natural choice as a site for two great ecumenical councils in the thirteenth century. The first of these was held in 1245 when Innocent IV summoned his bishops to issue an excommunication against the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. Taking advantage of the security he found within the domains of the archbishop of Lyon,

Innocent remained there for another six years after the conclusion of the council. To thank the inhabitants of Lyon for their welcome celebrations and costly acts of hospitality, he issued a bull prohibiting them from being hauled to court outside of their home city – an important dispensation that offered a measure of security and peace of mind for merchants conducting business abroad. He also granted the citizens of Lyon the right to send representatives to Rome to advocate for their interests, which gave them leverage in their future disputes with their archbishops.133 In 1274, Gregory X called another ecumenical council in the city where he had once been a canon at the cathedral chapter, bringing together representatives of the western and eastern churches in an effort to resolve the schism between them. More than 500 bishops were in attendance, along with the patriarchs of Constantinople and Antioch, sixty abbots, and another thousand clergy from the full spectrum of religious orders. In addition to bringing in this

132 René Fédou, Les hommes de loi Lyonnais à la fin du môyen-age: étude sur les origines de la classe de Robe, (Paris, 1964), 10. 133 Cartulaire de la la ville de Lyon, 18.

102 prestigious assembly of ecclesiastical magnates, the second council also saw appearances by Jaime I of Aragon, and Philip III of France.134

In the short term, the presence of such luminaries proved costly for the Lyonnais, as they were forced to foot the bill for extravagant entry ceremonies and accommodations worthy of the stature of their guests. But the councils also did much to bring prestige to the city, while helping to develop the local markets by drawing in foreign merchants and bankers who catered to the luxurious tastes and financial needs of the wealthy guests who flocked to the councils and the papal courts. As mentioned above, Lyon had developed into a center for banking from the eleventh century because of its role as a crossroads for merchants traveling between realms that relied on strictly regulated currencies. While vital to the city’s development as a commercial center, the members of the financial industry within Lyon occupied a precarious position within the community because of the negative perception of money and banking professions and their privileged and protected status. A mint established in Lyon by the end of the eleventh century remained active until the , providing a ready source of liquid capital that helped to sustain the banking industry and promote the free exchange of merchandise. The monnayeurs who operated the mint held exemptions from taxation and military obligations. These were a source of contention with other citizens, particularly when the burdens of defending the city mounted with the onset of the Hundred Years War. The origins of these exemptions are not clear; after the definitive integration of Lyon into the kingdom of France in 1290, they derived from the authority of the French monarchy, which always struggled to ensure the consistent supply and value of its currency. Whenever they first came into

134 For details on the councils see Gervais Dumeige, S. J. (dir.), Hans Wolter, S. J., Henri Holstein, S. J., Histoire des conciles œcuméniques: Lyon I et Lyon II (Paris, 1966), as well as Philippe Pouzet, Le pape Innocent IV à Lyon et la Concil de 1245 (Paris, 1929), 280-318.

103 effect, the monnayeurs insisted that their exemptions were ancient and inviolable when municipal authorities asked for contributions.135

The community of Jewish bankers in Lyon also held a prominent but socially marginalized place until the archbishop Philip of Savoy ordered their expulsion from the city in 1250. Even after this first exile, they returned in fits and starts until they were finally ordered out of the kingdom of France for good in 1394. There has been little study of the Jewish population of medieval Lyon due to the dearth of extant sources, but their presence is remembered in the name Rue de Juiverie given to the street that they left vacant in the Saint Paul quarter near the cathedral after they were forced out.136 The precise circumstances leading to the decision to expel the Jews of Lyon are uncertain, but the usual suspects of religious discrimination and financial expediency both played a role.

As part of a wider effort to define orthodox Christianity and establish firm religious boundaries within Christendom, the ecumenical council held in Lyon in 1245 yielded a proclamation ordering Jews to wear insignia to identify themselves. In practice such regulations proved difficult to enforce, and the expulsion of the Jews in 1250 may have aimed to put a more definitive end to the struggles to uphold these measures.

Furthermore, on the level of local political affairs and pragmatic concerns, the archbishops of Lyon habitually took out loans to fund their efforts to suppress the citizens’ uprisings and maintain control within their overextended territories. The expulsion of the Jewish bankers who had extended these loans would have temporarily

135 Archives Municipales de Lyon, Series HH. 136 The efforts to repopulate this street by attracting foreign merchants to settle there will be examined in Chapter 4. See B. Vermorel, Histoire des rues de la ville de Lyon: pour faire suite au plan topographique et historique de lyon (Lyon, 1883).

104 alleviated their financial burdens, but the need for capital to buttress the régime against the threats posed by unruly inhabitants of Lyon remained.137

For this purpose, they turned to the “Lombards”—a catchall term used to refer to

Florentines, Sienese, Piedmontains, Luccans, and Genoese—who set up their changers’ tables at the end of the Saône bridge, at the meeting point of kingdoms. Colonies of

Italian bankers and merchants had already been well-established in Lyon before the expulsion of the Jews in 1250, although their status as members of the community would remain a point of disagreement well into the sixteenth century. The departure of rival

Jewish bankers, combined with the stimulus provided by the ecumenical councils, the residencies of the papal courts, and the continued escalation of Italian involvement in the

Champagne fairs bolstered the Lombards’ financial strength within Lyon. The wealth that they accumulated through their roles in banking and trade allowed them to offer the enormous loans that the archbishops and the canons of the chapter of Saint Jean needed to maintain control of the local population.138 But dependency on the Lombards would prove to be untenable in the long term, and ultimately contributed to the unraveling of the seigneurial authority of the archbishops and the chapters within Lyon. After their uprising in 1208 was tactfully suppressed by papal intervention and a limited series of concessions, the citizens of Lyon had contented themselves by adamantly defending their existing privileges. By the second half of the century, however, their ambitions had once again outgrown the old limits imposed by their rulers, and they intensified their efforts to obtain privileges of communal administration on par with those enjoyed by their

137 On the Jewish community within Lyon in the thirteenth century, see François Delpech, “Note sur les Juifs et les relations judéo-chrétiennes à Lyon à l'époque des conciles œcuméniques de Lyon de 1245 et 1274”, in Sur les Juifs: études d’histoire contemporaine (Lyon, 1983), 142-147.) 138 Kleinclausz, Histoire de Lyon, 164.

105 counterparts in Italy and elsewhere in France. The debts that the ruling ecclesiastical establishment accumulated left it badly weakened and vulnerable to sustained pressure and internal strife.

The series of events culminating in the recognition of a communal administration in Lyon in 1320 is worth examining here because the concerns that drove the conflict played such an instrumental role in the power dynamics and organization of the institutions that shaped the community. Abdication of the archbishop Philip of Savoy in

1267 created the conditions needed to reinvigorate the push for municipal autonomy and permanently realign the power dynamics within the city. With no clear candidate lined up to fill the vacant seat, the canons of Saint Jean were all too eager for the opportunity to realize their ambitions for greater authority and seize the reins of seigneurial power for the following six years. They seem to have enforced their control with much greater zeal than the archbishops had traditionally done, which quickly earned them the enmity of the population and ultimately led to a violent uprising in 1268. After the Lyonnais blocked their streets with chains and reinforced the northern wall of the Presqu’île in order to inhibit any attempts to quash the rebellion, they sacked villages and buildings under the canons’ fiefdoms outside the city before finally setting up a new commune and selecting twelve men to serve as consuls. Inverting the established order of financial control, these consuls demanded dues from all inhabitants of the city, including the clergy. The bishop of Autun issued sentences of excommunication against the rebels, but this measure had little impact except to drive the Lyonnais to seek the support and protection of the French monarchy. For their part, Louis IX and his successors in the French throne had good

106 reason to seek greater control over a city that served as a strategic gateway with the Holy

Roman Empire and a center for commerce with Italy.

A series of interventions by Louis IX, his son Philip III and Pope Gregory X finally restored the status quo in the 1270s, but the support and protection that the French monarchs had offered revealed their sympathies and emboldened the bourgeois to continue their efforts to win broader involvement in their political and economic affairs.

The power of the canons of Saint-Jean had already been eroded after the rebellion of the late 1260s, and the debts they owed to the Lombard bankers who had financed efforts to put down the uprisings led them to overreach yet again in the 1280s. Their attempts to restore their secular jurisdiction ultimately pushed the Lyonnais to turn to the French monarchy in 1292. It was on this occasion that the city finally began to be permanently integrated into the kingdom, after Philip IV seized the territories the canons held within

Lyon and appointed a guardian to oversee matters of secular jurisdiction. The inhabitants of the city finally received authorization to assemble and appoint twelve consuls to discuss municipal affairs. These measures initiated a struggle that saw Pope Boniface

VIII intervene in an effort to check the power of the French monarchy and restore the canons and the archbishop to their position of secular authority. An agreement about the distribution of power was finally reached when Philip IV attended the coronation of

Clement V in Lyon in 1305. Under its terms, the archbishops were restored in their secular jurisdiction on the condition that they were to recognize the sovereignty of the

French crown in their domains. They were also to share the revenues gained from their tolls on merchandise and an annual tax levied on the inhabitants of the city.139

139 Kleinclausz, Histoire de Lyon, 200.

107 For their part, the Lyonnais were hardly pleased with the outcome of this accord, which had once again left them disenfranchised as subjects to multiple sources of authority and jurisdiction. Their objections to its terms—specifically, the co-existence of multiple courts within the city—prompted Philip IV to seize the occasion of the vacancy of the archbishop’s seat in 1308 to assert both temporal and spiritual authority over Lyon.

Philip of Savoy aimed to restore the vastly diminished power and prestige of his archdiocese after his investiture as archbishop in 1310, and to do so he worked to ameliorate relations with both the inhabitants of the city and the king of France. In 1312, he ceded rule over Lyon to the French monarchy and accept the permanent establishment of a royal seneschal in the city. In return for these concessions, the archdiocese of Lyon regained uncontested spiritual jurisdiction and the right to the revenues from tariffs on goods sold in the local markets and tolls on the merchandise passing through the city.140

In 1320, the Philippe of Savoy negotiated the restoration of temporal jurisdiction to the archbishops of Lyon as compensation for granting the King Philippe V the right to send the bailli of Mâcon to take the keys to the gates of the city and bring men-at-arms into the city to ensure its defense. Under the terms of this agreement, the inhabitants of Lyon were to swear an oath of loyalty to support the king after reaching the age of fourteen, thus aligning the terms of membership within the community with allegiance to France.

These terms reflect that the principal objective of the monarchy in Lyon was to secure their frontier with the Holy Roman Empire.141

Although they had previously been opposed to the exercise of temporal jurisdiction by the archbishops, the Lyonnais seem to have accepted the terms of the

140 Cartulaire de la ville de Lyon, 54-58. 141 Cartulaire de la ville de Lyon, 65-75.

108 agreement with the monarchy without opposition. In return for their accession to these conditions, Philippe of Savoy granted the inhabitants of Lyon their first charter of communal privileges on June 21, 1320. The charter took the form of nineteen requests made by the inhabitants of Lyon, followed by the responses of the archbishop to their demands. The first article of the charter finally offered formal recognition of the right of the Lyonnais to assemble as a commune to discuss the affairs and finances of the city.

The administration created under this provision consisted of twelve consuls elected by general assembly from the ranks of the arts majeurs, which included drapers, bankers, smiths, furriers, judges and notaries, and apothecaries and physicians. This deliberative body would have the authority to levy a taille on the population in order to pay for the expenses of fortification and the defense of the city. In the same vein, the Lyonnais received authorization to organize their own guet and garde to patrol the city at night.

Control over the gates gave them the ability to regulate and monitor those entering and leaving the community. This privilege would prove critical to their strategies for evaluating which outsiders would be allowed into the city limits during periods of epidemic and war later in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In addition to the provisions for self-administration and defensive autonomy that they had won, the citizens of the commune of Lyon became the beneficiaries of new protections against unjustified imprisonment. They also retained the privilege that Innocent IV had bestowed stating that they would not be forced to answer to courts based outside the city. On matters of both secular and spiritual jurisdiction within Lyon, the archbishops were to exercise full control, while the canons of Saint-Jean were to have no part in the administration of justice.142

142 Cartulaire de la ville de Lyon, 114-119.

109 Known to posterity as the Sabaudine because of its association with Philippe of

Savoy, the charter of 1320 thus offered a formal resolution on the principal points of contention between the Lyonnais and ecclesiastical and royal officials, while giving the inhabitants of the city much greater authority to define the terms and conditions of membership within their community. The charter was silent on the question of who would be counted as a citizen of Lyon and how outsiders would be treated. But even in its silence – and in part because of it - the Sabaudine in fact did much to shape the framework that would inform efforts to handle outsiders who came to the city during times of crisis. Without a clear set of institutional guidelines in place for determining how membership within the community would be defined, the Lyonnais had greater flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and implement policies towards newcomers at the municipal level that fit the needs of their community. Because Lyon owed much of its economic growth to the flow of merchandise between Italy and the Champagne fairs, the activities of Lombard bankers, and the presence of foreign dignitaries of the Church, an ability to accommodate beneficial outsiders was necessary to ensuring continued prosperity. A list of the 3,000 conjurées who took the oath of loyalty to the French monarchy shortly after the creation of the commune in 1320 shows that immigrants from both distant kingdoms and the surrounding region were officially accepted as members of the nascent commune. The figure of 3,000 included citizens who came from the

Beaujolais and Forez regions, other towns in France such as Le Puy, Besançon, Saint-

Omer, and Paris, along with Italians coming mainly from Florence, and Genoa. A small number of English and German immigrants were also among the original citizens of the commune.143

143 Arch. National, J. 268, F. 66, as cited in René Fédou, Gens de Loi, 9. Unfortunately, more detailed

110 Whether there was a residence or marriage requirement for such outsiders to become members of the community is unclear, but by the fifteenth century these would both be important criteria for assessing an individual’s intentions to become a citizen.

Other methods for distinguishing between natives and outsiders co-existed along side the designation of citizen, as they did in Rouen. We are less well informed about the early development of the craft corporations Lyon. There were no corporations or métiers jurés, but minutes of the consulat from the fifteenth-century include separate policies towards craftsmen who were considered estrangiers that made distinctions about where they could work and sell their goods.144 In terms of the significance of space within the city, the Saône river formed an administrative boundary between the western side of Lyon - the coté du royaume, closest to France- and the population center on the Presqu’île, which was known as the coté de l’empire. Six consuls were elected from each side, and municipal records show that they sometimes implemented different policies according to the distinctive attributes of these two sections of the city. Although the Saône river was a key boundary for the purpose of the structure of municipal administration, although there is little indication that there was a difference in the privileges enjoyed by those living on either side of the river. Regardless, this division and the requirements that regulated the integration of newcomers into Lyon show the complexity of the boundaries that developed in the absence of clear guidelines within the foundational charters of the commune.

While giving the Lyonnais something of a clean slate on which to draw the limits of their community, the absence of a well-established series of regulations governing

statistics on the precise ratios of immigrants within the population have not been offered. 144 Jean Déniau, La Commune de Lyon et la Guerre Bourguignonne, 61.

111 outsiders to Lyon meant that the consuls had much less leverage to work with as they negotiated the status of newcomers to the community with the king and his lieutenants.

Municipal authorities in Montpellier could refer to longstanding legislative protections for outsiders that predated their integration into the kingdom of France by more than a century. They could also invoke the role that such protections had played in enabling their city’s to prominence as a great center of commerce and learning within western

Europe. Similarly, the échevins of Rouen could point to privileges bestowed by the Kings of England in the twelfth-century and repeatedly confirmed by their French successors in the following centuries that allowed them to define who would be a part of their community. By contrast, the consuls of Lyon had only a short record of policy-making that they could point to as they advocated for their community’s interests. As a result, they were in many ways forced to work within the parameters of the policies that the

French monarchy established to define foreigners and their rights. At the same time, even from this disadvantaged position, the Lyonnais were able to invoke the important contributions that outsiders had made through their involvement in the fairs of

Champagne. This background would be essential to their campaigned to restore bring back their own community demographic and economic decline by pursuing authorization to hold international fairs.

Conclusions

This chapter has traced out the development of municipal policies towards outsiders in Lyon, Rouen, and Montpellier in order to illuminate the wide variety of factors that shaped the legal and social boundaries that separated locals from outsiders

112 within these cities. The distinctive political histories of these three communes and the attributes of the commercial networks they were involved in created significant discrepancies in the legislation that informed decisions about who would be eagerly welcomed and who would be excluded during periods of hardship. In Montpellier, competition with rival commercial centers in the western Mediterranean led municipal officials to develop rigorous and extensive legislative protections for foreign merchants who decided to make the city their port of call. The significant autonomy that the

Montpelliérains won from the charter they received from Peter of Aragon in 1204 gave their representatives the ability to enforce and modify these policies to suit their shifting needs, and their location on the outskirts of France allowed them leeway to do so even after their integration into the kingdom. From their position of control over the gateway to the Seine River, and as a leading center for the production of textiles and other manufactured goods, the inhabitants of Rouen had the ability and motivation to restrict and regulate rival merchants as much as their own commercial interests abroad would permit. They used this power mainly to protect and advance commercial privileges and industrial monopolies that had enriched the wealthy bourgeois who ran the city. As the youngest of the three communes, Lyon also had the least clearly defined set of policies towards outsiders. As we will see in the following chapters, this gave the consuls room to develop and refine regulations that were specifically suited to the era of crisis in which their commune came of age.

The charters of privileges and commercial regulations and the unofficial traditions that developed as the bourgeois of communes around France asserted their autonomy provided the framework of the policies their descendants implemented as they addressed

113 the challenges posed by an influx of refugees, wandering beggars, and soldiers. In times of great chaos, the ancient boundaries that delineated the community represented a source of stability and order: to ignore or abandon them to accommodate newcomers was to concede the dissolution of the values and identities that defined cities. It is for this reason that municipal leaders and the constituent groups they represented clung to those old frameworks with such tenacity, even during prolonged periods of hardship in the Late

Middle Ages. But if the established boundaries of communities were not easily broken or dissolved, they could nevertheless be bent when doing so served the interests of the local population and its leaders. As municipal and royal authorities decided how to confront invasions, epidemics and economic decline, and face the challenges presented by the new people who were arriving in their cities, they consistently legitimized their policy decisions by situating them and integrating them within and relating them to the old frameworks. At the same time, as economic conditions and the advantages of different geographical positions changed with shifting political circumstances and military developments, municipal leaders and the various stakeholders within urban communities needed to modify their approaches to outsiders in order to ensure their survival—setting up a struggle between tradition and adaptation that continued in Montpellier, Lyon, and

Rouen through the Late Middle Ages.

114

CHAPTER II

MANAGING MIGRATIONS AND MIGRANTS IN AN AGE OF CRISIS

Migrations to and from cities were a principal cause and effect of the crises that ravaged the kingdom of France and the rest of western Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. An influx of newcomers seeking food, shelter, and work changed the costs of staple goods and the wages earned by laborers, forcing the leaders of urban communities to reconsider how they would apply and uphold their local privileges and enforce the regulations outlined within the municipal charters. Unfamiliar outsiders could also present more pressing threats to the wellbeing of the local population, whether by spreading the contagious diseases that afflicted their home communities, spying or sabotaging local defensive systems, or sewing discord among impoverished “commons.”

On the other hand, the departure of established community members—whether by death or emigration—left holes within the social fabric of urban centers, leaving municipal authorities to consider how they would make up for the taxes and service such individuals owed and contributed. The kings of France needed tax revenue to pay for the ever- mounting costs of war with England and its allies, and the burden for supplying that revenue fell on the shoulders of the bonnes villes. Military preparations that were essential to those cities’ survival also required leadership, manpower, and money—all of which were often in short supply. For these reasons, municipal authorities made it their business to carefully monitor those who entered their communities and those who left:

115 their cities depended on their ability to control the flow of men and women into and out of their communities.

Although population movements were a critical component of the crises of the

Late Middle Ages, the historian seeking to gain any understanding of their impact faces daunting challenges. Offering even the most tentative estimate of the numbers of men, women, and children displaced by plagues, wars, famines, and economic upheaval is a nearly impossible task. Many of the people who left their homes to find safety, work, or economic opportunity were poor and rootless, and the destitute rarely show up in the sources that inform population estimates, such as hearth records and cadastres. This leaves us to examine the phenomenon of late medieval migration from the perspectives of the people most affected by the arrival of newcomers and the departure of established residents. When we take this approach, and look at the records kept by the municipal authorities who confronted the task of managing communities in flux, we see that the population movements instigated by crises resulted in the redrawing of the boundaries that defined urban communities. As refugees and wandering beggars arrived at the gates of cities to seek charity and protection, local officials had to make difficult decisions about how they would allocate limited space and resources. Similarly, when well-heeled residents fled to look for better living conditions somewhere else, those they left behind had to find ways to meet the tax burdens and military responsibilities that were the foundations of membership in an urban commune.145

145 For a useful overview of the principal challenges and issues within the study of migration in the late Middle Ages, see Robert Fossier, “Aspects des migrations en Europe occidentale à la fin du Moyen-Âge”, in Le migrazioni in Europa, secc. XIII-XVIII: atti della “Venticinquesima settimana di studi”, (Florence, 1995), 47-64. On the most recent scholarship and debates within the study of migrations in urban contexts, see Dénis Menjot, “Les gens venus d’ailleurs dans les villes médiévales: quelques acquis de la recherche,” in, “Arriver” en Ville: Les migrants en milieu urbain au moyen âge, 15-29.

116 Simply put, the migrations instigated by the crises of the late Middle Ages forced the leaders and members of urban communities to reevaluate what separated privileged residents from newcomers. This chapter explores the ways that municipal authorities made decisions about which groups and individuals would be welcome in their communities as they dealt with the shifts in the dynamics and composition of their populations. Through a close analysis of the ways that officials in Rouen, Lyon, and

Montpellier navigated the distinctive crises that their populations faced, I will demonstrate that efforts to regulate migrations and migrants were central to the strategies the leaders of these cities used to prevent and survive disasters. In Rouen and Lyon, the influx of poor newcomers seeking shelter and opportunity forced municipal and royal officials to make determinations about who would enjoy the privileges of protection and prosperity that their communes could provide. Whether the threats they posed were real or perceived, outsiders were seen as principal causes and contributors to the problems afflicting those cities. For this reason, the decisions local authorities made about how to handle refugees and poor transients shaped the ways that their communities experienced ongoing wars and recurring epidemics of plague and other diseases. By contrast, within

Montpellier, the departure of established residents combined with high mortality levels to threaten the remaining population’s ability to endure royal tax burdens. The need to retain inhabitants and attract new ones directly shaped the ways that the Montpelliérain authorities treated outsiders as they worked to help their city survive and recover from decades of economic and demographic decline.

Although it is widely recognized that immigration from rural areas played a central role in filling the demographic void left by the mortalities that afflicted late-

117 medieval cities, the workings of population replacement have rarely been a point of focus within scholarship. 146 When scholars have examined this phenomenon they have tended to explain demographic turnover mechanistically, with peasants passively filing into cities to take up the roles left vacant by the turn of the Malthusian screw.147 To be sure, there were larger economic and demographic forces that promoted immigration into urban centers. With labor markets devastated by the loss of all manners of craftsmen, artisans, and menial workers, rural migrants could hope to find economic opportunities and new freedoms when they left behind their fields and their feudal obligations to come to the city. The promise of wealth and liberty that emanated from major centers of commerce and industry such as Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier must have exercised a powerful draw on peasants and villagers who spent their lives behind the plow, doing unrelenting and grueling work for uncertain yields and even more dubious personal rewards. But most people do not take the decision to leave behind their homes and livelihood lightly. This was perhaps even more true in an age when travel was slow and perilous, particularly for those who could not afford wagons or pack animals to haul any possessions they hoped to bring with them as they embarked on a new chapter in their lives. The dangers that abounded in unprotected rural areas acted as catalysts that drove emigration from rural areas into cities.

Similarly, the great hardships that urban communities faced could prompt well- established residents to seek better living conditions in neighboring cities or principalities that offered more safety or better economic prospects. The densely packed neighborhoods

146 For a helpful overview of scholarship concerning ” l’exode rurale ”during the late Middle Ages, see Jean Favier, “ La vie et la mort ,” in Favier et al. XIV et XVème Siècles : Crises et genèses (Paris, 1996), esp., 139-140. 147 See for example, Samuel K. Cohn Jr., The Black Death Transformed, 199-200.

118 clustered around the waterways that served as the lifeblood of urban industry could make the populations of cities especially vulnerable to outbreaks of disease.148 The bubonic plague has always been a focus of scholarship on the late middle ages, but municipal sources record a wide range of maladies such as whooping cough and venereal diseases—oftentimes, they simply lament the effects of ambiguously defined maladies contagieuses. Urban communities were particularly vulnerable to famines as well, because they had limited capacity for primary production and thus depended heavily on the availability of food brought to market from the countryside.149 When this was not forthcoming, city dwellers had few means of providing for themselves, whereas their counterparts in the countryside often had more opportunities for forage. As military outposts and centers of wealth, cities were also targets for armies seeking to gain territory and power.150 In addition, the damage inflicted by natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes could be especially devastating in heavily populated areas. The financial burdens that communes faced as they worked to overcome these challenges could make life even more miserable for those who had somehow managed to survive and endure them. The pressures of the royal taxes known as tailles that funded the monarchy’s relentless warring were especially resented, particularly because these annual impositions had originally been reserved for use only in the most dire circumstances.151 All of these

148 The epidemiology of the plague continues to be hotly debated, but the study by Jean-Noël Biraben, Les Hommes et la peste en France et dans les pays européens et méditerranéens (Paris, 1975) remains unsurpassed as a starting place for understanding the spread of the disease because of the rigor of its quantitative analysis and the inclusion of numerous maps illustrating the spread and intensity of contagion. On modes of diffusion, see especially, 71-92. 149 On the experience of famine within towns and urban communities, see William Chester Jordan, The Great Famine, 127-166. 150 Bernard Chevalier offers the classic statement concerning the military role of provincial cities known as bonnes villes in this period in, Les bonnes villes de France. 151 On modes of taxation in late medieval France, see especially, Favier, Finance et fiscalité au bas moyen âge, and Philippe Contamine “Lever l’impôt en terre de guerre: rançons appatis et souffrances de guerre

119 factors could drive city dwellers to make the decision to leave, provided they had the means to do so.

A comparison of the decisions that authorities in Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier made as they handled the comings and goings in their cities allow us to understand how crisis changed communities in the late Middle Ages. While these cities each faced similar hardships, they experienced them and thus responded to them differently. The three case studies that follow illustrate the ways that municipal authorities dealt with the distinctive challenges confronting their cities, while illuminating the local factors that shaped the decisions they made about how to deal with the altered demographics and dynamics within their communities. The first case study examines how the leaders of Rouen made decisions about how to deal with the refugees driven to their city by war. Throughout the

Hundred Years War, refugees from around Normandy flocked to their city to find shelter, creating a slew of additional challenges for a population struggling to protect itself. The consuls of Lyon confronted similar issues as they deliberated on how they should handle refugees and the transient poor, and my second case study looks at the range of policies they implemented as they worked to prevent or control outbreaks of the plagues that had repeatedly devastated the city over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The third and final case study of this chapter considers the emigration that contributed to the overall demographic and economic decline of Montpellier in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The departure of wealthy Montpelliérains who sought safety and lower tax burdens outside of France drove the consulate and the monarchy to seek ways to bring in new inhabitants to revive the city. Together, these three examples showcase the central

dans la France des XIVe et XVe siècles”, in Philippe Contamine, Jean Kerhervé, and Albert Rigaudière, L’impôt au Moyen Age (Paris, 2002).

120 role that the arrival of outsiders played in the urban experience of crisis, and the central role that crisis played in determining how urban communities would treat outsiders.

The Privilege of Protection and the Protection of Privilege: Refugees in Rouen

Walls have long been seen as the defining feature of cities in late-medieval

Europe, and France in particular. Walls protected the communities within them from enemy armies and the bands of soldiers that roamed the countryside; they also acted as symbols of the privilege of the urban community—as delineations separating the protected bourgeois “haves” from the “have-nots” who labored as serfs in the fields.152 It was from walls that cities in France derived the military importance they gained during the Hundred Years War, as armies could only win and hold territory by capturing the fortified urban centers that dominated strategic positions on rivers, hills, and coastlines.153

But if walls were the physical feature that defined cities and the urban communities within them, the attribute that defined walls was that the work on them was never really finished. In the relative peace and prosperity that prevailed in France in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, many urban communities allowed their defenses to fall into disrepair, often relying on the vestiges of Roman fortifications to provide rudimentary barriers against surprise attacks. The population growth that continued through this period of revival left suburbs that were often just as large as the old city centers exposed to attacks.

For this reason, the outbreak of conflict between the Plantagenet and Valois in the mid-

152 On these topics see the work of Martha Howell, and particularly, “The Spaces of Urbanity,” in Shaping Urban Identities, 3-23. 153 See Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France, as well as Michael Wolfe, Walled Towns and the Shaping of France: From the Medieval to the Early Modern era (New York, 2009), and “Siege Warfare and the Bonnes Villes of France during the Hundred Years War”, in The Medieval City Under Siege, ed., Ivy A. Corvis and Michael Wolfe (Woodbridge, 1995), 50.

121 fourteenth century forced municipal authorities to rush to extend their existing fortifications to protect their enlarged populations and prepare for the threats posed by enemy armies, mercenary companies, and even the supposedly friendly forces fighting for the king.154 Even when the task of enlarging walled enclosures seemed complete, the maintenance of those fortifications and the evolution of artillery weaponry necessitated continuous renovation.

The need to develop and maintain adequate urban defenses became a central preoccupation for municipal and royal officials as war with the English continued into the fifteenth century, particularly as an interrelated civil conflict between the Armagnac and

Burgundian factions of the Valois royal family began to escalate in the 1420s. Efforts to establish strong defensive systems dominated municipal fiscal policy while shaping the daily activities of city dwellers across France.155 In addition to the work completed by the masons, carpenters, metalworkers, and laborers in the construction and maintenance of walls, defensive preparations included the digging of trenches and the installation of chains that could be stretched across city streets to entangle any cavalry forces that breached the fortifications. Able-bodied male bourgeois were commonly obliged to contribute their labor and serve in night patrol forces such as the guet. The demands these requirements placed on bourgeois were intensified by the financial demands they had to

154 Kathryn Reyerson uses the case of Montpellier to offer an illuminating analysis of the issues that arose as communities extended their old fortifications. See, Reyerson, “Medieval Walled Space: Urban Development vs. Defense” in City walls: the urban enceinte in global perspective. For a detailed analysis of the construction, extension, and maintenance of urban fortifications, see Françoise Michaud-Fréjaville “Essai de chronologie des travaux effectués sur l’enceinte d’Orléans 1391-1427,” Nouvelle série 8, no. 58 (1982). 155 The treasury records of the city of Orléans provide one of the best illustrations of the importance municipal leaders placed on adequate fortifications, with an average of two thirds of the annual budget going to the extension, improvement, and maintenance of the city walls and the other barriers and chains that formed the local defensive system. See Françoise Michaud-Fréjaville, “Une ville face aux crises: les ramparts de la fidélité, de Louis d’Orléans à Charles VII, d’après les comptes de forteresse de la ville d’Orléans”, in Françoise Michaud-Fréjaville, Une ville, une destinée: recherches sur Orléans et Jeanne d'Arc en l'honneur de Françoise Michaud-Fréjaville (Paris, 2005).

122 meet as they juggled their martial duties with the responsibilities of their chosen occupations. Originally established to raise funds for the monarchy in times of extraordinary need, the tailles levied from the populations of cities became annual impositions by 1436.156 On top of these burdens, municipal authorities regularly sought authorization to impose taxes on their populations to fund the construction and maintenance of fortifications that they insisted were necessary for the welfare of the kingdom. Given the obligations in time, energy, and money that members of urban communes committed to ensuring their own security, it is not surprising that municipal authorities made sure that any outsiders who came into their cities would not compromise their carefully developed defenses.

The circumstances that brought refugees to the gates of cities meant that they were often a source of concern from the moment of their arrival. Refugees naturally traveled the shortest distance possible in order to find safety. This meant that the movements of armies and brigands and the food shortages and epidemics that had forced them to leave their homes in the first place usually posed threats to the communities they wished to enter as well. Nowhere is the central role that refugees played in the crises that unfolded in urban communities more poignantly illustrated than in Rouen. Normandy was fiercely contested for almost the entire duration of the Hundred Years War, as the duchy had both strategic significance as a frontier between France and England and symbolic significance as an ancestral domain of the English monarchy. As the largest walled city and administrative capital of the duchy, Rouen served as a principal

156 On the history of the taille, and resistance to its imposition during the fifteenth-century, see Katia Weidenfield, “Le contentieux de la taille royale au XV siècle”, in Contamine, L’Impôt au Moyen-âge, 861- 888.

123 destination for refugees displaced by the ongoing warfare within the region.157 Most dramatically, an influx of refugees was a principal factor in the events that unfolded when an English army under the command of Henry V came to besiege the city at midnight on

July 29, 1418. To understand the central part that refugees had to play in the experience of the crisis that the siege inflicted, it is worth considering the background and events of the population’s seven-month struggle some detail here.158

The siege of Rouen was the culmination of a fierce English campaign of conquest and colonization that deprived thousands of people in towns and rural areas alike of their homes and safety. Within three years of capturing the port city of Harfleur in August of

1415, Henry’s forces had crushed the French army at Agincourt and captured most of

Normandy. Rouen was the final major piece that Henry needed to solidify control of the duchy and pave the way for the conquest of France. In preparation for the effort to capture Rouen, Henry followed the standard strategy for besieging large cities by first securing the small towns and villages that could provide outposts and staging areas for relief armies and convoys of supplies. To cut the Rouennais off from the French controlled areas to the south, Henry laid siege to the towns of Pont de l’Arche and

Louviers, while dispatching a company of Irish soldiers to pillage the area immediately surrounding the city.159 These efforts not only deprived the Rouennais of convenient

157Archives Départmentales de la Seine-Maritime (ADSM), 3E1 Anc. Registre U2, Folio 144v., provides the clearest articulation of the importance Rouen had as a center for refugees in the late-medieval Normandy, noting in the 1360s that “… Il n’y avoit pour lors autre ville close à seureté ou le peupple peust avoir son refuge que en ladicte ville de Rouen”. 158 The best recent analysis of the siege of Rouen is found in Anne Curry, “Henry V’s conquest of Normandy 1417-19: the siege of Rouen in context.” XXXI Semana de Estudios Medievales (July 2004), 237-254. The most comprehensive study of the siege remains Léon Puiseux, Siège et Prise de Rouen par les Anglais (Caen, 1867), which still retains value for the useful source references it provides. 159 The Burgundian chronicler Enguerrand de Monstrelet offers one of the most detailed accounts of the events taking place before and during the siege of Rouen, including an extended description of the Irish detachment that, even if sprinkled with colorful exaggerations, is not without interest for understanding

124 sources of assistance and military support, but also intensified the burden on their food supply by forcing additional refugees into the city.

In a charter issued just after the beginning of the siege, on July 24, 1418, the bailiff of Rouen Pierre Poolin commented that “the people of the country side and surrounding villages and even from the region of Caux and across the Seine came and poured in day after day to take refuge in the city of Rouen.”160 In addition to the immigration from the rural areas devastated by English forces, refugees from the previously captured cities of Harfleur, Caen, Cherbourg, , Evreux, and Bayeux also sought shelter in Rouen. Numerous smaller towns were forcibly evacuated as well – in Vire, Saint-Lô, Domfront, Avranches and Mortain, the inhabitants were at least given the choice of swearing allegiance to the English régime or leaving their homes behind.161

On top of the influx of migrants stimulated by the English conquests, the sacrificial measures taken by the garrison of Rouen increased the numbers still further. In the weeks leading up to the siege, they had prepared for the English onslaught by destroying suburban settlements that could provide shelter and fortification for the besiegers, thus

contemporary stereotypes of the Irish current that spread from Normandy. See J.A. Buchon, ed. Chroniques d’Enguerrand de Monstrelet (Vol. III), (Paris, 1826), 115. The bare feet of the Irish soldiers and their rude attire were apparently quite remarkable to the locals, with the Rouennais chronicler Pierre Cochon offering a similar description when recounting the role the Irish played in the pillaging of Normandy in 1416. See Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire, Chronique Normande de Pierre Cochon (Rouen, 1870), 277. 160 ADSM, 3E1 Anc. Registre A, Folio 174,v : “ Plusieurs places et forteresses d’entour la dicte ville de Rouen, comme le Pont-de-l’Arche, Fontaines-le-Bourg, Blainville, Préaux, Douville, Long-Pré et autres empeschoient venir des vivres en la dicte ville pour ce quelles etoient tenus et occupés par les enemis et adversaires pour ce que les gens du plat pais et des villaiges d’environ et mesme du pais de caux et du pais d’oultre Saine venoient et affluoient de jour en jour et se tenoient à refuge en la dicte ville de Rouen et illec s’appliquoient à avoir et trouver manière de vivre… ”. 161 René Cintré, “ À propos des immigrés et réfugiés normandes dans les ville bretonnes proches de la frontière durant la guerre de cent ans ”, in Jean-Pierre Leguay, ed. La Ville Médiévale en deçà au-delà de ses murs (Rennes, 2000), 143.

125 displacing the residents of these areas and driving even more people into the walled enclosure of the city.162

Although there is no way to offer a precise estimate of the population in Rouen and the number of additional mouths there were to feed when the English arrived, it was clear to observers that the number was substantial. There was a counter movement of emigrants who left Rouen as rumors of a reinvigorated English campaign in Normandy began to spread in 1417, with some of the wealthier members of the community moving on to cities further south in anticipation of the coming storm.163 The crises of recent years had also served to diminish the population: in 1413, an epidemic of whooping cough that swept across France inflicted heavy fatalities in Rouen.164 Even as the siege was beginning the community was reeling from a plague that had devastated some of the poorest and most densely populated areas of the city, such as the clos Saint Marc in the insalubrious dying and tanning district. But any decrease in population effected by the combination of emigration and epidemic seems to have been greatly outweighed by the number of refugees flowing into Rouen. Seeking to glorify the exploits of their sovereign, the English accounts speculated that there were anywhere from 250,000 to 400,000 people in the city when Henry V concluded his successful siege. Modern scholars are inclined towards far more conservative estimates. Paul Le Cacheux estimated that there

162 See the poem by John Page, who witnessed the siege from within the English camp. The text of the poem, originally published as, ‘The Siege of Rouen: A poem', in The Historical Collections of a Citizen of London in the fifteenth century (1876), 1-46 is now available at : http://www.british- history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=45550, (Accessed : September 18, 2013.) 163 The account offered by the chronicler of Charles VII, the Bishop Thomas Basin, provides an illustration of the itinerancy that characterized many people of the middle class. His parents left Caudebec during the first stage of the English campaign in Normandy in 1415 and took refuge in Rouen. An outbreak of plague drove them from the city shortly thereafter, but they returned in 1417, only to leave again for Falaise when they caught wind of the imminent English campaign. The movements of the Basin family are outlined in Léon Puiseux, L’emigration normande et la colonisation anglaise au XVème siècle (Caen, 1866), 22-23. 164 Chronique Normande, 338.

126 were some 50,000 to 60,000 people in the city at the time of the siege, with this figure representing a doubling of the normal population due to the influx of refugees.165 Even if exact totals and ratios are difficult to nail down, the decisive role these refugees played in the way the events of the siege unfolded was plain to those who commented on the conflict.

The importance of refugees to the outcome of the siege derived from the strategy that Henry V was forced to adopt in order to capture the city. After conquering towns and cities almost at will around Normandy, the English found themselves confronted with a large and fiercely determined enemy in the Rouennais. They were well-garrisoned with companies of mercenaries numbering around 4,000 and civilian militias numbering another 16,000, and the city was well-defended by thick walls and trenches.166 The gambit the garrison had made by flattening buildings and felling trees all along the outside of the city allowed them to harass any attackers who threatened a direct assault with the artillery weapons they mounted on their walls and hails of crossbow bolts. The

English army of some 30,000 men met with fierce resistance when they first began to establish siege positions around the city, with the garrison sallying out to hassle them at every opportunity. Any hopes Henry had harbored for a quick and easy victory similar to those he had enjoyed at Harfleur and Caen were quickly dashed, thus forcing him to settle for a costly, drawn out effort to bring the city to its knees through blockade induced famine. The captains of the garrison of Rouen intended to be prepared for this possibility, ordering that the city should have a supply of ten months of grain in order to hold out at length while waiting for external support from the dauphin, the future Charles VII of

165 Pierre Le Cacheux, Rouen au temps de Jeanne d’Arc et pendant l’occupation anglaise, 1419-1449, (Paris, 1931). xxvii-xxix. 166 On preparations for the siege within the city, See Chroniques d’Enguerrand de Monstrelet, 112.

127 France, and John “the Fearless”, Duke of .167 Two main factors made this impossible. First, the timing of the siege, which was calculated to begin in mid-summer, meant that the Rouennais could not reap the fruits of the year’s harvests. Secondly, the increase in population due to the arrival of refugees meant that the food supply dried up far more quickly – a fact not lost on locals.

In spite of the garrison’s determined efforts to hassle the English, the besiegers managed to establish strong positions all around Rouen, particularly after September when they captured the fortress of Saint Catherine that overlooked the city from a hill positioned just over a kilometer to the east. To prevent efforts to restock the city and to guard against the counterattacks that had been launched from within Rouen, the English dug a trench all the way around its northern side, filling it with sharpened stakes to stop any counter-attackers dead in their tracks. After this noose was set, Henry V had only to wait until the population was choked off from food and desperate enough to accept his terms of surrender. It is not clear just how quickly the food supply in the city began to dwindle. In a 1,300 line poem commemorating Henry’s exploits, the English observer

John Page mused that “there vytale waxyd scars” by Christmas.168 But the effects of the blockade were felt within Rouen much more quickly than they were noticed by the

English stationed outside the city. What is beyond question is the severity of the food shortage in the latter half of the siege. Monstrelet placed the death toll of the famine at

50,000 - even accepting substantial exaggeration on his part, this estimate attests to the awesome scale of the crisis that the siege inflicted on those trapped in the city. Nearly every account of the events of the siege emphasized the dismal situation within Rouen by

167 On royal planning attempts for lifting the siege, see Chroniques d’Enguerrand de Monstrelet, 135-143. 168 Page, “Siege of Rouen”.

128 describing the diet of the population, but the dark lyricism of John Page provides the most memorable assessment: .”..flesche save hors hadde they non. They etete doggys, they ete cattys; They ete mysse, horse, and rattys.”169 If Page elsewhere showed himself prone to artful embellishment, there is little reason to doubt his rhyme about the wretched state of affairs during the siege.

The local Chronique Normande offered an account nearly identical to the one that

Page provided, noting that “the city was so afflicted with hunger that they had to eat horses, dogs, cats, and rats." As an explanation for the intensity of this famine, the anonymous author offered the assessment that, “there were too many people from away who had come to the city for help.”170 Coming from the chronicler best positioned to understand the perspectives of the people who suffered through the siege, the specific assertion that the influx of refugees was responsible for the intensity of the famine serves as clear evidence of the critical role that outsiders played in the way this crisis was experienced and understood. This view may also lend support to an argument made by the nineteenth-century historian of the siege, Léon Puiseux, who asserted that refugees were the probable targets of the massive expulsion that took place as the garrison made a last ditch effort to lessen the burden on the city’s food supply. In this most tragic chapter of the siege of Rouen, hundreds if not thousands of poor men, women, and children who were deemed to be unnecessary to the defensive effort were driven from the city.171 After their expulsion, this group prepared to leave Rouen altogether; those who decided to send

169 Page, “Siege of Rouen”. 170 Chronique Normande, 342. The account reads, “ Et fu la ville si affamée qu’il convenoit mangier les chevax, chiens, chas, ras à bons saveur. Car il avoit en la ville trop de peuple de hors de la ville qui estoit venu àreclain, qui y furent enfremés. ” 171 Monstrelet estimated that there were at least 12,000 poor men, women and children in the ranks of the expelled. See Chroniques d’Enguerrand de Monstrelet,132. Jean Le Fèvre of Saint Rémy offered the even more inflated figure of 20,000, and emphasized the presence of the elderly and feeble in this group. See François Morand, Chronique de Jean le Févre, seigneur Saint-Remy (Paris, 1876).

129 them away may have anticipated that Henry would mercifully allow them to pass through his lines to find refuge elsewhere. Instead, he ordered his archers to fire on any who dared approach his siege encampments. Those driven out of the city were thus trapped between the English army and the walls of a community in which they were no longer welcome.

Seeking shelter, they amassed in the trenches around the walls, where they were left to freeze and starve to death as the population of Rouen struggled to hang on until the king of France and the duke of Burgundy sent help.

We have few details about the decision to drive hundreds if not thousands of people out of Rouen in the middle of the winter. Was there popular pressure from the desperate population of the city to remove the dead weight, or was the decision a unilateral action taken by hardheaded military leadership? Who exactly was deemed to be useless for the defensive effort and rounded up for expulsion? In support of his contention that the people expelled from Rouen were mainly refugees, rather than the relatives and neighbors of the established jurés of the city, Puiseux cited John Page’s line that the Rouennais envoys who had treated for peace with Henry had implored him to

“graunte them leave for to gone” —which he took to mean that they had wanted the king to allow the people in the ditches to return past his lines to their previous homes. Taken on its own this passage seems inconclusive, particularly in light of the minor discrepancies between extant manuscripts of the poem. Nevertheless, there are other good reasons to believe that refugees were among those singled out for expulsion. Along with the fact that their very presence was seen as a principal factor in the failure of the food supply, the loss of homes and livelihood that had driven refugees to Rouen in the first place made them especially vulnerable to the poverty and dependency that was the one

130 attribute that all accounts of the siege mentioned when describing those driven out into the cold. Moreover, refugees occupied a marginal position within the local community: their presence in Rouen was contingent on the fickle policies instituted by municipal and royal officials who grappled for power while trying to address the shifting needs and demands of the multiple factions of a population beset with crises.

The tenuous status that refugees had within late-medieval Rouen is most clearly observed in municipal records of the debates over the working rights of forains or gens de dehors – terms that could apply to anyone who was not a juré, or sworn member of the commune of Rouen, whether from a nearby village or a more distant city on the fringes of Normandy or beyond. Correspondences between municipal and royal authorities and minutes of the municipal counselors’ deliberations include numerous examples of debates over the working status of outsiders that continued off and on from the onset of the

Hundred Years War and well into the sixteenth century. Butchers, bakers, and members of the old drapers’ corporation were frequently at the center of disputes over whether or not forains should be allowed to work in the city, and where and when they would be allowed to produce and sell their goods if granted this privilege. Such concerns were not unique to these most powerful corporations within Rouen, however, and the ordinances and regulations for crafts ranging from weaving and tanning to hat-making included provisions legislating the working status of the outsiders coming into the city. The requirements for admission into different corporations varied according to the demands of each profession: in some cases, these statutes offered more liberal terms of admittance for those individuals who had been trained in a ville de loi – a term used to refer to enfranchised communes that regulated the training and examination of master craftsmen.

131 Regardless of the discrepancies between different crafts, the corporations’ concern for the protection of the long-established privileges and the maintenance of the quality standards remained consistent as forains tried to find their place in the local markets.172

Detailed examination of the debates that unfolded as municipal and royal authorities deliberated on the working status of refugees illuminates the range of factors that affected how fully they would be integrated into the community. A petition from

1445 offers a convenient starting place for this analysis, as it provides an illustration of the principal challenges that the influx of outsiders created for the Rouennais. This was long after the English had taken control of Rouen and imposed their own administrative structures, with their appointed lieutenant general and bailiff managing the garrison and local affairs in the place of the disempowered municipal council. But the question of how refugees should be treated remained a pressing one. After the coronation of Charles VII as king of France in September of 1429, the tide of the Hundred Years War once again turned against the English, and the French efforts to reclaim Normandy resulted in a reinvigoration of war and turmoil in the region. This in turn caused another surge of

“people from many places and of diverse trades to be driven into this city of Rouen in order to avoid and flee the great dangers and perils that could come to them.” Needing a source of income, the newcomers sought opportunities to provide for themselves, “and they were charitably and kindly received by the permission and justice, and consent of the gardes des mestiers… especially the gardes of the butchers.” 173 The permission

172 On the history and organization of the craft corporations of Rouen, see Etienne Martin Saint-Léon, Histoire des corporations de métiers as well as Ouin-Lacroix, Histoire des anciennes corporations d’arts et métiers et des confréries religieuses de la capitale de la Normandie. 173 ADSM 3E1, Boite 113. April 12, 1445. “ …comme a cause de la guerre que a esté a laquelle dieu plaise de sa grace mectre fin et apaisement gens de plusieurs parties et divers mestiers se soyent trays en ceste ville de Rouen pour obvier et fuir es grans perilz et dangiers qui pouroient advenir en laquelle ville ilz ont esté charitablement et douchement Receullyz et par promision de justice du consentement des gardes des

132 granted to these bouchers venus de dehors stipulated that their activities were to be tightly regulated, and that they were only allowed to sell their merchandise outside two designated gates of the city. By 1445, however, truces between the French and English had reduced the trouble in the countryside, and the local butchers sought to rescind even this limited “tolerance” and send the outsiders back to their own domains as expediently as possible.

To make the case for the reaffirmation of their ancient monopoly on the sale of meat within the city, the Rouennais butchers emphasized that they had borne great expenses because of the war while claiming that the majority among them could no longer make a living “because of the great number of them there… due to the permission and tolerance that had been made to the butchers from away.”174 They also insisted that newcomers had violated the limited permissions they had granted. On these grounds, all bouchers de dehors were obliged to leave the city as soon as possible, and by the beginning of 1446 at the latest. It is worth acknowledging that the refugees did get some voice in these discussions. Indeed, we only know about the order to make them move on from the city because one of the butchers affected by the implementation of this ban—

Guillaume Frégant, from the town of Jumièges, some twenty kilometers to the west of

Rouen—brought a successful petition to English authorities, requesting an exemption so that he could continue in his established practice of selling his meat outside of the city gates. His request was ultimately granted. Still, this example shows that refugees in

mestiers dicelle ville incluians a leurs Requestes en especial des gardes de boucherie ceulx qui se emmectoient dudit mestier de boucherie ont jouy et use dudit mestier de boucherie hors les portes chaussoise martainville et le bout du pont soubz la visitation desdiz gardz et sans preuidice de leurs ordonnances… ” 174 “ A cause de la guerre le grand nombre quilz estoient dont la greigneur partie ne povoit vivre pour la promision et tollerance qui estoit faicte auxdiz bouchier venuz de dehors ”.

133 Rouen were only able to live and work in the city by leave of the local authorities, who in turn faced pressure from the powerful factions within their city as they decided on the extent of the local privileges that outsiders could enjoy. Many similar policy decisions on the status of forains and gens venus de dehors arose over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as refugees came to the Rouen to escape war and pestilence. The precise issues of contention and the power dynamics shifted as the structures of local governance changed under the régimes of Plantagenet and Valois monarchies. But the parameters and central issues of those debates remained consistent.

Even from the earliest phases of the Hundred Years War, authorities in Rouen found themselves confronted with dilemmas that forced them to decide between opening their city up to those displaced by war or protecting the interests and privileges of the people who were already a part of the population. A 1358 charter issued by the mayor

Jacques le Lieur concerning the regulation of the butchers of Rouen demonstrates that municipal authorities were already dealing with many of the same concerns that arose during and after the siege as they evaluated the status of refugees within the community.

In that year, because of the war and pillaging carried out by the French and English armies, “a great quantity of men from the countryside around [Rouen] came to take refuge in the city, for which it was necessary to bring a great deal of food and provisions, not only for the sustenance of the people of the city, but also for the people who came to take refuge.”175 The effort to deal with the arrival of the displaced created a whole host of concerns for local corporations of food producers and the council of municipal leaders

175 ADSM, 3E1 Anc. Boite 113.1 “ Comme pour doubte des aucuns et malvueillans du Roy et du duc nos souverains seigneurs plusieurs grant quantite des gens du plat pays demurian ladicte ville soient venuz a Reffu en icelle par quoy il estoit necessite que il venist en ladicte ville pluesiers biens et denrees Espalment de vivres et vitailles tant pour la substentation du peupple de la dicte ville comme pour les gens venus a Reffui come dit es.t ”

134 tasked with defending the community and smoothing over tensions that arose within it.

Helpfully, the text of the decision that Jacques le Lieur handed down in 1358 traces out the contours of the refugee crisis and specific response measures that the municipal authorities had already implemented in order to justify the policy that the charter ultimately implements. This record showcases the delicate balancing act that the conseillers of Rouen had to perform as they tried to adapt to a crisis while honoring long- established precedents governing the corps des métiers.

The influx of refugees in the late 1350s had an immediate effect on the prices and availability of food in Rouen, with the charter issued by Jacques le Lieur explaining that,

“provisions were too dear in the city, which was a great detriment to its common people.”

176 Aggravating the situation was the fact that many of the personnes venus de dehors who had come to find safety in Rouen had always earned their livelihood as butchers

“and did not know how to do anything else, so that they were unable to make a living to provide for themselves, their wives, and their children.”177 The slaughter of livestock and the sale of meat was tightly controlled by the powerful corporation of butchers established within the city. According to their regulations, only established jurés of

Rouen could hold this profession. This forced capable butchers out onto the streets to beg for their bread, and in doing so contributed to the general shortage of food to go around to the urban poor. In light of these concerns, the prud’hommes of the city decided, “at the request of the common people,” that the butchers who came from outside of Rouen should be given leave and license to sell their meat in designated locations, namely, near

176 Ibid. ” Lesdictes vivres feussent trop encheris en ladicte ville, laqeulle chose eulte esté ou gran peuidice et assansement du commun peuple d’icelle et desquelles personnes venuz de dehors. ” 177 Ibid. “ Desquelles personnes venuz de dehors pluseiurs en y a qui ont acoustumé à vivre du mestier de boucherie ne scavent autre chose faire eulx leurs femmes et leurs enffans don’t eulx se puissant vivre ne soustenir. ”

135 the gates of the city, far away from the markets where the local butchers hawked their merchandise. The decision to authorize outsiders to sell meat in Rouen was clearly made with the intention of appeasing a population anguished by hunger and high prices, but in taking this step the municipal council infuriated the local butchers. The gardes of were joined by many of its members as they offered a pointed response to the new policy.

Specifically, the representatives of the butchers’ corporation emphasized that the licensing of newcomers directly contravened “the privileges, customs, and traditions of the city,” and they insisted that the extraordinary allowance ran “expressly counter to the ordinances of their profession.”178 To make their case, they reiterated that the butchers’ longstanding regulations stipulated that no one who had not already lived in Rouen and maintained a hearth there for the span of a year and a day could work as a butcher. On top of this restriction, their ordinances required that new members perform four years of service to the city before entering the corporation. Rebutting the claims about the hardships refugees faced as they tried to earn a livelihood, they insisted that it was the

Rouennais butchers who could no longer provide for their wives and children as a direct result of the new policy. In support of this claim, they outlined the obligations that they had to meet as inhabitants of Rouen, while complaining that the new policy forced them to compete with outsiders who did not have to perform duties in the guet and militias or contribute to the numerous tailles, subsides, and aides paid by members of the local population. Finally, the butchers’ representatives emphasized that they paid substantial fees even to gain admittance into the corporation, in addition to the costs they bore in the form of taxes to the royal and municipal war effort. In short, the corps of local butchers

178 Ibid. “ … Et nous ont monstre en complaignant que les choses dessudictes sont contre les privilleges coustumes et usaiges deladicte ville et expressement contre lordonnances de leurdict mestier. ”

136 believed that the municipal council had granted their counterparts from outside the city all the liberties that they enjoyed as jurés without subjecting them to any of the same obligations and regulation.

Forced to confront the impact that their policy had on this prominent faction of the population, the mayor and counselors chose to modify their original policy in an effort to achieve a compromise. In response to the supplication of the corps of butchers, they agreed to establish clear parameters and regulations on the sale of meat by the refugees in the city. The first step was to ensure that there would be no further abuses by butchers who left their designated areas in order to entice customers away from the local butchers markets in the center of the city. To this end, the act granted the gardes of the butchers’ corporation jurisdiction over the markets near the four city gates, and in doing so gave them the power to uphold local standards on the quality and price of the merchandise they sold. The members of the corporation also received assurances that they would not be facing this new competition indefinitely; under the revised terms governing the sale of meat by gens de dehors, this privilege would only be guaranteed for a year and a day. Furthermore, if the conditions in the region changed and an abatement in the “war and pestilences that are present” offered refugees a chance to return to their homes, then their license to slaughter and sell meat in the city would be immediately rescinded. By contrast, if the situation in the plat pays did not improve within the year, the mayor retained the right to extend the authorization that they had granted.179 And indeed, it took much longer than a year for the troubles in Normandy to subside, which

179 Ibid. “ iceulx de dehors ne peussent plus user ne labourer dudict mestier en icelle… toutefuoyes que si les guerres et pestillences qui son present ne cessoient entre cy et ledicts temps. que nous ou le maire puissons les allonger. ”

137 forced authorities in Rouen to regularly reevaluate whether or not outsiders would be welcome to earn a living in the city – and if so, on what conditions.

There is no record of what happened to the refugees who were working as butchers in Rouen in 1358 after the year passed and war and plague still reigned in the countryside. We do know, however, that as the unyielding tumult in Normandy prevented refugees from returning to their original homes, the bouchers forains came to be an established part of the Rouennais commercial landscape. This did not mean that their presence and competition came to be any more acceptable to members of the local corporation, who continued to offer their vociferous objections to any encroachment on their traditional privileges and regulations. For example, in 1389, they directed an appeal to Charles VI in order to express their discontent that the bouchers forains were abusing their privileges by selling their meat in the streets around the city – specifically, near the cathedral of Notre Dame and in front of the church of Saint-Maclou, rather than in the designated market hall. This not only prevented the gardes from monitoring their merchandise, but also reduced the revenues that they obtained from their market stalls, thereby increasing the burden of the fees they paid to conduct business there. The king responded by issuing a decree that the restriction on the sale of both fresh and salted meat by outsiders should be rigorously reaffirmed and publicized by the town criers so no forains could plead ignorance and continue in their violations.180 This example illustrates the fact that the privileges of the local corporations were not liable to be cast aside lightly in favor of outsiders, even at the highest levels of governance. Not only did they have the force of custom behind them, but they served a recognized economic purpose in maintaining the strength of the city’s tax base.

180 ADSM, 3E1 Anc. 113.2, March 6, 1389.

138 In other cases, economic interests took precedence when dire circumstances dictated that the privileges of the craft corporations should be set aside in order to advance the welfare of the wider community. In the early 1400s, the demographic situation shifted once again: where the influx of refugees and the resultant increase in the population had been blamed in 1358 for dramatically increasing housing costs, the counselors of Rouen complained to the king in 1408 that their city was “entirely depopulated,” and that the majority of the houses were vacant and ruined. As a result of the shortage of competent craftsmen in the city, the population was struggling to meet the obligations of the royal tailles because of a lack of revenue. In response, Charles VI agreed to void “the ordinances and statutes of the métiers… by which no one could work a craft in the city if he had had not learned it there and served a certain tenure according to the ordinances of each métier.”181 Charles’ ruling on the matter went on to add that such restrictions had prevented “many people who were good, sufficient and able” from working in the city. In authorizing the admission of “any worker of any craft” who was willing to come stay in Rouen and pay the requisite fees for entry into the local corporations, the royal ordinance emphasized that this decision had been taken at the behest of not only the counselors but also the gardes of the corps des métiers. Even though there was widespread recognition of the need to loosen the regulations restricting forains’ ability to work, the ordinance noted that the corporations of butchers and drapers vehemently persisted in their objections.

181 ADSM, 3E1 Anc. Régistre U2, June, 1408. “ …pour l’occasion que sur le facit des mestiers deladicte ville dont y en avoit grant nombre avoient aucunes ordonnances statuts et autres observances rigoreuses par lesquelles nulle personne ne pouroit ouvrer dudit mestier en ladicte ville sil ne lavoit aprise en icelle et sejourné le temps qui y apparteneroit selon l’ordonnance dun chascun mestier. Et a moien de ce plusieurs personnes qui estoient bons suffisans et habilles pour executer lesdicts mestiers nestoit en ce recuez, Ladicte ville estoit entièrement despuepplee, la pluspart des maisons dicelle tumbez en Ruyne et les discours de la marchandise à neant… ”

139 Similarly, during the early stages of the English siege of 1418, the municipal counselors and the royal officers stationed in the city agreed to lift longstanding restrictions on the sale of bread within the city. As the staple of the Rouennais diet, the production and sale of bread was normally monitored and tightly regulated by municipal authorities and the gardes of the bakers’ corporation. The “ancient instructions and ordinances” of Rouen dictated that boulangers de dehors (bakers who were came from outside the ban of Rouen) could only sell the bread that they made within the city limits during the general market that took place each Friday at the Vieil-Tour; additional regulations stipulated that they would forfeit any unsold bread in order to pay for the costs of running the local mills. Furthermore, bread prepared outside of Rouen could only be sold at designated gates, and could not be resold during a twelve hour window on market day in order to insure that the “common people” received the best price. But in consideration of the “necessity of the people in and flocking into [Rouen] each day,” the counselors determined that any and all restrictions on the sale of bread should be lifted.

According to these provisions, anyone—whether local or from away—could sell bread at any time, and anywhere within the city. To explain this policy, the council noted that many of the people who had come to take refuge in Rouen were trying to find ways to earn an honorable living, either by baking bread or by retailing directly to other members of the population. Allowing them to do so served the interests of the community by increasing the availability and decreasing the price of bread, while simultaneously reducing the refugees’ dependency.182

182 A full transcription of this document, from ADSM 3E1 Anc. Régistre A, 173v-175, is available in Adolphe Chéruel, Histoire de Rouen sous la domination Anglaise au quinzième siècle (Rouen, 1840), 156- 162.

140 As soon as the siege ended, the bakers of the ban of Rouen promptly dispatched a representative to the new procureur who managed the city’s affairs on behalf of the

English, in order to demand that their ancient privileges be confirmed and their monopoly on the sale of bread reinstated. The request was promptly granted—another testament to the decisive influence of precedent and privilege, and the contingent status of the refugees who came to Rouen in times of crisis. In summarizing the trends observed in the treatment of the refugees, it is worth acknowledging that the various royal officials and municipal authorities tasked with guiding Rouen through crises regularly tried help the displaced. After all, they could have decided never to admit them through the city gates; if we are to take them at their word, they made the decision to allow refugees to take shelter inside their walls out of charity and pity for their suffering in the countryside.

Nevertheless, if the privileges and customs that structured the markets within Rouen could be temporarily set aside because of a crisis, the needs of the local population ultimately took priority. In those cases where authorities in Rouen loosened working regulations on forains and gens de dehors, when we look more closely we invariably find that they did so to advance the immediate interests of the city, whether by rebuilding the tax base, limiting the prices of food for “the common people” of Rouen, or reducing the numbers of non-working poor who were roaming the streets and acting as a social menace. In making such decisions, they temporarily ignored the complaints of factions of the community that were negatively affected in order to advance the interests of the wider population. As soon as the immediate dangers had passed, they responded to pressure to restore the boundaries between jurés and forains that had structured their industries and markets for so long.

141 Returning then to the group sent out to die in the ditches around Rouen during the

English siege, it does indeed seem justified to conclude that refugees—and particularly those who did not have skills as butchers or bakers that could allow them to the contribute to the well-being of the population in some way—were probably a principal contingent among the expelled. In times of crisis, authorities in Rouen consistently looked out for their own and implemented regulations and policies towards outsiders that advanced the best interests of the city. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the expulsion of refugees during the siege does not serve as evidence of xenophobia, per se, or even any particular hostility towards the people who had come to take shelter in the city in the weeks before the siege began. The contemporary accounts of the siege almost all emphasize how devastating it was for those inside the walls to witness the plight of the people they had left to perish in the ditches outside the city, and how much pity they felt for them.183 Rather, the expulsion of refugees is the most extreme manifestation of the calculating self-interest that guided the policy decisions of the municipal council.

Ultimately, the gambit they made proved futile: the king of France and the duke of

Burgundy never mustered the long awaited relief force, and by January of 1419 the dire state of the food supply forced the Rouennais to accept ruinous terms of surrender from

Henry V – including a provision ordering them to accept any survivors left in the ditches back into the city.184 But as this episode so tragically demonstrates, when desperate times called for desperate measures, the authorities charged with protecting Rouen regularly

183 See especially Chroniques d’Enguerrand de Monstrelet,132, and John Page, “Siege of Rouen”. 184 The terms of surrender, which called for an enormous tribute of 3,000 écus and the forfeiture of all weapons, along with other humiliating provisions, specifically ordered, “ que lesdictes nobles bourgoys et autres estans dedens ladicte ville et chasteau incontinent Receveront et feront entres en ladicte cite tous et chacuns estans aux fossez ou entour les fossez de ladicte ville. Lesquelz par pouvreté seroit sortis dicelle. Lesquelz ils seroient tenus de nourir jusques au dict XIXme jour de janvier. ” The full text of the January 1419 surrender agreement is found in ADSM 3E1 Anc. U2, Folio 121v.-127.

142 chose to preserve members of their commune by putting the burden of sacrifice on those who came from somewhere else.

“Dangerous, Infected, and Suspected”: Plague Prevention and the Itinerant Poor in Lyon

The twelve consuls of the municipal administration of Lyon faced many of the same dilemmas as their counterparts in Rouen, and the strategies they adopted to handle refugees and the transient poor show that they too sought to implement pragmatic measures that put the well-being of members of the commune above any other concerns.

Beyond this overall similarity, the methods the consuls of Lyon used and the reasoning they offered to explain their policies reflect the influence of the distinctive concerns that shaped their decisions. Though the Lyonnais dealt with all the same crises that affected

Rouen, there were fundamental discrepancies in the coping strategies they adopted that are attributable to the different ways that they experienced them. Like Rouen, Lyon was frequently affected by warfare, as the city was implicated in conflicts within France and in the struggles spilling over from the duchy of Savoy, Italy, and the Holy Roman

Empire. During the civil war within the Valois royal family that ravaged France from

1417 until 1435, the city held particular strategic significance as a stronghold of support for King Charles VII on the frontier of the territories of his enemies, the dukes of

Burgundy.185 As a prosperous commercial center, Lyon and its suburbs were attractive targets for bands of mercenaries, and the registers of the consulate show that the

185 On Lyonnais involvement in the Anglo-Burgundian Civil War, and the general conditions within the city during this conflict, see Jean Déniau, La Commune de Lyon et la Guerre Bourguignonne 1417-1435. For an invaluable survey of the full range of crises afflicting Lyon in this period, see the chapter “Epreuves et promesses” by René Fédou in André Latreille, ed. Histoire de Lyon et du Lyonnais (Toulouse, 1975), 112-132. Marie-Thèrese Lorcin, Les Campagnes de la région lyonnaise aux XIVème et XVème siècles (Lyon, 1974), offers invaluable contextual information about the conditions within the wider region around the city.

143 municipal officials and royal lieutenants were ever mindful of the threats posed by armies moving through their region – and individual outsiders who could do violence to their community from within its walls. Yet while officials in Lyon were always preoccupied with preventing and preparing for war, it was in fact plague that consistently inflicted the greatest damage to their community.

The fear of contagion played a principal role in shaping the ways the consuls treated outsiders. Because of its position as a major intersection for western Europe, Lyon was particularly vulnerable to the spread of illness by travelers, merchants, and pilgrims moving to and from “infected places” —as cities stricken with plague were commonly described within the municipal documentation. Between thirty and forty percent of the

Lyonnais died in the great plague epidemic of 1348. Another major epidemic devastated the city in the early 1360s, leaving the population around half of the size it had been when the commune first received privileges of self-administration in 1320. Several years of poor harvests paved the way for plague to sweep through Lyon again a decade later, between 1371 and 1375. Epidemics recurred frequently over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with more than ten afflicting the community between 1427 and

1482 alone.186 The frequency of these outbreaks had a devastating effect on population levels, and in their appeals for tax reductions for the city, municipal officials commonly lamented that the mortality was so great that entire streets and neighborhoods had been left vacant. Epidemics had major economic consequences as well. The rumor that contagion was spreading in or around Lyon could send ripples through the commercial networks that relied on the city as an entrepôt, deterring merchants from coming to trade

186 Fédou, in Histoire de Lyon et du Lyonnais, 113.

144 their goods.187 In some cases, the mere threat of plague was enough to prompt the wealthier members of the community to seek safety elsewhere, leaving a diminished population with even less ability to pay the tailles the monarchy demanded to pay for the kingdom’s wars.188

In light of the demographic and economic damage the plague wrought within

Lyon, it is not surprising that the members of the consulate did everything in their power to prevent disease from spreading into the community. If we trace the measures they implemented from the earliest epidemics in the fourteenth century up through the demographic and economic revival that was beginning to gain momentum in the city by the sixteenth century, it is not surprising to find that the strategies for preventing and controlling contagion grew more comprehensive, refined, and brutal through long and hard won experience. Even the most sophisticated plans to protect the city from disease were far from completely successful, which meant that municipal authorities were often faced with the task of halting epidemics while they dealt with the challenge of finding new ways to prevent additional outbreaks. Over decades of trial and error, authorities in

Lyon tested a wide range of measures as they worked to eliminate modes of transmission and sources of pollution that could facilitate the spread of disease. Strict regulations on where and when butchers could dump their offal aimed to preserve the quality of the water.189 Recognized as transmitters of disease because of their habit of wallowing in the city’s latrines, pigs were removed to the outskirts of the city when fears of an epidemic

187 Archives Municipales de Lyon (AML) CC 431 Piece 60; CC 480.2, Piece 43. These records from the municipal treasury, both of which were request for tax exemptions because of the effects ‘mortalités’ in deterring merchants, attests to concerns about diminished revenue as a result of the prevailing insecurity in this period. 188 AML CC 455 Piece 22, 1472-1475. 189 AML BB 5, Folio 172.

145 were running high.190 Public assemblies that were held to give citizens the opportunity to discuss the affairs of the commune were suspended in order to limit interpersonal contact, and homes known to house families affected by plague were quarantined.191 By 1477, the consulate had begun work on an enlarged hospital to care for the plague-stricken on the outskirts of the city. These and other measures aimed at preventing the corruption of air and water were important aspects of the overall strategy that the Lyonnais consuls used to avoid epidemics.

But it was the identification and management of human carriers of contagion that became central to the strategies that they used to prevent and contain the plague. Fewer municipal records survive from fourteenth-century Lyon to detail the measures that the consulate put in place to prevent or control plague outbreaks. By the middle of the fifteenth century, there is clear evidence that they viewed and treated lepers, outsiders, and wandering beggars as principal sources of disease. For this reason, the immediate responses to the appearance of plague or rumors of epidemics spreading in nearby regions focused on managing the movements of these groups in and around the city. As was the case elsewhere in France and Western Europe, the lepers of Lyon were always subject to regulation, with the consulate maintaining designated, lock-secured plots on the outskirts of the city for colonies of the infected. They delegated the task of providing for the lepers to members of the city’s religious orders, or low-ranking municipal officials, and at times they showed themselves to be ostensibly sympathetic to their plight. In 1456 for example, the consuls granted the lepers who were deemed to be less contagious the right to come into the city in order to beg for alms, although this measure

190 AML CC 534, Piece 50. 191 Among the many examples of this policy in action, see AML CC 739, N° 20.

146 could be viewed more cynically as an attempt to reduce the financial burdens the city bore in providing for them.192 When the risk of disease was high, however, municipal officials acted more coldly. When fears of a spreading contagion arose anew in 1486, the treasury records of the consulate list payments to a “Master Pierre, executor of high justice, for chasing the poor lepers out of the city and making sure that they stayed there.”193 By this point, such measures were taken because of the general association of leprosy with the spread of disease, rather than the rash suspicion that triggered a general massacre of the Lyonnais lepers in 1321, when they were blamed for initiating famine by poisoning the wells, vines, and grain.194

The expulsion of lepers when epidemic spread through the Lyonnais region in

1486 was only one element of a wider strategy that the consuls used to identify and purge sources of contagion from the city in that year. They also ordered the gatekeepers to closely monitor individuals coming through the gates, specifically singling out “those from Soleise”, a town just over two hundred kilometers to the east of Lyon where plague was running rampant. Unfortunately, we have no details about how the gatekeepers determined where someone was from. Did they look at sealed documents and insignia used to identify and authorize merchants who wanted to come trade in the city? Did they seek testimonies from local citizens who could vouch that they had been honest about where they came from? Did they rely on visual markers such as clothing, scars, tattoos, or birthmarks, or aural cues such as distinctive regional and local accents? Such methods

192 BB 7 f. 32-34v. 193 CC 506, Pièce 30, “ à maistre pierre, executeur de la haute justice, pour chasser les povres ladres hors ladite ville et soy prendre garde qu''ilz n'y arrestent. ”See also, AML CC 472, N°3, “ A maistre Pierre, le bourreau de ladite ville, pour avoir dechasse les povres malades ladres par les moys prohibez. ” 194 On the persecutions of Lepers in 1321, see Malcolm Barber, “Lepers, Jews and Moslems: The Plot to Overthrow Christendom in 1321”, and Histoire de Lyon, 112.

147 served as identification techniques in cities elsewhere in late-medieval Europe, but the succinct treasury records that provide much of the best information about the steps the city took to prevent contagious outsiders from entering Lyon do not mention how the gatekeepers carried discerned who was coming from where, and whether or not their provenance made them dangerous.195 What is clear is that the consulate usually implemented policies that were aimed at managing and containing the threats posed by specific groups. Rather than taking the drastic measure of banning every outsider from the city—a decision that would have had obvious negative implications for commerce— the consuls instead opted for a more targeted approach.

Frequently, the consular deliberations and treasury records simply mention the need to prohibit individuals linked to “dangerous places,” or “suspected and infected places” from entering the city. At the first sign of an epidemic raging through the surrounding region, the consuls implemented strict measures to forbid any people from coming to the city from those places associated with the plague. The gates of Lyon acted as a first line of defense, where gatekeepers stopped and evaluated would-be entrants to determine if they posed a risk to the community. In order to maximize the effectiveness of such restrictions, they placed the highest value on early and accurate information about where and how and epidemic was moving. The records of the consular deliberations frequently list the payments made to messengers and scouts who ventured out into the countryside and to nearby cities in order to get news about where epidemics were spreading and what other dangers lurked.196 Municipal authorities used this information,

195 On the identification methods commonly used in late medieval Europe, see Valentin Groebner, Who are you?, as well as Etienne Hubert, “Una et eadem persona sive aliae personae”, in “Arriver” en Ville, 52-64. 196 See for example, AML CC 750, Folio 8, which records payments to servants who went around to identify places infected with the plague and drive infectz from the city.

148 in turn, to inform decisions about who would be allowed to enter the city. In some cases, the consulate issued vague, blanket restrictions with the stated objective of preventing any suspectz or infectz from coming to the city. In other cases, however, the consulate issued much more focused restrictions, as they did when banning people from Soleise from coming into Lyon in 1486.197 Records of the measures they took in such instances can offer insights into how they might have implemented the restrictions that prohibited specific groups from entering the community, while also provoking challenging questions about how they evaluated whether or not a newcomer posed a danger to the community.

The targeted restrictions that the Lyonnais authorities imposed in 1456 provide a revealing illustration of the strategies used to identify and curb the threat of epidemic. As plague spread through southern and eastern France, the consuls took preventive measures that relied on the containment of contagious outsiders as a principal means for evading an outbreak in the city. The concerns articulated in their minutes focused on the “dangers that could come to pass through mortality and pestilence because many from the lands of

Languedoc and Burgundy [were coming] to retreat into the city in order to flee and escape the said mortality.”198 This passage indicates that Lyon had become a major destination for refugees from those regions afflicted with plague. It was a role the consuls were eager to shirk. Hoping to limit the risk that potentially contagious refugees could find their way into the city, they issued payments to guards to stand watch at the entry to the bridge of the Rhône and the gate of Bourgneuf, to the southwest of the city. These

197 CC 506, Pièce 30. 198 BB 7, Folio 38r. “ Item pour obvier aux dangiers qui poroit advenir en mortalité et pestilence à l’occasion de ce que plusieurs du pais de langue doch et aussi du pais de bourgogne se viennent Retrayre en ceste ville pour fuir et eviter ladicte mortalité… a ordonné que l’on comecte es portes du pont du Rosne et de bourgneuf en chascune porte une personne qui guarde icelles portes et deffende lentree a ceulx qui veindront desdicts pais infectz de pestilence aux gaiges et salaire… etc. ”

149 gates were the principal access points for travelers using the main roads from the afflicted regions of Burgundy and Languedoc, respectively. Close monitoring of the entrants at these locations would thus have facilitated efforts to limit the numbers of potentially contagious persons coming to the city. Refugees from Burgundy and Languedoc were not the only ones to use these the Rhône bridge and the Port de Bourgneuf, however, which still leaves the question of how the gatekeepers distinguished them from others who were seeking entry into city. The consulate minutes indicate that refugees from these regions were arriving en masse, which would have made the gatekeepers’ duties easier by allowing them to lump unknown individuals together and turn away groups of tired people lugging a few cherished possessions.

Inevitably, the restrictions that aimed to protect the Lyonnais community from dangerous outsiders also affected those who were necessary to the local economy. At the most draconian extreme of municipal policies for preventing plague outbreaks is the uncompromising stance that the consuls of Lyon adopted in the measures they took to protect their population in 1502. When news reached the city that plague was moving through “many and diverse places, near and far” the members of the consulate took swift and dramatic measures to prevent the contagion from spreading to their population. On the recommendation of the chancellor who served the interests of the monarchy, they issued an order prohibiting “all manners of people coming from dangerous places, suspected and infected with plague... from entering, passing through, or staying in the city.” Those who dared to violate this ordinance were to be “hung and strangled,” or subjected to arbitrary fines.199 The act outlining these stern measures insisted that they

199See payments made in AML CC 561 and AML CC 552 N° 12 “ Aux huit portiers qui furent commis a la garde des portes pour obvier au dangier de la peste, ainsi et par la maniere qu'il fut advise par monseigneur

150 were an absolute necessity for averting the dangers posed by epidemic. To implement the quarantine, the consulate made payments to the eight gatekeepers to stand watch at the four gates of the city. But it was not enough to simply issue this ordinance for the prohibition to be effective: the restrictions and the punishments for trespassers had to be well known and strictly enforced if they were to have any impact on deterring people from coming to the city. After the first implementation of this policy in 1502, recurring violations forced the consulate to take additional steps to demonstrate the sincerity of their intentions. For this purpose, they hired a master carpenter to construct scaffolds at each of the four major gates of the city, “so as to terrify bypassers and to punish the disobedients and delinquents... coming from dangerous places.”200

Not surprisingly, the shadow of the gibbets that loomed over those arriving at the gates made Lyon a less than welcoming place for everyone who wanted to come to the city, whether they had come to find shelter and opportunity or buy and sell merchandise.

The restrictions seem to have helped in limiting the extent of the damage that the epidemic of 1502 and 1503 inflicted on Lyon, but authorities in the city were keenly aware of the toll that their drastic measures had taken on the local economy. In a request for a reduction in the taille imposed in 1504, the consulate noted that the merchants from

“infected and suspected places” had neither dared nor been able to trade in the city, “a thing that is more than notorious.” They cited the restrictions as a principal reason for

le chancellier et autres seigneurs du grant conseil du roy… par ordonnance de monsr le chancellier et du grant conseil, en ensuivant le commandement et bon plaisir du Roy, pour donner crainte à toutes manières de gens venans des lieux dangereux, suspectz et infectz de peste, en l'année derrière passée, fut deffendu sur peine d'estre penduz et estranglez et autres amendes arbitraires ” 200 AML CC 561 N° 1.1 “à Jehan, filz de Girardin de la Roche, maistre charpentier, pour quatre gibetz en façon de potences, faiz ès quatre principalles yssues de la ville pour terrir les passans et pugnyr les desobeyssans et delinquans…”

151 their economic struggles.201 The emphasis the consuls placed on the role that royal officials had in advising implementation of such strict and brutal measures indicate that they may have hoped to lower their tax burden by shifting responsibility for their economic problems onto the monarchy—a common ploy in such requests. Regardless of their reasons, the fact that the consuls underscored the damage their policies had done in scaring away merchants is a reflection of their tendency to differentiate between groups of outsiders and make distinctions within the policies they implemented between those who were beneficial or detrimental to the city. In this instance in 1502, their fears of the great epidemic ravaging the surrounding region were so great that they took the drastic step of banning “all manners” of people from dangerous, infected places. More commonly, they based the restrictions they imposed on outsiders coming into the city not only on where they were coming from, but on what kinds of people they were.

If it was wealthy merchants that the Lyonnais consuls were most keen to protect and attract to their city in order to help rebuild its economy, it was the transient poor that they were desperate to keep out of their community – particularly when there were fears or rumors of an outbreak of plague. In a classic article on changes in the structure and administration of poor relief in early sixteenth-century Lyon, Natalie Zemon Davis illuminated many of the concerns surrounding the poor outsiders who came to the city as she explained the development of the charitable institution known as the Aumône-

Générale in 1531. As Zemon-Davis notes, the anxieties about the activities of

201 AML CC 555 N°20. “ la ou mortalité auroit en cours puis davant la sains baptême dernier passée en tous les lieux circumvoisins de ceste dicte ville jusques a présent a cause de quoy aucuns marchans ne marchandises mulaturs ne charretiers venans des lieux suspectz navoient pu ne ousé entrer en ladicte ville comme la chose est plus que notoyre ”

152 impoverished strangers long predated the establishment of this municipal poor house.202

For this reason, it is instructive to take a closer look at the long-term shifts in policies towards vagrants when analyzing the policies that aimed to protect the Lyonnais population from contagious outsiders. As early as the fourteenth century, royal and municipal authorities around France began to take proactive measures to curtail the activities of the masses of unemployed people who gravitated towards cities in search of food and alms. The presence of such individuals was deemed to be an unwanted burden to the networks of charity intended for the support of the “true poor” who were locally based. Vagrants were also associated with all manners of social ailments, such as crime, idleness, and drunken revelry. In 1351, King John II handed down an ordinance that ordered that everyone in Paris should state their profession and find work within three days, or leave the city. This seems to have had little effect, however, and Bronislaw

Geremek has shown that the struggle to stamp out vagabondage in Paris continued through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as the local provost and the monarchy both made repeated, futile attempts to discourage idle strangers from coming to the city.203

In Lyon, there is not only clear evidence of the widely held scorn for the idle behavior of the wandering poor, but also find that the consuls almost invariably viewed and treated vagrants as a principal threat to the health of the local population. This is apparent even in the terminology used to describe them in official documents. In the administrative records of the consulate, wandering beggars who came to Lyon in search of shelter and charity were commonly known as mendiants and vagabondes, or more

202 See Natalie Zemon Davis, “Poor Relief, Humanism, and Heresy” in Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays (Stanford, 1975), especially Part I, 22-29. 203 Bronislaw Geremek, The Margins of Society in Late Medieval Paris (Cambridge, 2006), 28-35. Geremek provides an excellent analysis of the legislation imposed to control vagabondage and associated crime. See also, Sharon Farmer, Surviving Poverty in Medieval Paris (Ithaca, 2005).

153 pejoratively, as maraulx, ribauds, or coquins – terms translating roughly to tramp, or bum. Their presence was so closely linked to the spread of disease that municipal documents often use these derogatory terms interchangeably or in close conjunction with labels such as les infectées and les salées – the infected, the filthy. This connection was not without some foundation, of course. The plague was an equal opportunity killer—the two chapters of the Lyon cathedral lost two thirds of their canons during the epidemics of the early 1370s—but the destitute were more likely to suffer from the malnutrition that made them especially vulnerable to disease.204 Living in close quarters in the squalor of the city streets and roaming between different cities and towns would also have increased chances of exposure to illness. Beggars’ wanderings within the city limits could also have expedited the spread of contagion from one neighborhood to the next. In light of the widespread disdain of the transient lifestyle and the sometimes legitimate concerns about the health risks that poor travelers posed, it is hardly surprising that the consuls of Lyon singled out transients and treated them as a principal threat to the well-being of the community. The fact that their city was a major destination and an attractive stopping point exacerbated the difficulty of the task they faced in attempting to manage their movements in and around Lyon.

Several main strategies for dealing with transients appear in a survey of municipal administrative records from the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. These defy attempts to trace out neat chronological patterns and trends: depending on a host of factors, such as the personalities involved in the decision-making process and the level of fear within the community, the consulate adopted approaches for dealing with the transient poor that ran the gamut from charitable to pitiless. It should be noted, however,

204 Histoire de Lyon, 113.

154 that the consuls mentioned their concerns about the activities of impoverished strangers much more frequently in the records of the early sixteenth century. This is likely an indication that the demographic and economic recovery that was taking hold in this period was drawing in greater numbers of poor people hoping for alms, or perhaps that there was a more severe attitude toward the destitute developing in this period. But many of the measures that the consulate implemented to handle the influx of transients already had a long and established history. The most drastic step the consuls opted for was the wholesale expulsion of all wandering beggars, a measure usually accompanied by a crackdown on lepers who had made their way into the city. The first record of efforts to void the city of “vagabondes et coquins” appears in the municipal council records of

1428, in the wake of a severe epidemic.205 The city was also embroiled in the ongoing civil conflict with Burgundy in this period, and the consuls demonstrated an overall wariness towards outsiders out of fear that they could undermine the local war efforts.

The succinct statement that records the expulsion order makes no explicit connection between this action and the crises the population faced at the time. In other instances though, it is more apparent that the consuls viewed the careful management of poor outsiders as an essential public health measure.

During the long reign of epidemic and famine that afflicted Lyon and the

Lyonnais region in the early 1480s, the consuls twice took measures to limit the numbers of transients in the city in an effort to alleviate the burden on the food supply and diminish the chances that they would spread contagion. The record of the first of these orders, from 1481, offers a somewhat sympathetic assessment of the plight of the poor, lamenting the presence of “many unfortunates, as many from Lyon as from the

205 Georges Guigue, Registres Consulaires de la Ville de Lyon 1422-1450, (Vol. II), (Lyon, 1926), 44.

155 surrounding area, dying of hunger, poverty, and misery, which was a very pitiable thing to see.” They had come to find refuge and “to beg for something to live on,” but the sorry state of affairs within Lyon meant that their presence would only have aggravated the intensity of the suffering felt by those already in the city limits. The consuls did order that a donation of bread should be made to give comfort to those who had come to find help in Lyon, but they made this offering on the condition that the recipients move along and promptly leave the city behind. To bar them from any further attempts to enter the community, they shut three of the gates to the city and ordered guards to closely monitor the entrants coming through the others. 206 Two years later, a new cohort of consuls viewed and treated the itinerant poor who had gathered in the city with even less pity, explaining that the “poor mendicants flowing into the city in great numbers, as much from [places affected by plague] as others, are infected, filthy, and dishonest.” In May of

1483, they ordered their expulsion from Lyon, and told the guards to take precautions so that they would not try to come back. The minutes that explained this measure outlined the specific concerns that prompted it, noting that “in many and diverse places around the city, people were dying of the plague and other contagious maladies.” The principal explanation for the expulsion of the poor newcomers was “the great and irreparable inconvenience” that they could cause, but the minutes also include the remark that “the poor could find something to live on in their quarters, or elsewhere in the countryside.”207

206 AML, BB 352, folio not noted. “ Mesures prises à l’égard des malheureux, tant de Lyon que de circumvoisins, qui mourant de faim de povreté et de misere, qui estoit chose fort pitoyable a voir. ” 207 AML, BB 17, Folio 60r. “ Pour ce que en plusieurs et divers lieux circumvoisins deladicte ville se meurent de la peste et autres maladie contagieuse, et que en cestedicte ville affluent pouvres mendians en grant nombre, tant desdictes lieux ou l’on se meurt que dautres qui sont infectz sales et deshonnestes. Au moyen de quoy ladicte ville et suppostez dicelle pourroient tumber en grant inconvient et irreparable aussi que moyssons apprecier et pourront lesdict povres trouver de quoy vivre en leurs propres quartiers ou ailleurs sur les champs… ”

156 These two examples from the 1480s reveal some of the prejudices that shaped the treatment of itinerants during periods of crisis, while also outlining two of the principal approaches that the consuls used to handle them. In the first instance, the more sympathetic views expressed towards the poor victims of famine seem to have derived from the recognition that their poverty was attributable to the circumstances of the widespread shortage of food and resources, rather than a lifestyle choice. Though the consuls still recognized poor newcomers as a potential threat to the community and accordingly told them to move along, they at least offered alms to temporarily alleviate their suffering—or at least to have a clearer conscience as they sent them away. Such payoffs were a familiar and common strategy for the consulate, particularly in dealings with refugees: for instance, in 1426, when plague had driven sick people from across the

Rhône and the western suburb of Vaise to seek help in the city, the consuls had delegated local officials to bring them alms on the condition that they stop trying to come into the walled enclosure of Lyon to seek help.208 When it came to those who were believed to be career beggars, however, the consuls took a cynical view that translated into the harsher attempts to regulate their activities. Viewed as inherently dishonest, the lifestyle of wandering beggars was treated as something worthy of modification and punishment.

The wealthy bourgeois who held positions within the consulate demonstrated an eagerness to address both the social and physical ills they associated with vagabondage.

The variations in the severity of the measures they used to do so was not only connected to the intensity of their concerns about the spread of contagion, but also influenced by a sense of realism about the practical challenges of implementation.

208 AML, BB 2, Folio 20.

157 The Lyonnais consulate followed two main approaches for managing the growing numbers of poor outsiders who came to city seeking charity in the early sixteenth century. When there were pressing concerns about the spread of disease, their preferred option was still the wholesale expulsion of vagabonds and those deemed to be undesirables. In 1510, the consuls issued payments to two sergeants “to chase pigs, tramps, and bums, and those from Vourles and other places afflicted with the plague out of the city, in order to maintain it in health and security and to avoid the greatest inconvenience.”209 As the population suffered through another violent outbreak of plague nine years later, the consuls dealt with an influx of “tramps… mendicant friars, and

Egyptians [gypsies]” who had been chased off from Paris because of the plague. They promptly followed the Parisians’ example, ordering that the new arrivals should be

“pitilessly” expelled from the city limits.210 In addition to the concerns the consuls so regularly articulated about the unclean living of the wandering poor and the risk that the presence of such individuals could contribute to the spread of contagion, they at times expressed fears that they were actively trying to do harm to the local community by intentionally spreading disease among the ranks of the healthy. For example, the municipal treasury accounts record payments to several sergeants and boatmen for their efforts in rounding up and banishing “three [female vagrants] infected and contagious with the plague… who mingled with the healthy inhabitants of the city, in order to better

209 AML, CC 597, N 12. “ …à deux sergeants, pour chasser les porceaulx, les marauz et coquins et ceulx de Vourles et autres lieux contagieux de la peste hors de ceste dite ville pour elle maintenir en santé et seurté et affin d’obvier à plus grand inconvient. ” 210AML, BB 38, Folio 293v-297v discusses the measures taken to respond to the plague in the late summer of 1519. The order in question from August 9 orders, the “expulse impitoyablement de la ville des maraulx… religieux, qui sont chassez de Paris à cause de la peste, et égissiens.”

158 infect the city.”211 Such actions provide a clear illustration of the deep-seated anxieties about the effects and intentions of transients that made the tight restrictions on their presence and movements around the city a central element of efforts to combat the spread of disease.

Yet the consuls of Lyon almost always found that it was much easier to order the banishment of the wandering poor than it was to carry out such measures effectively and ensure that the expelled would not return just as soon as they had been driven off. In the late 1520s and early 1530s, as the combined forces of famine and plague once again made the rounds in Lyon and the surrounding region, the consulate made repeated attempts to “chase and send away the unknown tramps and bums who had come into the city to beg because of the shortage of bread.”212 They also continued with targeted efforts to keep those coming from “infected places” out of Lyon, while working to prevent more transients from coming to beg.213 These attempts to regulate the numbers of poor outsiders in the city all proved to be largely futile, which forced the consuls to find other ways to address their presence. One of the main solutions they devised was the imposition of labor requirements for any able-bodied beggars who had gathered in the city. In return for their work, the consuls offered the food and alms that they had come to

Lyon to find, on the condition that they would stay outside the city. This more compromising approach is certainly not an indication of a softened stance towards

211 AML, CC 719, N°13, records a receipt for payment to “ bateliers et sergens qui ont vacqué a bannyr trois maruades infectes et contagieuses de peste.. qui s’entremesloient avec les saint habitans, affin de mieulx infecter ladicte ville. ” 212 AML, CC 802, Piece 41, records salaries given to the sargeants “ qui ont vacqué a chasser et mettre hors les maraulx et coquins estrangers venuz en la ville mendier, a cause de la cherté du pain. ” 213 AML CC 802, N° 29, 30, 34, 35, 36 all list payments given to various sergeants and other officials who made sure that people coming from infected places did not enter Lyon;AML, CC 832, Piece 4, lists a 1533 payment to Claude Thévenet “ commys à la porte du Rosne à vacquer que les maraulx et infectz n’entrassent en ladicte ville, et mesment ceulx qu’on avoit jecté hors Saint-Laurent… ”

159 transients. Rather, it shows a recognition of the limitations of municipal power. The consulate was always in need of more laborers for the never-ending work on the trenches that served as a first line of defense against enemy armies and brigands seeking to do harm to Lyon or pillage the suburbs. Their efforts to cajole citizens into doing their part consistently met with resistance. By corralling the transients wandering through the city streets and bringing them out of Lyon to work in return for food and alms, the consuls were able to find the path of least resistance as they worked to address two needs that they believed to be central to the community’s ability to endure crisis and prevent further misfortunes.

Indeed, the range of policies that the consuls of Lyon implemented to deal with the transients and refugees who flocked to their city consistently reflect the same sense of pragmatic self-interest that guided the decisions of the municipal council in Rouen. As we have seen, the careful management of outsiders was a central tenet of the strategies that authorities in both cities used as they worked to preserve the well-being of their communities or limit the effects of crises that were already afflicting their populations.

To be sure, the harsh measures that the Lyonnais enacted to control the transient poor who came to their city at times reflects a level of discrimination that went beyond reasonable concerns about the possibility that they might spread disease to the population through their wanderings within the city and from place to place. Still, on close inspection, the records detailing the expulsion and punishment of transients reflect a resentment for their debauched lifestyle and their efforts to draw on local networks of charity more so than an inherent hostility to the foreign. When dealing with refugees and people coming from “dangerous and infected places,” the consuls at times took brutal

160 measures to ensure the safety of their community. But they also recognized that a city that relied on commerce could not afford to be closed off to outsiders for long. For this reason, they consistently attempted to differentiate between the diverse groups and individuals who sought to enter their cities, and they adapted their policies to meet rapidly shifting circumstances: the continued survival and prosperity of their communities depended on their ability to accurately discern who was beneficial and who was detrimental to their community.

The Road to Ruin and Recovery: Migration and the Decline of Medieval Montpellier

For the inhabitants of Rouen and Lyon, the challenge of dealing with an influx of refugees, transients, and poor migrants was a central element of the experience of crisis.

As the case studies above have shown, municipal authorities in those cities attempted to protect their communities by implementing targeted measures to regulate the presence, privileges, movements, and activities of the newcomers who had been driven to their gates by war, plague, and famine. In Montpellier, however, the officials within the local consulate only rarely articulated worries about the threats posed by refugees and migrants coming into their cities. Instead, they expressed a much greater concern about the departure of prominent members of the community that contributed to the depopulation and overall economic decline of their once great commercial center.

The exodus of inhabitants had been a problem for Montpellier from at least as early as 1388, when the consulate sent a request to the king, Charles VI, for a remission of the great tax burdens that he had imposed upon them. In their plea, they stressed the fact that they were no longer able to meet his demands because “of the great mortalities

161 that have come through the land numerous times.” Complaints about the effects of diminished population and the plagues, wars, famine, and pillaging that afflicted the kingdom were the norm in requests for tax remissions. But the Montpelliérain consuls also cited the fact that “many inhabitants of the city had fled and gone to stay in Aragón or elsewhere, out of our Kingdom.” As they told it, the emigration of these individuals was both a result and cause of the economic hardships that had forced many members of the population to take exorbitant loans from Jewish bankers to pay the sums expected of them.214 In time, the consuls came to the conclusion that it was only by reversing the trend and encouraging immigration that their community would be able to recover.

The steep financial demands of the French monarchy and the royal lieutenants charged with overseeing local affairs in Montpellier were an unyielding burden that exacerbated crises and created additional hardships for the local population by driving away wealthy members of the community. The city’s inhabitants had been accountable to

French taxation demands since 1349, when Philip IV of France completed the annexation of Montpellier by purchasing its remaining territories from the king of Majorca.

Following its acquisition Montpellier became a member of the estates of Languedoc, which consisted of an assembly of the three estates of clergy, nobility, and bourgeois that negotiated taxes with the king. Most commonly, the royal taxes took the form of the direct taille, a set sum imposed on a community and distributed and collected according

214 Archives Municipales de Montpellier (AMM), Louvet, Grand Chartrier 143, 144, 145. “ …par occasion du fait de noz guerres qui eslongent et continuelement ont duré es diz pays et des grans mortalitez qui par plusieurs foiz y ont esté, et aussi pour la sterilité des temps. Et pour les grans charges fraiz mises et despens quil leur a convenu et convient chacun jour supporter pour le dit fait de noz guerres…Et avec ce pour plusieurs --- gens darmes de compaignez et autres malfaiteurs qui par plusieurs foys ont esté et chevauchié par les diz pays piller et robber les habitants dicellui… Et pour les empruns que faire leur a convenu aux Juifs et autres par yceulx exposans sont si descheuz et venir a grant pouvreté, misère et mendicité qu’ilz nont de quoy vivre… et se sont renduz fuitifz plusieurs habitans diceulx pays et aler demourer en aragon et autres parties hors de nostre royaume. ”

162 to the value of the property and possessions of each inhabitant. The impact of this mode of taxation thus depended heavily on the size and wealth of a population, and this meant that the Montpelliérains felt the effects of the new impositions acutely.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Montpellier had been one of the great urban centers of the western Mediterranean, with a permanent population of approximately 40,000 supplemented by the lively traffic of merchants and students hailing from Catalonia, Italy, other regions of France, and Northern Europe. Relying on the compoix used to assess the taxable property of the inhabitants of Montpellier, Josiah

Cox Russell concluded that the city’s population at the end of the fourteenth century was only a quarter of what it had been one hundred years earlier.215 This decrease even led

Charles VI to reduce the number of major consuls administering the city from six to four in 1388. The plague was the culprit that initiated the decline with the great epidemic of the Black Death in 1348; it returned with vengeance in the early 1360s, recurring again frequently thereafter, through the fifteenth century. Like the inhabitants of many cities along the Mediterranean, where estimates propose that as much as 75 percent of the population died in some areas, the Montpelliérains struggled to prevent or halt the spread of disease, and suffered even greater losses demographically than their counterparts to the north in Rouen, and to the east in Lyon. The explanations for the especially heavy toll that plague inflicted in the Mediterranean region vary, but the longer summers in the southern climate, and the rapid dissemination of contagion between port cities undoubtedly facilitated the spread of the disease.216

215 Josiah Cox Russell, “L’évolution démographique de Montpellier au moyen âge,” 345-360. 216 See Samuel Cohn Jr., The Black Death Transformed, 155.

163 Prolonged drought and famine had intensified the effects of the great epidemic that struck in 1363. A major earthquake localized to the Languedoc region struck

Montpellier in 1368, with another tremor rattling the city in 1373. Plague returned again in 1374, and the severity and relentlessness of the outbreak drove the desperate consuls of the city to order the production of a candle wick that matched the total circumference of the walls of the Comuna clausura – the local name for the enclosure that encircled the commune. All through this period, the bands of brigands and unemployed warriors known as “companies of adventure” did their part to contribute to the prevailing insecurity, passing through Languedoc repeatedly and making a direct and ferocious incursion into the Montpelliérain suburbs in 1361.217 This series of calamities served not only to inflict high death rates and suffering on the local population, but also deterred the merchants and students that were the lifeblood of this commercial and intellectual center from coming to trade and study. As outlined in chapter one of this dissertation,

Montpellier was in constant competition for the business of merchants seeking to bring goods from around the Mediterranean region to the markets of the kingdom of France.

Whereas Rouen and Lyon both benefited from the positions they held at the gateways and intersections of major trade routes, Montpellier relied on the protections and incentives that their foundational charter offered to foreign merchants in order to gain an advantage over other destinations along the southern coast of the kingdom. Even the most generous

217 The Occitan chronicle known as the Petit Thalamus, provides one of the best records of the various crises afflicting Montpellier, where it was written. Regarding the first epidemic of the plague in 1348, however, the account is painfully succinct, noting of 1348 only: “Lan de la mortaudat…” (The year of the mortality). The only publisheedtion of the chronicles is Martel ed., Thalamus parvus: le petit thalamus de Montpellier (Montpellier, 1840), 349. The fascinating passage about the fabrication of the candle wick is found on p. 391. A new and much needed critical edition is currently in progress under the direction of Daniel Le Blévec.

164 provisions could do little to encourage wary merchants to come to a vastly diminished market facing such persistent turmoil.

The severity of the demographic hardships that faced Montpellier in the late fourteenth century drove the city’s consuls to follow a much different tack in their treatment of refugees from their counterparts in Lyon and Rouen. The evidence detailing the approaches the consulate took to dealing with those who came to Montpellier to find safety is admittedly limited when compared to the rich array of municipal sources that comment on these issues in Rouen and Lyon. This may simply be a product of differences in the types of municipal documentation that have survived within the respective archives of these cities, but it may just as likely be a result of the circumstances surrounding their admission into the community. As the consuls of

Montpellier dealt with severe and long-running economic decline, they showed themselves to be eager to protect the interests of the refugees who came to their community to find safety and shelter for their families in 1370 and preceding years.

Driven to the gates of Montpellier by war and the activities of the mercenary companies running roughshod through the countryside and the villages and towns throughout

Languedoc, these refugees were welcomed into the city on the condition that they would contribute to the payment of tailles and carry out the military duties that all inhabitants were obliged to perform. For their part, the leaders of the communities they had fled were none too eager to allow absentees to shirk their responsibilities to pay taxes and contribute their services to local defensive efforts in their hometowns. To pressure former residents who had moved to Montpellier to meet their obligations, they conducted seizures against the properties that they left behind in an attempt to goad them into

165 returning. In response, the consuls of Montpellier petitioned the king to put a stop to the harassment of the new members of their population.218

In light of the string of crises and the general decline that afflicted the

Montpelliérains in the second half of the fourteenth century, it is not surprising that the consuls were keen to offer protection to any who were willing and able to establish themselves in the city. They needed all the help they could muster if the population was to meet royal tax burdens, and fresh bodies helped them to avert additional problems by contributing their time and energy to local defensive and fortification efforts.

Nevertheless, the arrival of refugees was not always seen as entirely beneficial to the local economy. The decline that began with the Black Death of 1348 continued into the

1400’s, while the burdens of royal taxation only mounted as the monarchy became mired more deeply in conflicts with the English and Burgundians. This meant that the presence of individuals who could not support themselves increased the general hardship felt within the local community. In 1440, the consulate directed a plea to Charles VII requesting a remission of the taille he had imposed. The content of that plea, as reproduced in the official royal reply, offers a revealing description of the principal hardships that the city faced, as seen by those tasked with addressing them. To justify their requested reduction, the consulate offered a lengthy list of the crises and expenses that had diminished the ability of the population to meet royal financial demands. The consuls had opened their grievance with the plaintive remark that “Montpellier was once one of the best cities in the land of Languedoc, until the mortalities and sterilities of the

218 AMM, Louvet, Grand Chartrier, 1973.

166 age, which had been running through the city for twenty years, or more.”219 They immediately followed this doleful description of the city’s continual decay by emphasizing the role that the royal taxes and the relentless warring of the monarchy had played in weakening its economic foundations.

Moreover, the consuls’ appeal for a reduction in the taille explained specific recent developments that made the royal impositions unusually onerous. At the top of the list, they noted the great expenditure of 1000 livres that the population had born in order to send a delegation of nine local notables to a six-month session of the three estates, held in the distant city of Bourges. Immediately thereafter, the request turned to focus on events within Montpellier; here the consuls’ account illustrates the primary role that the migrations of men and women into and out of city had played in reshaping the community. Outlining the most pressing expenses weighing on the population, their appeal first explained “that they had needed to accept, help, and provide for many poor people from and its neighboring regions, who had lost everything because of the war, and retreated towards [Montpellier].”220 On the surface, the focus on the burden that these refugees imposed may seem to represent a shift in outlook from the attempts that the consulate had made in the 1360s and 1370s to secure royal protections for those who had immigrated to Montpellier in wartime. But it is important to exercise caution here. In the context of an appeal for a tax remission, it was naturally in the best interests of the consulate to emphasize the great cost and trouble the community had gone to in

219 AMM, Louvet, Grand Chartrier, 1164. “ Que comme icelle ville que le temps passé souloit estre lune des meilleurs villes de nostredicte pays de languedoc. Soit a loccasion des mortalitez et sterilitez de temps qui y ont esté et couru continuellement presque par chacune année puis vint ans ença ou plus. ” 220 Ibid. “ Il leur a convenu recueillir plusieurs pouvres gens des parties d’Auvergne et de par deça qui après qui après ce qu’ilz ont eu tout perdu par le fait de la guerre se sont retraiz devers eulx et leur aidier à vivre. ”

167 providing for fellow subjects who had been displaced by war. Still, many of those who traveled hundreds of kilometers from the Auvergne region to find safety in Montpellier had undoubtedly been forced to leave in haste. As they trekked southwards through the rugged terrain of the French Midi to find shelter and better prospects in Languedoc, it would have been cumbersome and dangerous to carry all but the smallest and most essential possessions.

The arrival of a large and empty-handed cohort of refugees would indeed have posed a considerable burden for any cash-strapped city. Rather than indicating a resistance to the presence of these newcomers, per se, the complaints the consuls made about the costs associated with the refugees from Auvergne served to emphasize the systemic financial problems of Montpellier. The consuls went on to articulate the precise nature of these problems within the remainder of their appeal for the tax remission; other municipal sources verify and expand on the points they made. According to the assessments of the consulate, two additional factors inhibited the ability of the

Montpelliérains to raise the funds needed to meet the demands of the taille. The first was that “merchandise had long had very little circulation in this region” - a fact directly attributable to the insecurity of commercial routes to Montpellier. This decrease in commercial activity was also directly connected to the consuls’ second main point, in which they lamented that “many inhabitants of our city have left to go and stay in the realm of Aragón, and other strange nations near here, because they do not have to furnish the said taxes there.”221 It is not surprising that those who left the city looked for the safety and prosperity they craved in Aragón. Montpellier had deep historical and cultural

221 Ibid. “ … la marchandise a eu peu de cours dès longs temps a oudit Pais au Regard de ce que elle souloit avoir que plusieurs des habitans de nostredicte ville sen sont alez et vont demourer ou pays darragon et autres estranges près dilec pour quilz ne peuvent fournir aus dictes charges et autrement…”

168 ties with the adjacent kingdom, with part of the city remaining under the direct authority of its royal family until 1349. The similarities between the Occitan that served as a principal spoken and administrative language in Montpellier and the Catalan used in the domains of Aragón surely facilitated such a transition.222 Most importantly, and as the consuls’ appeal to the king emphasized, those Montpelliérains who left for Aragón hoped for freedom from the exorbitant direct taxes that stunted their efforts to accrue wealth and prosperity as subjects to the crown of France, as well as the inhabitants of Aragón contributed their taxes in the form of impositions on commodities such as wine, salt, or merchandise.

For all the benefits that emigrants to Aragón enjoyed, the departure of well- established, wealthy inhabitants intensified the suffering for those left behind in

Montpellier. The consuls concluded their 1440 plea to Charles VII by lamenting that the city’s population was “much diminished in people and inhabitants… such that those who remain having nothing to live on or pay the sum that remains [for the taille].”223 Such was the sorry state of affairs in Montpellier, at least according to the members of the city’s consulate. But all of the points that they made about the role that migrations to and from Montpellier played in the economic decline of the city raised a central question for the king and his royal officials: were the consuls telling the truth about the nature and extent of their city’s plight? After all, they had good reason to lie or dissimulate as they begged for leniency. The men of commerce and finance who dominated positions of

222 The study by Louis J. Thomas, Montpellier entre la France et l’Aragon pendant la première moitié du XIV siècle (Montpellier, 1929), remains useful in illuminating the enduring ties between Montpellier and the kingdom of Aragón in this period. 223 AMM, Louvet 1164. The plea to the king noted that the city was, “moult diminué de peuple et habitans…telement que grant partie desdictes supplians nont de quoy vivre ne paier plusieurs restes que enocre doivent a cause de nos taillez et impostz.”

169 municipal leadership in cities in France were known to be a cagey lot, and royal officials tended to be suspicious of their unrelenting pleas for exemptions from the financial impositions that sustained the kingdom.224 In order to assess the veracity of the

Montpellier consuls’ persistent complaints of decline and hardship, Charles VII ordered a delegation of royal officials to conduct an inquiry into the economic conditions prevailing in the city in 1448. The immediate impetus for the investigation was a request that the consuls had made asking the king to allow them to collect duties on imported goods, in lieu of imposing a direct taille. The consuls desperately needed funds to support the reconstruction of the ‘Gay Juvenal’ bridge that provided a main avenue to the city across the Lez River. Charles aimed to determine what effect their proposed solution would have, and whether the tailles he had already imposed really created as much hardship as the consuls claimed.225

The record of the inquiry carried out in 1449 provides an extraordinary source of social history that attests to the primary role of migrations in the challenges that the

Montpelliérains faced as well as the strategies they adopted to overcome them. Led by

Thierry le Comte, the governor appointed to oversee affairs in Montpellier for the monarchy, the royal commission solicited testimony from thirty-eight notables within the city ranging in age from twenty-five to sixty. This total included current and former members of the consulate, wealthy merchants and skilled craftsmen, doctors of law from the local university, and royal notaries. Preserved in a beautiful manuscript held in the municipal archives of Montpellier, the text of the inquiry offers an invaluable window

224 On fiscal relations between Charles VII and municipal leaders see, Rivaud, Les Villes et le Roi, 53-62, as well as Katia Weidenfield, Le contentieux de la taille royale au XV siècle (Paris, 2000). 225 The twenty-three folio manuscript detailing the conduct of the inquiry and the testimonies of the Montpelliérains is available in the Archives Municipales de Montpellier under the cote, Louvet 1250.

170 into the personal views that shaped municipal policy decisions in a period of crisis. There is significant overlap in the assessments that the various interviewees from Montpellier provided when asked to assess the state of the local economy and answer whether or not an alteration in the form of municipal tax collection would be beneficial to the crown. Yet the local elites were proud men of professed experience and wisdom, who were keen to share and show off both when given an audience with a governor and a royal commission. Their examinations were conducted independently and under oath.

Although there were several dissenting voices, the vast majority of the thirty-eight witnesses expressed the same general opinions about the economic conditions within the city, while using distinctive experiences and personal insights to support their points. The similarities in their statements derive from the fact that they participated in the same local meetings and debates and shared many of the same views on local affairs, rather than a simple desire to tow the party line.

For this reason, the points that the collection of local worthies made as they testified before the royal commission are especially illuminating in understanding the economic conditions that the city faced in the middle of the fifteenth century. Not only was the emigration of Montpelliérains from the kingdom of France a point of emphasis within explanations for the poverty of the city; the immigration of new inhabitants from

“strange nations” was key to the advocated path to recovery. Because of the distinctive and revealing elements within the testimonies that made these points, it is worth examining a sampling of individual accounts in some detail in order to understand the complete economic context surrounding the departure of local residents. The first recorded testimony before the commission, offered by “the honorable and sage Pierre,

171 dyer, bourgeois of Montpellier of the age of fifty years or around there, with a memory of thirty-five years, or around there,” introduced many of the principal comments and concerns that would show up repeatedly within the inquiry. The commission began by asking Pierre to give his opinion on the truth of the account that the consuls’ had provided of the hardships that the tailles had created for the city. In response he explained that their report was accurate, and that Montpellier was so badly affected by the direct impositions of the tailles because “the greater part of the inhabitants consists of laborers and people of mechanical arts [craftsmen].” As Pierre told it, as a result of their great poverty and the overall depopulation of the city, many had been forced to sell their possessions at prices well below market price, in order to meet their tax obligations to the crown. He considered it to be a great injury to the king that the Catalan merchants who were buying up their goods were returning home with the wealth of Montpellier and the kingdom of France. 226

The second witness called before the governor and the royal commission, a forty- three year old lawyer named Jehan Barrière, offered a similar response. Responding to questions about the effects that the collection of tailles had on the local community, he explained that many of the inhabitants “were in extreme poverty, and were forced to beg for bread” because they had sold all their worldly possessions at half their real value in order to meet the pressing demands of the crown and commune. Others, he hastened to add, had left behind the city and the kingdom “and gone to live in the land of Catalonia,

226 AMM, Louvet 1250, Folio 2r,v.. “ la greigneur partie desdicts habitans laquelle consiste en laboureurs et gens dart mecanique est venue a tres grand pouvretté… lesqeulx par exequtions parce quilz navoient de quoy payer on esté venduz et se vendent tous les jours a vilz pris car plusieurs fois ce qui valloir cinq sols cest donné pour cinq. Et pource que les habitans dicelle ville navons de quoy les acheter sont venuz plusieurs du pays de Cathelongne et les ont achettez pour les vilz pris quilz se vendoient et les en ont portés oudit pais de Cathelogne qui est la destruction et depopulation de ladicte ville et par consequence le dommaige dudict seigneur ”.

172 and other parts.” In turn, the absence of these inhabitants had left many of the houses in

Montpellier vacant and ruined, “which was a great detriment to the city and kingdom.” 227

Jaume Arbousse, a fifty-five year old spice merchant, was even more grim in his assessment of the role the tailles played in diminishing the population of the city, noting in his testimony that “there were many who can no longer tolerate the burdens [of royal taxation], who have decided to take themselves elsewhere, to go stay out of the kingdom.

And because so many people have gone and are going every day, the city becomes ever more depopulated.” As a result of this exodus, he concluded, “the city cannot pay the taxes that the king would like to take.”228 Arbousse may have been the most emphatic in his assertion about the role that royal taxation played in driving more inhabitants out of the city each day and diminishing the general economic strength of the population. But of the thirty-seven other notables who testified before the royal commission, twenty-two others focused on emigration as a principal product or factor in the fiscal hardships that afflicted Montpellier.

Some of the witnesses who noted the deleterious effects of emigration were more optimistic in their appraisals of the community’s ability to enjoy a quick recovery if the king’s council opted to amend royal tax policies. Offering his response to the inquiries about the ideal modes of tax collection, a sixty-year old merchant dyer named Ysarn

227 Ibid., 2v. “ Venerable et discret homme maistre Jehan Barrière licence en loys de Montpellier de laage de cinquante trois ans ou environ et de memoire de quarante trois ans ou environ… a veu que pour avoir de chacun singulier et habitant de ladicte ville la quotte part et portion que lui touchoit dudit aide Ilz ont esté contrains par Riguereuses exequtions venditions de leurs biens meubles… a cause de quoy plusieurs desdictes habitans sont venuz a extreme pouvretté et querir le pain pour dieu et les aucuns delaisser ladicte ville et le Royaum sen sont allez habiter ou pais de Cathelonge et autre parts hors dudit Royaume et tellement que puis aucuns temps enca en a visité les maisons desdicts habitans pour enquerir les facultez… une très grand partie est devenue en Ruine et dereliction. ” 228 Ibid., Folio 12v. “ Jaime Arbousse, espicier de Montpellier de laage de lv ans ou environ de memoire de xl ans... dit qu’il y a plusieurs qui ne le peuvent plus souffrir mais on dispose de leur en aller demourer hors du Royaume et a cause de ce s’en sont allez plusieurs et s’en vont tous les jours et par ainsi se depeuple ladicte ville... par faulte de peuple ny a qui maintiengne et ny paient pas ledit seigneur les droitz quil y vouloit prendre... ”

173 added illuminating personal reflections to substantiate his points. He explained that he had taken several turns on the consulate, and that he had spoken and participated in the recent meetings to determine the best approach to levying tax funds for the monarchy.

Based on his time serving in municipal administration and working with the city’s finances, Ysarn expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the taille. To his mind, it was difficult if not impossible to gain an accurate assessment of the value of the properties that the inhabitants of the city owned because of their tendency to dissemble and conceal the true extent of their wealth. These opinions led him to the conclusion that the imposition of a barrage - a duty on various goods imported into the city - would be far more efficacious in raising the sums that the monarchy demanded. As evidence for this appraisal, he related that he had observed in his travels that cities in Catalonia and

Italy had larger populations that enjoyed greater overall prosperity because they paid duties, rather than tailles. In his view, adopting this approach would help to distribute the burden of royal demands more evenly, and in doing so, would help to encourage those

Montpelliérains who had left the kingdom for Catalonia to come back.229

Going even further in his assertions about the great benefits of levying taxes by barrage rather than by taille, the legal scholar Jehan Angelin espoused the belief that taking this step would stimulate a reversal in the trend of depopulation that had afflicted the city. More specifically, he explained that “many people from strange nations, when they are made aware that they will not pay anything by manner of a taille, will be able to come and live, trade, and work in the city…from which the king could take many great

229 Ibid., Folio 3v-4r.

174 profits, revenues, and emoluments.”230 As Angelin saw it, the immigration that would be stimulated by a change in royal tax policy could initiate an economic recovery, both for

Montpellier and for the kingdom as a whole. Others who testified expressed equally hopeful views about the benefits that the addition of inhabitants from foreign lands could bring, with eighteen of the thirty-eight notables suggesting that the elimination of the taille would encourage departed Montpelliérains to come back while also drawing in new inhabitants and greater numbers of merchants. Of course, the proposal to implement the barrage instead of a direct general tax was not without a few detractors: a prominent butcher named Douchon Foumans complained in his testimony that the imposition of duties would hurt both the city and the king by driving away the merchants who were forced to pay added fees. He even added that this change in the collection of the tax would prompt more of the city’s inhabitants to leave, noting that he would do so himself if such a change was ever implemented.231 But while the cantankerous Foumans differed from fellow inhabitants of Montpellier in his assessment of how best to collect tax revenue, the concerns he expressed about sustaining the circulation of merchants and preventing the emigration of local residents show that he was the exception that proved the rule.

230 Ibid. Folio 4v, “ Venerable et Scientiffique personne Maistre Jehan Angelin docteur en loys de la ville de Montpellier delaage de xxv ans ou environ et de memoire de xv ans ou environ…dit plus que plusieurs destranges nations quant ils seroient advertiz que en ladicte ville ne se paieroit aucune chose par manière de taille pourroient venir habiter en icelle ville et y marchandiser et besogner a cause de quoy ledit seigneur pourroit avoir et prendre plusieurs prouffiz revenus et emolumes ”. 231 Ibid. Folio 19v. “ Douchon Foumans, boucher de beufz de Montpellier… Interrogé quel dommaige auroit ledit seigneur [upon the imposition of a barrage], dit que ladicte ville ne seroit pourveue de marchandise ny dautres victualles car les marchans ne vouldront point porter vivres ne marchandises en ladicte ville quant ils sauroient que ledit barraige y sera et plusieurs desdicts habitans sen yront demourer hors deladicte ville. Interrogue commen il le scet quilz sen yront demourer hors de ladict ville dit le savoir pour lui mesmes car si le barraige don en ladict requeste est faicte mention estoit mis sus ledit qui parle sen yroit demourer hors de ladicte ville ”.

175 Facing a trend of depopulation that had continued almost unabated in Montpellier since the Black Death of 1348, the city’s leaders increasingly turned to outsiders and immigration as a means of recovery in the fifteenth century. They hoped to encourage newcomers to settle in their city through altered tax policies and generous incentives, which will be examined in detail in Chapter Four. But as for the immediate result of the royal inquiry conducted in 1449, the consuls seem to have been disappointed in their efforts to convince the king to make their city more a inviting place. After recording the opinions the Montpelliérains offered about the benefits of collecting money through the barrage, Thierry Le Comte asked the members of his commission to weigh in on what they had heard and seen. All of them accepted the claim that tailles had been a source of great hardship for Montpellier. Nonetheless, they were reluctant to embrace the imposition of the barrage as an alternative, citing a need for more details about which imports the consuls would tax. Ultimately, indecision led to the maintenance of the status quo, and in 1450, Charles VII again imposed a crushing taille. The consuls promptly complained that as a direct result of this tax, “the greater part of the inhabitants of

[Montpellier], which was once very notable and well-populated, have left and taken themselves and their households to other lands, cities, and places out of the kingdom, with as many going to Catalonia, , Provence, and the Counties of Venice, Savoy,

Piedmont, and Genoa as to other neighboring places.”232 There is no better illustration of the role emigration had as both a cause and effect of the crises that Montpellier faced in

232 AMM, Louvet 203, “ … la plus grand partie des habitans de ladicte ville qui souloit estre meult notable et bien peuplée ont d’icelle desemparée et se sont transportez et mis leur domicile en autres pays villes et lieux hors de nostre Royaume, tant en Cathelogne avignon provence Conté de Venice Savoye Pymont Genes que autres lieux voisins. ”

176 the late Middle Ages than the consuls’ wistful remarks about the demise of their city and the departure of its population for lands beyond the French kingdom.

Conclusions

In an era in which urban populations faced such a brutal slew of hardships, there were many challenges that municipal authorities in Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier and other cities around France were nearly powerless to control. They could not halt the incessant warring of their sovereigns, nor the squabbling of the high and petty nobles contesting titles and territories around the kingdom. They could plead for lower tax burdens, but there were no guarantees that they would receive satisfaction. In spite of the best efforts to stockpile grain and other necessities, prolonged droughts or sieges could bring urban populations to their knees and make them vulnerable to additional outbreaks of the diseases that staunched the most determined attempts at economic recovery. But the futility that the municipal authorities so often endured as they attempted to guide their cities through such troubled times did not lead them to despair and turn to the resigned superstition that for so long has been seen as characteristic of late medieval society.

Instead, they worked to prevent crises by focusing their administrative energies on those problems and challenges that they could address. As the examples above have shown, the movements of refugees, itinerants, and migrants into, around, and out of cities were a central component of the calamities that the populations of Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier faced in the late Middle Ages. The leaders of those cities did exercise a great deal of authority—if not always control—over who would or would not be included within their communities. For this reason, their efforts to navigate and overcome the hardships

177 inflicted by plagues, wars, famines, and economic decline often revolved around the measures they implemented to handle the migrations of outsiders and citizens.

The specific attributes of individual cities and the distinctive aspects of the crises that they confronted led municipal authorities to adopt radically different approaches towards newcomers as they worked to preserve their populations. The Rouennais counselors’ continual efforts to balance charitable impulses with the interests of the

“common people” and the ancient privileges of powerful corporations of craftsmen left refugees in a highly variable but ultimately vulnerable position. In Lyon, fears of recurring plagues were coupled with an abiding concern for the maintenance of commercial connections, leading the local consuls to be both brutal towards threatening strangers and discerning in the ways that they determined who was threatening. By the early fifteenth century, the consulate of Montpellier began to promote immigration as a solution for the demographic and economic decline brought on not just by mortalities but by heavy taxation and the mass departures of wealthy inhabitants. Although there are clear discrepancies in the measures that municipal authorities in these three cities implemented as they tried to manage the movements of men and women in and out of their communities, their strategies for leading their populations through crises tend to reflect more of a localistic pragmatism than an instinctual hostility to the “Other.”

Scholarship on late medieval crisis has often focused irrational, hysterical persecutions of marginalized groups such as Jews and lepers. Yet the focus on the most horrific episodes of violent intolerance has often led to historians to overlook the rationales and local factors that drove a much wider spectrum of responses to those who were seen as

178 outsiders. Those rationales hold the key to understanding the changes crises effected on urban communities both within France and across late medieval Europe.

179

CHAPTER III

FRIENDS, FOES AND FRONTIERS OF COMMUNITY IN AN AGE OF WAR

To the men, women, and children who suffered the predations of roaming soldiers and brigands in defenseless hamlets and villages around the countryside of late medieval

France, walled cities must have seemed like enticing safe havens. As the Hundred Years

War dragged on, urban communities in France developed sophisticated defensive systems to protect themselves from sieges and surprise attacks. With their imposing walls surrounded by sophisticated systems of trenches and chains and manned by trained militias and professional corps of archers and gunners, the bonnes villes came to be societies organized for war over the latter half of the fourteenth century.233 But the defensive strength and relative wealth that made cities attractive destinations for refugees from the French countryside also made them valuable targets for military leaders and roaming bands of soldiers. Municipal authorities were smart enough to know that their corps of merchants, craftsmen, and laborers needed the support of savvy military veterans to hold out forever against well-equipped enemy armies. Yet it was not just the English and their allies that the leaders and inhabitants of French cities had to fear, but the treachery and fickle loyalty of the companies of career warriors that the Valois monarchy paid to defend their subjects. The blurred lines between friend and foe meant that the

233 This framing, “societies organized for war” is taken from the excellent study by James Fuller on the ways that persistent warfare shaped frontier communities in medieval Iberia by James Powers, A Society Organized for War : the Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284 (Berkeley, 1988).

180 leaders and inhabitants of cities tended to view anyone who professed the warrior’s trade with suspicion.

This chapter analyzes the specific threats that soldiers posed to urban populations and the ways that the dangers and financial burdens of war affected concepts of community and identity in late medieval France.234 The experiences of the inhabitants of

Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen during the Hundred Years War demonstrate that views of soldiers and outsiders were inextricably connected. Tracing and analyzing these connections shows how more than a century of war altered the ways that municipal authorities determined who to trust. The decisions they made and the policies they implemented to defend against external threats influenced the welcome that travelers, students, merchants, and pilgrims met when they entered cities. In assessing how local officials distinguished dangerous outsiders from allies, the current chapter will answer several central questions. First, where was the line between enemies and “friends,” and how did that line shift over the course of a multi-faceted conflict that not only pitted the

Valois against the Plantagenets but also various factions within France against one another? How did the changes in the composition of the forces that fought for control of the kingdom influence the ways that urban populations interacted with soldiers? To better understand the power dynamics between municipal and royal authorities, and the ways that the inhabitants of cities understood their relationship with the monarchy and their place within the kingdom, it is necessary to consider how views of those who came from foreign realms differed from attitudes towards mercenaries who hailed from other parts of

234 I use the term soldiers here to apply to variety of categories referenced within the records of the period, such as hommes d’armes, gens d’armes, gens de guerre. These terms are not always synonyms but they tend to be used interchangeably to refer to both mounted warriors and infantry, and are often ill-defined.

181 France. Were suspicions of soldiers rooted mainly in what they did, or who they were and where they came from?

War has often been identified as a catalyst for the formation and strengthening of national identities, and the Hundred Years War in particular has received credit for fostering nascent sentiments of unity and patriotism that in turn promoted the development of the modern nation state.235 Georges Minois has made the most sustained case for this thesis, arguing that the protracted conflict between France and England led to the birth of both nations by pitting their institutions, languages, and cultures against one another.236 In Minois’ assessment, the war generated a patriotism in France that was founded on xenophobia towards the English, with bishops and royal authorities successfully emphasizing the differences between the two peoples for propaganda purposes.237 Following the approach of Benedict Anderson and focusing specifically on the construction, establishment, and perpetuation of national myths and symbols, Collette

Beaune has also identified the era of the Hundred Years War as a turning point for the people of France that instilled within them “the awareness… of being a particular human community, unique in its origins and history, a people who imagined themselves linked to this specific valued land for all time.” In her evaluation, the English served a necessary role as an external evil that enabled the growth of “willingly xenophobic” notions of

French superiority.238 Other studies have drawn similar connections between the Hundred

235 Sinisa Malesevic, The Sociology of War and Violence (Cambridge, 2010), 181-201 provides an excellent overview and critique of scholarship linking nationalism with war. 236 Georges Minois, La Guerre de Cent Ans: Naissance de Deux Nations. See especially, 562-593. 237 Minois, Guerre de Cent Ans, 593. 238 Collette Beaune, The Birth of an Ideology, 310.

182 Years War and the rise of national sentiment, based on the tacit assumption that mutual animosity promoted the development of a national identity.239

The conclusion that war with England encouraged subjects of the French crown to see themselves as members of a larger national community—defined against the

“Other”— is worth interrogating at some length, as it lies at the heart of the question of where and how urban communities delineated the boundaries that separated locals from outsiders. The period of the Hundred Years War is also particularly important to consider because as outlined within the introduction to this study, Claudine Billot and Bernard d’Alteroche have traced the origins of the concepts and legal institutions of national citizenship in France to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.240 The protracted conflict did indeed promote animosity towards the English, but the presence of a shared enemy did not translate simply and organically into the development of a unified front and bonds of camaraderie extending beyond the local level – a consequence often taken for granted as a natural byproduct of war. Beyond the litany of civil conflicts that pitted nobles in

France against the monarchy and each other as they jockeyed for titles and influence within the kingdom, there existed deep divisions within and between the populations of different cities. From birthplace to language, the rank and file of the armies that defended the kingdom from the English campaigns often had precious little in common with the populations they were supposed to be fighting to protect. Even when they were ostensibly on the same side, the goals of the Valois kings, the soldiers they paid to fight for them,

239 Margaret Lucille Kekewich and Susan Rose, Britain, France, and the Empire, 1350-1500 (New York, 2005); Denise N. Baker, ed. Inscribing the Hundred Years’ War in French and English Cultures (New York, 2000). 240 Claudine Billot, “Les étrangers dans le royaume de France aux XIVe et XVe siècles”; Bernard d’Alteroche, De l'étranger à la seigneurie à l'étranger au royaume XIème-XVème siècle, (Paris, 2002).

183 and municipal authorities were more parallel than coinciding. There was rarely much love lost between them.

The Hundred Years War had its genesis in a succession dispute between two of the great royal houses of Western Europe, the Plantagenets of England and the Valois of

France, but for the leaders and inhabitants of French cities the conflict was never a straightforward matter of ‘us’ against ‘them’. From the vantage point of the bonnes villes, the shifting contours of royal and noble power struggles were of background importance to the struggle to survive, rebuild, and prosper in an age of recurring and multifarious crises. City dwellers had clear reasons to despise the English, who in the fourteenth century did their best to undermine the Valois war effort by pillaging poorly defended rural and suburban settlements that helped to sustain urban communities in France with long raiding campaigns known as chévauchées.241 The advances made by English forces in the first half of the fifteenth century took a great toll on the towns and cities of

Normandy, and culminated in a frequently heavy-handed thirty year English rule over much of the north of France.242 Yet it was far from clear that the régime of the Valois monarchs was such a preferable alternative. In return for their loyalty and tax contributions, the bourgeois naturally expected benevolent and competent stewardship from a sovereign who maintained their best interests close at heart. Not only were they persistently disappointed in their hopes for this ideal - from the beginning of the conflict

241 For a rich analysis of the impact of the chévauchées and subsequent attempts at recovery, see Robert Boutruche, La Crise d’une société, especially 201-211, also available in English translation as “The Devastation of Rural Areas during the Hundred Years War and the Agricultural Recovery of France,” in P.S. Lewis ed. The Recovery of France in the Fifteenth Century (Suffolk, 1971), 23-52. Nicholas Wright, and Peasants (Woodbridge, 1998), which does a particularly admirable job in looking beyond national identities to illuminate the daily struggles that led to hostility between soldiers and rural populations. 242 For an overview of the impact of English rule in Normandy is C.T. Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 1415-1450: the History of a Medieval Occupation (NewYork, 1983). See also, Anne Curry, Military Organization in Lancastrian Normandy 1422-1450 (Middlesborough, 1985).

184 through to its conclusion - but they often endured crushing financial burdens and even grievous injury at the hands of royal lieutenants and mercenaries.

Through an interwoven narrative account of key episodes and developments within Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier during the Hundred Years War, the analysis that follows will challenge the view that these conflicts promoted the development of a sense of national community in France. I do not dispute the point that royal and ecclesiastical officials attempted to deploy symbols and rhetoric to legitimize the Valois régime and bolster the power and influence of their institutions. Nor do I intend to dispute that some of the ideas they promoted began to germinate among the broader population of France as the conflict dragged on. But just because the concept of France as a discrete nation began to take firmer hold during the Hundred Years War does not mean that it was a strong motivating force for those who lived through the conflict. Indeed, the search for the origins of the modern nation has directed attention away from side effects of the conflict that had greater significance to lived experience of city dwellers and the day to day affairs of urban communities, and the primary motives that drove their actions in the conflict. Rather than dissolving boundaries and fostering unity among between bourgeois, soldiers, and kings fighting against the common enemy of the English ‘Other’

– the war promoted deep tensions and divisions between these groups and within the populations of cities that led municipal authorities to define the limits of their communities more narrowly. With untrustworthy allies who seemed to change allegiances overnight, and royal officials and nobles who were more interested in their own political agendas and economic needs than the welfare of their subjects, the lengthy struggle for control of the French crown pushed municipal authorities to look out for their

185 own interests, at the expense of any other considerations. In some cases, this meant that they went along with the agenda of their rulers to avoid the painful repercussions that could result if they did not, or to gain an authorization or an exemption. In other cases, this meant that they treated the soldiers fighting for their sovereign as reviled outsiders rather than trusted compatriots.

Uncertain allegiances: Distinguishing Friends and Foes in an Age of Self-Interest

Although the people of France rarely enjoyed complete freedom from turmoil during the Hundred Years War, two periods within the conflict stand out for the particular hardships they inflicted on the inhabitants of the bonnes villes, and these will be the focus here. The first continued from the late 1350s and through the 1360s, as the war between the Valois and the Plantagenets became entangled with the personal ambitions of the King of Navarre, Charles II, as well as the economic and social upheaval that resulted from the mortality inflicted by the Black Death of 1348.243 The second began with the disembarkment of the armies of King Henry V Normandy in 1415, which initiated renewed English campaigning after a period of relative peace following the establishment of a truce at Leulingham in 1389. The effects of this onslaught were exacerbated by the concurrent, interrelated civil war between the Armagnac and

Burgundian factions of the Valois royal family, a bitter feud that forced urban populations and their constituent groups to make difficult decisions about who they

243 Charles of Navarre in particular had a complicated and central role to play within the troubles that afflicted Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier. The bibliography dedicated to this always controversial schemer is surprisingly small, but for specific analysis of his intrigues during the reigns of John II, and his son Charles V, see Philippe Charon, Relations entre les cours de France et de Navarre en 1376-1377 (Genève, 1992), 85-108.

186 would support.244 During both of these periods, the challenges that cities around the kingdom faced were intensified by the fact that they suffered devastation inflicted not only by enemies but by soldiers who were supposed to be on their side, fighting to protect them. Whether pillaging was carried out by an enemy bent on strategically demoralizing the subjects of the Valois monarchy, or by bored and hungry allies seeking to supplement their wages, the distinction made little difference to the victims.245

To understand the origins and characteristics of animosity towards soldiers within cities, it is necessary to look more closely at the experiences of specific communities and the dynamics of their relationships with soldiers and the kings they served. The cities of

Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier had very different roles in the struggle for control of the

French kingdom, and the specific ways that their inhabitants interacted with the warriors involved in the conflict varied significantly as a result. As was seen in the second chapter of this study, Rouen was a target for advancing English forces because it was the capital of the duchy of Normandy and the gateway from the Atlantic coasts to Paris and inland

France via the Seine River. Along with the wealth, size, and symbolic significance of their city, the penchant the Rouennais had for intrigues against their sovereigns often made them important players within the civil political struggles of the realm. For its part,

244 Jean Favier, La Guerre de Cent Ans (Paris, 2008) remains the best general survey of the Hundred Years War and the various interrelated power struggles between lords and nobles that took place during the course of the conflict. Jonathan Sumption’s monumental three volume series on the Hundred Years War provides the most comprehensive narrative accounts of the first half of the conflict. See Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War (I-III) (Philadelphia, 1991-2009). 245 It is easy to condemn the members of the free companies that ravaged France in the Hundred Years War for the great hardships they inflicted on the populations of cities and rural areas, but it is worth acknowledging the frequent financial difficulties and hardships that led them to take these measures. As Brian Ditcham has shown, the infrequency of wages, when coupled with a suspicion for more the more economically savvy populations of the cities where they were garrisoned, could lead soldiers to harbor their own resentments towards the bourgeois. The biases soldiers had towards city dwellers will not be a focus here, but they are well explored in a dissertation by Brian Ditcham, “The Employment of foreign mercenary troops in the French royal armies, 1415-1470” in Jeanne d’Arc: une époque un rayonnement (Edinburgh, 1978), 261-310.

187 Lyon stood at the equally important juncture of the Saône and the Rhône rivers, which made the city an outpost on a major political frontier. Lyon was politically integrated into

France in 1312, but lay at the furthest reaches of the kingdom on the boundary of territories claimed by the Holy Roman Empire. Within local administrative records, the

Saône river served as a line that divided Lyon into two sections: everything to the west of the river was on the side of the kingdom of France, while all roads and buildings that lay to the east of the river were labeled as being “on the side of the Empire.” Although the emperors never pressed their claims to the lands on the eastern banks, both the French kings and the Lyonnais were keenly aware of the threat they could pose if they did. The machinations of the dukes of Burgundy to the north and Savoy just to the southeast often came to involve Lyon and its people as well. Montpellier did not have as much strategic significance, but as a prominent commercial center along the Mediterranean, the city was an appealing target for pillagers all the same.

Despite the differences between their cities, the inhabitants of Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen were caught up in many of the same key developments that affected the bonnes villes of the kingdom and the relationships between their leaders and the monarchy. Since many urban communities around France had neglected to maintain their fortifications and expand their walled enclosures to include the suburban settlements that grew up around them in the thirteenth centuries, sections of their populations were vulnerable to the English chévauchées. To respond to and prepare for such attacks, municipal authorities took a variety of steps to improve their defenses. The extension of fortifications to encompass prosperous suburban settlements was a priority, but this process entailed a fundamental change to urban space that generated new problems.

188 Homes and buildings needed to be leveled to make way for walls, and the owners of the sacrificed structures had to be compensated for their losses.246 The incorporation of new residents into fortified enclosures also caused disputes and raised questions about whether those forced into the city limits should be entitled to the privileges enjoyed by established inhabitants. In Montpellier, for example, an influx of residents from the suburban settlements in 1365 led the bailli to issue an order that the Jewish population of the city should be forced to vacate their homes, on the grounds that these outsiders should not be given precedence over Christians – though this act was eventually overturned on the grounds that the Jews’ privileges were inviolable.247 Similarly, in Rouen, the establishment of a new line of fortifications to encompass the suburban settlements led to longstanding disputes between the new residents and those families long established with the ancien cloison, which were only finally resolved in 1455.248

In addition to the efforts to extend fortifications to encompass unprotected settlements, a variety of other improvements ranging from simple to sophisticated altered urban landscapes and the communities that called them home. Deep trenches and wooden barriers positioned outside walls could hinder charging cavalry; heavy chains installed in the city streets could be stretched tight to force any that gained entry in the city to dismount. The acquisition and development of gunpowder artillery weaponry helped those cities who invested in their arsenals to provide formidable opposition to armies that hoped to reduce them to submission through siege. All of these measures helped to increase the independence of urban communities by limiting their need for the military

246 See Reyerson, “Urban Development vs. Defense,” 110-113, and above, Chapter 2. 247 AMM, Louvet 2445, 2446. The Count d’Estampes, conservator of the privileges of the Jews, was responsible for overturning the measure only five days after its passage. 248 AMR, 3E1 Anc. Tiroir 245, non-numbered pact of 1455.

189 support of professional soldiers to the most dire circumstances. Of course, such modifications had costs, imposing additional financial demands on populations that had in many cases been severely diminished by demographic decline and emigration.249 This could lead to internal discord within urban communities between those inhabitants who were subjected to the taxes, and those groups that enjoyed exemptions or royal protection, including university students, clergymen, minters, Jews, and outsiders – all of whom tended to be just as ardent in the defense of the ancient privileges that they had received. Authorities in Montpellier, Rouen, and Lyon regularly appealed to royal officers to overturn such privileges as they worked to ensure that the tax burdens were equitably distributed. But even when their requests were granted, they faced considerable resistance in collecting funds from groups that had traditionally benefited from exemptions, not to mention those who wished to shirk their responsibilities by claiming that they belonged to the ranks of the privileged.250

Tax burdens were almost always a principal point of contention between the monarchy and municipal authorities, and the leaders of Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier did not hesitate to complain about the taxes that the Valois monarchs levied to sustain their war efforts. The precise terms of the privileges and enfranchisements bestowed on cities around the kingdom varied considerably, but the principle that their inhabitants would not be taxed without granting their consent was one of the central tenets of membership within a free commune. Yet as centers of population and wealth, the bonnes villes of

France were one of the foundations of the kingdom’s tax base, and prolonged conflict

249 On the funding of urban fortifications, see in addition to Reyerson, “Urban development vs. defense,” Philippe Contamine, “Les fortifications urbaines en France à la fin du moyen age: aspects financiers et économique,” Revue Historique 260 (1978): 23-47. 250 In one notable example in 1384, a group of six Montpelliérains disguised themselves as outsiders selling bread in an attempt to sneak past officials collecting duties on purchased goods. See AMM, Louvet 2508.

190 with the English necessitated that the terms of ancient charters regularly be set aside for payments to the soldiers in the royal armies.251 Institutional safeguards emerged to limit the resistance that the inhabitants of communes offered when subjected to direct taxes such as tailles that contravened their traditional privileges. The Rouennais sent representatives to the regional estates of Normandy, while their counterparts in

Montpellier participated in the Estates of Languedoc – one of two central assemblies in the kingdom - after Charles VII orchestrated their reestablishment in 1417.252 These assemblies deliberated on the form and portion of tax funds that individual cities would contribute to meet the king’s requested sums, thus acting as a sort of buffer between the communes and the royal officials. Officials at the municipal level in turn oversaw the collection of their share of the requested sums, while regularly appealing to the king for authorization to levy and allocate tax funds to pay for necessary civic projects such as fortification building and the repair of crumbling bridges.

In spite of royal attempts to curtail resistance to taxation, the leaders of Rouen,

Lyon, and Montpellier all offered persistent objections to the burdens imposed on their populations, with those objections periodically escalating from formal pleas for remissions and reductions into more active opposition. Of course, there hardly needs to be a specific impetus for resistance to taxation. But examining the impact of royal policies within these three cities and the justifications that municipal authorities articulated for defying their rulers reveals the reasons for the depth of the bitterness about

251 On these points, see Bernard Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France, especially 94-101. 252 The early development of the regional estates and the two central assemblies of Languedoil and Languedoc is a critical but still understudied topic. P.S. Lewis, “The Failure of the French Medieval Estates,” Past & Present (1962): 3-24 offers a useful introduction to the roles that they played as a buffer between royal authorities and the bonnes villes. On the estates of Normandy, see the still valuable work by Alfred Coville, Les états de Normandie, leurs origines et leur développement au XIVème siècle (Paris, 1894).

191 the exactions the monarchy demanded. One of the principal sources of contention was the vicious cycle relating to the recruitment and organization of the French royal forces that would continue – though in changing form - through the Hundred Years War and beyond.

At the outbreak of the conflict in the mid-fourteenth century, the kings of France had a variety of traditional tools at their disposal to summon the requisite forces. The arrière- ban authorized them to call upon the male subjects of the kingdom between the ages of eighteen and sixty to render a set period of military service – typically 40 days - in the event of an emergency, although the duration of the war meant that this demand became commonplace. In practice, individuals and communities could exempt themselves from this obligation through the payment of taxes, also known within municipal documentation as the arrière-ban. Nobles, knights, and squires could be called up through a semonce; if their numbers were sufficient for the needs of the kingdom this measure could avoid the general imposition of the arrière-ban to all the subjects of the realm.253 The monarchy could also require the bonnes villes to send soldiers to their aid, and some municipalities developed corps of trained bourgeois who were prepared to answer this call: Rouen, for example, had a force of arbalestiers – local crossbowmen who enjoyed exemptions from taxation as compensation for their service.254

Over the course of such a protracted period of conflict, these modes of recruitment were rarely sufficient on their own to muster the numbers needed to wage war effectively. The most intensive combat was seasonal, with fewer military

253 On modes of recruitment, see Contamine, Guerre, état, société à la fin du moyen age, especially 27-64, which provides an indispensable reference for all matters concerning the organization of the armies of the Valois monarchy in this period. 254 On the development and training of this prominent local militia force see, Henri Bouttelier, Histoire de Rouen: des milices et gardes bourgeoises (Rouen, 1846), and Charles Robillard de Beaurepaire, Notice sur la compagnie des arbalétriers, autrement dite la cinquaintaine de Rouen (Rouen, 1885).

192 engagements taking place during the winter, but the finite terms of required service were still completely impractical for campaigns that lasted for months at a time. All of these factors necessitated a greater reliance on companies of “volunteers” who were willing to serve as long as there was pressing need, on the promise of payment or the spoils of war.

Usually, those who offered their services joined as companies, following a proven captain who took the payments from the royal treasury and oversaw the distribution of wages among the rank and file. Effectively mercenaries, the career warriors who answered the recruitment call could come from anywhere within the kingdom of France and beyond. In addition to the companies of Bretons and Gascons who regularly served in this capacity, specialized companies of archers and crossbowmen came from Genoa and Lombardy,

Provence, Savoy, and Spain to seek employment. All of these companies required payment and supplies if their masters were to have any hope that they would serve them loyally and effectively. Even then their discipline was questionable, as career warriors had an affinity for supplementing whatever wages they did receive by ‘living off the land’ – a euphemistic expression commonly used within negotiations between municipal and royal authorities to describe theft and pillaging in suburban settlements and rural areas around cities.255 Thus, the urban populations that bore so much of the financial burden of paying royal soldiers were often among the principal victims of their indiscipline. This in turn contributed to their understandable resistance to paying their antagonists and the anger they felt towards royal officials who failed to protect them.

Dissatisfaction with royal governance and management of the war led the inhabitants of French cities to turn inwards to find solutions within their own

255 The accusation that the hommes d’armes or gens de guerre acting in service of the monarchy were ‘vivans sur le plat pays’ is a common complaint in letters between the bonnes villes and royal officials.

193 communities, or alternatively, to look externally for a different leader who would serve and defend their interests more effectively. Both of these impulses influenced how municipal authorities and urban populations viewed royal soldiers, how they dealt other newcomers to their cities, and how they understood their roles and handled the duties they had in the conflict for control of France. This was evident in the earliest stages of war with England, as the efforts that both Philip IV and John II of France made to avert the English advance and consolidate power began to irreversibly alter the dynamics of the relationships between urban communities and the monarchy. Rouen provides an appropriate starting place for examining this relationship, as the city was among the first in France to feel the direct effects of the war, having already faced English incursions into the area surrounding their city by the . 256 Owing to the involvement of Rouen in previous conflicts between the French and English in the thirteenth century, the city’s fortifications were also among the more well-developed in France at this early stage; this allowed the population to escape depredations on the scale of those visited on undefended towns in the region such as Louviers, which was subjected to a series of English assaults that ultimately forced many of the inhabitants out onto the road to seek refuge in Rouen.

But the walls were not impervious to the financial demands of King John II, who consistently showed little regard for the economic welfare of subjects struggling with the depopulation inflicted by plague. The costs, labors, and sacrifices needed to ensure that the fortified enclosure of Rouen would remain strong enough to turn aside the enemy and large enough to protect all of its inhabitants weighed heavily on the community as well.

256 The Chronique Normande written by the Rouennais notary Pierre Cochon (not to be confused with the Bishop of , Pierre Cauchon, who directed the trial of Jeanne d’Arc), offers an essential source for understanding affairs within Rouen in the fourteenth century. On the English activities in Normandy in the 1340’s, and early efforts to fortify and enclose the suburban settlements of Rouen, see Chronique Normande, 70-74.

194 The Rouennais rose up in open rebellion to John II in 1351 upon the imposition of a new tax – there had already been restlessness within the population because of the arrest and summary execution of the Count of Eu, Raoul, who had loyally defended

Normandy from the English as the Constable of France. After emptying the royal treasury with his expenditures on extravagant tournaments and feasts, John had convened the

Estates General of France in 1351 to order to receive endorsement for new subsidies to be levied on the communes of the kingdom. After this was achieved, the tax still needed to be approved and the burden distributed by the Estates of Normandy before it could be collected from the communes of the region. The regional assembly attached conditions to their decision to pay the requested sum in the form of duties on products entering and leaving the city – a decision that was taken with an awareness of the consequences of incurring royal displeasure. One of the principal stipulations for the payment of the requested tax was that the seizures by the king’s officials should be stopped. As

Normandy was ravaged by war in the 1340s, royal forces regularly seized provisions, along with horses and other supplies without offering compensation, on the grounds that these materials were needed to sustain the royal war effort. The members of the Estates of

Normandy also expressed their particular displeasure with the persistent violation of the anciently established and sacrosanct principle that the inhabitants of the region were not to be hauled away to jurisdictions beyond their own, as the king’s sergeants had frequently overstepped their authority by bringing Norman merchants to face justice in

Paris.257 Finally, they asked that the king take more proactive measures to halt the civil strife that contributed to the general climate of insecurity in the region.

257 The record of the deliberations of the Estates of Normandy on these matters is found in AMR 3E1 Anc. Registre U2, Folio 109, which is the basis for the summary that Adolphe Chéruel provides within his

195 In the long run, John II failed to live up to the empty promises his commissioners at the Estates of Normandy had made to quell the violence and abuses of royal soldiers and officers. Even in the short term, however, the inhabitants of Rouen were so unconvinced of the good faith of their ruler that they refused to accept the demands for tax contributions that would stifle the flow of commerce. We have no details about the nature of their opposition, but the severity of the punishment issued after the suppression of the rebellion – which entailed the hanging of 23 local drapers – suggests that the backlash to the tax was intense. Even after this brutal royal response, and probably at least partially because of it, the Rouennais continued to work against the king as they looked for an advocate in the duplicitous King Charles II of Navarre.258 After he was passed over for the coveted title of duke of Burgundy, Charles maneuvered to gain power and influence in the north and east of the kingdom in the traditional strongholds of his family. As the greatest city in Normandy, Rouen was a natural focal point of these efforts. Saddled with the moniker of ‘the Bad’ by the king’s propagandists, Charles established a popular following in Rouen in the 1350s as he worked to gain influence over the dauphin, who had been named as the Duke of Normandy in an effort to put an end to the claims the king of Navarre made to inherit the territory as the son of the Count of Évreux. In further efforts to undermine John, he also made overtures to the English leaders established along the coasts of Normandy, promising them favor and support in their advances through the region. Rouen was the site of Charles’ arrest for these plots in

1356, when the disguised King John burst into his son’s castle with his entourage to

Histoire de Rouen, Vol. 1, 157-168. 258 The Rouennais chronicler Pierre Cochon explains the opposition to Jean in Normandy by noting “qu’il ne les tenoit en leur franchises comme ses predecesseurs roys”, and follows this by acknowledging that “le roi de Navarre avoit la greigneur partie de Normandie, tant en bonnes ville, chastiax commen en grant revenue.” See Chronique Normande, 81.

196 arrest the king of Navarre as he dined with the dauphin, on accusations that he had conspired with the English. 259

The circumstances surrounding the fabled events that took place in the castle of

Rouen in 1356 illustrate the persistent fluidity of the battle lines in the Hundred Years

War. The precipitous downfall of the King of Navarre also reflects the challenges that the leaders of communes across France faced as they attempted to align themselves with the noble protectors who would be the most inclined and best-positioned to advance their interests. Such advocacy took on particular importance as the worsening financial situation of the kingdom intensified the burdens on urban populations while contributing to further disorder. Over the course of the 1350s, the steady and steep inflation of the royal currency led to discontent and resulting indiscipline among mercenaries compensated at set wages for their services. The continued inability of John II to halt the chévauchées of Anglo-Gascon companies that Edward the so-called ‘Black Prince’ led through the south of France contributed to further upheaval, and the situation came to a head at in 1356.260 After finally catching up to Edward’s forces in

September of that year, John II personally led his army into battle and suffered a disastrous defeat that culminated in his capture. This in turn forced the dauphin, the future king Charles V, to impose heavy taxes on the entire kingdom in order to begin collecting the enormous ransom of 4,000,000 écus d’or that the English demanded for his return from captivity in London. The defeat at Poitiers and the capture of the sitting king thus ushered in a new phase in the Hundred Years War that extended financial crisis onto

259 These events are dramatically recounted by Pierre Cochon in his Chronique Normande, 82-87. 260 See Favier, Guerre de cent ans, 301-312.

197 the entire kingdom, with cities across the realm bearing heavy fiscal burdens and in some cases, deep personal costs as well.261

The negotiations and final conditions for the release of John II led to the further deterioration in relations between the Valois monarchy and its subjects, and a deepening distrust within urban communities for soldiers contesting the outcome of the conflict for control of France. John remained in captivity for four years as his son tried to muster the resources for his release without conceding substantial territories, but he eventually settled on forfeiting parts of and a diminished but still exorbitant ransom of

3,000,000 écus d’or at the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360. Since this sum could not be collected all at once, the terms for the release of King John also stipulated that notable hostages—including 40 bourgeois from the 19 principal cities of France—should be sent to England as collateral to ensure that his ransom would eventually be paid in full.262

Determining the proportional costs imposed on each of the bonnes villes is a tricky matter, since the records of different cities recorded the demands for the king’s ransom in varying currencies that fluctuated in comparative value in an era that witnessed rapid inflations. The Rouennais were to pay 24,000 moutons d’or, which was roughly equivalent to one percent of the total owed for the king’s release.263 Two of the former mayors of the city were among the contingent designated to be sent to England. The

Lyonnais sent two hostages as well, and not only paid for their annual maintenance of

600 livres during their time in England, but also contributed 4,000 livres each year to

261 Chronique Normande, 107. Pierre Cochon sets the figure at 24,000 moutons, at the value of 25 sous each. See the appendix for an explanation of the various monetary units in use in this period. 262 George Guigue, Récits de la guerre de cent ans: les tard-venus en Lyonnais, Forez, et Beaujolais (Lyon, 1886), 39-41. 263 Chéruel, Histoire de Rouen,

198 help pay off the king’s ransom.264 For their part, the Montpelliérains were accountable for their share of the 70,000 moutons d’or imposed as an annual tax on the Estates of

Languedoc, with their contributions taking the form of a tax of 12 deniers for each livre of a purchase, and eventually the direct taxes known as tailles.265

Irrespective of the relative value of the sums that they were accountable for, the leaders and inhabitants of Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen all complained forcefully and often that the tax burdens they endured for John II had lessened their abilities to rebuild fortifications and recover from the effects of the plague—Montpellier in particular suffered a severe outbreak in 1361 that inflicted further depopulation and intensified the financial hardship inflicted by the costs of the king’s ransom.266 Beyond the tremendous burdens that the conditions for the ransom of John II imposed on all subjects of the kingdom, the establishment of peace between the Valois and Plantagenets at Brétigny actually had the effect of stimulating more widespread violence. With all parties in the struggle relying increasingly on mercenaries, the cessation of hostilities did not bring about a simple end to combat when those summoned to answer their feudal obligations were released from their duties. To the rank and file of veterans, returning home was not a feasible or desirable proposition, since war was their occupation and livelihood – not to mention the fact that home was often a long way off for those who had joined the conflict from foreign principalities. This in turn led soldiers from the nominally disbanded armies to come together to form numerous independent companies composed of men from

264 On p. 230 of Kleinclausz, mention of 1000 francs annually. 265 AMM, Louvet 131; 1039. In order to help cover the enormous burden of the ransoms, the consuls requested authorization from Charles V for the creation of two fairs in 1368, although their requests were not granted at this point. On this early attempt to use fairs as a means of economic revival, see AMM Louvet 756. 266 Thalamus parvus, 359.

199 ‘diverse nations’. Answering to no real master and with few real loyalties, they followed the whims of whichever would help them to reap the greatest personal rewards, which they evaluated in terms of opportunities for pillage and rapine. Following in the tradition of the English chévauchées that had so terrorized the kingdom, the so-called

‘Great Companies’ spent their days roving from place to place, usually refusing to engage in open combat and instead preferring to pick on prosperous but vulnerable suburban settlements. 267

Montpellier and Lyon became preferred targets for the great companies of routiers that inflicted particular devastation from the late 1350s through the 1370s. The

Occitan chronicle known as the Petit Thalamus that commented on events across

Christendom from within Montpellier meticulously noted the companies’ movements and their incursions around the city as well as the surrounding region, providing a detailed look at their impact and the ways that the leaders and inhabitants of the community viewed them and responded to the threats they posed. The first major campaign to elicit commentary was led by a minor Gascon noble, Arnaud de Cervolle, who was widely known as the ‘Archpriest’. The pillaging he and his men conducted in Provence in 1358 culminated in the seizure of castles and territories in the Baux region, roughly sixty miles to the east of Montpellier. The worry elicited by the proximity of those forces soon dissipated, however, as the dauphin enlisted the support of the Archpriest and his followers to help quell the and the plots by ‘the king of Navarre, the Provost of

Paris, and some traitors of the city of Paris’. According to the Montpelliérain chronicler,

267 In addition to the general introduction to this period, “Les Temps de Compagnies”, in Favier, Guerre de Cent Ans, 288-325, see the excellent study by Kenneth Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries: The Great Companies (Oxford, 2001), which offers biographies of the main captains and analysis of their principal campaigns.

200 these conspirators planned to strip Catalan, Italian, Provençal, and Languedocien merchants of the wealth and property they had accumulated within the capital. Indeed, some merchants from Montpellier had already been victimized in this dastardly enterprise by one of their own, a certain Pere Gili of Saint Guilhem-le-Desert, who was a partisan of

Charles of Navarre.268 This version of the events in Paris contains inaccuracies and distortions that reflect the influence of royal propaganda, but the confused account of the shifting alliances and schemes of the varied companies and Charles of Navarre is also indicative of the uncertainty that prevailed within cities as mercenaries and nobles changed affiliations and objectives.

Montpellier was to become a frequent victim and pawn within these internecine struggles, promoting the militarization of a population that had to learn to defend itself to have any hope of survival. In 1361, the company of one of the greatest mercenary captains, the Gascon , descended on the region surrounding the city with a large company that had successfully pillaged and captured settlements and fortresses all across the lower Languedoc and Provence regions, even establishing a stronghold in Frontignan – just fifteen miles to the southwest. From there, his forces led repeated incursions into the Montpelliérain suburbs during the month of April.

Montpellier eventually received support from Robert de Fiennes, the Constable of

France, in putting a brief end to these incursions several weeks after they began. The

Petit Thalamus proudly recounts the prominent role that ‘many and diverse brave men of

Montpellier’ played in helping Robert de Fiennes in recapturing Frontignan and pushing

Seguin de Badefol and withdraw his forces on April 13. But the bold actions taken under the city’s banner had little long-term effect. The companies had already returned to

268 Thalamus parvus, 353.

201 Frontignan by May, and quickly relaunched their attacks, seizing and ransoming five

Montpelliérains from the church of Saint-Côme just outside the city.269 In August, a company under the command of another prominent mercenary captain, Berard de l’Albret, came to the city and captured the Franciscan monastery lying just outside the city, from which they proceeded to launch additional attacks on the suburbs. The inhabitants of Montpellier were on their own this time, and the anonymous local chronicler once again attested to the valor that they showed, noting that “each day they went out of the city to do battle.” They were well-supplied, well-armed, and strong in numbers, and they were determined to set an end to the raids, at any cost.270

The proud account of the Petit Thalamus offers an illustration of the independence and defensive strength urban populations around France tried to cultivate in response to the threats they faced. The chronicler acknowledged that the

Montpelliérains lost many men in their struggles with the forces of Berard de l’Albret, but also pointed out that they inflicted heavy casualties among ‘los enemics’ - as the companies were generically labeled. Eventually, the locals’ vehement efforts to defend themselves pushed this latest cohort of warriors to turn back to look for less obstinate and well-defended populations elsewhere, but not before their raids had resulted in the destruction of numerous houses and buildings in and around the city walls. Not all of the damage was inflicted by the companies, as some of the structures were razed in a campaign of strategic sacrifice. The Montpelliérain authorities had decided to destroy buildings around the southern gate in order to impede any attempts that the companies

269 Thalamus parvus, 358. 270 Thalamus parvus, 358.

202 made to launch concentrated attacks on their fortifications and suburbs.271 After their enemies departed, they continued with these efforts, tearing down suburbs and even churches and a Carmelite monastery just outside the communa clausura in order to deprive the companies of any shelters that they could use to launch assaults against the city. These costly sacrifices were accompanied by a crackdown against “many spies and others from the enemy” found in Montpellier, who were hanged and quartered for their actions; the mangled pieces of their bodies were then prominently strewn in trees around the city in order to serve as a warning to those who would compromise the defenses.272

The Petit Thalamus offers no details about who these alleged “spies and others” were, or how they were identified and condemned to such a spectacularly brutal fate. Viewed alongside the destruction of the suburbs though, their punishment bears witness to the ferocious defensive posture that repeated encounters with the companies encouraged in

Montpellier.

The tactics of offensive warfare commonly employed in this period gave the inhabitants of all towns and cities good cause for wariness about the dangers posed by spying and sabotage, and strangers whose intentions were not known. Strong fortifications manned by civilian militias and artillery weapons presented challenges and risks that most armies and bands of routiers were neither inclined nor able to accept head-on. But if walls could be breached by other means, urban centers presented the most lucrative possible targets for pillage, leading would-be invaders to adopt a range of

271 See for example, an entry in the Thalamus parvus from 1363: “Item, a XXVII de setembre, los senhors cossols et obriers de voluntat de totas las III temporals e del pobol, comenseron a far derocar los XII palms dels ostals que si tocon de fra am los murs de Montpellier, et I continueron cascun iorn entro que fo complit, anant per los murs am los curials e portant prumieyras doas bandieyras o estandartz estendudas. ” Thalamus parvus, 363. 272 Thalamus parvus, 359. “Et encaras que motas espias et autres que hom trobet dels enemics foron à Montpellier qui pendutz, qui traynatz et escapsartz et escartayrats, e las pessas pendudas en las forcas et en los arbres per diverses camins ”

203 creative methods to overcome their defenses.273 The chronicles of the age record numerous ruses that soldiers used to gain entry into cities. For instance, the Petit

Thalamus noted one such example in 1362 when forces loyal to Charles of Navarre orchestrated the downfall of the city of Arras in distant Picardy by soliciting the support of some of the Dominicans who were established there. The treacherous friars conducted dozens of carts loaded with barrels into the city, claiming that they were full of wine, only for the soldiers hidden within them to burst out and open the gates to their comrades the next morning. The surprise assault brought about the speedy demise of the city, with the Navarrese forces leaving a wake of pillage, destruction, and slaughter behind them as they claimed victory and established their dominion over the population.274 Such episodes rarely failed to elicit commentary from around the kingdom of France and beyond, with the grave results of such acts of treachery serving as cautionary tales that could only serve to heighten awareness of the dangers to populations that let down their guard.

Elevated sensitivity to the threats posed by treacherous strangers and traitors acting from within the shelter of fortified cities helped to promote stern measures of self-protection such as those implemented within Montpellier.

The regular clashes the Lyonnais had with the Great Companies ultimately forced them to take similar steps to defend themselves. Since they had previously been spared from intensive conflict during the early phases of the Hundred Years War, the city’s inhabitants had been resistant to the financial and labor demands imposed by the royal bailli of Mâcon to establish fortifications.275 This meant that they were ill-prepared to

273 On professional saboteurs, see André Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart et François de Surienne, agents de l’Angleterre (Paris, 1936), as well as Bernard Chevalier, Les bonnes villes, 115. 274 Thalamus parvus, 354. 275 Kleinclausz, Histoire de Lyon, 225-228.

204 deal with the armies that campaigned through the surrounding region in the late 1350’s.

But the first campaigns that Charles of Navarre and his brother conducted through Forez and the southern Lyonnais gave the municipal consulate the incentive to intensify efforts to comply with royal demands and complete the large defensive enclosure around the city. 276A new line of fortifications was completed along the western ridge around Lyon in 1361, but this was not in time to spare the city from attacks by the Archpriest and his

“”, known for the white uniforms they wore to identify themselves as they terrorized the countryside. Illustrating just how fickle the loyalties of such companies were, had only just returned from helping the Valois monarchy in Paris when they came to resume the pastime of pillage in the area around

Lyon in 1360. The fortifications were completed in time to offer some protection from the forces of Seguin de Badefol, who by 1362 had gained a foothold in the town of

Brignais, just eleven miles to the southwest of Lyon.

Nevertheless, the recently completed defenses did not put a stop to the raids conducted by the multiple mercenary captains who had converged to use Brignais as a base to conduct devastating raids around Lyon – including some, such as ‘Le Petit

Meschin’, who had only recently served the monarchy against Charles of Navarre and the

English. The ventures of such companies raised serious concerns at the highest levels over the dangers that could befall the kingdom if this crucial frontier outpost fell into their hands. Royal authorities quickly dispatched the Count of Tancarville John de Melun to take on the role of royal lieutenant and lead the defense of the city. Soon thereafter, the

Count of Bourbon Jacques and his son Pierre arrived with additional feudal contingents

276 On the development of the fortifications of Lyon in this period see Vermorel, Les fortifications de Lyon au moyen age (Revue Lyonnaise, 1881), and Léopold Niepce, Lyon militaire: notes et documents pour servir à l’histoire de cette ville (Lyon, 1897), 43-46.

205 to reinforce the Lyonnais. From the outset, however, the defensive efforts were plagued by the old problems of loyalty, payment, and inefficiency that increasingly forced urban communities to rely on their own defenses. After his arrival in the city the Count of

Tancarville demanded that the Lyonnais mete out a loan of 5,000 florins to ensure that his army would not disband – this on top of the sums that they were already expected to contribute for their own fortifications and the ransom of the king.277 Unwilling to risk a confrontation until they had maximized their numbers, the royal forces that had convened in Lyon continued to lean on the population for support until they had been joined by additional forces – including the companies of the Archpriest, once again enlisted to fight on behalf of the monarchy to defend a region they had pillaged just a few years earlier.

When these combined forces finally engaged the companies holed up in Brignais on

April 6 of 1362, they were badly outmaneuvered and ultimately defeated by a more well- organized enemy.278

The decisive victory by the companies at Brignais was cause for consternation in

Lyon – with the great Burgundian chronicler John Froissart noting that the inhabitants of the city were “terrified when they heard that the day had gone for the companies, though they welcomed very kindly all manners of men who returned from the battle.”279 There is no particular reason to discount the claims Froissart made about the warm welcome the

Lyonnais gave to their defeated heroes. But regardless of any affection the Lyonnais may have felt for the soldiers who had fought against Seguin de Badefol and his confederates at Brignais, the loss forced them to find their own solutions for the imminent threat that

277 Guigue, Tards-Venus, 78. 278 On the events leading up to and including the battle of Brignais, see Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, 44- 77, and Guigue, Les Tards-Venus, 84. 279 Siméon Luce, Chroniques de , publiées pour la société par Siméon Luce (Paris, 1869), Vol. VI, p. 69.

206 the unchecked mercenary companies could pose now that their greatest adversaries had been crushed. The consulate responded by imposing new taxes to fund the recruitment of additional soldiers to come to support the city. The canons of the chapters of Saint-John and Saint-Just took similar measures, dipping into their treasuries to fund additional defensive measures to protect their holdings. But like their counterparts in Montpellier, the Lyonnais also responded brutally towards those who they believed would compromise their defenses. When a group of six soldiers entered the city in 1363, ostensibly in the service of the king, they were quickly recognized as members of one of the companies that had terrorized the population. In retaliation, they were summarily hanged or drowned, but this dramatic measure promptly invoked the wrath of the king, as one of the men had indeed been a royal officer.280

The Lyonnais ultimately managed to escape serious punishment for this affair, owing to the dire state of affairs in their city. The incident nevertheless provides a poignant example of the tensions between royal authorities, urban communities, and soldiers in an era when the line between friend and foe was often impossible to decipher.

The inability of royal officials to effectively suppress the activities of the free companies after the defeat at Brignais created a crisis of insecurity for the Lyonnais, that forced them to take further measures to defend themselves. The companies converged in Brignais soon found that the region had already been too thoroughly despoiled to support the several thousand warriors who had gathered there, leading some of the captains to depart to the northeast to Burgundy, with others migrating further into central France in

Auvergne and the Midi. Those that stayed behind – most notably Seguin de Badefol and his followers - continued to pose problems for the Lyonnais for years, however, harassing

280 This episode is outlined in Guigue, Les Tards-Venus, 90.

207 any merchants who dared to use the major commercial routes running in and out of the city. Only by purchasing safe-conducts directly from him could anyone pass through the region.281 Ultimately, the scale of the damage inflicted by Seguin de Badefol and the companies reached such proportions that the Lyonnais were forced to pay him off to end the attacks.282

In October of 1365, they began negotiations, enlisting the support of Pope Urban

V to facilitate a diplomatic solution. With little leverage to use against the Gascon captain, the consuls could only offer payments large enough to make it worth his while to stop the raids and depart from the region; the sum of 40,000 florins, 25,000 of which was to be levied from the inhabitants of the Lyonnais and Maconnais regions, was finally enough to accomplish a deal.283 Urban V sweetened the deal by offering absolution to all those mercenaries who left the kingdom to serve France in fulfillment of an accord that

Charles V had made to support the claims that the Count Henry of Trastámara made to the Castilian throne. The agreement put a temporary end to the attacks, as the companies kept to their end of the bargain and began to depart. Officials in Lyon remained alert, however, and sent spies and scouts after the forces of Seguin de Badefol to observe their movements and ensure that they would not return.

On their way to the Iberian peninsula, many of the departing companies traveled by Montpellier, and the Petit Thalamus likewise noted the precise routes they took

281 Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, 75-85 provides an excellent analysis of Seguin de Badefol and his activities in Auvergne and Anse during the 1360s and 1370s. On the commercial impact of the Seguin de Badefol and other companies, see AML CC 190.3, Folio 26, which notes the revenues lost from diminished returns on aides. 282 Such “protection” payments were among the principal options that municipalities had at their disposal if they were militarily unable to combat the companies, but these could take a devastating economic toll over time. William Caferro has demonstrated the long-term economic damage inflicted by and other mercenaries who forced the Sienese to make payments to avoid their pillaging, in Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena (Baltimore, 1998). 283 On efforts to raise the required sum, see Kleinclausz, Histoire de Lyon, 233.

208 through the region and the composition of their forces – anxiously recording the passage of group of Bretons here and some Gascons and Germans there, while noting the names of the greatest captains who came through the city. True to form, the companies did not fail to cause mischief on their way past, with the pillaging led by one of the Gascon leaders nicknamed “Bras de Fer’ forcing the consuls of Montpellier to send “good men from the city on horse and foot to go to the mills of Lez to collect all the grain and flour and bring it back into the city.”284 Between November of 1365 and April of 1366, at least twelve companies passed by or through Montpellier en route to Iberia, with the largest cohort entering the city with the great Breton captain Bernard du Guesclin on November

29, 1365. This group—which according to the local chronicler included companies of

French, English, Germans, Bretons, among others—came and left after staying in the city for a week without major incident. The departure of the companies for Iberia offered a welcome if short-lived reprieve for the inhabitants of cities in the Midi and eastern

France.285

They had learned difficult lessons from the crisis the Great Companies had inflicted on their communities over the course of the 1360s. The experiences shaped the approaches that municipal authorities took as they continued to work to guide their communities through an era of war. No longer could bourgeois afford to neglect the upkeep of their fortifications while focusing on commercial pursuits and staying above the fray of disputes between lords and petty nobles. Urban centers and the commercial routes that sustained their economies had become key targets, and the populations of the bonnes villes had found that they could not count on sovereigns who alternately seemed

284 Thalamus Parvus, 369 285 Thalamus parvus, 369-371.

209 indifferent to their plight or incapable of defending them effectively when they wanted to.

With the companies of soldiers who were contesting the conflict regularly switching sides or serving only their own ambitions, city leaders often had little choice but to rely on the strength of their own communities. Even then, they could still be subject to the whims of monarchical policy. A case in point: after years at war with forces aligned with Charles of

Navarre, Montpellier was placed under his authority in 1365 when Charles V needed a plum offering to convince his adversary to make peace. 286

Given the vagaries of royal politics, the easily shifting nature of the mercenary companies’ allegiances, and the general state of insecurity that urban communities lived under as they struggled to fend off the danger they faced on multiple fronts, it is not surprising that the self-reliance that city dwellers had been forced to cultivate was accompanied by a wariness towards warriors, who threatened their welfare regardless of who they were serving. Distinguishing enemies from allies was an especially tricky proposition precisely because soldiers’ affiliations did not always follow language, nationality, or even feudal affiliation that would make their intentions more discernible or predictable. Breton and Gascon captains and their soldiers were just as likely to fight shoulder to shoulder with the English or Charles of Navarre as for the Valois monarchy.

Even when they were ostensibly working for the bonnes villes of France they could easily change sides when the winds of war shifted. When lacking employment the companies and unaffiliated mercenaries could seem even more dangerous, since their objectives

286 Thalamus parvus, 370-376. The efforts Charles of Navarre made to assert his primacy over the city wore heavily on the Montpelliérains: three years after the Thalamus parvus notes the Charles of Navarre’s takeover of the city 1365, the chronicler notes that French royal authorities were forced to intervene to prevent them from violating safeguards protecting local merchants from exactions. The content of the dispute is outlined in detail in AMM Louvet 326, and 360-370 which note that Navarre was trying to subject them to duties to be levied exclusively from estrangers, in violation of the long-established local privileges.

210 centered on self-sustenance, which so often entailed extortion from urban populations.

The confusion that such conditions engendered is clearly seen within the varied accounts of the events of this first phase of the Hundred Years War. In some cases, as in the Petit

Thalamus, the chronicle of the Rouennais notary Pierre Cochon, and local treasury records detailing the companies’ activities from Lyon, the varied groups of routiers were simply lumped together as “enemies.” Elsewhere within the same sources, the disparate bands ravaging the countryside and suburbs were indiscriminately labeled as English. In still other cases, the same authors took pains to note the specific nations from which each of the captains and companies hailed.

The range of terms applied to the companies of soldiers that roamed France in the late 1350s and through the 1370s is a reflection of the covalent layers of anxiety their presence generated within urban populations. On one level, those fighting within the companies could be grouped together as “enemies” because their objectives of pillage and personal gain quite simply placed them in direct opposition to the urban populations they so regularly targeted. In the instances when varied companies were labeled as

English – even when they were not primarily composed of English soldiers or even fighting directly for the Plantagenet cause – there are possible indications of efforts to find order within the chaotic conflict by simplifying the adversary; this tendency may just as easily indicate awareness of the fact that Edward III continued to promote the companies’ activities in order to undermine the Valois rulers while a truce prevented open warfare. Similarly, in other cases, varied forms of the label “false French” refer to those soldiers who hailed from the French kingdom but fought along side the English.287

287 For example, the Thalamus parvus uses the expression “fals franceses”, p. 357 when referring to traitors who supported “une companha dAnglezes”.

211 If we set out to find the origins of nationalistic sentiment, we can see traces within such descriptions. But focusing only on this impulse obscures more complex views of the diverse ranks of soldiers that were so often rooted in the fact that they were strangers to the populations of the cities, in the simplest sense of being unknown individuals whose intentions were not immediately clear. The more discerning attempts of local populations to distinguish between Gascon, Breton, German, French, English, Flemish, Scottish, and

Spanish companies reflect an attentiveness to the specific attributes that made soldiers distinct from the local populations. Still, at this stage there is only sporadic evidence for the development of cultural and linguistic stereotypes concerning the various contingencies of soldiers involved in this early phase of the Hundred Years War.

The recruitment policies put into action by Charles V as war with England resumed in earnest in the late 1360’s show that soldiers’ origins had become an important consideration when assembling armies, reflecting an awareness of the tensions that existed between local populations and soldiers who came from distant lands. In his magisterial study, Guerre, état, et société à la fin du moyen âge, Philippe Contamine has demonstrated that Charles sought to rely mainly on soldiers who were not only from

France but from the regions where they would be fighting. This made practical sense on multiple levels; a knowledge of terrain, along with an affiliation with the region and a personal investment in its continued welfare certainly had advantages on the battlefield.

The costs and logistical challenges of moving soldiers to the locations of military engagements were also diminished when their captains recruited in the vicinity. Reliance on local soldiers also helped to reduce the tensions arising between the native populations

212 and the soldiers fighting for the monarchy. 288 Naturally, there were limitations to how completely such an approach could be followed; ever the pragmatist, Charles continued to call upon the more skilled corps of crossbowmen that came from beyond the borders of the kingdom because of a dearth of quality alternatives from France. On the whole, however, the reforms he implemented to alter the composition of his armies and the revenues he earned through the imposition of hearth taxes known as fouages facilitated the reclamation of the lands that had been ceded to the English in 1360. The success of such measures may have helped Charles the moniker of “the wise”, but resentment over the fouages ignited intensified tensions between the Valois monarchy, the soldiers that fought for it, and the bonnes villes that ultimately undermined those gains.

Divided Kingdom: Community and Local Identity in an Age of Invasion and Civil War

It was during the period of transition between the reigns of Charles V and his son

Charles VI in the late 1370s and early that the paths of the three cities at the center of this study began to diverge sharply, in ways that would redraw the limits of their communities and the roles they played in the remainder of the Hundred Years War. The

Lyonnais reaped benefits from the sacrifices they had made in order to fend off the advances of the Great Companies during the 1360’s, receiving privileges from Charles V in 1375 that exempted them from all manners of royal exactions. The consulate also enjoyed royal support in their efforts to resist the financial demands of the canons of the chapters of Saint-Just and Saint-John, and they received authorization to accept the coinage of Dauphiné and Savoy, which facilitated commerce with these adjacent regions.

288 On attempts to foster regional recruitment among the companies serving Charles V, see Contamine, Guerre, état, et société, 157-162.

213 289 Montpellier and Rouen were not so fortunate, and both were involved in the wave of urban revolts that erupted in western Europe in this period. After being granted as appanage to Charles of Navarre in 1365, Montpellier endured the brunt of his attempts to assert his sovereignty over the region, and the local leaders were almost immediately forced to appeal to Charles V to rein in his vassal’s encroachments on the traditional protections they had enjoyed under the privileges of their communal charter. In 1378, the

Valois ruler took back Montpellier for good, with his brother Louis, Duke of Anjou looking after the city as royal lieutenant of all of Languedoc. But this assignment coincided with the imposition of a crippling fouage to pay for renewed military campaigning in Languedoc; the population of Montpellier was assessed for a contribution of 12 francs from 800 households, but the municipal consuls protested that combined forces of war, plague, famine and emigration had diminished the actual number of inhabited residences to 600.290

The Petit Thalamus recounted that the “insupportable demands and especially the twelve francs per hearth per year” led to “great insult in Montpellier by some populars,” with the officers of both the king and his lieutenant suffering grisly deaths at their hands after their meeting to compel the consuls to levy the tax went awry.291 The reaction from

289 Jean Déniau, Histoire de Lyon et du Lyonnais, 148. 290 AMM, Louvet, 2515. “Les consulz et habitans de la ville de Montpellier nous ont humblement supplié comme vingt ans et plus que le nombre des feux pour lors estant en ycelle ville faire ramené et réduit au nombre de huit cens feux… la dict ville de Montpellier et les habitans en icelle soyent moult apetetiez et diminuez de personnes tant par les mortalitéz, guerres, sterilitéz comme autrement qui depuis ledit temps son survenues. ” Compare with AMM Louvet 1735, from 1378, in which the Duc of Anjou assesses the number of taxable residences at 1000. 291 The events of the revolt are recounted in lengthy detail in the Thalamus parvus, 398, but the following passage provides a particularly a key summary of the role of a crisis of depopulation and economic decline in prompting the revolt ”Item, dimars a XXV doctobre al vespre e tota la nueg seguent fon fach i gran insult en Montpellier per alcus populars en lo qual foron mortz et aucitz alcuns grans officiers de nostre senhor lo rey e de moss. Lo duc d’Anjo son frayre e luoctenant en la Lengua doc, per so que fazian grans et importablas demandas et specialment de xii francs per fuoc per an, et lo pobol era tot guastat et deseretat

214 the Duke of Anjou was swift and the punishment exemplary, even in its moderated final form. Arriving in the city in January of 1379 with 1000 men-at-arms and a mass of arbalestiers, he ordered the surrender of all weapons within the city and had a large scaffold set up next to one of the gates, from which he read a lengthy sentence for the city’s punishment. After asserting his right to hold the entire population accountable,

Louis settled on the execution of 600 of the participants in the revolt – 200 were to be beheaded, 200 hanged, and the final 200 to be burned alive. The Montpelliérains would lose their consulate, their archives, and the bell-tower that summoned them for assemblies, and their walls and gates would be leveled to prevent any further resistance.

Finally, they would be forced to pay 600,000 francs as an indemnity. Notables including the Marquesse of Majorca and the Cardinal of Albano, who acted on behalf of Pope

Clement VII, joined the consuls’ pleas for mercy.292 Together, they convinced the duke to commute the sentence and allow the city to retain its communal privileges if they paid the reduced but still enormous sum of 130,000 francs.293 An untold number of the ringleaders of the uprising still faced execution. Although it is doubtful that the original sentence was ever likely to be carried out to its fullest extent, the revolt and the brutal spectacle of royal power that the Duke of Anjou enacted provides a poignant illustration of the gap between Montpelliérain and royal interests during the war.

The uprising known as the Harelle that took place in Rouen in 1382 was a product of the same profound disconnect, and the rebellion and the royal response served

per los grans cartz que longament avian corregut sur lo pays… ”. The causes of the rebellion are also outlined in AMM, Louvet 2490-2494, the last of which notes that the revolt had also spread to Carcassone. 292 The response is also outlined in the Thalamus parvus, 398-399. 293 See also Germain, Histoire de la commune de Montpellier, Vol. III, 193-198, and the text of the royal act detailing the final decision by Charles VI on the punishment that would be administered to the city among the pièces justificatives, 388-402.

215 to deepen that divide – with long-term consequences. Guilt over the weight of the tax burdens he had imposed on his subjects may have prompted Charles the Wise to rescind numerous royal tax impositions from his deathbed; the decision may also have been an ill-fated attempt to quell the unrest that afflicted the kingdom before his young son took the throne under the regency of his four brothers. But the successors to Charles V were ill-prepared to carry on the business and wars of the kingdom without these important sources of revenue, and after his death in 1381 they immediately reinstituted the old taxes. This provoked violent upheaval in cities around France, and on February 25, 1382 fury over the renewed taxes prompted a group of several hundred Rouennais to assemble to the sound of the belfry. The gathered crowd propped up a local draper as their true king, denouncing the taxes and carrying out mob justice against the persons and estates of royal officers and collectors, as well as the monks of the wealthy of abbey of Saint-Ouen.

When the revolt had finally run its course, the royal response was once again furious and spectacular. Needing to establish the authority of the young Charles VI, his uncles led him into the city with a substantial entourage, ordering the destruction of one of the main gates and the removal of the heavy chains that blocked cavalry charges through the streets. Both measures aimed to undermine the independence of the commune by making it indefensible. After publicly executing the leaders of the uprising in the city square before the forcibly assembled population, as well as the municipal authorities who failed to stop them, royal officers oversaw the destruction of the ancient local bell-tower, which served as an alarm that called the population to assembly or to arms, and thus a symbol of local strength.294

294 On the events of the Harelle, and related rebellions within Paris and Flanders, see Pierre Cochon, Chronique Normande, 163-170.

216 After all these measures were carried out, the Valois regents ordered the imposition of an indemnity of 60,000 francs, of which 25,000 was to be delivered immediately. They also dissolved the commune of Rouen and revoked its privileges, thus voiding any rights the inhabitants of the city could invoke to appeal their punishment.

This did not prevent further resistance to the collection of the crippling indemnity, which escalated into another revolt in August of 1382. The leaders of the Rouennais community attempted to exculpate the population for this second uprising and regain the privileges of the commune by asserting that the rebellion “was not done by them or by the good men of the city, but against their will and by gens estranges and from outside of the city, who had come to the market.” To make their purpose clear, they added that “they could do nothing about this, because they had no communal administration or jurisdiction.”295 The appeal that a revolt was caused by outsiders was and for that matter still is a common one, so it should be seen for what it almost certainly was – an attempt to diminish the burdens on the city by shifting to blame onto unidentified external actors while also emphasizing the damage done by the usurpation of local authority. But while the complaint may indicate little about who truly instigated the secondary rebellion within

Rouen, or the dynamics of relationships between locals and outsiders, the plea that the disenfranchised leaders of the city made reflects the politicization of the limits of community in negotiations between municipal and royal authorities. In this case, the

295 AMR, 3E1 Anc. Tir. 2.1; Tir 3.2. “[Those of the city] eussent propose que elle n’avoit pas esté facite par euls ne par les bonnes gens de la dicte ville mais contre leur voulenté avoit esté fecte et par gens et de hors la dicte ville, qui estoient venus au marchié, et que en ce ils ne povoient n’osoient mettre aucun remède, pour ce qu’il n’avoient ne ont corps de Commune ne juridiction aucune, car les avions prins en nostre main, et encores les y détenons. ” A full transcription is also available in the pièces justificatives of Chéruel, Histoire de Rouen, 552.

217 attempts to scapegoat outsiders came to nothing, as Rouen would remain under the direct authority of a royally appointed maire and commissioners into the fifteenth century.

The revolts that took place in Rouen, Montpellier and other cities around the kingdom even as the Valois monarchy conducted a successful campaign to reclaim lost territories in Gascony demonstrate the extent to which war with England could cause a divergence between local and royal interests and their representatives in this first half of the Hundred Years War. In light of the severity of the punishments inflicted on those communes that took part in the uprising, it is not surprising that the populations of many bonnes villes in France showed themselves to be open to alternative sources of authority after war resumed in earnest in 1415, following a twenty-six year truce. Indeed, the events of this latter phase of the war show that local interests continued to trump any sense of affiliation with a “national community,” while illustrating just how divisive the soldiers fighting for the Valois monarchy had become. Even more clearly than in the first half of the conflict, a principle source of contention was the fact that so many of those who were fighting for the crown came from regions or principalities that seemed foreign to the people they were defending. There were several reasons for this view. The decisive victory by Henry V at the battle of Agincourt on October 24, 1415, resulted in the deaths of several thousand men from the French army, and the capture of another 1,500. Among the ranks of casualties and prisoners were many from the “flower of French ,” including some of greatest princes in the kingdom, including the dukes of Bourbon,

Britanny, Orléans and Alençon, as well as seven counts and 90 knights bannerets – all of whom led and mustered their own companies of men-at-arms. The loss of so many men

218 and military leaders created a long-term impediment on all recruitment through the traditional feudal channels, forcing greater reliance on mercenaries.296

Beyond the great numbers lost at Agincourt, mounting civil strife between competing factions of the Valois family altered the composition of the royal forces as well, particularly when the dispute escalated into open warfare following the assassination of the duke of Burgundy in 1419. With his father Charles

VI effectively incapacitated by mental illness, the dauphin and future king Charles VII took up the Valois mantle in fending off Henry’s advance and taming the ambitions of the Burgundians. He relied heavily on the companies of his mentor Bernard VII, the count of the Armagnac region of southwestern France; these companies consisted of

Gascon warriors, many of whom were hardened veterans who had made a living ‘off the land’ during and after campaigns against the English earlier during the war. The distinctive dialect they spoke differentiated them from the populations of northern

France, and they came to be closely associated with the indignities they inflicted when they were sent to Normandy to halt the advances of the English and Burgundians in the region.297 After 1419, Charles VII also began to rely heavily on contingents of Scottish soldiers, who came to France to fight against the English in honor of the “Auld Alliance” established between the Scots and the French in 1295. A group of 6,000 Scottish soldiers arrived in La Rochelle in 1419, in answer to Charles’ pleas for reinforcements, and as many as 15,000 had entered the kingdom by 1424. Their contributions were essential to efforts to impede the English advance in Normandy and elsewhere in France, but they

296 On the battle of Agincourt and the death toll on the forces of the Valois monarchy, see the chart in Anne Curry, Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations (London, 2000), 12. 297 For a general analysis of the composition of French forces in this period see Contamine, Guerre, état, et société, 235-273. See also, Contamine, “Les armées française et anglaise à l’époque de Jeanne d’Arc,” Revue des sociétés savantes de Haute-Normandie, Lettres et sciences humaines, no. 57, (1970), 5–33.

219 quickly became notorious in their own right for their penchant for rowdiness and pillaging. Such behavior earned them pejorative nicknames including ‘mutton-guzzlers’ and ‘wine bags’, within the towns and regions where they were quartered.298

The lack of discipline among Armagnac soldiers who had ostensibly come to fend off “the descent of the English” in the Caux region around Rouen caused simmering tensions to boil over into rebellion in the summer of 1417. The text of a letter from the dauphin Charles from July of that year outlines the events leading up to the rebellion and the specific complaints that instigated the unrest, providing a clear demonstration of the conflict of royal and local interests in the face of a common enemy, and the centrality of concerns over foreign soldiers. According to Charles’ missive, the Rouennais had “taken up arms to guard the city” against the English, although their call to arms was also a response to the measures royal officers had taken to impose authority over the city in order to prevent the spread Burgundian influence. In spite of the warnings they received, the leaders of Rouen patently refused to entrust their city to the care of “many strangers

(plusieurs estrangers), who being service of the king in the garrisons of the lands of

Caux, did such execrable deeds that it was out of the question to confide themselves to them or to receive them.” Even when informed of a royal ordinance issued by the dauphin that demanded they accept the support of these soldiers, they persisted in refusing “the entry of or commerce with the said soldiers.” Their continued objections prompted Charles to come to the city personally to attempt to defuse the situation and order the Rouennais himself to receive his soldiers. Even with the heir to the throne

298 On Scottish soldiers in the armies of Charles VII, see Brian Ditcham, “Mutton Guzzlers and Wine Bags”: Foreign Soldiers and Native Reactions in Fifteenth century France”, in Power, Culture, and Religion in France, ed. Christopher Allmand (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1989), Bernard Chevalier, “Les écossais dans les armées de Charles VII jusqu’à la bataille de Verneuil,” in Jeanne d’Arc: une époque, un rayonnement (Paris, 1982), 86-92.

220 lodged with his entourage in the chateau of Saint-Katharine that loomed directly over the city not even a kilometer to the east, the population still resisted, remaining armed and locking their gates. While insisting on their loyalty to the dauphin, they specified that they would only allow him into the city on the condition that he would not bring with him

“the said strangers.” Naturally, the dauphin refused to tolerate such insulting limitations to his authority.299

Ultimately, the enmity between the two parties escalated to the point that some from the city issued “several offers of war against the king and [dauphin], and even those who were garrisoned in their own chateau.”300 Burgundian sympathizers had already assassinated the royal bailli of the city, Raoul de Gaucourt, on July 23, in order to take back control over their commune after he and his sergeants had acted to revoke municipal privileges and authority and establish martial law. When the dauphin’s show of force from the chateau of Saint Katharine failed to compel the leaders of Rouen to cede the power they had seized back to royal authorities, he had little choice but to negotiate, and after several exchanges the Archbishop of Rouen, Louis of Harcourt and some of the less belligerent representatives of the commune prevailed in convincing the two sides to come to terms. The dauphin agreed to allow the Rouennais to retain the keys to the gates and the rights to organize their own defenses. He offered amnesty to the population for the

299 AMR 3E1 Anc. Registre U2 Folio 131,v. “Comme pour la renommée qui estoit pour lors dela dessent des Angloys, les bourgoys de la ville de Rouen se feussent mis en armes pour garder la dicte ville, et cependant sur ce qu’ils avoient esté advertis, que plusieurs estrangers estant à la soulde du roy ès garnison du pays de Caux faisoient si exécrables cas que seure chose n’esoit de soi fier à eulx ne de les recepvoir, pour laqeulle chose ils avoient ruse l’entrée et conversation des dicts estrangers néantmoins l’ordonnance du roy et du dict seigneur Dauphin… toutefoys ils offroient le recepvoir [i.e they offered to accept the dauphin into the city] au moyen qu’il n’ameneroit avec luy en icelle les dicts estrangers, à quoy le dict seigneur n’avoit voullu entendre, attendu que à nul n’appartenoit limiter l’auctorité du roy ne la syenne; et sur ce que les avoit faict de rechef sommer, avoit esté faict de la part de la dicte ville plusieurs offers de guerre au prejudice du roi et du dict seigneur. ” 300 Ibid.

221 egregious insult done by the revolt, and he also stipulated that he would only enter the city in the company of a small escort. Finally, he agreed not to force the commune to accept, lodge, and provided for his companies of estrangers, acknowledging that resistance to such impositions had been the principal source of the uprising. In return for these remarkably extensive concessions, he kept the right to appoint commissioners and officers who would retain final authority over the affairs of the city, which would give him the power to take legal actions against any further attempts by the Burgundian faction to gain control over the city. Such terms reflect the complex power dynamics between the Rouennais and the dauphin in this period. Although the two sides eventually came to a resolution, this was mainly because neither could afford to engage in open conflict; the divide between their objectives and interests remained vast.

Moreover, even though the dispute was multi-faceted, the letter that the dauphin sent to the leaders of Rouen when he pardoned the city places a specific focus on the animosity the population had for the estrangers that he had sent to the region to fight off the English. This may reflect an attempt to minimize the appearance of remaining tension between the dauphin and the Rouennais by laying the blame at the feet of a third party.

Still, the particular form this takes is noteworthy for the fact that the foreignness of the royal forces was a primary point of emphasis. Had the resistance to the soldiers who fought for the dauphin derived only from the fact that they were disorderly, there would have been little reason to repeatedly underscore that the estrangers were the root of resistance in Rouen; the letter could just as easily have used the common labels of hommes d’armes, gens d’armes, or gens de trait when referring to the various types of warriors perpetrating outrages in the Caux country. Instead, Charles’ letter gives a clear

222 sense that the soldiers were defined by the fact that they were estrangers, and that this was a central element of the objection to their presence. Indeed, the ways the term estranger are applied are also revealing. The exact composition of the forces that had been sent to combat the English in the northern part of the kingdom at this stage is not clear, but Gascons affiliated with the Armagnac party continued to comprise the primary contingent of the armies who fought for the dauphin in this period. Whether or not other foreign elements existed among the companies he had assembled in Normandy in 1417, the fact that the dauphin’s soldiers were indiscriminately labeled as estrangers indicates the persistence of notions of community and identity founded on local affiliations, while also demonstrating that the looming presence of the English did not simply break down such divisions.

Nor did relations between the Rouennais and royal authorities improve when

Henry V and the English arrived to lay siege to the city in July of 1418, almost exactly a year after the revolt. If xenophobia towards the English promoted French patriotism, as

Minois and Beaune suggest, we would expect to find that this most direct confrontation would have promoted such sentiments in the desperate population of Rouen. At first glance, there does seem to be evidence in support of this hypothesis. Clearly, the leaders and inhabitants of Rouen were not keen on submitting themselves to English authority without a fight, which would have meant accepting a permanent garrison along with uncertain impositions and restrictions on the autonomy of their commune. The stories they heard from refugees who had fled villages and towns that the English had ransacked surely helped to strengthen their resolve not to accept Henry’s ultimatum to cede control of their city or face the consequences of a siege. Confronted with an army of at least

223 7,000 Englishmen, the inhabitants of Rouen accepted the presence of soldiers from outside their city in order to buttress their garrison and civilian militias. As the Rouennais frantically attempted to stockpile food and weapons to hold out against a siege, they also sent envoys to ask for additional aid from the king Charles VI, whose insanity left him under the direct influence of their preferred leader, the Duke of Burgundy, John the

Fearless. They even appealed to help from the dauphin, their erstwhile adversary. But when their initial entreaties went unanswered, any signs of unity and reconciliation began to disappear, and the relationship between royal authorities and the population of the capital of Normandy quickly and dramatically deteriorated.301

With no help forthcoming, the leaders of the city’s defensive effort dispatched a local lawyer, Eustache de Pavilly, to make a renewed plea to the king and the duke of

Burgundy. Enguerrand de Monstrelet, who was well-informed about the nature of their conversations in his capacity as the Burgundian court chronicler, recounted that the representative had told the king and the duke, “it is enjoined upon me by the inhabitants of the city of Rouen, to cry out against you… regarding the great distress they have from the English; they demand and tell you through me that if they do not receive help for you, and it is necessary to surrender to the king of England, you will never in all the world find worse enemies than them, and if they are able, they will destroy you and your progeny.”302 These are hardly the words of a populace filled with patriotic sentiment by their hatred for a common enemy. Later in the siege, after the increasing desperation of

301 These defensive preparations and negotiations are outlined in Monstrelet, Chroniques (Vol. III), 111- 118; 302 Monstrelet, Chroniques (Vol. III), 126-127. As recorded by Monsrelet, the statement by Eustache de Pavilly went as follows : “Très excellent prince et seigneur, il m’est enjoint de crier contre vous, et aussi contre vous, sire de Bourgogne, qui avez le gouvernement du roi et de son royaume le grand haro, lequel signifie l’oppression qu’ils ont des Anglois ; et vous mandent et font savoir par moi, que si, par faute de votre secours, il convient qu’ils soient sujets au roi d’Angleterre, vous n’aurez en tout le monde pires ennemis d’eux, et s’ils peuvent, ils détruiront vous et votre génération. ”

224 the situation within the walled enclosure had led to the expulsion of fellow subjects who had come to take refuge in the city, the Rouennais leaders once again dispatched an envoy to appeal for reinforcements. Reiterating both their indictment of the royal authorities’ inaction, and their assertions of the consequences for this neglect, the emissaries explained: “the good people of Rouen have already signified to you and made known the great necessity and distress that they have suffered for you; and you have done nothing to help, as you had promised. So for the last time, we send ourselves to you, in order to tell you, on behalf of the besieged, that if there is no help, they will surrender to the English, and from this moment, if you do not come to their aid, they will break all oaths of loyalty, service, and obedience that they have made.”303 Sure enough, the requested reinforcements never came, forcing the starving inhabitants of the city to accept Henry’s punishing terms of surrender, in January of 1419.

Did the thirty year occupation that followed the capitulation of Rouen promote anti-English sentiment within the city, and a more ardent embrace of French identity? To be sure, the terms of surrender did little to endear the conquerors to the conquered. The

Rouennais lost the freedom to leave the city without explicit authorization, and they were forced to put themselves at the mercy of Henry and the English. As a punishment for their resistance, they were subjected to an indemnity of 300,000 écus d’or, and were required to cede enough space inside the walls for the construction of a royal palace, which was to serve as an administrative and military base for the English government of

Normandy. The fact that the Rouennais had to readmit and accommodate the refugees they had expelled during the siege added to these burdens. On top of these demands, thee city’s inhabitants also lost the right to carry weapons, which they were ordered to

303 Monstrelet, Chroniques (Vol. III), 132.

225 surrender along with their armor in a central location. They forfeited the practically and symbolically significant privilege of maintaining chains to cordon off the city streets – a privilege they had only regained from the king of France in 1416 after it had been revoked following the Harelle. Finally, all the inhabitants and refugees who had come from Normandy were required to pay homage to Henry V - and they were forced to promise not to offer any support to the king of France or any others who attempted to make a claim on the city. As a guarantee, Henry held eighty hostages from Rouen – including twenty knights and squires and another sixty drawn from the ranks of the local bourgeois. 304 On top of all these concessions, the Rouennais were forced to accept a permanent garrison of English officials and soldiers, who would carry out justice and manage the local defenses; under their direction, the inhabitants of the city faced intensified requirements for the guet, or night watch – owing service one in every four nights. Such obligations became a principal source of contention. 305

If we look beyond these earliest impositions at the full duration of English rule in

Rouen, however, we find that this was not simply an era of oppression that fostered widespread xenophobia and an accompanying upsurge of French patriotism. As the capital of the duchy of Normandy, the city of Rouen had deep historical ties to England, and Henry V and his brother the Duke of Bedford – who served as regent in France during the minority of Henry VI – both sought to exploit this heritage in order to legitimize Lancastrian rule over the region. In the terms of surrender he offered to the

Rouennais, Henry reinstated the charter of enfranchisements that had governed Rouen back to the era when the kings of England had ruled over the city as dukes of

304 The terms of surrender are recorded within AMR 3E1 Anc. Régistre U2, Folio 121v. –127. 305 This supposedly led to the departure of many residents from the city who were seeking to alleviate themselves of such burdens. See AMR 3E1 Anc. Tiroir 245. Unnumbered charter of 1424.

226 Normandy.306 The indemnity that the population was forced to deliver to Henry imposed a crushing financial burden, but after assuming control of English holdings in France in

1422 the duke of Bedford sought to govern Rouen and the rest of Normandy with a lighter touch in order to promote the economic welfare of holdings that could provide a key source of revenue for military campaigns against Charles VII. Lucrative commercial partnerships between Normandy and England that had been severed by war once again flourished. The autonomy of the commune was limited by the presence of the English garrison and the fiscal exactions that the royal officers made to pay for campaigns against the crown, but no more so than under the punitive restrictions that the French monarchy had implemented after the Harelle in 1382. The municipal council retained the right to meet to discuss local affairs and policies that affected commerce and industry. Many of those individuals and families that pledged their support for the English régime retained their posts and benefited from renewed economic ties with England and Ireland.307

Eager to exculpate their city for its role as the site of the trial and execution of

Joan of Arc, local historians from Rouen who have written on the period of English rule have been keen to ferret out and emphasize patriotic responses to occupation by

‘l’étranger’. In one oft-cited episode of resistance in 1432, a local Franciscan and a Swiss soldier conspired to allow forces loyal to Charles VII into the castle just to the north of the city, as the first step in reclaiming Rouen. But the effort ultimately failed: the leader

306 See Anne Curry, “Siege of Rouen”. 307 Though cautious in his claims, Philippe Cailleux presents a convincing picture of considerable continuity within English governed Rouen in his analysis of housing purchases and marriage contracts within Rouen. See Cailleux, “La presence anglaise dans la capitale normande: quelques aspects des relations entre Anglais et Rouennais”, in La Normandie et l’Angleterre au moyen age (Caen, 2003). The collection of sources assembled by Paul le Cacheux in Rouen au temps de Jeanne d’Arc remains an essential point of departure for studies of the period of English occupation. See also the pièces justificatives of Adolphe Chéruel in, Histoire de Rouen sous la domination Anglaise au Quinzième Siècle. For a general introduction to the period of English rule over Normandy, see CT Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy 1415- 1450 : The History of a Medieval Occupation (Oxford, 1983).

227 of the endeavor, Guillaume de Ricarville, hoped for support from his comrades in

Beauvais and from the local population of Rouen. Yet he received neither, even after he had dispatched the sleeping English garrison and successfully gained control of the castle. Indeed, the city’s inhabitants actually supported the English reinforcements who came to take back the castle. Fear of repercussions for failing to honor their oath of loyalty may well have prompted the Rouennais to offer their aid, although the permanent garrison of English soldiers in their city was only around 300 men strong. One local chronicler attributes the support for the English to the fact that a stray arrow shot from the castle killed a local child and incited the population. Either way, the incident can just as easily serve as evidence of tepid enthusiasm for Charles VII and his cause as for simmering hostility towards an English oppressor.308 Once Charles’ reclamation of

Normandy had become a near certainty in the 1440’s, the Rouennais would offer an enthusiastic statement of their enduring loyalty to him in 1449, noting “the great work and resistance they had put up when encountering his adversaries… and the dangers and perils that had exposed themselves to in order to restore the city to his obedience.”309 But these statements of loyalty should also be seen for what they very expressly were: attempts to excuse the population for swearing allegiance to the English.

308 For a length account of this episode, see Monstrelet, Chroniques (Vol. III), 30. 309 U2 Folio 117v, “ville cappital de toult le pays de laquelle il avoit entendu que ses bons vrays et loyaulx subgectz les gens deglise nobles bourgoys marchans manans habitans de ladicte ville avoient grand desir eulx reduire et remectre en sa vraye et loyalle obeisance. Mais ilz doubtoient que pour la longue d’occupation que lesdictes adversaires avoient faict de ladicte ville et des serments et obeissance qui leur au fais durant ledict temps et du secours qui leur avoietn donné a l’encontre dudict seigneur tant au faict et exercice de la guerre que autrement leur en peust estre aucune chose impute a ladvenir. Pour quoy lesdictes seigneurs reduisans a memoire le grand devoire et la grande resistaence quilz avoient fecte a lencontre de la force de sesdictes admversaires quant Ilz y misdrens le siege les duretez penies despense et travaulx quilz endurerent le temps dessudicts qui a nul temps ne se doibvent oublier et les dangers et perilz en quoy plusieurs deux sestoient mis par plusieurs foys pour Remectre ladicte ville en son obeissances. ”

228 To be clear, my point here is not that the Rouennais had any particular affinity for the English, or that sentiments of affiliation with France were completely non-existent.

Rather, the events leading up to the capture of Rouen in 1419 and during the thirty year period of English rule indicate that the leaders and members of the local population were mainly driven by self-interest and a pragmatic desire to preserve their own welfare and economic interests. As determined as the Rouennais had shown themselves to be in resisting the siege imposed by Henry V, they did so in order to retain autonomy and avoid an unknown fate, and not because they were firmly aligned with the Valois monarchy. As clearly evidenced by the events of the revolt of 1417, the Rouennais were just as likely to express and act on xenophobic sentiments towards the companies of

Gascon soldiers fighting for the future Charles VII as to their English counterparts, since they could just as easily pose a threat. Indeed, even when facing an imminent English advance, the Rouennais exhibited a willingness to go to war with royal authorities in order to protect themselves and their privileges. All of this serves to demonstrate the persistent dominance of local conceptualizations of community and identity in Rouen during a period in which the population faced external threats from agents acting on behalf of all sides of the conflict for control of the kingdom. The question remains, though, of whether the leaders and inhabitants of Rouen were exceptional in their propensity for putting the needs and safety of their commune ahead of other loyalties and affiliations. After all, they already had ties to the English monarchy that the Lancastrian régime purposefully exploited to facilitate their transition into power, and these ties were paralleled by a long record of resistance and rebellion in the face of exorbitant demands imposed by the Valois monarchy.

229 Lyon provides a counterpoint to Rouen that allows us to evaluate whether the events of the latter phases of the Hundred Years War pushed other urban populations within the kingdom towards a more xenophobic comportment, and a more ardent devotion to their French sovereigns and the concept of France as a discrete and united community. Lyon remained firmly aligned with Charles VII from the earliest stages of the civil war with Burgundy. Because of its position near the southern fringe of the and on the frontier with the Holy Roman Empire—both of which came to be loosely allied with the English after 1419—Lyon was a key strategic point for all parties involved within this conflict. This led representatives for the competing factions to make consistent efforts to secure the support of the commune in order to gain a foothold in the

Rhône Valley. Few of the bonnes villes of France were completely unaffected by the populist overtures of John the Fearless of Burgundy; in Lyon, some of the poorer laborers seem to have aligned themselves with the Burgundian cause after the commune received a copy of the letter that John the Fearless sent to the bonnes villes around the kingdom in

1417, and there were elements within the large ecclesiastical establishment in the city that seem to have supported his cause.310 But whatever support existed for the Burgundian leader, it failed to stimulate the same level of unrest in Lyon as elsewhere, and the commune remained firmly in the camp of the dauphin. The Duke of Savoy, Amadeus

VIII, whose allegiances lay with Burgundy and the empire, also attempted to cultivate favor within the city. He had more success in these efforts, as he presented himself as a defender of the peace seeking to restore local commercial partnerships. Even these

310 The content of the letter that John the Fearless sent to bonnes villes around the kingdom is reliably recorded in Monstrelet, Chroniques (Vol. III), 416-425.

230 overtures met with reluctance, though: the leaders of the consuls repeatedly sought out the approval of the dauphin before any negotiations.311

Yet the loyalty the Lyonnais exhibited towards Charles VII during the civil war with Burgundy should not be mistaken for patriotic sentiment, or seen as a product of a more narrow belief in the importance of preventing the monarchy from falling into foreign hands. Viewed within the full context of local affairs, it is clear that the support that the consuls offered to Charles advanced their own economic interests. Devastated by decades of population decline inflicted by plague, bad harvests, and emigration, the

Lyonnais suffered another epidemic in the late spring of 1418, even as the conflict between the Armagnacs and Burgundians began to escalate. The consuls had already begun efforts to stimulate a demographic and economy recovery at this point. In some cases this simply meant loosening preliminary requirements for residency, a step which could be authorized at the local level: in May of 1418, the consulate promptly granted citizenship to six men from the suburb of Saint-Didier, a few kilometers to the northwest of the city – they had come as refugees because of “the wars that reign in the kingdom.”312 Eager to bring in and retain individuals who could help meet the demands on the time, energy, and finances of the local population, the six were admitted into the commune on the conditions that they would do their share to contribute and remain in

Lyon permanently. The consuls even offered to defend the new residents from the claims of the syndics of Saint-Didier, who complained that they were losing key members of

311 On the strategic importance and complex political relationships of the Lyonnais in this period, see Déniau, La commune de Lyon et la guerre bourguignonne 1417-1435. 312 AML, Registre des actes consulaires, 1418 1419. BB 1, Folio 58r. “pour les guerres qui règnent en ce Royaume se sont retrais à Lion en leur mesons, et pour ce ont requis que l’on les retiengne pour citiens deLion, et ilz on promis de fairs tous fais communs comme les autres habitans de la ville, et faire leur demourance continuelle toute leur vie à Lion ; et parmy ce l’on a ordonné que l’on les deffendra à la court du Roy, aux despens communs, contre les sindiques de Saint-Didier. ”

231 their night watch and militia. Beyond simply seeking warm bodies who could help to replenish the population and defray the expenses on local residents, the consuls had also begun the search for competent individuals who could stimulate industry and help revive the economy: in January of 1419, they had offered any master drapers, dyers, and fabric workers who wanted to settle in Lyon exemptions from all financial obligations for the span of ten years.313

The central piece of the consuls’ strategy for recovery was the establishment of

‘free fairs’, in the tradition of the great fairs of the Champagne region that had drawn together wealthy merchants and buyers from all over western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The creation of such fairs in Lyon required the sanction and support of royal authorities: only the crown could authorize exemptions from the duties and tariffs levied on merchandise entering the kingdom, and the taxes on items sold within local markets. Merchants entering France from other realms required royal safe-conducts in order to have any confidence in their personal security and the safety of their goods as they traveled through war-zones and the domains of petty lords and nobles. Furthermore, since Lyon was situated at the juncture of trade routes between Italy, Germany, France, and Switzerland, it was essential for the facility of commercial transactions that merchants coming from different realms be able to use their own currencies. In normal circumstances, the use of other currencies within France was tightly restricted, in order to limit fluctuations in the value of the livre tournois that served as the base of the monetary system. The suspension of these regulations eliminated the expenses and headaches

313 AML, Registre des actes consulaires, 1418-1419 BB1, Folio 31. “Ilz ont esté de conclusion et d’acors que les mestres drappiers, ovriers et teinturiers de draps, s’ilz veuillent, viegneent demourer à Lion, et, pour ce que plus voulentier y viegnent, l’en leur baillera, aux despens communs de la ville, leur demourance francehment pour dix ans entiers, et durant ledit temps seront frans de toutes charges communes de ville, excepté guet et garde. ”

232 involved in exchanging currencies, thus acting as a potent method of economic stimulus.

Such privileges were not granted lightly, however, because their side effects—including the rerouting of trade routes, the devaluation of currency, and the loss of tax revenue— could be detrimental to markets in other cities and to the economic welfare of the kingdom as a whole. The consulate dispatched numerous representatives to convince the dauphin to grant them these privileges, first sending envoys in January of 1418 in an attempt to win support for two annual fairs.314

As negotiations were ongoing, municipal authorities in Lyon had clear incentive to demonstrate their city’s unwavering devotion to the dauphin in order to secure his favor. The arguments they made as they worked to gain authorization for the fairs reflect a clear intent to emphasize their importance to Charles’ war effort. They framed their requests in terms of the mutual benefits to both the commune and the kingdom that would result from the establishment of international fairs, and the great harm that could come to them all if their requests were not granted. Recounting their “humble supplication”, in the typical formula of royal letters patents, the dauphin’s final response to their pleas began by acknowledging the strategic significance of the city, noting: “[Lyon] is one of the keys of the kingdom, situated on its limits and borders, and on the frontier with the countries of Savoy, Dauphin, Italy, Germany, and others of the Empire on one side, and Beaujolais,

Bourgogne, and Languedoc on the other, and along Forez and Auvergne along the banks of the Rhône.” In light of the importance of this location, and the fact that the city was

“of very great circulation, and size, like the city of Paris around there,” it was of grave concern that it “was in many parts poorly inhabited and feebly defended and enclosed,

314 The fairs of Lyon will be discussed at length in the fourth chapter. The best general introduction remains Marc Brésard, Les Foires de Lyon au XVe and XVI siècles (Paris, 1914).

233 particularly on the side of the Empire.” The reason for this disconcerting situation was that “the city was very poorly populated because of the mortalities, pestilences, famines, wars, passage, of men-at-arms, and other great burdens, damages, and inconveniences that had befallen the city.” For all of these reasons, Charles judged that it was “not only very expedient, but profitable and necessary, that the city should grow and be augmented with people of all estates, and with goods, as is desired by every prince in his bonnes villes and towns.”315

In recognition of all of the points and concerns outlined by the “councilors, residents, and inhabitants of Lyon,” Charles finally granted two fairs of six days each in

1419, after receiving multiple envoys and a festive royal welcome when he came to personally evaluate the situation in the city in January of that year – the celebration of his arrival had taken months and required significant expense. His final decision to grant these two fairs hardly met with enthusiasm, because of the limited scope of the privileges he bestowed. The minutes of the municipal assembly note that the consulate initially decided that “they should refuse the fairs that the officials of the council of the regent had granted, since they had not made them free, and for this reason they would not be at all profitable to the city since they were not exempt from all aides, both ordinary and extraordinary.” After more negotiations, they went back on this decision, coming to the conclusion “that they would take the fairs such as the council of the dauphin had granted

315 The privileges of the fairs of Lyon are compiled in several early printed editions. Here I use the 1560 version of Pierre Fradin, although the discrepancies between the texts of the varied editions are largely superficial issues of spelling and presentation. See Pierre Fradin, Ordonnances et privileges des foires de lyon: et leur antiquité (Lyon, 1560. Available as C8152 in the Archives Municipales de Lyon. The privileges granted by Charles VII in 1419 are outlined in folios 27-34.

234 them, since they could not do any better.”316 Even after the consuls agreed to the terms of the fairs that Charles had initially granted, they continued with efforts to gain more extensive privileges for future years. They also had to work to ensure that they would retain those provisions that had already been granted. For these reasons, the consuls continued to have good cause to ensure that their city would show itself to be firmly in the dauphin’s camp as wars with Burgundy dragged on into the 1420s. None of this meant that they had any enthusiasm for his war effort, or any feelings of warmth towards those who fought for him. Indeed, the steps the consulate took to protect their city in times of danger show that feelings of xenophobia generated by the threat of attack extended towards soldiers on all sides.

Moreover, whatever xenophobia is evinced by the policies of the commune of

Lyon in this period seems to have derived not from oppositional views of cultural or national difference, but uncertainty about the intentions of those individuals who were simply unknown to the local community. When scouts relayed rumors and reports of an approaching army and an imminent attack, fears of sabotage and espionage could lead to the expulsion of those who were seen as estrange. For example, in 1418, when there were rumors that the Holy Roman Emperor would make an imminent attempt to stake his claims to the city, the consuls ordered that “all strange people (gens estranges) be taken away, so that no one could know anything about what the city was doing.” The term estrange used in the council minutes is typically (and frustratingly) vague, but the ambiguity in itself suggests that the concerns did not apply to one particular, well- delineated group but to those who were not well-established and trusted within the

316 AML, Registre des actes consulaires, 1418-1419. BB 1, Folio 32r. “Ilz ont esté de conclusion que l’on preingne les foyers telles que le conseil de monseigneur le Daulphin les ont octroyées qui ne les porra meilleurs avoir, et ou cas que le seel cousteroit trop chier, que actendu qu’il les ont octroyées. ”

235 community. Only a few months earlier, the consuls attempted to force refugees from the nearby suburb of Ecuilly and ‘many other estrangiers who have their houses in this city’ to do their part to contribute to the guet and the expenses the rest of the population had to bear in order to pay for continued fortification efforts. We have no way of determining whether the same individuals who were compelled to support the local war effort were shortly thereafter forced to leave in order to protect the community – it seems probable, if uncertain, that those who had become permanent residents elicited less concern from their local neighbors since they were entrusted with duties in the night watch. What is clear, however, is that the local authorities viewed the careful observation and regulation of all unknown soldiers passing through their community as an essential defensive measure.

As the commune faced the threat of an attack from the forces of the Holy Roman

Empire in 1418, the consuls offered their endorsement for a decision by the royal bailli,

Philippe de Bouvay, to take thirty men-at-arms forces to garrison the castle of Saint-Just, a short distance beyond the western fortifications of the city. They sent fifteen men from

Lyon to support him, and agreed to his decision to supplement this force with fifteen

‘estrangers’. They remained deeply suspicious of even this small cohort of unfamiliar mercenaries, however, offering generous payments to a trusted royal sergeant and nine of his companions so that they would keep a close watch on them because “they were strangers, and not known.”317 Similarly, when the dauphin sent 80 men-at-arms and 60 archers to supplement the garrison of Lyon before a potential attack, the consuls

317 AML, Régistres des actes consulaires, 1418-1419. BB 1, Folio 36 [verify], “a Jehan Lecamus, sergent royal pour lui huit de ses compagnons, pour leurs despens et de leurs chevaux d’avoir fait le gayt à Saint- Just les Lundi et Mardi Sains derreniers passés avec la garnison des gens d’armes qu’y estoit, pour ce car lesdits gens d’armes estoitent estrangiers et non cognieuz. ”

236 reluctantly agreed. But in the same motion they ordered that the population should stay on high alert while they were there, with lanterns remaining lit throughout the city. In other cases, the consuls aggressively restricted and regulated the soldiers entering the city. In June of 1422, for instance, they expressed grave concerns about the “men-at-arms who are around in this country”, noting that they feared “that they should want to take some bonne ville in order to forage there… because they are badly paid.” The concern that the dauphin’s soldiers would try to exploit urban populations was a typical fear in the

1420s, as the royal treasury dwindled following continued English gains in the north. In order to ward off the threat they posed, the consuls assigned “a notable person of the city” to join the ranks of the normal gatekeepers, and to “note who would enter and leave the city.”318 Any soldiers were to be directed to one closely monitored gate, the Port de

Bourgneuf at the far western edge of Lyon. A maximum of thirty soldiers were to be allowed in at any time, and they were to be kept under tight guard until they reached their hostels, where they would be required to leave their weapons.

The consuls of Lyon depended on the efficacy of such regulations as they struggled to ensure that their population would remain safe from threats from the multiple, varied armies and free companies roving through their region. The array of measures they took to protect their community from those who were ostensibly fighting on their side is a reflection of a specific form of wary self-reliance – one that was

318 AML, Registre des actes consulaires, 1421. BB 1. Folio 127v-129v. Several entries outline such measures, for example, an entry for June 1: ”Ilz ont concluz que attendu les grans gens d’armes qui sont tout autor de ce pays et doubtans qu’ilz ne vueillent prendre aucune bonne ville pour icelle forragier, ainsi comme aucuns l’ont donné entendre, mesment qu’ilz sont mal paiez de leurs gaiges, que l’en mettra à chascune des iiii portes de Lion chascun jour, une notable personne de la ville, à tour de papier, avec les autres gardes ordinaires, laquelle notable personne saura qui entera ne sauldra en la ville, mesment que tousjours les gardes orindaires ne sont pas abilles à ce faire… ” Another piece stipulates that all soldiers are to be directed to the gate of Bourgneuf for surveillance, noting “qu’on ne lessera entrer nulles gens d’armes en la ville par les portes de Saint-Just et de St-George, excepté mons. le baillif à son simple estat… ”

237 cultivated by the fact that the enemy was not constant, singular, clearly defined, or even readily distinguishable. Over the course of the 1420s, the Lyonnais confronted dangers from the forces of Burgundy, the Holy Roman Empire, the duchy of Savoy, and Prince

Louis I of Orange, as well as the undisciplined and often poorly paid soldiers of the king of France, Charles VII. All of these parties paid contingents of mercenaries who came from other regions and lands beyond France. Many of them also relied on feudal retainers whose differences with the Lyonnais population would have been subtle: the

Burgundians for example, held control of the Maconnais bailiwick of which Lyon had previously been a part, and drew forces from that region. The vassals who served the

Prince of Orange may have spoken a more distinctive variation of Provençal, but it seems doubtful that their speech would have sounded more foreign to Lyonnais ears than the

Gascon dialects of the Armagnacs fighting for Charles VII – to say nothing of the major contingent of Scots who supported his cause. As for the English, they were only mentioned rarely within the deliberations of the Lyonnais consulate during the 1420’s, and then only as a distant although still menacing presence.

In the case of Lyon, then, the notion that animosity towards the English promoted greater affiliation with the French nation, community, and cultural identity simply does not pass muster. On the contrary, the fact that the war involved multiple vaguely delineated parties – some of which were based in France—pushed the consulate to sustain a very narrow view of which warriors could be trusted. Given the fact that soldiers fighting on any side of the conflict could be dangerous, that view necessarily prioritized familiarity and knowledge of intention, and was accompanied by an emphasis on close observation and regulation of all those who were strangers, and “not known”—

238 whomever they were serving. The consuls of Montpellier relied on similar strategies and approaches for dealing with warriors as they worked to protect their community in final decades of the Hundred Years War. Like their counterparts in Lyon, the Montpelliérains rarely faced a single, clearly defined enemy in this period, although the events of the conflict between the Valois monarchy and the English were closely followed in the city.

The Petit Thalamus noted the great battles between the forces of the dauphin Charles and their English counterparts with interest, and commented on the disputes and peace treaties between Charles VII and his Burgundian counterparts. Interestingly, the anonymous author of this local chronicle even commented that great celebrations took place in Languedoc when Henry V died in 1422, because of the great violence he had done to the realm. Such sentiments undeniably reflect a hostility towards the English, and even a sense of allegiance with the inhabitants of the distant regions of the kingdom afflicted by their invasion.

But in terms of the practical, daily affairs of the commune—as outlined within records of the more mundane transactions and policies of the municipal consulate—the war effort remained a local affair, with the ‘senhors et cossols’ of Montpellier taking on the lion’s share of the responsibility for the safety of the community. This was done out of necessity: with the English pushing southwards from Normandy and the Burgundians pressing the diminished realms of the Valois monarchy from the east, Charles VII could ill afford to focus his attentions on the southern fringes of his realm. As for the local authorities who took on the task of looking after Montpellier and ensuring its safety, local needs continued to trump considerations about affiliation with a national cause or community. Neither of the two main threats to Charles’ régime posed a direct danger to

239 Montpellier during this latter phase of the war; in spite of occasional rumors of an invasion from the Mediterranean or Gascony, the principal enemies of the commune were the companies of routiers that continued to slash through the Languedoc region. This forced the consuls to adopt tight restrictions on unknown warriors passing through their communities. When faced with reports of companies of soldiers loose within the surrounding countryside in 1418, the deputies of the comuna clausura took a series of measures to ensure that that the city would remain well prepared for the threats that they posed. To maximize the defensive capabilities of the population, they ordered that no armor, and “no manner of arms or artillery” should be allowed out of the city. This order explicitly stipulated that “anyone who sells arms or artillery to any stranger must denounce them to the deputies before they are out of their power,” reflecting not only the desire to keep valuable weapons in the city, but also an intent to keep them out of the hands of those whose intentions and identities were unknown.319

This is borne out even more clearly in the other measures the deputies of the comuna clausura implemented in 1418. In addition to carrying out a long list of actions aimed at bolstering and regularizing the guet and the organization of the local militias, they also ordered that the owners of any inns should inform them when individuals with weapons came to board in their establishments, and that they should closely monitor such guests. These measures reflect the close relationship between attempts to establish

319 AMM Louvet, 670. Per ordonanssa dels senhors deputastz et per actoritat del Reys mesenhor azels donada fay hom assaber a tota person de qualque condition que sie que non siesi ausarda de trayre nenguna manieyra darmes ne dartelharre de la villa de Montpellier sense licencia dels unhs senhors deputatz et aysso fus la pena de perdre larmes et artillharre, valura daquel applicadoyra et commertiboyra a la forifficacion et reparacion de la muralha et vezitacion daquella. Item que tota persona que vende armes ne artillhare a nengun estrangier a’ia a denuncias als dichs deputatz davant que parta de son poder sus la pena desus dicha aplicadoyra et connertidoyras coma desusdicts. Sus la pena de detz libras et applicicadoyras et connertidoyras coma desus. Item que nengun hostalier fonduguiers ni autra persona non permeta ni soffira que en son hostal se lyon valas in gafostz ont agia armes

240 defensive self-sufficiency at the local level, and wariness towards strangers who could compromise those efforts. It is important to point out here, however, that such measures were not directed towards all outsiders—just at those who carried weapons.320 Concerns about the numerous threats the community faced did not lead the Montpelliérain authorities towards a sweeping xenophobia, or cause them to sever the critical commercial and intellectual ties that sustained community in order to protect their city.

Nor did allegiances to the dauphin lead them to instinctively accept his enemies as their own. In 1419, for example, the consuls made an appeal to his royal court seeking protections for Burgundian students who wished to come study at the city’s famed faculty of medicine. Responding to their request, Charles acknowledged their statement that

“many good students and scholars from Burgundy and other countries dare not come stay in Montpellier because the city has recently come into [his] obedience, and they fear that some, seeing that they had come from Burgundy, would want to imprison them or do them harm.” He agreed to grant the special dispensation that they requested for the protection of these students, on the condition that they would not speak out against him as they pursued their studies.321

If Charles is to be commended for his leniency in granting his assurances to

Burgundian students, the credit ultimately lies with the consuls of Montpellier, who were

320 Municipal authorities commonly called up the owners of inns and taverns to report back to them about any suspicious individuals who came to their establishments. From Montpellier, see for example AMM, Louvet 3133, outlining such a request in 1389. The conseillers of Rouen made a similar request that any forains with weapons should promptly be reported to local authorities. See AMR 3E1 Anc. Déliberations de la ville de Rouen 15 170vr., 11 November 1408. 321 AMM, Louvet 647. “Les consulz et habitans de la ville de Montpellier nous ont exposé comme pour cause des debas noises et divisions qui ont esté en ce Royaume en especial en ce pais de Languedoc plusieurs bons escoliers et estudians qui sont du pais de Bourgogne et dautres pays nosent pas bonnement demourer en lestude dudit lieu de Montpellier, icelle ville ville est nouvellement venue a nostre obeisance et si doubtent que aucun ou aucuns obstant ce quilz sont dudit pays de Bourgogne ne les voulist prendre pour prionniers… ”

241 keen to rebuild their city’s reputation as a welcoming entrepôt and intellectual center even as they faced continued threats from the companies of soldiers roving through their region. This welcoming stance towards the subjects of their sovereign’s enemy was perhaps easier to follow because Montpellier faced only a marginal threat from the

Burgundians. At the same time, the effort to offer assurances and protection to outsiders who were seen as beneficial – even as those who were seen as detrimental were carefully identified and observed – is indicative of the wider strategy that the consulate used to rebuild the local population while preventing additional crises. The consuls of

Montpellier had already begun look to immigrants as primary agents of recovery for their severely depopulated city in the 1420’s, just as their counterparts in Lyon worked to establish fairs that restore their community by drawing together wealthy merchants who would sell their goods and settle in the city. The success of such policies depended on the ability to attract and keep the right sort of outsiders, and this in turn depended on municipal authorities’ success in ensuring the security of their communities as well as the security of those who came to settle, visit, worship, or do business.

Conclusions

Challenging the argument that xenophobia towards the English fostered the development of national identity within France, this chapter has set out to demonstrate three main points. Firstly, the lines of conflict during the Hundred Years War were almost never so clear cut that it was easy for the inhabitants of urban communities to

242 decipher their allies from their enemies along national lines. In the early stages of the war, the companies of mercenaries that fought for both the Valois and Plantagenets regularly changed sides or acted as independent renegades, leaving the inhabitants of cities with little option but to find their own means of defending themselves. The self- sufficiency they developed with their own sweat, money, and blood was accompanied by an inherent suspicion of those who could compromise their safety, and soldiers of all allegiances tended to fit that description because of the propensity they had for stealing from civilian populations. Furthermore, the fact that the soldiers who fought for the

Valois monarchy were often just as foreign to the bourgeois of the bonnes villes as the

English meant that it was never straightforward to cultivate a national identity in opposition to a single enemy ‘Other’ distinguished by language and culture. Indeed, the fact that the enemies that cities faced were in some cases just as French as their inhabitants meant that the leaders of those communities needed to find other ways to determine who to trust. This translated to an emphasis on knowing the intentions and identities of those warriors who were outsiders to their cities.

Secondly, my analysis of urban revolts and the frequent complaints that municipal authorities made to their sovereigns about taxation shows that their actions during the war were not motivated by some attachment to a lofty ideal of national community, or even a more narrow belief in the importance of keeping the crown in the hands of French rulers.

On the contrary, their policy decisions were mainly guided by a desire to help cities endure and rebuild during an age of war and other miscellaneous crises. When that put them at odds with royal authorities, they showed themselves to be willing to resist their rulers by whatever means they had at their disposal – whether that meant invoking the

243 privileges established in ancient charters, or barring the gates to strange soldiers who posed risks to their persons and possessions. Moreover, the Hundred Years War did not simply lead to a sweeping xenophobia towards any individuals came from outside the kingdom of France. The third and final point that I began to sketch out is that local leaders continued to look to those who came from outside the walls of their communities and beyond the frontiers of the kingdom as agents of revival - even as they confronted numerous external threats. Indeed, as will be seen in the chapter that follows, the concerted efforts that municipal authorities in Lyon, Montpellier, and Rouen made to attract the right outsiders were central to the strategies they used to guide their communities to a new age of prosperity and economic growth.

244

PART II

REACHING OUT TO RECOVERY:

TRADE AND IMMIGRATION, SURVIVAL AND REVIVAL

IN THE BONNES VILLES

245 How did urban communities in late medieval France recover from the depopulation and economic hardship inflicted by decades of war, recurring plague epidemics and famines, emigration, and relentless royal taxation? This question is of particular importance for understanding the long-term impact of these crises and the transition between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. As I will demonstrate in the chapters that follow, the efforts that municipal leaders in Lyon,

Montpellier, and Rouen made to maintain their commercial networks and attract outsiders to their communities played a central role in their efforts to survive crises and rebuild from their long-term demographic and economic effects. The recovery from the crises of the late middle ages has too often been depicted as a passive process in which the men and women who lived through this period were simply the beneficiaries of increased birth rates, immigration from rural areas, and the invisible hand of a reawakened market economy. But the pressing need for reconstruction and economic stimulus was just as apparent to municipal authorities in late medieval France as it is or should be to the leaders of our modern societies. They were certainly no more willing to wait for God or royal officials to restore their cities to their prior glory. On the contrary, the leaders of

Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen showed themselves to be determined, proactive, and savvy in finding ways to encourage the development of industry, the reestablishment of severed commercial ties, and the growth of the tax base. They followed different approaches for achieving these goals, but for all three of those communities, newcomers had a central part to play in revival.

Through an examination of policies that aimed to revive cities by bringing in new residents and reinvigorating the economic ties that served as the lifeblood of urban

246 prosperity, Part II of this study builds on the foundation of the preceding chapters while tying together the arguments they advanced. Chapter I outlined the ways that communes in France established boundaries that separated the privileged residents from outsiders who came to work, trade, or live within their city limits. As municipal authorities tried to rebuild their cities over the course of the fifteenth century, these old privileges and restrictions often had to be modified or set aside to encourage immigration and integrate newcomers into the local community and economy. Chapter II demonstrated that municipal leaders’ efforts to regulate migrations into and out of cities were central to their strategies for guiding their populations during a crisis and its immediate aftermath.

Here, we will see that this also held true in the long-term process of recovery. Whereas strategies for preventing crises or limiting their effects often focused on monitoring and restricting the activities of outsiders who could do harm to the community, strategies for rebuilding centered on finding ways to draw in the right sort of people – merchants, skilled craftsmen, artisans, and settlers of “good reputation.” Chapter III challenged the argument that the Hundred Years War cultivated a French patriotism founded on willful xenophobia. By showing just how much municipal authorities relied on immigrants and merchants from both near and far to revive their cities, the analysis that follows will continue flesh out that challenge by demonstrating that openness to outsiders became a constitutive ideal—if not always a reality—in the diverse urban communities at the center of this study.

These arguments offer a substantial contribution to the scholarship on recovery from crisis in late medieval France and western Europe. In spite of the importance that the reconstruction strategies used by the leaders of the bonnes villes had in stimulating

247 renewed demographic and commercial growth, the development, implementation, and impact of their policies has rarely been the subject of sustained investigation. Those studies that have focused on recovery from crisis have tended to focus narrowly on one community, although there have been some notable exceptions to this trend. Writing in the aftermath of World War II, Robert Boutruche offered a rigorous analysis of the short- term and long-term impact and response to late medieval crisis within the Bordelais region of France. Mindful of the parallels between the monumental task of reconstruction that faced his own nation and the challenges that faced the French kingdom in the Middle

Ages, Boutruche offered an influential analysis of efforts to orchestrate an agricultural recovery in rural areas devastated by war, pillage, and emigration. Other scholars followed his lead in focusing their attentions on the modes of rural recovery needed to support demographic growth. The tendency to assume that immigration and renewed commerce drove recovery in cities has meant that restoration efforts in urban areas of

France have not received the same scrutiny. It is true that rural areas were often hit the hardest during times of crisis, particularly during wars and campaigns by the great companies. But while many of those who survived these hardships fled to cities, urban communities faced challenges of their own that demanded and prompted carefully tailored solutions.

Seeking to understand the role that late medieval crises played in kindling the

Renaissance, scholars of Italian communes have devoted more attention to the history of urban recovery and repopulation efforts. William Bowsky traced out Sienese efforts to offer incentives to immigrants who would come to repopulate the city in the aftermath of

248 the Black Death.322 M.E. Bratchel offers a more extended analysis of the strategies used to restore Lucca as a commercial power in the fifteenth century after the city was buffeted by plague, revolt, and decades spent in the shadow of Florence.323 His study shows that the efforts of Luccan authorities to attract skilled artisans away from neighboring cities played a principal role in invigorating the textile industries within their city. Officials in German towns used similar initiatives to encourage recovery, with the magistrates of Mainz offering valuable exemptions and privileges to nobles and knights who would come and settle in their city limits.324 Such techniques of repopulation also had an important role in the resettlement of the Iberian frontier as the kings of Castile and

Aragon extended their domains to include Mediterranean islands and conquered Muslim territories in the south of the peninsula. Those studies that have focused on repopulation efforts in late fifteenth century France have tended to concentrate on monarchical policy and the development of an increasingly centralized French state under Louis XI and

Charles VIII, covering municipalities mainly as they relate to this process. But while the policies of these rulers unquestionably helped to facilitate rebuilding efforts in the bonnes villes, the initiative for the strategies they put into action most often came from the municipal authorities seeking solutions to their local problems.

A comparative analysis of the policies that the leaders of Montpellier, Rouen, and

Lyon advocated for rebuilding their cities illuminates the specific needs that shaped strategies for recovery, while also demonstrating the central part outsiders had to play in

322 William Bowsky, “The Impact of the Black Death upon Sienese Government and Society”, Speculum 39 (1964): 1-34. 323 M.E. Bratchel, Lucca, 1430-1494: The Reconstruction of an Italian City-Republic (Oxford, 1995), 143- 148. 324 Friedrich Keutgen, Urkunden zur stadtischen Verfassungsgeschichte (Berlin, 1901), 449-50, as cited in David Nicholas, The Later Medieval City, 62-63. Nicholas provides an invaluable overview of the scholarship on demographic change and recovery in fifteenth century cities. See especially, pp. 62-64.

249 attempts at urban renewal. To trace the development of reconstruction policies, the

Chapter Five begins by looking more closely at municipal authorities’ attempts to protect and sustain networks that supported their cities during periods of crisis and insecurity.

Since commerce had driven urban growth in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, municipal leaders naturally looked at the sustenance of trading partnerships and the protection of foreign merchants as a critical component of strategies for survival and recovery. Even in the darkest days of the civil war between the Armagnacs and

Burgundians, the leaders of urban communities that relied so heavily on commerce for economic strength knew that they could not afford to alienate valued trading partners.

The nature of the hardships afflicting each commune and the distinctive attributes of the commercial networks they were involved in determined how local leaders balanced attempts to sustain trade with efforts to ensure the security of their populations in the face of external threats. The strategies that municipal authorities implemented and advocated to royal authorities as they worked to promote long-term recovery built on those prior efforts to maintain old commercial ties. At the same time, the leaders of Lyon,

Montpellier, and Rouen consistently showed that they were not content to rely on previously established connections. Instead, they sought out innovative ways to foster the use of specialized skills and new technologies, while also attempting to establish trading partnerships that would allow them to join new markets.

The final chapters illuminate the methods that municipal authorities used to drive their cities back to prosperity, and the distinctive roles that outsiders had in strategies for reconstruction and renewal. Once again, we see that the policies leaders in Montpellier,

Lyon, and Rouen enacted depended on the attributes of their cities and commercial

250 networks. This in turn led to major differences in the contributions newcomers made to recovery efforts. Negotiations with the monarchy also played a determining role in shaping the final form of reconstruction policies. For the kings of France, the repopulation and economic strength of the bonnes villes was of critical importance because cities provided an essential source of tax revenue. But while royal officials shared the aims of municipal authorities who sought to encourage demographic and economic growth, their reasons for seeking this outcome centered on the economic stability of the monarchy rather than the intrinsic welfare of urban populations. Divergent interests frequently led royal and municipal officials to advocate differing strategies for rebuilding while maintaining conflicting views on the roles that outsiders should have within individual communities. The need for reconstruction forced them to hash out solutions that advanced both local and royal aims. The effectiveness of the strategies they developed ultimately required cooperation between the local authorities, royal officers, and regional nobles who implemented them, and the outsiders who left their homes seeking new opportunities for trade, work, and liberty.

251

CHAPTER IV

COMMERCE IN CRISIS: SUSTAINING TRADE IN LATE MEDIEVAL FRANCE

For all the crises that the inhabitants of French cities endured over the course of the late Middle Ages, the most unrelenting hardships they faced were economic.

Epidemics usually ran their course and took their greatest toll on urban populations in the span of a few months.325 Famines were often more prolonged: a poor harvest one year not only diminished the supply of food that was immediately available, but also impacted future crop yields by diminishing the availability of seeds for planting and feed for livestock. The most acute shortages could last for several few years – the “Great Famine” that lasted from 1315 to the early in some areas wreaked the greatest and most widespread devastation, reducing the population of Western Europe by ten percent according to some estimates. In time, however, weather conditions improved, and better growing seasons paved the way for a return to relative normalcy. 326 The Hundred Years

War caused persistent insecurity within poorly defended rural areas, and often hindered

325 There were notable exceptions: the leaders of Montpellier often complained in their correspondences with Charles VII in the and 1450s that the epidemics afflicting their city had been circulating for almost twenty years. In the case of bubonic plague the long Mediterranean summers may have contributed to the resilience of the bacteria that caused the infections and the circulation of the rodents that are often blamed for spreading infection. 326 William Jordan, The Great Famine, and Aberth, From the Brink of Apocalypse, 11-55 provide the best explanations of the ways that one year’s bad harvests could lead to several years of low crop yields. Among the often overlooked side-effects of low yields of grain is the malnutrition of cattle and other farm animals, which in turn contributed to animal murrains. For an excellent introduction to the oft-neglected role of animal murrains in prolonging and intensifying famine, see Philip Slavin, “The Great Bovine Pestilence and its economic and environmental consequences in England and Wales, 1318–50,” Economic History Review 65.4 (2012), 1239-1266.

252 the process of recovering from poor crop yields and cattle murrains.327 Yet the economic side effects of war often posed greater challenges than the violence of combat itself. The most intensive campaigning was usually seasonal, with the spring and summer months witnessing an increase in conflict and predatory raiding by bands of mercenaries. As the military and strategic situation changed, some regions of France went for years and even decades without witnessing major military engagements, granting opportunities for rebuilding and a resumption of the normal activities of daily life.

While the apocalyptic combination of plague, famine, war, and generic

“mortalities” inflicted acute but sporadic suffering, there was seldom any relief from the financial burdens of royal taxation and civic building for those who survived crises. The tendency to focus on shifting social dynamics and the peasant revolts within England has often led scholars to seek reasons for optimism in the aftermath of the Black Death of

1348, portraying it as a time when an increased demand for agricultural labor led to an increase in worker’s rights and wages.328 It was not so straightforward in French cities.

Those who survived catastrophic events had to toil on and make their contributions to unyielding royal tailles while selling their merchandise and offering their services within an economy diminished by demographic decline and the breakdown of trade routes.

Walls required constant maintenance and upgrades to keep up with the latest

327 Boutrouche, La crise d’une société, remains the best study of the combined short-term and long-term effects of war, famine, and disease in the Late Middle Ages on rural areas. Nicholas Wright, Knights and Peasants, provides an informative examination of efforts to rebuild and carry on life as normal within unprotected villages ravaged by persistent conflict and raiding. 328 Samuel Cohn Jr., “After the Black Death: Labour Legislation and Attitudes Towards Labour in Late- Medieval Western Europe” The Economic History Review, 60.3 (2007), 457-485, adopts a comparative approach that situates the labor legislation implemented in England into a wider European context, and produces a more balanced assessment of the economic impact the Black Death had on the working conditions for city dwellers. Faye Getz Cook provides an instructive critique of the search for the positive side effects of catastrophic events in her article, Faye Marie Getz, “Black Death and the Silver Lining: Meaning, Continuity, and Revolutionary Change in Histories of Medieval Plague”, pp. 265-289.

253 advancements in military technology, and this demanded time, money and energy from residents.329 Coupled with those burdens, guard duties and shifts in the night watch during times of unrest made the everyday responsibilities in the workshop or market particularly unpleasant —if not completely infeasible—for the exhausted workers who had logged long hours monitoring the walls.330 Wealthy merchants were not immune to the pains of reduced trade and general insecurity either. In Montpellier, for example, those merchants who did not opt to emigrate often complained of the great burdens they were forced to bear to make up the difference to pay for what their diminished populations owed in royal taxes. They also lamented the loss of their fortunes on the ships in their commission that were wrecked or robbed at sea.331

As urban populations struggled to cope with the financial demands imposed on them by their kings and regional lords, and the taxes that they paid for crucial municipal building projects, their rulers struggled with their own financial and military problems as they sought the means to protect their territories and their hold on power. The central role that walled cities had in producing revenue and securing territory for the French monarchy meant that royal authorities could ill afford to grant leeway on the sums they demanded from the populations of the bonnes villes. The costs of paying, arming, and

329 See Philippe Contamine, Guerre, état, et société, and Kathryn Reyerson, “Medieval Walled Space: Urban development vs. Defense”, as well as François Michaud-Fréjaville’s illuminating studies of the costs and challenges of wall maintenance in late-medieval Orléans, in Une ville, une destinée: recherches sur Orléans et Jeanne d'Arc. 330 For example, when King Charles VI ordered the Rouennais into a state of heightened state of alert in preparation for a potential English attack in 1389, they responded by complaining that their duties in the night watch prevented them from earning their livelihood because they were unable to work the next day. Their descendants would make the same claim when Henry V attempted to impose similar requirements upon his assumption of power in 1419. 331 The Montpelliérain consuls commonly included the loss of merchandise in sunken ships among their principal justifications for receiving a tax reduction for the monarchy. For example, in one plea to Charles VI in 1387, they complained, that “plusieurs nefs chargées de diverses marchandises de la ditte ville de Montpellier desquelles les aucunes ont esté submersés en mer par fortune de et les autres pillés et desrobées par lairons et pirates de mer et autrement.” AMM Louvet 1746.

254 feeding armies and horses were enormous, and the risks of defaulting on these obligations great. The variability of the value of French coinage also led to significant financial headaches for monarchy. With the value of the royal currency tied to the availability of bullion within the kingdom, the risks of a shortage posed a grave threat to the king’s hold on power, not to mention the overall security of the kingdom.332 The causes of the shortages and devaluations in currency were hotly contested, with some arguing that evolving commercial transactions created demand for currency that outpaced the supply gleaned from mines, with others asserting that royal manipulation and dilution led to damaging fluctuations. Whatever the true reasons behind the unreliable value of French coinage in the later middle ages, royal authorities were keen to ensure that cities were drawing in and paying to the monarchy more than was leaving their limits in the hands of foreign merchants.

With the kings of France and the populations of the bonnes villes each facing major financial challenges, it was in the best interest of both parties to ensure that cities would continue to generate revenue. Since commerce had driven urban growth in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, municipal leaders in Rouen, Montpellier, and

Lyon naturally viewed the maintenance of trading partnerships and the protection of foreign merchants as a critical component of strategies for surviving and overcoming the

332 The persistent fluctuations in the value of French coinage during the 1420s in particular had severe and far-reaching effects on the security and economic stability the kingdom and its bonnes villes; there is no single work that provides a good point of entry for studying the subject—a fact surely attributable to the density and complexity of the subject rather than its importance. Philippe Lardin “Monnaie de compte et monnaie réelle: des relations mal étudiées”, Revue européene des science sociales 137 (2007), 45-68, and Lardin, “La crise monétaire de 1420-1422 en Normandie,” in Actes des congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l’enseignement supérieur public. 28e congress (Paris, 1997), 101-143, offer valuable assessments of the effects that fluctuations in the value of money had in the Normandy region. For the effects of the monetary crisis on Lyon, see Déniau, La commune de Lyon et la guerre bourguignonne, 115- 127, which includes an immensely helpful table of real values of different taxes imposed on the city between 1416 and 1425. For more general assessment of the monetary situation in France during the Hundred Years War, see Phillipe Contamine, “La guerre de cent ans en France: une approche économique”, in La France au XIVe et XVe siècles: hommes, mentalités, guerre et paix (London, 1981).

255 economic challenges they faced. The hardships afflicting each of these communes and the distinctive attributes of the commercial networks they were involved in determined how local leaders balanced attempts to sustain trade with efforts to ensure the security of their populations in the face of external threats. The strategies that the councils of those three cities implemented and advocated to royal authorities as they worked to navigate times of crisis and economic hardship built on existing commercial ties. At the same time, municipal authorities were savvy enough to know that they could not simply rest on established connections or depend solely on initiatives undertaken by the monarchy if they were to continue to compete with rival cities. They sought out innovative ways to foster the use of specialized skills and new technologies, while also attempting to establish trading partnerships that would allow them to tap new markets. Even as they undertook new initiatives to bring business to their cities, they had to coordinate their efforts with the monarchy. Fiscal issues were central to almost every exchange between municipal officials and royal authorities, and this was particularly true of negotiations over the status and privileges accorded to foreign merchants who came to do business in

France.333

This chapter examines the measures that municipal and royal authorities took to sustain trade during troubled times, and the factors that shaped the treatment of outsiders when they came to buy and sell goods in urban markets in times of crisis. In doing so, it shows that policies towards outsiders who came to do business were shaped primarily by

333 Although the older works of Bernard Chevalier and Albert Rigaudière retain value for explaining the nuances of the institutional structures governing the financial rapport between the monarchy and the bonnes villes, David Rivaud, Les bonnes villes et le roi, provides the best analysis of the evolving power dynamics in the fiscal relationship between the monarchy and municipal leaders. See especially the thorough introduction to the form and content of their exchanges, in Chapter IV, “Les bases de la personnalité fiscale des corps de ville,” 53-62.

256 economic concerns, rather than fears and enmities relating to their status as strangers.

Given the hefty financial demands on both the monarchy and the bonnes villes, economic stability was essential to efforts to endure and overcome the multitude of hardships confronting urban populations and the kingdom of France as a whole. Maintaining medium and long-distance trading partnerships was one of the best ways to ensure that money would continue to flow into the local coffers. Tariffs and tolls on imported merchandise helped to raise the revenues needed to support local building projects. The money that came into the hands of local producers and merchants who sold their goods to outsiders also served to diminish the weight of the burdens they felt as they struggled to amass the funds needed to meet the demands of royal tailles. 334 Of course, the distinctive features of the trading networks that Rouen, Montpellier, and Lyon were involved in created challenges for the leaders of those cities as they worked to preserve trading partnerships and long-term economic interests while also defending against external threats. As they worked to survive and adapt in the face of changing local conditions, municipal authorities also needed to adjust their policies to handle the changing economic and political circumstances that were altering their wider economic networks.

By exploring the ways that the leaders of urban communities attempted to balance efforts to protect their populations with their commitments to sustaining commercial ties, this chapter’s comparative assessment of three commercial centers also contributes to efforts to fill in a major gap within the historiography of late medieval France. There have been no major surveys or comparative assessments of the impact of late medieval

334 On these matters, see above, Chapter II.

257 crisis on trade in cities in different corners of the kingdom of France, perhaps as a result of the assumption that pervasive insecurity brought meaningful commercial activity to a halt has seemingly deterred inquiries into the ways that municipal and royal authorities tried to preserve one of the sources of revenue that was most critical to the economic stability of cities. 335 Perilous conditions on trading routes, fears of contagion, and diminished markets unquestionably acted as deterrents and obstacles to merchants and the intermediaries they relied on to transport their goods. Indeed, it is unquestionable that the volume and value of merchandise in and out of France and between its cities diminished as a result of the dangers that awaited those who dared to venture onto roads or journey onto rivers infested with brigands and mercenaries. But a decline in trade did not mean that local authorities simply gave up and conceded that their cities would no longer be destinations for merchants from around France and western Europe.

Commerce was not only integral to economies of Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier, but central to the identities the leaders of those cities projected as they pleaded with royal authorities to show leniency in the financial demands they imposed in the form of flat tailles imposed. In Montpellier, the consuls routinely opened their correspondences to the king in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by lamenting that their city had once been of the greatest in France, attracting merchants from all over the Mediterranean,

335 Many of the best studies of commerce in Hundred Years’ War era France were produced by archivists and local historians in the nineteenth century. Classics that have stood the test of time include Germain’s Histoire du commerce à Montpellier and Philippe Mantellier, L’Histoire des marchands frequentans la rivière de Loire (Orléans, 1867). Ernst Fréville’s Mémoire sur le commerce maritime de Rouen (Paris, 1857), has been a valuable reference here, although the analysis is clearly influenced by the author’s great local and national pride. The annalists directed fresh attention onto the economic effects of the Hundred Years War, and the rigorous statistical analyses they produced on individual regions has provided a point of departure and foundation for the comparative analysis included here. See especially, Michel Mollat, Commerce maritime normande à la fin du moyen age (Paris, 1952), as well as the numerous works by Jean Combes on the commercial history of Languedoc and Montpellier. See also, André Bouton, Le Maine: Histoire économique et sociale XIVe, XVe et XVIe siecles : les ruines de la guerre de cent ans, les classes sociales de la renaissance, les dechirements des luttes religieuses (Le Mans, 1970).

258 before the “sterilities” and “mortalities” they faced had diminished their role as a premier destination for trade. The Lyonnais leaders emphasized that their city was one of the keys to the kingdom, and particularly well-situated for commerce because of its position on the frontiers of France. They also noted that their city had convenient access to three major rivers that connected them to the markets of central Europe, the Mediterranean, and inland France, but complained that depopulation prevented them from exploiting these advantages and realizing their economic potential. The leaders of Rouen tended to place less explicit emphasis on their geographic and economic advantages than the greatness of their city and the ancient privileges and liberties that had been accorded to them, which related primarily commercial autonomy and authority over taxes imposed on merchandise. For all three cities, commerce was a source of both strength and pride. As the leaders of Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen worked to bring their populations through periods of crisis, they looked to commerce—and the foreign merchants who drove it—as a means for survival.

SUSTAINING COMMERCIAL CONNECTIONS IN TIMES OF CRISIS

When confronting an outbreak of plague, a possible siege, or a shortage of grain, municipal officials in Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier all tended to prioritize the immediate needs and safety of their populations. In some cases, this led to the deterioration of commercial networks. If an enemy army was approaching, or if an epidemic was sweeping through the surrounding region, the risks of welcoming strangers who could sabotage the local defenses or spread disease within the population could outweigh the benefits of accepting their business. This could lead municipal authorities to implement

259 surveillance measures to monitor their activities within the city limits– one commonly employed strategy for fending off threats was to ask innkeepers to inform on suspicious foreigners and unfamiliar guests who sought lodging in their establishments.336 Economic partnerships with merchants and travelers whose intentions could not be fully known and trusted could be severed completely when the threat seemed serious enough. Dealings with subjects of the king’s enemies were almost always heavily restricted, if not completely forbidden. In other cases, the breakdown of commercial networks was simply a symptom of the dangers posed by brigands, war, and contagion, which forced ever- wary merchants to stay off of perilous routes and avoid endangered cities and diminished markets.337 In spite of the risks involved in maintaining ties with strangers during times of war, upheaval and insecurity, municipal authorities were keen to do whatever they could to preserve and protect the source of income that outsiders provided.

Municipal leaders around France consistently worked to balance short-term security concerns with attempts to maintain and protect the commercial networks that they recognized as the foundations of long-term prosperity. They were acutely aware of the economic importance that local, regional, and international trade had for their cities. It bears reiterating that the individuals who served in the municipal councils of the bonnes villes most often hailed from the ranks of long established bourgeois families that had risen to prominence through ties to international commerce. In Montpellier, changers and drapers dominated the ranks of the twelve major consuls: the members of both of these groups stood much to gain from Mediterranean trade and the role that the city played as

336 See among many examples, AMR, U2-f. 76r, cited above; AMM Louvet 3133. 337 The consuls of Montpellier were particularly vocal in articulating this side-effect of disorder and war in their dealings with the monarchy, perhaps reflecting the fact that their city’s relied more exclusively on trade.

260 an entrepôt for merchants bringing goods between France, Italy, and Catalonia.338

Likewise, the consulate of Lyon was dominated by drapers, spice merchants, and bankers, with the Chaponay, Varey, Pompierre, Cuisel, Molon, and Tourveon clans retaining the preeminent roles.339 In Rouen, the extreme concentration of power in the hands of a narrow merchant elite had created such tensions in the city that King Philip V intervened to restructure local governance in 1320; the establishment of an assembly of thirty-six peers gave the more middling bourgeois a voice in local affairs. Nevertheless, a handful of merchant families continued to exercise the greatest sway over municipal policy.340

The personal stake that municipal leaders had in the continuation of normal commercial activities undoubtedly served as one source of motivation for their efforts to maintain the normal functions of commerce during periods of crisis. Those efforts were not exclusively self-serving, however. With burdens of direct royal tailles weighing heavily on the diminished populations of urban centers, the need to maximize the flow of revenue into local coffers was essential not only in meeting obligations to the king but in paying for local building projects, and the construction and maintenance of walls and weaponry that defended cities from new threats. Gabelles on salt and aides on wine and other imported goods were vital because they made it possible to shift some of the tax burden onto merchants outside the city—thereby reducing the hardships inflicted on the

338 Cholvy, Histoire de Montpellier, 63. 339 On these families and their rise to prominence within Lyon, see Guy de Valouis, Patriciat de Lyon (Paris, 1973). See also Déniau, Histoire de Lyon et du Lyonnais, as well as the invaluable list of fifteenth and early sixteenth century councilors available at the following hyperlink, from the thesis of Caroline Fargeix, “Les élites lyonnaises au miroir de leur langage. Recherches sur les pratiques et les représentations culturelles des conseillers de Lyon du XVe siècle, d’après les registres de délibérations consulaires,” (Université de Lyon, 2005). : http://theses.univ-lyon2.fr/documents/getpart.php?id=lyon2.2005.fargeix_c&part=97344#Noteftn2660 340 Eugène Le Parquieur, L’organisation municipale de Rouen, 51-56.

261 local population. The imposition foraine, collected in both Lyon and Rouen on goods imported from lands beyond the kingdom and from provinces that had not contributed to the ransom payments of John II after the treaty of Brétigny in1360, also helped to alleviate the burdens on urban populations—though the revenues supplemented rather than replaced the contributions that the local populations made to the crown.341 The taxes on all sales and purchases in the market halls also provided an important source of municipal income, but these impositions tended to become a source of discord because they weighed most heavily on the poor.342 Since the taxes were assessed according to the value of the items sold, however, the sale of more expensive items helped to raise more funds. This in turn served as an additional incentive to encourage merchants of imported luxury goods to continue to bring their goods to the local markets.

Similarly, bourgeois leaders and the wider populations they directed both stood to gain when well-heeled merchants elected to settle permanently or purchase property within their cities. Their presence helped to facilitate trade between local merchants and producers and lucrative markets abroad, and their buying power enticed others to come sell their goods. In some cases, this promoted rivalries and tensions with local corporations that held monopolies and privileges on the sale of certain local specialty goods such as textiles. In Rouen, only the cloth produced by the drapers established in the city could be sold in the local market halls, and this led to frequent disputes with forains

341 The establishment of the imposition foraine is outlined in, Eusèbe Laurière, Louis George Oudart, et. al, Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race: ordonnances de Charles VI données depuis le commencement de l’année 1383 jusqu’à le fin du règne de ce prince, avec supplements (Paris, 1745), which imposed the fee of four deniers per livre of merchandise. The merchants of Castile were exempted from these impositions. 342 See the case of Lyon rebellion for example, as outlined in René Fédou, “ A Popular Revolt in Lyon in the Fifteenth Century: The rebeyne of 1436”, in Lewis The Recovery of France, 243-266. Fédou notes that a principal source of the uprising, which targeted not only royal authorities but municipal officials, who were blamed for not doing enough to diminish the taxes on the general population while finding ways to evade them.

262 who attempted to circumvent these restrictions by ignoring local privileges or claiming they were entitled to them as residents. It fell to the members of the council to resolve these matters, and they almost always sided with the privileged jurés and the powerful corporations of their communes rather than newcomers.343 On the frequent occasions when the populations found themselves in dire economic need, however, municipal authorities came to depend on the contributions of wealthy outsiders who had settled in their cities and taken an interest in local affairs. Faced with heavy tailles and the high costs of fortification projects, officials in Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier all had occasion to seek loans from affluent “Lombard” bankers, as well as Jews. Of course, both of these groups were easy scapegoats when the combination of royal taxes and interest charges exceeded the local population’s ability or willingness to pay.344 Special taxes levied on the properties that non-residents owned could help to counterbalance the fact that they were exempt from paying tailles, although collecting these sums could be a difficult and contentious process.

Merchants who came to trade or settle in Rouen, Lyon, and Montpellier thus occupied a complex and variable position within those communes. On the one hand, their

343 These disputes are among the most commonly addressed issues within the deliberations of the municipal council, ADSM 3E1 A1-A11, passim. For understanding these conflicts, in addition to the general background found within Mollat’s, Histoire de Rouen, 138-141, the work of Jean-Louis Roch of the University of Rouen is indispensable for understanding the complex history of the Rouennais drapperie. See especially, Jean-Louis Roch, “La crise de la draperie à la fin du XVe sicle de la manufacture urbaine à la domination régionale,” in La Normandie dans l’économie européenne (XIIe-XVIIe siècle): Colloque de Cérisy-la-Salle (Caen, 2009), 153-178. I am also grateful to Claude Bouhier, who generously shared his time and extensive expertise on the nuances of cloth production in medieval Rouen during my trips to the Archives départmentales de la Seine-Maritime . 344 There is an extensive historiography on the expulsion of the Jews in France, with William Jordan, The French Monarchy and the Jews (Philadelphia, 1989), serving as the best introduction to the period from 1179–1322. Maurice Kriegel, Les Juifs à la fin du moyen age dans l’Europe méditerranée (Paris, 1979) remains an effective if in some aspects outdated introduction to the history of Jews in the later Middle Ages. The history of expulsions of “Lombards” in late medieval France has been less thoroughly studied, but Rowan Dorin’s in-progress dissertation, “Expulsions of Merchants and Moneylenders in Western Europe, 1200-1450,” promises to remedy this gap.

263 business was necessary for the local markets. The combination of personal interests and the need for tax revenue gave municipal authorities powerful incentives to encourage merchants to come and sell their goods. On the other hand, those marchands estrangers who settled down could be resented by the locals for the wealth they accrued as they enjoyed exemptions from taxes and duties in the guet. Their lack of clout within municipal deliberations could also make them vulnerable to financial exploitation by authorities seeking to diminish burdens on their own populations. But there was another important factor complicating the status visiting merchants had within these cities: all three communes had their own companies of merchants traveling down rivers in France, and to ports in Northern Europe and around the Mediterranean. Many of them came from the same families that dominated the local administrations, and for this reason municipal officials remained closely attuned to their needs and concerns. Reciprocity was the governing principal that allowed trading partnerships to function during times of war and general turmoil.345 Local leaders knew that the treatment merchants met with when they came to their cities could be visited in kind on their comrades. The right of reprisals, and letters of marque allowed authorities and offended individuals to recoup losses on defaulted debts and stolen property by taking action not only against the perpetrators but their compatriots as well.346 Awareness of the fact that each injurious action taken within a commercial network elicited a response played a major role in determining the welcome merchants received when they came to Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen.

345 On the central importance of reciprocity as well as inter-city competition in shaping municipal commercial policies, see Oscar Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce: The Institutional Foundations of International Trade in the Low Countries (Princeton and Oxford, 2013), 10-15. 346 Bryan Dick, “Framing ‘Piracy’: restitution at sea in the later Middle Ages” (PhD thesis, Glasgow, 2010) offers an excellent and much-needed analysis of the legal and diplomatic instruments such as marques and reprisals that were of central importance within Late Medieval commerce. See also the valuable collection of primary sources included in the pieces justificatives of René de Mas-Latrie, “Du droit de marque ou de représailles au Moyen Âge,” Bibliothèque de l’école de chartes 29, 294-317.

264 The leaders of these cities thus had many good reasons to tread carefully as they worked to balance the need to defend their communities against external threats with efforts to sustain trade. The full range of considerations that shaped the treatment of merchants can be traced particularly clearly across the pages of the minutes of the deliberations of the Rouennais council; these records also offer a vivid picture of the ways that municipal officials juggled the challenges they faced as they tried to attend to concerns about short-term security and long-term commercial interests. Since Rouen served as a gateway between the upper Seine and the Atlantic, officials in the city had considerable power to determine who could bring their merchandise up or down the river or to the local markets. The commune did share jurisdiction over commerce along the lower Seine with the Vicomté de l’eau, which had been founded by Philip Augustus in the early thirteenth century in order to collect royal duties on merchandise conducted along the river.347 But the importance of this royal office declined over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the minutes of the municipal council—from the first surviving volume of 1389 and through to the period of English occupation—indicate that municipal authorities in Rouen took it upon themselves to regulate the passage of merchants who sought to conduct their goods past the city.

In order to bring merchandise up or down the Seine past Rouen, merchants first needed to pay the fee known as the hanse if they were not enlisted members of the local

Compagnie Normande. Collected by an officer known as the hansier, these fees were

347 The occupants of this office also exercised jurisdiction over both criminal and civil disputes involving forains and estrangers. Unfortunately, the records of this somewhat obscure institution have not survived, but in any case, its importance appears to have declined over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. On the vicomté de l’eau see Charles de Beaurepaire, De la vicomté de l’Eau de Rouen et de ses coutumes au XIIIème et au XIVème siècle (Evreux, 1856), and Fréville, Mémoire sur le commerce maritime de Rouen depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu’à la fin du XVème siècle (Rouen, 1857), 92-93.

265 allocated to poor relief, particularly the support of destitute young women who were preparing for marriage.348 Under the hanse, non-local merchants were also to be accompanied by a citizen of Rouen (chitayen) and supervised as long as they remained in the city.349 Those who attempted to evade the terms of the hanse could be arrested and held until their cases were resolved. Ultimately, the perpetrators could be subjected to additional fines and seizures, although the councilors sometimes sided with the merchants if they believed that the hansier had been overzealous in trying to extract exorbitant payments and fees.350 The municipal council also issued permissions known as congiés to merchants who wished to conduct goods along the Seine. In some instances, these consisted of exceptional authorizations for the trade of products that could normally be transported along the Seine only by local producers and corporations. In other cases the, congiés served as a form of assurance or safe conduct. After the Treaty of Leulingham brought about a hiatus in open hostilities between France and England, the municipal council of Rouen once again took requests from English merchants who wished to return to Normandy – for 1390, immediately after the truce began, the council minutes record eight of these authorizations.351 They soon authorized Englishmen not only for the one- time imports that were permitted under these early congiés but also for continuous trade in products such as herring, and designated varieties of cloth that would not threaten the strength of monopolies on locally produced merchandise.352

In times of relative calm, the Rouennais officials were able to use these varied regulatory tools to advance the needs of their community by protecting the privileges of

348 For example, ADSM 3E1 Anc. A3-74v, 89r. 349 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A1-94v. 350 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A1-145v. 351 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A1- 123; 130v; 139 352 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A3-20; 29; 31v; 33v.

266 the corporations of merchants, and the drapers and other craftsmen within their city. They were careful not to abuse the power they held over the Seine in order to avoid reprisals against their own merchants and the breakdown of their commercial networks. But when they could make a strong case that their rights had been violated, they did not hesitate to take decisive action. Merchants from the great cities of the Low Countries and Flanders including Brabant, Ypres, Ghent, Bruges, and Brussels had frequent hosti with the local authorities in Rouen as they tried to bring wine, grain, and textiles back and forth from markets in Paris and along the Atlantic coast. Merchants seeking to export these goods down the Seine had to pay the hanse to the Rouennais, and when they failed to meet this obligation they could face stiff penalties. In one case in 1389, two merchants from

Malines and two merchants from Brussels together transported 104 barrels of wine purchased in Burgundy down the Seine to take it to their cities by sea. Municipal authorities stopped and held them when they tried to evade the hanse. Though they ultimately allowed the offending merchants to take their shipment of wine and go on their way, they did so only after they selected the two finest queues (approximately 400 liters) of white and red wine as an indemnity. In addition, the Rouennais officials compelled the offenders to “recognize and confess” that they had no right to transport wine past the city without their permission, and they also made their release contingent on a promise never to try to take wine past the city again.353

This episode serves as an illustration of the approach that municipal officials in

Rouen commonly used as they worked to assert the privileges of the commune: they imposed penalties on those who attempted to avoid their various restrictions and tolls, but they were more interested in ensuring that their privileges would be openly and officially

353 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A1-94v, 95.

267 acknowledged by those they punished. In taking this measure, they legitimized whatever penalties they imposed, and they affirmed the power and privilege of the commune through acts of clemency. The council minutes emphasize the benevolence shown to merchants who had violated local privileges, regularly using the formulas “just for this once”, or “only this time” when explaining the permissions granted to merchants who were allowed to leave with their property after committing an infraction. Simply seizing the goods of merchants who had evaded the hanse or violated local commercial privileges would have been easy enough in the short term. But appearances were everything for the councilors and peers of the municipal administration of Rouen, who knew that they could ill afford to look like they were using their position of power along the Seine to carry out illegal extortions. This would have exposed their comrades to similar treatment in their business transactions abroad. Limited symbolic penalties deterred additional violations, but did not overstep the bounds of law and propriety needed to sustain trading partnerships. Judging by the continued use of such measures into the sixteenth century, the diplomatic approach seems to have served the Rouennais well.

In times of grave need, municipal authorities in Rouen could be driven to use their power over the Seine to take more forceful measures to advance the immediate interests of the community. Even in the most dire situations, they remained attentive to the appearances and implications of their demands and exactions. 1408 brought an array of troubles down on the kingdom of France that forced exceptional measures of self- preservation. For that year, Pierre Cochon’s Chronique Normande is devoted to the events leading up to the assassination of the duke Louis of Orléans, which sparked an

268 intensification of hostilities between the Orléanist and Burgundian factions that eventually escalated into civil war. In his separate chronicle of local events, Cochon focused on the effects of the severe weather that afflicted much of western Europe. A brutally cold winter left the Seine covered with a thick sheet of ice, which initially provided a source of entertainment, as people drank and made merry while crossing freely from one bank of the river to the other. By the end of January, the ice had been blanketed with a layer of snow “so great that there no one could remember ever having seen anything like it”; a sudden increase in temperature led to severe flooding that destroyed mills and houses and washed out fields all along the banks of the ice-clogged rivers and streams of Normandy.354 The severe saturation of the soil hindered planting and ultimately reduced yields of grain, leading to a steep increase in the prices of bread sold within Rouen and elsewhere in the following winter. As the staple of the Rouennais diet, the prices on bread had always been carefully regulated and the market closely monitored by municipal authorities. In a time of widespread shortage, the challenges they faced in maintaining a stable supply of grain were intensified by fierce competition.

To prevent a famine, the council of Charles VI had issued an ordinance that no grain should be exported from the Languedöil region of the kingdom in 1408.

Responsibility for enforcing this prohibition on exports of grain often fell on the shoulders of the municipal officials who monitored traffic on the Seine. The emergency

354 Cochon, Chronique Normande, 329-330. The passage describing these events is not without intrinsic interest for understanding the impact of severe weather on daily life within Rouen and Normandy: “l’endemain de Noël la rivière de Saine fu si gellée que, le dimenche après la Thipagne ensuiant, les gens aloient ribler, chouller, en travessant la riviere de costé en autre, tant qu’il fu deffendu, de par le roy, que plus n’y alast... Si avint que le vendredy xxvii jour du mois de jenvier, après disner, commencha à desgeller; et le samedi ensuiant, si fort et si soudeinement que la terre estoit si fort plommée de gellée que l’eaue ne povoit entrer ens; et convenoit que l’eaue trouvast son cours. Si vint si grant ravine ès vallées et rivieres par toute France et Normendi, qu’il n’estoit plus de pitié de jour en jour, oir les plaintez de par tous pais que les dictez eauez faisoient, tant de moulinz, maisons, chaussiez, pons, bestez, hommez, enfanz, tout alant à val l’eaue.”

269 order gave them wide authority to seize grain to support the needs of the local population.

In one such action, carried out on October 28, they took an unspecified quantity of wheat that was being transported by Jacques de Bagnemere, a merchant from Bruges, who claimed to have received authorization from the king to take grain back to his home port.

As justification for the seizure, the Rouennais councilors cited the royal ordinance against grain exports, and “the great necessity for grain that there presently is in this country.”355

They also mentioned their skepticism about Jacques’ unsubstantiated claims to have received a royal congié. Nonetheless, they did not simply strip him of his merchandise, but instead compensated him at a price of 20 tournois for his troubles. As usual, the minutes of their deliberations emphasized the great magnanimity of the gesture. The councilors were forced to revisit this action in December, however, after they received letters from the échevins of Bruges and the Duke of Burgundy. They asserted that the merchant had their backing and complained of the fact that he had not received full market value. This ultimately pushed the Rouennais authorities to increase their compensation to Jacques de Bagnemere in order to bring resolution to the situation and restore positive trading relations.356

Disputes over exports of grain during periods of shortage frequently forced municipal authorities in Rouen to weigh such complex political and economic considerations against local interests. In many cases, they faced pressure not only from their royal and noble superiors, but also from the hungry and desperate people within

355 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A5. 167v. “Item fu delibere que nous ne ottemperions point aux letres de Jaques de bagnemere marchand et bourgeois de bruges faisant mentions comme le Roy monseigneur mandoit que len lui lessast passer certain nombre de muys de ble. Pour ce que il nouse esté depuis entremis certains letters duidt seigneur pass. en son grand conseil faisan mencion que l’en nen lessast point passer ne presenter hors de pays de langue doil atendu la grant necessite de ble qui en est en ceste pays…”. 356 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A5-175(?)–181v.

270 their city limits. Famine afflicted Normandy once again in 1410, and the pages of the council minutes from the spring and early summer months of that year are filled with records of discussions about how to handle the shortages. The municipal authorities frequently consulted merchants who were familiar with the fluctuations in prices and the availability of grain in regional markets.357 Even the most detailed reports and determined preparations could do little to remedy the long-term repercussions of bad harvests from a previous year. By the end of another hard winter, the reserves of grain had been badly depleted. In the face of a famine, a principal source of concern for the municipal leadership was the upswell of unrest among the local populace, which threatened to undermine order and the rule of law within the city. On May 15, the municipal council issued an order banning all public gatherings in order to “avoid the inconvenience that could arise by the assembly and congregation of people.” In their explanation for that order, they noted that the “the people said and spoke out very loudly about the shortage of grain and feared that the shortage had been caused because a great quantity of grain had been allowed out of the kingdom.”358 The popularity of this explanation for the famine prompted the council to take proactive measures to ensure that their wrath would not be incited by the passage of merchants transporting grain down the Seine.

With demand for grain running high everywhere in Normandy and Brittany, the first step that the Rouennais councilors took to appease their restless populace was to increase observation and regulation of the local markets, so that “no merchants or other

357 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A6, passim, but especially 89-98 358 ADSM 3E1 Anc. 89v. “Delibere fu que pour eschuer aux inconveniens qui pourroient advenir par assemblees et congregations dont … pour ce que le peuple disoit et parloit moult fort que chierte estoit de ble et quilz doubtoient que la chierte ne faise cause par ce que on en avoit laise a divers hors du Royaume grant quantite que demain palin marchié seroite crier et publier et que doresenavant pour eschuer aux inconveniens desusdiz et qui pour le temps advenir pourroient ester ils ne sassemblent ne facent aucune assemble de peuple en la ville de Rouen sans congié ou autorité…

271 people… would deliver up any grain to be taken out of the city, either by water or otherwise.”359 They also stopped all merchants who were trying to transport grain out of the city. On May 18, they halted a squire named Nicholas Bertran who was bringing grain down the Seine to the captain of Saint Malo on the Breton coast. Bertran carried letters from King Charles VI authorizing his passage through the city with fifty muids of grain, and he planned to transfer his cargo to a seafaring ship in Rouen, which was the farthest point inland that these larger vessels could travel. In light of the desperation present within the city, however, a full assembly of the six councilors and twenty-four peers of Rouen decided that they could ill afford to let him pass through unimpeded while the local markets remained “much depleted of wheat.”360 Yet they did not wish to offend the king by ignoring his letters, or risk damaging the city’s reputation by disrespecting an honorable squire who had taken great pains to purchase grain in Paris for his lord. In these most dire of circumstances, there was never a question of seizing the grain outright: instead, deliberations focused on determining what price would be fair, with arguments centering on whether he should be paid at the rate charged during the previous market day in Rouen, or simply reimbursed for the costs he had incurred purchasing the grain in

Paris and transporting it down the Seine.

The record of these deliberations in the council minutes consistently emphasizes that the assembly was acting not only in the interest of the population’s short-term well-

359 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A6-89v. “Et aussi seroit crier que quiconques sauroit ouu auroit cognie que aucuns marchans ou autres gens eussent baille ne livrer ne fait bailler ou livrer aucuns blez pour mener hors par eaue ne autrement.” 360 ADSM 3E1 A6-Anc. 90v. “Sur ce que naguère Nicolas bertran escuier famillier et facteur de messier Olivier de M. cappitaine de St. Malo avoit fait advenu par la riviere de sayne jusques a Rouen le muys de ble messier de par pour iceulx se descharger et metre en un autre vessel… pour mener et conduire a saint malo au mont st. michel… sur quoy le dit messier Olivier avoit obtenu letres du roy messier pour iceulx se scharger et se mener jusqus es diz lieux dessus nommez… Et pour ce que le dit escuier et facteur depuis la presentation dicelles et que son ble a este a Rouen a sceu et apercu que la dit ville de Rouen et le pays autour estoient meult desgarnis de blez…”

272 being, but also with an attentiveness to the satisfaction and welfare of Nicholas Bertran.

Ultimately, the assembly determined that they should buy the grain at the price Bertan had paid for it in Paris, because this was “the most profitable option not only for the city but also for the facteur (Bertran).”361 They also noted that this measure would allow both parties to avoid “any inconvenience” from unrest within the population, implying that they had sheltered Bertran from the potential acts of violence he would have been subjected to if the nature of his business was uncovered by the hungry masses. After explaining the decision, the minutes offer a lengthy list detailing Bertran’s expenditures, counterbalanced with a record of the fees that he would have owed to the city for his passage. At the conclusion of this account, the minutes note that “the facteur remained pleased with [Rouen].”362 A few weeks later, on June 2, the Rouennais assembly dealt with a nearly identical situation with a merchant from Paris, who brought one hundred muids of wheat to the city with the intention of transporting it to the domains of the King

Pierre of Navarre. Once again noting the pressure imposed by “the voice of the people”, they refused his passage but allowed him to return to his home port.363 These instances serve as representative examples of the balance municipal authorities in Rouen tried to strike as they dealt with visiting merchants during times of great hardship. When matters were truly desperate and the population was in a deep state of unrest, they took measures necessary to keep the peace—but they also went out of their way to maintain their reputation and their political and economic relationships.

361 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A6-90v. “Et après eussions eu deliberation avec les dessus nommez par tous a un accort nous avons trouvé que le meilleur et le plus profitable pour la ville et aussi pour le dit facteur seroit pour eschuer a tous inconveniens qui sen pourroient enfuir de prendre le dit ble pour la dite ville au pris qu’il avoit couste au dit facteur et le deffraier des fraiz raisonnables quil avoit fait…” 362 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A6-90v. “Et par tant le dit facteur est demoure content de la dicte ville.” 363 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A6- 94v. “Et nous requer. Que nous optemperrans diceulx laisser passer par Rouen… attendu la grant chierte de ble este a Rouen et la voix et crie du peuple.”

273 Though the Rouennais authorities were careful not to abuse their power as gatekeepers of the Seine, their control over this principal artery of northern France provided them with a distinct advantage in their negotiations, and in their efforts to balance immediate needs and long-term strategic concerns during periods of crisis.

Although they were mindful of the potential for reprisals against their own merchants as they deliberated on how to treat transporters bringing grain through the city, they could have confidence in the fact that goods would continue to circulate under their bridge, between the ports of the Atlantic coast and the markets of Paris and the rest of inland

France. This gave them leeway to carry out extraordinary measures to help their local community during periods of famine, even if they were always careful to preserve the appearance of discretion and legality as they did so. In Montpellier, by contrast, the municipal consulate lacked such a decisive form of leverage to use in helping their population. The population relied heavily on foodstuffs and merchandise from other regions, and their city was not an unavoidable stopping place or point of connection between larger markets. Facing competition from Mediterranean port cities such as

Marseille and Barcelona, the consuls needed to ensure that Montpellier remained an attractive destination for merchants in its own right. They also needed to maintain the economic relationships that would allow them to purchase what they needed elsewhere.

In some cases, this brought them into direct conflict with royal policy towards merchants from other polities, forcing the consuls to campaign to persuade the king and his officers to make exceptions that would allow them to reestablish their trade lines and restore their access to vital resources.

274 In 1362, the Montpelliérains faced a severe shortage of grain inflicted by the relentless raids of routiers throughout the region surrounding their city, prompting the consuls to write to John II and his council seeking modifications in commercial policies that had been detrimental to efforts to stock grain. The royal order responding to their

“humble supplication” provides insights into the consuls’ concerns and their efforts to influence the king and his officers. Their plea began with an explanation of the reasons for the shortage, noting that “ the enemies were in the countryside when the wheat had been planted in the fields, and they trampled and burned it, and prevented laborers from working their fields.” As a result of these misfortunes, they “had no grain, for which the country is in very great distress and mischief because a horse loaded with grain cost at least seven florins.”364 Whether these doleful remarks about the wretched state of affairs served as an implicit indictment of the king’s failure to provide adequate protection, a simple statement of fact, or both, the consuls made a clear case that royal policies were inhibiting their own efforts to address their needs. The collapse in the local grain supply had forced the community to rely even more heavily on imports, and as they often did, the merchants of Montpellier sought to remedy the shortage by taking to the seas to tap into the markets of other Mediterranean ports. But their efforts to bring in grain from foreign markets brought them up against their old rivals in Marseille, who harassed them and seized their shipments as they navigated past the city along the coastline.365

364 AMM Louvet, “Supplie nous ont humblement les consuls et habitans de nostre ville de Montpellier et pais d’environ, comme en l’annee passée les ennemis furent par le dit pais, ou temps que les blefs estoient sur les champs, et yceulz gasterent et ardirent, et aussi les dictes bonnes gens ne peurent labourer, pour cause des diz ennemis qui estoient sur le dit pais, par quoy en ceste annee presente n’ont eu nulz blefs, par quoy le dit pais en est a moult grant destresse et meschief; car un cheval chargié de blef y vaut bien sept florins et plus.” 365 Focusing on the Marseille consul registers, Christopher Beck provides an instructive assessment of the role of the marque as a last resort means of resolving private disputes, and the importance of avoiding such issues for the diplomatic interests of the city. See his, “Common good and private justice: letters of marque

275 The consuls of Montpellier attributed the seizures carried out by the Marseillais to their “hatred of the marques granted by [the royal court] against them.” Until its annexation to France in 1481, Marseille remained under the authority of the Counts of

Provence, who were vassals of the Holy Roman Empire. In order to chip away at the economic strength of an enemy ruler, John II and his royal court had issued letters of marque authorizing the seizure of goods transported by the merchants of Marseille, and their actions against Montpellier were in direct response for the hardships these measures had inflicted. The consuls explained that the retaliatory seizures did tremendous damage to their country, and that “a great famine” could occur if the marque against Marseille was not lifted. This dire prediction and desperate plea succeeded in extracting the desired change in royal policy, and even prompted a complete reversal in the prescribed treatment of merchants of Marseille who wanted to do business in France and in the ports of its Mediterranean coast. With his response to the Montpelliérains, the king instructed the seneschal of Beaucaire, the rector of Montpellier, and all the other royal officers of his realm that “the marques against the people of Marseille that you carry out should be completely stopped for the duration of the next two years from the present time…and that they should have leave and license to come and go, stay and sojourn in our kingdom, with their merchandise and any goods whatsoever, securely and peaceably… and that they should not be taken, seized, arrested, impeded or disturbed in any manner.” To affirm the authority and weight behind the measure, the letter concluded with a stern warning that

and the utilitas publica in fourteenth-century Marseilles,” Journal of Medieval History (2014): Available:http://www.tandfonlin

276 any violations of the provisions it outlined would induce severe punishments, “such that they would be an example to all others.”366

The change in royal policy towards the Marseillais in 1362 provides a clear illustration of the role that the municipal authorities of the bonnes villes could play not only in shaping the treatment of those who were outsiders to their cities, but also in influencing the reception given to those who were foreigners to the kingdom. Moreover, even though the war-induced shortage initially sparked tensions between the merchants of Montpellier and Marseille, the pressing need for grain ultimately drove the

Montpelliérain consuls to set aside any hostilities in order to open up the commercial avenues that they needed to allow their population to ride out the crisis. On its own, the shift in royal policy towards the merchants of Marseille was not sufficient to increase the supply of grain available in the Montpellierain markets. By the end of the year, the continued shortage pushed the consuls to make renewed appeals to encourage the king to take additional measures to facilitate trade. Specifically, they had complained that

“because of certain reprisals or marques, granted to some merchants of the provinces of

Beaucaire and Carcassonne against Genoese and Provençal merchants, the said Genoese and Provençals did not dare to bring wheat, oats, and other grain from overseas to the

366 AMM Louvet, 1045. “Et comme les gens de Montpellier aient grant volenté d’aler queire du blef par la mer, pour aidier et secourre au pais, et leur convient passer par la mer de Marseille, lesquelles gens de Mersaille leur empeschent et retiennent leurs diz blefs, par la haynne des marques qu ont esté données en nostre court sur les dictes gens de Marseille, laquelle chose est ou gran dommage du pais, et en pourroit venir une grant famine... pourquoy nous vous mandons et estroictement enjoigons, et a chascun de vous, si comme a lui appartendra, que les dictes marques contre les dictes gens de Mersaille vous faciez cesser du tout, jusques a deux ans prochain venans, a compter de la date de ces presentes; et leur donnons congié et licence d’aler et venir, demourer et sejourner en nostre royaume, avecques leurs marchandises et biens quelconques, seurement et paisiblement, sanz ce que pour occasion des dictes marques eulx, leur biens ou marchandises quelconques pednant le dit temps puissent estre pris, sais, arrestez, empeschiez ou destourbez par quelque maniere que ce soit... Et gardez que en ce n’ait aucun deffaut; car ou cas ou il y seroit, il nous en desplairoit tresforment, et en punierens les faisans le contraire par telle maniere que ce seroit exemple a touz autres.”

277 port of Aigues-Mortes, and to the place of Montpellier.”367 In the consuls’ assessments, the inability to entice merchants hailing from great economic centers of the western

Mediterranean inhibited the flow of grain into the local markets, and for this reason the consuls once again urged the king to take measures to end the reprisals that they blamed for the shortage afflicting the kingdom.

The royal council ultimately chose to heed these warnings, firmly ordering that no royal officers or independent merchants should carry out reprisals against the Genoese or

Provençals until the feast of John the Baptist in June. They attached a few other limitations to the temporary nullification of reprisals and marques as well, stipulating that grain could only be sold in Montpellier or Aigues-Mortes, and not in any other location in the entire province of Beaucaire. Regardless of these restrictions, the act took another major step in establishing vital commercial ties, with the provisions of the order opening up the local markets even more comprehensively than the previous edict prohibiting the enactment of marques against the merchants of Marseille. Once again, the initiative for this royal action had originated in the meeting hall of a municipal council, with local authorities seeking solutions to the great shortage of grain available in their market. The consuls of Montpellier frequently relied on appeals to the monarchy when they believed that royal policies were inhibiting their ability to obtain adequate supplies for their markets. As seen above in the case of Rouen, one of the most common measures that royal officials used to avert a widespread famine was a ban on the export of grain from the kingdom. In some cases, they even prohibited trade between administrative districts

367 Germain, Histoire du commerce, 298. “Cum per dilectos nostros consules ville nostre de Montepessulo et nonnullos subditos nostros senescalli Bellicadri nobis fuerit expositum quod, obstante certa represalia seu marcha, nonnullis mercatoribus et subditis nostris senescalliarum Bellicadri et Carcassone contra Januenses et Provinciales mercatores concessa, prefati Januenses et Provinciales blada, avenas et alia grana de partibus ultramarinis ad portum Aquarum Mortuarum adducere seu adduci facere non sunt ausi.”

278 (i.e. bailliages and sénéchausées), in order to avert the disputes that arose when officials and communities in competing territories squabbled over prices or access to a commodity. For cities that relied heavily on imported foodstuffs, as Montpellier did, this could be a stifling imposition; when Charles V made such a drastic order in response to a shortage in 1376, the consuls responded swiftly, and their determined arguments eventually extracted a dispensation that allowed them to continue trading grain between their district of Beaucaire and neighboring Carcassonne.368

Beyond the determined efforts that the consuls made to coax royal authorities to overturn policies that threatened trade in Montpellier, they also took steps to ensure that their city would remain a welcoming place for merchants, even during periods of turmoil.

In some cases we see that efforts to attract merchants were undertaken as a direct response to the effects of crisis. In 1414, for example, the consulate sent letters to the future Charles VII to seek authorization to collect aides and gabelles to support the construction of a new clock, a project they framed as a necessary step to alleviate the hardships afflicting the city. In their plea to the dauphin, they introduced their request using the formula found in so many municipal entreaties for financial support or tax exemptions. To explain the need for the funds, they outlined the full magnitude of the crises afflicting their local population. But they did not just list the typical apocalyptic combination of plague, war, and famine as the sources of the disastrous economic situation afflicting their community. Instead, their request devoted specific attention to the breakdown of the local commercial networks, depicting the negative climate for trade as both a symptom and source of crisis. Explaining the sorry economic state of the community, the letters the consulate sent pointed out “the great damage and misfortunes

368 Germain, Histoire du commerce II, 298.

279 that [had befallen Montpelliérain merchants] at sea in parts of the orient, when they had lost their boats and ships in encounters with pirates, who often pillaged and stripped them.” The request also noted that the city had lost a great deal of merchandise, and that their population and revenue had been so diminished that they could not support the costs of urgently necessary civic projects; specifically, they complained that they could not adequately maintained the walls and gates of the town, which were in “a ruinous and bad state and in need of swift repair.”369

For all of these reasons, the consuls of Montpellier explained that it would be profitable to have “a clock that sounds artificially, as those in the lands of France do.”

Large mechanically operated clocks had surged in popularity in municipalities all around

France during the fourteenth century, with their sophisticated components and seemingly independent movements acting as technological marvels and symbols of urban prosperity. Among the most notable exemplars of this trend was the Gros Horloge of

Rouen, which continues to preside magnificently over the eponymous street leading between the cathedral and the Vieux-Marché after it was first installed at the end of the fourteenth century in an effort to restore the city’s glory after the Harelle. In addition to the value these great municipal clocks had in terms of promoting civic identity and pride, they of course served the more practical purpose of keeping time accurately, which was

369 AMM, Louvet 2521. “Charles par la grace de dieu Roy de France…nous avons receu humble supplication de noz amez les consulz et habitans de nostre ville de Montpellier contenant comme pour occasion de mortalitez et autres pestilences qui depuis environ seize ans ença on esté en ladite ville des grans charges qui au temps passé leur a convenu et convenient encores supporter et aussi pour plusieurs pertes domages et deffortunes quilz ont eu par mer es parties dorient par ------de nefs navires rencontrees de pirates et excumeurs de meur qui souventefoiz les ont pillez desrobez… ilz ont perdu grant quantité de merchandises quilz avoient en ladite ville… yceulx supplians soient moult diminuez de gens et de chevance s et telement quilz ne pourroient supporter ne fourni aux necessities communes de ladite ville qui sont grans et urgentes et par especial ne pourroient lesditz supplians Reparaer ne tenir au estat convenable les murs et forteresse les voyeries chemins et chausées entrées yssues de ladicte ville, lesquelz sont ruyneux en mauvais etat et on besoin de bonne et bref Reparacion.”

280 necessary to the smooth conduct of commercial transactions. From the central positions they occupied near market squares, the large clocks provided merchants, transporters, and the numerous other intermediaries involved in trade with a single reference for telling time that helped to remove the guesswork in coordinating meetings. Market activities and the work schedules of craftsmen and artisans were also regulated according to time and the accompanying signals of the city bells.370 The need to keep up with the latest technology seems to have been close on the minds of the consuls of Montpellier. In their request to the dauphin for authorization to raise funds for the project, they explained that they needed a more precise clock because the one they had “was sounded unreliably by a man, and is neither certain nor true.”371 This, they claimed, in turn led to problems in the local markets, “because when [the clock] sounds, the estrangiers cannot understand what time it is.”

The consuls’ plea to the king concluded by noting the greatness Montpellier had once enjoyed as a commercial power, before reiterating laments about the decline of the local markets and the emigration of wealthy local residents. Viewed in its entirety, the request to collect new aides provides a clear demonstration of the fact that authorities in

Montpellier believed that keeping their city attractive to outsiders who wanted to conduct business was essential to efforts to guide the city through economic hardships and prevent further disasters. The installation of a clock was more than just an important practical measure for facilitating the daily workings of commerce. Montpellier had

370 For a fascinating discussion of the role that the introduction of clocks played in supplementing and replacing elaborate municipal bell notification systems, see the chapter “Clock Time Signal, Communal Bell, and Municipal Signal Systems” in Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, History of the Hour: Clock and Modern Temporal Orders (Chicago, 1996), 197-213. 371 AMM, Louvet 2521. “… feust bien chose expedient et convenable que en ladite ville qui est de notable recommendation eust un horloge vraye sonnont artificelement comme font ceulx des pais de France. Car l’orloge qu’ilz ont presentment sonne par mistere d’un homme et n’est point certain ne veritable ne par icelui quant sonne les estrangiers ne peuvent entendre quelle heure il est.”

281 always been in competition with other urban trading centers in France, Catalonia, and

Provence for the business of cloth traders and spice merchants traveling from Italy and the eastern Mediterranean, and the lack of a central clock put the city at a decisive disadvantage. Paris had a public clock by 1300, and Charles V ordered the construction of three more during his reign. , Florence, Genoa, and Bologna all had their own clocks by the middle of the fourteenth century, and Barcelona had one by 1392.372 The

Montpellierains knew that they could ill afford to let their city look like a desolate and backwards place if they wanted to draw in the wealthy traders needed to increase municipal revenues. Their complaint that “estrangiers could not tell what time it is” even reflects a sense of embarrassment over the city’s failure to meet the standards of merchants who were accustomed to more technologically advanced urban centers.

For such details of market life to matter at all, however, the major routes and avenues of trade needed to be safe enough for merchants to enter and leave Montpellier without fear that their goods would be stolen. Aside from the reprisals and restrictions that were authorized and carried out by the officers of the French monarchy, merchants traveling to Montpellier by sea frequently faced the threat of piracy, either by independent freebooters or by privateers acting on the authorization of the lords and sovereigns of rival polities.373 As we saw within the request the consuls made for authorization to collect aides to support the construction of the public clock, the

Montpelliérains frequently listed acts of piracy as a key factor in the city’s economic

372 Ruth A. Johnston, All Things Medieval: An Encyclopedia of the Medieval World, Vol. 1, (Santa Barbara, 2011), 143-144. 373 Here it should be noted that there is controversy about what constitutes piracy as opposed to official acts of sanctioned warfare, with some scholars arguing that the term piracy is misleading when used to refer to authorized actions carried out by privateers or corsairs. I use it here because it was the term commonly used in municipal documentation in Montpellier when referring to seizures carried out against merchants from the city.

282 decline. Of course, piracy had always been a looming threat for merchants involved in

Mediterranean commerce. In response to a general economic upswing and the invigoration of trade with the east after the establishment of the Crusader Kingdoms in

Outremer, rates of piracy increased in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Over time, seizures both authorized and otherwise came to be an increasingly popular tool for gaining ground in economic competition and open war, with the naval powers of Genoa,

Pisa, Provence, and Aragon taking a leading role in these activities as they jockeyed for dominance over the western Mediterranean Basin. In the fourteenth century, the kings of

Aragon directed an aggressive campaign of seizures against both Muslim and Christian traders as they worked to solidify control over key commercial routes. 374

Whether the rate of seizures against merchants traveling to and from Montpellier actually increased or was simply more painful in the later Middle Ages is not easy to determine, but the evidence reviewed above attests to the fact that shortages could indeed prompt more aggressive efforts to confiscate grain and other commodities. Though further quantitative research is needed to fully assess shifts in the economic effect of piracy on the Mediterranean over the course of the Middle Ages, it is apparent that the impact of the loss of ships, merchandise, and trading partners was especially painful to the Montpelliérains when they were facing other hardships and a general decline in revenues and population. On an individual level, royal tax burdens exacerbated the

374 Clifford R. Backman, Decline and Fall of Sicily (Cambridge, 2002), 269-270. Backman’s study provides an excellent introduction to the history and wide ranging-effects of the economy of piracy and corsairing in a medieval Mediterranean society. See also, Pinuccia Franca Simbula, “Îles, corsaires et pirates dans la Méditerranée médiévale,” Médiévales 47 (2004): 9, accessed October 13, 2012, http://medievales.revues.org/document500. htmlFor a more focused examination of the role that seizures and kidnappings played in the commercial policies of the Kingdom of Aragon, see Jarbel Rodriguez, Captivity in the (Washington, D.C., 2007), and Damien Coulon, Barcelone et le grand commerce d’Orient au Moyen agge (Madrid, 2004).

283 challenges facing those who had been victimized by piracy. Even for wealthier merchants, the challenge of recovering from a major loss of merchandise and reestablishing stock was made all the more difficult by tailles and the tolls on imports.

Piracy threatened the community as a whole, not only by deterring merchants from coming to sell their luxury goods, but also by diminishing the number of buyers coming to purchase local specialties such as scarlet-dyed fabrics, verdigris, and silver ware. By the late fourteenth century, the reduction in wealth and population in Montpellier and the fear caused by the persistent activities of routiers had already made the local markets less enticing, and this made the need to secure sea routes and maintain surviving trading partnerships that much more important. Piracy continued to pose a major challenge to these efforts in the fifteenth century, and the increasing boldness of the pirates and corsairs taking actions along the Mediterranean coast repeatedly prompted aggressive royal action.

In early 1442, for example, Charles VII wrote to his seneschals in the districts of

Beaucaire, Caracassonne, and Toulouse, as well as the royal governor charged with overseeing municipal affairs in Montpellier, granting them each authorization to take action in response to relentless piracy along the Mediterranean coast of France. Outlining the impetus for the order, he noted that “pirates and corsairs of the sea, and other men from islands and seamen from many nations, regions and lands, often descend onto land, and issue from their boats, and take our men and subjects that they find, in the places of our kingdom situated near ports… and take them away as slaves.” As a result of their actions, he explained, “ many places remain depopulated and are as if uninhabited, to our great damage, and to the great diminution of our revenues and prejudice public justice in

284 Languedoc.” For these reasons, he ordered his officers to announce that all the subjects of the kingdom should have leave and license to put to justice all of the “pirates, corsairs, and other larcenists and raiders that they find descending in our kingdom to justice.” He even issued a preemptive pardon to those who killed pirates who resisted capture, and he also ordered that anyone who had been imprisoned for such actions should be immediately released without being subjected to further penalty. 375 Similarly, in 1448, he reaffirmed an edict of 1333 by Philip VI authorizing further action against pirates, supplementing the original order by noting that his subjects in Languedoc had requested this permission because of depredations carried out by the Aragonese and Genoese, as well as the Provençals, Florentines, and “many other foreigners.”376

The broad license that Charles VII granted for independent action reflects the seriousness of the threat that piracy posed to commerce and general security throughout the Languedoc region in this period; the content of his proclamations also reflects the profoundly complex role that seizures could have on relations between the agents of rival commercial powers. While the actions carried out under the banners of the maritime powers of Aragon, Genoa, Provence, and Florence could generate animosities that escalated into armed conflict on the open seas, the Montpelliérains could never afford to sever ties or disrupt trade with these principal centers of commerce. Even as Charles was

375 AMM Louvet, 3069. “Comme, a l’occasion de ce plusieurs pirates et cursaires de mer et autres gens insulaires et gens continuans la mer, de plusieurs nations, regions et pays, souvent descendent en terre, et yssent de leurs bateaulx et prenent nos hommes et subgetz qu’ilz treuvent es lieux de nostre royaume situez et assis sur port de mer, peschans et faisans le sel et autres leurs oeuvres, besongnes et affaires, et les emmenent prisonneiers comme esclaves, plusieurs lieux de nostre royaume demeurent despopulez et son comme inhabitez, en nostre très grant dommaige, et grant diminution de noz dommaine et aides, prejudice de la justice publicque de nostre pays de Languedoc, et plus seroit, se bresve provision n’y estoit sur ce donnee,..pour ce est il que nous, voulans a ce pourveoir, et relever noz subgetz de teles voyes de fait et oppressions, vous mandons et commandons par ces presentes, et a chascun de vous, si comme a lui appartenra et que requis en sera, que vous faites ou faites faire expres commandement, de par nous... que tous noz subgetz de voz juridictions, que ilz se mectent sus, et tous lesdiz pirates, cursaires et autres larrons et escumeurs de mer qu’il trouveront... et les meinent a justice.” 376 Germain, Histoire du commerce, 369.

285 issuing licenses to crack down on piracy during the 1440s, the consuls were asking him to grant new taxes on goods imported from overseas. War, and epidemics recurring “every two years for the past ten years” had diminished their ability to pay for the construction of their new bell tower and the installation of the great bell and “beautiful clock” that were being installed inside it. For these new taxes to generate the requisite revenue, the city needed merchants to continue coming to their markets.377 Municipal officials in

Montpellier thus faced a great challenge in keeping their commercial avenues open while actively trying to deter acts of piracy against their own ships. Their task was complicated significantly by the fact that the line between merchants and pirates was blurred because so many individuals moved fluidly between the roles of transporter and robber. The distinction between illegal acts of private vengeance and legitimate acts of justice or war could seem just as vague.

Moreover, subjects of the same states, identifying themselves with the same banners above their arm-laden caravels, could harbor sharply differing intentions.378

Catalan merchants were among the most important trading partners for Montpellier

377 AMM Louvet, Liasse G Nº10, outlines both the exact projects the city needed the funds for, and the modes of taxation they sought and received authorization for: “Savoir faisons nous avoir receue l’umble supplicacion de noz bien amez les consulz, bourgoys, manans et habitans de nostre ville de Montpellier, contenant que, puis aucun temps ença, ilz aient faient faire une grosse cloche, pesant environ quatre vintz dix quintaulx et une très belle tour de pierre taillée, assse sur une des portes de l’église de Nostre Dames de Tables de ladicte ville, et dessus icelle tour fait faire ung bel orloge avec ladicte cloche, pour laquelle cause soient tenuz et obligez iceulx supplians en pluseur et grans sommes et deniers; et oultre est besoing et necessité ausdiz supplians de faire couvrir de plomb et autre couverture perpetuelle lesdiz cloche et orloge, qui pourra couster grans sommes de deniers... en nous requerant humblement qu’il nous plaise leur donner sur ce congié et licence de imposer et faire ceuillir et lever ung aide sur les vivres et marchandises qui se vendront en ladicte ville, par la maniere qui s’enseuit... cest assavoir, sur toutes denrées et marchandises venues par mer, payeront de valeur de cent francs vingt sols tournois, et sur chascun quintal de verdet [i.e. verdigris- the local specialty], et toutes et quantesfois qu’il sera vendu en icelle ville, quinze solz tournois, pour les deniers qui en ystront estre convertiz et employez es choses dessudictes et autres necessitez communes de ladicte ville.” 378 Kathryn Reyerson offers an excellent analysis of the fluidity of the distinctions between piracy, acts of war, and commerce in the medieval Mediterranean, including a fascinating discussion of the specific role that banners played within identification. See Reyerson, “Shifting Identities of Pirates in the Medieval Mediterranean”, Mediterranean Studies 20.2 (2012), 129-146. On these issues, see also, Emily Tai, “The Legal Status of Piracy in Medieval Europe," History Compass, 10.11 (2012): 838-851.

286 throughout the fifteenth century, and Catalans would later be among those that the municipal authorities pursued most eagerly in their efforts to repopulate their city. Yet

Catalans were also among those most frequently implicated in acts of piracy within the municipal records of Montpellier. The Crown of Aragon had continued to authorize seizures against rival maritime powers with letters of marque and official reprisals in the fifteenth century, but there were also many instances of unauthorized attacks. Indeed,

Catalans themselves did not go unscathed by attacks carried out by compatriots who were acting outside the law or interpreting their royal license for privateering very liberally.379

The challenge of differentiating between trading partners to be protected and pirates to be voraciously tracked down and punished thus required a hands-on approach that was beyond the purview of the consuls majeurs who administered affairs within Montpellier.

Instead, these chief municipal officials delegated those responsibilities to two separate institutions, the consulat de mer and the consulat sur mer. The former monitored ships coming into the client port town of Lattes, and collected duties on imported merchandise.

The officers of the latter body accompanied Montpelliérain merchants aboard their trading vessels in order to monitor transactions in foreign ports and observe any encounters on the open seas.380

The officers of these two institutions were uniquely positioned to report back to the central consulate of Montpellier about ways to promote trade and defend the interests of the wider community. By the fifteenth century, the consulat de mer and the consulat

379 Coulon, Barcelone, 208; and Reyerson, “Identity in the Medieval Mediterranean World,” 141. 380 Alexandre Germain also offers a useful introduction discussion to the roles of the Consuls de mer and the Consuls sur mer within Montpelliérain affairs in, Histoire du Commerce, 68-81. See also Albert Berne, Consuls sur mer et d’outre mer de Montpellier (XIIIe et XIVème siècles) (Carcassonne, 1904). For a general overview of these institutions and their counterparts in cities around the medieval Mediterranean, see Louis Blancard, “Du consul de mer et du consul sur mer.” Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes 18 (1857): 427-438. Given the important role these institutions held in regulating Mediterranean commerce, they warrant greater attention within modern scholarship.

287 sur mer were already two of the most venerable institutions within Montpellier, having both been formally recognized in the municipal charter of 1204. The mounting challenges of conducting commercial transactions within such perilous and complicated commercial networks had pushed their officers to seek broader authority to carry out their responsibilities to the city and promote smooth commercial relations. In 1463, the consulat de mer received authorization from King Louis XI to exercise direct jurisdiction over the city’s client ports of Aigues-Mortes and Lattes, thereby extending their ability to protect the interests of Montpellier and facilitate commercial activities. Few of the records of the consuls de mer have survived, leaving us with only scattered glimpses of the transactions that involved them within the daily workings of local affairs outlined in the notarial registers and letters exchanged between the central consulate and the monarchy. What can be surmised from the extant evidence is that both institutions had central roles in maintaining the commercial ties that provided the lifeblood that sustained

Montpellier. Officers in these institutions pledged in the local Occitan dialect to protect the privileges and interests of local merchants while also facilitating trade to the city.

From their posts on the front lines of commercial exchange and conflict, they could fulfill that promise by providing the consulate of the city with authoritative knowledge of the market impact of royal policies.381

Reliable information was always an invaluable tool in efforts to convince the monarchy to modify royal policies in order to suit local needs, and it was especially useful in dealings relating to the convoluted matters surrounding piracy, reprisals, and the general conduct of commerce. Since their primary responsibility was to monitor and

381 Though few records from the consuls de mer and the consuls sur mer have survived, the organization and purposes of the two institutions can be analyzed in a beautiful manuscript that includes the oaths the officers in these institutions took as they assumed their roles, AMM Louvet 245.

288 regulate merchandise flowing in and out of the local ports, the consuls de mer knew who was bringing in what quantities of goods, while their counterparts in the consulat sur mer experienced firsthand the effects of unprovoked acts piracy as well as acts retaliation for letters of marque issued by the king. As the central municipal administration tried to guide the community through a plethora of crises, detailed knowledge of the functioning of their city’s commercial network provided leverage in negotiations with the royal council that could be used to influence policy. In this way, the activities of the consuls de mer and the consuls sur mer could work to promote a more discerning balance between efforts to defend against piracy and efforts to maintain positive trading relations. This leverage would prove to be essential as the consuls of Montpellier worked to advance a long-term recovery. As their strategy centered on making their city a more enticing place for wealthy merchants from all over the western Mediterranean, their success in stimulating a revival depended in part on their ability to convince their rulers to authorize punitive measures against those who threatened their trade while simultaneously protecting those who could help to restore their city. Of course, the effectiveness of those efforts ultimately depended on how well royal officers followed orders.

In their attempts to secure royal policies favorable to commerce and general economic and demographic growth, the consuls of Lyon faced many of the same challenges as their Montpelliérain counterparts. As outlined in the preceding chapter, representatives from Lyon had beaten a path back and forth from the court of the dauphin

Charles VII between 1417 and 1419 as they tried to convince him to grant fairs with comprehensive privileges and tax exemptions that would attract the wealthiest merchants and buyers to the city. In spite of the disappointment the consuls of Lyon initially

289 expressed about the limited scope of the authorization Charles offered for two annual fairs of six days each, they nevertheless fought vigorously to preserve them, believing that even those limited privileges were tenuously held. 382 To promote the success of the fairs, they also worked to ensure that their trading routes would remain open. The first challenge they confronted in sustaining the fairs came from within the city, in the form of resistance from the local merchants and craftsmen who were irritated at the idea of facing greater competition from outsiders unburdened by restrictions and tolls that would normally force them to raise the prices they charged for their merchandise. As they prepared for the first fair in November of 1420, the consuls received a request from the

“drapers and other merchants of the city”, who out of protest asked for permission not to attend the fairs - a request they backed up with a more pointed insistence that they would not be forced to go against their wishes. The consuls unanimously denied this plea, on the grounds that the absence of local merchants would be a personal insult to the dauphin after he had agreed to authorize the fairs.383

In reaching this decision, the consuls also expressed their concern that a lack of support from local merchants would lead to a general defamation of the fairs that would put them at disadvantage in their competition with the fairs of Paris and Châlon. The decision they made regarding the local merchants’ appeal is a reflection of their attentiveness to the importance of maintaining a strong reputation and welcoming

382 Their determination is evident in Guigue, Registres Consulaires I, 21. Noting the great expense that they went to obtain the fairs, the consuls reluctantly agreed to accept the fairs as they were granted, conceding: “Il seroit impossible de y riens changier pour ce que l’en obtint lesdictes foires à très grans dangiers et dispense et qui voudroit riens changier l’on seroit en aventure de les perdre.” 383 Registres consulaires I, 266. “Ilz ont concluz, excepté Bernerd de Varey, Mandront et Enemond de Syvrieu qui n’estoient point encoures venus, que l’on ne fera point fait comun de la request que on fait les drappiers et autres marchans de ladite ville de non aler ès foires de ladite ville s’il ne leur plait, et que à ce l’en ne les puisse contraindre, pour ce car elles on esté octroyées par monseigneur le Daulphin et à la request de ceulx de la ville, et se ceulx de la ville n’y alloient, lesdites foires en seroient diffamées et ès autres foires, comme Paris, Challon, etc.”

290 conditions for trade. In spite of their best efforts, the consuls continued to face resistance that could not be easily suppressed during these early fairs. When the issue of local attendance arose again in May of 1422, the same cohort of consuls that originally ordered the merchants and craftsmen from the city to attend conceded that, “no one would be forced to go to the fairs if he did not wish.”384 Nevertheless, the consulate insisted that those who refused to participate would not be allowed to work while the fairs were ongoing. Even though they had done what they could to suppress internal resistance, the consuls had already come to the realization by that point that the pervasive climate of insecurity was the greatest obstacle to the success of their efforts to draw in wealthy merchants. In the very same meeting in which they decided not to compel local participation, the consuls ordered that no one should be allowed to enter the city with weapons during the fair in order to ensure the safety of participants. Ever attentive to the need to remain prepared for a potential siege, a majority voted that only small quantities of tallow, oil, iron, steel, coal, and cattle could be exported to the Holy Roman Empire – though two dissenters argued that the terms of the fairs should be resolutely honored.

The tension between security concerns and the desire to remain completely open towards merchants ultimately proved to be an intractable problem for the fairs Lyon held in the early 1420s. From their earliest efforts to persuade the dauphin to grant his approval for the fairs, the consuls had expressed concerns about the challenges that the continuous war between the Dauphin and the Duke of Burgundy would pose; they had even questioned whether it would be worth their trouble to seek out the privileges to hold the fairs at all, consulting their lawyer and sometime ambassador to the monarchy, Jean

384 Registres consulaires II, 3. (AML BB 1, f.156.) “Ilz ont concluz que nul ne sera contraint d’aler en foire s’il ne veul, mès qui n’y yront n’ovriron point leurs ovreuers.”

291 Paterin, about whether they would be better off waiting for peace.385 Situated at a frontier and intersection between Burgundy, France, Italy, Savoy, Provence and the Holy Roman

Empire, Lyon could only benefit from this central location if merchants were actively traveling between these domains. With hostilities between Charles VII and the Duke of

Burgundy intensifying as civil war continued during the 1420s, however, the vital trade routes running through Lyon between Italy, Northern France, and the Low Countries were effectively severed. This meant that the city would need to be a sufficiently attractive destination it its own right, since the traffic from merchants using their roads and rivers to travel elsewhere had greatly diminished. When Charles authorized the establishment of two fairs in February of 1419, he offered reassurances to merchants concerned about their personal safety and protection, granting them a safeguard and ordering royal officials not to harass them as they freely entered and left the kingdom with their money and merchandise.386

Yet with the length of the two fairs that the dauphin set at only six days in length apiece and separated by half a year, the risk that merchandise would be seized by brigands or disobedient royal officers outweighed the rewards. Authorities in Lyon did whatever they could to ease visiting merchants’ concerns by supporting those who claimed they had been mistreated and subjected to unforeseen costs as they entered and left the city. They insistently ordered the local officials who collected taxes on imported merchandise to allow everyone to come and go without facing financial imposition, while also sending local notables to redouble the watch at the city gates in order keep everyone safe as the fairs were ongoing. When a group of petty merchants refused to attend the fair

385 Registres consulaires I, 182. 386 The full text of the privileges Charles VII granted to Lyon in 1419 is available in Fradin, Privilèges des foires, 26v.–34.

292 in November of 1421, on the grounds that they had endured the great risks of transporting their goods to Lyon during a time of war without receiving the promised privileges and exemptions, the consuls promptly reassured them that they would receive the privileges the next time, and even reimbursed them for their original journey.387 As they worked to ensure the success of the fairs, the consuls also tried to restore commercial ties that had helped to encourage trade in the city in the past. In July of 1421 they sent letters to the dauphin requesting that he allow shipments of coal, iron, steel and salt to be transported to the duchy of Savoy. Royal officials had included these items on lists of products that could not be traded away because they were necessary for the war effort, but the consulate of Lyon was chiefly interested in returning the city to the good graces of the duke, as they needed supplies and merchandise from his territories.388

Though municipal authorities in Lyon made their best efforts to keep their trade alive and take full advantage of the limited terms of the fairs the dauphin had granted them in 1419, the troubles that afflicted the kingdom as a whole and the Lyonnais region in particular were ultimately too much to overcome. With concerns about the value of the royal currency and the quantity of bullion within the kingdom running high, the dauphin had imposed restrictions prohibiting gold and silver from being exported from the kingdom as he struggled to raise revenues from a realm diminished in both territory and population. Along with the bans and limitations imposed on the export of the many goods that were deemed necessary for war, these restrictions on the movement of bullion acted

387 Registres Consulaires II, 298. 388 Registres Consulaires I, 335. “Ilz ont concluz que, actendu l’éminent peril qu present règne, et mesment pour la foire de ce moys de novembre, toutes les portes et posterles dessus le Rosne fermeront, excepté rue Nove.” Déniau, La commune de lyon et la guerre bourguignonne offers a detailed analysis of the troubles in those years, 411-413, which included the threatened advance of Burgundian forces, and the arrival of soldiers in the employ of Charles VII who were there to halt any incursions into the Lyonnais region.

293 as an additional inconvenience that lessened the draw of the fairs. The dangerous conditions facing all travelers – and well-stocked merchants in particular - undoubtedly had an even greater impact. Even as they ramped up preparations for their second fair in

November of 1421, the consuls were forced “by the imminent peril that at present reign(ed)” to order the closure of all the gates and small along the Rhône, in order to keep the companies of soldiers roaming in the surrounding area from harming the city. Little could be done to overcome the unwelcoming appearance such a measure would have presented to the merchants who had braved dangerous roads to come to the city. By 1423, the fairs of Lyon had faded into obscurity, only three years after their establishment. The

Lyonnais consuls could only do so much to counteract the fortunes of their time and the whims of their ruler. Yet their experiences in attempting to salvage these early fairs helped them to take advantage of their position on an international frontier when conditions improved after the civil war with Burgundy and the protracted conflict with

England finally drew to a close.

Conclusion

At a time when populations and markets had diminished while tax burdens had either increased or remained consistent, the need for revenue demanded that the leaders of urban communities around the kingdom of France remain open to outsiders who could help their ravaged economies and fill their depleted municipal coffers. Economic strength was not only necessary for paying royal taxes and remaining in the good graces of the king: it was in itself a requirement for the security of urban populations, given the enormous costs of maintaining walls, purchasing artillery weaponry, and paying

294 professional soldiers—or paying them off, so that they would stay away. The need for the revenue that could be obtained from aides on imports and goods sold in the local markets and duties on merchandise en route to others destinations did not mean that municipal leaders ignored the threats that strange merchants could pose as pirates, spies, or competitors for meager resources. Rather, officials in Lyon, Montpellier, and Rouen sought to find ways to address such concerns while also presenting an open and welcoming front so that they could continue to compete for the business of the reduced number of traders and factors who dared to move merchandise in such perilous times.

The strategies and methods they developed to achieve these aims and maintain a balance between self-protection and trade were determined by many local factors, including the traditional privileges and enfranchisements outlined in ancient communal charters; the dynamics of power between royal authorities, municipal leaders, and the various factions within the local populations; a rapidly shifting military and political situation; and the effects of recurring shortages and epidemics.

Though it is impossible pinpoint one factor that played the primary role in shaping the approaches that municipal leaders took to sustaining their trading partnerships as they confronted economic decline and new hardships, the distinctive characteristics of their commercial networks and were certainly the source of the greatest differences between them. For Rouen, it was the economic power provided by control and wide authority over the conduct of merchandise up and down the Seine—one of the principal arteries of the kingdom—that allowed the councilors and their deputies to demand payments from merchants who had little choice but to use the river as a conduit and pass through the city. At the same time, the needs of Rouennais merchants, and the

295 desire to maintain markets for the city’s cloth, necessitated a diplomatic approach and ensured that local authorities rarely abused their ability to control access between the

Atlantic and the markets of inland France along the Seine. Lacking such an important source of leverage, and faced with stiff competition from Marseille and other more conveniently situated ports within the Western Mediterranean, the Montpelliérain leaders needed to make an extra effort to ensure that their city could match its rivals in terms of convenience and security. This drove them to advocate proactively to encourage royal authorities to curtail piracy and seizures by French merchants that could bring down reprisals against foreign merchants and transporters traveling to Montpellier to trade and distribute their goods; they also needed to compensate for the apparent decline afflicting the city by improving conditions for doing business and making transactions more convenient. Though the frontier location of Lyon put it at risk during the civil war between supporters of Charles VII and the Burgundians, its role as the meeting point of

Western and Central Europe and as a banking and changing center for merchants traveling between them that afforded the opportunity to begin cultivating international fairs. Though the first iterations of the 1420s did not succeed, they provided an important foundation for future development.

As conditions in France improved in the second half of the fifteenth century, the experience that the leaders of Lyon, Rouen, and Montpellier gained as they worked to maintain the economies of their cities directly informed the strategies their successors used to stimulate recovery. The end of the conflict between Charles VII and Philip of

Burgundy in 1435 and the abatement of the war with England over the 1440s did not completely end the troubles of the kingdom and its bonnes villes. Epidemics and famines

296 remained looming threats. The upheaval of the noble uprising known as the Praguerie in

1440 and the tension between Charles and his son the future king Louis XI led to fresh political instability. Renewed raiding by companies of disbanded mercenaries known as

écorcheurs continued to disrupt rural life and travel. But the recapture of Normandy and the rest of Northern France from the English reduced the threat of sieges that city dwellers faced, allowing them to devote less time and money to defensive preparedness and more energy to rebuilding their communities. For the Valois rulers of France, efforts to draw foreigners and their wealth into the kingdom from Italy, the Holy Roman Empire,

Iberia, and the eastern Mediterranean were consistently central to recovery efforts. Just as they had been a focal point in efforts to endure economic decline, skilled and wealthy outsiders, whether they hailed from a neighboring region or from a foreign kingdom, were essential to municipal strategies for expediting economic and population recovery.

297

CHAPTER V

A MODEL OF URBAN RECOVERY: THE FAIRS OF LYON

The increased security and stability that began to take hold in France with the conclusion of the Hundred Years War in the middle of the fifteenth century offered an opportunity for new growth and rebuilding. But the scars inflicted by years of conflict and mortalities ran deep, posing substantial challenges for those who sought to promote renewal. In many parts of the kingdom, war and brigandage had forced peasants to abandon their fields, rendering vast sections of farmland overgrown, untilled, trampled, or otherwise unproductive.389 Within cities, the visible markers of decline could be seen in the abundance of vacant houses and derelict buildings; in those that had experienced war most directly, such as Rouen, poorly developed suburbs attested to the heavy sacrifices that populations had made by razing buildings to prevent soldiers from setting up camp close to their walls.390 On an economic level, decades of turmoil had taken their toll as well, in spite of municipal authorities’ efforts to sustain commerce during periods of hardship. Regional and international commercial networks that had fallen into decline

389 The collection of essays included in P.S. Lewis, ed., The Recovery of France in the fifteenth century (London, 1971), provide an excellent overview of the varied effects of the war. On the diminution of crop yields and the long term destruction the war caused in the countryside, see especially, Boutruche, “The devastation of rural areas during the Hundred Years War and the agricultural recovery of France,” 23-52, which complements and extends to the rest of France the conclusions of his magisterial study of the Bordelais region, La crise d’une société. The collection of documents edited and compiled by the Domican friar Henri Dénifle La desolation des églises, monastères, et hôpitaux en France pendant la guerre de cent ans, 3 vols., (Paris, 1897-1899). remains unparalleled as a starting place for understanding the scope of the destruction wrought on both urban and rural France by the Hundred Years War. 390 Mollat, Histoire de Rouen, 133.

298 due to perilous conditions and diminished markets could not be restored overnight. The confidence of foreign merchants had to be regained, and habits and preferences had to be changed if old trade routes were to be revived.391 While facing such daunting challenges,

Charles VII, his son and successor Louis XI, and the municipal leaders of bonnes villes around France all had ample incentive to take aggressive measures to stimulate economic renewal.

The final two chapters of this study analyze and compare the models of long-term recovery employed in Lyon, Rouen, and Montpellier, while illuminating the varied but invariably central roles that outsiders had in efforts to stimulate new growth within each of these communities. Although there were major discrepancies between modes of recovery in each city, the policies municipal authorities implemented and advocated in their negotiations with royal officials generally aimed to achieve two primary objectives.

On the one hand, they all aimed to foster vibrant trade, particularly with wealthy merchants from outside the kingdom who would sell luxury goods such as silk and spices. Increased imports meant increased revenue from the various tolls paid to the king and the communes on incoming merchandise, and this could reduce the financial burdens on the local populations as they worked to rebuild their communities. Municipal leaders also sought to increase sales of local specialty products, as they were eager to encourage the development of the specialized industries that were the foundation of economic strength. A second, related strategy for recovery was to encourage repopulation by

391 Those regions of western Europe that had escaped substantial conflict during the period of the Hundred Years War had benefited significantly from the upheaval that redirected trade into their hands. As will be detailed below, Geneva and other Swiss cities were benefactors of the redirection of spice routes over land rather than into the Mediterranean ports of the south of France; the fairs of Geneva also helped to fill the void left by the Champagne fairs, which experienced a precipitous decline in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries due to English incursions and the civil war between factions of the Valois family. Though most of Provence did not escape the hardships of war, Avignon had grown into a major center of commerce during the tenure of the papal curia in the city, from 1309-1377.

299 facilitating immigration—particularly, but not exclusively, by wealthy or uniquely skilled outsiders. For both municipal and royal officials, population was seen as a source of wealth and prosperity. The number of propertied residents in a city was correlated with the amount of tax revenue it yielded.392 A robust population also meant a strong market.

Thus, municipal leaders were often happy to draw in tax-paying outsiders who were coming from elsewhere within France. By contrast, royal officials generally preferred to encourage wealthy foreigners to immigrate into cities, so as not to diminish the revenue farmed from other subject populations.393

The success of municipal leaders’ efforts to promote trade and immigration depended in part on their ability to coordinate their efforts with royal council, which had to balance concerns about the well-being of individual communities with their visions for maintaining the overall strength of the entire kingdom. Economic competition between cities complicated this balancing act. Granting an exemption from tolls on goods imported to one city could mean that neighboring towns would be less attractive to merchants and would suffer. Thus, to persuade the king to enact policies that would stimulate beneficial trading activity and immigration to their cities, local leaders had to frame their appeals in terms that emphasized the advantages to the monarchy and France as a whole to be gained by enacting measures favorable to commerce. They also had to

392 For an explanation of the emphasis placed on population growth and the belief in its role in fostering wealth within the kingdom, see Gandilhon, Politique économique de Louis XI, 105-120. On the unique but nevertheless instructive case of Louis’ efforts to repopulate Arras with inhabitants of other French cities after taking it by siege, see Jessica Roussanov, “The Kings, the Dukes and the Arrageois: State Building and Fifteenth Century Arras,” (PhD Thesis, Northwestern University, 2009). The success of trade and immigration as means for promoting wealth depended in large part on efforts to establish security, and André Bossuat, “The Re-establishment of Peace in Society during the Reign of Charles VII” in Lewis, The Recovery of France in the Fifteenth Century, 61-81 offers an invaluable introduction to the thorny challenges of restoring law and authority after the prolonged war. 393 Arras, mentioned above, was an exception to this, as Louis XI was keen to ensure that the city would remain loyal to him after posing such resistance during his campaign against Charles of Burgundy. Thus, he ordered his loyal bonnes villes to contribute citizens to his repopulation efforts there.

300 work to counter the claims made by their counterparts in rival cities, who vehemently complained about any act of perceived favoritism from the monarchy that put them at a disadvantage. For their efforts to promote trade and immigration to have the greatest effect, municipal authorities solicited the input of and attended to the concerns expressed by the foreign merchants and potential settlers whom they wished to entice to their cities as they determined how to solidify their commitments to participating in the local markets. As they tried so hard to do while guiding their cities through the short-term effects of crisis, they continued working to preserve and promote their communities’ reputations as lucrative and welcoming places.

As proactive as local authorities were in trying to attract merchants and build their populations, the effectiveness of their recovery efforts was also determined by forces that they could not fully control. Shifts in taste, political instability, piracy, economic competition, and recurring disasters were among many factors that could divert merchants and immigrants away and continue the spiral of decline. The changing needs of individual cities led to major differences in the approaches their leaders took as they interacted with the newcomers and negotiated recovery strategies with the royal council.

The Montpelliérains were the most aggressive in trying to entice and integrate anyone who could restore their flagging population and economy, though their persistent efforts could never fully reverse the decline. Rouen, though lacking in political leverage with the

Valois monarchy after thirty years of English rule from 1419-1449, was perfectly situated on the Seine to profit from new commercial partnerships with Spain, the Low Countries, and England, as well as the opening of new Atlantic trade routes. The frontier position of

Lyon made it ideal for international fairs, and the success of these events made them the

301 centerpiece and focus of the consuls’ efforts to encourage growth. Though the scale of the recovery and the advantages and obstacles to development in each of these cities differed, the innovative strategies their leaders took to exploit the contributions of outsiders provide an important counterpoint to Johan Huizanga’s stubbornly persistent image of late medieval societies as backwards and superstitious in the face of crisis and decline.394

The Fairs of Lyon

The remainder of this chapter directs close attention to the Lyonnais consulate’s efforts to promote recovery and population growth by developing international fairs that would draw in foreign merchants and fully exploit their city’s frontier position and cement its role as a center of banking. Their efforts warrant sustained investigation because the ascendancy of the fairs enabled a revival that was unmatched by any experienced elsewhere in France. Thanks to the fairs, the population and economy of

Lyon grew to unprecedented levels—more than doubling from approximately 30,000 to

72,000 from the mid-fifteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth century— as outsiders from France and beyond its borders flocked to the city to buy and sell merchandise, negotiate deals, and settle loans.395 Culturally, Lyon acquired a role as the principal conduit for the ideas and tastes of the Italian Renaissance. It also became a premier center for printing and the book trade, which in turn promoted sophisticated

394 Johan Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, trans. Rodney Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch (Chicago, 1996). 395 Precise assessments of medieval population are notoriously difficult to offer, but Richard Gascon offers a meticulous analysis of the Vaillant cadastres and other tax records and offers convincing support for the estimate that the population had reached a total of approximately 60,000-65,000 by 1528-1529, and 72,000 by 1551. The number of taxable households had increased from 1909 in 1446 to 3561 in 1551, but this latter figure did not include the many families of étrangers who were not liable for municipal taxes. See Gascon, Commerce et vie urbaine I, 341-351.

302 literary production and the wider dissemination of humanism.396 During the reign of

Francis I, Lyon served as a seat for the royal court, and with his help, the citizens funded

Giovanni da Verrazzano’s expeditions to Newfoundland in 1523. The fairs and the diverse congregation of cultures that they promoted have even been credited for planting the seeds of the renowned Lyonnais cuisine.397 All of these developments beg the question: why were the fairs of Lyon so successful? After all, the leaders of many other cities in France, including Montpellier and Rouen, attempted to promote trade by seeking to establish fairs or expand existing events in order to attract merchants. Certainly, some of the success of the fairs of Lyon can be ascribed to the good fortune of the city’s proximity to Italy. But I will argue here that it was the municipal consuls’ unrelenting efforts to convince royal authorities to take measures that would exploit the city’s frontier position, spurred on by a desire to gain an edge in fierce competition for the business of foreign merchants, that played the greatest role in driving their dramatic development.

To draw merchants away from the fairs of their chief rival, Geneva, the consuls of

Lyon knew they needed to exploit their city’s distinctive attributes. After the Treaty of

Arras ended hostilities between France and Burgundy in 1435, the Lyonnais leadership focused on turning the frontier location that had long been a source of vulnerability into a key advantage. At the intersection of routes connecting Italy, Germany, Switzerland,

Provence, Burgundy, and Languedoc, Lyon was perfectly situated to serve as the entrepôt of western Europe, and the city’s leaders invariably emphasized this fact in dealings with

396 The vibrant literary culture that flourished within Lyon in the latter half of the fifteenth and through the sixteenth century will not be a focus in the analysis that follows. For these matters, see James Wadsworth, , 1473-1503: The Beginnings of Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge, MA, 1962). 397 Marie-Josèphe Moncorgé, Lyon 1555, capitale de la culture gourmande au XVIè siècle (Lyon, 2008).

303 the French monarchy.398 But the frontier position of Lyon also posed persistent problems for the consuls as they worked to broaden the privileges of their fairs and preserve their right to hold them: precisely because it was located at the furthest reaches of the kingdom, at a major intersection of international trade networks, Lyon was crucial to the monetary security of France. The prospect that the currency of the realm would be carried off by foreign merchants hawking fine silks and exotic spices terrified royal advisors and treasury officials, who feared that a lack of monetary wealth could stall recovery or even exacerbate the financial hardships that afflicted the kingdom.399 The threat that France would be impoverished by spending on imported goods was a recurring concern that the

Lyonnais leadership regularly needed to address as they advocated for their fairs. As noted earlier, within this line of reasoning, any French currency used on merchandise coming from the eastern side of the Rhône river could be readily taken away from the kingdom. Extensive use of foreign coinage such as the florin or marc also posed the risk of undercutting the value of French livres.

Addressing concerns about monetary security was key to gaining support for the fairs from the French monarchy. For royal authorities, the primary objective of recovery efforts was to increase the overall wealth of the kingdom, and to restore France to economic, political, and military preeminence within Western Europe—all of which were closely intertwined. Conflicting philosophies among the various royal advisors and branches of governance led to inconsistencies in the commercial policies implemented to

398 They commonly used the following formula to make their case: “… la ville et cité de Lyon sur le Rhosne… est une des clefz de ce royaume, assises es limites et extremitez d’uicelluy, et en frontiers marchissantz es pais de Savoye, Italie, alemaigne, et autre pais et terres del’Empire et le Dapuhiné d’un costé, Beauioulois et Borgoigne au long de la riviere de Saone, et Languedoc au long du Rhosne Forest, et Auvergne d’autre costé.” Fradin, Privileges des foires 25v-27. In some cases, they also placed special emphasis on the Saone and Rhône rivers, and the proximity of the Loire. 399 The debates and concerns over monetary policy and the fairs of Lyon are outlined in a series of records in the Archives Municipales de Lyon, Série HH 290-300.

304 achieve this goal. One school of thought advocated the benefits of free exchange with other realms as a means of generating wealth and promoting development within France.

The alternative, mercantilist position derived from an acute awareness of the dangers of a low supply of bullion. Having presided over a monetary crisis in the 1420s, Charles VII knew all too well the necessity of retaining an abundance of bullion within the kingdom and stabilizing the value of currency; the ability to offer reliable pay to soldiers to maintain their loyalty and discipline was of the highest order of importance to him, particularly as he began efforts to establish a standing army in 1445.400 The experiences of the troubled early years of his reign made Charles VII keen to ensure that the kingdom maintained a trade surplus, so that money would continue to flow into royal coffers at the expense of rival neighbors. At the same time, he recognized the merit in the claims of those who believed he needed to loosen regulations and taxes on trade in order to promote economic revival in their communities. Louis XI showed a greater willingness than his father to relax commercial regulations to promote growth within cities.401 But he was not deaf to the dire warnings of advisors who feared that liberalization would undermine the fiscal stability and security of the kingdom.

For these reasons, negotiations between the royal court and the consulate over the terms of the “free fairs” often centered on what conditions foreign money could be used, and on what conditions French currency could be taken out of the kingdom. Debates about whether the fairs should even be held in Lyon hinged on the question of the city’s

400 Contamine, Guerre, état, société, 235-319 offers a rigorous explanation of the close connection between the challenges of paying and maintaining the discipline of royal forces and the fluctuations in the value of French currency. 401 On the economic strategies of Louis XI, in addition to Gandilhon, Politique économique de Louis XI, see Jean Favier, Louis XI (Paris, 2001), which offers a concise but excellent explanation of Louis’ commercial Louis XI propensity for promoting commerce

305 frontier status, and whether the position that made it so convenient for commerce in fact made it more beneficial to foreigners than to France. Those debates and the pivotal role that outsiders played in the recovery of Lyon can only be understood within the context of the complex power dynamics that shaped negotiations between the monarchy and the city’s consulate. After the failure of the original fairs of the 1420s, the impetus for fresh negotiations between municipal and royal officials to revive the fairs was an upswell of unrest following the conclusion of the Treaty of Arras. Though the accord established nominal peace between supporters of Charles VII and the Burgundians, its aftermath in fact stimulated the upheaval because after fanning hopes for renewed prosperity. In another illustration of the divide between Charles’ interests and even the most outwardly loyal city, Lyon was wracked by a substantial rebellion in 1436 after the conclusion of peace failed to bring a reduction in taxes or an increase in security, since the soldiers left unemployed by the agreement joined together in bands to raid the countryside.402 The rebyne changed little within the structure of municipal governance and achieved even less in the effort to lessen the financial impositions on local population. To reestablish authority over Lyon, Charles entered the city with an army in a show of force in

December of 1436—just one year after he had been jubilantly welcomed following the peace with Burgundy.403

Within a few weeks of Charles’ arrival, the leaders of the rebeyne had been captured, mutilated, or beheaded, and the privileges of Lyon as a commune suspended.404

While the revolt was suppressed and the status quo restored, the incident underscored the

402 On the rebeyne of 1436, see the excellent article by René “A Popular Revolt in Lyon in the Fifteenth Century: The Rebeyne of 1436”, in Lewis, The Recovery of France, 243-266. 403 Kleinclausz, Histoire de Lyon, 301. 404 Registres consulaires, II, 466.

306 need to raise revenues for all parties involved, as both municipal and royal authorities were keen to increase revenues and thus reduce the tax burdens that caused the unrest. In the context of Charles’ brutal response to the uprising in Lyon, it is somewhat surprising that the city’s consuls would ask him to confirm his grant for the fairs just two months later. Indeed, the minutes of the consulate record that the city’s representatives Aynart de

Villenove and Jean de Chapponay made this request during a trip to the royal court in which they discussed the recent “assemblies,” about which the dauphin expressed his great displeasure. The timing should not be dismissed as a strange coincidence.405 On a practical level, addressing the seemingly disparate matters of a rebellion and the granting of royal privileges made sense because of the expense of sending envoys to travel to the royal court – though at the time Charles and his entourage were based in nearby Vienne.

But the renewal of the fairs also served a valuable purpose for the king and the municipal authorities who had been targeted for failing to defend the city from royal impositions.

For Charles, the confirmation of the fairs was an act of clemency that served to affirm his authority and benevolence after he had already demonstrated his power by meting out harsh punishments and collecting steep indemnities. For municipal authorities, royal confirmation of the fairs provided a foundation for efforts to restore trade and respect for the consulate. For both sides, the fairs provided a valuable tool in the effort to achieve the shared aim of repopulating the city and restoring financial stability and social order.

Thus, at the solicitation of the representatives of Lyon, Charles agreed to renew the fairs in 1436. The minutes of the consulate suggest the tenuous nature of this concession by noting that he had only agreed to extend them for “a certain time.”406

405 Registres consulaires, II, 448. 406Registres consulaires, II, 448. “Quant à la franchise des foires, le Roy les a octroyé à certain temps, etc.”

307 There are no details about the exact terms of the privileges the king granted for the fairs on the occasion of this meeting, but he had originally granted the two fairs for perpetuity in 1419, so the renewed fairs would have still been subject to those terms. Nor is it completely clear whether the fairs had ever been completely disbanded in the 1420s and early 1430s, or if the Lyonnais had simply continued to hold them without much success, since there is a gap in the consulate minutes for the years of 1428 through 1433. In those records that do survive, there is no mention of the fairs after 1423 until the renewal of

1436. Regardless of the exact status of the fairs during this intermediary period, it is clear that they failed to flourish even after this confirmation and the nominal peace established by the conclusion of a Treaty with Burgundy in 1435. With the companies led by

Castilian mercenary captain Rodrigo de Villandrando continuing to terrorize the French countryside in the late 1430s, genuine insecurity exacerbated any nagging uncertainties about the safety of traveling through a kingdom that had suffered under the shadow of war for so long. 407 Such fears and the force of merchants’ habits placed the fairs of

Lyon at a serious disadvantage in the face of stiff competition from Geneva, which at the time hosted the greatest international fairs in western Europe.408

Competition with the fairs of Geneva would be the driving force that shaped the ways that royal and municipal authorities developed the fairs and treated foreign merchants during the latter half of the fifteenth century. The fairs of Geneva had existed since at least 1262, but they reached their apogee in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth

407 On Rodrigo de Villandrando and the écorcheurs, Jules Quicherat, Rodrigue de Villandrando: l’un des combatants pour l’indépendence française au quinzième siècle (Paris, 1879), remains the best starting place, although there remains much room for new scholarship on the impact of his raiding in the latter stages of the Hundred Years War. 408 On the fairs of Geneva, see Jean Borel, Les foires de Genève au quinzième siècle (Geneva, 1892), and Jean François Bergier, Les foires de Genève et l’economie internationale de la Renaissance (Paris, 1963).

308 centuries. The Hundred Years War precipitated the decline of the great Champagne fairs that had once served as the nexus linking northern Europe and the wool producing regions of the British Isles with Italian merchants bringing luxury goods from southern

Europe and the Mediterranean.409 The Genevan fairs had replaced them in this niche.

Their ascendancy and resilience proved to be one of the principal challenges facing the

Lyonnais as they worked to develop fairs sufficient to reinvigorate the local population and economy. Geneva profited not only from the longstanding reputation and tradition of its fairs, but also from a location that rivaled Lyon in terms of centrality and convenience, particularly for the coveted merchants of Germany and northern Italy. The fact that there were seven annual fairs within Geneva also served to solidify trading partnerships and networks of exchange and logistics. Of these seven, the four held during Easter and the feasts of the Epiphany, Saint-Peter, and All-Saints’ Day were major international events that drew in merchants from all over western Europe, including France. The duration of these fairs varied according to the popularity of the celebration and seasonal availability of merchandise, but most ranged from six to ten days in length until they were regularized at fifteen days in 1503. Their greater frequency and length added to the convenience Geneva that offered for trading.410

Local authorities in Lyon knew the challenges they faced in the struggle to establish fairs that could draw merchants away from those held in Geneva, and their efforts to tip the balance in their city’s favor provided the impetus for Charles VII to broaden the franchises he had originally accorded in 1419. The need for more extensive

409 The great Champagne fairs have been largely neglected within recent scholarship, but several older studies offer excellent introductions to the subject. See especially, Elizabeth Chapin, Les villes de foires de Champagne, des origins au début du XIVè siècle (Paris, 1937). 410 Jean Borel, Foires de Gènève au XVème siècle (Geneva, 1892), 57-60.

309 concessions was apparent after the fairs had still failed to take root following the establishment of peace with Burgundy and the narrow confirmation that the king had conceded in 1436. By 1444, the improving political and military situation in France had offered an opening for more proactive royal commercial policies. A successful campaign against the English in Guyenne in 1442, and the departure of Rodrigo de Villandrando and his company of écorcheurs for Castile in 1443 had paved the way for efforts to establish a more lasting peace. In the lead-up to peace negotiations with England at

Burgundy at Tours in March of 1444, Charles agreed to extend the privileges he had first issued to Lyon, prolonging the fairs from eight days to twenty and adding a third fair to the original two. This decision was part of a wider royal campaign to revive trade in

France by authorizing new fairs and buttressing and enhancing the privileges granted to existing ones. The great business magnate Jacques Coeur played a key role in promoting this strategy to the king from his newly position on the royal council.411 But while the extension of the fairs of Lyon was a part of a wider recovery effort emanating from the royal council, the specific parameters of the fairs were a product of proactive municipal campaigning rooted in deep knowledge of local circumstances and familiarity with the needs and desires of foreign merchants.

The terms that Charles offered in the letters patent extending the fairs in 1444 outline the case that the leaders of Lyon had made in their campaign to win these concessions, and their arguments in turn reflect the influence of the lessons learned

411 Indeed, Jacques Coeur had a major part to play in the revival of most of seemingly all of the bonnes villes of France, including both Lyon and Montpellier, and to a lesser extent, Rouen. For a concise biography and excellent analysis of Jacques Coeur and his business techniques, see Kathryn Reyerson, Jacques Coeur: entrepreneur and king’s bursar (New York, 2005). A more comprehensive evaluation of Coeur and his role in the commerce of fifteenth century France is found in Michel Mollat, Jacques Coeur ou l’esprit d’entreprise au XVe siècle (Paris, 1988). On Coeur and his role in promoting the development of the fairs of Lyon, see Marcel Vigne, Lyon et la banque au XVe siècle (Lyon, 1903), 57.

310 during the earliest fairs of the 1420s. The Lyonnais authorities opened their appeal to the king by reiterating the benefits of the fairs, and more specifically, the value they could have in promoting repopulation. Describing their city as “one of the keys of this kingdom, seated on its limits and extremities,”they proceeded to offer another lengthy account of the hardships that afflicted their community, list off the usual combination of plagues, wars, and famines.412 They also lamented the exodus of inhabitants who had left the city for the Holy Roman Empire, in an attempt to encourage the king to take measures that would put the city on an equal footing with their rivals in Geneva. As always, the consuls remained cognizant of the need to frame their appeal in terms of the overall well- being of France, and so they reiterated the claim that the ruined state of the walls around the city posed a grave threat to the kingdom, and emphasized that the large expanse within the walled enclosure was largely uninhabited and in desperate need of new settlers and repopulation. Finally, after having laid out the foundation for their request, the consuls drove home their point by offering a dire assessment of the local consequences of the failure of the fairs, noting that their inadequacy had left the city to fall into continued decline because of the “great charges, losses, and damages that the city has sustained...”

Because the fairs had not flourished, they said, “the city had been depopulated by two thirds, and becomes more depopulated with every passing day.”413

412 Privileges des foires, 26v. These complaints were effectively a repeat of those included in the appeals of 1419. 413 Privileges des foires, 29v-. The full statement of the hardships facing the city and the need for more extensive privileges for the fairs reads as follows: “Lesquelles foires ainsi octroyées (i.e. as granted in 1419), tant pour ce qu’elles ne duroyent que six jours (qui estoit rop peu de temps), comme pour occasion des guerres, et divisions iusques à present ont eu cours en ce Royaume, et pour autres affaires, et empeschements survenuz en ladicte ville, et pais d’environ, ou autrement: n’ont peu avoir leus cours plainement, ne sortir leur effect, et n’ont bonnement esté entretenues, ainsi sont demeurrees interruptes, et de nulle valeur, prouffit, ne effect auxdictz supplians et tellement que par les grans charges, pertes, et dommaiges que ladicte ville a soustenus dpuis ledict octroy, elle est depueplee de pres deux pars, et se depeuple de iour en iour, et plus seroit…” The Vaillant of 1446 supports the bleak picture presented within

311 According to the assessment the consulate offered, two principal factors had caused the original fairs to be “interrupted, and of no value, profit or effect” for the city.

One of these was “the wars and divisions that had been present in the kingdom”, along with ambiguously defined “affairs and impediments” that had afflicted Lyon and its environs; this latter phrase presumably referred to the ongoing power struggles among the local nobility and the activities of the écorcheurs.414 With a hopeful sense of peace gradually spreading over the kingdom in the months leading up to settlement of the

Treaty of Tours in March of 1444, the problem of insecurity on the commercial routes seemed a less insurmountable problem. This meant that needs of trade could be the focal point of efforts to invigorate the fairs. The consuls thus focused on addressing the other principal factor behind the fairs’ troubles, which they had long identified as their short duration and the limitations of the privileges that Charles VII had originally granted. The consuls insisted on this point as they pleaded that the city would fall into even more serious decline if the king did not offer “more ample fairs.” In addition to seeking longer fairs that would encourage merchants to come trade in the city, they also sought out

“more ample grace” for the fairs in the form of broader authorizations for the use of foreign currency. They argued that this provision was essential, since the principal advantage Lyon enjoyed was the position it occupied on the frontier, at the meeting point of the great rivers of France and at the intersection between France, Italy, the Empire, the broader Mediterranean, and the Low Countries.415

this appeal, noting that 200 houses lay in ruins, as cited by Fédou in Latreille, Histoire de Lyon et du Lyonnais, 117. 414 Ibid. 415 Ibid.

312 In making pointed requests for expanded privileges for their fairs, the consulate revived the original complaint that their forebears had made when they first received the authorization to hold two fairs of only six days each in1420. On the occasion of their renewed request, however, they found a more receptive audience with Charles VII. They had two decades of failure to prove that the protections and privileges he had originally granted had been insufficient. They also benefited from the greater alignment between their own aims and the aims of the monarchy, as the abatement of the war had afforded the king greater leeway to turn his attentions onto matters of commerce and economic revival that were the principal concerns of the consulate. For his part, Charles seized on the opportunity to affirm the ties that bound the Lyonnais to him. In the preamble leading to the pronouncement of his decision to grant their requests, his letters patent explained that he had agreed to extend those privileges through “his special grace and full power”, in recognition of the fact that the councilors and inhabitants of Lyon “were and are” loyal to him and had always renewed their oaths of fealty every ten years.416 The letters also expressed the hope that his decision to grant the fairs would encourage the Lyonnais to remain faithful, both in the present and future. Indeed, the concession of the fairs did prove to be an effective means of securing the support of the Lyonnais, as local officials remained acutely aware that the king could on a whim take away franchises that only he had the authority to grant.

Aside from the fact that the power to grant fairs rested exclusively in the hands of the monarchy, the specific privileges necessary to develop the fairs of Lyon depended on

416 Privileges des foires, 28, “lesdictz Conseilers et habitans estoyent et son noz homes de feaulté, et pour ce nous on accoustumé de dix en dix ans faire et renouveller le serment de feaulté et qu’ilz avoyent esté tout le temps passé (comme encores sont, et on esperance de tousiours ester au temps avenir) bons et loyaux subiectz et obeissances à nous, et à la Coronne de France.”

313 royal prerogative as well.417 The consuls encouraged the king to implement more liberal monetary policies in order to take advantage of the distinctive advantages their city enjoyed as a center for banking and finance. Lyon had been a great center of banking activities since the thirteenth century, with its colonies of Jewish and Italian bankers facilitating transactions between merchants traveling back and forth between the territories of France and the Holy Roman Empire. The final expulsion of the Jews from

France in 1394 paved the way for colonies of Italian bankers to solidify their positions within the city, but the company of changers from Lyon also came to play a greater roll in the functioning of local markets.418 Oft-repeated ecclesiastical prohibitions against usury theoretically limited their ability to grant loans at interest, and members of the local corporation referred to themselves as changers in order to avoid the resentments and unseemly associations attached to the banker’s trade. In practice, the demands of commerce dictated that such restrictions were persistently ignored, and the changers supplemented the ample sums they gained from the fees they charged in exchange with credit transactions. The wealth the Lyonnais changers accrued made their corporation an influential faction within local politics. In addition, the two seats allocated to changers in the consulate afforded them the ability to play a proactive role in fostering trade and royal monetary policies that would advance their own interests and those of their colleagues.419

Beyond the personal considerations of those prominent members and factions within Lyon who had a direct stake in banking activities, the city’s proximity to the domains of the Holy Roman Empire and the Italian city states that relied on marcs and

417 Brésard, Foires de Lyon, 2. 418 Vigne, La banque à Lyon au XVème siècle, 39-44 offers a comparison and analysis of the roles of Jews and Lombards within the development of the Lyonnais banking profession in the fourteenth century. 419 Déniau, La commune de Lyon et la guerre bourguignonne, 74, explains the place of the “changers” within the hierarchy of professions in Lyon.

314 florins made the free exchange of foreign coinage an essential precursor to any efforts to maximize the economic potential of the fairs. Lyon also stood to benefit from its position near mines of silver and copper in Saint-Pierre-le-Palud and Chassieu, some twenty kilometers to the west.420 In 1413 Charles VI transferred the principal mint of eastern

France from Mâcon to Lyon because it was closer to the mines and thus a more secure destination for transport. This gave changers in Lyon a steady supply of currency to offer in exchange. But the restrictions on the export of French currency from the kingdom during the fairs of the 1420s prevented the Lyonnais from fully exploiting their prowess in banking. When Charles VII granted more comprehensive privileges in 1444, he answered the pleas of the Lyonnais consuls and included concessions that allowed foreign merchants who came to the fairs to use and transport their coinage more freely.

Namely, he authorized foreign merchants who entered France to attend the fairs of Lyon and use their own currencies, while also permitting them to enter and leave the kingdom with their earnings in liquid form. He authorized these privileges for a term of ten years.

The longer duration and greater frequency of the fairs and the vital permissions to take currency out of France made them far more attractive to the targeted clientele of merchants from Northern Italy and Germany. Other protections granted in 1444 were critical to establishing the climate of security and trust that was essential to the development of the fairs. Goods sold at the fairs remained completely exempt from all forms of taxation, including the droit d’aubain that gave the king the authority to seize the property and goods of foreigners who died while they were in France. 421The safe- conducts issued under the privileges of 1419 that suspended reprisals and offered royal

420 Vigne, Lyon et la banque, 72-73. 421 On the droit d’aubain, see Bernard D’Alteroche, De l’étranger à la seigneurie à l’étranger au royaume.

315 protection to merchants who entered the kingdom from abroad remained in effect. In addition to these terms, the privileges of 1444 outlined specific measures that eased foreign merchants’ concerns about the safety of the merchandise and the information they relied on to conduct their business. Merchants carefully protected the log books in which they noted details about individual trading partners and the prices paid and the goods available within different markets. The records they kept about their credit transactions were of the foremost importance to maintaining their finances and ensuring the efficiency of their and transactions. The secrecy of these logs could also be critical to their business reputations, as they could be used to determine their financial status and evaluate the honesty of their dealings. Under the terms of the privileges of the fairs, the log books were protected under the same terms of safe-conducts, so that no lords or royal officials could presume to claim the authority to seize them.422

This expanded set of privileges served as the foundation for the fairs’ growth and prosperity in the years that followed their confirmation in 1444. The deterioration of security in Florence, Milan, Lucca and other Italian city states that were divided by conflict between the Guelf and Ghibelline factions served as an additional catalyst for their development. Longstanding s fanctionalism within Italian cities prompted many bankers and merchants to look for more favorable locations to establish their bases of operations. Merchants’ success depended on the ability to adapt to shifting economic circumstances, and the privileges accorded by the fairs of Lyon presented an extraordinary opportunity to cultivate lucrative trading partnerships and take advantage of developing commercial routes. Along with the central location of Lyon, its proximity to

422 Fradin, Privileges des foires, 29-32v. outline the specific privileges and protections accorded by Charles VII in 1444. On the specific importance of the secrecy of the log books for the merchants’ business, see Brésard, Foires de Lyon, 109.

316 northern Italy, and the generous conditions that established the fairs, the presence of established banking operations and an existing community of Italians made the city especially attractive to those looking for a more secure environment for business.

Florentine, Milanais, and Luccan bankers, brokers and factors soon flocked to Lyon to solidify financing operations that would facilitate the operations of compatriots attending the fairs.423

The fairs’ early success in the 1440s and the consuls’ desire to maintain their privileges and ensure that Lyon would preserve the authorization to hold them meant that the planning and organization of the three annual events came to be a central point of discussion within the day to day administration of the city. The consulate constantly sought out ways to promote the fairs in France and beyond the kingdom, so as to maximize their profitability for the commune and ensure that they could remain competitive with Geneva. The first order of business after receiving approval to hold the fairs was to publicize the new terms of the events to merchants around France and abroad. The minutes of the consulate’s deliberations do not survive in their entirety for the years 1436 to 1445, but receipts entered into the municipal treasury records list payments to messengers who traveled to Germany and all around France to announce the more extensive terms of the new fairs.424 As the fairs began to attract a diverse array of buyers, sellers, and intermediaries, the consuls worked to ensure that these individuals would return. Though the privileges granted by the king strictly prohibited royal officials, tax farmers, and other petty lords and local authorities from harassing merchants en route

423 On the establishment of Italian operations in Lyon, and the political circumstances that drove many Italian bankers to seek opportunity in the city, see, Jacqueline Boucher, Présence Italienne à Lyon à la Renaissance (Lyon, 1994), 5-12. and Marie France Fiorenzi, “Lyon et la banque Martelli et la Renaissance économique lyonnaise, 1470-1495,” (PhD Dissertation, Université de Lyon II, 1974). 424 AML CC 398, nº18.

317 to the fairs, these injunctions were often disregarded. The consulate thus took on the responsibility of advocating for foreign merchants and upholding the privileges that the fairs were founded on, but they faced extensive and persistent challenges in asserting their jurisdiction in such matters.

To establish and maintain the positive climate for commerce that would entice merchants from all over Western Europe to continue to frequent the fairs, the Lyonnais consuls needed not only to direct the markets and uphold the privileges that they had received as efficiently as possible; they also needed to ward off challenges from those within the population and from outside of the city who were keen to see the privileges authorizing the fairs of Lyon withdrawn. On the first score, they had to coordinate with the local tax farmers who were assigned to collect and contribute set sums to the consulate on behalf of particular neighborhoods. For the franchises and exemptions of the fairs to attract merchants, the consuls needed to ensure that the tax farmers they had delegated to collect tolls would not overstep the terms of their commission and demand contributions from those attending the fairs. This proved to be a persistent challenge, and the pages of the consuls’ deliberations from the 1440s detail their frequent disputes with tax farmers who were either unfamiliar with the exemptions or resistant to granting them.425 As they worked to elevate the reputation the fairs enjoyed elsewhere in France and beyond the kingdom, the consuls also needed to assuage the concerns of local producers and merchants, who lodged complaints that they faced disadvantages when competing with outsiders who were exempted from paying to sell their merchandise in

425 An extensive discussion about the expectations and rights of the tax farmers during the fairs is outlined in the Registres consulaires, II, 547-548.

318 the Lyonnais markets.426 While these matters created headaches for the consuls as they attempted to direct the fairs, the external opposition they faced from royal authorities and rival towns posed the greatest threats to their continued existence.

A principal concern and a persistent source of contention between the Lyonnais consuls and the advisors to Charles VII was the possibility that foreign merchants would take advantage of the privileges of the fairs by taking merchandise and currency out of the realm without being subjected to the usual taxes and regulations. They were particularly concerned that merchants would try to exploit the privileges of the fairs of

Lyon in order to maximize their profits in Geneva. Although the longer fairs established in 1444 drew a surge of new business to Lyon, they were still second-tier events when compared with the well-established international celebrations held in Geneva. For merchants seeking a way to bring their goods through France to the lucrative markets in

Geneva without being subjected to the countless tolls imposed on merchandise traveling up and down rivers, over bridges, through cities, and across the boundaries of the kingdom, the ability to claim the exemptions afforded by the Lyon fairs presented an inviting way to beat the system and create revenue. The consuls and royal officials who oversaw the fairs were aware of this, and worked from the earliest iterations of the extended fairs authorized in 1444 to prevent fraud by marking all goods bought, sold, or presented at the fairs with the local seal, accompanied with a written certification detailing the nature and quantity of the products processed in a transaction. The challenge arose in ensuring that merchants were genuinely attempting to sell their merchandise,

426 A notable example is outlined in the deliberations of May, 1446, Régistres consulaires, II, 497, when several drapers, shoemakers, and merchants from the city complained that they were being charged from bringing their goods from one side of Lyon to the other, while their foreign counterparts were not.

319 rather than presenting their goods just long enough to collect the certifications required to obtain exemptions.427

If merchants saw the advantage in claiming the privileges of Lyon without actually offering their goods for sale, the prestige and economic benefit that was central to their purpose would be vastly diminished, and the objectives of stimulating population and economic growth unattainable. Furthermore, the leaders of rival cities saw the possibility that merchants would abuse the exemptions as a weakness that could be used to convince the monarchy that the fairs of Lyon were detrimental to the kingdom. The leaders of towns in Brie and Champagne, whose fairs had previously held the honor of being the premier economic events in Western Europe, appealed the king’s decision to grant privileges for free fairs to Lyon from the beginning. Indeed, the fact that Lyon enjoyed the very same privileges that had once distinguished the Champagne fairs posed a direct challenge to their own efforts to reinvigorate their fairs and stimulate an economic revival within their communities. They knew that they could not frame their arguments against the fairs of Lyon in terms of their own self-interest. Instead, in the repeated attempts they made to convince Charles VII to nullify the privileges he had bestowed on Lyon in 1444, they argued that the proximity of Lyon to Geneva facilitated and even incentivized merchants’ fraudulent activities, thereby undermining the fiscal welfare of the kingdom by enabling the export of its wealth.428 The consuls of Lyon thus had both economic and political reasons to make every attempt to counter these claims

427 Officers of the consulate also worked to move merchants along after their business was finished in order prevent acts of fraud and collaboration between compatriots in avoiding regulation and oversight. The council minutes from 1447, for example, records payments to several who were paid to “despecher les marchants quant ils ont tenu suffisament la foire,” Registres conulaires, II, 539. 428 Brésard, Foires de Lyon, 10.

320 and verify that the goods coming into their city for the fairs were in fact offered for sale and accurately certified before their departure.

To address such concerns, the consulate appointed an official whose sole task was to document sales and maintain detailed registers of all transactions during the period of the fairs. To facilitate the observation process and prevent merchants from colluding and transferring their goods between each other to avoid inspections and regulations, this officer also received payments to “hurry and direct” those merchants who had sold their inventory out of the city.429 In spite of efforts to closely monitor the transport of goods in and out of Lyon, however, allegations that foreign merchants were using the fairs to defraud the kingdom continued. There is no way of assessing the veracity of these allegations since it is impossible to enumerate the frequency of instances of fraud with any certainty. The persistence of the claims and the attention the Lyonnais consuls devoted to preventing fraud suggests that they were not without some foundation. As the fairs began to achieve prominence in the later 1440s, concerns about fraud remained a thorn in the side of the consuls who were trying to solidify their standing as premier economic events. In some cases, royal regulators and tax farmers harassed merchants who were leaving the fairs under the pretext of their suspicions of fraud, forcing the consuls to take action to defend their right to do business. Concerns about individual cases of fraud also stoked the unrelenting fears that the fairs were facilitating the export of the kingdom’s wealth.

These issues finally came to a head in 1453, as the consulate dispatched envoys to convince Charles VII to renew their privileges before the term of his original ten year

429 The deliberations of Novembre, 1447 explain the election held for officials who would “conserver et garde les libertés et franchises des foyers de ladicte ville, commençans demain premier jour de ecembre, et pour dépescher les marchians extrangiers qui viendront.”

321 grant came to an end. The and the royal treasurers immediately voiced their resistance to the renewal on the grounds that the fairs had led to a decrease in the monetary supply in the kingdom, so the king delayed his decision at length, before finally dispatching a commission of notables in July of 1453 to investigate. Employing a common tactic followed by municipal authorities to secure the support of prominent lords and nobles, they bestowed gifts of fine wine, fish, bags of oats, and 100 livres tournois to the three-man panel. This was not sufficient to sway their decision, as they had still failed to give a ruling in January after a five month sojourn in the city. Desperate to obtain confirmation as the status of the fairs appeared increasingly tenuous, the consuls dispatched another emissary, Pierre Thomassin, to distribute 500 livres tournois. This offering finally secured the confirmation of the privileges of the fairs in July of 1454, just as they were set to expire. But the victory was not complete. The king reasserted his right to collect the droit de rêve, a tax on goods leaving the city. This forced the consuls to pay off the tax farmers so they would not collect from merchants who came for the fairs, as they were determined to preserve the reputation that their fairs were truly free from impositions.430

The privileges that Charles VII confirmed in 1454 remained in place for the remainder of his reign, allowing for the continuation and early development of the fairs.

To complement the economic stimulus provided by the circulation of merchants during the three annual events, the consulate took additional measures to encourage the permanent settlement of the various brokers, bankers, and factors who wanted to stay year round in order to make their preparations for the fairs. Deputies acting on behalf of the Medici family had established operations in Lyon from 1451, with Francesco Sassetti

430 AML, BB 5, f.256v-258, HH 290.

322 directing operations there for Cosimo de Medici from that date.431 To facilitate the settlement of Sassetti and his comrades, the consulate granted them the title of citizen and offered them a comprehensive exemption from fiscal contributions to the city for the span of ten year, on the condition that they would pay 10 livres tournois annually. This was in fact a typical measure that the consulate also took on behalf of lesser known merchants and their families. In 1447, for example, the consuls granted an exemption of five years to a marchant estrangier named Charlot Rolin, of unspecified but apparently

Francophone descent, who expressed his “desire and intention to come with his wife and his entire household and make his residence there in Lyon, provided there was some grace given to him for the aides and common affairs of the city (i.e. the local taxes.)” The consuls granted his request, exempting him from taxes for a span of five years, on the condition he did his duties in the night watch, militia, and fortification.432

Beyond the possibility of receiving such exemptions, those who wanted to set up operations in Lyon to make their preparations for the fairs had other incentives to seek out full citizenship. Outsiders who did not intend to settle permanently in Lyon were not obliged to pay the taxes or perform the duties expected of residents, but they still owed contributions in return for the benefits they received from doing business there. Under the

431 Boucher, Présence italienne à Lyon à la Renaissance, 6 explains that Sassetti and his companions also received extensive privileges and exemptions from the city in 1455, including ten years of freedom from taxation, for which he was to pay the small fee of 10 livres tournois. 432 Registres consulaires, II, 534. The great interest of this piece for understanding the urgency with which the consulate tried to encourage repopulation makes it worth transcribing in full: A la supplication et request de Charlot Rolin, marchiant estrangier, disant qu’il a vouloir et est d’entencion de venir, lui, sa femme et tout son ménage demourer et fere residence en cete ville deLion, porveu que aucune grace lui soit faite sur le fait des aides et affaires communs d’icelle ville, il ont esté d’accord et commun consetnement que, attendu que ledit Charlot est estranger et que pour sa venue ladicte ville ne peu que mieux valoir, que icelui Charlot, s’il veut venir fere sadite residence en ladite ville, joyre des libertés et franchises de ladite ville et le tiendra l’on et demour franc et quitte des tailles, aideds, charges et afferes communs d’icelle ville par l’espace de cinq ans, commençans à la date du temps qu’il viendra fere sadite residence, excepté de guet, garde, et fortification d’icelle ville, à quoy sera tenus ledit Charlot quant besoing sera.” (emphasis mine).

323 droit de terre estrange, the consulate collected the sum of one denier for each livre of value assessed on the estates or material possessions that any non-residents held within the city limits.433 This one time payment usually amounted to less than that demanded of citizens of Lyon, who not only contributed payments for the standard royal taille, but could also be forced to pay supplementary aides for municipal fortification efforts and soldiers’ wages and serve in military duties. Citizens were also responsible for participating in the guet and garde of the city. Though much less taxing than the burdens imposed on established citizens, the imposition of the terre estrange could nevertheless push those who divided their time between different cities to commit to settling down when the burden was combined with the obligations owed to their own municipalities.

Not surprisingly, the collection of the terre estrange created logistical and financial challenges for the consulate when it came time to track down and procure payments from those merchants who held property but did not reside in the city. Payments made to tax collectors assigned to track down defaulting estrangers appear frequently across the pages of the registers of deliberations from the reestablishment of the fairs in 1444 and through the 1450s and 1460s.434

While Lyonnais authorities often struggled to secure tax payments from outsiders who used properties held in the city to store inventory and make plans for the fairs, they still reaped benefits from those who did meet their obligations to pay the droit de terre

433 On the droit de terre estrange, for which I found no equivalent in other cities in France, see the deliberations of November 3,1423, transcribed in Registres consulaires, II, 71. “Iceulx conseillers ont baillé à Audry Chivrier, present et acceptant, la charge de lever la terre estrange par la forme qui s’ensuit, c’est assavoir que ledit Audry Chivrier lèvrera ladicte terre estrange à ung denier pou livre tans sus les héretaiges comme sur les meubles et de XIIII ans passes et fenissant à la Toussains derrenière passée, c’est assavoir de ceulx qui auront esté estranges durans lesdids XIIII ans et des autres du temps qu’ilz auront esté estranges, et ce bien et diligemment, sans faveur ou hayne.” 434 For some of the most informative passages on this tax, see Registres consulaires, II, 141, 189, 231, 244, 259.

324 estrange, and they remained committed to drawing well-heeled immigrants and encouraging them to settle down in order to reinforce economic growth. Under the terms of the privileges that Charles VII extended and confirmed for ten additional years in

1454, the fairs helped with economic development. Still, they failed to rival the fairs of

Geneva in terms of prestige or the value of merchandise sold, and the consuls fretted over limited revenues and stagnation. As they saw it, the prominence and popularity of the fairs of Geneva remained the chief obstacle to their growth. It is worth noting here that the relationship between the fairs of Lyon and Geneva was not purely adversarial in this early stage. Indeed, the Genevan fairs drew French merchants through Lyon as they traveled to and from the city. But this relegated the fairs of Lyon to second-tier status.

When Lyonnais leaders explained the early development of the fairs two decades later, they noted that “because the fairs of Geneva had not been denounced, and because the merchants of this kingdom could go there freely, the foreign merchants did not come to

Lyon, but went to Geneva because it was closer to them.” They explained that this had been the principal reason that the fairs had been worth “very little” to Lyon, and failed in their principal aims of promoting economic recovery or repopulation. As a result of the continued supremacy of the Geneva fairs, when Charles VII died in 1463, “there were barely a thousand or twelve hundred hearths in Lyon, which was very little when considering the great area of the city.”435

435 AML. HH 283, which is also transcribed in the pieces justificatives of Brésard, Foires de Lyon, 327- 338. “Neantmoins pour ce que lesdites foires de Genesve n’estoient point descriées et que les marchans de ce Royaume y pouvoient aller les marchans estrangers ne venoient poient à Lyon mais venoient à Geneve pour ce que ladite ville est plus prouchaine d’eulx et a ceste cause lesdites foires de Lyon valloient bien peu. Item que lorsque le feu Roy Charles alla de vie a trespas il n’y avoit point plus de mil a douze cens feuz dedans ladite ville de lyon.”

325 The cagey methods that the consuls of Lyon used to maintain and win favor during the transition between the reigns of Charles VII and his son Louis reflect the proactive and central role that municipal authorities had in manipulating royal policies to support efforts to improve the fairs and increase the local population. Though the consulate remained cognizant of the need to stay in Charles’ good graces in order to keep the privileges authorizing them to hold free fairs during his reign, restlessness over the slow pace of population growth and economic recovery led them to hedge their bets by cultivating a relationship with his estranged son and rival, the dauphin Louis. Between

1455 and 1460, as conflict between the king and the dauphin was ongoing, the consulate secretly dispensed a total of 3,000 écus d’or to Louis, in spite of their unrelenting assertions of loyalty to Charles, which they invariably invoked when seeking confirmations of their privileges, additional concessions, or tax reductions.436 They reaped the rewards for their generosity when Louis ascended to throne on the death of his father in 1461. In 1462, they submitted a request to their new sovereign for more extensive concessions for the fairs, reiterating their old points about the need to repopulate the city and encourage commerce, while also explaining specific amendments to the old set of privileges that would be needed to achieve these goals. Critically, they rooted their arguments and the strategies they proposed for invigorating the fairs in the information they had received through consultations with foreign merchants themselves.

Based on their discussions with prominent local merchants as well as the foreign merchants that they were so eager to attract, the two envoys that the consulate dispatched to advocate for their interests (both of whom were merchants themselves), urged the new

436 Claude de Rubys, Histoire veritable de la ville de Lyon (Lyon, 1604), 340, cited in Brésard, Foires de Lyon, 18.

326 king Louis XI to take three main steps to bring their city’s fairs onto an equal footing with their Genevan rivals. First, they insisted that the tax exemptions that applied during the fairs should be extended so that merchants and transporters would have time to bring their goods to and from the city without having to scramble to avoid extra impositions.

They proposed that the exemptions should apply for the entire year, but also said that a one month exemption would be sufficient, so that merchants would have at least eight days to bring their goods to and from the fair. The consulate also deliberated on whether it was better to hold three fairs of twenty days or four fairs of fifteen days each in length.

They ultimately decided to ask for the establishment of a fourth fair, so that it would be more practical for merchants and their agents to remain in Lyon year round – and perhaps settle permanently – in order to participate in each event. Finally, they requested that the fairs should coincide with those held in Geneva. This provision was to be combined with a concurrent order that strictly prohibited any and all merchants from transporting their goods through the kingdom of France to market in Geneva, on both political and economic grounds. The Lyonnais promptly won approval from Louis XI for each of these measures.437

The argument that the fairs of Lyon served merely as a conduit for merchants traveling to Geneva had previously been used by the fairs’ detractors; the consuls turned this argument on its head by insisting that they should receive additional privileges that would establish the preeminence of their fairs and prevent foreign merchants from taking their business abroad. Specifically, they noted that “gold and silver were and are each day transported from the kingdom to Geneva, and elsewhere out of the kingdom, to the great

437 These new privileges are outlined in Fradin, Privileges des foires, 40-46, with the originals available in HH 279-281.

327 prejudice of (the king) and the public good.” 438 In amending the privileges that his father had issued and granting the requests the consuls had made of him, Louis acknowledged this point, while also noting the necessity of working to encourage foreign merchants to settle in Lyon. Whereas Charles VII had authorized the privileges of the fairs for ten year terms, Louis answered the consuls’ appeals for a more definitive confirmation by extending permanent authorization for the fairs, on the grounds that “if the said fairs were not established in perpetuity, the foreign merchants would fear to lodge themselves, live, and bring their goods and merchandise into Lyon.” For these reasons, he confirmed the number of annual fairs would be elevated to four of fifteen days and that this schedule would remain in place forever, “so that all foreign merchants would have greater courage, and would want to live and reside in the said place of Lyon.” The letters patent included many other key concessions as well, in response to the “remonstrances” that the consulate made.439

These privileges can be divided into two categories. One group of privileges served to reassure merchants that they and their goods would be safe during the fairs. To give merchants confidence in their security, Louis not only guaranteed that the privileges of the fairs would not be summarily rescinded (which would have made merchants vulnerable to reprisals or exorbitant tolls as they were leaving the fairs); he also pledged full protection of the monarchy over any who were entering and leaving the kingdom to buy or sell merchandise. To follow up on this assertion, he promised that the royal officers known as “masters and guards of the gates,”who monitored roads entering and

438 Fradin, Privileges des foires de Lyon, 41. “Parquoy lesdictes matières d’or et d’argent ont esté et son encores chascun jour transportees audict lieu de Geneve et ailleurs hors de nostredict Royaume, come faire se souloit, au tres grand preiudice de nous, et de la chose publique de nostredict Royaume, et seroit plus, si par nous n’y estoit donné provisions.” 439 Fradin, Privileges des foires de Lyon, 45.

328 leaving the kingdom, would be prohibited from harassing the merchants who were traveling to the fairs. To this end, he deputized the royal officer who held the joint position of bailli of Mâcon and seneschal of Lyon to serve as the conservator and guardian of the fairs. The holder of this role was to guarantee the protection of merchants entering the kingdom, and resolve any disputes between merchants who had claimed the right to carry out reprisals.440 Prohibiting the pursuit of reprisals and marques was critical to the overall climate of safety, and by granting jurisdiction to a royal lieutenant, Louis

XI also helped to eliminate the resistance that the consulate had previously faced as they tried to prevent petty lords and nobles in the region from ignoring the privileges of the fairs and harassing merchants coming to the city.

Other key provisions that aimed to instill confidence in foreign merchants included a more explicit and comprehensive revocation of the droit d’aubain, and an explanation of royal policy regarding the merchants hailing from enemy territories. On the first of these points, Louis XI ordered to suspend the droit d’aubain, “so that foreign merchants would more voluntarily frequent the fairs and live and make their residence there.” Explaining this provision, his letters affirmed “that it should be legal and permissible to all them to make their testaments and order their affairs as it seemed good to them.” More specifically, he continued, foreign merchants should be able to make their wills at any time during their residence in France and have their wishes be respected. If a foreigner happened to die within the kingdom without having made a will, the customs of their native lands would be respected, and their rightful heirs would be notified and entitled to their estates and possessions – without the affairs of the deceased being subjected to royal exactions. As for merchants hailing from territories in conflict with

440 Ibid., 62.

329 France, they were all allowed to attend the fairs in full confidence of their personal security – except for the English, “the ancient enemies.” Only those merchants who were personally implicated in a commercial dispute could be subjected to reprisals. Once again, these broad concessions reflect the direct influence the consuls of Lyonnais exercised in shaping the terms of the fairs to respond to the concerns that had arisen among foreign merchants in previous incarnations of the fairs.441

The second group of privileges aimed to attract merchants to attend the fairs and stay in Lyon year round by ensuring that the events would be lucrative, effectively run, and as enticing as the fairs from Geneva. On the latter point, Louis issued a simple pledge to grant merchants all the exemptions and benefits they enjoyed at the fairs of Geneva, regardless of what those privileges were – a flexible measure that aimed to keep the fairs of Lyon competitive, in spite of any adjustments their Genevan rivals made to keep merchants coming to their events exclusively. In addition to having the right to use any currency, and transport their currencies freely over the borders of the kingdom, merchants attending the fairs also received authorization to accept loans at interest and use lettres de change as they pleased. The lettres de change allowed a buyer to authorize a third party such as a banking agency or other financier to make payments to a seller on request, giving them the ability to move funds and make purchases securely without taking the risks of carrying currency over long distances and perilous roads. This system served as a foundation for the smooth operation of the Lyon fairs, and paved the way for the city to receive the full advantages of the strong banking traditions present within the city. Since

441 Privileges des foires, 46. “Et affin que tous marchans estrangiers frequentent plus volunteers lesdictes foires, et quierent avoir leur habitation et demeurance audict lieu de Lyon: Nous avons octroyé (comme dessus) qu’ils soit losable et permis à tous marchans estrangiers de tester et ordonner de leurs biens ainsi que bon leur semblera.”

330 the fairs drew in merchants from all over Europe, Lyon also came to serve as a kind of clearing house where debtors and creditors could finalize international transactions.442

Efficient credit transactions were to become the backbone of the fairs, and the consuls of Lyon, though somewhat powerless to control the precise workings of credit negotiations, did their best to keep those transactions running smoothly and efficiently.

Credit dealings continued for a full month, in excess of the fifteen day duration of the fairs themselves. The sweeping authorizations Louis offered to smooth the workings of credit and finance also fostered additional banking operations within Lyon. Prominent

Florentine bankers responded to these incentives by withdrawing from the fairs of

Geneva to set up their operations in Lyon, with families such as the Capponi, Gadagni, and Pazzi joining the Medici in Lyon 1466, after the latter transferred its principal foreign branch from Geneva to Lyon in the same year.443 Many smaller operations followed suit.

The privileges that Lyon offered for those who would remain year round to prepare for the fairs encouraged this shift. Included within the letters of March of 1463 was an article asserting that any merchant or factor could remain in Lyon year round, between the fairs.

This authorization complemented the decision to increase the number of annual fairs from three to four. With the four events spaced no more than three months apart over the course of the year, it would have been expensive and impractical—not to mention risky— for merchants to travel to and from the city for each of these events. Moreover, different goods were on display over the course of each fair, in accordance with the seasonal availability of merchandise. Those foreign merchants who wished to see the full range of

442 On the workings of the letters d’échange and their exchange during the fairs of Lyon see, Vigne, La banque à Lyon, 160-168. 443 Vigne, La banque à Lyon, 85-85 explains the establishment of the great Italian banking families in Lyon. See also, Jacqueline Boucher, Présence italienne à Lyon, especially, pp. 6-23, which explains the early development of the Italian nation in Lyon in the fifteenth century.

331 products available for sale thus needed to have places to store their goods. If they chose not to remain in the city themselves, they could nevertheless choose to assign agents to take on the task of preparing their inventory and evaluating market conditions.444

The combination of measures that facilitated commerce and immigration with measures that ensured security during the fairs provided the foundation for an influx of foreigners over the last quarter of the fifteenth century. The wealth, merchandise, ideas, and technical expertise they brought with them stimulated a major economic revival within Lyon and elevated the city to a level of prominence and prestige it had not seen since Roman times. Advertised by royal criers in Lorraine, Burgundy, Provence, Genoa,

Savoy, and Milan, the privileges issued in 1463 drew in wealthy merchants from each of these territories, and others in Western Europe.445 In their earliest iterations during the reign of Charles VII in the 1420s and 1440s, the fairs were glorified urban markets, in which buyers and sellers could more freely exchange the merchandise that was already available for sale within cities– textiles, spices, pelts, leather, pots, livestock, metal goods, and wood products. The fairs that grew out of the privileges that Louis XI instituted drew in a wider range of goods, greater revenues, and more foreign visitors and settlers. Luxury fabrics such as silk and golden cloth from the manufacturing centers in

Genoa and Lucca came to be closely identified with the fairs of Lyon. Exotic spices and medicines imported by Florentine, Genoese and Luccan merchants from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean also enhanced their appeal. The large volume of fine wool cloth that the merchants of Germany and Italy came to purchase in the city made the fairs such an asset in the minds of royal authorities. Buyers from outside the kingdom who came to

444 Fradin, Privileges des foires, 42v-45. 445 Fradin, Privileges des foires, 47.

332 buy up the specialty items produced French craftsmen brought revenue to France, while promoting trade and adding to the relative strength of the realm.446

The influx of foreign merchants and outsiders from elsewhere in France was a boon for Lyon on several levels. Under the twenty year reign of Louis XI, the population of Lyon climbed back to approximately 30,000, after falling to as low as 15,000 during the rule of Charles VII. Various sectors of the local economy enjoyed particular benefits: the owners of inns and taverns profited from the greater numbers of visitors passing through the city, as did the merchants, artisans, craftsmen and changers who sold them goods or provided for their daily needs. The revenue that the consulate accepted in taxes reflected the economic revival, with the city quadrupling the value of the taxes previously collected under the reign of Charles VII.447 In addition to enriching the resident population—with the wealthiest local merchants and bankers reaping the greatest rewards—the fairs also succeeded in directing more outside money directly into municipal coffers. Aside from the taxes the consulate collected on properties that foreigners owned within the city, and the aides they paid on purchases of commodities such as wine and salt during their sojourns, the growth of colonies of foreigners who came to reside in the city year round also increased the concentration of wealth in Lyon.

The merchants and bankers who established firms in Lyon to facilitate their operations during the fairs brought with them entourages of intermediaries—including factors, brokers, and array of servants. The colonies of expatriates were organized into nations, with the Florentines, Luccans, Milanese, Genoese, and Germans being the most

446 For an excellent analysis of the type and quantity of merchandise exchanged during the four annual fairs of Lyon, see Brésard, Foires de Lyon, 159-201. 447 Kleinclausz, Histoire de Lyon, 321-322.

333 prominent.448 Members of these nations inhabited distinct neighborhoods within the city, and even organized their own religious activities and confraternities—the Florentines, for example, occupied a former Dominican convent in the heart of the city, and worshipped in its church, Notre-Dame de Confort, the construction of which it helped to fund.449

The presence of these nations within Lyon also advanced the consulate’s repopulation efforts by making the city more welcoming to political exiles and refugees, who were eager to join communities of compatriots in a favorable setting. The organization of these nations as discrete administrative entities reflected an aversion to complete assimilation, but this never seems to have become a major concern for the consulate, so long as the foreigners met their tax obligations. The consuls of Lyon readily granted their representatives a voice within local affairs. As they had done when deliberating on the appropriate measures to fuel the growth of the fairs at the debut of the reign of Louis XI, they often took pains to solicit the input of their representatives when it came to matters of commerce; they used their opinions to leverage the king to enact or confirm policies that would favor trading activities.450 They had good reason to listen, as foreigners were of the foremost importance to the fairs’ economic success. As the wealthiest, largest, and most well-organized nation, the Florentines exercised the greatest influence of all the nations in Lyon. With more than 140 Florentine commercial firms operating in Lyon by the turn of the fifteenth century, they were the keystone of the financial system underpinning the fairs. Merchants doing business during the fairs

448 AML HH 283, cited above, provides a detailed list of the varied effects of the fairs from the perspective of the Lyonnais leadership, who were trying to convince Charles VIII to defend the privileges of the fairs from the criticisms of ambitious rival cities. 449 On Notre-Dame de Confort and the role it acquired as the center for the activities of the Florentines, see Jean Baptise Montfalcon, Histoire monumentale de la ville de Lyon (Paris, 1866), 111. 450 One key example is from April of 1467, when the consulate assembled the representatives of the nations to ask whether they would prefer several short fairs or a smaller number of fairs of greater duration. BB 10, f. 243r.v.

334 gravitated towards the Florentines’ loggia in its central location on the Presqu’île, which served as the principal clearing house where the lettres de change were finalized. In recognition of this status, the Florentines enjoyed the privilege of speaking first when the consulate consulted with the nations; in some cases Florentines also served as the messengers for exchanges between Lyon, Italian princes, and the king.451

By drawing in large numbers of Florentines and other Italians, the fairs also served to promote the spread of ideas, fashions, and industries that elevated Lyon to unprecedented prestige within France and Western Europe. When combined with the colonies of Luccans and Milanese, and the smaller numbers of Venetians, Bolognese, and

Genoese who came for the fairs, the Florentines helped to bring Lyon a distinctly Italian flavor over the final quarter of the fifteenth century. Their collective influence was such that when the Venetian traveler Andrea Navagero came to Lyon in 1528, he commented that “the greatest part, almost the entirety, of the population consisted of foreigners, and above all Italians, because of the fairs and the commerce and exchanges that take place there. The greatest number is of Florentine and Genoese merchants.”452 Navagero’s assessment of the numerical prominence of Italians in the city may have been an exaggeration: there is no way to assess their actual ratio within the population, as those who had not requested local citizenship do not appear in the tax rolls. In some cases the names of Italians and other foreigners who did settle permanently were adapted into

451 Abbé Rouche, “La nation Florentine de Lyon,” Revue d’histoire de Lyon, 9 (Lyon, 1912), 26-28. For an invaluable recent analysis of the Florentines activities in sixteenth century Lyon, see Nadia Matringe, “L'entreprise Florentine et la place de Lyon : l'activité de la banque Salviati au milieu du XVIe siècle,” (PhD Dissertation, European University Institute, 2013). 452 M.N. Tommaseo, ed. and trans., Rélations des ambassadeurs vénitiens sur les affaires de France au XVIè siècle (Paris, 1838), 35-36. “… è Lion ben abitato, ed da buone case. Il più delle gente che abita, è forestiera di varie nazioni, ma il più però, anzi quasi il tutto, Italian da varie cite, per le fiere che se vi fanno, e gran contratto di mercanzia e cambia che vi è.Il piu de I mercatanti che stanno in Lion so Fiorentini e Genovesi.”

335 French, making it impossible to identify them. But the influence of their presence and the tastes they brought with them was certainly clear and dramatic. Lyon retains vestiges of the fashions and tastes that they imported with the fine silks, gold cloth, drugs, and spices they brought from around the Mediterranean. One notable example is the present-day maison des avocats in the Saint-Jean Cathedral quarter of old Lyon, which held the name of Auberge de la croix d’or when it served as an inn for guests coming to the fairs (Fig.

2). Originally established in the fourteenth century, it gained the distinctive gallery connecting the main hall and chambers in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.

Although the exact details of the construction and patronage of the addition are unclear, the three rows of wide, semi-circular arches on Roman columns, and the spaciousness of the open gallery embody Italian Renaissance architectural preferences.

The presence of established colonies of Florentines, Milanese, and Luccans made

Lyon a principal conduit for Renaissance ideas and tastes into France. Historians of the city and the Renaissance have debated whether Charles II of Bourbon, who served as archbishop of Lyon from 1444–1476, or King Francis I played the greater role in promoting the spread of humanism through Lyon to the rest of the French kingdom.453

But it is critical to acknowledge the pivotal role that the consuls of Lyon played in promoting the influx of Renaissance ideas by enticing Italians and convincing them to keep coming back. Their fairs would not have developed without the initial support of

Charles VII, or flourished without the more concerted collaboration of Louis XI. The opportunism of the Italian merchants, and the tumultuous conditions on the peninsula that prompted their departure were also essential in eliciting responses to the consuls’

453 Latreille, Histoire de Lyon et du Lyonnais, 129-130, and Simone Franco, The French Renaissance: medieval tradition and Italian influence in shaping the Renaissance in France (London, 1961).

336 invitations to settle and do business in the city. Other scholars have attributed the prominent role that Lyon played in the French Renaissance to the fortuitous location that made the city a stopping point for travel between Italy and France, or the fact that it was a primary point of departure from France for soldiers heading to and from the Italian Wars of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.454 Yet above all, it was the consuls’ focused attempts to respond to decline and depopulation by exploiting their city’s geographic and economic advantages that allowed the fairs to thrive. It was the fairs, in turn, that instigated and sustained the most continuous flow of correspondence, wealth, and merchandise between Lyon and Italian cities.

The early failures of royal efforts to stimulate the growth of local silk production, when juxtaposed with the rapid growth of the printing industry in the city, attest to the central role the consuls and prominent Lyonnais played in shaping the course of recovery efforts and economic developments. The history of the development of these two industries in Lyon shows that even though the Lyonnais were often eager to embrace the contributions of foreigners, they would do so on their own terms, in ways that were directly beneficial to themselves or the city. The communities of wealthy Italians within

Lyon helped to promote a taste for the fine silks that they imported and wore themselves, and this in turn encouraged the continued increase in demand for the luxury textiles manufactured in Lucca and Genoa. The great value of the Italian silk and golden fabric at the fairs – a royal ordinance put the figure at the enormous sum of 4,000-5,000 écus d’or—was a source of concern and envy for royal officials. Demand for silk also came at the expense of French urban communities such as Rouen, where cloth was a principal product and export. Seeking to staunch the flow of currency leaving the kingdom in the

454 (who?-check notes)

337 hands of Italian silk merchants who sold their goods to French buyers at the fairs, Louis

XI demanded a contribution from the Lyonnais population of 2,000 livres to support the foundation of local workshops in 1466. He wanted to use these funds to procure the tools and materials that master silk workers would need to flourish; he tried to lure competent practitioners of the trade— whether Italian or French—with the promise of exemptions from taxes and obligations in local fortification efforts and guard duties for twelve years.455

The consuls resisted the king’s impositions, however, and their opposition postponed the rise of a major silk production center within Lyon until the sixteenth century. They were wary about the creation of an industry at the behest of the monarchy, and the risk that the king could grant a monopoly to foreign producers beholden to him.

In their reply to Louis’ request, the consulate and sixty-one local notables couched their opposition in terms of their concerns that the sum he had imposed would be insufficient to support a silk industry that could sell their merchandise at prices that would be competitive with the large and efficient production centers in Italy. The monumental sum of 40,000 écus would be needed to undertake such an effort they claimed – a sum so great as to be preposterous; the expenses for the preparation of the fairs, as well as the steep costs of fortifying the city and acquiring new gunpowder weaponry made it impossible for the Lyonnais to think of collecting such a large amount. In their response to the king’s request the Lyonnais assembly did offer to undertake efforts to find an efficient means of silk production themselves, although this proposal was ignored. In the end, the need to

455 Vital de Valous, Étienne Turquet et les origins de la fabrique lyonnaise, recherches et documents sur l’institution dee la manufacture des étoffes de soie (Lyon, 1866), offers an excellent compilation of sources detailing the development of silk manufacture—and resistance to it among the traditional drapers of Lyon. For Louis XI original letter from November 24, 1466 attempting to establish silk production in Lyon, see pp. 10-12. The original is listed as available as AML HH 124.

338 maintain royal favor for the privileges of the fairs finally led them to offer financial support for his initiative by 1468. Yet the lack of local support for the specialists who answered the call to develop the silk industry finally pushed Louis to transfer his ambitions for the creation of silk industry to other cities within the kingdom, such as

Tours, which lacked both the market and access to technically competent technicians from Italy that had led him to choose Lyon as the best place to support the luxury fabric industry.456

By contrast, the fairs provided a direct impetus for the creation of the printing industry that would make Lyon one of the greatest centers for book production in France, while helping to establish the networks that would serve as the foundation for the collaboration between prominent locals and competent typographers from abroad was essential in stimulating its development. The first printing press in Lyon was founded by

Barthelémy Buyer in 1472, who was a citizen and a member of an influential local family. The Buyers rose to prominence thanks to the legal prowess of Pierre Buyer, who acted as lawyer to the consulate in several dealings with the monarchy. Success in the book trade allowed Pierre and his sons Barthelémy and Jacques to build up the wealth that solidified the family’s influence within local politics. Books were among the principal items bought and sold during the fairs, and both Italians and Germans had a prominent role within the growing market for volumes adorned with woodcut prints.457

Unlike their Italian counterparts, the Germans who came to the fairs in Lyon did not

456 Ibid., 12-15. 457 For a detailed study of Barthélemy Buyer and the early development of the printing press in Lyon, see Charles Perrat, “Barthélemy Buyer et les débuts de l’imprimerie à Lyon.” Humanisme et Renaissance 2, 103-387. On the ties between Buyer and Le Roy, see also Aimé Vingtrinier, Histoire de l’imprimerie à Lyon de l’origine jusqu’à nos jours (Lyon, 1894), 36-39. The Musée de l’imprimèrie in Lyon also provides an excellent and well-documented introduction to the history of the printing profession in Lyon.

339 usually remain in the city year round; not only was it relatively convenient for them to travel back and forth cities such as Nurembourg, Strasbourg, Augsburg, Frankfort along

Rhône inlets, but their primary business at the fairs consisted of buying up French cloth and Italian silks, as well as other luxury goods imported from around the Mediterranean.

They did have an active role as importers of books from German presses, however, and their expertise in printing was critical both to the foundation of the Buyer press and to the continued growth of the printing industry within Lyon over the final quarter of the fifteenth century.458

The demand for imported books at the fairs of Lyon created ample incentives for locals to enter the production side of the market, while also connecting them to foreigners who had the technical expertise to support them as they established presses. Barthélemy

Buyer had been inspired to invest in the printing trade during his time as a student in

Paris through his contact with Jean Heylin, a scholar and theologian of German birth who established the first printing press in France at the Sorbonne in 1469. Though Buyer knew a good idea when he saw it, he initially lacked the technical expertise in typography to run his own press. Instead, the printing shop he founded on the Rue Mercière on the

Presqu’île of Lyon depended on the technical expertise of one Guillaume le Roy, born

Wilhem König of Liège. Le Roy had trained as an apprentice typographer with the

German specialists with ties to the original presses founded by Johannes Gutenburg, and he had also spent time abroad in Venice, the most prominent center for printing within

Italy. After publishing the first printed book in Lyon in 1473—Reverendissimi Lotharii

Compendium breve, a history of the Lyonnais Cardinal who Pope Innocent III—they

458 On the book trade in Lyon and the Germans’ role within it, see Brésard, Foires de Lyon, 120-122; 187- 189.

340 published a popular translation of Jacob Voragine’s Golden Legend, in 1476, as well as an edition of Guy de Chauliac’s influential manual on surgery. The financial success of these and other editions allowed Buyer to fund another workshop managed by the

German typographers Nicolas Philippi and Marc Reinhart. Aided by the German typographer Mathieu Husz, his brother Jacques founded another press in Lyon in 1483.459

German printers like Husz would retain a central role in the printing industry in

Lyon through the remainder of the fifteenth century. In addition to their expertise in typography, their knowledge of the titles that had sold well in their home cities allowed them to commission translations and editions that would be most profitable. The prowess

Lyon boasted in printing, in turn, helped to solidify the burgeoning prestige of the city, with King Louis XI himself even making arrangements to visit the Buyers’ workshop on the Rue Mercière to examine the operations for himself in 1476. Where they had been reluctant to accept outside help in the foundation of a silk industry, the leaders of Lyon were keen to tout the role that foreigners played in the printing industry, and indeed the greater part they had played in the revival of the city by means of the fairs. When Charles

VIII ascended to the throne in 1484, a bevy of Lyonnais notables including the consuls,

Charles II of Bourbon, and the deans and canons of Saint Jean Cathedral, set aside their differences to collaborate on a spirited and collaborative defense of the privileges of the fairs. Fearing that the new ruler would heed appeals to transfer the privileges for the fairs to another central town such as Bourges or Tours on the grounds that the frontier position of Lyon facilitated the export of wealth from the kingdom, they composed a petition of

76 articles that enumerated all of the benefits that both the local population and the kingdom as a whole reaped from the business that the fairs generated. As they did so,

459 Vingtrinier, Histoire de l’imprimèrie, 59-61.

341 they repeatedly emphasized the prominent roles that foreigners who had come for the fairs had played in the recovery of the city. 460

Of primary importance to the Lyonnais leaders’ defense of the fairs was the fact that the extensive privileges that Louis XI had bestowed in 1463 had allowed them to draw foreign merchants to France, and away from rival Geneva, to the “great good, profit, and utility of the king and of his kingdom.” To emphasize the widespread appeal of the fairs, they noted that “many foreign merchants, such as Germans, Italians,

Aragonese, Spaniards, and many others frequent and make their residence in the city for the said fairs.” 461 Explaining why the fairs appealed to such an international clientele, the Lyonnais repeatedly emphasized the specific advantages that their city enjoyed because of its frontier position, noting that “[foreign merchants] brought their goods, possessions and merchandise because of the convenience of the place, and because of the rivers, and the proximity of their countries.” Rather than facilitating the export of bullion from France because of its frontier location, they said, the convenience of Lyon for

German and Italian merchants actually reversed the flow of wealth out of the kingdom:

French buyers were no longer forced to travel and spend money abroad, or rely on the

“great merchants” as international middlemen to procure the finest fabrics, spices, books, and arms. Furthermore, at the fairs of Lyon, small producers of fine wool cloth and wines from all around the Lyonnais region could sell their goods to a larger clientele of merchants from Italy, Spain, and Germany. If the fairs were transferred to a central location such as Bourges or Tours, they said, the fairs would no longer be convenient to foreign buyers, and would thus become unprofitable.

460 Cited above, HH 283. 461 Ibid. “Item que plusieurs marchans estrangers come Alemans, Ytaliens, Castellans, Arragonnez, Espagnolz, et plusieurs autres ont frequenté et fait leur residence en ladite ville au moyen desdites foires.”

342 Indeed, the petition to Charles VIII argued that fairs could only flourish if they were positioned on the frontiers of the kingdom, in a location that could attract the foreigners who were essential to their success; of course, it was Lyon that best fit that description. As further evidence, the petition cited the free fairs of Lendit, near Paris, where “there were no foreign merchants, and hardly anyone at all save the merchants of

Rouen and Paris.”462 In this way, the petition portrayed the foreigners who came for the fairs of Lyon as the essential ingredient for their success. To drive home the point, the

Lyonnais leadership enumerated all the benefits that foreigners’ presence, both to their city and France as a whole. Appealing to the purely pragmatic sensibilities of the king, their petition listed the specific values of merchandise purchased by foreigners during the fairs, and compared these revenues to those that had been obtained previously. For example, they noted that 100,000 francs were spent annually on French fabric before the fairs, as opposed to 600,000 after their establishment. They offered an estimate the specific sum of money drawn into the kingdom by German merchants, explaining that

“each year they bring in a great quantity of silver, and each year more than fifty, and sometimes sixty thousands marcs, which they exchange for merchandise and goods that come from this kingdom.” They also explained that the fairs had given the king greater control over the market in armor and weapons; where the king had previously been forced to purchase arms and weapons in the production center of Milan, these items were now readily available at the fairs of Lyon, giving him the authority to control their flow from the kingdom to potential enemies.

462 Ibid. “Item mais au regard des foires qui ont esté au illieu du royaume est peu de chose car combine que Lendit qui est près de la ville de Paris qui est foire france et de long temps et anciennté touteffoiz en icelle il n’y a point de marchans estrangers et n’y a quasi que les marchans de Rouen et ceulx de ceste ville de Paris.”

343 After all of the points the Lyonnais petition made about the economic and military benefits of their fairs both to the city and the kingdom, it was an appeal to the vanity of the king that served to drive home the argument. “Because of the fairs” they concluded,

“the king was and is loved, feared, revered, and respected by merchants and other nations and princes who frequent them, and he acquired great glory, while bringing great profit and benefits to his subjects.”463 The 1484 petition was in fact one among many sources that portrayed the appeal the fairs of Lyon held to foreign merchants and their lords as a source of pride both for their city and the king. The local chronicler Simon Champier boasted that Lyon “consisted of many groups and nations” and hailed the city as a place

“where gold and silver comes from all regions and kingdoms, and where diverse merchandise circulates.” He also listed the nationalities of those who came to live in

Lyon as a result of the fairs, explaining that the city was a place almost wholly reliant on commerce, “where men of all nations lived, including Italians, Florentines, Genoese,

Luccans, Allobroges, Germans, Spaniards, and other nations lived.”464 The formulaic introductions used within official correspondence between the Lyonnais consulate and the monarchy echoed these sentiments, invariably emphasizing both the importance of the frontier location of Lyon and the convenience the city offered to merchants coming from all over Western Europe. Indeed, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, the diversity of the population within Lyon and the international draw of its fairs had come to be a constitutive element of the city’s identity.

463 Ibid. “Item que a l’occasion desdites foires le Roy a este et est amé, crainc, doubté et prinsé des marchans et autres nacions et preinces fréquentans lesdites foires et ont esté tous les marchans de son royaume en grant seureté don’t il a acquis grant gloire et a ses subgectz grant utilité et prouffit.” 464 Ibid.

344 The aptitude the consuls of Lyon displayed in coaxing successive kings to implement and uphold privileges that would draw foreigners to their fairs and rebuild their economy and population made their city one of the great success stories of the Late

Middle Ages. Competition with Geneva and a steady stream of criticism directed at the fairs by detractors in the royal court and the leaders of other cities in France forced the

Lyonnais consulate to remain innovative and proactive as they worked to make their fairs ever more attractive to foreign merchants. Their efforts to insure the security and ease of business transactions at the fairs drove dramatic growth, and the influx of foreigners who responded to their incentives reshaped the identity of the city—though it should be noted that this was not without some negative consequences and backlash for the poorer members of the community.465 Lyon unquestionably benefited from its position at the intersection of the Rhône and Saône, and its role as a convenient crossroads for merchants and travelers coming from all over Western Europe. The city also profited from the continual instability on the Italian peninsula that drove skilled and wealthy refugees and exiles to settle down within their community. But Lyon would not have benefited from these advantages and experienced such a dramatic renaissance had it not been for the persistent campaigning of local consuls who worked to exploit that frontier by making it safer, easier, and more comfortable for merchants to cross. Though the frontier position of Lyon was a source of concern for those who argued that the city’s fairs encouraged the export of wealth from the kingdom, the consuls were savvy enough to identify this feature as an asset that enabled lively trade and necessitated aggressive

465 An important negative consequence of the fairs that has not been discussed here is the role they played in increasing the disparity and in wealth between the wealthy merchants and common artisans and craftsmen in Lyon, which also led to a reduction in the role this latter group had in shaping municipal policy. On these issues the collection of articles in Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France.

345 recovery efforts. Even as they worked to protect their city from dangerous outsiders by deterring contagious refugees and monitoring and diverting unfamiliar soldiers, the consuls believed and argued that they could also make their city more secure by opening their limits to those who could help to revitalize their community. And thanks to their determined efforts to implement this strategy, it worked.

346

Fig. 2. Gallery of the Maison des avocats in Lyon. Author’s photograph.

347

CHAPTER VI

MODELS OF URBAN RECOVERY: ROUEN AND MONTPELLIER

The steps that the leaders of Montpellier and Rouen took to restore their communities to prosperity had much in common with those that the consuls of Lyon implemented as they worked to establish, enhance, and defend their fairs. Indeed, the renaissance that unfolded in Lyon made it a model for successful economic recovery all over France. The generous privileges that Charles VII and Louis XI bestowed on the

Lyonnais also elicited great jealousy from the leaders of other communities, who felt they had been severely disadvantaged in their struggle to attract foreign business. Municipal officials in Montpellier and Rouen were not content to complain to royal authorities about the negative impact the fairs of Lyon had on their cities, however.466 Instead, they sought to convince the king to offer them similar privileges that would allow them to host their own fairs, and compete effectively with the Lyonnais for the business of foreign merchants.467 They did not pin their hopes of renewal exclusively on the success of those fairs, but sought out other innovative measures that addressed the needs of their

466 For example, AMM, Louvet 3458, details an appeal by the Lyonnais consulate to Charles VIII that the institution of the Lyon fairs had caused a cessation and discontinuation of the flow of merchandise through the city. Montpellier was in fact hit especially hard by the establishment of the fairs of Lyon because they opened up land routes from Italy to northern Europe for the trade in spices and drugs that had previously been imported to Mediterranean ports, such as Aigues-Mortes. The Rouennais, particularly the drapers, benefited more from the establishment of the fairs of Lyon, but nevertheless sought privileges to expand their own fairs. They received such an extension from Louis XI in 1468, though this was for only of fair, for the span of six days. See ADSM 3E1 Anc. U1-Folios 66-76, which detail the privileges of the four annual fairs of Rouen, which were held in celebration of Pardon, Candlemas, the Pentecost, and the feast day of Saint-Romain. 467 Whereas Rouen received an extension of one fair in 1468, the Montpellierain consulate first received extended privileges in 1488, but won two annual fairs of eight days each.

348 communities. Though the leaders of Rouen and Montpellier both recognized the need to open their gates to outsiders who could help revive their economies, this meant something different for each of these cities because of their distinctive concerns and attributes. In Montpellier, depopulation was a primary concern because the vastly diminished number of residents felt the burdens of royal taxes especially heavily. This made population growth a principal goal, as it was in Lyon. A steady influx of refugees from the Norman countryside meant that the leadership of Rouen faced fewer concerns about depopulation as such; rather, they faced greater challenges in finding an adequate number of skilled laborers, and distinguishing and welcoming beneficial outsiders while regulating those who were threats or competitors.

The geographic and economic attributes of Montpellier and Rouen played a decisive role in determining which outsiders would come to trade within their markets, and how they would be treated as they conducted their business. Both cities relied on regional and international trade, yet they had sharply contrasting roles within their networks that dictated how they handled those who came to exchange their merchandise.

As had long been the case, the fierce competition that Montpellier faced from other

Mediterranean ports for the business of foreign merchants meant that its leaders needed to work constantly to keep them coming to the city.468 This was more true than ever as they found themselves working to climb back up a slippery slope of economic and demographic decline that afflicted the city since the beginning of the fifteenth century. To

468 Subdued by Aragonese siege and sacking in 1423, Marseille came to pose particular economic challenge to Montpellier after the annexation of Provence by the French monarchy following the end of Angevin rule in 1481. On the siege by the Aragonese and the transition to French rule, see Edouard Barétier, Histoire de Marseille (Marseille, 1973), 117-122. Barcelona was also a source competition, but it was a potential trading partner as well, and the Montpelliérains made outreach to Catalans and Barcelonans in particular a centerpiece of their efforts to draw in outsiders to repopulate the city and revitalize its economy.

349 maintain the flow of merchandise, the leaders of Montpellier had always needed to remain welcoming to outsiders, and their strategy for recovery built on this tradition by taking even more proactive measures to make the city inviting—not only to wealthy merchants, but to any immigrants who could help revitalize the economy. Rouen, by contrast, retained its role as an unavoidable checkpoint for traffic on the Seine, a distribution center, and a center of production for fine wool cloth. Given these attributes, and the relative concerns about depopulation, the councilors of Rouen could be more selective about who they accepted into their communities, and what privileges they would have.

The nature of the relationships between municipal and royal authorities also played a primary role in shaping the form and process of recovery within Montpellier and

Rouen. Representatives from Montpellier were among the most prominent participants in the Estates of Languedoc, and in this way the perspectives of the city’s leaders carried clout in shaping royal policy towards the entire region. The consuls of Montpellier exercised more direct influence on royal policy because the population had been an unerring source of financial support for Charles VII and the campaign to expel the

English, even in the face of the great hardships that they confronted (a point which they never failed to mention).469 The consuls invariably tried to leverage the loyalty they had demonstrated when they made appeals to the royal council. Their assertion that

Montpellier could provide ample funds to the monarchy if their recovery efforts succeeded also helped to secure support for their attempts to draw in outsiders. The leaders of Rouen found themselves in a more subservient position after the restoration of

469 On the relationship between Montpellier and the monarchy in the later middle ages, and the rise of Montpellier as an administrative capital in the kingdom, see Cholvy, Histoire de Montpellier, 133-135; 140-141.

350 Valois rule over the city in 1449. The Rouennais had never been on good terms with

Charles VII.470 Though he confirmed their charter of enfranchisements after entering and taking back the city, he maintained the restrictions that had been imposed by his father after the Harelle rebellion in 1382, which gave him the authority to choose the city’s powerful mayor. In practice, Charles and his successors usually deferred to local judgment on day-to-day affairs within the city, but the royal influence within the municipal council was such that it is often difficult to discern whether the initiative for a broader policy came from the local leaders or the royal court and their bevy of lieutenants.471

Ultimately, as was the case in Lyon, it was the internal dynamics of the community and the negotiations between municipal officials and royal authorities that determined how local attributes and economic features could be exploited. This is borne out most clearly in Rouen. There, we can see evidence of a clear distinction in the treatment of the forains and estrangers and the roles that each group played within the means that local authorities used to encourage recovery. Although it is important to bear in mind the shifting and sometimes ambiguous meanings of the various terms, as well as the frequent slippage between them, by the latter half of the fifteenth century the labels forains, gens venus de dehors, and gens d’ailleurs more consistently referred to the individuals and groups from nearby towns and cities within Normandy who had had come to seek safety in Rouen during the course of the Hundred Year War. They also applied to the middling merchants who came to hawk their wares from the countryside at the local markets and fairs. The term estranger, by contrast, had come to refer primarily

470 Recall rebellion of 1417, above Ch. 3, pp.38-42. On the terms of the affirmation of Charles VII as ruler of Rouen ,see ADSM 3E1-U1. 117v-118v. 471 Le Parquier, Organisation munivcipale de Rouen, 109-113.

351 to individuals hailing from another kingdom, or in some cases, another region of the kingdom of France. The royal council maintained strong but differing interests in both groups. In relations between the Rouennais and other subjects, the kings of France had incentive to ensure that all of their subjects were well-off economically so that they would have a strong tax base; in dealings with those who came from outside the kingdom to Rouen, royal authorities often prioritized strategic military and economic interests.472

For their part, the municipal council of Rouen and the leaders of the city’s powerful corps des métiers tended to look at the forains as rivals and competitors seeking to undermine or encroach upon their carefully cultivated privileges. The Rouennais shared royal concerns about the threats that estrangers could pose as spies or saboteurs, but they also knew that they could provide a source of exotic luxury goods and tax revenue. The limitations on municipal power and the complex and sometimes contradictory military and economic concerns facing the city meant that the local leadership did not develop and advocate so coherent and aggressive a strategy for recovery as their counterparts in Lyon and Montpellier. At the same time, we can also speculate that the council did not display such a sense of urgency in developing policies to promote revival because their city was in less dire straits at the end of the Hundred

Years War. The terms of surrender that Henry V had imposed on Rouen in 1419 had been crippling, and the period of his rule a harsh one.473 But Henry’s brother John, the Duke of

Bedford, showed himself to be more lenient when he took over because he was keen to assert the legitimacy of English rule and win support for the régime of his nephew, Henry

VI. Trade between Rouen, Paris, Brittany, and England flourished until Charles VII

472 This assessment is based on trends observed in a thorough review of the deliberations of the council of Rouen, A1-A13, which cover a period from 1389-1419, and 1449 to 1534. 473 ADSM 3E1 Anc. 121-127, detail the terms of surrender.

352 regained control of the capital in1436. Even then, the ties between England and

Normandy remained strong. Some wealthy merchant families profited greatly from their support for the English, as did ecclesiastical institutions such as the Abbey of Saint-Ouen and the Cathedral of Notre Dame. The dominant local industry of cloth production benefited from the renewed commercial ties, which furnished a steady supply of high quality English wool. 474

Nevertheless, by the time Charles VII wrested control of Rouen away from the

English in 1449, the city was in need of revitalization. Even though Rouen had not suffered such a severe economic or demographic downturn as other communities around

France during the Hundred Years War, the decline was still apparent to those within the city. The municipal finances had been badly depleted during the period of English rule, as the revenue obtained through local taxes was funneled directly back into the war against

Charles VII.475 The productiveness and population of the surrounding countryside had been diminished by the lengthy war, and this in turn impacted the volume and value of merchandise sold in local markets. The gradual reclamation of Paris and then Normandy by Charles’ armies in the 1430s and 1440s disrupted trade between Rouen, Paris,

Brittany, and Eastern France. Even more significantly, ties with the southern half of

France, including the ports with access to the Mediterranean, had been suspended for the

474 Mollat’s Commerce maritime normande remains a classic, and includes the best general analysis of commercial activity in Normandy during the later stages of the Hundred Years War and the period of English rule, pp. 41-52. For the succinct version of this research, see Mollat, Histoire de Rouen, 132. Another brief but invaluable analysis of English and Rouennais transactions, drawn from meticulous review of the tabellionage is to be found in Philippe Cailleux, “La présence anglaise dans la capitale normande: quelques aspects entre Anglais et Rouennais,” in La normandie et l’Angleterre au Moyen age (Caen, 2003). 475 ADSM 3E1 Anc. Tiroir 245 includes pieces noting the emigration of wealthy Rouennais in efforts to avoid the increased duties they faced in the guet and garde under the English, leading to a reduction in revenues for the city. The Rouennais had also paid tremendous sums in indemnities to the English under the terms of the surrender of 1419.

353 duration of the period of English rule over Normandy.476 Church edifices in the various parishes around the city reaped the rewards of the benefices that the English bestowed on the local clergy to earn endorsements of the legitimacy of their rule, but civic building had suffered as the local treasury was depleted. Furthermore, many of the suburban buildings that had been demolished during the course of the siege of 1418 and 1419 had never been replaced. The state of the fortifications long remained a point of local consternation, and one that concerned royal authorities as well. The well-placed fear that the English could launch another incursion into France via Normandy and the Seine

River was an ever-present one that the council of Rouen could always use to make the case for royal policies that were favorable to their local economy and the development of their defenses. 477

Thus, while Rouen was not in such dire straits as Montpellier and Lyon after the end of the Hundred Years War, the king and municipal council nevertheless had ample incentive to collaborate to stimulate new growth in a city that was labeled the “mother and metropolitan” of Normandy.478 Since cloth production had long been the most lucrative and esteemed industry in Rouen, and the cloth the local drapers produced the city’s principal export, the reinvigoration and effective regulation of this trade became central to efforts to build up the local economy and the municipal finances that depended

476 Mollat, Commerce maritime normande, 52-57. 477 A particularly noteworthy example of the negotiations about the status of the fortifications as they related to foreigners in the city is, 3E1 Anc. A9 Folio 40v.-42, which explains preparations to the fortifications and additional defensive measures taken before an anticipated English invasion in 1492, that ultimately did not materialize. 478 Following the restoration of French rule in Normandy, Rouen soon regained its role as the center of the duchy of Normandy as well as the seat of the échiquier de Normandie, which served as the sovereign court of the region. The city also became home to the regional administration known as the parlement de Normandie. Though not examined in detail here, these roles helped Rouen to solidify role as an administrative and judicial capital, though the functioning of these institutions remained largely separate from that of the municipal council. On the échiquier, see the Ordonnances de l'Échiquier de Normandie aux XIVe et XVe siècles,

354 on its strength. Within these efforts, the status of forains and gens de dehors became a central issue. Those who had come to take refuge in Rouen from Normandy and other nearby communities in Northern France over the course of the Hundred Years War had carved out roles for themselves within the local economic life of the city, sometimes requiring the protection of royal authorities against locals irritated by encroachments on their traditional privileges. In spite of their strident opposition, the masters of the drapperie ancienne had been forced to tolerate the existence of a drapperie foraine in the city after the king had authorized refugees from his kingdom to work there in 1372.479 In

1424, during his regency over English holdings in northern France and Normandy, the

Duke of Bedford had unified the drapperie ancienne and the drapperie foraine into a single drapperie rouennaise, effectively imposing a formal end to the division between the established corporation of drapers from Rouen, and those who had come from away.

After the English were driven from Normandy, however, the reasons for the initial authorization granted to the forains to work the drapers’ profession in the city—namely, the war and upheaval in the surrounding countryside—were no longer applicable.

Without an immediate impetus for the admission of the forains into the corporation, municipal and royal authorities and the drapers and forains themselves were free to rethink the divisions that defined their trade, their reputation, and their community.

Indeed, the end of the war had recast the issues in the debate about the status of the forains. Most of those who came from surrounding towns to seek refuge and work in the drapers’ trade in Rouen during the early fifteenth century had long since been integrated into the corporation, and the community. Those who had come more recently, after the establishment of a tenuous peace with England in the 1440s, were mainly seeking

479 Mollat, Histoire de Rouen, 139-141.

355 opportunities to take advantage of new prosperity within the city. At first, they enjoyed a clear if challenging path for entering the local drapers’ corporation, which required them to conduct a normal term of three years of apprenticeship before completing a demonstration of mastery. In time, however, another division emerged, as those newcomers who wished to evade the regulation of the corporations developed their own separate branch of cloth production, which was not subjected to the rigorous standards and oversight of the local corporation and the high prices that this entailed.480

The challenges facing the drapers and municipal and royal authorities as they deliberated on the status of this new drapperie were illustrative of the obstacles that urban communities confronted in determining how to integrate immigrants hailing from the kingdom of France into the local economy and community. By moving production to suburban towns such as Darnétal and Martainville, the outsiders who came to work as drapers gained greater flexibility to employ new methods, styles, and colors that deviated from those employed by the tightly regulated Rouennais corporation. Their less strictly regulated and more inexpensive cloth bore a seal with the letter ‘F’, for ‘forensis’, and though this label started as a way to maintain the quality and integrity of the local corporation’s product when faced with inferior competitors, the forains’ product came to have a market as a brand of its own. While the drapperie foraine came to be an important component of the Rouennais economy, the members of the drapperie ancienne of Rouen and the councilors who weighed in on their affairs were keen to ensure that the city could

480 On the history of the drapperie of Rouen, see the work Jean-Louis Roch has done on the subject, and on the forains more specifically, see Roch, “Entre drapperie rural et drapperie urbaine: la drapperie foraine de Rouen à la fin du Moyen Age, Annales de Normandie 48.3 (1998), 212-213, and “La Crise de la Draperie Rouennaise à la fin du XVè siècle de la manufacture urbaine à la domination régionale,” in Mathieu Arnoux and Anne-Marie Flambard Héricher, eds., La Normandie dans l’économie européene au XII–XVIIè siècle, (Caen, 2009), 154-178.

356 maintain international renown for producing soft wool cloth of the highest quality.481 In

1458, when the council faced the decision of whether or not to disband the drapperie foraine and expel its members, they chose to let them stay, on the condition that they would abide by strict standards on quality and close observation by the gardes. The motive for this decision was to ensure that the members of both the drapperie foraine and drapperie ancienne met carefully defined standards, and contributed to the strength of the city’s reputation around France and beyond the borders of the kingdom. 482

The co-existence and competition between the local and forain branches of cloth production within Rouen and its suburbs generated tensions that ultimately came to a head in the final years of the fifteenth century as the city’s cloth industry suffered a decline in reputation and profitability. A widespread change in fashion in France and western Europe more broadly was a principal challenge facing all those manufacturing wool textiles. Deliberating on remedies to take to address the dire state of the drapperie, the council minutes of March 1494 note that “where once the great lords adorned themselves in wool cloth, now they and even others of lower status dress themselves in silk.”483 In fact, the fairs of Lyon played a leading role in promoting this shift, as they made obtaining fine silks from Italy easier and less expensive than ever before.

Furthermore, as silk gained in popularity, methods for producing wool cloth at lower cost

481 Roch, “Entre drapperie rural et drapperie urbaine: la drapperie foraine de Rouen à la fin du Moyen Age,” 212-213, as well as Mollat, Histoire de Rouen, 103-105; 139-141. 482 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A8, f.120-121v. 483 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A9 [Folio not noted- see entries for the assemblies of March 22, 23. “Les grans seigneurs se souloient vestir de drap de layne, et maintenant les seigneur et autres de petit estat se voistent de soyent. Les moulins ostent la vie à plusieurs personnes; et fault fair différence entre le drap foullé au pié et l’aultre au moullin.” An even more stark assessment of the decline of wool cloth in comparison to silk is included in the entry for ADSM 3E1 Anc. A9, June 17, 1493. “Que ceulx de drapperie se plaignent que les bons draps, qui soulloient porter à Paris n’y sont plus receuilliz ne venduz, pour ce que les marchans qui les achtetaient leur ont dit qui n’y en portent plus, car les seigneurs se vestent de soye, et est la drapperie abusée.”

357 and in greater bulk developed as well. Rouennais drapers had traditionally softened and degreased their cloth with labor-intensive foot pressing, but the increasing numbers of water powered pressing mills that had been constructed in the eastern suburb of

Darnétal—an area traditionally occupied by forains excluded from the central markets of

Rouen—had “deprived many of their livelihood” by making the process more efficient.

The supervisors of the local drapperie insisted on the superiority of the traditional method, however, and refused to grant permission for cloth to be processed otherwise by its members. Meanwhile the forains could do as they chose.484

The “great poverty” of a key facet of the Rouennais economy pushed the members of the municipal assembly to walk a fine line as they attempted to balance the interests of the wider community and those of the drapers as they decided on how to regulate production. According to some who weighed in during council meeting, the inability to compete with the lower cost and more efficient mills used outside the city made it impossible for the “poor people of the drapperie of Rouen” to make a living. As a solution, some of the councilors suggested either loosening the restrictions on modes of cloth production so that anyone—local or forain—could use the mills. More drastically, others proposed that the mills should be destroyed to eliminate the great competition that had driven down price. But the members of the assembly did not come to a hasty decision on the matter, instead holding deliberations and consultations with multiple members of the drapers’ profession over the course of more than a year to ensure that they would find an appropriate remedy. Eventually, in December of 1496, royal authorities weighed in on behalf of Charles VIII to advise the municipal assembly about the decline of the

484 On the technical aspects of production in the drapperie of Rouen, which has provided the basis for the explanation here, see, F. Concato, “Sur la technique drapière en Normandie à la fin du Moyen Age.” Annales de Normandie 25.2 (1975), 75-98.

358 drapperie, since the industry provided the foundation for the economic strength of one of the kingdom’s principal cities. To set the drapperie right the king had issued an order that the abuses of the forains should be put to a halt, and that public notification should be given that they would be subject to stricter oversight and potential expulsion.485

Members of the municipal assembly voiced great differences in opinion about how they should respond to the king’s missive. There were some among the Rouennais who agreed that the forains should be subjected to much stricter regulation, or even expelled all together from the city, so that everyone selling cloth would be tightly regulated—this group included the members of the local drapperie. But there were others within the leadership of the city who had wider economic concerns, who continued to urge caution while asserting the need to call a full meeting of the assembly before announcing any ordinances of the king, let alone enforcing them. Several members of the assembly raised questions about the impact that cracking down on the forain drapers would have on the city’s markets and municipal finances. Guillaume Auber, for example, noted that “there was danger in punishing forains for their way of making a living, for they pay the taille, which they would no longer do.”486 In addition to noting the economic benefits the forains offered the city, Auber also noted that subjecting the forains to greater scrutiny could drive them away to sell their merchandise on the markets of Paris, which had offered them enfranchisements from tailles in order to encourage them to bring their skills and come make their residence in the Saint-Denis quarter.487 Guicault de

485 The full text of the debate, including notations about which members of the council took particular positions, is available in ADSM 3E1 Anc. A9, 216-217v. 486 Ibid. “Sire Guillem Auber dit que la matiere est grande et perilleuze à ouvrir en considerant que se les forains este pnez de venir le pais en vaudra moins et y en a des forains corrigez et pugnis... » 487 Ibid. “Guille auber dit que ceulx de paris on offert franchir de taille ceulx de dernestal se ilz veullent aller a sainct denis”

359 Marromme went even further than Auber, citing the example of a man in Rouen skilled in making fine cloth who could not receive the authority from the local producers to do so because he was forain. He even insisted that the council should assert to the king that forains actually attracted marchans estrangiers to the city to buy up cloth, as a testament to their economic value.488 A majority of those whose opinions were recorded in the minutes shared and echoed these concerns. Several suggested resisting the king’s directives to read letters condemning the abuses of forains, because it could stifle the growing interest that merchants showed in the cloth that they were producing and selling on the markets of Rouen.

In the end, the Rouennais council agreed not to disseminate the orders outlined in the letters the king sent to chastise the forains for their abuses, instead preferring to emphasize the value that the inhabitants of Darnétal brought to Rouen. Although enforcing stricter regulations on forains or expelling them altogether may have temporarily eased the challenges facing the local producers, the prospect that stricter regulation of the forains would merely drive them to take their operations and earning power elsewhere prompted the local leadership to side with the forains and offer their protection, in order to guarantee their continued contributions to the economy. Although the local corporation of drapers had long been among the dominant factions in the city, the waning market for their cloth forced the municipal council to remain open to the contributions that the forains could offer to help bring the city to more secure financial footing. Indeed, the debate over the status of forains within the drapperie of Rouen is illustrative of the premier importance that its leaders placed on maintaining the economic

488 Ibid. “Guicould de Marromme dit quil y a en homme qui a fait draps maiz les bononneurs ne ont voullu donner congié de le fouiller et doit on [the council] Regner au Roy que tous forains viennent besogner a Rouen.”

360 strength of the city in the latter half of the fifteenth century. While attending to such concerns, the council also needed to balance the interests of the various factions that called Rouen home, so as to maintain social stability within the community. The struggle between the various local power-brokers from Rouen and the forains from neighboring towns and the surrounding rural areas was a continuous one that had a major hand in shaping the community and the economic recovery of the city.

Some families within the local population fought vigorously to defend the ancient privileges they had been granted, while the newcomers who had left their homes to come to Rouen during the war or seek opportunities there in its aftermath sought to solidify the roles they had acquired within the community. The issues that divided them often came down to issues relating to the allocation of space, and the privileges associated with areas of economic or symbolic significance. In 1455, for example, Charles VII wrote to the

“bourgeois, residents, and inhabitants” of Rouen, who had written an appeal to him asking for his assistance in resolving a dispute between those families who had lived within the limits of the old walled enclosure “from such a time as there [was] no memory of any other way,” and those who lived within the space included in the new walled enclosure.489 The walls had long served as a clear physical boundary separating those

489 AMR, 3E1 Anc. Tiroir 245, non-numbered pact of 1455. This piece is worth including for its great interest for understanding the significance of space and privilege in Rouen, as well as the traditional guidelines that governed them, : “Charles par la grace de dieu Roy de France Savoir faisons a tous presens et avenir qeu comme de grant anciennete les bourgois manans et habitans de nostre ville et cite de Rouen qui est la mere et metropolitaine de nostre pays et duchie de normandie ait par noz progeniteurs predecesseurs este dotee et muneye de pluseirus privilleges franchises et libertez comme de fouaige coustumes barrages estalaiges passaiges travers et dautres franchises et libertez. Dont iceulx bourgois manans et habitans quie sont et ont este demourans dedans lancienne cloison de nostre dicte ville on Joy et use de tel temps quil nest memoire du contraire. Et pour ce que depuis les concession et octroy desdiz privileges et libertez ou ducunes diceulx icelle nostre cite de Rouen a este dilatee acreue et augmentee et est de plus gran encloure espace et circuite quelle nestoit anciennement. et que entre lancienne cloaison et celle qui depuis y a este faite de et reside grant partie des bourgeois manans et habitans dicelle nostre ville et cite lesquelz len na pas voulu ne veult souffrir joye desdis privilleges franchises et libertez dont jouissent les autres residens en lenclux dicelle ancienne closture.“

361 who enjoyed the ability to work and sell goods freely within the local markets, and those who paid fees and tariffs while laboring under tight regulations and restrictions on the quantity and kind of merchandise sold. But the population of Rouen had outgrown the original fortifications, rendering the enclosure outdated as a boundary, and thus forcing new decisions about who counted as a local resident worthy of enjoying the city’s privileges.490

The construction of new fortifications to protect the growing population in the

1450s intensified disagreements about who was actually an enfranchised member of the community, redrawing the boundaries of the city and forcing decisions about whether everyone in the enclosure would enjoy its privileges. Ultimately, Charles VII weighed in to resolve the feud between the old families of the ancient enclosure and the municipal council, which had sided with those living in the space encompassed in the new walls. In his ruling, Charles agreed that the city was to be “one single and same body”, and that since “the [inhabitants] were all subject to the duties of doing the guard and watch, everyone like the other,” they should also enjoy the same privileges and liberties. As a direct result of his ruling, those individuals living within the new sections of the city received full exemptions from taxes such as the fouage (hearth tax), the barrage

(imposed on imported goods), as well as the estalage tax on shops and market stalls. This provision not only extended to those who were staying in the new sections of the city, but also to those “who would like to come stay within the enclosure of the city, outside of the ancient enclosure,” an indication of the increasing openness towards those who wished to come and stay and establish themselves, as well as a recognition of changing demographic realities. In spite of the joint municipal-royal decision to lift or adapt some

490 Ibid., Transcribed n.24.

362 of the older restrictions on who could gain the privileges of residency in the city, the local markets remained carefully regulated and monitored to prevent encroachments and abuses by outsiders.491

In addition to the gradual opening in Rouennais policy towards outsiders hailing from other parts of northern France, the second half of the fifteenth century also witnessed cautious but concerted efforts to renew and expand commercial ties with other polities. Foreign merchants had much to offer the Rouennais, and trading partners from

Castile, Portugal and England in particular would prove to be invaluable to efforts to revitalize the city over the latter half of the century. The establishment of trading ties did not always progress smoothly, and in some cases royal directives were needed to break down the resistance the Rouennais leaders posed on the grounds that their privileges were being infringed upon. Soon after wresting control of Normandy from the English, Charles

VII took the initiative in reestablishing ties with Castile, which had provided a source of support for his war effort. He also established trading ties with the kingdom of Denmark and Norway, although rampant piracy in the North Sea and continued hostilities with

England meant that these only had a limited impact.492 Even the English themselves also came to be important trading partners in the final quarter of the fifteenth century, after

Louis XI reopened trading lines with them in 1475 when his victory over Charles of

491 Ibid. Nous ait este tres humblement supplie et Reques de par les bourgois manans et habitans dicelle nostre ville que eu Regart et consideracion a ce que Icelle ville est ung seul et mesme corps et que tous les demourans en lenclous dicelle sont subgetz les ungs aussi come les autres au guet garde et deffence de ladicte ville et contributifz a tous les autres fraiz que il leur conveneirent porter et soustenir. Nous leurs vueillons octroyer et accorder que ceulx ainsi demourans et qui pour le temps avenir vouldront demourer dedans ladicte ville et encloire dicelle au dehors de ladicte ancienne cloaison soient desormans perpetuellement et a tousiours et pour le temps avenir affranchiz et exemptez de paier iceulx fouaiges coustumes barraiges estalaiges et autres subsides et arguitz et dicelles franchises puissent jouir et user tout ainsi et pareillement que font et on tuse et acoustume faire les bourgois qui son demourans et residens dedans lenclous et la cloaison ancienne de nostre dicte cite. 492 Fréville, Commerce maritime de Rouen I, 280-281.

363 Burgundy set a more definitive end to any ambitions his rivals north of the channel may have had about asserting their claims to the throne. The old ties with the great commercial centers of the Low Countries—Bruges, Brussels, Ghent, Ypres, and Flanders also remained an important source of commerce.493

Whereas debates about policies towards forains in Rouen almost always revolved around considerations relating to the city’s privileges, discussions about policies towards marchans estrangers hailing from foreign kingdoms also needed to take into account the security threats that they could pose and diplomatic issues. After Charles VII reestablished control over the city in 1449, municipal officials in Rouen continued to enforce restrictions on merchants from other kingdoms and domains who needed to pass through their city bringing wine and grain, imposing fines on those who attempted to go up and down the Seine without purchasing a hanse or congié. Well into the sixteenth century, they also continued their policy of tightly monitoring the local supply of grain and restricting exports passing through the city in times of shortage. Not surprisingly for a city that had for so long been on the front lines of conflict between England and France, the leaders of Rouen remained particularly wary of the very real threat of invasions from the north. Merchants speaking foreign tongues could easily become subject to suspicion in a community that was already on edge about the dangers of war. Multiple scares and rumors about potential English invasions led to the occasional imposition of restrictive measures towards all foreign merchants in the latter half of the fifteenth century.

In 1453, for example, shortly after the Valois reassumed control over the city, the seneschal of Normandy—the chief royal lieutenant and judicial officer in the region— warned the municipal council that failure to remain vigilant had jeopardized the entire

493 AMR, 3E1 Anc. Tiroir 245.

364 city. He explained that he knew with certainty, “that three English and others of the language of France who supported the sect and company of the English had entered the city, and found no one at the gates, either when entering or leaving.” Detailing the threat they posed more fully, he explained that “they came to spy as merchants... to survey the fields and find other members of our party to bring as prisoners to Calais.”494 To avoid further incident, the seneschal and the municipal council ordered innkeepers to give notification when any outsiders (estrangers), or unknown or suspicious persons (gens incogneuz et soupçonnez) came to their establishments. Similarly, in 1492, when the

Rouennais received reports that the English were preparing to invade, the city’s leaders deliberated at length about the measures to take to ensure that the population would remain safe in light of the daily comings and goings of English merchants. Several royal officials and municipal councilors urged the expulsion of all estrangers. The king’s legal representative even asserted that everyone in the city should make it known to the

English visitors that “we do not like them at all.” Other municipal councilors suggested a more measured approach and warned against overreacting, and suggested increased record-keeping about the numbers and intentions of outsiders in the city as an alternative.

As the officer in charge of the local defenses, the bailli ultimately decided that the

494ADSM 3E1 Anc. A8, f9-11v. “Ordonné que doresnavant chacun voise a la garde des portes, quant son tour sera et escherra, et en perssone; et si dit mon dit seigneur le grant séneschal, cappitaine, que il a sceu de certain que, il n’a pas granment de jours, que trois Anglois et deux autres de la langue de France, de la secte et compaignie desdictes Anglois furent et entrèrent en ceste ville, et ne trouvèrent ès dictes portes, tant à leur entrée que à leur yssue, aucunes personnes à la garde, lesquelz vindrent en ceste ville pour espier tan marchans que autres de ce parti pour les trouver et gueter sur les champs et pour les mener prisonners à Callaiz....et que telles entrées, veu la male garde desdictes portes se pevent avenir et faire souvent par telz Anglois et leurs complisses, dont grans inconvéniens pourroient avenir. Item fu dit, oultre par mon dit seigneur lecappitaine et delibere. que les hostelliers herbergent estrangers en icelle ville, gens incongneuz, que doresnavant, quant aucuns estrangers, non congneuz et souppeçonnez par iceulx hostelliers se vendront logier cheux iceulx hostelliers, que ilz le viennent faire savoir et annoncer...

365 English would be allowed to stay, but would be required to wear badges, observe a curfew, and travel in the company of a Rouennais companion. 495

Notwithstanding the deterrent that scares about invasions and the resulting security measures could have on commerce, international trade developed apace over the latter half of the fifteenth century, and burgeoned in the sixteenth century. Though sometimes facing suspicions about their intentions, the English continued to import wool and other raw materials such as lumber and iron. But it was Castilians and the other merchants from the Iberian Peninsula who followed their lead who had the greatest role to play in the Rouennais economy in the century following their readmission into the city in 1450. Initially, they faced some resistance from the council, after they reasserted claims that Charles V had granted them exemptions from the hanse on merchandise conducted up and down the Seine.496 The Rouennais leaders fought for and eventually received guarantees that the Castilians would pay for the hanse along with everyone else.

When they saw that such a partnership was advantageous to the local economy, however, the local worked to protect and solidify ties with Iberian merchants. The Iberian

Peninsula, and the Burgos region in particular, provided a source of wool for the local drapers, and merchants from Burgos, Biscay, and Bilbao brought oranges and other exotic fruits, along with a wide variety of Mediterranean nuts. 497 They also provided an alternative source of alum, a mineral used in dying that had long been monopolized by

495 ADSM 3E1 Anc. A9-40-42. There is much to unpack within the rich records of the debate about how to treat the English during fears of invasion, but the statement by the king’s representative Monseigneur de Longpaon, that “it must be shown that we don’t like them one bit”, when referring to the English, provides a compelling illustration of anti-English sentiments. 496 Mollat, Commerce Maritime en Normandie, 122-137; Fréville, Commerce maritime de Rouen, 281-283. 497 On the role of Iberian merchants within late medieval Rouen, see Christiane Douyère, “Les marchands étrangers à Rouen au XVIè siècle: La colonie espagnole à Rouen,” Revue des societés savntes de Haute- Normandie 76 (1974), 28-51, and on the later sixteenth century, Gayle K. Brunelle, “Immigration, assimilation, and success: Three Families of Spanish Origin in Sixteenth Century Rouen,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 20.2 (1989), 204-220.

366 Italians. The Iberian merchants in turn brought back the renowned cloth of Rouen for resale in their local markets and ports further afield. While the number of transactions between Iberian merchants and the Rouennais remained modest in the latter half of the fifteenth century, the partnership between them would prove to be increasingly valuable after the unification of Aragon and Castile and the establishment of networks spanning the Atlantic to the New World, and Brazil in particular.498

Merchants from beyond the kingdom of France and craftsmen and petty traders from neighboring towns and regions thus came to occupy a crucial role within the

Rouennais economy as the leaders of the city worked to promote growth and recovery in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. As protective as the municipal council and the leaders of local industries were about the privileges that had long defined their city, they also recognized the need to adapt to changing economic conditions and take advantage of the resources and networks that increased commercial interactions with England, Spain, the Low Countries, and the colonies of the New World could provide. At the same time, as is clear from the restrictions and surveillance measures they put in place when they felt that their community was threatened or believed that their traditional privileges ignored, their recognition of the value that various outsiders provided should not be mistaken for a warm embrace of their presence. The colonies of foreign merchants who established themselves in Rouen to facilitate trading activities remained small and transient when compared with their counterparts in Lyon, and there was little effort to integrate them into the population, as this would have meant sharing and thereby diluting the value of the privileges enjoyed by established residents. The forains, though eventually accepted

498 On the establishment of trading connections in Brazil, see Gayle K. Brunelle, New World Merchants of Rouen, (Kirksville, MO, 1991).

367 into the community and the local markets, still remained a class apart long after they had first come to take refuge in Rouen during the war. It is true that many members of the municipal assembly were keen to ensure that merchants would continue coming to do business in the city, but there is no indication that they ever granted outsiders a meaningful voice in policy decisions as the Lyonnais consulate had.

In Montpellier, by contrast, the role outsiders had in the community and in promoting local prosperity was central to the identity that the consuls projected in correspondence with the monarchy as they worked to influence royal policy to assist their earliest recovery efforts. As the loss of Normandy to the Anglo-Burgundian alliance thrust the monarchy of Charles VII into even deeper financial turmoil in the 1420s, the hefty sums that he demanded to reinvigorate his war effort prompted the six consuls of

Montpellier to write multiple appeals for relief and exemptions. The text of those appeals repeatedly emphasized both the misery that afflicted their population, and the role that the precipitous decline of commerce had in creating and exacerbating the problems facing their city. In 1427, for example, they complained, “with humbly bended knees before the king, his majesty”, of “the poverty, misery, depopulation, tribulation, and other anguish, in which the city of Montpellier, and the diocese of Maguelone, and all the surrounding lands had been afflicted.”499 As reasons for this suffering, they blamed “the frequent mutations of money, both gold and silver, the diminution of the harvests, and the infrequency or cessation of trade and navigation, which used to be free, due to the

499 AG 336. “...Consules universitatis ville Montispessulani...pro explicando, supplicando et humiliter flexis genibus dicte regie magestati, supplicantibus et requirentibus nunquam denegat assensum, supplicando paupertatem, miseriam, depopulacionem, tribulacionem et alias angustias, in quibus villa Montispessulani, ac diocesis Magalonsis, et alias tota patria circumvicina est posita, tam propter mortalites, que ibidem frequenter viguerent, gencium armorum perseveraciones, monetarum, tam auri quam argenti, frequentes dimenuendo mutacione, mercaniarum, properter viarum pericula, infrequentacionem, sive cessaciones, navigacionis, que esse solebat libera adnihilacionem, seu perdicionem, quam per alia quamplurima, dict patrie inconveniencia atque dampnifera non modicum, ymo in immensum.”

368 dangers of the roads.” They then pleaded for a reduction of their share of the taille of twenty-two thousand livres that he had imposed on Languedoc and Aquitaine, reiterating that the reduction in the value of the French currency had pushed trade into Provence and

Avignon — which were under the sovereignty of the Dukes of Anjou.

The consuls of Montpellier made another, related appeal to Charles VII in 1428, this time requesting that he help to alleviate their struggles by lifting restrictions on the circulation of foreign currencies that he had imposed in order to reduce fluctuations in the value of royal money. Their letter began with an extended and strikingly cosmopolitan testimonial on the benefits and necessity of trade for Montpellier, and all parties involved. They opened the appeal by lamenting the decline of their city from its role as an entrepôt for all the merchandise “that came through the lands of Languedoc, by sea and by land.” Next, they commented on the reduction of the once great diversity of their community, and lauded the role that Montpellier had as an international meeting point.

They then explained that because of the circulation of merchandise in the city, “lands of diverse nations abounded and conversed there, including Germans, Flemish, Aragonese,

Catalans, Spaniards, Genoese, Florentines, Lombards, Piedmontese, and others from other lands and strange countries.” Finally getting to their point, they explained that according to longstanding practices, local merchants from Montpellier served as factors and handled commissions and orders from foreign merchants, just as those merchants did in their own countries for the Montpelliérains. As reasoning for such arrangements, they explained that trade was beneficial because “in one country, some things abound, of which another has none; and so it is convenient that one helps the other, and that one lives with the other; and because the moneys are different within different lands and

369 nations... it is convenient that the merchants of Montpellier, should maintain their accounts, papers, and lettres de change in the currency of their foreign companions.”

Concluding their impassioned plea for international trade and the free circulation of currency, they warned that the foreign merchants would continue to bring their business elsewhere if the restrictions were not lifted.500

Charles VII exhibited a willingness to respond to such pleas from the

Montpelliérain consuls, though he did so with his own interests at heart, and took great pains to emphasize the munificence he showed when he made such concessions. In truth, many of the merchants based in Montpellier had never followed the royal ordinances forbidding the use of foreign currency, preferring to risk fines and penalties imposed by royal authorities rather than drive away valued business partners from abroad. The king expressed his displeasure about the transgressions, but chose to show leniency on the grounds that doing so would help the city to meet the tax burdens that they so regularly tried to shirk. He also acknowledged the “mortality that had been in the city for sixteen years, and was again present,” as well as the overall impoverishment and desolation

500 AMM Louvet 1215 provides richly detailed proclamation the benefits of commerce for Montpellier and its trading partners, and the necessity of free exchange of currency for the ease of trade between merchants of different countries, and is thus worth transcribing in full here: “Receue avons l’umble supplicacion de noz bien amez les consulz habitans et singuliers de nostre ville de Montpellier, contenant que ladite ville a este ou temps passe le chef et le principal reppaire de la marchandise se fasoit au pais de Languedoc par mer et par terre, et par la frequentacion de ladite marchandise y affluoient et conversoient gens de diverse nacions, si comme Almens, Flamens, Arragonnois, Cathelans, Espagnolz, Jenevois, Florentins, Lombars, Piemontois, et dautres pais et contrees estrange, et consequeement par la coustume ancienne, encores y a aucunement cours ladite marchandise, et ont les marchans de ladite ville de Montpellier des compaignies, factories, et commandes de marchans estrangiers, et sembablement les marchans forains font en leur pays pour iceulx de Montpellier aucunes factories; car l’un pais habonde en aucunes choses dont les autres nont point; ainsi convient que l’un secoure lautre et que les ungs vivent avec les autres; te pour ce que selon les pais et nacions, les monnoies sont diverses, et chacun veult faire son fait et son compte, jouxte la monnoie de son pais et nacion, il conveint necessairement que lesdiz marhcns de Montpellier facent leur compte, livres papiers, lettres de change, et autres choses touchans ladite marchandise au nom et au compte de la monnoie des pais et nacions dont sont leur compaignons marchans foraisn; car se autrement estoit fait, lesdiz marchans forains se estrangeroient, et cesseroient la communicacion de ladite marchandise entre eulx, que seroit grant dommaige a nous et a la chose publique de nostre royaume.”

370 within the city. In spite of such sympathetic assessments, the decision to lift the ban on foreign currency may have been influenced by resignation about the practical challenges of enforcing his will. Ultimately, Charles agreed to lift the restrictions on the free circulation of foreign currencies in the city for a period of two years, on the condition that the local merchants and factors would make every effort to change those moneys for the royal currency. Whether they actually did so is doubtful. Regardless, the back-and-forth provides an early illustration of the conflicting strategic interests and motivations that shaped efforts to stimulate a recovery within Montpellier over the course of the fifteenth century. The consuls of Montpellier saw the reestablishment of a welcoming commercial climate as a solution for the great problems their city faced. As was the case in dealings between the monarchy and Lyon, royal authorities were mainly concerned with their régime’s fiscal stability and military strength.501

As the Montpelliérains struggled to meet the demands of royal taxation and sustain their economy during the 1420s, the consulate began to take more proactive and sustained measures to stimulate recovery, tailoring their strategies to the local conditions they faced. Reinvigorating lucrative trading partnerships was always a top priority, but the consuls also recognized that the city as a whole needed a strong economic foundation to build on if it was to once again become a premier center for Western Mediterranean trade. Recall here that the number of taxable households within Montpellier had been reduced from a total of 4,520 in 1367, to a mere 334 by 1412, with both epidemics and emigration to more secure and less financially burdensome destinations in Provence or

501 Ibid.

371 the Kingdom of Aragon driving the precipitous population decline.502 A ghost town that had been absented by many of those merchants who had the wherewithal to leave hardly presented an inviting destination for trade, particularly with concerns about epidemics and the perils awaiting highway travelers persisting. Wealthy merchants who were interested in establishing their operations or their residences in Montpellier also had good reason to fear that they would be subjected to crushing tax burdens if they settled in a city with such a drastically reduced population, since royal impositions were rarely adjusted swiftly to account for demographic change. The consulate thus took aggressive measures to encourage immigration. They sought not only to attract wealthy settlers, as was the primary objective in Lyon: they also wanted to draw in any individuals who could contribute to the size of the population and the economic strength of the city.

An announcement that the consulate of Montpellier issued in 1432 offers a succinct and illuminating description of a central component of the strategy the city’s leaders took to stimulate economic recovery. Addressed to “all foreign persons (toute personne estrange),” on behalf of the consuls, the advertisement urged everyone, “of whatever estate, condition, or land they may be from” to come and take up residence in

Montpellier, “whether they be bourgeois, merchants, minstrels, laborers, or other persons of honorable living, along with their wives, children, and servants.” The consuls also encouraged interested individuals to come speak to them directly, because they would be willing “to hold them free and exempt from all charges of the said city, for the span of six years, counted from the day when they came to live in the city, without any difficult or

502 Germain, Histoire du commerce à Montpellier, 51. See above, Chapter 2, on the effects of emigration on Montpellier.

372 contradiction whatsoever.”503 The generosity of such exemptions at a time when the local population faced crippling taxes and the usual burdensome obligations to offer service in the night watch and fortification efforts is quite remarkable. On the one hand, the consuls’ stated willingness to offer exemptions to any newcomer—regardless of their wealth or social status—can be seen as a simple testament to the sheer desperation that they felt as they tried to buttress the finances of a badly faltering population. But it also attests to a willingness to take a long view of the strategic interests of the city, and a flexibility about adapting the boundaries of the community to meet the shifting challenges that it faced. In addition, the policy reflects a recognition of the fact that

Montpellier needed individuals from an array of backgrounds to replace the departed, so long as they were “of good life.”

The precondition that the newcomers to Montpellier should be of good and honest reputation was longstanding and central to the approach that the city’s leaders took to preserving the integrity of their community, even while accepting strangers into their midst. The solicitation of reports about the character of new settlers in fact formed a critical part of the formal process through which they received their authorization to reside in the city, a process about which we are well informed. The record of the proclamation that the Montpelliérain consuls disseminated in 1432 did not mark the beginning of their efforts to attract new settlers from beyond their city limits, with the first confirmable traces of the policy appearing in 1424; the likelihood is high that it had

503 AG 335. “De par les consulz de la ville de Montpellier, faiz on a savoir a toute personne estrange, de quelque estat ou condition et pais que ce soit, que vueille venir demourer et faire son habitation en la dicte ville de Montpellier, soient bourgoiz, marchans, menestayralz, laborers, et autres personnes de bonne vie, eulx, leur femmes, enfans et mesnages, viengent parler ausdiz consulz; car eux tenront francs et quittez de toutes charges appartenant a ladicte ville, jusques a six ans, a compter du jour qu’ils vendront demourer ou fair leur habitation en la dicte ville, sanz contrediction ou difficulté aucune.”

373 first been implemented even earlier. Two volumes, each labeled, Liber affranqiumentorum, offer an indispensable source on the process by which new settlers were formally integrated into the community, as well as a richly detailed record of who responded to the incentives for new settlers. Included within two bound registers, as well as a dossier of loose manuscript leaves, these records list the names of individual immigrants, the diocese they originally came from, and their profession, before providing succinct assessments of their reputations. For the first register, spanning the period from

1424-1441, 286 individuals answered the consuls’ appeals to come and settle in

Montpellier.504 A second register covers the period from 1469 to 1553, with 259 receiving the formal authorization to come and live in the city before the end of the fifteenth century.505 At least two dozen records survive for the intermediary period between 1441 and 1469, but it is impossible to provide any meaningful assessment of how many new arrivals there were, since these consist of loose folios.506

There were changes in notaries’ styles of record-keeping between 1424 and the last enfranchisement of 1553, as well as adjustments to the terms and durations of specific exemptions and the order and detail in which they were recorded, but the basic process for winning admission into Montpellier and the reasons the consuls gave for granting generous exemptions to new settlers remained largely unchanged over this period. The first surviving enfranchisement, which authorized one John of Bruges to make his residence in Montpellier, includes the key components that would characterize

504 AMM, BB 278. 1424-1441. The script used in this register is a challenging but legible Latin hand, but some of the enfranchisements are partially or fully obscured by water damage to the tops of the unnumbered folios. 505 AMM, BB 268. 1469-1553. This volume is in better condition than BB 278, although the variations in the individuals scripts used by the multiple notaries who compiled the register poses paleographical challenges. 506 AMM, BB 277. These folders also contains several noteworthy pieces on the status of étrangers in seventeenth century Montpellier.

374 these authorizations for the remainder of the fifteenth century. Almost all the records began by listing the name of the individual who was being enfranchised as a member of the community, along with their occupation and the diocese they hailed from. In the case of John of Bruges, the record notes clearly that he was originally from the diocese of

Limoges in central France—unfortunately, the occupation listed for him is obscured by water damage. After offering this introductory information about the individual receiving exemptions, the full form enfranchisement outlined the provisions the consuls were offering to newcomers and their reasons for doing so. The act also explained that the consuls agreed to grant the same privileges, franchises, and liberties, that would be granted to true inhabitants. This they did because “they were desirous to increase the population with good and honest persons.”507 The consuls made their determinations about the quality of a person’s character by asking respected witnesses to give their assessments: the record of John of Bruges’ admission into the city noted that the consuls had heard many “laudable testimonies of his good reputation.”

The character clause within the enfranchisement was an essential precursor to the exemptions that the consuls offered to settlers, as their policy of encouraging outsiders to come and reside within the community would only achieve its objective of rejuvenating

507 The entry in BB 278, Folio 2 for the affranchissement of John of Bruges establishes the basic formula, as follows: “Cunctis fiat manifestum per honorabilis et nobilis viri...consules universitatis ville Montispessulani... cupientes dictam villam bonis et honestis personis et habitatoribus augmentari et fore populatem, considerantes quis per quantis pluribus prvileges franchesis et liberatibus ipsius ville persone par dictos alios consules in veros incolas et habitores eiusdem ville. Recipiende utentur et gaudebunt, tanto melius et libentius mansionem suam continuam in dicta villa facient, cum alibi domicilium suum eligere possent. Ea proprter ipsi domini consules, pro se et sucessoribus suis consulibus Montispessulani, audito a multis laudabili testimonis de bona fama et conversatione honesta Johannis brugerrii ibidem presentem Requierentem stipulantem quis Recipientem Receperunt et tenore preesentis publici instrumenti recepiunt in civem fine incolam et habitatorem faciendo in eadem villa utantur et gaudeat ombnibus et singulis privilegiis concedenis habitatoribs et incolis dicte ville montpli...Preterea volumis et concesserentur voluntque et concedit ipsi domini consules dicto John Brugerii ut super stipulanti... sub pactis et conditionibus infracsriptis, quod idem Johannis sit liber quictus et immunes per bonis suis mobilibs dum taxat a solutione et contribution quarumcunque talliarum, subsidiruom et indicitonum, impositarum et imponendarum per dicots dominos consules et eorum sucessores in presnti villa Montispessulani...”

375 the city if the new inhabitants did their part to help. Although the contributions of foreign merchants and the diversity of the local population had often been a source of

Montpelliérain pride, municipal officials had plenty of experience in dealing with outsiders who did not wish to do their part to help the city meet its burdens. Those who owned property in Montpellier but did not reside there permanently—an arrangement that merchants often had in place in order to facilitate their transactions—had long resisted the burdens imposed on local property holders, on the grounds that they were not members of the community. In 1405, for one of many examples, the consuls had been forced to appeal to King Charles VI for the authorization to demand payments from the

“Genoese, Venetians, Catalans, and other merchants of strange language, who rent certain houses, and do great business in the city.” They complained that these individuals not only wanted to “pay nothing at all, for their fair part and portion” of two aides that the king had imposed on Montpellier to help pay for his war effort, but also failed to contribute to the other financial burdens on the city. The king granted their request and ordered that all who held property in Montpellier should contribute to its tax burdens. But this did not settle the question permanently. Local officials regularly struggled to enforce this ruling and find ways to track down and extract payments from those outsiders who evaded their demands.508

In light of the resistance that they had faced in ensuring that the prominent contingents of outsiders within their community met their obligations, the consuls were keen to ensure that the new residents they recruited were truly committed to Montpellier,

508 AMM Louvet, The appeal to Charles VI notes that the consuls of Montpellier had created a commission of 20 people, “pour plus justement et loyaument asseoir sur un chascun sa part et porcion selon leurs facultes et chevances, neantmoints plusieurs Genevoiz, Veniciens, Cathelans, et autres marchans d’estrange langue, qui toutesvoyes demeurent en certaines maisons qu’ilz tiennent a louaige, et marchandent grandement, et font tres grant fait de marchandise en ladicte ville, ne veulent paier ce a quoy.”

376 and not likely to abuse the generous exemptions they offered to attract them. Under the provisions outlined within the enfranchisement, newcomers received between three to ten years of exemptions from the burdens of paying local and royal taxes and fees. They were also discharged of the responsibilities of contributing military service for the night watch and militias. These incentives were contingent upon the fulfillment of a promise to stay in

Montpellier for a period of at least ten years. After the exemptions expired, the immigrants were required to do all the duties expected of other permanent residents. To ensure that they would not leave before they had begun to contribute to the economic recovery of the city, their past exemptions would be declared void if they departed, obliging them to pay for all the previous contributions that they would have owed had they not received the city’s generous dispensations. To enforce this requirement, the consulate required new settlers to provide a deposit upon their admission to the community, which they would forfeit if they left without notification. The value and nature of these securities varied, and was seemingly correlated with relative wealth. But even with these safeguards in place, the consulate was keen to find people who they could rely on to be honorable members of the community who would keep their commitments and contribute their skills, money and unyielding allegiance to Montpellier.

In addition to seeking testimonies from respected local witnesses, and taking a security deposit to ensure that the newcomers would stay, the consuls also required all of those who received the enfranchisements to prove their worthiness to the city by taking a solemn oath, in which they swore allegiance to the king of France and pledged to defend the community and uphold its values. The full text of the oath is written out on the opening folio of the first of the two volumes of the enfranchisements and is commonly

377 included in the same form in individual grants of exemptions.509 Notably, the oath is the only portion of the texts of the enfranchisement that is written in the local , rather than the notarial Latin usually used to record information about the new settlers (in exception cases they were recorded in Occitan). The link between language and identity seems obvious here, with the Occitan oath providing a nudge for the new settlers to assimilate and communicate their commitment to Montpellier in its local tongue. Of course, we do not know if the immigrants actually had to take the oath in

Occitan, or what standards their linguistic skills were held to if so. We should also be wary of jumping to conclusions about the complex question of the significance that

Occitan carried for the Montpelliérains of the fifteenth century, a period that saw the consulate gradually begin to maintain more and more administrative records in the royal

French rather than Occitan.510 At the same time, varied municipal records and chronicles in Montpellier commonly distinguished those individuals who were “of strange tongues,” signifying the importance of language as an identifying attribute. The fact that the oath was in Occitan thus seems to present another testament to the endurance of local conceptualizations of identity.

509 BB 268, Folio 1. The full text of the oath read as follows: “Aquest sagraman fan aquels qu se meton en la communalez et al Consolat de Montpellier. Yeu home jure fizentant a nostre senor lo Rey de fransa e senhor de montpellier dayssi avant quia los autres homes de montpellier li an jurat. Et jure a vos senhors consols de montpellier, recebons per la communaleza de montpellier. Et a tota la universitat de montpellier et acad(—) de la universitat estaria valensa mantenensa et deffend. de totz homes e encontra totz homes. Et promet et commet salvar et gardas bien fizelment et deffendre las personas et las causas dels habitans de montpellier presens et endevenidors et tot aquo que perten ho pertendra a la communaleza de Montpellier dais et defforas. Et promet comient a vos senhors consels de montpellier presens et endevendiros que en totas causas que pertanehn o pernheran a la communaleza de Montpellier bon et fizel et hobedien vos seray. Totas questas causes et cadanna tenray et garderay a bona fe, salva la fizentat de nostre senher lo Rey. Si dieu me a. aquestz santz evangelis de dieu salvas las costumas et las franquesas et las libertatz els uses de montpellier et cascuna de las causas subredichas juradas.” 510 Thanks to Benoît Soubeyran, of the Université Paul-Valéry in Montpellier for sharing his master’s thesis, “L'écrit occitan dans les Inventaires et Documents des Archives de la ville de Montpellier (1350- 1550),” (Master’s thesis, Montpellier, 2013), which studies the shift from Occitan and Latin to French in the later fifteenth and early sixteenth century, and for generously sharing his thoughts on these issues with me.

378 The full text of the oath illuminates the layers of identity and obligation that immigrants promised to embrace upon their reception into Montpellier, and in doing so helps to explain the meaning of community in a city that was trying to fill holes within its population by bringing in new members. The opening line of the oath of allegiance required for the enfranchisements asked recipients to begin by swearing loyalty to the

“rey de Fransa.” This is not surprising, since the Montpelliérains were subject to the

French monarchy, after all. But the oaths went into even greater detail about the expectations that the consulate had for what the newcomers would contribute to the community. They swore to the “lord consuls of Montpellier” that they would “uphold and maintain the community, and defend and meet all men who came against it.” They also agreed “to promise and commit to safe-guarding the interests of the inhabitants of

Montpellier, and those who were to come, well and faithfully.” Finally, they swore that they would remain faithful and obedient to the consuls, and uphold and defend the king in good faith.” The pledge was sealed by a commitment that the recipient would always honor the “customs, franchises, and liberties of Montpellier.” Together, all of these promises provided assurances that the new residents who were entering the community were not just there to take advantage of the economic opportunities that the city had granted them: from the substance of the oath, the message was clear that they were to become full-fledged members of the community. Whereas foreign merchants, bankers, and the diverse array of intermediaries who came to Lyon for the free fairs usually remained within autonomous ‘nations’, the Montpelliérain consulate emphasized permanent settlement and integration into municipal affairs and daily life.511

511 See above, n. 44.

379 The individuals and families that answered the consuls’ call for new settlers came from diverse locations and economic backgrounds. Eventually, the present author plans to compile detailed quantitative information on the geographic origins and professions of the new settlers who came to take advantage of the incentives the consuls offered. The challenges posed by water damage, the sheer volume of droits d’habitanage, and the challenging notarial scripts used in the records rendered a complete quantitative assessment infeasible for the purposes of the current study. Yet some interesting conclusions can be offered based on thorough review of the material. All of the enfranchisements were granted directly to men, and it was men whose character and reputation was assessed for worthiness of the community. But the recipients of the enfranchisements were authorized to bring their wives and families with them. Indeed, it was assumed and encouraged that they should do so in order to promote the repopulation of the city. If an outsider had married a Montpelliéraine, this was taken as ironclad proof of an intent to remain and commit to the community. Approximately two thirds of the enfranchisements preserved within the first volume covering the years between 1424 and

1441 were granted to men who were coming from other dioceses within the kingdom of

France. As was the case with John of Bruges, who came from the diocese of Limoges, a majority of these individuals came south from dioceses in central France, although others came from as far away as the diocese of Rouen to take advantage of the generous privileges that Montpellier offered.512

The war that ravaged northern and eastern France and the écorcheurs who roamed freely through the center of the kingdom during the waning years of the Hundred Years

War likely provided the impetus for many families from these regions to leave their fields

512 These assessments are based on the records of AMM-BB 268 and BB 278.

380 and workshops to look for better conditions further south. Montpellier was of course not immune to these perils, but experienced the effects of this phase of the war more through the crippling financial burdens that the Valois monarchy imposed to compensate soldiers and fund the war effort. The incentives that the consulate offered insulated newcomers from these burdens, and also afforded them a respite from the financial and military responsibilities they shouldered within their own villages and cities elsewhere in France.

It should be noted that other inhabitants of Languedoc were not permitted to come to

Montpellier to take advantage of those privileges: allowing such a move could have further diminished the populations of other neighboring communities, which would have been a detriment to the entire region and a source of contention with the leaders of other cities. The consulate was keen to attract wealthy merchants from abroad to help reinvigorate commerce, but a majority of those who dared to make the perilous journey to

Montpellier from further afield in France between 1424-1441 were of a more middling status—craftsmen such as rope makers, dyers, carpenters and embroiderers. Laborers and farmers were among the professions most commonly listed professions among the recipients of the enfranchisements. Individuals from such backgrounds likely had the most to gain and the least to lose by leaving their homes to seek out relative safety and better economic conditions in Montpellier.

Although the incentives the consulate offered were most effective in attracting craftsmen, artisans, and laborers, they also drew in some wealthy opportunists and entrepreneurs who were keen to exploit the convenient location that Montpellier still provided for Mediterranean commerce. The names of Italian merchants and factors appear sporadically within the records of the enfranchisements, but far more Catalans

381 opted to make the trip northwards and settle down. The historical ties that Montpellier had to the kingdom of Aragon and the similarities between the Catalan and Occitan languages likely eased their transition. The contributions of those who came from beyond the borders of the kingdom were already highly valued by the consulate at this stage. It was the great financial mind of Jacques Coeur, however, that provided the greatest boost to the local economy during the first half of the fifteenth century, simultaneously vaulting

France into a more prominent role in trade with the eastern Mediterranean. There is no record of a habitanage awarded to Coeur, but his arrival in Montpellier in 1432 followed soon after the announcement that the period of exemptions that newcomers would enjoy would be extended from three to six years. After settling in, he made preparations to journey to Damascus, where he negotiated arrangements to open commerce with the east with the Sultan of Egypt, initiating trade with Egypt and the Levant. Due to the dominance of the Genoese and Venetians, merchants from France had previously relied on their costly services as intermediaries. The ties that Coeur established allowed

Montpelliérain merchants to establish a fleet of a dozen ships bringing goods directly to and from the east.513

A vibrant trade in luxury goods including eastern spices, drugs, and textiles burgeoned out of the connections that Jacques Coeur established from his center of operations in Montpellier after his arrival in 1432. The rival port of Marseille suffered from the insecurity and economic cost inflicted by the military campaigns that the ruling family of Provence, the House of Anjou, was conducting to reclaim the Kingdom of

513 Kathryn Reyerson’s biography of Jacques Coeur offers excellent analysis of his contributions to the Montpellier economy, drawing on her extensive knowledge of the city. On his early years in Montpellier, see especially, Jacques Coeur, 51-52. See also, Alexandre Germain, Histoire du commerce à Montpellier 2, 23, 373—380.

382 Naples. Its decline as a principal port within the Western Mediterranean provided an opening for Montpellier to reclaim a role as a commercial leader in the region, and direct trade with the Levant and Egypt provided them a means for doing so. In addition to protecting these connections, the consulate worked to facilitate transactions within their city in order to encourage merchants to keep coming to do business. At the urging and with the financial backing of Coeur, they worked to build a central lodge for merchants that would rival those in the ports of rival Italian commercial powers. The building was finally completed in the mid-1450s, and the richly decorated if simply structured two- chamber facility served as a source of local pride as well as a welcoming and convenient gathering place for those who wished to do business. Jacques Coeur’s fall from grace in

1455 dealt a blow to the financing for the project—not to mention the Mediterranean trading networks he worked so hard to cultivate and maintain. But when it was finally complete, the lotge des merchans embodied the consulate’s strategy of revitalizing

Montpellier by facilitating trade and encouraging outsiders to come back to do business.514

The challenges that other cities posed to the economic revival of Montpellier ensured that its leaders would remain in consistent dialogue with royal officials as they worked to secure privileges that would put them on an equal footing with their rivals by making their city a welcoming place for trade. Of course, the consuls had every reason to continue to work to revive their own community: the local population desperately needed revenue to support the burden of the tailles, and many of those who directed the consulate stood to benefit personally from the revitalization of commercial ties. In many cases, the

514 The funding and construction of the lotge des marchans is detailed in the pièces justificatives of Germain, Histoire du commerce, 375-383.

383 consuls needed to win their king’s approval for the measures they wanted to take to repopulate Montpellier and stimulate invigorated trade. The succession of kings who reigned over France in the latter half of the fifteenth century showed themselves to be amenable to many of their requests, since they too had good reason to listen and display flexibility. It is doubtful whether we should put much stock in the reasons they stated for showing leniency and generosity towards Montpellier in fiscal matters—their grateful acknowledgements of the loyalty of the population or their sympathetic assessments of the crises they faced. For the monarchy, helping Montpellier to rebuild was simply good fiscal policy. Even while directing their greatest energies into Lyon and Marseille, which had recently demonstrated such exciting potential, Louis XI and Charles VIII also recognized that Montpellier could once again provide an invaluable source of revenue if it could be restored to even a shadow of its former greatness.515

With hard-won royal support, the consuls of Montpellier took a succession of additional measures to repopulate and revive their community in the latter half of the century, all of which focused on making the city more attractive to outsiders who wanted to come and settle and trade. The early efforts to stimulate immigration had hardly been a failure, having attracted 286 tax-paying families into a city that had fallen to a low of some 330 families at the beginning of the century. But the influx of newcomers who responded to the city’s incentives had not been sufficient to reverse its decline as a commercial center, particularly as Montpellier confronted new challenges from Lyon and

Marseille. For this reason, the consuls intensified their attempts to attract immigrants and reinvigorate foreign trade. As they did so, they remained cognizant of the fact that the establishment of greater security in and around their city was an essential pre-condition

515 Gandilhon, Politique économique de Louis XI,

384 for success. The threat that merchandise could be taken from its proprietors and their intermediaries under the sanction of letters of marque and reprisals had always endangered free exchange; as seen in Chapter 4, attempts to minimize these concerns had played a central role in the consuls’ efforts to preserve their trade networks in times of crisis. As they worked to promote a recovery and overcome the blow dealt by the royal acquisition of Marseille by Louis XI in 1481, the consuls sought even more comprehensive protections to be extended to merchants who wished to come to the city.

To that end, they wrote to their new ruler Charles VIII in 1483, asking him to prohibit royal authorities and private merchants from other cities in the kingdom from claiming the right of reprisal or acting on letters of marque against merchants entering and leaving

Montpellier.516

The king granted their request, but the problems that arose in the implementation of this new exemption illustrate the multiple challenges that the Montpelliérains faced as they worked to promote recovery through increased trade and immigration. After receiving confirmation from Charles VIII that “all merchants and other persons, of whatever nation or condition, aside from those of Languedoc, who wanted to come and stay in [Montpellier], could come and do so freely without anyone harassing or molesting them during their sojourn,” the consuls dispatched messengers to encourage people to come and take advantage of these new assurances. They made announcements in the kingdoms of Valencia and Majorca, and in Italy and Catalonia, among others, “to attract

516 The text of this exchange between Charles VIII is included in multiple manuscripts within the Montpellier Municipal archives, including BB 277, Dossier II, and Louvet 1574—among others—attesting to the long-term importance its provisions had for commercial policy and recovery efforts. For the transcriptions and analysis below, I have used Louvet 1574, which is in superior condition and probably among the earlier copies of the original correspondence. Alexandre Germain noted that the original was included in the Grand Chartrier of Montpellier, in Armoire F. Cassette V, N°46, although I was unable to find it under this listing by cross-referencing with the Louvet index.

385 and draw people into the city.” These seem to have had the desired effect on those who heard them. The enfranchisements from the latter half of the fifteenth century include the names of dozens of Catalans of varying professions, as well as the occasional Spanish,

Portuguese, or Italian merchant. But while Catalans were among those who most frequently responded to the Montpelliérain incentives, the new settlers’ compatriots also remained among those most frequently implicated in acts of piracy and privateering sanctioned by the kings of Aragon. This made Catalan immigrants a target for the marques and reprisals typically authorized when the perpetrator from a given polity could not be brought to justice. Even when strictly prohibited by royal proclamation, such practices did not die out easily, as Montpelliérain officials quickly found out.517

The success of the consuls’ efforts to attract newcomers to their city depended not only on their own work to make their city welcoming, but on their ability to ensure that regional nobles and royal officials did not interfere with those efforts. This proved tricky.

An incident between Pierre Simoneau, a merchant from Fontenay in Poitou, and one

Domp Francisque de Tourelles of Barcelona in 1485 jeopardized the work the

517 AMM Louvet 1574. “Charles par la grace de dieu Roy de France. A tous ceulx qui ces presentes letters verront salut. Comme tantost après nostre avenement a la couronne informez de la pouvrete et depopulation en quoy nostre ville de Montpellier estoit devenue. A fin de icelle repopuler. Nous des le derneier jour de fevrier mil cccc quatre vignt et trois. Ordonasmes a noz tres chiers et bien amez les consulz bourgeois manans et habitans de nostre dicte ville de Montpellier par noz lectres deschartes et pour les causes a plain contenues en icelles. Que tous marchans et autres personnes de quelque nation ou condition quilz feussent excepte ceulx de languedoc qui vouldroient venir demourer en nostre dicte ville le peussent faire franchement. Sans ce que pendant le temps qu’ilz y seroient leur demourant ni ailleurs en notre Royaume on les peust Inquieter ou molester soubz coueleur de queleconques marques contremarques ou reprisailles qui apres ledictes octroy pourroient estre laxées et declairees ? Entre les villes communetez et marchands particulieurs de leurs nations et contrees dont ilz seroient aussi partiz et deslogez pour venir demourer en nostre dicte ville de Montpellier. Lesquelles lectres decharte iceulx consulz et habitans en toute dilegence ont fait publier es Royaume de Vallance et Maillorque ce pays dytalie de catheloigne et autres ou meulx leur a semble le faire pour atraire et tirer gens en ladicte ville a moyen de laquelle publication et des privileges exemptions et libertez declairez esdictes lectres de chartes. aucuns marchans cathelans et autres gens de barcelonnes riches et puissans sont desca venu habiter audict Montpellier et autres qui se sont deslogez et departiz des villes et lieux ou ilz demouroient et sont encores sur les chemins pour y venir faire leur residence soubz esperance dudictes privilege et denjoir et vser...”

386 Montpelliérain authorities had done to draw new settlers into their community. We have no details about the dispute, but it culminated in a decision by Charles VIII to issue letters of marque against the Barcelonan merchant’s compatriots from Catalonia. On this basis, the royal lieutenant in the region, the Seneschal of Beaucaire, seized a different merchant from Barcelona, Jacques Vernegail, who had already been granted a habitanage and accepted as a legitimate inhabitant of Montpellier. The consuls had received guarantees that new settlers would be protected from marques six months before

Vernegail’s seizure, and they had announced these protections widely to reassure people who were coming to live in their city. Appealing to the king, they said the actions taken against Vernegail were “to the great prejudice and damage of Montpellier and

Languedoc,” lamenting that his arrest had undermined confidence in their promises of protection. The consuls complained bitterly that the episode caused the failure of their efforts to “to attract Catalan merchants and other rich and powerful people from

Barcelona, some of whom had already left their homes to enjoy the privileges

Montpellier offered, and some of whom were already on the road to make their residence there.”518

518 AMM Louvet 1574 (cont.), Le seneschal de beaucaire ou son lieutenant par vertu de certaine marque par nous octroyez a pierre Simoneau marchant de fontenay le conte en poictu en lencontre de domp franscisque de tourilles demourant a barcelonne et autres subgectz dudict lieu et principaulte de catheloigne. Sest efforce de fait prendre au corps Jaques Vernegail marchant natif de barcellonne et japieta fertu pour habitant en ladicte ville de montpellier selon la teneur dudict privilege. Jatoit et que dicelluy et de la reception dudicte Vernegail en feust lors faicte obstention audict leiutenant dudict seneschal. Lequel ne voult differer de proceder a lexecution dicelle marque qui estoit donne octroy de faire retraire et garder lesdictes marchans et autres estrangiers de venir demourir et eulx habiter en nostre dicte ville de montpellier. Laquelle exemption ne doit preiudicier ne desroguer contre la teneur desdictes privileiges. Actendu quilz estoient ja obteniz six moys auparavant ladictes marque et execution dicelle. Qui a este faicte ou tres grant prejudice et dommaige de nostre dicte ville de Montpellier et pays de languedoc pour ce que tous marchans estrangeiers advertiz et doubtans ladicte marque on differe et different venir marchandamment oudict pays et y faire descharger leurs marchandises. Mesmement ceulx de la nau et barque de Roddes et boleniez de ballante. Lesquelz puisuagneres venoient deliberez pour fair leur dechargment au port daiguesmortes et sen sont retournez deschargez ailleurs.

387 In an appeal asking Charles VIII to rein in his subordinates and order them to respect the exemptions that he had granted six months prior, the Montpelliérain consuls explained that the marque had not only damaged their efforts to attract new settlers, but their work to promote international commerce as well. Successful merchants needed to be adaptable to avoid the new dangers that awaited them on different routes, and opportunistic if they were to fully exploit the opportunities that awaited as cities competed for their business. In dealing with a merchant clientele that was necessarily fickle, the consuls knew the impact that any whiff of danger could have on trade.

Reiterating that the imprisonment of Vernegail was “to the great prejudice and damage of

Montpellier and Languedoc,” they explained to the king that “all foreign merchants, informed and warned about the said marque, have declined or are declining to come trade in this land, and to import their merchandise.” They emphasized that the damage done by the failure to respect the city’s protections from marques had not only deterred the

Catalans to whom they applied, but also merchants bringing cargo coming from further away. To buttress their claims, they mentioned specific vessels from Rhodes and

Valencia that had unloaded their goods elsewhere after planning to disembark in the port of Aiguesmortes. As a result of the application of the marque, they concluded, the flow of merchandise through the entire Languedoc region to the rest of the kingdom had been severely diminished.

The appeals that the Montpelliérain leaders made in this case ultimately helped to bend royal policy to favor their efforts to repopulate the city and promote commerce by establishing a more favorable climate for foreigners: at the desperate urging of the consulate, Charles VIII agreed to confirm and extend his ban on the application of

388 marques, counter-marques, and reprisals in Montpellier, “for consideration of the good love and loyalty [the inhabitants of Montpellier] had shown him, and so that they would inclined to persevere and continue as good, true, and obedient subjects.”519 His response to their appeal specifically noted that no one was to disturb any foreigner who came to reside in the city of Montpellier. Moreover, he ordered that the protections for new settlers and merchants coming to Montpellier should be widely advertised and announced in any affected cities. Obtaining royal support on this matter was a major victory for the consuls and their efforts to promote recovery through trade. Even with these royal protections in place, however, they still needed to contend with stiff competition, and they required the king’s help as they tried to reestablish their community as an inviting place for trade. As the fairs in Lyon continued to grow in economic reach and reputation in the 1470s and 1480s, they increasingly became the main event for merchants traveling from Europe and around the Mediterranean. The rise of Lyon as the center for the spice trade in France, and the accompanying decline of spice imports to Mediterranean ports as

Italian traders came to rely on overland routes, dealt yet another blow to Montpelliérain commerce.520

Instead, the Montpelliérain leaders intensified their efforts to stimulate trade by working to obtain privileges to hold fairs of their own in 1487. As their Lyonnais counterparts had done, the consuls of Montpellier framed their request for authorization to hold fairs by emphasizing the specific local attributes that made their city an

519 Ibid. 520 In his letter to Montpellier granting authorization to establish new rules for the new drapperie in 1493, Charles VIII specifically noted the detrimental effects that the fairs of Lyon had on Montpellier, noting that “les foyres de Lyon,.. leur ont osté le traffigue et art de la marchandise, ou grant prejudice des previleges et libertez dudit pays de Languedoc”. Germain, Histoire du commerce II, Pièces justificatives CCXXV, p. 426. .See also Cholvy, Histoire de Montpellier, 148.

389 advantageous location for commerce. To convince Charles VIII to show Montpellier the same favor that his father Louis had bestowed on Lyon, they emphasized the history and convenience of Montpellier as place for trade, and the hardships the inhabitants had endured to support the Valois. Specifically, they asserted that their city was “one of great and ancient renown, in which there was once great exchange of merchandise, at which time, the city was constructed and built up with many beautiful and sumptuous houses of cut stone, mostly vaulted, and fournished with boutiques for the protection of merchants and merchandise.” They also noted that ships from “all nations” came daily to the nearby port of Aigues-mortes, bringing spices and other food items and goods from the east. To offer reassurance that the fairs would bring money into the kingdom rather than facilitating its departure, the consuls of Montpellier lauded their own region of

Languedoc as a fertile producer of valuable products such as grain and wine. Apparently convinced by these points, Charles offered the city privileges for two fairs spanning eight days each, leaving the consulate with wide authority to hash out specifics— though he attached the stipulation that they should not coincide with the fairs in the Pézenas and

Montenac, which were the largest in Languedoc.521

The fairs of Montpellier had some limited success, and eventually supplanted those in Pézenas and Montenac as the premier events in Languedoc. They never achieved the same draw as those in Lyon, however. This was at least partially attributable to the fact that the consulate never managed to extract such a generous set of privileges from the monarchy, with their two fairs of eight days in duration paling in comparison to the

521 On the development of the fairs of Montpellier, and their status in relation to those of Pézenas and Montenac, see Jean Combes, “Les Foires en Languedoc au moyen âge,” Annales 13.2 (1958), 231-259, esp., 252-259. The requests for the fairs and the royal responses are transcribed in the Pièces justificatives of Alexandre Germain, Histoire du commerce II, 404-414.

390 four fairs of fifteen days each in Lyon. Moreover, by the time the consuls of Montpellier had initiated their effort to win fairs of their own in the late 1480s, those in Lyon were already well-established, and the advantages and disadvantages of the periods of free trade that they provided for had been extensively and hotly debated. It was thus unlikely for any city to receive the kind of privileges needed to compete with those that protected the fairs of Lyon. The Montepelliérain consuls remained persistent in their efforts to draw

Mediterranean merchants back away from Lyon, but by the mid-1470s they had already begun to hedge their bets and consider alternatives to commerce as they worked to stimulate revival. Having long relied on Mediterranean trade as a source of wealth, the consuls seem to have grown increasingly aware of the fragility and fickleness of those networks as their distance from the glory days of the early fourteenth century increased.

Commerce was always seen as the swiftest path to revival, but the consuls also recognized that a strong production sector could provide a more stable foundation for growth, and cloth production was one of the most consistently productive industries in

France. Rouen and to a lesser extent Lyon had long served as prominent centers for cloth production, and benefited from these roles. Montpellier lacked such a strong reputation in production, though the city did enjoy a strength of its reputation for fine scarlet dyes. The resplendent fabrics they made were a niche product rather than a basis for an economy, however.

To lay the groundwork for the establishment of new industry in Montpellier, the municipal leaders of Montpellier wrote to Louis XI in January of 1476 to request authorization to create a cloth production industry, “like those in the cities of Rouen and

Bourges.” Production in these centers was carefully regulated, with their manufacture,

391 pricing, and distribution closely controlled to ensure consistent quality. It was in the best interest of the king to ensure that the reputation of all textiles exported from France remained strong so that the prices paid and the revenues earned on tariffs would remain high. It was thus necessary for the Montpelliérain consulate to seek out royal sanction as they sought to create a drapperie. In their request, they once again reiterated the great need of the city, lamenting that their city “had once been greatly populated and inhabited by many notable merchants, and men of diverse estates, abounding with riches and goods.” Emphasizing their particular need for royal aid, they painted yet another bleak picture of the situation within their community, explaining “the mortalities that been current within the kingdom, and specifically within the land of Languedoc, and wars, divisions and the passage of men-at-arms, along with the great burdens imposed for the affairs of the kingdom, such that the city was so diminished and impoverished, both in people and in wealth, that half the houses are uninhabited.” They proposed the establishment of a drapperie on the grounds that the city needed to have “great circulation of people” if it was to be repopulated, and that this could not be achieved

“without some new art or craft.”522

522 AMM, Grand Thalamus, fol. 178-178v. Transcribed in Alexandre Germain, Histoire du commerce, 387-388. “Receue avons l’umble supplicacion de noz chiers et bien amez les consulz bourgoiz, manans et habitans de nostre ville de Montpellier, contenant que nostre dicte ville, qui est assise en tres bon et fertil pays, soloit estre fort peuplée et habitée de plusieurs notables marhcans, et autres gens de divers estatz, habundands en richesses et biens, et a present, et puis aucun temps en ça, a l’occasion des mortalités qui ont eu cours en nostre royaume, et especialment en nostre pays de Languedoc, et des guerres, divisions, et passages de gens d’armes qui ont esté oudit pays, et aussi des grans charge qu’il leur a convenu et convient chascun an porter, pour subvenir aux tres grans et urgent affaires de nous et de nostre royaume, icelle nostre ville est tellement diminuée et apouvrie, tant de gens que de chevance, que la moitié des maison d’icelle ne sont habitées, et laquelle chascun jour se diminue et apouvrist grandement; et pour ce qu’elle ne peut estre bonnement rasseurée ne repeuplée sans grant frequentation de peuple, a quoy ilz ne pourroient parvenir sans avoir aucun art ou mestier de nouvel en ladicte ville, iceulx supplians ont advisé entre eulx de faire mectre sus en nostre dicte ville de Montpellier le fait et art de drapperie, qui leur semble le plus convenable pour aidier et remectre sus icelle ville...

392 The consulate of Montpellier recognized that their local population would need outside help to cultivate a drapperie that could compete with the ancient cloth production centers elsewhere in France. Of course, in making their initial request to the king to authorize a new production in 1475, they emphasized that their city already had enterprising inhabitants and suitable geographic conditions that would make their new enterprise a viable one. They asserted that Montpellier was perfectly positioned to produce fine cloth, with a little river with clean water running just past the suburbs. They also boasted of the “daring” inhabitants who had already begun to take advantage of these resources. But the consuls did not hesitate to admit that they would benefit from the others who would come to take work cloth in the city if authorized to do so. In fact, they asserted that those who came specifically to work in the trade would help Montpellier to

“populate and enrich itself.” They also framed their appeal by noting that the surrounding region had the resources to support a drapperie, but that the wool and other raw materials that they had offered were usually taken away and processed in Italy because there was no local industry. It was thus imperative for the Montpelliérains to attract competent craftsmen who could establish the standards and uphold the regulations that would ensure consistent quality in the cloth they produced.

The idea of drawing in competent outsiders to assist in the establishment of cloth production in Montpellier in 1476 was not a new one: as early as 1444, the consulate had offered privileges to Catalans who would come to share their expertise in cloth production, in early attempts to redress the effects of epidemic and population decline.

These efforts had never culminated in the establishment of a strong industry of cloth production, however, and the new initiatives undertaken in 1476 seem to have had little

393 initial impact. But the consuls of Montpellier continued to pursue cloth production as a mode of recovery all the same. To facilitate the establishment of the industry, and to establish order as new immigrants came to advance the profession, they convinced

Charles VIII to grant authorization to establish a corporation of certified drapers governed by strict regulations to ensure that their city would meet the same standards that applied to drapers elsewhere in France in 1493. Under the terms of the provisions he granted, the corporation and the regulations that they were to abide by were specifically based on those of Rouen, which was described as “the principal [city] of the art of drapery.” To achieve the goal of competing with the established northern rival, and matching its standards, the consulate established strict regulations outlining the precise requirements for cloth manufactured in the city and sold under its label. With silk supplanting wool cloth as the most popular textile sold within markets in France by the

1490s, the Montpelliérains also hedged their bets by working to establish silk production to rival that of Tours.523

The regulations that governed the new wool cloth and silk industries in

Montpellier emphasized quality and rigorous oversight, and this in turn necessitated continued efforts to draw more experienced and skilled workers into the city from away, as the local population lacked sufficient expertise in these areas. The terms of 1493 established a commission of “a certain number of men notable and knowledgeable in the said art, that will be named the Surposez, who will have the power to monitor cloth production and what goes on within the work of the draperie, and to correct faults and

523 AMM, Grand Thalamus, fol. 202 r. See also the excellent section on cloth production in Montpellier in Cholvy, Histoire de Montpellier, 128-131.

394 abuses.”524 Perpignan had long been a center of cloth production, and was the closest and most natural source of expertise for new officers to oversee cloth production in

Montpellier. The city had been a part of the kingdom of Aragon until 1463, when it was forcefully taken by Louis XI, but in an effort to stabilize the southern border of the kingdom before campaigning in Italy, Charles VIII had restored Perpignan to Aragonese control in 1493—the same year as he sought to instigate further growth within the drapperie in Montpellier. With Perpignan reintegrated into the kingdom of Aragon, the need to ensure that Catalan merchants would not be subjected to marques and reprisals took on added importance: yet in spite of their best efforts to offer reassurances and enticing privileges, the consuls of Montpellier had never managed to fully overcome the uncertainty and fear instilled by the reprisals visited on those Catalans who had answered their calls for new immigrants in 1483. Thus, while some hardy expert drapers from

Perpignan did make the move to the east to Montpellier to establish workshops there, the consulate never succeeded in attracting a critical mass that would enable the production of cloth on a scale that could rival other urban centers such as Rouen in terms of quality and price.

Ultimately, the leaders of Montpellier had only limited success in their efforts to stimulate growth and repopulation by encouraging skilled drapers to come and set up shop in their city. The cloth they produced was generally regarded as middling in quality, although some products, such as blankets, found markets beyond the local and regional fairs of Languedoc. Perhaps it was simply too late to develop a corporation that could rival the sophistication and longstanding reputation of a city like Rouen; perhaps the

524 AMM Grand Thalamus, fol. 202.

395 Montpelliérain leaders’ inability to enforce royal edicts prohibiting the harassment of

Catalan merchants en route to their city prevented the kind of influx of foreign expertise that was needed to help it truly take off. Whatever the case—and the answer to that question is one worthy of future research on the Late Middle Ages— the population of

Montpellier entered the sixteenth century without having enjoyed a major demographic or economic recovery from the dark years of the middle fifteenth century. It was not for lack of trying. Time and again, the consuls had appealed to their rulers to establish privileges and exemptions that would allow them to attract outsiders from elsewhere in

France, and foreign merchants from all over Europe and beyond to not only trade but also settle intheir city. Faced with the combination of frequent mortalities and slower birth rates, immigration and trade ostensibly provided much speedier and more readily achievable solutions than waiting for the plague to abate and birth rates to improve.

Conclusion

Montpellier, Rouen, and Lyon all followed very different models of recovery as their leaders worked to rebuild from the crises of the Late Middle Ages, all of which met with very different results. The leaders of all three communities continued to deal with concerns about epidemics, famines, and invasions over the course of the latter half of the fifteenth century. Many of those threats were in fact credible, and the dangers they posed real. But the municipal administrations that so often played the foremost role in defining the social boundaries of communes and determining who could enjoy their privileges also had to prioritize economic considerations. Whatever privileges they enjoyed, and whatever autonomy they had over their own affairs depended in part on their ability to

396 maintain stability and the financial strength that was needed to maintain security and the independence of their communal administration. This in turn dictated that municipal leaders needed to compete with one another to draw in the merchants and inhabitants who could help them build their markets and meet their financial obligations to the king.

Competition played a principal role in determining what form their efforts revitalize the economy would take. In Lyon, the effort to catch up with and eventually surpass

Geneva’s fairs drove the consulate to seek and advocate ever-more extensive privileges with the monarchy in order to share in the fairs’ success. In Rouen, competition for limited resources, including not only living space, but spots on the market stall solidified divisions between locals and forains: the need for recovery forced the leaders of Rouen to set aside those differences, while also working to solidify other trading partnerships with foreign powers. In Montpellier, competition with Marseille and Lyon forced the consulate to try a series of measures to make the city more welcoming, prosperous and secure.

Within the competition for the attentions of foreign merchants, geography undeniably played a leading role in determining who would have the upper hand. Lyon,

Rouen, and Montpellier had all risen to prominence because they had served as commercial centers within various trading networks, but the structures and functions of those networks had shifted significantly by the latter years of the fifteenth century, in ways that permanently changed the dynamics of community within those cities.

Providing an easy point of access between France, Italy, Burgundy, Germany and the

Low Countries during the dawn of the Renaissance and the rise of the printing press,

Lyon benefited from the best fortune of any of the bonnes villes in France. But the city’s

397 leaders were also savvy enough to find ways to take advantage of this position, so that these benefits would not be bestowed upon another location. Rouen had always enjoyed a position of authority and control on the Seine River, but in the sixteenth century, proximity to the Atlantic made it perfectly positioned to serve as a point of connection between Paris and inland France, and the markets of Spain, England, and the New World.

These benefits could not fully overcome the deleterious effects of the rise of silk as the luxurious alternative to the wool cloth that the Rouennais had always depended on. But connections to the Brazilian trade, and access to Brazilwood in particular, allowed the drapers to adapt their products to both drive and respond to the latest trends. In spite of their determined efforts, the Montpelliérains suffered from their inability to offer as much convenience to foreign merchants as Marseille, which was both closer to Italy and more squarely on the coast. The decline in Mediterranean trade with the rise of the

Transatlantic networks also impacted Montpellier adversely, at least initially.

As much as competition, geography, and changing market forces shaped the policies that municipal authorities in Montpellier, Rouen, and Lyon implemented towards outsiders as they worked to promote recovery, the values and identities around which those communities had been built and structured for centuries remained highly influential. In Montpellier, the consulate resolutely promoted exemptions and privileges for foreign merchants and outsiders because they believed that the reinvigoration of commerce was the most expeditious solution for the problems of depopulation and decline that they faced. The free flow of commerce and the congregation of “diverse nations” had been central to daily life within Montpellier before the decline of the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and it remained a key component of the identity that its

398 leaders projected long after the role it played as an entrepôt had been effectively eliminated. Well-versed in the travails of war, the Rouennais tended to remain leery of the intentions of unfamiliar individuals, and protective of the ancient privileges that so many from the surrounding countryside and neighboring towns jealously coveted.

Nevertheless, the city's leaders recognized the benefits of trade and the prolific manufacturing and selling power of the forains who clustered in the suburbs around the city. For the Lyonnais, a proud tradition of sophisticated banking provided the perfect foundation for international fairs that would take advantage of this infrastructure and facilitate exchanges and credit transaction for merchants moving all over Western

Europe.

Where competition, geography, and identity all played central roles in determining what strategies municipal leaders advocated to address their specific local challenges, the final form and effectiveness of those strategies was also determined by whether or not they could win the king’s endorsement and his support in dealing with the plethora of petty lords who were subject to his jurisdiction. Because efforts to promote immigration by individuals journeying over the borders of the kingdom or across the boundaries of different regions within France could affect the realm as a whole, local authorities often needed not only approval but support from the king—usually in the form of safe-conducts and exemptions from the droit d’aubain and other royal taxes. Calls for new immigrants to come settle or trade also needed to reach and inspire the appropriate audiences, who in turn had to take on the often great personal risk of moving themselves, their business interests, and their families. Without sufficient interest from outsiders seeking to exploit the privileges offered to them, efforts to stimulate trade and

399 immigration would have been snuffed out at an early stage. Those who did respond to such incentives often faced a choice of becoming fully integrated into the city and eventually taking on all the duties and financial obligations that membership entailed, or simply remaining apart from the community and retaining independence to move independently and the ability to influence policy decisions. Indeed, as much as municipal leaders wished to shape the fates of their cities as they worked to guide them through recovery, the success or failure of their efforts to promote commerce and immigration was also determined by the desires, fears, and agendas of those they viewed as outsiders.

400

CONCLUSION

Over the course of the one hundred and fifty years spanning from the plague pandemic of 1348 to the conclusion of the fifteenth century, urban communities around the kingdom of France underwent dramatic change as their leaders and inhabitants responded to demographic decline, immigration, and persistent economic upheaval. In many ways, the boundaries that had separated the privileged inhabitants of cities from the outsiders who came looking for safety, work, and trouble became more porous and fluid as local authorities worked to guide their populations through outbreaks of disease, famines, and decades of war. The charters and craft regulations that had for so long delineated how newcomers would be treated could not fully accommodate the needs of cities that faced heavy mortality and migrations that overturned their local populations.

New policies were needed to establish order and maintain stability as communities dealt with the challenges these changes posed. Municipal leaders worked to honor the traditions and legal structures that had governed their communities and defined their privileges, but they also needed to deal with outsiders on a case-by-case basis, as they worked to determine who would be helpful or detrimental to their efforts to navigate crises.

This comparison of medieval Montpellier, Lyon, and Rouen has illustrated the wide range of local needs and economic conditions that shaped how the leaders of these cities made determinations about how to redefine the meaning of membership within their communities. The precise solutions that they decided on and implemented varied

401 greatly as a result of their differences, and the effectiveness of the measures that they took was often determined by geographic, economic, and political factors that lay outside of their local control. Decisions made in royal and ducal courts placed limits on the options that were available to municipal leaders as they worked to guide their communities through crises and help them to rebuild. The military and economic strength that cities gained over the course of the Hundred Years War afforded their inhabitants some leverage and influence over policies towards outsiders from other parts of France, and those who came from beyond the kingdom. In the final years of the Hundred Years

War, the consolidated strength of the monarchy and the central institutions that Charles

VII developed in response to the demands of war and a quarrelsome aristocracy forced municipal leaders to take on a more deferential posture. Nevertheless, they continued to vigorously debate the status of outsiders and the roles that they would have within their cities, and they advocated relentlessly for the strategies that they believed to be essential to the survival and growth of their communities.

Undeniably, concerns about security were of primary importance to deliberations about whether and how newcomers should be welcomed or turned away, particularly during and in the short-term aftermath of epidemics, famines, and military conflicts.

When urban communities faced such conditions, the ability to identify and observe potentially dangerous strangers took on special importance. On an official level, the burden of this task fell to the city gatekeepers and the owners of inns and taverns, who were in the best position to evaluate those who came and left. There are few records to illuminate how units such as neighborhoods and parishes may have contributed to efforts to monitor outsiders during times of turmoil; the requirement that new residents who

402 wanted to immigrate to Montpellier should find two local witnesses to vouch for their character confirms that such networks of familiarity were at least essential in establishing trust and positive economic partnerships. One suspects that their role went far beyond this. Some groups of outsiders, specifically the transient poor, were always subject to fear and suspicion, and the treatment they received when they came to cities seeking alms ranged from charitable to hostile, depending on the conditions reigning in the countryside. Similarly, whichever side they were ostensibly fighting for within the dynastic struggle for France, soldiers tended to be seen as a menace, particularly when they spoke languages that could not be readily understood by the local population.

While concerns about the security threats that outsiders could pose never went away, over the long term, municipal leaders refined their strategies for balancing economic relationships with the need for self-protection. Indeed, examination of shifting policies towards outsiders over a hundred and fifty year period confirms and fills out the developing portrait of late medieval societies as profoundly adaptive and resilient in the face of crisis. The centrality of trade and industrial production to urban economies and municipal finances dictated that cities could not sustain an exclusionary stance towards outsiders indefinitely. Municipal leaders worked to ensure that their cities could grow both demographically and economically by bringing in people who could help to revitalize their economies. Wealthy merchants and bankers who could help to establish networks for the trade in luxury goods were almost always among those that municipal leaders were most keen to attract. The leaders of Lyon and Montpellier aggressively promoted and defended their strategies for drawing in foreign money as they worked to reassure the king of the merit of their strategies for attracting new trading partners and

403 settlers. Their efforts helped to revitalize these two cities, even if the Montpelliérains ultimately enjoyed less sustained economic and population growth. Because of the position of control Rouen occupied on the Seine, its leaders could afford to be more selective about which merchants they allowed to do business within their communities, and what they allowed them to bring through their city. The need to maintain the good faith of trading partners provided an important backdrop for those discussions, as the merchant elite of Rouen recognized that they depended on their hospitality in foreign ports, and profited from the wealth that visitors brought to the local markets.

The relationship between local craft corporations and outsiders was a perpetually complex and charged one that was often complicated by the fact that many of the workers who came to cities seeking protection and opportunity were coming from neighboring towns or other parts of France. As such, they benefited from the weight of the promise of their king’s protection. But the specific monopolies and working regulations within individual cities could in practice inhibit their efforts at earning a living. From the perspectives of local craftsmen and municipal leaders, the loosening of protectionist measures could further destabilize important industries and sources of revenue in a period when cities could ill afford to sacrifice any source of wealth. At the same time, demographic decline and the demands imposed by war and famine often forced urban communities to set aside their reservations and their working regulations and embrace any who could fill the demands of paying taxes to the king. Over time such compromises contributed to the realignment of entire industries, as was the case with the drapperie of

Rouen. An influx of luxury goods imported by foreign merchants could also destabilize the operations of local craftsmen by promoting changes in taste. For the wealthy

404 members of the consulate of Lyon, imports of luxury fabrics, medical drugs, and assorted foodstuffs for the fairs were a boon. But for clothmakers from Lyon and the Lyonnais region who made traditional woolen textiles, the surging popularity of silk spelled a decline in demand and revenue.

Looking at other cities in the kingdom of France and elsewhere in Europe would unquestionably illuminate other challenges that urban communities faced as they worked to navigate crises, and other strategies for achieving a balance between self-protection and openness to beneficial outsiders. This is itself a key point. As the case studies offered within this study show, late medieval communities cannot be lumped together as intrinsically xenophobic and irrational, but must be closely analyzed to understand the complex local power dynamics and the wider political, geographic, and economic forces that shaped decisions about how the lines of community would be drawn. Hostility towards religious, geographical, and social “Others” may have been among the common responses to calamities in the short-term, but over the long run, the survival and prosperity of urban communities also depended heavily on their leaders’ success in developing sensible policies that could convert the energies of population movements and evolving commercial networks into demographic and economic growth. Of course, in making the case that a fundamentally pragmatic and self-interested approach played the greatest role in shaping the ways that urban communities treated the varied outsiders who entered their cities, it is important not to swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction, and paint cities as centers of tolerance and forward-thinking. Dirty looks and heated verbal exchanges rarely leave traces within the historical record, and much work remains to understand the views and experiences outsiders who came to late medieval

405 cities seeking shelter and opportunity during times of crisis. The reasoning of municipal authorities surely mattered little to exhausted refugees and desperate journeyman when they were left out in the cold or barred from working in their chosen profession.

But in considering the legacy of the Late Middle Ages, and the contributions that efforts to survive and rebuild from crisis made to the transition into the early modern period, it is important to take municipal authorities and the inhabitants of cities on their own terms, and hear out their explanations of the motives that guided their decisions.

Faced with hardships and upheaval on an unfathomable scale, city leaders left a record of a long and often bitter struggle to adapt to the radical changes that were taking place within their cities, their kingdom, and their commercial networks. The picture that consistently emerges from city council minutes, local chronicles, diplomatic exchanges, and financial records is one of communities that would do whatever was necessary to ensure their survival—whether that meant shutting the gates on the king’s mercenaries or refugees from the next town over, or inviting Italian and German merchants into their cities to enjoy exemptions from taxes and military duties. Royal authorities exercised significant influence over the strategies that municipalities implemented to address the many challenges that they faced in the Late Middle Ages. But the focus on the early development of the nation over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has too often distracted from the solidification of the urban identities and civic pride that came to exercise significant influence during the Reformation and the French Wars of Religion.

While the changes that mortality and immigration caused within urban populations led the boundaries of local communities to become more fluid in the sense that they were more regularly and more readily modified, frequent confrontations with crisis and its

406 aftermath also forced municipal leaders to decide on and articulate the priorities that defined their cities more clearly. Examination of those priorities and the rationales that municipal authorities offered for their policies towards outsiders illustrates both the complexity of urban communities and the necessity of comparative research.

407

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