Robert R. Bowie, Richard H. Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. New York and Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1998. x + 317 pp. $49.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-19-506264-9.
Reviewed by Richard V. Damms
Published on H-USA (April, 1999)
The end of the cold war and the demise of the duce the most meticulous study to date of the for‐ Soviet Union has brought forth a wave of scholar‐ mulation of Eisenhower's basic national security ship seeking to explain how the United States and policy between 1953 and 1954.[1] Based on thor‐ its allies engineered victory. Here, the authors ough research primarily in the Eisenhower and make the well-reasoned case that Dwight D. Eisen‐ Dulles papers, and drawing on Bowie's personal hower deserves a share of the credit for success‐ recollection of events in the National Security fully crafting a winning strategy. In their view, Council (NSC) Planning Board, the authors pay Eisenhower devised "the frst coherent and sus‐ particular attention to the development of NSC tainable cold war strategy" suitable for the basic 162/2, the frst comprehensive statement of the conditions that would prevail for the next three new administration's cold war strategy. decades (p. 3). Although they accept that the Sovi‐ In the most original section of the book, the et collapse and peaceful resolution of the cold war authors detail Eisenhower's and Dulles's critiques owed much to the internal problems of the Soviet of President Harry S. Truman's national security system and the recognition by Soviet leaders of policies. Until 1950, they argue, Eisenhower gen‐ the need for reform, Eisenhower's New Look con‐ erally endorsed Truman's containment strategy tainment strategy nevertheless "provided the in‐ and collective security policies. Indeed, as Army dispensable external context for producing that Chief of Staf, temporary chairman of the Joint outcome" (p. 258). Chiefs of Staf (JCS), and then the frst supreme al‐ Authors Robert Bowie, former director of the lied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Or‐ Policy Planning Staf in John Foster Dulles's State ganization (NATO) forces, Eisenhower had been a Department, and Richard Immerman, a self-con‐ minor participant in many of the key national se‐ fessed Eisenhower revisionist who has written curity debates of the day and bore responsibility and edited several important works on Eisenhow‐ for implementing Truman's policies. But the out‐ er and Dulles, have pooled their talents to pro‐ break of the Korean War and the adoption of the H-Net Reviews alarmist NSC 68, calling for an expanded military Europe at the expense of Asia and the developing establishment, troubled Eisenhower. He became world, and adopting a static containment strategy increasingly concerned about the apparent disar‐ that preserved the status quo and frustrated the ray in Truman's policymaking procedures and the legitimate aspirations of oppressed peoples. long-term implications of an open-ended contain‐ Dulles advocated a dynamic policy of liberation, ment policy. What was required, he believed, was to be achieved primarily through propaganda and a coherent strategic concept based on "a realistic psychological warfare means, backed up by a examination of threats, objectives and priorities, more explicit emphasis on nuclear weapons to de‐ and an objective appraisal of the means and sup‐ ter general war. Such a strategy would throw the port required to achieve them" (p. 42). Truman's Soviets on the defensive and hasten their demise. team had failed to grasp that "the purpose of During the 1952 campaign, Eisenhower glossed America is to defend a way of life rather than over his fundamental disagreements with the iso‐ merely to defend property, homes, or lives" (p. lationists in his own party by making few refer‐ 45). Based on his own military experience, he had ences to foreign afairs and allowing Dulles to a healthy skepticism of dire intelligence assess‐ write the Republican foreign policy platform. ments. He had also witnessed frsthand the devas‐ In the second part of the study, the authors tation wrought on the Soviet Union in World War analyze Eisenhower's policymaking procedures. II and believed that Soviet leaders would not de‐ "Eisenhower believed that careful and integrated liberately risk a similar confagration that might planning, systematic exposure to diverse points of jeopardize their regime. If the United States and view and the broadest range of available informa‐ its allies could carefully husband and exploit their tion, methodical review, and efective teamwork resources, project an air of resolve, and maintain and coordination were essential for making poli‐ unity behind a long-term containment strategy, cies that best serve the national interest" (p. 256). the Soviet system would ultimately collapse under To that end, he reorganized and reinvigorated the the weight of its own internal contradictions. NSC. He established a Planning Board, composed Dulles's critique, meanwhile, derived from his of the chief planning ofcers in each department varied diplomatic experiences and his study of or agency, to draft policy statements for NSC dis‐ philosophy. A veteran of the Versailles peace con‐ cussion and presidential approval and to identify ference and a student of Henri Bergson, Dulles "splits" between agencies requiring resolution. He came to believe that change was inherent in the set up an Operations Coordinating Board to en‐ international system and that enlightened states‐ sure compliance with NSC decisions, and appoint‐ men had to make progressive adjustments and ed a special assistant for national security afairs promote global integration in order to preserve to oversee the new bureaucracy. In order to en‐ peace and security. As the British and French had courage his advisers to take a broader view of na‐ apparently failed to learn this basic lesson, the tional security, Eisenhower required each policy onus was now on the United States to champion proposal to include a budgetary annex, and fre‐ peaceful change and mobilize the free world quently invited the budget director and chairman against the communist threat. Like Eisenhower, of the Council of Economic Advisors to join the he defned national security broadly to include treasury secretary in the NSC's deliberations. military strength, economic power, world opin‐ Eisenhower, himself, presided over the weekly ion, and moral force. "Peace," he wrote, "must be meetings and promoted freewheeling discussion. waged just as war is waged" (p. 65). In his view, The authors make the now familiar argument that the Truman administration had failed by focusing Eisenhower devised Operation Solarium (the too narrowly on military power, concentrating on mid-1953 exercise when administration ofcials
2 H-Net Reviews stafed out three alternative strategies of contin‐ long-term investment in national security. Indeed, ued containment, nuclear deterrence, and aggres‐ in the developing world, NSC 162/2 committed the sive rollback) to foster consensus among his ad‐ United States to progressive change in order to visers for his preferred strategy of containment. short-circuit attempts by the Soviets to capitalize The last third of the book details the cold war on frustrated nationalist aspirations. strategy outlined in NSC 162/2, adopted in October Understandably, given the relatively narrow 1953. Eisenhower explicitly rejected NSC 68's des‐ focus on 1953-54, the authors are overly generous ignation of 1954 as the "year of maximum danger" in their assessment of the New Look and its impli‐ and its prescription for coercing the rollback of cations. As they occasionally acknowledge, the Soviet power. Rather, he viewed the Soviet threat various provisions enshrined in NSC 162/2 could as a long-term one that would require a free not always be reconciled in practice. Eisenhower world strategy sustainable by the United States authorized covert operations in Iran and and NATO over the "long haul." The New Look Guatemala to achieve short-range objectives that therefore stressed a return to the original contain‐ clearly undermined reformist national aspira‐ ment concept, collective security, and increased tions in both countries. These "successful" opera‐ reliance on nuclear weapons both to deter a gen‐ tions generated false confdence in the efcacy of eral war and to allow economies in defense covert action as a diplomatic tool. Operation AJAX spending. It also endorsed a forward defense begat Operation PBSUCCESS which begat the Bay strategy for NATO, advocated greater European of Pigs. Similarly, the same policymaking proce‐ cooperation and integration, and favored mea‐ dures that the authors praise for airing diverse sures to promote international trade and econom‐ opinions and generating consensus for presiden‐ ic growth. Dulles achieved his dynamic policy tial decisions actually stymied Eisenhower's arms with a commitment to "liberation" by peaceful control initiatives. Strong bureaucratic resistance means, primarily through stepped up psychologi‐ by the Department of Defense, the JCS, and the cal warfare eforts against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Atomic Energy Commission consistently frustrat‐ but both Eisenhower and Dulles ruled out the ed Eisenhower's halting moves toward even a lim‐ more aggressive military rollback plans contem‐ ited nuclear test ban agreement. Despite Eisen‐ plated by the JCS as being unnecessarily provoca‐ hower's occasionally eloquent ruminations on the tive and dangerous. Finally, Eisenhower's deep arms race and the horrors of nuclear war, more‐ concern about the dangers inherent in the nucle‐ over, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile mush‐ ar arms race led him to support limited arms con‐ roomed to some 18,000 warheads by the end of trol measures that might reduce the risk of war his presidency. To ascribe this increase, as the au‐ and ease the economic burden of armaments. thors seem to do, mainly to Truman's expansion Despite the new emphasis on balancing of production facilities is disingenuous. Readers means and ends, Eisenhower made clear that he interested in examining the New Look beyond would not sacrifce security for solvency. While 1954 might beneft >from Saki Dockrill's more endorsing the idea of a major redeployment of comprehensive Eisenhower's New Look National ground forces from Europe and Asia in principle, Security Policy, 1953-1961 (New York: St. Martin's he agreed to postpone such moves indefnitely for Press, 1996). the sake of maintaining allied cohesion. Similarly, These reservations aside, Waging Peace pro‐ he refused to countenance the massive reductions vides the most sophisticated discussion of the gen‐ in foreign aid programs favored by Budget and esis of Eisenhower's national security policy to Treasury ofcials, arguing that they were a wise date. While the authors' conclusions regarding the
3 H-Net Reviews ultimate wisdom of Eisenhower's New Look strat‐ egy remain open to debate, the book will become required reading for all students of Eisenhower and the national security policymaking process. Notes: [1]. See, for example, Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Inter‐ vention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); idem, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomat‐ ic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; and idem, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999). Copyright (c) 1999 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected].
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Citation: Richard V. Damms. Review of Bowie, Robert R.; Immerman, Richard H. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. H-USA, H-Net Reviews. April, 1999.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=2992
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