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Allen Dulles Dead at Age 75 R- 3I - CO Allen Dulles Dead at Age 75 r- 3i - CO. By Don Oberdorfer Was11Illgton.20444341,11WrIter Allen W. Dulles, the most creative, powerful and emi- nent American intelligence of; ficer of modern times, died of complications of pneumonia late Wednesday night at Georgetown University Hospi- tal. He was M. The grandson of one Secre- tary of State, the nephew of another and the brother of still another—the late John Foster Dulles—he was the Nation's foremost intelligence operative during World War II, working from Switzerland. As director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1953 to 1961, Dulles presided over some of the most brilliant suc- cesses and some of the worst embarrassments of American espionage. Dulles did not establish the CIA, but he professionalized it and transformed it into one of the boldest and most impor- tant instruments of national power. Under his direction, the CIA conceived, constructed and flew the 11-2 spy plane and the spy-In-the-sky satellite, using them to photograph Russia's growing nuclear arsenal; tun- neled under the Berlin Wall; toppled a Communist from power in Guatemala with guns for his enemies, and overthrew a leftist premier in Iran through a coup; began sub- sidies to American labor, edu- cation and cultural organi- zations operating overseas, and mounted the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion in an at- tempt to topple Cuba's Fidel Castro. United ?reel' Leiterastional A prominent plaque in the Allen Dulles, the Nation's foremost spymaster, is shown lobby of the CIA's vast con- with his brother, John Foster Dulles, and with See DULLES, AS, Col. 1 Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. DULLES, From Al crete building at Langley. Va., bears a sculpted likeness of Dulles and the inscription: "His Monument Is Around Us." A powerfully built, vigorous man with great energy and en- durance, he had been in de- clining health since suffering a mild stroke more than a year ago. He entered George- town Hospital on Dec. 24, suf- fering from a bad case of flu which grew into pulmonary edema—water on the lungs. He died at 11:10 p.m. Wednes- day from complications, ac- cording to a hospital spokes- man. In a statement issued at the White House yesterday, Presi- dent Nixon praised Dulles as "a man who brought civility, intelligence and great dedica- tion to everything he did." Mr. Nixon added that.'in the na- ture of his task, his achieve- ments were known to only a few. But—because of him—the world is a safer place today." At Walter Reed Army Hos- pital, former President Eisen- hower extolled Dulles as "a devoted public servant whose outstanding ability will be Allen Dulles and his wife, Clover, at Swedish Embassy party in December, 1967. greatly missed by the Nation." Dulles headed the CIA during • virtually the entire Eisenhow- ly hated the Soviet Union and was a system to be dealt with. Switzerland, near the end of er Administration and always was the advocate of unscru- He never had his brother's World War I when an "insig- maintained—without rebuttal pulous ideological and propa-,moralistic loathing." nificant little man" called to from the White House—that ganda activity by the United Clergyman's Son see someone in authority in the CIA operations were carried States Government. ' U.S. Mission. "I was scheduled With their three sisters, the to play tennis, so I had no time out only after high-level. ap- Assailed in 1951 proval. Dulles brothers grew up in a for him," Dulles recalled later. Strong as it was, the Tass series of Presbyterian parson "Somewhat later I learned that Helms Tribute statement did not reach the ages occupied by their father, the man was Lenin. If I had Director Richard Helms of bombastic level set by in 1951 the Rev. Allen M. Dulles. seen him, who knows what the CIA, who worked for Dulles by Ilya Ehrenburg, a leading Often the brothers went sail- results might have been." for many years, praised his Soviet propagandist. "Even if ing together. "Foster wants to Object Lesson "unique" contribution to the the spy, Allen Dulles, should reduce things to clear com- He often cited the story later establishment of the modern arrive in Heaven through, pass directions," said a sailing to CIA associates as an object American intelligence service. somebody's absent-mindedness, companion of the time. "Allen lesson in his theory that no "He was inspired by what to Ehrenburg wrote in Pravda, feels out the currents and one is too insignificant for of- him were the lasting Ameri- 'the would begin to blow up moves on a more complicated ficial attention. can traditions of freedom, jus- the clouds, mine the stars and course." Dulles resigned from the tice and tolerance," Helms slaughter the angels." Young Allen was extremely Foreign Service in 1926 to said. "He clearly saw his ca- Though Allen Dulles often prococious; writing a pamphlet enter law practice In New reer in intelligence as service spoke and wrote of the dan- at age 8 on the Boer War after York. where he had a distin- to these principles. it was his gers to the United States posed hearing it discussed by his guished career at Sullivan Sr deepest conviction that the by Soviet ambition and aggres- grandfather, John W. Foster, Cromwell, also his brother's American Government and siveness, he was far less of Secretary of State under Pres- firm. During World War II, people should know the truth, an ideological anti-communuist ident Benjamin Harrison, and Gen. William J. Donovan, the and that the truth should than his elder brother, John his uncle, Robert Lansing, who chief of the Office of Strategic make and keep them free." Foster Dulles. In the half- was to be Secretary of Slate Services, recruited Dulles as In the Soviet Union, where cloaked world of modern es- under President Woodrow Wil- his intelligence chief in Switz- attacks were launehed on Dul- pionage, the younger Dulles son. erland. les beginning in February, worked against the Russians After receiving B.A. and 1948. and continuing with with great energy and enter- M.A. degrees from Princeton, Hundreds of Agents great intensity during his CIA prise, as he bad against the Dulles served as a junior dip- According to the citation for years, the official news agen- Germans during World War II. lomat and intelligence officer his Medal for Merit, signed by cy, Tess, declared yesterday Nevertheless, said one of his in Europe. One of his favorite President Truman in 1946, that the was not only spy former close associates yester- incidents of his early diplo- Dulles "within a year effec- number one, but he also fierce- day, "To Allen, Communism mate service occurred in Bern, tively built up an intelligence .AF 8 Friday, Jan. 31. 1969 THE WASHINGTON POST ulles Dies at 75 network employing hundreds A strong supporter and cam- of Informants and operatives paign aide of Gov. Thomas E. reaching into Germany, Yugo- Dewey in 1948, Dulles would slavia, Czechoslovakia, Bul- garia, Hungary, Spain, .Portu- have been CIA Director in a Dewey Administration. When gal and North Africa, and he was finally appointed to oompletly covering France, the job in February, 1953, by Italy and Austria." Dulles ob- President Eisenhower, he tained and personally man- brought a unique combination aged an agent within the Ger- man foreign Office who had of assets. The full impact of the Cold access to every document. War had broken in Washing- Through him and other mem- ton, with a massive increase bers of his extensive appara- in the official consciousness of tus, Dulles obtained the first Soviet military and political information on the German ambitions and operations. Dul- rocket program and many les had been the most eminent other secrets. and experienced intelligence Directing clandestine nego- field officer during the war. tiations with some of Hitier's and now he became Director generals, Dulles arranged the of CIA as the brother of the surrender of the German new Secretary of State. Army of Northern Italy near- Perhaps as important, his a week before V-E Day. love of "the craft of intelli- This "secret surrender,' later gence" (the title of another of the subject of one of his sev- his books), his uncommon eral books; was one of his boldness and his magnetic proudest achievements. ability to attract bold and able After he was recruited as men all contributed to a surge Dulles testifying at Senate hearing in 1955. Deputy Director of the CIA M of power and importance at 1950 by its director, Gen. CIA. vember, 1961, with public Walter Bedell Smith, and in When Dulles learned In 1954 I Despite the uproar following his eight years as CIA Direc- that German scientists were the crash of Francis Gary praise from Kennedy and the presidential observation to tor, Dulles constantly harked working on highly secret Powers in a U.2 in May, 9)60, CIA employes that "your suc- back to his wartime Swiss ex- strategic missiles under Soviet many authorities consider the perience, which was probably direction deep inside Russia, overflights as the most impor- cesses are unheralded — your the great adventure of his he insisted that the United I tant American intelligence failures trumpeted." life. Because he had been an States had to learn the details triumph of the postwar era. Mrs. Clover Todd Dulles, the intelligence officer in the whatever the cost or risk. On the other hand, the Bay former CIA Director's wife, field, and a superbly success-1 His staff came up with Idea of Pigs invasion of April, 1961 survives'him, as do two daugh- ful one, he possessed a zest of a high-flying spy plane.
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