Heuristics and Coalition Expectations David Fortunato Randolph T. Stevenson University of California, Merced Rice University
[email protected] [email protected] Abstract A new, decidedly empirical body of research has shown that voters in parliamentary sys- tems cast their ballots with an eye toward post-electoral bargaining, seemingly expressing their coalition preferences. But in order for voters to behave this way, they must have well-formed expectations about which coalitions are likely. Whether and how voters actually form such ex- pectations remains an open question. Building on recent multidisciplinary work on heuristics, we provide a theory of how voters formulate expectations of coalition formation outcomes. We then test the implications of our theory with new data from four pre-electoral surveys administered in Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway. We find that voters in general expect the largest party to provide the prime minister and coalesce with a set of ideologically compatible parties to form a legislative majority. These cues, however, are context dependent: voters use them when they are, on average, accurate and not otherwise. 1 A great deal of recent work in comparative political behavior is aimed at providing an answer to an old question: do voters in coalitional systems (i.e., systems which are typically governed by coali- tion cabinets) use their votes to try to influence which coalitions form (Blais et al. 2006; Bowler, Karp and Donovan 2010; Duch, May and Armstrong 2010; Kedar 2005; Meffert and Gschwend 2010)? The scholars who have produced this work, unlike many of their predecessors, have taken a decidedly empirical approach to answering it | employing new individual-level survey data and using aggre- gate electoral data in new ways | and have produced an unambiguous answer: \coalition-directed voting" is widespread in coalitional systems.