The General Election, 2010 Transcript
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6FFLK015: Advanced Constitutional Law | King's College London
09/27/21 6FFLK015: Advanced Constitutional Law | King's College London 6FFLK015: Advanced Constitutional Law View Online 1 Bradley AW, Ewing KD, Knight C. Constitutional and administrative law. Seventeenth edition. Harlow, England: : Pearson 2018. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=5418645 2 De Smith SA, Brazier R. Constitutional and administrative law. 8th ed. London: : Penguin 1998. 3 Turpin CC, Tomkins A. British government and the constitution: text and materials. 7th ed. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2011. http://kcl.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=775039 4 Le Sueur AP, Sunkin M, Murkens JE. Public law: text, cases, and materials. Third edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: : Oxford University Press 2016. 5 McEldowney JF. Public law. 3rd ed. London: : Sweet & Maxwell 2002. 6 Phillips OH, Jackson P, Leopold P. O. Hood Phillips & Jackson’s constitutional and 1/58 09/27/21 6FFLK015: Advanced Constitutional Law | King's College London administrative law. 8th ed. London: : Sweet & Maxwell 2001. 7 Loveland I. Constitutional law, administrative law, and human rights: a critical introduction. Eighth edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: : Oxford University Press 2018. 8 Barnett H. Constitutional & administrative law. Twelfth edition. London: : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2017. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=4917664 9 Jowell JL, Oliver D. The changing constitution. Eighth edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: : Oxford University Press 2015. 10 Munro CR. Studies in constitutional law. 2nd ed. London: : Butterworths 1999. 11 Tomkins A. Public law. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2003. 12 Marshall G. Constitutional conventions: the rules and forms of political accountability. Oxford: : Clarendon 1984. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198762027.001.0001 13 Griffith JAG, Ryle M, Wheeler-Booth MAJ, et al. -
Queen Elizabeth II
16 May 2017 Queen Elizabeth II PROFESSOR VERNON BOGDANOR FBA CBE Today’s lecture is on the Queen. I gave a lecture on the Queen last year to commemorate her 90th birthday, and of course, I want to avoid repeating anything I said in that lecture, which is naturally available on the Gresham College website, so what I want to discuss today is the constitutional role of the Queen and, more generally, the role of constitutional monarchy in the 21st Century, but I shall also discuss the constitutional role of the Prince of Wales, which is I think widely misunderstood. But above all, I shall discuss the changes, which I think are very considerable in the monarchy since 1952 when the Queen came to the throne. But let me begin with a confession: this has been the most difficult lecture of the series to prepare, and the reason is that, inevitably, we know far less about the Queen than about her predecessors. There are official biographies of all the past monarchs whom I have discussed in this series, except for Queen Victoria, and that was because Edward VII, for some reason, would not allow an official biography. We also have historical works about past monarchs, based on material in the Royal Archives and in the National Archives. What we have learnt about past monarchs does, in many cases, alter the view that people had of them at the time, especially perhaps in the case of Queen Victoria. Bagehot, writing in the 1860s, thought her a perfect constitutional monarch, but later research has shown that she was very far from that. -
Transcript (PDF)
Podcast Episode Season 1, Episode 15: In Conversation with Theo Koll From the ULI Germany: Real Estate ??? Cities ??? People Date: September 04, 2020 00:00:00 --> 00:00:04: Real estate provided people of the USA Germany Podcast co-creators 00:00:04 --> 00:00:06: of the built environment, 00:00:06 --> 00:00:10: creators of the real estate industry 00:00:10 --> 00:00:12: and personalities who shape our cities. 00:00:12 --> 00:00:18: Real estate, cities, people this common thread runs through our 00:00:18 --> 00:00:18: programs, 00:00:18 --> 00:00:22: our podcasts and of course also through the evening song 00:00:23 --> 00:00:27: Sammet what distinguishes the Julei from other organizations? 00:00:27 --> 00:00:33: We consistently look at all real estate issues in an 00:00:33 --> 00:00:37: urban context and always focus on people. 00:00:37 --> 00:00:42: The actions of the industry of all of us are 00:00:42 --> 00:00:44: socially relevant. 00:00:44 --> 00:00:48: So who, if I do the Julei, should also examine 00:00:48 --> 00:00:52: all socially relevant topics and not only look outside the 00:00:52 --> 00:00:52: box, 00:00:52 --> 00:00:55: but also think and act? 00:00:55 --> 00:00:59: The world is not only in turmoil since today, 00:00:59 --> 00:01:07: but today, in September 2020, we feel this particularly intensely. -
Evidence from Professor Vernon Bogdanor 7 December 2015
Evidence from Professor Vernon Bogdanor 7 December 2015 BK: We’ll kick off, if we can. Thank you very much for coming to present to us this afternoon. I’d like to start with quite an open question. You wrote this very excellent report before the election, which set out the crisis in the constitution. If you were taking stock now, post the election, what would you say? Would you feel more or less optimistic? VB: I have taken stock and there is now a second edition of my pamphlet, `The Crisis of the Constitution’, published in February 2016. I am more optimistic to the extent that there is now a broad general policy of devolution and decentralisation in England which I welcome. But there are some fundamental problems that have not been fully confronted. I still hold very strongly to the view that to confront them, we need, if not a constitution, at least a charter, laying out what policy areas are suitable for devolution and decentralisation, and which need to remain at the centre. That is crucial not just for devolution in England, but also for devolution in the non-English parts of the United Kingdom. We do need a clear criterion of what is suitable for devolution and decentralisation and what is not. BK: One of the phrases you use in this document is that ‘asymmetry is the price we pay for the Union’ which is a very striking phrase. VB: There has been a lot of loose talk about a federal system for Britain. Federalism could take two alternative forms, first a Parliament in England, or second regional authorities in England with roughly similar powers to those of the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly. -
Electoral System Change in Europe Since 1945
Electoral reform in Europe since 1945 Article Supplemental Material online supplement Renwick, A. (2011) Electoral reform in Europe since 1945. West European Politics, 34 (3). pp. 456-477. ISSN 1743-9655 doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.555975 Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/21318/ It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing . Published version at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2011.555975 To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.555975 Publisher: Routledge All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement . www.reading.ac.uk/centaur CentAUR Central Archive at the University of Reading Reading’s research outputs online Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945 West European Politics 34:?, ??–?? Online Supplement: Details of Categorizations Used in and Sources Used For Tables This supplement provides additional details regarding the criteria for including and classifying cases of electoral system change and lists the principal sources used for each country. Contents Abbreviations 2 Criteria Used to Identify and Classify Cases 3 Sources Used to Identify and Classify Cases 16 1 Abbreviations MMM mixed-member majoritarian MMP mixed-member proportional PR proportional representation SMP single-member plurality STV single transferable vote 2 Criteria Used to Identify and Categorize Cases Countries Included The sample used for this article includes European countries since 1945. -
GERMAN GREENS in COALITION GOVERNMENTS a Political Analysis
GERMAN GREENS IN COALITION GOVERNMENTS A Political Analysis by Arne Jungjohann 1 GERMAN GREENS IN COALITION GOVERNMENTS A Political Analysis A Political Analysis A Political German Greens in Coalition Governments German Greens in Coalition Governments A Political Analysis By Arne Jungjohann Published by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union English version published with the support of the Green European Foundation About the author CONTENTS Arne Jungjohann is an energy analyst and political scientist. He advises foundations, think tanks, and civil society in communication and strategy building for climate and energy policy. Previously, he worked for Minister President Winfried Kretschmann of Baden-Württemberg, the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Washington DC, in the German Bundestag, and in the family owned business. As its editor he launched the most influential English Twitter account on the German Energiewende (@ EnergiewendeGER). He co-authored ‘Energy Democracy: Germany’s Energiewende to Renewables’ Foreword 7 (Palgrave Macmillan 2016). Arne is a member of the Green Academy, a network with leading thinkers Foreword by the author 9 from science, politics and civil society which is facilitated by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. He is the founder of the local chapter of the German Green Party in Washington DC and lives in Stuttgart. He studied at Philipps University Marburg and at the Free University of Berlin. 1 Introduction 11 1.1 State of the research and sources used 12 1.2 Lead Questions and Composition of the Study 14 2 Coalition Constellations 15 3 The Coalition Arena at State Level 19 3.1 Departmental Responsibilities of the Greens 19 3.2 Coalition Management in the G-states 26 3.2.1 The Bundesrat Clause 27 3.2.2 Coalition Personnel 28 3.2.3 Coalition Committees 30 You are free to share – copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and adapt – remix, transform, and build upon the material. -
FLJ+S Bogdanor 6 (Q6) 27/6/07 15:16 Page 3 Page 15:16 27/6/07 6 (Q6) Bogdanor FLJ+S FLJ+S Bogdanor 6 (Q6) 27/6/07 15:16 Page 4
FLJ+S Bogdanor 6 (Q6) 27/6/07 15:16 Page 3 The Foundation for for Foundation The Law, Justice and Society Justice Law, Bridging the gap between academia and policymakers Bridging the gap between Courts and the Making of Public Policy The Conflict between Government and the Judges Vernon Bogdanor The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society in collaboration with The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford www.fljs.org 4 FLJ+S Bogdanor 6 (Q6) 27/6/07 15:16 Page 4 The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society FLJ+S Bogdanor 6 (Q6) 27/6/07 15:16 Page 1 THE CONFLICT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE JUDGES . 1 Executive Summary ■ The United Kingdom has been engaged over the ■ The Human Rights Act seeks to secure a democratic centuries in the process, unique in the democratic engagement with rights on the part of the world, of gradually giving itself a constitution. representatives of the people in Parliament. This is being achieved in an ad hoc fashion with no However, the main burden of protecting human stated consensus as to what the end result should rights has been transferred to the judges, whose be. The cornerstone of this new constitution will be role is bound to become more influential as a result. the Human Rights Act of 1998. It is the closest the United Kingdom can get, under its current system, ■ The compromise upon which the Human Rights to a bill of rights. The Act is transforming our Act is based is a tenuous one, dependent as it is understanding of rights and of the relationship upon self-restraint by judges, ministers and MPs. -
The SPD's Electoral Dilemmas
AICGS Transatlantic Perspectives September 2009 The SPD’s Electoral Dilemmas By Dieter Dettke Can the SPD form a Introduction: After the State Elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland coalition that could effec - August 30, 2009 was a pivotal moment in German domestic politics. Lacking a central tively govern on the na - theme in a campaign that never got quite off the ground, the September 27 national elec - tional level, aside from tions now have their focal point: integrate or marginalize Die Linke (the Left Party). This another Grand Coali - puts the SPD in a difficult position. Now that there are red-red-green majorities in Saarland tion? and Thuringia (Saarland is the first state in the western part of Germany with such a major - How has the SPD gone ity), efforts to form coalitions with Die Linke might well lose their opprobrium gradually. From from being a leading now on, coalition-building in Germany will be more uncertain than ever in the history of the party to trailing in the Federal Republic of Germany. On the one hand, pressure will mount within the SPD to pave polls? the way for a new left majority that includes Die Linke on the federal level. On the other hand, Chancellor Angela Merkel and the CDU/CSU, as well as the FDP, will do everything to make the prevention of such a development the central theme for the remainder of the electoral campaign. The specter of a red-red-green coalition in Berlin will now dominate the political discourse until Election Day. Whether this strategy will work is an open question. -
Heuristics and Coalition Expectations
Heuristics and Coalition Expectations David Fortunato Randolph T. Stevenson University of California, Merced Rice University [email protected] [email protected] Abstract A new, decidedly empirical body of research has shown that voters in parliamentary sys- tems cast their ballots with an eye toward post-electoral bargaining, seemingly expressing their coalition preferences. But in order for voters to behave this way, they must have well-formed expectations about which coalitions are likely. Whether and how voters actually form such ex- pectations remains an open question. Building on recent multidisciplinary work on heuristics, we provide a theory of how voters formulate expectations of coalition formation outcomes. We then test the implications of our theory with new data from four pre-electoral surveys administered in Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway. We find that voters in general expect the largest party to provide the prime minister and coalesce with a set of ideologically compatible parties to form a legislative majority. These cues, however, are context dependent: voters use them when they are, on average, accurate and not otherwise. 1 A great deal of recent work in comparative political behavior is aimed at providing an answer to an old question: do voters in coalitional systems (i.e., systems which are typically governed by coali- tion cabinets) use their votes to try to influence which coalitions form (Blais et al. 2006; Bowler, Karp and Donovan 2010; Duch, May and Armstrong 2010; Kedar 2005; Meffert and Gschwend 2010)? The scholars who have produced this work, unlike many of their predecessors, have taken a decidedly empirical approach to answering it | employing new individual-level survey data and using aggre- gate electoral data in new ways | and have produced an unambiguous answer: \coalition-directed voting" is widespread in coalitional systems. -
Germany Ahead of the 2021 Federal Elections
Germany ahead of the 2021 federal elections The German federal elections in September 2021 will mark a historic turning point: the end of the Merkel era with the departure of the Chancellor after 16 years in office. An entire generation has grown up and been politically socialised with Angela Merkel as the ruling Chancellor. None of her male predecessors in office ruled Germany longer than the first woman in the chancellorship - only Helmut Kohl also had a term of office of 16 years. With Angela Merkel's departure, it is highly likely that the so called "grand coalition" of CDU/CSU and SPD, which formed the government in Oliver Sartorius three of the four legislative periods under Angela Merkel's chancellorship, will also be Director Political Research replaced. and Advisory Kantar Public Germany 1 I. The decline of the people parties and the fragmentation of the German party system Thus, the end of the Merkel era will also mark the end of the dominance of Germany's two catch-all-parties (in German called “Volksparteien”). The heydays of the centre-right CDU/CSU and centre-left SPD peaked in the mid-1970s with around 90 percent vote shares at federal and most regional elections but had started to lose popularity since the 1980s. The process of German re-unification defined a preliminary halt to the downward trend in the 1990s, but increasingly since the turn of the millennium, voters have noticeably continued to turn away from the CDU/CSU and SPD. In particular, the three "grand coalitions" of the CDU/ CSU and SPD within the last four legislative periods (2005-2009, 2013-2017, 2017-2021) have obviously accelerated the downward trend of the popular parties. -
Despite Riding High in the Polls, a Coalition with the CDU/CSU May Be the Only Route for the German Greens to Enter Government in the 2013 Elections
blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/03/12/german-greens-elections-2013/ Despite riding high in the polls, a coalition with the CDU/CSU may be the only route for the German Greens to enter government in the 2013 Elections. by Blog Admin Federal elections are due to be held in Germany on 22nd September this year. As part of EUROPP’s series profiling the main parties in the election, Wolfgang Rüdig assesses the prospects of the German Greens. Although the party’s standing in opinion polls is extremely healthy, the weakness of its preferred partner, the SPD, might make a coalition with Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU the only option for entering government. However this strategy could prove unpopular and generate tensions between the two competing wings of the party. The German Greens had a good start to 2013. In the regional elections in Lower Saxony on 20th January, they achieved their best ever result in the state: 13.7 per cent, a major increase compared with their previous record of 8 per cent in 2008. Although their intended coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), weakened, the strength of the Greens was suf f icient to give a ‘red-green’ coalition [1] a majority in the regional parliament, ensuring a return to government in Lower Saxony. Will this set a pattern f or the f ederal elections to be held later this year? The Greens are currently standing at between 14 per cent and 17 per cent in the national polls, several points above their record 10.7 per cent achieved in the last f ederal elections of 2009. -
DIE LINKE) in Western Germany: a Comparative Evaluation of Cartel and Social Cleavage Theories As Explanatory Frameworks
Understanding the Performance of the Left Party (DIE LINKE) in Western Germany: A Comparative Evaluation of Cartel and Social Cleavage Theories as Explanatory Frameworks Submitted to London Metropolitan University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Valerie Lawson-Last Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, London Metropolitan University 2015 Abstract In 2007 Germany’s Left Party (DIE LINKE) won its first seats in the regional parliament of a western federal state, Bremen. This success contrasted with the failure of its predecessor, the PDS, to establish an electoral base beyond the eastern states. Today the Left Party is represented in eastern and western legislatures and challenges established coalition constellations both at federal and regional level. How can we understand the Left Party’s significant breakthrough in the West? The existing literature has sought to analyse and interpret the Left Party’s origins, success and challenges, and has also emphasised the importance of the western states, both for the PDS and the Left Party. This thesis offers new insights by evaluating the respective strengths of two distinct theories, Cartel Theory and Social Cleavage Theory, as explanatory frameworks for the Left Party’s breakthrough. The theories are also appraised in a detailed case study of Bremen. The study examines whether the party displayed the organisational traits, parliamentary focus and electoral strategy identified in Cartel Theory. The investigation of Social Cleavage Theory explores the mobilisation and framing of class-based protest in the anti-Hartz demonstrations, and analyses election results for evidence of a realignment of class- based support. The existing empirical data is supplemented by qualitative evidence obtained through questionnaire responses from Left Party members and sympathisers in Bremen.