Evidence from Professor Vernon Bogdanor 7 December 2015

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Evidence from Professor Vernon Bogdanor 7 December 2015 Evidence from Professor Vernon Bogdanor 7 December 2015 BK: We’ll kick off, if we can. Thank you very much for coming to present to us this afternoon. I’d like to start with quite an open question. You wrote this very excellent report before the election, which set out the crisis in the constitution. If you were taking stock now, post the election, what would you say? Would you feel more or less optimistic? VB: I have taken stock and there is now a second edition of my pamphlet, `The Crisis of the Constitution’, published in February 2016. I am more optimistic to the extent that there is now a broad general policy of devolution and decentralisation in England which I welcome. But there are some fundamental problems that have not been fully confronted. I still hold very strongly to the view that to confront them, we need, if not a constitution, at least a charter, laying out what policy areas are suitable for devolution and decentralisation, and which need to remain at the centre. That is crucial not just for devolution in England, but also for devolution in the non-English parts of the United Kingdom. We do need a clear criterion of what is suitable for devolution and decentralisation and what is not. BK: One of the phrases you use in this document is that ‘asymmetry is the price we pay for the Union’ which is a very striking phrase. VB: There has been a lot of loose talk about a federal system for Britain. Federalism could take two alternative forms, first a Parliament in England, or second regional authorities in England with roughly similar powers to those of the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly. Now, as to the first, an English Parliament does have some support, but not, I believe, majority support. I know of no federal system in which 85% of the country live in one of the units. I believe it would annoy the non-English people in the UK by replicating English dominance. It would be a bureaucratic nightmare if one imagines an English Parliament sitting in, shall we say, Bristol or Newcastle, and the various conflicts of jurisdiction that would occur with a United Kingdom Parliament sitting in Westminster. I believe that the last thing the public want is another set of politicians and officials staffing an English Parliament. John Major said once, ‘If the answer is more politicians, you’re asking the wrong question.’ Now, as regards a regional system, that would not solve the West Lothian question because no one proposes regional governments with legislative powers, so that there would be different laws in Newcastle from those in Bristol. Even with the sort of scheme that John Prescott proposed in 2004 for the North East, the area thought to be most sympathetic to devolution, no one was particularly interested. I think the trouble is that, in England, regions do not attract the kind of emotional allegiance as do Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, or regions on the continent. If you were to ask somebody in Bristol or Canterbury what region they belong to, they would look at you rather oddly and say they live in Canterbury which is a town, and in Kent, which is a county. They do not think of themselves as living in a region. So I do not believe that regional devolution is really an option. This means that federalism in either form is not really suitable for England. The right approach is that adopted by the government of combining local authorities or in some cases devolving to unitary local authorities. Asymmetry is the price we pay for a union. England is the naturally dominant nation with 85% of the country, and 85% of the MPs. Anything it wants it can get. The problem is to reconcile non-English people, a permanent minority, to the United Kingdom. We refused to give devolution in the form of Home Rule to Ireland, in the late 19th century with disastrous results. We failed to keep Ireland within the United Kingdom and of course that exacerbated the community problem in Northern Ireland. We do not have a community problem in Scotland, but I hope we do not repeat the mistake there that we made with Ireland. We must do all we can to keep Scotland within the United Kingdom. That is what I mean by saying asymmetry is the price we pay for the Union. BK: That’s very clear. Introduce yourselves as you ask a question. Barbara? BJ: I’m from the House of Lords. I’m the former leader of Bristol. I did quite a lot of work with core cities on the current proposals. I hear what you say about a federal system and there are two points I’d like to make. On the one, there’s a very strong belief that unless we have something that much more resembles a federal system, the union will cease to exist and Scotland will become independent. On the point you made about regional assemblies, I take the point that people don’t necessarily have local allegiance, but the big problem with the regional assemblies was that they had no powers. Do you not think if powers were to be devolved to a much greater degree there would be much more interest in it? If you take places like Cornwall, I was in the South West, which I think is one of the areas where everyone argued about whether they were in it or not, but the need for partnership in terms of equalisation of funding and resources was really important. If you have no powers, there’s no obligation to cooperate or form any sort of local government. VB: In Cornwall, there will be devolution to the county, rather than to the South West as a region. I do not wholly agree that the main reason for the rejection of devolution in the North East was the inadequacy of the powers proposed. I believe there was a general disinclination to support another layer of politicians and officials. It is worth saying perhaps that devolution does not necessarily mean decentralisation. In Scotland, the government has centralised. It has for example centralised the police force. It is up to the devolved government whether there is decentralisation or not. Decentralisation is not a necessary concomitant of devolution. As regards the Scottish question, in general, I believe that the problem is as much social and economic as constitutional, and it is a problem that England faces as much as Scotland. The problem is that of skills. If one looks at the outcome of the referendum in Scotland in 2014, the strongest yes areas were Labour voting areas such as Strathclyde and Dundee. SNP middle class areas such as Perthshire, Angus and Aberdeenshire voted no. The skills problem also gives rise to the UKIP vote in England. It is the problem facing those who are left behind by globalisation. Those people are saying, both in England and in Scotland, that government is not doing very much for them. They are also objecting to immigration which, so they believe, keeps wages low. BJ: I think the point I was making was it’s not necessarily local identity that is generating the wish for devolution. It is the whole issue of self-interest, lack of funding, the idea that everything done at arm’s length, whether regeneration or investment. People want more local economic leadership and the ability to prosper within their own area, whatever that might be. VB: I agree with that. There is a huge imbalance between London and the rest of the country. The further you go from London the more strongly it is felt. BK: The reasons for devolution vary. In Scotland, it’s the notion of national identity. In other parts of England it’s about economic balance and tackling social issues. There are different drivers. VB: Absolutely, and I think there is a sense of alienation, a feeling that people in London do not understand the problems of, shall we say, Cornwall, Newcastle, Liverpool or Manchester. I think that is felt quite strongly. BK: What’s your sense about the mayor? You say you were supportive of it at the time. VB: We need clarity on when a mayor is needed, and when it isn’t. Cornwall, which is a unitary authority, is not required to have a mayor as long as it has suitable arrangements for accountability i.e. the council leader model. I do wonder under what circumstances a mayor is required and when a mayor is not required. Directly elected mayors were rejected by many of the northern cities in 2011. One may argue that to impose a mayor when the voters do not want it is itself a centralising measure. It is being said that local government can have whatever structure it likes as long as it is one of which central government approves! I would like to know, and I think the government should be clearer, about the circumstances under which a directly elected mayor is required. In addition, it is important to know what the scrutiny arrangements are to be. In Greater Manchester, there seems no equivalent to the Greater London Assembly. Combined authorities can make accountability very difficult. A directly elected mayor has a great deal of power. It is important that he or she be accountable. BK: It’s combined authorities that hold the mayors to account. VB: Combined authorities are some degrees away from the voter. One does not vote for a combined authority.
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