Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit

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FOOL DC TWICE WHY D.C. MUST ABANDON PRIVATE-SECTOR CONTROL OF PUBLIC TRANSIT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent years, local elected officials in the District of Columbia have launched efforts to create a publicly-funded, privately operated, multi-modal transit system. This has included the creation of the D.C. Circulator and D.C. Streetcar. Since their inception, both projects have been plagued by a multitude of problems: labor law abuses, safety standard violations, and repeated failures to meet promised ridership and service goals.

This report:

• details the history of these projects; • analyzes their performance to date; • traces their relationship to the regional transit system, and; • recommends basic principles that should guide further efforts to expand transit options in the District.

In particular, Fool D.C. Twice explores:

• how local business interests drove the creation of the highly-subsidized D.C. Circulator to primarily serve a “premium” ridership; • repeated failures by the D.C. Circulator’s operating contractor, First Transit, to maintain basic urban transit safety and labor standards while avoiding government oversight; • the hundreds of millions of transit dollars wasted on poor planning and poorer construction of the D.C. Streetcar and fruitless efforts by its operating contractor to prevent unionization, and; • how D.C. government leaders undermined regional transit development by attempting to assume control of and privatize all transit service within the District.

We encourage elected officials and appointees at public transportation agencies in the District of Columbia and across the country to prioritize the public good before embracing the elusive solutions promised by public-private partnerships. Specifically, we recommend that public officials commit to three basic principles:

1. Transit expansion should focus on improving service for all communities, not providing specialized service to “premium” clientele. 2. Transit spending should be directed toward the mobility needs of residents, especially those who lack transit access, rather than the demands of regional developers. 3. Public transit should be publicly maintained and operated, not subject to profitability for contractors.

We are confident that the experiences of de-regionalization and privatization in Washington, D.C. are not unique to the District. Instead, we believe they offer important lessons to be learned for transit agencies across the country.

Amalgamated Transit Union 1 Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame confidence in mass transit, contributing to an historic on me. This old proverb finds new meaning in the ridership decline.2 District of Columbia, where well-intentioned local elected officials have twice been persuaded that private D.C., like its neighbors in Virginia and Maryland, contractors could establish and operate local public has contributed to the neglect of WMATA, which still transit systems without lowering passenger safety or serves as the region’s central nervous system. Instead labor standards. But why did public-private partnerships of championing a new era of regionalism and public become so hip in the District, and how should D.C. transit policy, the District has focused on developing leaders proceed now that these experiments have failed? a parallel, locally-controlled, privately-operated transit In this report, the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) system that benefits its newer and wealthier residents seeks to answer those critical questions. and the businesses and institutions that employ and serve them. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of transit workers and hundreds of thousands of riders who do not fit the preferred profile are seeing their livelihoods INTRODUCTION and lifelines erode. D.C. is in the midst of an economic boom. Employment is up, and property values are skyrocketing as The problems posed by privatization of transit were laid redevelopment rapidly transforms wide swaths of the bare in recent years by the now infamous DC Streetcar. city. There has been an influx of But long before the streetcar tracks young urban professionals seeking were laid, the District had already good jobs and the sort of services Workers and…riders started to pursue a form of stealth and cultural amenities that only privatization of its bus system. Led major metropolitan areas provide. who do not fit the by the presidents of two politically To safeguard the perceived gains influential business improvement of this demographic shift, the preferred profile are districts with aid from the District District has sought to seize more Department of Transportation local control of one of its new seeing their livelihoods (DDOT), a carefully branded and populations’ most sought-after and lifelines erode. subsidized bus system, the DC urban benefits: a robust public Circulator, was created to compete transportation system. with the District’s already existing Metrobus system. Alongside suburban Virginia and Maryland, D.C. has been served by the regional Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) since 1967. As the THE DC CIRCULATOR IS CREATED entire region’s population shifted in the last two decades, however, cooperation gave way to competition, with While the WMATA-provided MetroAccess paratransit each WMATA jurisdiction seeking to free itself from service has been privately operated since its origin in the the burden of negotiating local transit services with one early 1990s, the first District-led reprivatization of transit another. The result? Years of underinvestment in the regional system have led to a devastating maintenance SafeTrack Leaves Riders Wondering: Where Did $5B For Metro Forward Go? June backlog, cascading service failures, limited service 13, 2016. WAMU. Online at: http://wamu.org/news/16/06/13/safetrack_ leaves_riders_wondering_where_did_5b_for_metro_forward_go (Accessed expansion, and several high-profile fatalities of transit September 16, 2016); Di Caro, Martin. Playing The Metro Blame Game? Start riders and workers.1 This backslide has sapped public With Decisions In Decades Past. March 18, 2016. WAMU. Online at: http:// wamu.org/news/16/03/18/playing_the_metro_blame_game_start_with_ decisions_in_decades_past (Accessed September 16, 2016). 1 Di Caro, Martin. Fort Totten Crash Still Weighs Heavily On Discussions 2 Di Caro, Martin. Metro Ridership Is Down, With WMATA Pointing To About Metro Safety. June 22, 2016. WAMU. Online at: http://wamu.org/ External Forces For Drop. June 27, 2016. WAMU. Online at: http://wamu. news/16/06/22/fort_totten_crash_still_weighs_heavily_on_discussion_ org/news/16/06/27/metro_ridership_is_down_with_wmata_pointing_to_ about_metro_safety (Accessed September 16, 2016); Di Caro, Martin. external_forces_for_drop (Accessed September 16, 2016).

2 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit dates back to 1997, when the National Capital Planning Convention Center to the southwest waterfront— Commission (NCPC) issued a long‐range vision for beginning in 2005 with a fare of 50 cents per trip. The the city that included plans for “a supplementary District provided funds to pay for the buses (distinctive transit system called a ‘circulator’ to carry tourists and models to be purchased from the Belgian company Van commuters around the Core.”3 The DC Circulator, as it Hool NV) and for annual operating costs not covered by is now known, was envisioned to deliver routes between the BIDs.7 major national monuments, Arlington National Cemetery, the Mall, Georgetown, Union Station, the By the time that service began in July 2005, the fare U.S. Capitol, and Anacostia. had been set at $1. It became public knowledge that operation of the Circulator had been contracted out to In 1998, the Downtown DC Business Improvement First Transit, with funding streams provided through District (Downtown BID) assembled a planning group to DDOT.8 WMATA was to oversee the operating contract, advance the Circulator idea along with NCPC, DDOT, and marketing was to be handled by DC Surface and WMATA. The following year, the Downtown Transit Inc.9 BID released a report, commissioned from Parsons Transportation Group, on the feasibility of a Downtown Circulator with two routes, one through downtown and one through the Monumental Core.4

Soon after the Downtown BID released its report, the Georgetown Partnership (the predecessor to the Georgetown BID) created its own low‐cost private bus service. Known as the Blue Bus, the service was created to serve local commuters, especially those travelling outside rush hours. The Georgetown BID’s two routes, which were operated under contract by Yellow Transportation, were a big hit.5 The service was later replaced by the DC Circulator with the support of the Georgetown BID. Who Does the Circulator Serve?

In July 2003, the Downtown BID, NCPC, DDOT From the beginning, the Circulator project was and WMATA released a Circulator implementation conceived of as a premium service. Attempts were made plan. It proposed four low‐fare routes with projected early on to differentiate it from WMATA’s Metrobus annual operating costs of $17 million, about 45 percent service by a distinct color scheme and eye-grabbing of which would come from fare box revenue paid by a visuals. Importantly, there was a desire to maneuver projected 45,000 riders on an average weekday (16.3 around WMATA’s unionized workforce, which 6 million annually). Circulator boosters saw as a cause of poor customer service at Metrobus.10 D.C. and WMATA officials approved the creation of two routes—Union Station to Georgetown and the 7 Ginsberg, Steven. D.C. to Roll Out New Downtown Bus Routes. May 14, 2004. Online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25324- 3 National Capital Planning Commission, Extending the Legacy: Planning 2004May13.html Washington Post. (Accessed September 16, 2016). America’s Capital for the 21st Century (1997), p.43. 8 Layton, Lindsay. Crosstown D.C. Bus Service Starting for a Buck a Ride. 4 Described in District of Columbia Downtown Circulator Implementation July 9, 2005. Washington Post. Online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ Plan (July 2003), pp.15‐16. wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/08/AR2005070801803.html (Accessed September 16, 2016). 5 Layton, Lindsay. Georgetown Buses Bursting With Business. January 19, 2003. Washington Post. Online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 9 DC Surface Transit. DowntownDC.org. (Accessed June 15, 2016). archive/local/2003/01/19/georgetown-buses-bursting-with-business/ 10 Layton, Lyndsey. Shuttle Service En Route for D.C.; Circulator Bus cf3a60f2-c017-403b-9ab9-f8d47327a307/ (Accessed September 16, 2016). Planned for Tourists, Workers Downtown. June 1, 2003. Washington 6 District of Columbia Downtown Circulator Implementation Plan (July 2003). Post. (Accessed December 14, 2016) Where Does This Bus Go? The D.C.

2 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit Amalgamated Transit Union 3 They succeeded in all of these areas. They were able service. This in turn has created pressure on local to brand the service in a completely distinct manner politicians to defend the service and expand it, even from Metrobus, thus distancing their service from the into neighborhoods that are already covered by the less politically popular WMATA-run service. They existing Metrobus network. were also able to purchase distinctive-looking low- floor buses, avoiding Buy American requirements by One especially illustrative example comes from Ward using money acquired from a District settlement that 2. Citizens in Ward 2 were active in campaigning for was exempt from the regulations.11 the K Street Circulator to turn up Wisconsin Avenue. They were successful in securing a temporary trial of The new service quickly achieved a reputation as that reroute.15 clean, reliable, and quick, thanks in no small part to its 10-minute headways. From the start, this made DDOT, analyzing the effect of the detour on overall DDOT’s Circulator easily distinguishable from service, claimed the trial leg served only 2% of WMATA, though in many cases it directly duplicated ridership despite accounting for 15% of the route’s routes already served by Metrobus.12 cost.16 Accordingly, because of the high cost for relatively little benefit, the city planned to end the More troubling than this difference in branding and trial reroute of service and save $950,000. However, perception was the difference in their service areas. Ward 2 Councilmember Jack Evans and Mayor Adrian Looking at a census tract breakdown of the areas served Fenty’s office, under pressure from their constituents, by the Circulator, it is striking how much whiter and secured money to save the Wisconsin Avenue stretch. wealthier they are when compared to the District’s In Evans’ words, “The great outpouring of support overall population. 13 The average census tract served from the Circulator ridership has once again ensured by the Circulator is 15% whiter and 18% less black the continued service of this vital transportation than the District population as a whole.14 option along the Wisconsin Avenue corridor.”17

This service coverage has helped create a cycle of In other words, a politically active constituency mutually reinforcing power. The decision to run the managed to successfully pressure the District Circulator in areas with a wealthier, whiter population government to subsidize a premium service for a small created a politically influential constituency for the number of people who were already served by existing transit. This was in spite of the fact that serving them reduced the effectiveness of the overall route.18 Circulator Struggles to Get Out of the Red. October 7‐13, 2005. Washington City Paper. (Accessed December 14, 2016) Good Jobs First Interview with This stark example encapsulates the inequities of the Michael Weil and Joe Sternlieb. Circulator system more broadly. 11 Where Does This Bus Go? The D.C. Circulator Struggles to Get Out of the Red. October 7‐13, 2005. Washington City Paper. (Accessed December While the true costs of the system are often hidden 14, 2016) BACKGROUND RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF THE DC CIRCULATOR: Prepared for the Amalgamated Transit Union by Good Jobs from the public due to the low fare ($1 dollar for a First. August 2012. Pg 8-9. Circulator ride versus $1.75 for a normal Metrobus 12 DC Circulator 2014 TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT PLAN UPDATE. September 2014. DDOT. Pg ix. Online at:http://ddot.dc.gov/sites/ default/files/dc/sites/ddot/publication/attachments/2014%20DC%20 15 Good Jobs First (GJF) Interview with Joe Sternlieb. Circulator%20Transit%20Development%20Plan%20Update%20 16 Thomson, Robert.Dr. Gridlock on the Closing of the Circulator White- Report.pdf (Accessed December 14, 2016) O’Connell, Jonathan. District haven Extension. September 20, 2009. Washington Post. Online at: adds new D.C. Circulator party routes. March 16, 2009. Washington http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/19/ Business Journal. Online at:http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/ AR2009091902282.html (Accessed September 16, 2016). stories/2009/03/16/story4.html?page=all (Accessed December 14, 2016). 17 Mathis, Sommer. Georgetown Circulator Route Will Continue Up Wisconsin 13 Data on family income was obtained from the 2011-2015 ACS 5 year Ave. September 29, 2009. DCist. Online at: http://dcist.com/2009/09/ survey. Circulator routes were matched with the census tracts that they georgetown_circulator_route_will_co.php (Accessed September 16, 2016). overlapped and compared with the averages for the D.C. population as a whole. 18 Thomson, Robert. Dr. Gridlock on the Closing of the Circulator 14 Data on race was obtained from the 2011-2015 ACS 5 year survey. Whitehaven Extension. September 20, 2009. Washington Post. Online at: Circulator routes were matched with the census tracts that they overlapped http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/19/ and compared with the averages for the D.C. population as a whole. AR2009091902282.html (Accessed September 16, 2016).

4 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit ridership, abysmal labor standards, and poor safety record bear this out.

The Circulator’s Performance

The 2003 Circulator implementation plan projected that the four routes it was proposing would have a combined annual ridership of more than 16 million passengers. The actual Circulator system, which began with two routes in 2005 and now has six routes, has never come close to reaching that figure. While it experienced significant ride), they are worth considering. The Circulator’s growth, doubling from just over 2 million passengers in farebox recovery ratio has steadily declined from a peak 2006 to 5.8 million in 2011, that trend has reversed. It has of 24% in 2011, to 23% in 2012, 20% in 201319, and declined to 5.7 million in 2013 and 5.1 million by 2014.22 19% in 201420. In comparison, the Metrobus farebox recovery ratio was 26% in FY 2011, 26% in FY 2012, 26% in FY 2013, and 25% in FY 2014.21 Considering that the Circulator serves D.C.’s urban core, while Metrobus serves a much broader area, these numbers are particularly surprising. This low farebox recovery necessitates high direct subsidies to keep the system solvent.

The end result is that costs are shifted away from the Circulator’s riders and toward District taxpayers as a whole, most of whom derive no direct or indirect benefit from the service. The general public is subsidizing a service designed to serve the District’s Along with the growth in ridership and route expansion, whiter, wealthier residents and tourists. there has been a substantial rise in operating costs. In its first full year of operation, the Circulator system cost Even setting aside the issues of rider equity and $5.3 million. By 2011, that had more than tripled to disproportionate political influence, of greater concern $15.9 million. On a cost‐per‐rider basis, the Circulator is the service’s overall lack of reliability. Its lackluster went from $2.54 its first year to $2.75 in 2011 (after reaching $2.87 in 2010). 19 DC Circulator 2014 Transit Development Plan Update. DDOT. Online at: http://ddot.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddot/publication/ attachments/2014%20DC%20Circulator%20Transit%20Development% Despite these growing costs, the Circulator’s performance 20Plan%20Update%20Report.pdf(Accessed December 15, 2016) leaves much to be desired, as was confirmed by a recently 20 Circulator Dashboard. Finance Tab, farebox recovery filter. Online at: published audit performed by the Transit Resource Center http://circulatordashboard.dc.gov/cirdashboard/ (Accessed June 20, 2016). (TRC). TRC was brought in by DDOT to examine the 21 Operating Budget Report 4th Quarter FY 2012. Pg-27. WMATA. system’s Van Hool fleet (the low floor buses bought when Online at:https://www.wmata.com/about/records/public_docs/upload/Q4- 23 Financial-Report.pdf (Accessed December 15, 2016) Operating Budget the service first began). Report 4th Quarter FY 2013. Pg-21. WMATA. Online at:http://web. archive.org/web/20140210005927/http:/wmata.com/about_metro/docs/ FY2013%20Fourth%20Quarter%20Financial%20Report%202013-09-06. 22 DC Circulator 2015 Press Kit. Pg 4. Online at: http://www.dccirculator. pdf (Accessed December 15, 2016) Washington Metropolitan Area Transit com/connect/newsroom/press-kit/ (Accessed September 16, 2016). Authority Fiscal Year 2015 Financials. Pg-28. WMATA. Online at:https:// www.wmata.com/about/records/public_docs/upload/FA-Report-Q4-2015. 23 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. pdf (Accessed December 15, 2016). August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 3.

4 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit Amalgamated Transit Union 5 The audit involved: 1) physical examination of 42 of selected buses, and looked at whether any defects were the 49 Van Hool buses (7 were out for repairs and could repeated from one PMI to the next. The goal was to see not be examined); 2) testing of essential drivetrain whether First Transit had a process in place to distinguish fluids; 3) examination of related maintenance and between those defects identified and repaired during inspection records; and 4) verification of workers’ the PMI from those scheduled for repair at a later qualifications. date, and whether they actually followed up and repaired the defects identified during the previous PMI.28 The inspection revealed an “exceptionally high number of defects,” a total of 924 or an average of 22 defects per The review of the PMI checklists found that in the vast bus.24 Of these, 120 (an average of 2.9 per bus) were majority of cases technicians were simply checking off “A” level serious safety defects that should have each inspection item as being satisfactory with little to rendered a vehicle unfit for service until repairs were no elaboration regarding any of the defects existing on completed. Of the 42 Van Hool buses inspected, 40 of the buses. Given the sheer number of defects identified them (95% of the fleet) had at least one “A” level defect, by TRC in their own inspections, there should have leaving only two fit for service.25 been many more defects noted, and explanations regarding the nature of those defects written up as part To emphasize the extraordinary nature of the of the PMI process.29 maintenance situation at the Circulator, the TRC report compared their findings with those of two The result of the ineffective detection program was the other maintenance audits they had done of other gradual accumulation of defects over time, resulting in transit providers. Their inspections of the Potomac the unusually high number of total defects in the fleet. and Rappahannock Transportation Commission The report further notes that this could have led to (PRTC) in Woodbridge, Virginia, which provides the reliability problems suffered by the Van Hool fleet city and commuter bus services and is also operated during revenue service. by First Transit found about three defects per bus, and 0.08 “A” defects per bus on average. Similarly, inspections conducted by TRC for the Capital District Transportation Authority (CDTA), in Albany, New York, which only provides city-bus service found an average of only about five defects per bus, and 0.4 “A” defects per bus.26 To quote the report’s own conclusion “Any inspection that reveals an average of nearly three “A” defects per bus is an indication that the maintenance program is not effective and needs immediate attention.”27

This failure was confirmed by an examination of records associated with the Circulator’s preventative The TRC examined the road call histories for the fleet maintenance inspections (PMI). The TRC reviewed the and found that it suffered about 10-20 road calls per PMI sheets for the last three PMIs done on 12 randomly month, approximately 180 annually. The predominate cause of the failures found almost every month 24 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. were coolant leaks, air leaks, engine shut downs, and August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 3. 25 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 4 & 26. 26 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. 28 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 3 & 11. August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 17. 27 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. 29 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 15. August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 17.

6 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit door related problems.30 These overlap significantly WMATA top operator wage rate of $31.69 per hour.35 with the categories that TRC found had the highest To put the Circulator number into perspective, number of defects.31 according to the MIT Living Wage Calculator, a minimum of $30.81 per hour is needed to sustain a As shown by the report, this remarkable failure of single parent and child in the District.36 detection and maintenance led to an unusually high number of road calls. It also resulted in the deployment This disparity is especially notable given that Circulator of unsafe vehicles on D.C.’s roads, endangering the operators perform essentially the same service as safety of both riders and workers. This public safety Metrobus operators within the same market (some crisis was only revealed after an intense campaign in routes even running parallel to existing Metrobus 2016 by the Circulator’s employees, especially bus routes), just under a separate branding. The most operators represented by ATU recent CBA raises their top rate Local 1764.32 Fortunately, the Most of WMATA’s to $31.69 per hour by 2018. They signing of a collective bargaining are now on track to achieve wage agreement (CBA) between First Metrobus service within parity with WMATA operators, Transit and ATU 1764 secured the District, D.C.’s own though benefit parity is still unprecedented safety language elusive.37 that, for the first time, grants bus Circulator, and a soon- operators the explicit right to By raising wages, the union refuse to drive unsafe vehicles.33 to-be-built DC Streetcar provided a valuable public service. would be turned over to With Circulator operators properly In addition to the above safety compensated for their work at gains, the most recent CBA for a private entity to design, rates comparable to that of their Circulator workers also went a build, and operate Metrobus counterparts, the union long way towards addressing the enabled the service to attract and two-tier wage system that the retain qualified employees. Circulator had introduced to the District. Before the latest CBA, the top rate a Circulator operator earned Unfortunately, the mistakes made in the development was $23.47 per hour34, significantly lower than the of the Circulator were seemingly dismissed as the District sought to develop its own rail system. Since at least the Mayoral administration of Vincent 30 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. Gray, the District government has openly sought to August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 26. establish a private streetcar to complement its private 31 VEHICLE & MAINTENANCE EVALUATION DC Circulator. August 24-28, 2015. Transit Resource Center. Pg 12-13. Circulator service. 32 Smith, Max. Exclusive: Audit finds DC Circulator buses crumbling, unsafe for service. April 7, 2016. WTop. Online at: http://wtop.com/ sprawl-crawl/2016/04/exclusive-audit-finds-dc-circulator-buses-crumbling- unsafe-for-service/ (Accessed September 16, 2016); Sadon, Rachel. The Circulator Fleet Is A Total Disaster, According To Audits. April 8, 2016. DCist. Online at: http://dcist.com/2016/04/circulator_1.php (Accessed September 16, 2016); Zanona, Melanie. Report finds major safety concerns for DC Circulator buses. April 8, 2016. The Hill. Online at: http://thehill. com/policy/transportation/275658-report-finds-major-safety-concerns-for- dc-circulator-buses (Accessed September 16, 2016). 35 AGREEMENT between WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY and LOCAL UNION 689 of the 33 Giambrone, Andrew. D.C. Circulator Operators Get Higher Wages AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION AFL-CIO. January 5, 2015. and Safety Guarantees in New Contract. May 20, 2016. Washington City Paper. Online at: http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/city-desk/ 36 Glasmeier, Amy. Living Wage Calculation for District of Columbia, District blog/20780758/dc-circulator-operators-get-higher-wages-and-safety- of Columbia. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Online at: http:// guarantees-in-new-contract (Accessed September 16, 2016). livingwage.mit.edu/metros/47900 (Accessed September 16, 2016). 34 LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN FIRST TRANSIT, INC., 37 LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN FIRST TRANSIT, INC., WMATA CIRCULATOR OPERATION AND AMALGAMATED WMATA CIRCULATOR OPERATION AND AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1764, AFL-CIO CLC. July 12, 2013. TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1764, AFL-CIO CLC. May 24, 2016.

6 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit Amalgamated Transit Union 7 THE DC STREETCAR Dev MacDonald Transit (RDMT), the corporation COMES TO LIFE whose mismanagement turned the DC Streetcar into a punch line. In 2012, DDOT released an RFI that laid out a plan for a single non-regional, multi-modal, privately- run transit system.38 Though ostensibly looking The Train to Nowhere for No One for contractors to build and operate a new streetcar system, the RFI also proposed privatizing all of From the time it began more than a decade ago, the WMATA’s non-regional bus routes.39 It was dubbed DC Streetcar project has been beset by numerous the “Integrated Premium Transit System Plan.” cost overruns and a litany of broken promises and 44 In essence, the plan would have reduced WMATA to a blown deadlines. heavy rail-only system with a few multi-jurisdictional The most obvious failure has been its poor construction bus lines. Most of WMATA’s Metrobus service within and design. The result of the same cost-cutting logic the District, D.C.’s own Circulator, and a soon-to-be- behind most privatization attempts, a decision was built DC Streetcar would be turned over to a private made to build the Streetcar’s tracks in curbside mixed entity to design, build, and operate. Under the terms traffic rather than giving it a dedicated lane or operating of the plan, this system would remain in private hands it along a median.45 While it is true that this made for at least 30 years.40 While the proposal has faded the project cheaper than securing the necessary rights from view after Gray’s mayoral fortunes declined, his of way, it also eliminated one of the system’s potential successor, Mayor Muriel Bowser, has not dismissed it advantages over other forms of surface transportation. from consideration. Because the DC Streetcar operates in curbside mixed To the contrary, while Mayor Bowser may no longer traffic, it likely will not travel any faster than private speak of the Gray Administration’s 37-mile streetcar cars or buses along the same route. Moreover, it lacks system, she appointed a new DDOT Director, Leif the flexibility to maneuver around obstructions. This Dormsjo, and tasked him with rescuing the troubled decision eliminated one of the mode’s main sources H Street Benning Road streetcar line.41 Dormsjo in of utility: its ability to quickly move people regardless turn hired Tim Borchers, an Interfleet consultant of traffic. The result is a form of transit that costs with prior experience as launch manager of the still- more per mile than buses or cars, lacks their ability to beleaguered Atlanta Streetcar.42 With Borchers’ change routes, and whose major advantage has been help, Dormsjo and Bowser were finally able to bring neutralized.46 the streetcar into operation.43 Unfortunately, they did so by maintaining the previous administration’s The blunders did not end with poor design, however. management and operation contract with RATP The contractors in charge of building the streetcar system failed miserably at the most basic of tasks. For

38 District Department of Transportation. 22-Mile Priority Streetcar System: example, they: Request for Information. RFI# DCKA-2012-I-0083. Pg 7-8. 39 District Department of Transportation. 22-Mile Priority Streetcar System: Request for Information. RFI# DCKA-2012-I-0083. Pg 7-8. 44 Laris, Michael. D.C. streetcar makes its first voyages on H Street. ‘Is it 40 District Department of Transportation. 22-Mile Priority Streetcar System: really happening?’. February 27, 2016. Washington Post. Online at: https:// Request for Information. RFI# DCKA-2012-I-0083. Pg 7-8. www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/dc-streetcar-makes- 41 Di Caro, Martin. How D.C. Streetcar May Have (Finally) Made It Through its-first-voyages-on-h-street-is-it-really-happening/2016/02/27/bd0c3234- The Testing Process. February 12, 2016. WAMU. (Accessed June 15, 2016). dd5b-11e5-891a-4ed04f4213e8_story.html (Accessed September 16, 2016). 42 Di Caro, Martin. Meet D.C.’s New Streetcar Launch Manager. July 20, 45 Yglesias, Matthew. Meet the worst transit project in America. July 25, 2014. 2015. WAMU. Online at: http://wamu.org/news/15/07/20/meet_dcs_ Vox.com Online at: http://www.vox.com/2014/7/25/5937215/dc-streetcar- new_streetcar_launch_manager (Accessed September 16, 2016). disaster-mixed-traffic-streetcars-are-evil (Accessed September 16, 2016). 43 Chinn, Surae. DC streetcars begin full service. February 27, 2015. 46 Yglesias, Matthew. Meet the worst transit project in America. July 25, 2014. WUSA9. (Accessed June 15, 2016). Vox.com

8 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit • failed to install switch heaters that would prevent of the transportation network and little use for either snow and ice buildup on track components, commuters or tourists, the streetcar’s main purpose is necessitating costly retrofitting in order to get limited to transporting people up and down H Street’s them back in working condition;47 short retail corridor.

• built stops that were improperly lit and Moreover, the H Street corridor is already served by lacked ADA accessibility, necessitating further three Metrobus lines: the X1, X2 and X9.55 These are retrofitting;48 among the most popular bus routes with an average of over 17,400 riders every weekday.56 They connect • purchased cars from the Czech Republic before commuters to job centers and serve District residents securing adequate storage facilities, exposing the who live east of the Anacostia River in Wards 7 and 8. vehicles to the elements and damaging them.49 These routes already provide broader service than the streetcar does with the added flexibility of being able to Once testing began, more problems arose including maneuver around obstructions. the streetcars’ tendency to catch fire,50 clip the sides of parked cars with their mirrors,51 scratch the edges of the Given the limited utility of the project to residents platform due to improper alignment,52 and other design and its greater costs compared to existing bus transit defects too numerous to mention. in the corridor, one of the few remaining justifications given for the project was its utility in encouraging The streetcar also suffers from a poorly planned route. economic redevelopment along the corridor. There The current H Street Benning Road route does not is little direct evidence that the streetcar actually had connect to the District’s major job centers, making the much to do with reinvestment in H Street. In fact, 53 route of limited utility for commuters. It does not other explanations are more likely. integrate well into the District’s existing transportation network, either, stopping just short of Union Station. In 2006, Mayor Adrian Fenty began the Great Streets Riders going to or from the Station have to navigate Initiative (GSI), a grant program that provided up a large parking garage and an overpass to get to their to $85,000 to small businesses renovating space on destination.54 Without effective integration with the rest corridors designated for the program.57 H Street was the first GSI corridor and the only one eligible for small 47 Khawani, Vijay. Peer Review for District Department of Transportation business grants until 2013.58 Washington, DC. June, 2015. APTA. Pg 12. Online at: http://ddot.dc.gov/sites/ default/files/dc/sites/ddot/publication/attachments/DDOT%20Final%20 Report%20June%2017%202015.pdf (Accessed September 16, 2016). The D.C. Council also authorized the Office of 48 Khawani, Vijay. Peer Review. APTA. Pg 10 – 11. the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic 49 Laris, Michael. How D.C. spent $200 million over a decade on a streetcar Development to issue up to $95 million in tax increment you still can’t ride. December 5, 2015. Washington Post. Online at: finance notes to support retail within six retail priority https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/how- areas along the initial GSI corridors. Up to $25 million dc-spent-200-million-over-a-decade-on-a-streetcar-you-still-cant- ride/2015/12/05/3c8a51c6-8d48-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html (Accessed September 16, 2016). 55 X1,3 Benning Road Line. Online at: http://www.wmata.com/bus/ timetables/dc/x1-3pdf.pdf (Accessed September 16, 2016); X2 Benning 50 Weiner, Aaron. Streetcar’s Latest Problem: Catching on Fire. February 22, Road –H Street Line. Online at: http://www.wmata.com/bus/timetables/dc/ 2015. Washington City Paper. Online at: http://www.washingtoncitypaper. x2.pdf (Accessed September 16, 2016); X9 Benning Road-H Street Limited com/news/housing-complex/blog/13124550/streetcars-latest-problem- Line. Online at: https://www.wmata.com/bus/timetables/DC/x9.pdf catching-on-fire (Accessed September 16, 2016). (Accessed September 16, 2016). 51 Khawani, Vijay. Peer Review. APTA. Pg 15; Di Caro, Martin. Meet D.C.’s 56 FY2017 Budget: Ridership and Revenue. October 8, 2015. WMATA. New Streetcar Launch Manager. July 20, 2015. WAMU. Online at: http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/board_of_directors/ 52 Khawani, Vijay. Peer Review. APTA. Pg 8. board_docs/100815_4BFY2017BudgetRidershipandRevenue.pdf#page=16 (Accessed September 16, 2016). 53 Yglesias, Matthew. Meet the worst transit project in America. July 25, 2014. Vox.com 57 Washington, Emily. DC Streetcar: Worse than nothing. June 26, 2014. Market Urbanism. 54 Washington, Emily. DC Streetcar: Worse than nothing. June 26, 2014. Market Urbanism. Online at: http://marketurbanism.com/2014/06/26/dc- 58 Washington, Emily. DC Streetcar: Worse than nothing. June 26, 2014. streetcar-worse-than-nothing/ (Accessed September 16, 2016). Market Urbanism.

8 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit Amalgamated Transit Union 9 out of the $95 million was authorized for the H Street fought to unionize, won an NLRB certified election, corridor.59 These grants would surely have factored into and overwhelmingly voted to join ATU Local 689, businesses decisions to set up shop on the H Street which represents WMATA workers.61 corridor rather than another neighborhood in the city, irrespective of the streetcar project. In part, their decision to join reflected frustration with the unsafe working conditions they had been forced to endure. In particular, several streetcar workers testified that they were given conflicting instructions as to how to properly signal the cars’ operators during car storage (leading to one instance where, due to miscommunication, one of the streetcar’s windshields was cracked62); were asked to drain track switches without proper equipment;63 and were expected to operate the streetcars with faulty radios, making it difficult to report incidents.64

Currently earning around $20 an hour at top rate,65 streetcar operators drive their vehicles alongside the X2 bus, whose senior operators would make a living wage of $31.69 per hour66 for transporting people down the same street.

In their effort to keep labor costs artificially low, RDMT and Midtown Group created an abusive and unsafe work environment that sparked a union organizing drive. In their attempt to keep workers from unionizing, RDMT and Midtown Group forced out qualified workers and had to spend time and taxpayer money training replacements who ultimately joined a union anyway. A Beleaguered Project, an Abused Workforce Similarly, in their efforts to keep construction costs down, the design-build contractors failed at the most Before passenger service even began, the abusive basic level, resulting in long delays and costly retrofits management of the streetcar project’s private contractor RDMT led to an attempt by the workforce to unionize. 61 Laris, Michael. D.C. streetcar workers vote to join Metro union. March 7, Rather than respect the rights of streetcar workers, 2016. Washington Post. Online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ dr-gridlock/wp/2016/03/07/d-c-streetcar-workers-vote-to-join-metro- RDMT and its hiring subcontractor The Midtown union/ (Accessed September 16, 2016). Group instead pursued an anti-union strategy of 62 Kevin Baker Affidavit, taken March 10, 2015. intimidation, firing one third of its workforce60 prior 63 Germaine Wells Affidavit, taken March 11, 2015. to a scheduled union election. Valuable time had to 64 Damian Simms Affidavit, taken March 10, 2015. be spent training replacements for the employees who 65 Thomson, Robert.More than 500 people apply for D.C. streetcar jobs. had been unjustly fired. These actions also proved January 27, 2014. Washington Post. Online at: https://www.washingtonpost. ineffective, as only a year later their workforce again com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2014/01/27/more-than-500-people-apply-for- d-c-streetcar-jobs/ (Accessed September 16, 2016) & Giambrone, Andrew. D.C. Streetcar Workers Vote 4:1 to Join Local Transit Workers’ Union. March 7, 59 Woody, Derrick Lanardo. A BRIEF HISTORY OF H STREET. H Street. 2016. Washington City Paper. Online at: http://www.washingtoncitypaper. org. Online at: http://hstreet.org/h-street/history/ (Accessed September 16, com/news/city-desk/blog/13070565/d-c-streetcar-workers-vote-41-to-join- 2016). local-transit-workers-union (Accessed September 16, 2016). 60 Sadon, Rachel. Union Demands That The Streetcar Open And Fired Workers 66 AGREEMENT between WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN Be Rehired. May 27, 2015. DCist. Online at: http://dcist.com/2015/05/ AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY and LOCAL UNION 689 of the union_streetcar.php (Accessed September 16, 2016). AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION AFL-CIO. January 5, 2015.

10 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit to make the system usable. Finally, the desire to deliver more effectively than the city itself. It sounds too good a public good at bargain prices led DDOT to launch to be true, because it is. a service that was poorly designed, poorly managed, wildly expensive, and publicly disdained before the first With its sub-state status and callous federal oversight, car ran down the track. the District understandably seeks an opportunity to control its own services rather than negotiate with This chain of bad decisions left workers and the regional partners to fix and fund a system in decay. general public in the unenviable position of trying But most Americans understand this simple truth: to salvage a useful service from the incompetence of you get what you pay for. If you buy an automobile private contractors and the public officials who failed for the price of a scooter, you shouldn’t expect it to to oversee them. perform like a sports car. When the District decided to bring in private contractors Is it working now, though? In spite who promised to provide public of the unusually large amount of services for a fraction of public time and money invested in the The District of Columbia’s sector costs, they adopted exactly system, ridership numbers on the this sort of logic. DC Streetcar are strictly mediocre argument that privatization among U.S. streetcar systems.67 The District of Columbia’s This is in spite of the higher overall of public transit would argument that privatization of density of the H Street Benning save money and improve public transit would save money Road area compared to the other and improve service has been systems with similar ridership service has been shortsighted shortsighted and disproven. Its numbers. Given that these numbers and disproven continued pursuit of privatization were taken from a period in which has been at the expense of the streetcar service is still fare-free, it’s safety and reliability of both unlikely that they will significantly the regional and local public improve over time. transit systems, has unnecessarily undermined public confidence in these services, and has failed to deliver promised cost savings.

CONCLUSION Unfortunately, despite several public and private confrontations with Circulator and Streetcar workers Public officials’ willingness to forfeit their responsibilities and their community allies, Mayor Bowser and many and entrust a for-profit contractor with a public service District leaders have refused to municipalize any of is not unique to the District of Columbia. The story the services or take a direct interest in building a better is the same in dozens of American cities. A cash- regional system. Instead, they continue to pursue strapped municipality sees opportunity in attracting privatization of public services more broadly, including vaguely-defined “Millennials.” It envisions cosmetic the introduction of privately-run ambulances,68 the urban improvements to attract them: an unprotected expansion of charter schools,69 and the continued bike lane here, a privately-built rail segment there, a WiFi-equipped bus that runs between new condos, 68 Hermann, Peter. Private ambulances will soon be sent out on calls in downtown offices, and a nightlife spot. It is then the District. February 16, 2016. Washington Post. Online at: https:// propositioned by a private contractor. They promise www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/private-ambulances-will- soon-start-responding-to-calls-in-the-district/2016/02/16/3783ebd4- that they can provide these services less expensively and d4c8-11e5-b195-2e29a4e13425_story.html (Accessed September 16, 2016). Austermuhle, Martin. Private Ambulances Start Helping D.C. Fire Department Respond To Medical Calls. March 27, 2016. WAMU. Online at: 67 Malouff, Dan. DC Streetcar ridership is... actually not bad. May 13, 2016. http://wamu.org/news/16/03/27/private_ambulances_start_helping_dc_ Greater Greater Washington. Online at: http://greatergreaterwashington.org/ respond_to_medical_calls (Accessed September 16, 2016). post/30782/dc-streetcar-ridership-is-actually-not-bad/ (Accessed September 16, 2016). 69 Decarr, Kristin. Bowser’s Mayoral Win in DC Signals Relief for Charter

10 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit Amalgamated Transit Union 11 contracting of the District’s school lunch system to a private contractor despite numerous well-documented failures.70

Given the failure of local elected officials to acknowledge the limitations of privatization and their refusal to change course despite high-profile failures, it will be up to the people of the District to take the wheel. They can do this by organizing and demanding a public transit system that is once again the envy of the nation, as it was when Metrorail first opened. With riders and workers aligned, they have the power to demand bus service that serves all of the residents of the District, rather than one that only subsidizes the leisure of city elites. They can demand that transit projects serve community needs rather than functioning simply as toys for regional developers. More immediately, they can demand that District officials municipalize existing local transit services.

As this report makes clear, however, at the core of any such effort should be a fundamental principle: public services must first and foremost serve the public good, not the needs of private profit.

Schools. Online at: http://www.educationnews.org/education-policy-and- politics/bowsers-mayoral-win-in-dc-signals-relief-for-charter-schools/ November 5, 2014. EducationNews.org. (Accessed September 16, 2016). Statement from DFER-DC on Mayor’s Announcement of Long-term Locations for DC Public Charter Schools. February 5, 2016. Democrats for Education Reform. Online at: http://dfer.org/statement-from-dfer-dc-on-mayors- announcement-of-long-term-locations-for-dc-public-charter-schools/ (Accessed September 16, 2016). 70 Anderson, Jeffrey. Hunger Games. July 3, 2015. Washington City Paper. Online at: http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/article/13046988/ jeff-mills-whistleblower-suit-revealed-rotting-food-fraud-and-millions (Accessed September 16, 2016).

12 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit 12 Fool DC Twice: Why D.C. Must Abandon Private-Sector Control of Public Transit AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO/CLC 10000 New Hampshire Avenue, Silver Spring, MD 20903 Tel: 301-431-7100 | Toll Free: 1-888-240-1196 | Fax: 301-431-7117