Yearbook of Muslims in Europe the Titles Published in This Series Are Listed at Brill.Com/Yme Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 6

Yearbook of Muslims in Europe The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/yme Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 6

Editor-in-Chief

Jørgen S. Nielsen

Editors

Samim Akgönül Ahmet Alibašić Egdūnas Račius

LEIDEN | BOSTON This publication has been typeset in the multilingual ‘Brill’ typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1877-1432 isbn 978-90-04-27754-0 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-28305-3 (e-book)

Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Contents

Preface ix The Editors xiii Editorial Advisers xiv List of Technical Terms xv

Counting Muslims: Censuses, Categories, Policies and the Construction of Islam in Europe 1 Kerem Öktem

Country Surveys

Albania 19 Olsi Jazexhi

Armenia 35 Sevak Karamyan

Austria 45 Thomas Schmidinger and Alev Çakır

Azerbaijan 67 Bayram Balci and Altay Goyushov

Belgium 83 Nadia Fadil

Bosnia and Herzegovina 108 Aid Smajić

Bulgaria 126 Aziz Nazmi Shakir

Croatia 144 Dino Mujadžević vi contents

Cyprus 153 Ali Dayıoğlu and Mete Hatay

Czech Republic 176 Štěpán Macháček

Denmark 189 Brian Arly Jacobsen

Estonia 210 Ringo Ringvee

Finland 218 Teemu Pauha and Tuomas Martikainen

France 229 Franck Frégosi

Georgia 244 Satenik Mkrtchyan and Ketevan Khutsishvili

Germany 262 Mathias Rohe

Greece 288 Konstantinos Tsitselikis

Hungary 300 Norbert Pap

Iceland 308 Göran Larsson and Kristjan Thor Sigurdsson

Ireland 317 Oliver Scharbrodt and Victoria Montgomery

Italy 334 Stella Coglievina Contents vii

Kosovo 352 Besa Ismaili

Latvia 364 Valters Ščerbinskis

Liechtenstein 370 Thomas Schmidinger

Lithuania 378 Egdūnas Račius

Luxembourg 388 Sylvain Besch

Macedonia 398 Muharem Jahja

Malta 409 Martin R. Zammit

Moldova 416 Aurelia Felea

Montenegro 429 Sabina Pacariz

Netherlands 439 Martijn de Koning

Norway 459 Oddbjørn Leirvik

Poland 472 Agata S. Nalborczyk and Stanisław Grodź

Portugal 487 José Mapril and Nina Clara Tiesler viii contents

Romania 498 Irina Vainovski-Mihai

Russia 511 Elmira Akhmetova

Serbia 529 Almir Pramenković

Slovakia 540 Jaroslav Drobný

Slovenia 547 Christian Moe

Spain 555 Jordi Moreras

Sweden 570 Göran Larsson

Switzerland 582 Andreas Tunger-Zanetti and Mallory Schneuwly Purdie

Turkey 596 Ahmet Yildiz

Ukraine 614 Elmira Muratova

United Kingdom 625 Dilwar Hussain Preface

This is the sixth volume of the now well-established Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, covering the calendar year 2013. This year the volume includes only 45 countries, as contacts with our Belarus author have failed—we hope to have it back next year. We have as usual omitted the Vatican and the three mini-states, Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. While the continuing financial crisis has drawn media and political attention away from Islam and Muslims, much attention returned to the question during 2013 after something of a lull the previous year. The great political changes which have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011 continue to remain mostly absent, beyond the occasional appearance in the section on public debate and the media. Even in those countries where there traditionally has been a close connection between Libya and local Muslim organisations it has not been possible to register the impact of the fall of the old Libyan regime. The impact of the civil war in Syria has been more marked with a significant rise in the number of Syrian refugees, especially into southern and south-eastern Europe. We have happily been able to continue the practice started in vol. 5 of inviting a scholar to comment on the issues arising out of an aspect of developments which are common across most of the continent. This time we are grateful that Kerem Öktem has accepted the invitation to reflect on the question of numbers following the large number of official censuses which were published during 2012 and 2013. The structure of the country reports remains unchanged. The information is presented under the same headings for each country, so that users who wish to make comparisons across countries can quickly find the information they seek within the same numbered section of each country report. Although, of course, much of the material is of a more general nature, special attention is given to developments during the year. The statistics provided in the first section usually state clearly which year they apply to, which is not necessarily 2013, as there are many countries where such statistics are not gathered regularly. Any significant developments that have taken place in a country since the beginning of 2014 have been held over to the next volume. In the process of copy editing, all the web sites cited in source references were tested, and they were functioning at the beginning of April 2014. It goes without saying that the situations in the various countries differ enormously in terms of numbers, complexity and occasionally the peculiarity of one aspect or another, usually to do with legal status. We have therefore x preface not imposed any strict guidelines for the length of individual country entries, except to keep within a guideline maximum—and even that we have had to breach in certain, in our view, justified cases. Sections 1–12 in each country report have a focus that allows for the presentation of factual data, but it is inevitable that, in deciding what information to include and what to exclude, judgments have had to be made. This is the case especially in section 3, where we have had to choose which national Muslim organisations to include. In countries with smaller populations, two organisations may be all that exist in the country, while in other, larger countries some provincial organisations may have national impact. The same goes for Muslim media, covered in section 12. On the other hand, the last three sections, 13–16, are more evaluative in their intent. Given that the situation is so varied among the countries covered, section 13, on family law, can only touch very briefly on those aspects that are particular to the country in question and which especially have impacts on Muslims and on public awareness. Readers interested in more detail will need to go to the extensive and technical legal literature. To help readers use the country reports, especially if they intend to make thematic comparisons across Europe, a more detailed indication of what each section of the country reports is intended to include may be helpful:

1. Muslim populations: Muslim populations, including their history within the country and ethnic composition, with overview statistics covering current numbers and ethnic and geographical distribution. This will include, as appropriate, an indication of the nature of the sources and a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the statistics. Any statistics here and later, should specify the basis on which they have been worked out, including reference to ranges of uncertainty. 2. Islam and the state: A summary of the general relation between state and religion, including questions of official recognition where relevant, and data on the place of Muslims and Muslim organisations within this structure, their place in the public sphere, and access to public funding. 3. Main Muslim organisations: Identification of the main national and, if relevant, regional or ‘sectarian’ Muslim organisations, including contact details, indication of their relative importance and ethnic, religious (Sunni, Shiʿi, Sufi, or other theological trend) and national allegiance. This will include as appropriate charities, cultural organisations, political parties and links with transnational and/or foreign organisations and movements. 4. Mosques and prayer houses: This section will provide an overview of mosques and prayer houses, including identification and locations of the main concentrations and overall numbers analysed according to local Preface xi

practice. Prayer rooms in public institutions. Legal issues, especially as regards official planning processes, will be referred to when relevant. 5. Children’s education: The place of Islam and Muslims in the general education system, including the teaching of Islam within the curriculum, any special arrangements for Muslim pupils, and provision for separate (private or public) Muslim-owned or -managed schools. 6. Higher and professional education: The history and place of Islamic studies in further and higher education institutions, including the provision of private or public professional training for imams. 7. Burial and cemeteries: Provision of facilities for Muslim burial both in terms of meeting ritual expectations and provision of space for Muslim cemeteries. 8. ‘Chaplaincy’ in state institutions: Provision of Muslim religious counselling and/or ritual services for Muslims in public institutions such as health services, prisons, and the armed forces. 9. Religious festivals: The status of the main Muslim religious festivals, how they are celebrated, and the extent to which they are publicly recognised, for example, in employment law or school holiday arrangements. Numbers of pilgrims on the annual hajj. 10. Halal products and Islamic services: Access to halal food and its sale, whether halal slaughter is permitted, and whether halal food is available in public institutions; special arrangements for hajj travel, access to Islamic banking and finance. Where appropriate include agency/company names and contacts. 11. Dress codes: How far—and where –Muslim dress, especially for women, hijab (head scarf ) and niqab (face covering), is permitted and practised, including reference to photos in id cards and passports. 12. Publications and media: A survey of the main Muslim print and electronic media. 13. Family law: The practice of elements of Islamic family law, whether formally in the official legal systems or informally within local social environments. 14. Interreligious relations: National interreligious councils and Muslim members, if any; interreligious events with Muslim participation (e.g. public celebrations/programmes, statements). 15. Public opinion and debate: Main features of the public debate about Islam and Muslims, including reference to the results of significant public opinion polls. 16. Major cultural events: Reference to any significant cultural events at which Islam or Muslims as a religious or cultural group have been a focus, whether organised by Muslims or by others. xii preface

The editors have entered into extensive correspondence with the country authors to seek clarification and to try to ensure that the information provided is as comparable across countries as possible. The form in which each country report is published is often the result of several exchanges back and forth between the author and the editors. The country chapters necessarily use various terms in use by Muslims and others for aspects of Muslim life and worship. Some may be familiar to readers and others not, so we include a list of technical terms which we trust will be useful.

Our thanks are due to the many researchers that have contributed to the volume. We are particularly indebted to Mark Bebawi for often complicated copy-editing; and colleagues at Brill, Nicolette van der Hoek, Nienke Brienen- Moolenaar ‎and Joed Elich, for their continuing enthusiastic support and cooperation.

The Editors Copenhagen, Kaunas, Sarajevo, Strasbourg, June 2014 The Editors

Jørgen S. Nielsen is Hon. Professor of Islamic Studies at the Faculties of Theology and Humanities, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Previously at the University of Birmingham, he has been researching and writing about Islam in Europe since 1978. He is the author of Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 3rd edition 2004), editor of Islam in Denmark: The Challenge of Diversity (Lanham: Lexington, 2012), and editor of Muslim Political Participation in Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).

Samim Akgönül is Professor at Strasbourg University and researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (cnrs). He also teaches Political Science at Syracuse University, usa, and International Relations at Yeditepe University, Istanbul. Among his recent publications are Minorité: regards croisés sur le concept de minorité dans le contexte turc (Istanbul: Isis, 2010) and The Minority Concept in the Turkish Context: Practices and Perceptions in Turkey, Greece and France (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

Ahmet Alibašić holds a PhD from the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo. He is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, and director of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He writes on Islam in se Europe, Islamic political thought, and interreligious relations.

Egdūnas Račius is Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies and head of the Department of Regional Studies at the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy of Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. His recent publications include “Islamic Organizations in the Baltic States: Commonalities and Differences,” in Matthias Kortmann & Kerstin Rosenow- Williams (eds.), Islamic organizations in Europe and the usa: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (London: Palgrave-Macmillian, 2013), pp. 111–128, and “Lithuanian Muslims’ attitudes toward participation in democratic political process: the case of converts,” in Jørgen Nielsen (ed.), Muslim political participation in Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 83–101. Editorial Advisers

Prof. Felice Dassetto Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Etudes de l’Islam dans le Monde Contemporain (cismoc), Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium

Dr Franck Frégosi Maison Inter-universitaire des Sciences de l’Homme, Strasbourg, Alsace, and Institut d’Etudes Politiques d’Aix en Provence, France

Dr Lene Kühle Faculty of Humanities, University of Aarhus, Denmark

Dr Nico Landman Department for Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Netherlands

Prof. Tariq Modood Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, United Kingdom

Dr Ferid Muhic University of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, Macedonia

Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland

Prof. Alexandre Popovic Directeur de recherche émérite au cnrs, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Socials (ehess), Paris, France

Dr Nina Clara Tiesler Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal List of Technical Terms

While many Islamic terms originate in Arabic, many have also acquired local variations. In the following we try to cover the most common variations, and the user will occasionally have to use a bit of imagination to adjust spellings. adhan/azan/ call to prayer. ezan Ahl al-bayt/ the family/descendants of the Prophet. Al al-Bayt Ahmadi/ reform movement founded in India in the 19th century and Ahmadiyya widely regarded by other Muslims as heretical. Alevi movement with traces back to the 12th century, often esoteric in nature and with links to Shiʿism; today especially strong among Turks and Kurds of eastern Anatolian origin. ʿAshura festival on the 10th of Muharram (1st month of the Islamic calendar) marking the death of Husayn ibn Ali (3rd Shiʿi imam) at the battle of Karbala in 680; a central Shi‛ite celebration. bayram festival (esp. Turkish for ʿid, q.v). Bektashi a heterodox Sufi order with strong Ottoman roots; marginalised during the mid-19th century Ottoman reforms and banned with other Sufi orders by the Turkish republic in the 1920s. burqa specifically the Afghan-style female full body covering, incl. the face; in common usage in Europe now taken to mean any form of female full body and face covering. dershane “cram school”, type of specialised school dervish a common term for Sufi. dhikr ritual practised by devotees of a Sufi tradition fatwa statement of opinion on a point of theology or law issued by an authority in response to an application. hafiz person who knows Qur’an by heart. Hajj the annual pilgrimage at Mecca at the beginning of the 12th month of the Islamic calendar; the highpoint is ʿId al-Adha. halal permitted. haram prohibited. hijab head scarf worn by women. xvi list of technical terms

Hijra migration of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Madina (Yathrib) in 622. husayniyya popular centre of learning and devotion in the Shiʿite tradition. ʿid festival (in Turkish usually bayram). ʿId al-Adha Feast of the Sacrifice during the pilgrimage at Mecca. ʿId al-Fitr festival ending the fast of Ramadan. iftar breaking of the fast at the end of the day during Ramadan, increasingly celebrated in invited company by mosques, churches and other organisations. imam religious leader, most commonly the one who leads the congregation at the regular prayers; also used about prominent scholars and spiritual leaders. Among Shiʿi Muslims, a legitimate leader of the community. jum‘a Friday noon prayer. khutba sermon. kurban/ sacrifice, as in Turkish kurban bayram (ʿId al-Adha). qurban Lailat al-qadr the ‘night of power’, 27th Ramadan, the celebration of the revelation of the Qur’an. madhhab school of law or theology. madrasa/ school at any level, usually elementary and high Islamic. medrese masjid mosque. mawlid/mevlud birthday of the Prophet. Mizar/ miziar cemetery. muadhdhin/ the person who calls to prayer. muezzin mufti person who issues fatwa; in some modern states the title of the leading Islamic official. muftiate office or institution of mufti. nawruz/nevruz New Year in the Persian/Turkish tradition. nikah marriage formalised in the Islamic tradition. niqab female face covering. ra’is al-ulama ‘dean of the scholars’, applied in some countries to the official head of the Muslim community. Ramadan the 9th month of the Islamic calendar, the month of fasting. riba (unlawful) interest on capital. Sabantuj Tatar and Bashkir cultural festival. List Of Technical Terms xvii sadaqa alms given at various occasions, often in connection with a religious festival. salah/salat prescribed prayers five times a day. Shariʿa Islamic law and ethics, the principles of good Islamic behaviour. shaykh/sheikh leader of a congregation, especially of a Sufi character; honorific for someone learned. Shiʿi/Shiʿism the branches within Islam which trace their authority through the descendants of ‘Ali, the Prophet’s nephew and son-in-law; make up 12–15% of the total number of Muslims worldwide. Sufi/Sufism the mystical tradition. Sunni/Sunnism the majority tradition within Islam, sometimes (misleadingly) called ‘orthodox’. talaq divorce by repudiation. tariqa/tarikat Sufi order. tekke/teke a Sufi meeting place (Turkish). turbe/turba tomb of a venerated person (‘saint’), often the object of popular devotion. umma the global community of believers. ‘umra the lesser pilgrimage at Mecca taking place at times other than Hajj. vakf/waqf religious foundation (of property) providing income for religious, charitable or educational purposes. zakah/zakat obligatory almsgiving. zawiya a Sufi meeting place (Arabic). zikr see dhikr. ziyara visiting family graves at set times of year.

Counting Muslims: Censuses, Categories, Policies and the Construction of Islam in Europe

Kerem Öktem

1 Introduction1

In many western and eastern European countries, debates about the number of Muslims have been at the very centre of public concern about immigration, diversity and security. Relatedly, a whole set of countries have introduced questions about religion in their census questionnaires in the last few years. Remarkably, most Western Balkan states (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) held censuses in 2011, in which the question of ethnic and religious affiliation was a controversially debated issue.2 In countries where constitutional requirements exclude questions on religious identity from censuses, like in Turkey since 1965 and France, surveys have been carried out to accrue empirical evidence of the number of Muslims living in those countries. In most European countries, we now have a general sense of the share Muslims hold in the general population. Yet, what does it mean when a state agency decides to count the ‘Muslims’ living in its territory? And what does ‘Muslim’ mean in this context? How are such categories constructed and how do they reflect on the real world? In this opening essay of the sixth volume of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, I suggest that the “statistical realism” inherent in these censuses (and suggested inter alia by

* Kerem Öktem is Professor for the study of Southeast Europe and Turkey at the University of Graz and Research Fellow at the European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, where he also teaches at the Faculty of Oriental Studies. 1 I would like to thank Samim Akgönül and Jørgen Nielsen, with whom I began the discussion of Muslim demographies and related topics during a conference I co-convened with my col- league Hansjörg Schmid at the Catholic Academy of Stuttgart-Rottenburg in November 2013. Riem Spielhaus, Armina Omerika, and Naika Foroutan all contributed to this discussion and suggested that the “category of Muslims” in Europe is being constructed “as we speak.” This hypothesis gave me the inspiration to think about the issue of “counting Muslims” in the context of the construction of the identity category “Islam” and “Muslim” in Europe. The speeches of said conference are available for download at www.die-internet-akademie.de/br-downloads .html?no_cache=1&tx_crieventmodule_pi1[showUid]=18298, accessed 26 May 2014. 2 Visoka, Gëzim and Elvin Gjevori, ‘Census politics and ethnicity in the Western Balkans,’ East European Politics, 2013, pp. 2–20, p. 1.

French statistician Labbé),3 which reduces complex subjective “identities” like faith4 and spiritual belief to an assumed objective core, has to be reconsidered.5 Is this statistical counting exercise then a reductio ad absurdum or a legitimate public act to shed light on an opaque question about a population that has been in the limelight at least since the 9/11 attacks, and in many countries well before that? Or could the census data on Muslim communities in Europe even be an act of enlightened public policy that seeks to counter fear-mongering against cultural and religious diversity and against Muslim immigrants and their descendants, who more often than not are now citizens of those countries? This chapter seeks to respond to those questions by disentangling the overlapping issues and contestations around the theme of censuses as state-led action to count and control of Muslim populations in Europe. I propose a matrix with two thematic axes, with the country context6 on one side and the census theme on the other. The census theme hosts four core actors and locales: Censuses and surveys administered by the state, Islamophobic actors who present the thesis of an ‘Islamic takeover’ of Europe, Muslim activists and institutions who seek to defend their flock and sometimes inflate the numbers of Muslims to further their claims, and external pollsters, like the Pew Research Centre, which have made important contributions and clarifications to the debate on Muslims in Europe. In the following four sections, I will discuss the four actors and locales

3 Kertzer, David and Dominique Arel (eds.), Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 19. 4 For a discussion of the complex relations between belief, belonging and behaviour see Akgönül, Samim, The Minority Concept in the Turkish Context. Practices and perceptions in Turkey, Greece, and France (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013). 5 The same is true for the category of ethnicity, which according to the uk demographer Ludi Simpson “is no less imposed than other social categories.” He comes to this conclusion by highlighting the shifting preferences of members of the same group for different ethnic community categories in the British census. Cf. Simpson, Ludi, ‘The concept of ethnicity has not much science about it and is no less imposed than other social categories’, lse Blogs British Politics and Society, April 8, 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ archives/41131?utm_content=buffer9a187&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter .com&utm_campaign=buffer, accessed 14 April 2014. 6 This categorisation is inspired by Konstantinos Tsitselikis’ differentiation of Muslim communities in Europe into three main groups: The post-colonial West, in which there are distinct immigrant Islams, a post-communist East where indigenous Muslim groups co-exist with incoming Muslim immigrants and a Post-Ottoman Southeast, where indigenous Muslim communities dominate. Cf. Tsitselikis, Konstantinos, “European Islams and Muslim Europes: Some thoughts about studying Europe’s contemporary Islam”, in Nielsen, Jørgen, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić and Egdunas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 5. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013) pp. 1–18. Counting Muslims 3

and then distinguish, where possible, between the different country contexts of immigrant Islam in Western and parts of Eastern Europe, minority Islam in Southeast Europe and plurality and majority contexts of Muslim communities in countries like Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania and Turkey.

table 1 Analytical matrix

Census as Islamophobic/ Muslim activists/ External actors/ state action Secularist actors institutions research centres

Islam predomi- Achieve a legible Inflate numbers Inflate numbers to Create credible nantly related society to underline strengthen claims estimates of to Immigration threat for representation Muslim popula- [Western and Create workable perceptions tions without parts of Eastern categories Homogenise questioning the Europe] Muslim category Estimate risks populations

Retrieve data for public policy

Differentiation and homogenisation

Minority Islam Censuses as space Inflate numbers Inflate numbers to Create credible [Southeast for contestation to underline strengthen claims estimates of Europe] threat for representation Muslim popula- Overlap of religious perceptions tions without and ethnic categories questioning the category

Plurality/ Censuses as space Concerns over Contestation of Create credible Majority Islam for contestation “European image”, census results by estimates of [Southeast attempts at Muslim Muslim popula- Europe] Overlap of religious downplaying ratio associations tions without and ethnic categories of Muslims questioning the (Albania, Kosovo) category Homogenisation of the category Muslim (Turkey) 4 Öktem

2 Modernity, Control and Identity Construction: Censuses and Surveys Administered by State Agencies

The relationship between the modern state, the census and the aim to “make a society legible” is a well-established topos. James Scott argues that the “builders of the modern nation-state do not merely describe, observe, and map; they strive to shape a people and landscape that will fit these techniques of observation” (1998).7 A census thus does not simply reflect social reality as David Kertzer and Dominique Arel argue in their “Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses,” “it plays a key role in the construction of that reality.”8 They quote Pierre Bourdieu to underline the power to create social reality through the use of words, in this particular case, the words of Islam and Muslims: “By structuring the perception which social agents have of the social world, the act of naming helps to establish the structure of the world, and does so all the more significantly the more widely it is recognised, i.e. authorised.”9 This social constructivist perspective on censuses and the aim to achieve legibility of a community that is more often than not considered as alien, and almost always as potentially problematic, can help us to understand the debates on the number of Muslims, particularly in the Western European context where Islam is still perceived as an immigrant religion, even though most manifestations of “Muslimness” in Europe are historically and culturally specific to its European context. Located at the intersection of perceived or real problem constellations (security risks; immigration; class), Muslim communities suffer from marginalisation, discrimination and educational under- achievement.10 It is at this intersection that nation-states are often caught in a dilemma between the desire to assimilate Muslims into what are considered ‘national’ or ‘acceptable’ forms of Islam and the responsibility to provide for universal human rights, including the right to the freedom of religion.11 Whether primarily motivated by security concerns or the genuine desire to address the challenges communities perceived as immigrants are facing— more often than not by a mixture of both—Western European states have

7 Scott, James, Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 122. 8 Kertzer, David and Dominique Arel (eds.), Census and Identity, p. 2. 9 Kertzer, David and Dominique Arel (eds.), Census and Identity, p. 21. 10 At Home in Europe project, Muslims in Europe: A report on 11 eu cities (New York, London, Budapest: Open Society Foundations, 2009). 11 Benhabib, Seyla, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Counting Muslims 5 engaged in counting exercises trying to ascertain the numbers of their Muslim citizens and residents. Once they embarked on this task, they immediately encountered the second challenge, i.e. how they would define and demarcate “Muslimness” and thereby reduce a complex sense of belonging into a clear-cut and most importantly workable category for public debate and policy. The example of the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkonferenz)12 suggests that the very diversity inherent in Muslim life has complicated this task considerably, while it has not prevented this agency from seeking to construct Islam as a category of the social and political. By inviting representatives not only of the main (mostly Turkish) Sunni Muslim associations, but also Alevi organisations some of which see themselves outside the umbrella of Orthodox Islam, and even atheists of Muslim cultural backgrounds and so-called “critics of Islam” (Islamkritiker), the Conference at once differentiated and homogenised communities related to Islam. The publication ‘Muslim life in Germany,’13 a sophisticated and well- researched volume on Germany’s Muslim communities, which the conference commissioned, seeks to square this circle between explaining the diversity of Muslim communities according to country or origin, ethnicity, language, denomination and religious tradition, while it also attempts to make public policy recommendations for a variety of communities that often have neither a collective language nor a shared cultural heritage or religious tradition in common. In so doing, it both constructs and deconstructs the category of Islam and Muslims and thereby creates a field of tension and contestation, both between and within Muslim communities, as well as within the public domain.14 Differentiation and reduction of the category appear as related strategies within the state that cater to different interests ranging from legibility to control, inclusivity and openness for difference to realpolitik considerations such as accounting for the high level of organisation among Alevi communities.

12 The Conference began its work in 2009 and was initially welcomed by all Muslim associations. Now it appears to be phased out gradually. See www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/ dik/de/Startseite/startseite-node.html, accessed 1 March 2014. 13 Haug, Sonja, Anja Stichs and Stephanie Müssig, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland, im Auftrag der Deutschen Islamkonferenz (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2009). 14 Kerem Öktem, ‘Germany’, in Shahin, Emad El-Din (ed.), Oxford Encyclopaedia of Islam and Politics (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). 6 Öktem

In countries of Muslim immigration in Europe, hence, the debate on what should constitute “Islam” and “Muslimness,” the construction of appropriate and measurable categories and the “naming” of Muslims is just beginning. This ‘territorialisation of religion,’15 that in countries like Germany or France is led by state actors, is contested by Muslim associations as well as by Islamophobic activists, who will be discussed in the following section. It is also a process that is intertwined with debates on ‘European Islam’ or nationalised forms of Islam, both of which are concerned with creating clearly defined categories of otherwise fuzzy and often unwelcome constellations of Muslims as foreign actors. In Muslim minority, plurality and majority contexts in Southeast Europe, the categories are slightly less contested, as they have been constructed in longer historical processes during the late Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the two Yugoslavias.16 The juxtaposition of notions of the Ottoman millet on one side and nationality politics in Socialist Yugoslavia on the other have created relatively clearly defined categories, at least in terms of Muslims where ethnicity and religion tend to overlap.17 Such is the case in Macedonia and Kosovo, where Islam tends to coincide with Albanian ethnicity. This is less so in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the term ‘Muslim’ has taken on an ethno- national significance and co-exists with the term ‘Bosniak’ to signify the same group despite internal differentiations, yet where confessional identity and national group have overlapped since the early 20th century.18 In Albania,

15 Thanks to Samim Akgönül, who alerted me to the phenomenon of the ‘territorialisation of religion’ by nation-states, a phenomenon further explored by Brubaker, Roger, ‘Religion and nationalism: four approaches,’ Nations and Nationalism, 18: 1 (2012), pp. 2–20. 16 This process of construction, however, was highly traumatic as it drew heavily on strategically used political violence by the nation-builders of different communities, particularly in Macedonia. Cf. Yosmaoğlu, Ipek K., Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013). 17 Cf. Radović, Milja, Citizenship and religion in the post-Yugoslav state. citsee Working Paper Series 2013/35 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2013) and Sarajlić, Eldar, A Citizenship Beyond the Nation-State: Dilemmas of the ‘Europeanisation’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina. citsee Working Paper Series 2010/09 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2010). 18 In Bosnia, however, there was confusion and heated debate over whether Muslim Bosnians should be counted as “Muslims” like in Yugoslav censuses or as “Bosniaks” in the 2013 census. The official decision in favour of the term “Bosniak” was criticised by most Muslim associations in the country for dividing the country’s Muslims. Yet, this conflict was about “Muslim” as ethnic category, as it was devised by Yugoslav authorities, not as a religious category. Cf. Jukic, Elvira M., Bosnian Census Accused of Dividing Bosniaks, BalkanInsight, 20 April 2013, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-muslims-complain- over-landmark-census, accessed 1 April 2014. Counting Muslims 7

Islam and Albanian ethnicity overlap, and even more so than in Kosovo or Macedonia, Muslimness is more of a nominal marker of social and regional identity within the post-atheist context of Albania. The censuses in the Western Balkans of 2011 are also excellent case studies for the social co-construction of census categories and their contestation, as Visoka and Gjevori argue in a recent paper,19 particularly focussing on ethnic and kin-group contestation. Census results were heavily contested in Kosovo, where Serbs in Northern Kosovo boycotted the process, and in Macedonia, where the ratio of Orthodox Slavo-Macedonians and Muslim Albanians (and other Muslim minorities) determines both representation in state agencies and access to state funds. More importantly, these ratios, in Macedonia’s complex system of ethnicised power-sharing, decide who “owns” the country: The dominant Slavo-Macedonians or the growing Albanian minority. It is particularly in those settings, where an ethno-religious group seeks hegemony of the state (i.e. with Slavo-Macedonians in Macedonia and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina) that census-taking and its results become contested and ethnicised. The Albanian census of 2011 was also controversial for a wide spectrum of perceived reasons ranging from the fear of secular intellectuals reluctant to appear “too Muslim” to Europe to the inflation of the numbers of Orthodox Albanian citizens manipulated by Greece. Another central debate closed in on the issue of self-declaration (i.e. citizens classifying themselves according to an ethno-religious category, rather than a census official making an “objective” decision on their behalf ) and on the internal differentiation of the category “Muslim.” While a group of Albanian intellectuals protested the inclusion of questions on ethnicity and religion as “dangerous,”20 the option to identify with the Sufi “Bektashi” brotherhood rather than “Muslim,” was opposed by the country’s official Muslim association.21 Despite the national myth about

19 Visoka, Gëzim and Elvin Gjevori, ‘Census politics and ethnicity in the Western Balkans.’ 20 Likmeta, Besar, ‘Albania’s Controversial Census Postponed’, Balkan Insight, March 2011, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-controversial-census-postponed-amid-row, accessed 25 March 2014. 21 Bektashism is a heterodox Sufi brotherhood with its roots in Shiʿi Islam, culturally shaped through its advancement from Central Asia via Anatolia to the Balkans. During Albania’s state and nation-building phase in the early 20th century, Bektashism took on a decid- edly national connotation as an Albanian religion. Cf. Norris, H.T., Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993) and Clayer, Nathalie, ‘La Bektachiyya’, in Popovic, Alexander and Veinstein, Gilles (eds.), Les Voies d’Allah: les ordres mystiques dans le monde musulman des origines à nos jours (Paris: Fayard, 1996) pp. 468–474. For a recent case study see: Kolczynska, Marta, ‘On the Asphalt Path to Divinity. Contemporary Transformations of 8 Öktem

Bektashism as a “modern” and “European” Albanian form of Islam,22 however, only slightly more than two per cent of all Albanians self-identified as Bektashi, while close to sixty per cent registered their belief as Muslim.23 In Bulgaria, where religious affiliation is a census question, ten per cent of the population did identify as Sunni Muslim, while the statisticians also introduced a category of ‘Shiʿi Muslim,’ in order to account for the country’s Alevi-Bektashi minority.24 As in the Western Balkans, there is a significant overlap between ethnicity and religion in Bulgaria, where the large majority of Muslims is Turkish-speaking, while a minority of Slavic speakers, the Pomaks, and an even smaller group of Roma adhere to Islam. In Bulgaria, Pomaks seek to distinguish themselves from Muslim Turks and may be experiencing a nationalising process of their religious belonging. In Greece, Pomak identity is also contested between the Greek state, which seeks claim them as Greeks, Turkish minority activists who treat them as Turks and Pomaks themselves, who are caught in between. In the Muslim-majority context of Turkey—nominally secular until the rising importance of political Islam in the 1990s and the gradual takeover of the Muslim conservative Justice and Development akp in 2002—religion has not been part of the census questionnaire since 1965, even though religious affiliation is recorded in personal registers and identity documents. While it is generally agreed that Turkey is “99 per cent Muslim,” the breakdown between the country’s main Islamic traditions has only been estimated once. The 2006 survey by Milliyet Konda25 was the first and so far last such attempt to distinguish between the majority Sunni-Hanafi community, the predominantly Kurdish Sunni-Shafi’i group, the Alevi-Bektashi tradition and the small Shiʿi-

Albanian Bektashism: The Case of Sari Saltik Teqe in Kruja,’ Anthropological Journal of European Cultures, 22:2 (2013), pp. 53–71. 22 Clayer, Nathalie, ‘Behind the Veil. The reform of Islam in inter-war Albania or the search for a “modern” and “European” Islam’, in Clayer, Nathalie and Germain, Eric (eds.), Islam In Inter-War Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 128–155. 23 Jazexhi, Olsi, ‘Albania,’ in Nielsen, Jørgen, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić and Egdunas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 5 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013) pp. 22–35. 24 2011 Population Census—Main Results, National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, 2011, p. 4, www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf, accessed 29 March 2014. 25 Yildiz, Ahmet, ‘Turkey,’ in Nielsen, Jørgen, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić and Egdunas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 5 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013) p. 649. Cf. Biz Kimiz? Toplumsal yapı araştırması, Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, 2006, www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2006_09_konda_Toplumsal_Yapi.pdf, accessed 3 April 2013. Counting Muslims 9

Ja‘fari community. This case of a state that appears to be undiscerning towards religion, more for the sake of Muslim unity than out of secular considerations, and at the same time keeps track of its citizens’ religious affiliations is particularly intriguing. Despite this considerable diversity in Europe in terms of censuses, surveys and discussion about categories, the “counting of Muslims,” and the debate about their numbers reminds us of the gulf between the neatly organised social representations of the census and the messy reality of the social world with its fluid and contested identities, particularly when it comes to Muslim immigrant communities in Western Europe and Muslim minority communities in Muslim majority contexts. To this we can add the juxtaposition of ethnic and religious identity in the yet unconsolidated states of the Western Balkans.

3 The Fear of Eurabia: Islamophobic Actors and the “Fear of Small Numbers”

The interest in the number of Muslims in Europe is not limited to state actors, but extends deep into particular segments of civil society. In most western European countries, far right parties as well as some of the conservative establishments have moved away from conventional Anti-Semitism to a position that can be largely described as Islamophobic. Whether the Front National, Austria’s Freedom Party, the Lega Nord, the British National Party or the Flemish National Interest, the members of these movements agree with the idea that Europe is existentially threatened by immigration from Muslim countries and high birth rates among Muslim communities. So do a number of public intellectuals, including the British historian Niall Ferguson, who argues that “a youthful Muslim society to the south of the Mediterranean is poised to colonise—the term is not too strong—a senescent Europe.”26 This thesis has been advanced most succinctly by Bat Ye’or in her 2005 publication Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis.27 Ye’or paints an emotive image of a Europe that is slowly infiltrated by Muslim masses and whose values and institutions will be subverted once their Muslim populations reach a certain proportion. Ironically, Ye’or is not primarily concerned with Islam, but uses this

26 Ferguson, Niall, ‘Eurabia?’, The New York Times, 4 April 2004, www.nytimes.com/2004/ 04/04/magazine/04WWLN.html, accessed 28 April 2014. 27 Ye’or, Bat, Eurabia: the Euro-Arab axis (Madison, nj: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). 10 Öktem thesis to accuse European governments of a supposed lack of support for Israel and to expose what in her view is complacency with Arab regimes. The argument of a “demographic time bomb” for Europe, is in fact a direct transposition from the Israeli debate,28 yet it resounded with significant parts of European publics and extended beyond western Europe.29 A particularly momentous artefact is the anonymous video “Muslim Demographics,”30 which has been viewed almost 15 million times since it was first uploaded to YouTube in March 2009. The video predicts that due to expo- nentially rising birth rates among Muslim immigrants and increasing “Islamic immigration,” as the narrator suggests, most Western European countries will have Muslim population majorities by 2050 and subsequently then will be turned into Shariʿa states. These assertions have been dismissed as scaremongering and proven to be wrong point by point by population scientists.31 Yet, they have been able to shape nation-wide debates on Islam, immigration and diversity in Western Europe, where the fear of difference is often expressed through demographic data regarding Muslims.32 On the far right, these myths have become building blocks of anti-Muslim electoral politics, highlighting the extent to which debates on the number of Muslims in Europe is politicised, negatively connoted and crucially central to some political groups and debates.

28 Cf. Sadot, Uri, Israel’s Demographic Time Bomb Is a Dud, Foreign Policy (December 2013), www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/18/israel_s_demographic_time_bomb_is_a_dud_ israel_arab_two_state_solution, accessed 2 April 2014. 29 Comparable images and arguments of a ‘Muslim takeover’ are often used in the Western Balkans to de-legitimise claims of Muslims, i.e. in Macedonia, Serbia and even in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Cf. Öktem, Kerem, ‘Between emigration, de-Islamization and the nation- state: Muslim communities in the Balkans,’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 11:2 (2011), pp. 151–169. 30 Anonymous, ‘Muslim Demographics,’ www.youtube.com/watch?v=6–3X5hIFXYU, accessed 2 April 2014. 31 The bbc 4 Radio programme “More or Less” examined every single allegation in the video in February 2012 and debunked them as inappropriate. The programme also cites Max Rademeyer, the former President of the German Federal Statistics Agency and current eu Chief Statistician, who is alluded to in the video. He describes the producers’ approach as “the worst way to use statistics,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfY3LqOpTLc&noredir ect=1, accessed 2 April 2014. 32 Cf. Appadurai, Arjun, Fear of small numbers: an essay on the geography of anger (Durham, N.C. and London: Duke University Press, 2006). Counting Muslims 11

4 Muslim Activists and Institutions: Basing Claims on Numbers, Defending the Umma

So far, we have discussed external perspectives, i.e. the efforts of nation states to count, control and provide, and the political agenda of Islamophobic movements and their scaremongering about growing Muslim populations. Yet, how does the question about censuses, categories and numbers play out within Muslim communities? What are the questions being asked there? This again depends very much on the country context and the relative position of Muslim communities in terms of reputation and power. In country contexts shaped by a history of Muslim immigration, debates on numbers can be a way of claim-making in terms of recognition and public visibility. Yet given that most Muslim associations in Western Europe act within an unwel- coming environment, their narratives are unlikely to dwell on the numbers of Muslims in a country, let alone inflate them.33 More important in this context is the question of representation and on whose behalf representatives of Muslim associations like the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş or the Muslim Council of Britain, which are by definition not representative, speak. The neatly organised representations of numbers of Muslims yet again conflicts with the complex reality of the social world with its fluid and contested identities, where Muslims self-identify in multifarious ways, and more often than not, not as observant.34 The issue of representation and observance then raises another question, which is even more momentous and valid in all country contexts: What do numbers tell us about Muslims, if we don’t know whether the counted are actually observant or even self-identify as Muslim? In all public debates about these numbers, including in census data, the goals to create a legible society, to get a fuller picture, to provide data for public services, or to prepare for security risks, there is an implicit assumption that all those counted as Muslims also follow the cultural and religious codes of Islamic devotion. This tendency we

33 The exceptions here are websites that post the number of Muslims worldwide and in Europe, such as: www.muslimpopulation.com/Europe or www.islamicpopulation.com/ Europe/europe_islam.html. They use data from different sources including Wikipedia and censuses, though they tend to inflate the numbers. In the comments sections below the tables, users comment on how wonderful it is to witness that the number of Muslims is rising in Europe, and others who think the opposite. It is remarkable that the comments in favour of a growing Muslim population resound with the YouTube video on “Muslim Demographics.” 34 For the case of Germany see Foroutan, Naika, Idenity and (Muslim) integration in Germany (Washington D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2013). 12 Öktem can call the “totalising effect of numbers” is closely related to the reductionist “statistical realism” discussed earlier. Once counted as Muslim, and labelled as such, Pierre Bourdieu reminds us, this “act of naming helps to establish the structure of the world” and structures “the perception which social agents have of the social world.35 In this reading, it is the categorisation by the state that circulates through the social world and turns people of diverse backgrounds into Muslims.36 It is in this context then, that debates on the size of Muslim communities also create opportunities for associations, as well as for religious entrepreneurs, to homogenise Islam from within, i.e. to remind their communities that they have to obey certain rules and principles, now that they have been named and counted as Muslims. Many Muslims may indeed have become more observant as a reaction to rising Islamophobia coupled with the structuration of the social world of Muslims with reference to Islam, particularly since 9/11. Many others have been secular and opted for cultural integration in their countries of residence. Some have considered conversion or atheism, as is expressed in the councils representing former Muslims, particularly in the uk, Germany and France.37 In Southeast Europe, where ethnicity and religion tend to overlap, contestations over censuses and numbers have often not primarily been concerned with Islam, but with the political power of certain ethnic groups and with the ethnic rift censuses may cause between communities, particularly in Bosnia.38 In fact, Visoka and Gjevori’s39 excellent synopsis of census politics in the Western Balkans does not even refer to the issue of religion or Islam.

35 Cited in Kertzer, David and Dominique Arel (eds.), Census and Identity, p. 21. 36 In uk hospitals, for instance, admittance questionnaires register a patient’s religious affiliation. If the patient indicates his or her religion as Islam, he or she will be served halal food. There is, for reasons of simplicity, no option of having Islam as a religion and eating pork. 37 Cf. Council of Ex-Muslims in the uk, http://ex-muslim.org.uk; Zentralrat der Ex-Muslime, www.ex-muslime.de/indexAktuell.html; Conseil Central des Ex-Musulmans, http:// ex-musulmans.over-blog.com. There are comparable organisations in Belgium and Switzerland. 38 Irwin, Rachel, Dzenana Halimovic, Maja Bjelajac, Dražen Huterer, Mladen Lakić, ‘Bosnian Census Risks Deepening Ethnic Rifts,’ Institute for War and Peace Reporting: International Justice, December 2013: http://iwpr.net/report-news/bosnian-census-risks-deepening- ethnic-rifts, accessed 3 April 2014. 39 Visoka, Gëzim and Elvin Gjevori, ‘Census politics and ethnicity in the Western Balkans’, East European Politics, 2013, pp. 2–20. Counting Muslims 13

In Bosnia, the conceptual overlap in the census between the current national assignation “Bosniak,” i.e. Muslim Bosnian and the term “Muslim,” which used to designate Bosnians of Muslim heritage living in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina before 1993, has caused fear among the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini) that this confusion would lead to a smaller numeric presence of Bosniaks and hence to reduced political power. Reis-ul ulema Husein Kavazović hence issued a statement insisting on the ‘proper’ categorisation. He underlined that “the Islamic Community is obliged to protect Muslims from a tendentious mixing-up of religious and ethnic or national affiliations”40 and that citizens should declare themselves as Bosniak in terms of nation and ethnicity and as Muslim in terms of religion. In the Bosnian debate, however, many secular Muslims have tended to identify as ‘Bosnian,’ thereby making their numbers ineligible for the Muslim as well as for the Bosniak communities. The Bosnian case is a prime example of a contested census, even before its results are published, highlighting the challenge to reduce a politically polarised and complex social reality into “objective” numbers.

5 Pollsters from Outside: The Pew Research Centre

The final actor and its related field of knowledge which we shall turn to is that of the outside pollster. The us-based Pew Research Centre and its Forum on Religion and Public Life Project has provided the most credible estimates of global Muslim populations, as well as their demographic trends and their political attitudes on main issues.41 As is the case with all censuses and estimates, Pew polls take “Muslim” and “Islam” as a given category and use the label Muslim in its widest sense, i.e. referring to observant and non-observant Muslims, people with a Muslim heritage, orthodox and heterodox groups. As the most complete overview of Muslim demographics in Europe, together with the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, the Pew estimates have considerable policy impact and can also be seen as a scholarly response to the fear-evoking statistics of the “Muslim Demographics” video. According to their latest surveys,

40 Jukic, Elvira M. (2013) ‘Bosnian Census Accused of Dividing Bosniaks’, BalkanInsight, 20 April, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-muslims-complain-over-landmark- census, accessed 1 April 2014. 41 Religion and Public Life Project, The future of the global Muslim population: Europe (PewResearch: 2011), www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population- regional-europe/, accessed 30 March 2014. 14 Öktem there were 44.1 million Muslims in Europe (Council of Europe countries excluding Turkey, including European parts of Russia), with a projected rise to 58 million by 2030, though with generally falling population growth rates. What the Pew survey shows, despite all its shortcomings if approached from a social constructivist angle, is that even highly aggregated survey data can play an important role in providing empirical evidence in what is, as we have seen, often a misguided debate about Muslim demographics. It is remarkable that it is a us-based institution that brings this important contribution to the debate on European Muslims. Another conclusion, which we can draw from the Pew surveys, is that Muslim populations in their most inclusive definition will not make more than 8 per cent of the entire population of Europe by 2030. However defined, Muslims will remain a small minority religion and culture in Europe for the foreseeable future, while contestations over the definition, content and direction of Islam, and the counting of Muslims will continue.

6 Conclusion

Censuses are at heart of the modern nation-state’s desire to create conditions of legibility and control of its population. For this aim, state agencies need clear-cut categories of religious affiliation, an aim that could be achieved relatively easily in Western European societies with a strong Christian heritage, and after several waves of internal homogenisation and confessional cleansing. Germany is a good example on how the two main churches, the Protestant- Lutheran Church and the Catholic church became more or less dominant after centuries of expulsion of other Christian religious communities, which would then emigrate to the us (e.g. the Amish, the Mennonites). For the state of many Western European countries, the diversity of their Muslim immigrant communities is confusing and at times threatening, but this has only become an issue of public concern thanks to the confluence of two factors: The growing unease at Muslim populations building up since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the realisation of European publics that Muslim communities are not Gastarbeiter that will one day leave, but new citizens who make claims in their new home countries. In Western Europe, hence, the debates on how to count Muslims and whom to include are at the heart of the negotiation of citizenship rights and national identity. At the same time, they create polar trends of homogenisation (for counting and security purposes) and differentiation (for purposes of inclusivity and policy). While the category of “Islam” and “Muslims” is thereby mutually constructed in social space, interesting trends deserve scholarly attention: In a number of countries like Germany and the Netherlands, Turkey-based Counting Muslims 15

Alevism is increasingly emerging as a separate category not as a sub-group of Islam but as a religion on its own. New research could look into the effects of this development on Muslim-Alevi relations as well as on repercussions for inter-community relations in the country of origin. Another trend is the emergence of ex-Muslims in the public domain. Their presence does challenge the coherence of the category ‘Muslim’ and highlights a creeping ethnicisation of the category in Western Europe, but even more so in the United Kingdom. If the debates on Muslim communities in Western Europe are above all a case for dealing with new communities, in Southeast Europe they are mostly about ethnicity and national claims. Here, a range of contestations exists. In the successor states to Yugoslavia, ethnicity still trumps religion, but in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnicity and religion are so deeply intertwined that every religious claim also becomes a claim on behalf of the national group. Another concern in the Albanian speaking parts of the region, and particularly in Kosovo and Albania, is the hope of European-oriented intellectuals to dimin- ish the “Muslimness” of their countries and to emphasise minority religions such as Catholicism or the ostensibly more tolerant Bektashi traditions as the “true Albanian” religion.42 This cultural-religious mimesis would need some detailed exploration. Turkey, as a majority Muslim state with an increasingly post-secular orientation on the margins of Europe, seems to synthesise many of the questions that we have encountered in the different contexts of Europe: What does being counted as Muslim really mean in terms of identity, belonging, piety and observance? What are the political factors that determine whether census categories are dictated by state agencies or chosen by citizens, and which ones account for determining whether different Islamic traditions and communities are differentiated or homogenised in a census? Keeping in mind that Turkey is the only country covered in this Yearbook, where a secularist arrangement of state and power is gradually succeeded by a state dominated and legitimised by religion, and in particular by Sunni Islam, scholarly interest should be devoted to the new dynamics of religious negotiations around Islam in a non-secular context. Finally, we should welcome the debate on Muslim demographics, censuses and categories in Europe as a social constructivist exercise of reminding our- selves that the social world is indeed complex and messy and the census only a very incomplete exercise of the representation thereof. An exercise, however, that remains necessary for different reasons in all parts of Europe.

42 ‘The politics of religion in Kosovo’, New Kosova Report, 2 March 2008, http://newkosova report.com/20080302689/Views-and-Analysis/the-politics-of-religion-in-kosovo.html, accessed 1 April 2014.

Country Surveys

∵

Albania

Olsi Jazexhi*

1 Muslim Populations

The official results of population registrations for the Muslim population of Albania that were conducted in 1937 and 1945 estimated that Muslims made up 69.3% and 72% respectively of the total population of the country.1 However, after the fall of communism the numbers of Muslims have dropped significantly. The census that was conducted in Albania in 2011 concluded that the number of Muslims (Bektashis and Sunnis included) was 1,646,236 or 58.79% of the population.2 They are still the largest religious community of the country, followed by the Catholic and Orthodox Christians. However they no longer constitute 70% of the population, having lost around 10% of their previous percentage. The Muslims of Albania are generally classified as ethnic Albanians in many publications. However, after the fall of communism and moderation of the state’s official nationalism, many have redeﬁned themselves as Bosnians, Gorans, Gollobordas, Turks, Roma, Egyptians, etc. The census of 2011 showed that the resident ethnic Albanian population is 82.58 % of the total population. The rest were declared to be Greek (0.87%), Macedonian (0.20%), Montenegrin (0.01%), Aromanian (0.30%), Roma (0.30%), Egyptian (0.12%), Others (0.09%), Not stated (1.58%), and (13.96%) did not answer.3 During Ottoman times, Sunni Muslims were usually concentrated in the urban centres, and in the centre and north of the country, while the Bektashis were concentrated mainly in the south. However, since 1991, many Muslims, following a national trend, have migrated towards the capital, Tirana. Islam is believed to have entered the regions that constitute modern-day Albania in the ninth century, while the lasting Islamisation started after the seventeenth century, largely thanks to the privileges and missionary work that

* Olsi Jazexhi holds a PhD in history and civilisation from European University Institute, Florence, Italy. 1 Dela Roka, Roberto Moroko, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri 1920–1944 (Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Nation and Religion in Albania 1920–1944) (Tirana: Eleni Gjika, 1994), p. 19. 2 Instat, POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUS 2011, (Shtypshkronja: Adel Print, 2012), p. 71. 3 Ibid.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_003 20 Jazexhi the Albanian-speaking populations benefited from the Ottomans.4 However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the numbers and positions of Muslims have changed markedly. An important factor was the establishment of a secular Albanian state in 1920, which adopted laicism as its official ideology, and diminished the role of Islam in the society. Islam and other religions were completely suppressed after World War ii, when Communist Albania was declared an atheist state (from 1967 until 1991) and all the religions in the country were banned. The official state ideology of Albania during these years, national-communism, taught the Albanians that religion was not important for them, and the only religion of the Albanians was Albanianism. As a result of many decades of rigidly enforced atheism, and after the fall of communism, political and media-driven Islamophobia, Christian missionary activities and the privileges that many Albanians gained by converting to Christianity, have caused many to abandon Islam. The fears that the media, local politicians and Western governments have created against Islam in the past decades have made the majority of the citizens of Albania stay away from practising or asso- ciating themselves publicly with Islam.

2 Islam and the State

Albania is a secular parliamentary republic with no official religion, in which the state guarantees freedom of religious belief. The Constitution of Albania recognises the equality of all religious communities and the state is neutral in questions of faith.5 However, the Sunni Muslims (known as muslimanët), Bektashi Muslims (known as bektashijtë), Catholic Christians (known as kato- likët) and Orthodox Christians (known as ortodoksët) are ‘recognised’ as the four traditional religious communities and are often invited to national ceremonies and celebrations. In recent years, Protestants (mostly associated with the American-backed Albanian Evangelical Alliance (vush) are also invited to attend national ceremonies. However, other faith communities such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Bahaʾis,‌ Ahmadiyya Muslims and other minor groups do not enjoy this status. While Albania is a secular state, Islam and the other four ‘recognised’ communities are often presented as being part of the Albanian mosaic of religious tolerance, even though the state very often does not fulfil their expectations.

4 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, p. 20. 5 Constitution of Albania/ Chapter I General Provisions/Article 10, www.parlament.al/dokumenti .asp?id=855, accessed 10 October 2008. Albania 21

During the past decades neither traditional nor non-traditional communities received any funding from the state. However, this situation has changed since 2009 when the government decided to fund those communities who were willing to sign agreements with the state. The change was proposed by the Council of Ministers on 15 April 2009 and approved by the Albanian Parliament on 15 May 2009. The communities that are benefiting from the funds are the four traditional ones; the Muslim Community, the Bektashi Grandfather- Headquarters (Kryegjyshata), the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. In the budget of 2013 the Council of Ministers allocated 105,162,000 Albanian lekë (around 1,022,288 usd)6 to the four traditional religious communities.7 After the allocation, the Muslim Community received 30,492,000 lekë (296,804 usd), the Bektashi Kryegjyshata 24,774,000 (241,146 usd), the Catholic Church 24,948,000 (242,840 usd) and the Autocephalous Orthodox Church 24,948,000 lekë (242,840 usd). The money allocated to the Muslim Community was to be used to pay its administrators and school teachers.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë (Muslim Community of Albania, mca, Rr. George W. Bush, Nr. 50, Tirana, Albania, tel.: ++355 42269123/4223701/230492, www.kmsh.al/, email: [email protected]) is the largest Sunni Muslim organisation in Albania, recognised by the state as the national organisation of Islam. It administers most of the mosques and is perceived to be the main representative of Sunni Islam in the country. It was originally founded in 1923, when the Muslims of Albania were officially separated from the Caliphate in Istanbul.8 After being abolished during the Communist era, the Muslim Community was reorganised in 1991. Kryegjyshata Botërore Bektashiane (World Headquarters of Bektashism, Rruga “Dhimiter Kamarda”, Tirana, Albania, tel.: ++355 4355227/ ++355 4355090, www.komunitetibektashi.org/, email: [email protected]) is the largest Suﬁ tariqa organisation in Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane

6 These exchange rates are as of May 2014. 7 Fletorja Zyrtare E Republikës Së Shqipërisë, Nr. 22, March 2013, Vendim Nr. 104, Datë 13.2.2013 Për Përcaktimin E Masës Së Financimit, Nga Buxheti I Vitit 2013, Për Bashkësitë Fetare Tradicionale Që Kanë Nënshkruar Marrëveshje Me Këshillin E Ministrave. http://Qbz.Gov .Al:81/Botime/Fletore_Zyrtare/2013/Pdf-2013/22-2013.Pdf, accessed May 27, 2014. 8 Jazexhiu, Olsi. Ottomans into Illyrians, passages to nationhood in 20th century Albania. (PhD Dissertation. Florence: European University Institute, 2011), pp. 190–194. 22 Jazexhi is recognised by the state as a national organisation and a separate religious community. The Bektashis claim their headquarters is the World Headquarters of Bektashism, but this is disputed by Bektashis living outside Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane was transferred from Turkey to Albania in 1931, after the prohibition of the order in Turkey in 1925. In 1946, the tariqa separated itself officially from Komuniteti Musliman (which represented the Sunnis and other tariqas) and became a separate religious community.9 Apart from the officially recognised organisations, a number of other Muslim bodies are active in the country. We can mention different Suﬁ tariqas such as the Rifaʿis, Qadiris, Saʿdis, Khalwatis and Tijanis, but also the recent presence of Ahmadiyyah Muslims. Important Muslim organisations include a number of non-governmental organisations which run many activities of the Muslim Community of Albania. They are Shtëpia Botuese Prizmi (“Muhamet Gjollesha”, prane Fakultetit te Ndertimit, Tirana 1, tel.: ++355 42233013, http://prizmi.com, email: [email protected]) a publishing house of the Fethullah Gülen movement, Fondacioni Sema which runs most of the madrasas, and Beder University (email: [email protected], www.sema.edu.al). Other important organisations are Qendra Kulturore “PROGRESI”, (Vasil Shanto/Rr: Çajupi Shkodër/Albania, tel.: ++355 22254634, www.progresibotime .com) a Sufi Turkish organisation which runs one of the madrasas of Shkodra. The League of the Imams of Albania (Unaza e Re, Rruga: Teodor Keko mbi Alfa Bank, Tirana, Albania, email: [email protected], tel. & fax: ++355 48320160, mobile: ++355 672304520 ++355 672582271, www.lidhjahoxhallareve .com) a Salafi organisation which tries to represent, support and defend the Salafi imams, The Albanian Institute of Islamic Though and Civilisation (Rr. Isuf Elezi Nr. 10, VILAT SELIT, P.O. Box. 2905, Tirana, Albania, tel.: ++355 42215087, www.aiitc.net, email: [email protected]) a family-owned ngo established in 1996 which publishes religious and nationalist books, etc.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

As of 2013, the Muslim Community of Albania has 545 mosques operating in the country.10 A number of mosques which originate from Ottoman times, and are administered by the Muslim Community, are classified as historical

9 Kalicani, Baba Selim, Bektashizmi si sekt mistik islam (Bektashism as a mystical sect of Islam) (Tirana: koha, 1999), pp. 228–229. 10 Information obtained from an ex-secretary of the Albanian State Committee on Religions, Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youths and Sports on 2 November 2013. Albania 23 monuments by the state and enjoy its protection. For restoring the mosques that are presently in ruins, on 16 February 2010 the Muslim Community, the Institute of Cultural Monuments and the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (tika) signed a protocol of cooperation whereby tika agreed to finance the restoration of historical mosques.11 This cooperation continued well into 2013. In June 2013 the Mufti of Korça declared to the media that tika was financing the restoration of Iljaz Bey Mirahori’s mosque in Korça.12 Apart from the historical mosques and those constructed after 1991, a small number of prayer houses and masjids (small mosques without minarets), operate throughout the country. The Ahmadiyya community runs one mosque on the outskirts of Tirana and the Rifa‘i tariqa runs a masjid in Tirana. The Bektashis have some 138 tekes (Suﬁ lodges),13 and the other Suﬁ tariqas (Rifaʿi, Alevi, Qadiri, Khalwati, Tidjani and others) have altogether an estimated 384 tekes, turbes, maqams and zawiyas.14

5 Children’s Education

Religious education was prohibited in Albania under communism, and religion was attacked by the educational system. After the fall of communism, school textbooks have adopted a more positive stance towards religion, but Islam is not always portrayed in very positive terms.15 Islam and other religions are not taught in Albanian public schools, but the Muslim Community of Albania and some other Albanian and foreign Muslim ngos run a number of Muslim schools (madrasas). The schools run by the Muslim Community, include seven high schools (madrasas), two primary schools and five other teaching facilities.16 The latest madrasa to be constructed is the madrasa of

11 “Firmoset protokolli per restaurimin e xhamive historike. (A protocol for restoring historical mosques is signed)”, Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, www.kmsh.al/aktualitet/66- firmoset-protokolli-per-restaurimin-e-xhamive-historike.html, accessed 14 February 2012. 12 “Xhamia-muze e Korçës, nis restaurimi me fondet e Turqisë” (The museum mosque of Korca is being renovated with money from Turkey), Gazeta Shqip, 2 June 2013, http:// gazeta-shqip.com/lajme/2013/07/03/xhamia-muze-e-korces-nis-restaurimi-me-fondet-e- turqise/, accessed 27 May 2014. 13 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Religions, 2 November 2013. 14 Ibid. 15 Jazexhi, Olsi., “Depicting the Enemy: the Image of the Turk and the Muslim in Albania’s High School Textbooks”, Islam in South East Asia Forum iseef, Paper No. 1, July 2008. 16 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Religions and reported by the Muslim Community of Albania. See also: “MEDRESETE DHE KURSET FETARE, 24 Jazexhi

Korça which was licensed on November 21, 2009,17 while in September 2013 the madrasa of Elbasan was reconstructed and relocated inside the city.18 Until 2003, most of the madrasas of the Muslim Community were sponsored and run by Arab ngos. However, after the start of the United States’ ‘war on terror,’ most of the Arab ngos which were sponsoring the madrasas were removed from the country or reduced their activities. They were replaced by Turkish organisations (mostly of the Fethullah Gülen movement, which at present run five out of seven madrasas). Mosques and some Muslim ngos also provide Islamic instruction outside school hours. The Bektashi Community and other Suﬁ organisations have no registered schools or courses for teaching religion. But the Bektashis are reported to operate a few religious clerical training centres.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Since the creation of Albania in 1913, the Islamic organisations of the country have not been able to develop any institutions of higher learning. Muslims were dependent on institutions elsewhere in the Muslim world for training their imams. Since nowadays the Catholic and Orthodox Churches run their own institutes of higher learning, and moreover because of the concern that the Albanian authorities had with the “Arab Islam” after 2001, the question of building an Islamic university has been raised on a number of occasions. While the Bektashis have made no demands for the establishment of a university, the Muslim Community, which has faced many media attacks during the past decade over the education of its imams, has repeatedly asked the state to permit it to open an Islamic university. The request of the Muslim Community of Albania for opening an Islamic University was finalised in September 2010, when in an extraordinary meeting it approved the opening of a Theological University with the justification that this university will be “providing higher education compatible with the culture, tradition and the characteristics of the Albanian society. Through its

(Madrasas and religious classes)” Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, www.kmsh.al/ al/?page_id=35, accessed 5 June 2014. 17 “Keshilli i Ministrave licenson Medresene e re te Korces. (The Council of Ministers licenses the new madrasa of Korça)” Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, www.kmsh.al/aktualitet/ 93-keshilli-i-ministrave-licenson-medresene-e-re-te-korces.html, accessed 12 January 2013. 18 “Organizohet ceremonia e hapjes së Medresesë së Elbasanit” (The organisation of the opening ceremony for the Madrasa of Elbasan), Komuniteti Musliman i Shqiperise, www .kmsh.al/al/?p=1140, 18 September 2013, accessed 5 June 2014. Albania 25 opening, the Albanian youth will no longer need to go to foreign countries to continue their theological studies.”19 The University of the Muslim Community, which is called Bedër (Full Moon), got approval from the Council of Ministers of Albania on April 6, 2011 and is presently manned by the Turkish Foundation Sema. It is not a fully theological university as the Muslim Community legis- lated in 2010. The university runs two undergraduate and graduate faculties, in Humanities and Philology and Education; and only under the Humanities is there a department of Islamic Sciences. The Department of Islamic Sciences offers a Bachelor’s Programme in Islamic Sciences, a Master’s Programme in Basic Islamic Sciences and another in Modern Islamic Sciences. In April 2013 the foundation which runs it started to construct a new campus in the area of Sauk in the outskirts of Tirana.20 Ilir Kulla, the former head of the State Committee on Cults, who was the first Albanian official to publicly announce the Albanian state’s plans for opening an Islamic University in the country, argued in 2005, that the reason for the creation of such a university was to replace the Arab-educated imams in the structures of the Muslim Community.21 This logic is repeated even in the pages of the university. In the “about department” link of the university, students who study Islamic sciences are told that after graduating, they will be given priority in employment in the headquarters of the Albanian Muslim Community (amc), its local offices in all the cities, all the mosques, tutoring and cultural centres, the madrasas and in the Bedër University itself.22 While the university seems to have been created to reform and de-Arabise Islam in the country, and Prime Minister Berisha has described it as a university which “will make Islam speak Albanian in the world.”23 Its Rector Ferdinand

19 “Kryesia e kmsh-se miraton themelimin e Universitetit Teologjik Islam ne Shqiperi (The leadership of the mca approves the establishment of a Theological Islamic University in Albania)” Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, www.kmsh.al/aktualitet/249-kryesia-e- kmsh-se-miraton-themelimin-e-universitetit-teologjik-islam-ne-shqiperi.html, accessed 12 February 2012. 20 “Nis ndërtimi i Kampusit të ri i Univeristetit Bedër” (The construction of the new campus of University Beder has started), Komuniteti Musliman i Shqiperise, April 26, 2013, www .kmsh.al/al/?p=558, accessed 5 June 2014. 21 Kulla, Ilir. “Pse-të e universitetit islam!” (Why-s of the Islamic University), Gazeta Korrieri, 23 January 2005. 22 See “About Departments”, Bedër University: http://isc.beder.edu.al/en/content/default/ about-departments-14-1/243/247, accessed 5 June 2014. 23 “Berisha, myslimanëve: Xhamia e re nis së shpejti” (Berisha, to Muslims: The new mosque will start soon), Gazeta Panorama, 7 April 2012, www.panorama.com.al/2012/04/07/ berisha-myslimaneve-se-shpejti-xhamia-e-re/, accessed 5 June 2014. 26 Jazexhi

Gjana has downplayed its Islamic character, describing it as “a private university focused on social sciences . . . and as the only university which has a department of Islamic sciences in its structure.”24 During its opening ceremony in 2011, Mustafa Ozcan, a representative of Sema Foundation in Tirana declared that “these schools will be the architects of the future, where mankind will no longer be different in religion or race, but knowledge, morals, love and dialogue will rule.”25

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Due to the communist legacy, separate Muslim cemeteries are not common in Albania. In graveyards built during the Communist era, such as those in Tirana, Christians and Muslims are buried together. However, a number of cemeteries exist outside Tirana, where Muslims are buried separately from Christians. In 2012, when the Municipality of Tirana announced plans to construct mural catacombs for burying the dead, the Muslim Community rejected the proposal and its mufti suggested the creation of separate cemeteries according to religious beliefs.26 The Muslim Community’s rejection of burying the dead in mural catacombs continued well into 2013, while the other communities have agreed with the city to go ahead with the project.27

24 “Intervistë me Rektorin e Universitetit ‘Hëna e Plotë’ (bedër), Dr. Ferdinand Gjana, dhënë në revistën ‘Monitor’ (Interview with the Rector of ‘Full Moon’ (Beder) University, Dr. Ferdinand Gjana,” given for The Monitor magazine), www.beder.edu.al/faqe .php?kategoria=rreth-universitetit&hap=marredheniet-me-publikun-median&sub=110, accessed 12 February 2012. 25 “Hapja e Universitetit Beder (The Opening of Beder University),” Top Channel, 7 April 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Bmko40wwAs, accessed 5 June 2014. 26 Ermelinda Hoxhaj “Varret murale, Myftiu: Feja s’e lejon, po duhen” (Mural Catacombs, the Mufti: The religion does not allow, but they are needed), Gazeta Shqiptare, 12 April 2012, www.balkanweb.com/gazetav5/artikull.php?id=114228, accessed 26 January 2013. 27 Shpresa Mezini, “Varrezat murale ‘peng’ i Komunitetit Mysliman” (The Mural Catacombs “hostage” of the Muslim Community), Gazeta Shqip, 2 August 2013, http://gazeta-shqip .com/lajme/2013/08/02/varrezat-murale-peng-i-komunitetit-mysliman/, accessed 5 June 2014. Albania 27

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

‘Chaplaincy’ is not legally recognised in state institutions, but religious preachers may have access to prisons to offer religious advice to inmates. However, religious chaplains are strictly prohibited in public schools.

9 Religious Festivals

The Albanian state recognises two Sunni religious festivals as national holidays in Albania. They are Bajrami i Madh (the Great Bayram, ʿId al-Fitr) celebrated at the end of Ramadan and Kurban Bajrami or Bajrami i Vogël (Kurban Bayram or Little Bayram, ʿId al-Adha) celebrated on 10 Dhu’l Hijja. Apart from the Bayrams, Sunni Muslims fast the month of Ramadan and celebrate five special sacred nights. In recent years the Muslim Community has developed a modern concert to celebrate the birthday of Prophet Muhammad in one of the weeks of April. The concert, which is organised in Tirana, is attended by political authorities, muftis, the head of the Muslim Community and ordinary citizens who often are not practising Muslims.28 Apart from the Sunni festivals, the Albanian state recognises as a national holiday the ‘Day of Sultan Nawruz’ which is celebrated by the Bektashis on March 22, in memory of the birth of Imam Ali. In addition, the Bektashis celebrate the day of ʿAshura in memory of the massacre at Karbala, as well as some other local festivals such as their pilgrimages to local saints’ shrines and tombs.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food and slaughter are permitted and are gaining popularity among the practising Sunni Muslim population of Albania. Halal food is available in halal shops, pizzerias and restaurants in major cities of the country. However, there

28 The birthday of Prophet Muhammad is usually celebrated in one of the weekends of the month of April. The organisers follow the solar rather than the lunar calendar. The ini- tiators and organisers of this concert are the Fethullah Gülen Tariqa, which, since 2005, have developed a strong influence inside the Muslim Community of Albania. The latest concert was organised on 12 April 2013. See: “8 vjet program festiv ‘Profeti Muhamed a.s.— Krenaria e Njerëzimit’ (8 years a celebratory program “Prophet Mohamed (pbuh) the Pride of Mankind), Drita Islame Online, www.dritaislame.al/8-vjet-program-festiv-profeti- muhamed-a-s-krenaria-e-njerezimit/, accessed 5 June 2014. 28 Jazexhi is no central institution for halal certiﬁcation and this food is not available in state institutions, such as in the army, hospitals, schools, etc. The requests of Muslim believers in these institutions for halal food are generally ignored.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public places or for pupils in schools. However, school principals have the right to set standards for “appropriate clothing” which at times includes restrictions on public displays of religious symbols. In recent years a number of incidents involving girls wearing hijab being expelled from schools and universities or being required to remove their head scarves have occurred. Although the state does not officially prohibit Muslim women from wearing the hijab, in most state and public institutions this practice is barred under the umbrella of compliance with internal uniforms and regulations, or with the claim that the secularity of the state must be maintained. In December 2010 the Ministry of Education announced a bill which was to be discussed by the civil society for adopting a new Law for the Pre-University Education. According to article 36, students were prohibited from displaying any religious symbols in the schools. However, as the media reported in April 2011, the Ministry of Education removed point 4 of article 36 which prohibited students from displaying their religious symbols. The media interpreted this move as state approval of the hijab in public institutions.29 In 2013 the debates on hijab did not draw much media attention.

12 Publication and Media

The main Muslim newspapers, magazines and radios in Albania are:

Drita Islame (The Light of Islam), newspaper of the Muslim Community of Albania; Zani i Naltë, scientific and cultural journal of the Muslim Community of Albania; Udha Islame (The Islamic Path), journal of the Muftiate of Shkodra; Drita e Kuranit (The Light of Qur’an) magazine published by the Qur’an Foundation; Këshilla (The Advice) magazine published by the Qur’an Foundation;

29 “mash lejon ferexhete ne shkolla, hiqet paragrafi per ndalimin e simboleve fetare (The Ministry of Education allows veils in schools, the paragraph prohibiting religious symbols is removed)”, Gazeta Sot, 21 April 2011. Albania 29

Drita e Ehlil Bejtit (The Light of Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Qadiri tariqa; Dashuria për Ehlil Bejtin (The Love for Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Rifaʿi tariqa; Etika (The Ethic) monthly magazine published by the Progresi Foundation; Etika për fëmijë (Ethics for children) monthly magazine published by the Progresi Foundation; Urtësia (Wisdom), magazine of the Bektashi Community; Familja (The Family), magazine published by the ‘Women’s association— Shoqata Kulturore “gruaja”; Lidhja (The League), journal of the League of the Imams of Albania; Radio Kontakt (Radio Channel Contact)—radio channel owned by Ramiz Zeka—broadcasts secular and religious programs; Albania fm 90.4. (Radio Channel Albania fm 90.4)—radio channel owned and operated by the Muftini of Elbasan. Broadcasts secular and religious programs; Mendimi (Thought), newspaper published by the Intellectual Muslim Forum.

Apart from the above newspapers, there are a number of Muslim publishing houses and organisations, which produce a variety of books, mainly translations from Arabic, Persian and Turkish. The most prominent are the League of the Imams of Albania, the Albanian Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation, “Prizmi” Publishing House, Rumi Foundation, Saadi Shirazi Foundation, Jehona Association, Tradita Association, Future’s Youth Organisation, alsar association and Ardhmëria association.

13 Family Law

Albanian courts do not recognise any religious law in their juridical practice. The Sunni Muslim Community recognises the practice of nikah (religious marriage), but this is not often practised and few people marry by having a nikah administered by an imam.

14 Interreligious Relations

Even though communist Albania was one of the most ruthless countries of Eastern Europe in suppressing religious freedoms, the official myth that state politicians have adopted after the fall of communism is that Albania is a country of religious tolerance and harmony. In the last few decades a number of projects for fostering interreligious relations have been sponsored by Western agencies such as usaid and “Religions for Peace.” On 22 October 2009, 30 Jazexhi the four heads of the Muslim, Bektashi, Orthodox and Catholic communities established in Tirana the Interreligious Council of Albania whose aim is to foster coexistence in the country. The council was registered in the court of Tirana on 25 October 2009. In November 2013, its secretary, together with a representative from the Muslim Community of Albania participated in an International Conference for Interreligious Dialogue that was organised in Vienna by the World Religions for Peace organisation.30 Even though the year 2013 was a year when the Shiʿis and Alevis were cursed in many mosques of Albania because of the Syrian conflict, officially very little was mentioned about these incidents. Major interreligious activities for 2013 included a scientific conference that the Centre for Albanian Studies and the President of Albania organised in Tirana with the four major religious communities of the country. Its title was “The Interreligious Harmony: An Inherited Albanian National Value.”31 The Directorate of Culture and Interreligious Dialogue of the Muslim Community reported that it organised an interreligious seminar with the Catholic Interdiocesan Seminary of Shkodra on 13 April 2013.32

15 Public Opinion and Debate

A number of issues pertaining to Muslims and Islam attracted media attention in Albania during 2013. The most noted event was related to the war in Syria. While the Albanian government of Sali Berisha and later Edi Rama openly supported foreign intervention against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria,33 the two governments were well aware that many Albanian Muslims from

30 “kmsh merr pjesë në Konferencën Ndërkombëtare për Dialogun Ndërfetar në Vjenë, Austri” (mca participates in the International Conference for Interreligious Dialogue in Vienna, Austria), Drita Islame Online, December 12, 2013, www.dritaislame.al/kmsh-merr- pjese-ne-konferencen-nderkombetare-per-dialogun-nderfetar-ne-vjene-austri/, accessed 6 June 2014. 31 “Harmonia fetare, fakt që i mban të bashkuar shqiptarët” (The interreligious harmony, a factor that keeps the Albanians united), Balkanweb, 31 May 2013, www.balkanweb.com/ bw_lajme2.php?IDNotizia=134863&IDCategoria=1, accessed 6 June 2014. 32 “kmsh, seminar për Dialogun Ndërfetar në Seminarin Ndërdioqezian” (mca, participates in a seminar for Interreligious Dialogue in the Interdiocesan Seminary), Zani i Nalte, 13 April 2013, http://zaninalte.al/2014/04/seminar-per-dialogun-nderfetar-ne-seminarin- nderdioqezian/, accessed 6 June 2014. 33 “Mbështetje sulmeve ndaj Sirisë” (Supporting the attack against Syria), Top Channel, August 28, 2013. www.top-channel.tv/artikull.php?id=262785, accessed May 27, 2014. Albania 31

Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia were going to Syria to fight against the Syrian state. During the first half of 2013 the Albanian media portrayed the Albanian fighters in Syria as martyrs and volunteers who were fighting for democracy and against a dictator.34 The portrayal of the Albanian Muslims as freedom- fighters or as Sunnis fighting against Shiʿis, Alevis and Kuffar was common in the Albanian, and even the American media covering the Balkans.35 The intervention of nato against Syria was supported even by Elvis Naçi, the Director of Islamic preaching at the Muslim Community of Albania.36 The support for the Syrian rebels had come from the mosques and many imams of Albania since 2012. In many mosques which were under the jurisdiction of the Muslim Community, Salafi imams led massive prayers and protests for the jihad in Syria,37 some imams claimed that angels had descended into Damascus to help the rebels,38 and fatwas of sheikhs like Adnan al-Aroor and Yusuf al-Qaradawi supporting the killing of Alevis and Syrian officials were propagated in many mosques and online portals. The pro-rebel protests were even led outside the mosques by Syrian and Salafi activists like Aliaa Noha and Ilir Hoxholli.39 However, in summer 2013 a number of Albanian newspapers and online portals started to publish several articles which claimed that hundreds of Albanians from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia were being recruited and sent

34 Dashamir Biçaku, “Rebelë shqiptarë në Siri, historitë e tre të vrarëve” (Albanian rebels in Syria, stories from three dead), mapo online, April 29, 2013, www.mapo.al/2013/04/29/ rebele-shqiptare-ne-siri-historite-e-tre-te-vrareve/, accessed May 27, 2014. 35 Fatmir Aliu, “Lufta në Siri dhe shqiptarët e Kosovës” (The war in Syria and the Albanians of Kosovo), Radio Evropa e Lire, June 01, 2013, www.evropaelire.org/content/article/ 25003862.html, accessed May 30, 2014. 36 “Komuniteti Myslyman Shqiptar pro luftës në Siri: Diktatorët s’duhet të kenë vend në botë” (The Muslim Community of Albania supports the war in Syria: The dictators must find no place in this world.), Balkanweb. September 6, 2013, www.balkanweb.com/ kryesore/1/komuniteti-myslyman-shqiptar-pro-luftes-ne-siri-diktatoret-sduhet-te-kene- vend-ne-bote-147416.html, accessed May 27, 2014. 37 See for eg. “Besimtaret e Xhamise Dine Hoxha solidarizohen duke bere lutje (dua) per popullin e Sirise.” (The believers of Dine Hoxha mosque pray and show solidarity with the people of Syria). Youtube User: Xhamite e Tiranes. June 01.2012. https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=7CbNtzZIXrM. Accessed May 28, 2014. 38 “Mrekullia që po habit Botën—Melaqet në siri—Shejkh AHMED KALAJA” (The miracle that is amazing the world—Angels in Syria—Shaykh Ahmed Kalaja). Youtube User: TheIslamiq. February 27, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-DG0CO0BoiE, accessed May 28, 2014. 39 “Mbështjetje Sirisë në Tiranë” (Support for Syria in Tirana), Top Channel tv, June 18, 2013. www.top-channel.tv/artikull.php?id=236893, accessed May 28, 2014. 32 Jazexhi to fight in Syria.40 The American-Russian agreement over the Syrian chemical weapons41 had its impact even in the Albanian debates about the participation of the Albanians in this conflict. From September and beyond the media of Albania and Kosovo started to criticise the involvement of Albanian Muslims in the Syrian conflict. The published video of an old Albanian man from Tirana who was calling on Albanian Muslims to join the Syrian jihad caused many public reactions in the media. Aliaa Noha who had protested with many Salafi believers against the Syrian regime, in an interview that she made with Shekulli Newspaper in October 2013, declared that “the Albanian fighters are not fighting for the liberation of Syria . . . They have been brainwashed to fight a war which is not for religion.”42 The condemnation of the Albanians fighting in Syria was much stronger in Kosovo where an analyst demanded that the Kosovar state remove citizenship from those people who were waging jihad in a foreign country.43 On November 12 the media of Albania reported that the Kosovo authorities had arrested some Kosovars for their involvement in the Syrian conflict.44 Two days later, in a press release that the Islamic Community of Kosovo published in the media, it urged the Kosovar youth to stay as far as possible from the Syrian conflict, since, even though the community supported ‘the just war of the Syrian people,’ the involvement of (foreigners) in this war was going to enable Bashar al-Asad to stay much longer in power and the people of Syria to suffer more.45 The reverses that the media and governments of Kosovo

40 “Lufta në Siri, në Tiranë u rekrutuan 769 shqiptarë” (The war in Syria, 769 Albanians were recruited in Tirana). Gazeta Panorama, August 15, 2013. www.panorama.com .al/2013/08/15/lufta-ne-siri-ne-tirane-u-rekrutuan-769-shqiptare/, accessed May 30, 2014. 41 “us and Russia agree Syria chemical weapons deal”. bbc, September 14, 2013. www.bbc .com/news/world-middle-east-24091633, accessed May 30, 2014. 42 Neritan Gjergo, “Luftëtarët shqiptarë nuk luftojnë për çlirimin e Sirisë” (The Albanian fighters are not fighting to liberate Syria), Gazeta Shekulli. October 10, 2013. www.shekulli .com.al/web/p.php?id=32935&kat=104, accessed May 31, 2014. 43 Halil Matoshi, “T’u hiqet shtetësia, kosovarëve që luftojnë në Siri” (The Kosovars fighting in Syria must have their citizenship removed), Gazeta Shekulli. September 14, 2013. https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/alb-muslimnews/conversations/messages/17263, accessed May 30, 2013. 44 “Kosovarët e kthyer nga Siria vihen në pranga si të dyshuar për terrorizëm” (The Kosovars returning from Syria have been imprisoned for suspicion of terrorism). Gazeta Shqiptarja. November 12, 2013. www.shqiptarja.com/kosova/2727/kosovaret-e-kthyer- nga-siria-vihen-ne-pranga-si-te-dyshuar-per-terrorizem-186645.html#sthash.Y62krfp4 .dpuf, accessed May 30, 2014. 45 “Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës: Kthehuni nga lufta në Siri, nuk ka lidhje me fenë” (The Islamic Community of Kosovo: Return from the war in Syria, it has no connection with Albania 33 and Albania made with the Syrian conflict were followed even by the Muslim Community of Albania and some Salafi imams. Imam Ahmed Kalaja, whose mosque was one of the first mosques to organise prayers in support for the Syrian mujahidin, on 9 November 2013, declared that the possibility for the Albanians to join the Syrian jihad was non-existent since they could not get permission from their families to do so.46 The Muslim Community of Albania followed the same line. On 11 January 2014, it condemned the participation of Albanians in the Syrian conflict.47 Like in the previous year, the question of the construction of the central mosque of Tirana drew much media attention even during 2013. In a meeting that Haji Selim Muça, the head of the Muslim Community of Albania had on 17 January 2013 with Prime Minister Berisha and Mayor of Tirana Lulzim Basha, he was reassured by the two that the construction of the mosque was going to start in March.48 The permission for the construction of the mosque was finally signed on 20 April 2013, when the agreement was signed between the Muslim Community, the city of Tirana, and the Albanian government.49 However, the construction of the mosque was opposed by a number of envi- ronmentalist and opposition politicians. They argued that the permission the Prime Minister had given was not only for constructing a mosque but a business centre as well.50 After the new socialist government came to power in

the faith). Balkanweb.com. www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/bashkesia-islame-e-kosoves- kthehuni-nga-lufta-ne-siri-nuk-ka-lidhje-me-fene-158710.html. November 14, 2013, accessed May 30, 2014. 46 Mariglen Mulla, Imami Kalaja: “Familjarë, ndaloni fëmijët që të bëhen xhihadistë” (Imam Kalaja: Families, stop your children from becoming jihadis), Shqiptarja.com, www.shqiptarja.com/Aktualitet/2731/imami-kalaja-familjar--ndaloni-f-mij-t-q--t--b-hen-xhihadist--186250.html, accessed June 2, 2014. 47 “Komuniteti Mysliman kundër përfshirjes në ‘Xhihad’ ” (The Muslim Community is against the participation in “Jihad”). Gazeta Shekulli. January 11, 2014. www.shekulli.com .al/web/p.php?id=38211&kat=109, accessed May 31, 2014. 48 “Berisha siguron Myslimanët: Punimet për Xhaminë Madhe në mars” (Berisha assures the Muslims: the construction of the Great Mosques will start in March). Balkanweb, January 17, 2013, www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/berisha-siguron-myslimanet-punimet- per-xhamine-madhe-ne-mars-117013.html, accessed June 2, 2014. 49 “Nis ndërtimi i Xhamisë së Madhe Muça: Zoti na lehtësoftë punën” (The construction of the Grand Mosque started. Muça: May God make our work easy), Shqiptarja, April 20, 2013, www.shqiptarja.com/aktualitet/2731/nis-nd-rtimi-i-xhamis--s--madhe-mu-a-zoti-na- leht-soft--pun-n--vd-152702.html, accessed June 2, 2014. 50 “Protesta: Me xhamine do ndertohen edhe dy qendra tregtare. Unioni i arkitekteve: Xhamia e papranueshme edhe estetikisht.” (The protest: Two centers of business to be built along the mosques. The union of the architects: the mosque is not acceptable even 34 Jazexhi

September 2013, the first decision that the National Committee for Territorial Adjustment took was to annul the construction of the mosque project.51 Edi Rama, the new Prime Minister argued that the annulment of the construction permission was not intended to target the mosque, but the second part of the project—the business centre.52

16 Major Cultural Events

Major annual cultural events organised by Muslims in Albania are:

– the concert for the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, organised in one of the weekends of April in Tirana by the Muslim Community; – public celebrations and prayers organised during the Bayrams and Ramadan throughout the country; – the celebrations of Sultan Nawruz on 22 March by the Bektashi Community; – Bektashi pilgrimages in the Tomori Mountain on 20–25 August in memory of the Shiʿi saint Abbas Ali.

for its look). Gazeta TemA, July 11, 2013. www.gazetatema.net/web/2013/07/11/protesta- me-xhamine-do-ndertohen-dhe-dy-qendra-tregtare-unioni-i-arkitekteve-xhamia-e- papranueshme-dhe-estetikisht/, accessed June 2, 2014. 51 “Namazgjaja, kkt anulon pjesën e ii të objektit. Basha: ‘De jure’ s’ka Xhami” (Namazgja, kkt annuls the second part of Basha’s object: ‘De jure’ there is no mosque”. Balkanweb. October 8, 2013. www.balkanweb.com/m/shqiperi/namazgjaja-kkt-anulon-pjesen-e-ii-te- objektit--basha--de-jure--s-ka-xhami-152748.html, accessed June 2, 2014. 52 “Xhamia e Namazgjasë, Muça: krt dhe Kryeministri vendosën të ndërtohet” (The namazg- jah mosque, Muça: krt and the prime minister have decided to construct it), Balkanweb, October 14, 2013. www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/xhamia-e-namazgjase-muca-krt-dhe- kryeministri-vendosen-te-ndertohet-153637.html, accessed June 2, 2014. Armenia

Sevak Karamyan*

1 Muslim Populations

Islam reached the territory of today’s Armenia shortly after its founding. The first Arab invasion of Armenia took place in 640 and thereafter Armenia was under Arab rule for more than 200 years. In the second half of the 9th century, the Armenians succeeded in overthrowing Arab rule and restoring independence which lasted till the beginning of the 11th century. From the mid- 11th century, however, Armenia experienced a number of invasions by the Seljuk Turks who, until the first half of the 12th century, kept Armenia under their control. As a result of Armenian-Georgian military cooperation, most Armenian territories were liberated from the Seljuk Turks. In 1236, a major military incursion of Mongols took place after which Armenia remained under Mongol rule for almost two centuries. Throughout the 15th century, Armenia was under the rule of two Turcoman tribes, the Ak Koyunlu or Aq Qoyunlu (the White Sheep) Turcomans, and Kara Koyunlu (Black Sheep) Turcomans. From the 16th century, Armenia was divided between two Muslim powers, Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran (Persia). The situation changed after the Russian- Persian wars of the 19th century, when some Armenian territories (including the territory of today’s Republic of Armenia) passed to the Russian Empire. In spite of the long presence of Islamic authority, the majority of Armenians remained strongly attached to their church and did not change their Christian religion, which the Armenian state had first adopted officially in 301, though some, for various personal reasons, chose to convert to Islam, especially during the Ottoman period. During the period of the First Armenian Republic, from 1918 to 1920, as well as in the following period of the Soviet Republic, the number of Muslims (Turkic people later called Azerbaijanis1 and Kurds) was high—about 80,000,2 and according to the last Soviet census that took place in 1989, there were

* Dr Sevak Karamyan is an Expert of the Group of Independent Experts of The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. 1 After 1929, this group began to be called Azerbaijanis in official documents (where they were formerly called Turks). See Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926г. (Census of the Population in 1926), Vol. 14 (Moscow: csu Publishing 1929), pp. 8, 13 (in Russian). 2 Mkrtumyan et al., National Minorities, p. 151.

4,151 Kurds and 84,860 Azerbaijanis3 in Armenia. The majority of these Azerbaijanis left the country during Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan that had begun in 1988. Kurds, who used to live in Azerbaijani enclaves in Armenia, by virtue of confessional and cultural relatedness (Kurdish children attending Azerbaijani schools, mixed marriages, etc.) left Armenia along with the Azerbaijanis. The recent census that took place in 2011 included an optional question on religious affiliation.4 According to census, the number of Muslims in Armenia was 812, which is the 0.027 % of the total population.5 However, various research publications, as well as the information provided by non-governmental organisations, estimate the number of Muslims in Armenia to be around 8,000 and 80% of them are resident non-citizens who stay in Armenia for extended periods of time. The majority of Muslims are from Iran, others come from elsewhere in the Middle East and India and most are businessmen, students and diplomats. The ratio of Shiʿi’s to Sunnis is about 3:1. There is some contradictory information concerning Kurds in Armenia. The last census showed that there are 2,162 Kurds in Armenia.6 However there are more than 35,0007 Kurdish-speaking people identifying themselves as Yezidis,8 who detach themselves from Islam in terms of religion and from the Kurds in terms of ethnicity.9 Their language is Kurmanji, a Northern Kurdish dialect, although Yezidis call their language Ezdiki in order to underscore their separate identity. It should be mentioned that some Yezidis identify themselves as Kurds or Yezidi-Kurds on the basis of language, traditions and customs.10

3 Газета Коммунист № 115 (17002) от 24.05.1990 (Daily Communist N° 115 (17002) from 24.05.1990). 4 www.armstat.am/file/doc/99465273.pdf, accessed, 20 November 2013. 5 www.armstat.am/file/article/sv_03_13a_520.pdf, accessed 20 November 2013. 6 http://armstat.am/file/doc/99478353.pdf accessed 20 December 2013. 7 Ibid. 8 An ethno-confessional group, whose main identity is religion—Yezidism or Sharfadin. Yezidism is a syncretic doctrine which combines the belief in the One God with the ven- eration of a Holy Trinity—Malak Tawus (Peacock angel), Shaykh ‘Adi and Sultan Yezid (all being incarnations of God), as well as an extensive popular pantheon that includes a number of divinities, saints and patron-deities having parallels with both Iranian and Semitic traditions. 9 Asatryan, G. and V. Arakelova, The Ethnic Minorities of Armenia (Yerevan: Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies 2004), p. 10. Also available at www.hra.am/file/minorities_en.pdf. 10 Sardar, A., Քրդերը Հայաստանում (Kurds in Armenia) (Yerevan: Hayastan Press 1996), p. 59) (in Armenian). Armenia 37

2 Islam and the State

According to Article 8.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia,

The church shall be separate from the state in the Republic of Armenia. The Republic of Armenia recognises the exclusive historical mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church as a national church in the spiritual life, development of the national culture and preservation of the national identity of the people of Armenia. Freedom of activities for all religious organisations in accordance with the law shall be guaranteed in the Republic of Armenia. The relations of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church shall be regulated by law.11

In 1991, a law on the Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organisations was adopted (amendments and additions were made to it in 1997, 2001 and 2011).12 This law guarantees the equality and freedom of religious organisations, and defines the process for their registration. Before becoming a member of the Council of Europe in 2001, Armenia had already signed and ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which guarantees such freedoms. In practice, the Armenian Apostolic Church has certain privileges vis-à-vis other religious communities and their organisations: it has its own television channel, and History of the Armenian Church is a mandatory subject in Armenian secondary schools. A picture of the Catholicos (Supreme Patriarch) of All Armenians is required to be hung in schools, along with other national symbols such as the flag and the coat of arms. There is a Council of National Minorities under the President of Armenia, coordinated by one of the advisors to the President. The Council is comprised of representatives of the main ethno-confessional minorities and their organisations in Armenia, but does not include any religious organisations. There is a Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs in the Government of Armenia (headed by Vardan Ascatryan, tel.: +374 10 515740, www.gov.am/ en/religion/), which deals with issues related to minorities and religions and provides recommendations and expert evaluations regarding the registration of religious organisations. There is no law, or any other legal framework, that

11 The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, Article 8.1, www.president.am/library/ constitution/eng/?pn=1, accessed 29 November 2013. 12 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&id=2041&lang=arm, accessed 24 October 2013. 38 Karamyan applies specifically to Islam. Muslim monuments are included in the list of sites of historic and architectural value that are protected and maintained by the state. As minister of Culture Hasmik Poghosyan stated, “Armenia will take any possible steps for the [inclusion] of the Iranian Blue Mosque of Yerevan into the unesco List of Cultural Heritage”.13

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are no officially registered Muslim organisations in Armenia, but there are organisations that carry out religious activities. The main organisation in Armenia is the Cultural Centre of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (14, Baghramyan 2nd lay, tel.: +374 10 229053, +374 10 229054, fax: +374 10 269160, http://yerevan.icro.ir). The Centre is a branch of the Iran-based Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation (www.icro.ir) and was established in 1999 and is led by the cultural attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Armenia. The activities of the Centre include free Persian language courses, translation of Persian and Islamic literature into Armenian (in 2006, the Qur’an was published in Armenian), courses on Qur’an study and calligraphy as well as exhibitions and conferences. There are also a variety of organisations attached to Muslim ethnic groups which do not have any religious activities. They are: the Association of Iranian Students (12, Mashtoc Ave., Yerevan, tel.: +374 10 525730); Organisation of Iranian Traders and Entrepreneurs (26/1A, Kievyan str, tel./fax +374 10 278593, www.iitpo.am) which supports Iranian businessmen in their activities in Armenia; the National Kurdish Council (Hatis Str., Cinema building, Abovyan, tel.: +374 222 20456); Kurdistan Committee (62/19, Terian Str., Yerevan, tel.: +374 10 582207); the Kurdish Council of Intellectuals (2, Arshakuniats Ave., 12th floor, Yerevan, tel.: +374 10 529612). The activities of these Kurdish organisations mainly focus on the issues of language, culture, and traditions, and not religious affairs.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There is a Shiʿi mosque in the centre of Yerevan called the Blue Mosque (built in 1766). Since 2013, there is a permanent imam from Iran who leads Friday

13 http://armenpress.am/eng/news/704871/involvement-of-blue-mosque-in-unesco-list-of- cultural-heritage-is-highly-significant.html, accessed 20 April 2013. Armenia 39 prayers and services during religious festivals. In 2013, a centre, named Dar Al-Qur’an, was opened at the Blue Mosque.14 The centre was founded with the purposes of conducting Qur’an study lessons as well as providing religious counselling.15 Apart from this mosque, Muslims use two unofficial places of worship, one of which is located in a room in the dormitory of Yerevan State Medical University (10, Davit Anhakht, Yerevan) and the other one is in Nor Nork Student campus (12/6, Moldovakan str., Nor Nork, Yerevan). These locations are more convenient for the mainly Sunni students. The role of the imam there is performed by one of the Muslim students who knows the Qur’an well.

5 Children’s Education

The only school that provides optional Islamic education is the educational centre “Martyr Fahmide”, (8, Lvovyan str., tel.: +374 10633718) sponsored by the Iranian Embassy in Yerevan. Besides the children of the diplomatic staff, the school is attended also by children of Iranian residents. According to the data of the Cultural Centre, there are more than 200 children in this school.16 The staff of the school are mainly from Iran and are of both Persian and Armenian origin. The school operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels.

6 Higher and Professional Education

More than 30 academic courses on Islam are offered at the Yerevan State University (ysu) within the departments of Arabic, Turkish and Persian Studies (Faculty of Oriental Studies), including ba, ma and PhD programmes. There is no institution for imam training in Armenia.

14 http://hy.yerevan.icro.ir/index.aspx?siteid=250&pageid=11740&newsview=604342, accessed 28 Octber 2013. 15 Ibid. 16 http://armenian.irib.ir/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=5488:matraseye-shahid- fahmide-dar-irevan-va-safire-iran-dar-irevan&Itemid=71&lang=en, accessed 28 September 2013. 40 Karamyan

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are some Azerbaijani and Kurdish cemeteries, particularly in the regions of Masis, Ararat Marz, and in the villages where Azerbaijanis and Kurds used to live in the greatest concentrations. There is a medieval Turkoman mauso- leum in the village of Argavand (Armavir Marz) built by Kara Koyunlu Emir Sadayi dating back to 1413. The majority of Muslims living in Armenia on a non-permanent basis usually send the bodies of deceased relatives to their homelands for burial.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Armenian armed forces or any other state institutions such as hospitals, schools, prisons, etc. However, the Law Regarding the Relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church allows the Armenian Church to have permanent representatives in hospitals, orphanages, boarding schools, military units, and all places of detention,17 while the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations permits other religious organisations to have representatives in these places on demand only.18 There is also Law on Alternative Service. According to Article 3 of the Law on Alternative Service (adopted in 2004, with amendments and additions made to it in 2006), alternative service may be performed by the citizens of Armenia whose religious beliefs or convictions are in contradiction with the performance of military service in armed forces, as well as carrying, keeping, maintaining and using weapons.19

9 Religious Festivals

No Muslim festivals are incorporated into the official calendar of the Republic of Armenia. The Iranian community celebrates Ramadan and the main Shiʿi events, such as Ashura. The communities of Muslims from the Middle East

17 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show& id=2911&lang=arm, accessed 15 December 2013. 18 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show& ID=2041&lang=arm, accessed 15 December 2013. 19 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show& id=1884&lang=arm, accessed 15 December 2013. Armenia 41 and India, mainly consisting of students, organise their celebrations in their dormitories.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

There are at least two recognised halal butchers in Yerevan. One is located in an agricultural market (35, Khorenaci str., Yerevan); the second offers halal meat at the Blue Mosque (12, Mashtoc ave., Yerevan) once a week. There is no special provision for halal food in public institutions. Muslim students report that they usually buy meat produced by Sadia which is internationally recognised as halal. The only Armenian meat producer which has a halal certificate (issued in the uae) is Geghard. As stated by the Minister of Agriculture of Armenia, it is planning to build three new slaughterhouses for producing halal-labelled meat.20 One bank in Armenia can be considered Islamic, namely the Iranian “Mellat Bank” (6, Amiryan str., Yerevan, tel/fax: +374 10581791 www.mellatbank .am). At the time of writing. there was no organised provision for hajj travel.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public. In the streets of Yerevan as well as the regions bordering Iran, hijab and other Muslim dress elements can be seen very occasionally; they are mainly worn by students, tourists, or employees (and their family members) of diplomatic missions from Muslim countries.

12 Publications and Media

There are at least two magazines, Mihr and Parsian, published by the Iranian Cultural Centre. They are not officially religious, but are rich in Islamic content. The former is published twice a month, the latter once a month and both are published in Persian and Armenian. The Centre also posts its information on its website (http://yerevan.icro.ir). The Centre has published a number of books and brochures with religious content. In 2006 the Qur’an was published in Armenian (Hayastan Press). There are two Kurdish tabloids, Ria

20 http://armenian.irib.ir/news/armenia/item/39363 -հայաստանում-կկառուցվեն- «հալալ»-մորթին-համապատասխան-սպանդանոցներ, accessed 20 November 2013. 42 Karamyan

Taza (in Kurdish) and Zagros (mainly in Armenian with one or two pages in Kurdish), which have no religious content. Apart from the newspapers, there is a 30-minute daily radio programme in Kurdish on public radio, but it too is without any religious content.

13 Family Law

Before 2007, Armenian legislation did not recognise religious marriages, including those contracted at the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church. Only civil marriages were recognised by the state. Since 2007, the Law on the Relations of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Church21 regulates the special relationship between the state and the Armenian Church and grants certain privileges to the Armenian Church that are not available to other religious groups including Muslims. It makes the Armenian Church’s marriage rite legally binding, but the supporting legal acts to enforce this are not yet in place. Polygamy is not recognised in Armenian family law.

14 Interreligious Relations

There are no interreligious councils in Armenia; nor are there interreligious events with the participation of representatives of different religions, including Islam. However, the Church leadership participates in the Interreligious Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States (8/29, Michurinskiy Prospekt, Hotel Universitetskaya, Moscow, 117192, Russian Federation, www .patriarchia.ru/db/text/54211.html). According to some experts, recent mutual visits between the Catholicos and the Shaykh al-Islam will be a new stage in resolving the Karabakh conflict.22

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The local media very rarely cover issues concerning Muslims living in Armenia. However, the coverage of the situation in Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as the conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, is considerable. In 2013, there were

21 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show& id=2911&lang=arm, accessed 10 December 2013. 22 www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/72754/, accessed 28 October 2013. Armenia 43 many reports concerning the situation in Syria, where a huge Armenian community lives. Since 2011, the number of Syrian refugees (mainly of Armenian origin) in Armenia passed 10,000.23 Acts such as Qur’an burning and the video “The Innocence of Muslims” were actively discussed, and the Armenian Church officially condemned these acts.24 On 19 October 2013, under the presidency of Catholicos of All Armenians, the opening ceremony of the Haghartsin monastery complex was held. The monastery was renovated with the generous spon- sorship of His Highness Sheikh Dr. Sultan Bin Mohammad Al-Qasimi, Member of the Supreme Council of the uae and Ruler of Sharjah.25 In his speech the Catholicos noted “. . . the symbolism, that a representative of the Islamic religion becomes a sponsor of Haghartsin monastic complex, will penetrate the souls of all the faithful and awaken the awareness that we are the children of the one and same God, called to praise Him on this Earth”.26 From time to time, the media publish speeches made by ambassadors of Muslim countries in Armenia, as well as reports from the Muslim countries with Armenian communities. The media become particularly active at times of official visits by leaders from Muslim countries. If a leader of a Muslim country does not visit the Armenian Genocide memorial in Yerevan, the media and the public discourse often interpret it as a sign of the solidarity of that particular leader and his country with Turkey.

16 Major Cultural Events

The Iranian Cultural Centre occasionally organises sports events and other social activities such as conferences, exhibitions and debates. On 2–8 February 2013, an exhibition dedicated to the 34rd anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran was held.27 On 1 August 2013, in the Blue Mosque, an event took place dedicated to international day of Al-Quds (Jerusalem).28

23 http://news.am/eng/news/173607.html, accessed 18 October 2013. 24 www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=2208&y=2012&m=8&d=20&lng=en, accessed 30 October 2013. 25 www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=2485&y=2013&m=9&d=19, accessed 29 November 2013. 26 www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=2487&y=2013&m=9&d=20, accessed 20 November 2013. 27 http://hy.yerevan.icro.ir/index.aspx?siteid=250&pageid=11740&newsview=594639, accessed 20 November 2013. 28 http://hy.yerevan.icro.ir/index.aspx?siteid=250&pageid=11740&newsview=601188, 20 August 2013. 44 Karamyan

The Kurdish community celebrates Nawruz on 21 March every year. Numerous performances of music and dance are staged during the celebration and the events are attended by many guests. Each year the President of Armenia conveys congratulations to the Kurdish community of Armenia on the occasion of Nawruz.29 In 2013, thousands of Iranians came to Armenia to celebrate Nawruz.30

29 www.president.am/en/congratulatory/item/2013/03/21/President-Serzh-Sargsyan- congratulation-Kurdish-community-of-Armenia/, accessed 22 March 2013. 30 http://news.am/eng/news/145754.html, 20 October 2013. Austria

Thomas Schmidinger* and Alev Çakır**

1 Muslim Populations

The history of Muslims living in the later Habsburg territories predates the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the region. Smail Balić argued that together with the Hungarian establishment in the Pannonian plains in 895, nomads of Asian origin, who were followers of Islam, entered the region.1 Hungarian documents write about izmaeliták and böszörmények as Muslims in Hungary. It is possible that some of these Muslim groups conserved their religious identity until the Ottoman conquest in the 16th century. However, with the conquest of the region by Austria in the late 17th century, almost all Muslims were deported. But with the Treaty of Passarowitz (16 August 1718) subjects of the Ottoman Empire were permitted to settle in the Empire, although it was mostly Jews and Armenians who settled in cities like Vienna and Budapest. The largest number of Muslims came under Austrian control after the former Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austrian troops in 1878. Despite the fact that many Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina fled to the Ottoman Empire, the majority stayed within the region and became Austrian subjects after the annexation of the territory in 1908. But after the collapse of the monarchy in the First World War, these territories were lost and only small groups of Muslims stayed within the borders of the new republic of Austria. Only a few private associations like the Orientbund or the Islamischer Kulturbund, led by Umar Rolf von Ehrenfels continued working as an organised Muslim community. After the Anschluß (the annexation of Austria by Nazi-ruled Germany) Ehrenfels, who was in opposition to the

* Thomas Schmidinger is lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Vienna, the University for Applied Science Vorarlberg and secretary general of the Austrian Association for Kurdish Studies. In 2012 he was participating in one of the expert round table of the Dialogforum Islam initiated by the state-secretary of integration. ** Alev Çakır is lecturer and PhD student at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Vienna and editor of a book series on Alevi Studies. She is also a graduate of the ma programme in Peace, Development, Security and International Conflict Transformation, at the University of Innsbruck. 1 Balić, S., “Zur Geschichte der Muslime in Österreich I, Lebensräume und Konfliktfelder”, in S. Heine (ed.), Islam zwischen Selbstbild und Klischee. Eine Religion im österreichischen Schulbuch (Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), pp. 23–35.

Nazis, had to emigrate and his association was dissolved.2 But in 1943, another Muslim association was founded under Salih Hadžialić and with the patronage of the regime.3 After the Second World War, some Muslim collaborators of the Nazis, predominantly of Bosnian and Soviet, mostly Tatar, origin, were stranded in the American zone of occupation in Salzburg. That was one of the reasons why Salzburg became a centre of Muslim activism after 1945. A bigger number of Muslims immigrated from the 1960s on, when agreements for labour immigrants (‘Gastarbeiter’) were signed with Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966). But Austria also received refugees from Islamic countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and, in the 1990s, from Kosovo and Albania. In addition, Muslim diplomats lived in Vienna, where the un, opec and other international organisations have offices. However, today the biggest Muslim populations in Austria are of Turkish, Bosnian and Albanian origin. An assessment based on the census of 2001 (no more censuses are being held) suggests that in 2009 there were slightly more than 500,000 Muslims in Austria, making approx. 6% of the total population.4 In 2013 there was no serious estimation of the growing number of Muslims in Austria. Due to naturalisation, 49% of the Muslim population were Austrians in 2009; 21% were Turkish nationals; 10% had a passport from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7% were from Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, 3% from Macedonia, and 4% from the Russian Federation.5 Most of the latter were in fact Chechens who were one of the biggest groups of refugees in the last decade. But not all of these 500,000 Muslims are religious and this number contains all Islamic groups, including heterodox groups like the Alevis or Nusayris. However, it must be stated that these numbers do not give any information about the self-definition of Muslims, their sectarian affiliation, personal beliefs and ‘religiosity’.

2 Krammel, G. / Abdelkarim, A., “Die Geschichte des Islam in Österreich”, in Schmidinger, T. / Larise, D., (eds.) Zwischen Gottesstaat und Demokratie, Handbuch des politischen Islam (Vienna: Deuticke, 2008), pp. 47–58 3 Pritz, O., “Vom Moslemischen Sozialdienst zur islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft,” (Disseration, Universität Wien, 2006), p. 88. 4 Marik-Lebek, S. ‘Die muslimische Bevölkerung Österreichs: Bestand und Veränderung 2001– 2009’ (The Muslim population of Austria: state and changes 2001–2009), in: Jane, Alexander and Mathias Vogl (eds.), Islam in Österreich (Islam in Austria), (Vienna: Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, 2010), pp. 5–9 (5). 5 www.integrationsfonds.at/wissen/publikationen/islam_in_oesterreich/#c6384, accessed 31 December 2012. Austria 47

2 Islam and the State

The Staatsgrundgesetz (StGG, Basic Law of the State) of 1867 (art. 14, 15, 17) for the Austrian half of the Empire (Cisleithania) already guaranteed freedom of religion. In Austria, there are two forms of state recognition6 which are: 1) legal recognition as gesetzlich anerkannte Kirchen und Religionsgesellschaften (churches and religious societies) and 2) state registration as a religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaft (religious denominational community). A legal recognition grants a religious community the status of a corporate body under public law with financial grants and a politically privileged role in the political system. However, a state registration as a religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaft grants fewer privileges than the legally recognised big Glaubensgemeinschaften (faith communities). The category of religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaften constitutes a legal entity in accordance with the right of association and is covered by private law. This status represents a preliminary stage for legal recognition.7 The Recognition Act in 1874, RGBl No. 68, also gave non-Christian religions a legal framework to be recognised as Cultusgemeinden (faith communities). The law did not mention Islam or any other specific religion, but it gave the legal ground for the legal recognition of religions including Islam.8 The Islamgesetz of 1912 (Law on Islam from 1912) legally recognised adherents of Islam, more precisely, of the ‘Hanafite rite’, as a legally recognised religious community.9 Today, Austria is a secular republic with institutional separation of church and state. However, this secular principle conflicts with the instrument of state recognition of religious communities and the state act of granting certain rights and privileges to them. These privileges encompass the possibility to offer religious education in schools, the right to express their opinion about a law related to their interests, or to collect tax-free funds from their members. The rights guaranteed to the Roman Catholic Church by the authoritar- ian regime of Engelbert Dollfuß in the concordat of 1933 are still the model for the rights of other state-recognised religions. Other recognised Christian

6 Both legal recognition as a religious society as well as state registration as a religious denominational community represent a form of state recognition. 7 Potz, R./Brigitte S., “Religionsrecht im Überblick”, (Vienna: facultas.wuv., 2005). 8 Gesetz vom 20. Mai 1874, betreffend die gesetzliche Anerkennung von Religionsgesellschaften. StF: RGBl. Nr. 68/1874. 9 Gesetz, betreffend die Anerkennung der Anhänger des Islams nach hanefitischem Ritus als Religionsgesellschaft. StF: RGBl. Nr. 159/1912. 48 Schmidinger and Çakır churches, the Muslims, the Buddhist and the Jewish communities share the same rights and privileges. Furthermore, Austrian religious politics, according to its corporatist political culture, is characterised by a selective cooperation between the state and religious communities as institutionalised coordination and cooperation partners in religious-political issues.10 In 1979, the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ, Islamic Religious Community in Austria, www.derislam.at, Bernhardgasse 5, 1070 Wien) was recognised by the Kultusamt (Bureau of Religions) of the Austrian Ministry of Culture and Education (bmukk, Bundesministerium für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur) as the official representative of all Muslims in Austria on the basis of the Recognition Act of 1874, the Islamgesetz of 1912 and the Islamverordnung of 1988 (Ordinance of Islam)11 which broadened its representation of the adherents from the ‘Hanafite rite’ to all adherents of Islam. Heterodox religious groups like the Alevis have been trying for years to get recognised as a legally recognised religious community. After a long legal and religious-political dispute, where three different groups of Alevis tried to get legal recognition in order to establish an independent state-recognised religious community, one of these three groups succeeded in December 2010 as a religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaft and later in May 2013, the Islamische Alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (iagö, Islamic Alevi Religious Community in Austria) obtained the status of a legally recognised religious society.12

10 Mourão Permoser, J., et al., “Religious Organization as Political Actors in the Context of Migration: Islam and Orthodoxy in Austria,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2010, 36 (9): pp. 1463–1481. Koenig, M., “Incorporating Muslim migrants in Western nation-states: a Comparison of the United Kingdom, France and Germany,” Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2010, 6 (2), pp. 219–34. 11 Verordnung vom 17. August 1988 betreffend die Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich. bgbi. Nr. 466/1988. 12 Verordnung der Bundesministerin für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur betreffend die Anerkennung der Anhänger der Islamischen Alevitischen Glaubensgemeinschaft als Religionsgesellschaft. bgbi: ii Nr. 133/2013. www.wienerzeitung.at/themen_channel/wz_ integration/gesellschaft/555279_Alevitentum-zweigeteilt.html, accessed 20 December 2013. See for more Cakir, A., “Governance religiöser Diversität in Österreich. Anerkennungspolitik am Beispiel der Islamischen Alevitischen Glaubensgemeinschaft.” (Unpublished Diploma Thesis, University of Vienna, Austria, 2011). Austria 49

This was facilitated by a decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court on 1 December 2010 that saw the decision of the Kultusamt of the Austrian Ministry of Culture and Education to accept only one Islamic community in Austria (the IGGiÖ) as a violation of religious freedom.13 That decision had a strong political and symbolic impact on the status of the IGGiÖ, because the Constitutional Court regarded the denial of recognition of the IGGiÖ as a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (echr) and concluded that Article I and § 1 of the Islamgesetz cannot be interpreted in a way that the Austrian law only accepts one officially recognised Islamic religious community. Moreover, due to the legal recognition of the iagö, a second Islamic religious community beside the IGGiÖ has been recognised by the state and the so-called “monopoly” of the IGGiÖ to represent all Muslims in Austria has been broken.14 Nevertheless, the IGGiÖ still claims to be the “official representative of the Muslims in Austria.”15 Although established experts on Islam, like Rüdiger Lohlker or Richard Potz still see the membership of the IGGiÖ as “ex lege” for all Muslims,16 Oliver Henhapel, the director of the Kultusamt, shares the argument that since the decisions of the Constitutional Court Nr. G 146/87 and G 147/87, the IGGiÖ can no longer claim to be the sole representative of all Muslims in Austria.17 In December 2010, further Islamic groups, including a Shiʿite and a third group of Kurdish Alevis requested legal recognition. After the application of the Kurdish Alevis was rejected for technical reasons, they applied again in 2012 under the name of Qizilbasch-Alevitische (Alt-Alevitische) Glaubensgemeinschaft (Qizilbash-Alevi (old-Alevi) Religious Community). On 23 August 2013, the Alt-Alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (aagö, Old-Alevi Religious Community) obtained the status of a state registered religious denominational community.18 Furthermore, the Islamische-Schiitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (Islamic-Shiʿite Religious Community in Austria) was registered as a religious denominational community on 1 March 2013.19

13 Erkenntnis des Verfassungsgerichtshofes Nr. G146/87, G 147/87, 1 December 2010. 14 Cakir, A. (2011). 15 www.derislam.at/?c=content&cssid=IGGi%D6&navid=10&par=0, accessed 24 December 2013. 16 Heine, S. / Lohlker, R. / Potz, R., Muslime in Österreich. Geschichte, Lebenswelt, Religion. Grundlagen für den Dialog (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2012), p. 60. 17 Interview with Oliver Henhapel, 9 February 2012. 18 www.bmukk.gv.at/ministerium/kultusamt/eingetr_rel_bekg.xml, accessed 12 December 2013. 19 Ibid. 50 Schmidinger and Çakır

In 2012 the state-secretary of integration, Sebastian Kurz, and the IGGiÖ started a forum for dialogue on Islam (Dialogforum Islam), following the example of the German Islamkonferenz (dik). The Dialogforum Islam did not only include representatives of the IGGiÖ, but also independent Muslim and non-Muslim experts, scholars and some other organisations, like the Forum für emanzipatorischen Islam. However, it did not include representatives of Shiʿite and Alevi organisations. One of the results of the Dialogforum Islam was the announcement to start academic education for imams at the University of Vienna in 2015 and to establish counselling centres for family members of radicalised youth.20

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Alongside with the legally recognised IGGiÖ there are large numbers of other Muslim organisations in Austria. Some of them cooperate in different ways with the IGGiÖ and some do not. While officially the IGGiÖ represented all Muslims in Austria, they always had a very limited number of members who were voluntarily paying their membership fees and who were participating in elections. In 2010 the IGGiÖ recruited new members before their new elections. The new constitution of IGGiÖ adopted in 2011 expands the number of the regional religious communities from four to nine, one for each federal state.21 The former youth organisation of the IGGiÖ, the Muslimische Jugend Österreichs (mjö) lost its status as the official youth organisation in February 2012. A new Jugendrat der Islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (JIGGiÖ) that includes the youth organisations of Milli Görüş and other Turkish Muslim associations was created by the new leadership of the IGGiÖ. This led to tensions between the mjö and the new leadership of the IGGiÖ under President Fuat Sanaç.22 Most of the other Muslim organisations are based on the ethnic background of Muslim immigrants. Many also have specific political affiliations.

20 http://religion.orf.at/stories/2561600/. www.ots.at/presseaussendung/ots_20121203_OTS0118/ dialogforum-islam-praesentation-der-ergebnisse-aus-dem-ersten-jahr, accessed 30 December 2013. 21 www.derislam.at/?c=content&cssid=Verfassung%20der%20IGGi%D6&navid=870 &par=10, accessed 30 December 2013. 22 See also the statement of the mjö concerning the creation of the JIGGiÖ: www.mjoe.at/ pdf/Stellungnahme.pdf, accessed 13 December 2013. Austria 51

The Austrian Islamic Federation (Österreichische Islamische Föderation, Avusturya Islam Federasyonu, aİf), with its stronghold in Vienna (Rauchfangkehrergasse 36, 1150 Wien, www.ifwien.at), is the Austrian section of the Milli Görüş Movement and runs about 44 member associations23 and more than 60 mosques,24 including prayer rooms in Vienna, Upper- and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Styria and Carinthia.25 It cooperates with the IGGiÖ and some of its functionaries also have functions within the IGGiÖ. The aİf is one of the strongest Muslim organisations in Austria and runs Qur’an classes as well as many specialised organisations for students, women, workers or entrepreneurs. Members of the aİf run for local elections in Lower Austria and were elected to the labour council under the name Bündnis Mosaik. Another big Muslim organisation that cooperates with the IGGiÖ is the Union islamischer Kulturzentren, Avusturya İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği (uikz, Pelzgasse 9, 1150 Wien, www.uikz.org) affiliated to the Turkish Sufi tariqa of the Suleymancılar. It runs 2326 or more than 34 associations,27 depending on the source, and 43 prayer rooms all over Austria.28 Since 1980, the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Diyanet) has been sending imams and religious teachers to Austria.29 It runs a Federation of Turkish Sunni prayer rooms, called Türkisch-Islamische Union für kulturelle und soziale Zusammenarbeit, Avusturya Türk Islam Birligi, atİb (Sonnleithnergasse 20, 1100 Wien, www.atib .at). atİb is the biggest Muslim organisation with 65 associated organisations (including prayer rooms) all over Austria.30 Until 2010, atİb did not cooperate with the IGGiÖ but it took part in the new elections in 2010/11 and supported

23 Waldrauch, H. / Sohler, K., “Migrationsorganisationen in der Großstadt. Entstehung, Strukturen und Aktivitäten am Beispiel Wien. Endbericht.” (Wien: Europäisches Zentrum für Wohlfahrtspolitik und Sozialforschung, 2004). 24 Al Rawi, O, Wiener Landtag, 8. Sitzung am 26. Jänner 2007, Wörtliches Protokoll, p. 57, www.wien.gv.at/mdb/ltg/2007/ltg-008-w-2007–01–26–057.htm, accessed 10 December 2013. 25 www.islam-landkarte.at/suche?title=&province=All&city=&postal_code=&field_ map_netzwerk_value=Islamische+Föderation&field_map_herkunft_value=All& viewtype=%23mapview, accessed 30 March 2012. See also Waldrauch, H. / Sohler, K. (2004). 26 Waldrauch, H. / Sohler, K. (2004). 27 Aydin, H. / Halm, D. und Sen, F., “Euro-Islam—das neue Islamverständnis der Muslime in der Migration.” (Essen: Renner Institut, Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien, 2003). 28 www.uikz.org, accessed 20 October 2012; Waldrauch H. / Sohler K. (2004). 29 Strobl, A, “Der österreichische Islam. Entwicklung, Tendenzen und Möglichkeiten,” in sws-Rundschau Nr. 4/2005: pp. 520–543, 530. 30 www.atib.at/atib/atib-yapisi-ve-hizmetleri, accessed 31 December 2013. 52 Schmidinger and Çakır the election of Fuat Sanaç as the new IGGiÖ President. The Turkish extreme nationalist political party Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, mhp (Party of the National Movement) also has a union of cultural clubs called Türkische Föderation that include 19 member associations throughout Austria,31 29 prayer rooms with 26 imams.32 The same is the case for the even more extremist mhp-splinter party Büyük Birlik Partisi, bbp (Great Union Party) acting under the name Nizam-e Âlem with groups in Vienna and Vorarlberg. The fastest growing groups of Turkish Muslims are the organisations affiliated with Fethullah Gülen and his movement. Many of these organisations are active in education which includes a private high school in Vienna,33 but they have not yet established a formal umbrella organisation. There are also some other smaller Turkish Muslim associations of different political, regional or religious affiliation.34 In Vienna, Graz, Linz, and Salzburg, there are different Muslim organisations of Arab origin, some of them affiliated with different currents of the Muslim Brotherhood. The biggest of these organisations is the Islamische Liga der Kultur with five prayer rooms. However, it supplied around ten mosques with imams, mainly from Syria and Palestine, in the eastern part of Austria and has, together with the Islamic Federation, significant influence on the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ). The Islamische Liga der Kultur is one of the organisations affiliated with the conservative wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, dominated by Syrian Muslim brothers.35 The Initiative Muslimischer ÖsterreicherInnen, imö, (www.islaminitiative.at) is also dominated by Arab Muslims. There was also a big Bosnian Muslim Federation, Islamska Zajednica Bošnjaka u Austriji (http://izba.at), that was affiliated with the Bosnian Islamic Community. In 2004, Union der Bosnischen Sport-, Kultur- und Religionsvereine with ten prayer rooms split from that federation. However, in 2012, these two organisations reunited under the name Verband der bosniakischen islamischen

31 Waldrauch, H. / Sohler, K. (2004). 32 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Türkische%20Föderation.pdf, accessed 17 Decem ber 2013. 33 http://phoenixrealgymnasium.at/, accessed 14 October 2013. 34 Larise, D. / Schmidinger, T. (eds.), Zwischen Gottesstaat und Demokratie. Handbuch des politischen Islam, (Vienna: Deuticke 2008), p. 180. 35 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Liga%20der%20Kultur_0.pdf, accessed 10 Decem ber 2013. Austria 53

Vereine in Österreich. The unified association claims to have 40 member associations all over Austria.36 The umbrella organisation of the Albanian Muslims in Austria was founded in 2008 and has 10 member clubs with as many mosques.37 Since 2013, the umbrella organisation Dachverband der albanischen Muslime in Österreich has the name Union albanischer Muslime in Österreich.38 In Vienna, Pakistani, African, Indonesian, Afghan, and Chechen Muslim organisations with their own prayer rooms also exist. Since 2009, some Salafi groups became popular within a minority of the Muslim youth. The most popular of these groups seems to be Die wahre Religion (The true religion) (www.diewahrereligion.at), a Salafi network that was spread from Germany to Austria and is partly based on recruitment of converts. Salafi preachers like Abu Dujana,39 Ibrahim Abou Nagie40 or the German convert Pierre Vogel (Abu Hamza)41 repeatedly preach and convert non-Muslims in Vienna, Linz, and some other cities of Austria. Through social media like Facebook or YouTube, the videos of these preachers are also popular among some young Muslims outside these bigger cities. Even in the rural county of Vorarlberg, a small Salafi group called Islamische Jugend Vorarlberg was established in 2010. The Salafi network of Ibrahim Abou Nagie got some attention in 2012 when it expanded its campaign to distribute the Qur’an for free to proselytise in Austria.42 Besides the Salafi preachers, Hizb ut-Tahrir also got some public attention. After the ban on the party in Germany, its headquarters for the whole German- speaking region in Europe moved to Austria. Although they are a small cadre organisation with limited support, they had some influence in Islamic student circles, particularly in the Catholic church-run Afroasiatisches Institut (aai),

36 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Verband%20der%20bosniakischen%20isla - mischen%20Vereine%20in%20Österreich_0.pdf, accessed 14 December 2013. 37 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Dachverband%20der%20albanischen%20 Muslime%20in%20Österreich_0.pdf, accessed 30 December 2013. 38 www.unioni.at/uebi/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=64&Itemid=54, accessed on 30 December 2013. 39 See: www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPrmwf1F5Lc or www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvVxVs G5yl8 accessed 31 December 2013. 40 See: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mg4fj9UTaRc, accessed 31 December 2013. www.welt .de/politik/deutschland/article106185024/Der-Mann-der-Deutschland-vor-der-Hoelle- retten-will.html, accessed 30 December 2013. 41 See: http://pierrevogel.de, accessed 31 December 2013. 42 http://kurier.at/chronik/wien/deutscher-islamist-auf-wien-besuch/756.513, http://wien.orf .at/news/stories/2528845/, accessed 30 December 2013. 54 Schmidinger and Çakır a student dormitory where Shaker Assem who is the spokesman of Hizb ut- Tahrir for the German-speaking region, has held the Friday prayer for more than 30 years.43 On the other hand, more liberal Muslim organisations also openly criticise IGGiÖ and other conservative Islamic organisations. The Islamisches Informations- und Dokumentations-Zentrum Österreich, iidz, (www.halal-iidz .eu) is an independent, accredited testing and certification body for halal food and services. Their certifications extend to all goods and services in which a Halal security must be given for Muslims.44 Initiative Liberaler Muslime in Österreich, ilmö, (www.initiativeliberalermuslime.org) is an organisation that aims to represent liberal Muslims in Austria and to support the integration of Muslims into Austrian society. In particular, their objective is to show the grievances of the IGGiÖ to the public.45 ilmö and iidz chiefly attack the leadership of IGGiÖ for being undemocratic and extremist. Forum für emanzipatorischen Islam (www.fei.or.at) promotes progressive thinking in Islam. Most Alevi associations are represented by Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich, Avusturya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, aabf, (Schererstraße 4, 1210 Wien, www.aleviten.or.at) or Islamisch Alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, Avusturya Alevi İslam İnanç Toplumu, iagö, (Schererstraße 4, 1210 Wien, www.aleviten.at). Organisations close to the pro-governmental Turkish Cem Vakfı are generally members of iagö, while organisations closer to Alevi-Bektaşi Federasyonu, abf,46 and Işıkçılık 47 are closer to aabf. Additionally, there is a rival Alevi organisation of Kurdish origin, Alevitisches Kulturzentrum in Österreich, akö, (Linke Wienzeile 78, 1060 Wien, http://alevi- heute.tripod.com). Pro-Iranian Twelver Shiʿite associations are represented by Islamische Vereinigung Ahl-ul-Bayt Österreich (ivaö), Verband für die schiitischen Vereine in Österreich,48 with their main prayer room, and Islamisches Zentrum Imam

43 Larise, D. / Schmidinger, T. (2008), p. 131. 44 www.halal-iidz.eu, accessed 10 April 2014. 45 www.initiativeliberalermuslime.org/, accessed 10 April 2014. 46 Gorzweski, A., Das Alevitentum in seinen divergierenden Verhältnisbestimmungen zum Islam, (Berlin: eb-Verlag, 2010), p. 63. 47 Schmidinger, T., “Alevitische ‘Identitäten’—Eine heterodoxe Religionsgemeinschaft zwischen Islam und Pantheismus, türkischen, kurdischem und Zaza-Nationalismus” in Schmidinger, T. (ed.) Kurdistan im Wandel. Konflikte, Staatlichkeit, Gesellschaft und Religion zwischen Nahem Osten und Diaspora (Frankfurt/Main; Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 53–62: p. 59. 48 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Islamische%20Vereinigung%20Ahl-ul-Bayt_0 .pdf, accessed 12 December 2013. Austria 55

Ali (Mollardgasse 50, 1060 Wien, www.izia.at). Most Iraqi and other Shiʿis who are following hawza ‘ilmiyya under Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf left the association and established there state-recognised Islamische-Schiitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (Islamic-Shiʿite Religious Community in Austria). Their association, the Islamisches Kulturelles Zentrum Al Mufid (Ahl-ul Bait Moschee, Pezzlgasse 58, 1170 Wien)49 was recognised as a religious denominational community on 1 March 2013 under the name Islamische-Schiitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (Islamic-Shiʿite Religious Community in Austria).50 There is also a small community of Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (Sand rockgasse 22, 1210 Wien, www.ahmadiyya.at). There are about 100 believers in Vienna who participate in the community and another 200 scattered around Austria. Ahmadiyya Muslims are not integrated in IGGiÖ. Imam Munir Ahmad Munawar is responsible for religious services for all Ahmadiyya Muslims in Austria.51 Despite the fact that there are also between 2,000 and 3,000 Alawis or Nusayris in Austria—a different heterodox Shiʿi sect that sees their origins in the teachings of Imam Hassan al-ʿAskarī (d. 873) and his pupil Ibn Nusayr (d. 868), they have not yet established a permanent organisation. In 2005, Alawis organised their first association under the non-religious name Çukurova Kültür Merkezi with 350 members,52 but it is now inactive. According to the speaker of iagö, some Turkish-Syrian Alawis have joined iagö.53 Furthermore, there are some families of Ibadi Muslims and a small number of adherents of Ahl-e Haqq (Kaka’i) in Austria—another heterodox Shiʿi sect form the Hawraman region of Kurdistan in the Iraqi and Iranian border region—but none of them ever established any religious organisations or any places of worship.

49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Interview with Munir Ahmad Munawar, Imam of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Gemeinde Österreich, 6 February, 2012. 52 www.hallac.org/index.php?id=9&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37&cHash=56105d4eb9e658ad2 6d29a4bb1cb9468&PHPSESSID=d2ad2947dc1665c89b14168f2e9e3858, accessed 17 Dec ember 2013. 53 http://mobil.dastandard.at/1381370019993/Aleviten-Sprecher-Es-bringt-sich-ja-nichts- uns-zu-diskriminieren, accessed 14 December 2013. 56 Schmidinger and Çakır

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are five mosques with minarets in Austria (Vienna, 21st district;54 Telfs and Innsbruck in Tyrol;55 Saalfelden in Salzburg56 and Bad Vöslau in Lower Austria).57 In Graz,58 Linz,59 Traun in Upper Austria60 and Wiener Neustadt61 mosques are under construction. According to IGGiÖ, there are 205 registered prayer rooms.62 However, all together there might be around 260–280 prayer rooms spread throughout Austria, most of them in private apartments or basements often combined with a shop or a tea room.63 The oldest mosque in Austria is situated in Vienna, with a 32m high minaret. It was opened in 1979 and predominantly financed by the king of Saudi Arabia.64 Building regulations in two federal states (Carinthia and Vorarlberg) have been formulated in such a way as to make the erection of minarets illegal.65 The Islamic Alevi Cem houses of prayer were recognised with the legal recognition of iagö as places of worship and obtained a legal status and are legally equated to churches, mosques and synagogues.66

54 www.izwien.at/die-moschee/, accessed 12 December 2013. 55 http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/religion/525221/Moschee-mit-Minarett-in-Telfs, accessed 12 December 2013. 56 www.moschee-saalfelden.at/pages/posts/weitgehend-unbemerkt-moschee-in-saalfelden-14.php, accessed 14 December 2013. 57 http://noev1.orf.at/stories/398650, accessed 12 December 2013. 58 http://derstandard.at/1316390284520/Graz-Muslime-bauen-erste-steirische-Moschee, accessed 10 December 2013. 59 www.nur-linz.com/Bauprojekt-Linzer-nur-Moschee/, accessed 8 January 2014. 60 http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/646641/Minarettstreit-in-Graz- Moscheenstreit-in-Traun, accessed 10 December 2013. 61 http://derstandard.at/1276413743569/Diskussionen-um-geplantes-islamisches-Zentrum- in-Wr-Neustadt, accessed 8 December 2013. 62 www.derislam.at/?c=content&p=suchen_moschee&v=vereine&cssid=Moscheen&navid =410&par=40&cssid=Moscheen&navid=410&par=40, accessed 12 December 2013. 63 http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/religion/589405/200-Gebetsraeume-fur- 500000-Muslime-in-Osterreich, accessed 10 December. http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/325487/Mussen-Moscheen-Minarette-haben?_vl_backlink=/home/ panorama/oesterreich/325958/package.do&direct=325958, accessed 10 December 2013. 64 www.izwien.at/die-moschee/, accessed 14 December 2013. 65 http://vbgv1.orf.at/stories/300135, accessed 12 December 2013. http://ktnv1.orf.at/stories/ 255969, accessed 12 December 2013. 66 www.aleviten.at/de/?page_id=136, accessed 13 December 2013. Austria 57

5 Children’s Education

As with other legally recognised religious communities, the state funds Islamic religious education in schools. This has been the case since 1982/83. According to IGGiÖ, there are 430 teachers teaching about 57,000 children in 2,000 schools.67 In addition to this Islamic religious education in public schools, there are six private Islamic schools in Vienna.68 Teachers have been able to study at the Private Academy for Islamic Education (irpa, Islamische Religionspädagogische Akademie), run by IGGiÖ since 1998. IGGiÖ also lists nine different Islamic kindergartens and nursery schools on their website. All of them are in Vienna.69 However, it is planned that the new Islamic Centre in Graz will have a kindergarten, a school and library areas as well.70 Since its state registration in December 2010, iagö can indicate religious confession as “Alevi” on school reports of children of Islamic Alevi families. With its legal recognition since May 2013, iagö has a right to its own religious instruction at schools. This is still in the planning phase.71 There are also trainings of religious teachers organised by religious organisations that are not state recognised as religious societies and, therefore, are also not entitled to teach at public schools. In 2013, for example, Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich (aabf, The Federation of the Alevi Communities in Austria) organised education and trainings for teachers for the Alevi religious education (aru) with the support of the Alevi Cultural Centres Jenbach and Kufstein, in Tyrol. Those teachers are only allowed to teach in the respective organisations. Furthermore, the purpose of the trainings is also to

67 www.derislam.at/?c=content&cssid=Schulamt/Rel.Unterricht&navid=904&par=40, accessed 12 December 2013. 68 For additional information about Islamic education in Austria see: Aslan, E, Islamische Erziehung in Europa. (Islamic Education in Europe), (Wien: Böhlau, 2009). 69 www.derislam.at/?c=content&cssid=Kinderg%E4rten/Hort%20&navid=460&par=40, accessed 12 December 2013. 70 www.gsp-architektur.at/portfolio/islamisches-kulturzentrum-graz/, accessed 11 December 2013. www.stadtentwicklung.graz.at/cms/beitrag/10179199/2858079/, accessed 12 December 2013. 71 www.wienerzeitung.at/themen_channel/wz_integration/gesellschaft/555279_ Alevitentum-zweigeteilt.html, accessed 12 December 2013; www.aleviten.at/de/?p=92, accessed 12 December 2013. 58 Schmidinger and Çakır prepare those teachers for future religious education in public schools in case of state recognition.72

6 Higher and Professional Education

Since 2006, the University of Vienna has been offering a Master’s degree in Islamic Religious Pedagogy (irp) whose academic director is Prof. Ednan Aslan. This degree is the qualification for teaching Islamic religious education in high schools.73 Since the winter term 2009/2010, the University of Vienna also offers a two- semester course ‘Muslims in Europe’ as an advanced training for imams and chaplains. In the 2013 summer term the course had 24 students and 17 students were registered in the winter term 2013/2014.74 In 2012, it was announced that Islamic religious studies would be established at the University of Vienna in 2015.75 In a new study Ednan Aslan, the Professor at the irp, calls for an Institute for Islamic theology as an interim solution and outlines a curriculum for a ba in Islamic theology.76 A Master’s degree in Alevi theology was started in October 2012 at the University of Innsbruck. The programme’s extension to other federal states in Austria is planned.77

72 www.aleviten.or.at/de-detail/article/bereit-fuer-den-unterricht.html, accessed 29 October 2013. 73 http://islamische-religionspaedagogik.univie.ac.at/, accessed 30 December 2013. For more on Islamic education see Ednan A. / Rausch, M. (eds.), in cooperation with Zsofia Windisch and Sedef Sertkan, Islamic Education in Secular Societies. Wiener Islamstudien—Band 4 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag, 2013). 74 Email Interview with Mag. Melitta Kuglitsch, Programme Manager of “European Studies” and “Muslims in Europe”, 16 December 2013. 75 http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/religion/1319704/Dialogforum-Islam_Studium- fur-Imame-kommt-2015, accessed 28 December 2013. 76 E. Aslan, “Islamische Theologie in Österreich. Institutionalisierung der Ausbildung von Imamen, SeelsorgerInnen und TheologInnen” (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2013), pp. 159–166. For more on Islamic theology and the education of imams in Austria see E. Aslan (eds.), in cooperation with C. Lux, S. Sertkan and K. El Abdaoui, “Islamische Theologie in Österreich—Institutionalisierung der Ausbildung von Imamen, SeelsorgerInnen und TheologInnen” Wiener Islamstudien- Band 2 (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang Verlag, 2013). 77 www.wienerzeitung.at/themen_channel/wz_integration/gesellschaft/555279_ Alevitentum-zweigeteilt.html, accessed 12 December 2013. Austria 59

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In the central cemetery in Vienna, there are three sections reserved for Muslims, an old and a new general Muslim section, and one for Egyptian Muslims. iagö signed an agreement with the administration of the cemetery to open an Alevi section on 11 April 2011. The first funeral in the new section took place in September 2012.78 Also, in Graz, Linz and some other larger cities, there are Muslim sections of public cemeteries. In 2009, a denominational Islamic cemetery of IGGiÖ in the 23rd district of Vienna was opened. A second Islamic cemetery for the Muslims of Vorarlberg was inaugurated in June 2012 in the village of Altach.79 The cemetery was designed by Austrian architect Bernardo Bader and received the Aga Khan Award for Architecture. This Islamic cemetery is not operated by IGGiÖ like the one in Vienna but by the municipalities of Vorarlberg in cooperation with an umbrella organisation of different Muslim organisations, including Alevis, meaning that the cemetery is also open for Alevis. A high proportion of Muslim families still return the bodies of their deceased relatives to their former homeland, but the number of burials in Austria is increasing.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic chaplaincy service is provided in hospitals, armed forces and prisons. The Supreme Council of IGGiÖ selects the chaplains. There has been a Muslim prayer room in the Maria Theresien barracks in Vienna since 2004.80 Since 2000, the Islamic visit and chaplaincy service (Islamischer Besuchs- und Seelsorgedienst) runs the chaplaincy in hospitals for IGGiÖ in Vienna. Chaplaincy in prisons was done by different Muslim organisations in different federal states until 2010. In January 2010, the Ministry of Justice signed a contract with IGGiÖ for future organisation of chaplaincy in prisons to be run by

78 Interview with Ertürk Maral, press officer of the iagö, 30 October 2012. 79 www.vol.at/islamischer-friedhof-wird-eroeffenet-%E2%80%93-tag-der-offenen-tuer-bis- 17-uhr/3269655, accessed 10 December 2013. 80 http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/351965/index.do?direct=351928&_vl_ backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/351928/index.do&selChannel=, accessed 20 December 2013. 60 Schmidinger and Çakır

IGGiÖ.81 Furthermore, in May 2013 the first Austrian-wide meeting of Muslim prison chaplains was organised by the head of the chaplain teams in Salzburg.82

9 Religious Festivals

Religious festivals of Islam have no legal status in Austria, but Muslims have the right to take a day off work for important religious festivals. The same is the case for Muslim school pupils. The legally recognised iagö has also the opportunity to take days off school for Alevi religious festivals.83 On 19 October 2013, the first nationwide Open Mosque Day 2013 (Tag der offenen Moschee 2013) took place with the objective of informing non-Muslims about Islam, mosques and the lives of Muslims in Austria, reducing resent- ments and prejudices against Muslims as well as highlighting similarities between non-Muslims and Muslims.84

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

In the cities there are many Turkish, Kurdish, Arab and Iranian stores and restaurants where halal food is available. Ritual slaughter is legally guaranteed as part of the freedom of religion and thus comes under the Staatsvertrag of St. Germain and article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There is a certification of halal products by iidz that is recognised by the Austrian Standards Institute (onr 142000/142001), but not by IGGiÖ.85 In September 2013, the Austrian trade association of the food industry in cooperation with iidz hosted an information session on the topic “Win new customers and markets with halal products” that was aimed at Austrian companies of the food industry.86

81 www.derislam.at/?f=news&shownews=1718, accessed 30 September 2013. 82 Ibid. 83 www.aleviten.at/de/?p=317, accessed 13 December 2013. 84 www.tagderoffenenmoschee.at, accessed 27 November 2013. For more on the conflicts and debates on mosques in Austria see Fürlinger, E., Moscheebaukonflikte in Österreich. Nationale Politik des religiösen Raums im globalen Zeitalter, (Vienna: Vienna University Press bei V&R unipress, 2013). 85 www.halal-iidz.eu/iidz.php, accessed 20 December 2013. 86 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:TZU4lpft5PUJ:portal.wko.at/ wk/format_detail.wk%3Fangid%3D1%26stid%3D743244%26dstid%3D323+&cd=7&hl= de&ct=clnk&gl=at, accessed 30 December 2013. Austria 61

There is limited supply, but also limited demand, for so called ‘Islamic banking’ or ‘Islamic finance’ in Austria.87 In 2008, the first Islamic investment fund started its service in Vienna. The Baraka GmbH fund was established by Mouddar Khouja in 2008, when he was the personal assistant of IGGiÖ President Shakfeh. However, the certification of ‘Islamic banking’ at the Austrian Standards Institute was again not done by IGGiÖ but by the rival iidz in 2010.88 There are some Turkish and Arab banks but no explicitly Islamic bank in Austria and none of the Turkish or Arab banks specialise in ‘Islamic banking’. Hajj travel is organised by different Islamic organisations in Austria. In 2013, the embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Vienna issued 1,515 Hajj visas.89

11 Dress Codes

There are no regulations that prohibit Muslims from wearing the Islamic headscarf in public places (schools, hospitals, etc.) or in employment or public services. However, in 2008 there was a court decision that a female defen- dant in a court case against two Islamic extremists was not allowed to wear the niqab.90 In 2010, the Medical University of Graz banned students from wearing niqab at exams.91 Other forms of the scarf that show the face are not prohibited. Public debates on banning the “burka”—a term often erroneously used in the media for hijab or niqab—also continued to some extent in 2013, but drew less attention than in prior years.

12 Publication and Media

IGGiÖ started to publish a quarterly e-magazine called Der Islam in 2012. Both the fourth and the fifth issues in 2013 concentrated on integration, dialogue

87 www.wirtschaftsanwaelte.at/islamic-finance-ein-nischenmarkt-in-osterreich/, accessed 20 December 2013. 88 www.halal-iidz.eu/banking.php, accessed 18 December 2013. 89 Email Interview with Sarah Tormoche, Office of the Ambassador, 10 January 2014. 90 Penz, E / Prack, G / Schmidinger, T / Wittek, T, “Dies ist kein Gottesstaat. Terrorismus und Rechtsstaat am Beispiel des Prozesses gegen Mohamed M. und Mona S.” (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2008). 91 http://derstandard.at/1285199558957/Med-Uni-Graz-regelt-Studienbedingungen-fuer- Schleiertraegerinnen, accessed 20 December 2013. 62 Schmidinger and Çakır and mutual respect between non-Muslims and Muslims, and on information on mosques and Islam such as the understanding of law and justice in Islam as well as on information about IGGiÖ which was mainly aimed to inform non-Muslims.92 There are also several weekly and monthly Turkish newspapers which focus on Turks living in Austria and discuss Austrian affairs as well as global events. Some of these newspapers, like Zaman Avusturya, Pusula or Dewa are affiliated to Islamic networks close to the Turkish akp and Gülen Movement or to Milli Görüş. Beside Turkish, there are also a few newspapers in some other languages of Muslim immigrants like Bosniak and Russian. But many of them are completely secular and can hardly be regarded as ‘Muslim newspapers’. Like other state recognised religious communities, Muslims have short tv programmes on the official Austrian tv station orf. During Ramadan or other important religious festivals these programmes explain the religious background of Muslim religious traditions. Islam also plays some role in other tv programmes about religion and about migration, for instance, Orientierung, Kreuz und Quer or Heimat, fremde Heimat or Religion orf.

13 Family Law

Family law is not considered to be the responsibility of religious communities but of the state. Austrian Muslims have to follow the same laws as any other Austrian. Polygamy and forced marriage are illegal and the unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) is not recognised. Muslims may conduct marriage ceremonies in prayer rooms or mosques but this is not considered legally binding.

14 Interreligious Relations

There are various interreligious events at local, regional and national levels. Churches and ngos invite Muslims for interreligious discussions. Muslims participate in tv debates and organise public iftars during Ramadan. Although the official representatives of IGGiÖ and the Jewish community highlight their good relations, the Middle East conflict sometimes overshadows Muslim- Jewish relations. But beyond the official religious communities, there are also attempts to work for a better interreligious understanding of Muslims and Jews.

92 www.derislam.at/?c=emagazine&o=emagazin&cssid=eMagazin&navid=1154&par=80, accessed 28 November 2013. Austria 63

In October 2011, the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (kaiciid, www.kaiciid .org) opened in Vienna. The kaiciid is an international organisation with three founding states (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic of Austria and Kingdom of Spain) and the Holy See as a Founding Observer of the Centre.93 Its ‘Board of Directors’ includes representatives of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sunni and Twelver Shiʿi Muslims.94 Its Secretary General is the former Deputy Minister of Education of Saudi Arabia Faisal Bin Abdulrahman al-Muaammar, its Deputy Secretary General—a former Austrian politician Claudia Bandion-Ortner.95 kaiciid held a two-day religion conference “The Image of the Other” in November 2013 in Vienna in connection to its one-year anniversary. Five hundred religious leaders from 90 countries took part. At the end of the conference, cooperation agreements, mainly in the field of education, between kaiciid and various international partners such as the African Union, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (isesco), the World Scout Foundation, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (unesco) and the Universities of Montreal and Vienna were announced.96 Ministers from different countries such as Austria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Spain who attended the forum expressed in a statement their support for kaiciid and their activities.97 In December 2013, the Secretary General and Board members of kaiciid participated in the World Policy Conference in Monaco and stressed the importance of the dialogue between religions and cultures.98 In July 2013, in Graz, the Afro-Asian Institute (aai), the integration department of the city of Graz (Integrationsreferat der Stadt Graz) and the mayor’s office (Bürgermeisteramt) organised an inter-faith Conference “Com Unity Spirit”. This event took place at the suggestion of inter-religious Council of the City of Graz (interreligiöser Beirat der Stadt Graz). At this conference,

93 www.kaiciid.org/en/the-centre, accessed 30 December 2013. 94 www.kaiciid.org/en/team/board-of-directors/board-of-directors-kopie.html, accessed 30 December 2013. 95 www.kaiciid.org/en/team/secretariat/, accessed 30 December 2013. 96 http://religion.orf.at/stories/2615463/ or http://religion.orf.at/stories/2615799/, accessed 20 December 2013. 97 www.kaiciid.org/en/press/statements/kaiciid-ministers-endorse-kaiciids-work.html, accessed 28 December. 98 www.kaiciid.org/en/press/statements/kaiciid-dialogue-can-avert-collision-of-identities- and-conflict-kaiciid-secretary-general.html, accessed 29 December 2013. 64 Schmidinger and Çakır

150 representatives and experts discussed issues of peaceful coexistence between religions and cultures in Europe.99 On 19 October 2013, the first nationwide Open Mosque Day 2013 (Tag der offenen Moschee 2013) took place in Austria, organised by IGGiÖ in cooperation with other Muslim umbrella organisations.100

15 Public Opinion and Debate

On the national level, IGGiÖ also participates in political debates concerning integration, migration and political Islam. Muslim critics of IGGiÖ also take part in these debates. Election campaigns of the extreme right wing Austrian Freedom Party (fpö) have often been explicitly directed against Muslims. Plans to expand an existing prayer house in Vienna have been met with aggressive protests by a citizens’ initiative101 that was supported by fpö and other extreme right wing groups. Islam and problems of Muslim immigrants are heavily debated in newspapers and other media. However, in the last years some journalists tried to focus on a more detailed picture of the Muslim population in Austria and also wrote about differences within the Austrian Muslim community. These reports challenge the homogenising reductionism in reporting about Muslims. Moreover, the growing number of young journalists with a Muslim background helps to draw a more differentiated picture of Islam and Muslim communities in Austria. Furthermore, the state registration and following state recognition of iagö as a second Islamic religious society beside IGGiÖ initiated debates in the media and in political circles about the heterogeneity of Muslim communities in Austria, and debates were provoked by the cessation of the monopoly of IGGiÖ representing all Muslims in Austria.102 In 2012, public distribution by Salafi groups of free copies of a translation of the Qur’an led to a public discussion about proselytising and Salafi radicalism in Austria. In October 2013, the discussions on Salafi radicalism were intensified due to discussions on

99 www.graz.at/cms/beitrag/10216431/5176669/, accessed 28 September 2013. http://inter relgraz2013.com/?page_id=190, accessed 28 September 2013. 100 www.tagderoffenenmoschee.at, accessed 27 November 2013. 101 www.moschee-ade.at/, accessed 30 December 2013. 102 www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/archiv/56014_Die-neue-islamische-Konfession.html, accessed 18 December 2013. www.wienerzeitung.at/meinungen/gastkommentare/30058_ Muslime-in-Oesterreich-Das-Ende-des-Monopols.html, accessed 30 January 2013. Austria 65 meetings of Salafi groups and their mobilisation of young Muslims in Austria.103 Furthermore, since spring 2013 debates on young Salafis in Austria who went to Syria to join in the jihad were extensively discussed in media. In particular, the return to Austria of the radicalised young Salafis from the war in Syria was perceived as a danger.104 In autumn 2013, the media discussed the candidacies of Muslims of Turkish origin for both big political parties, the Social Democratic Party of Austria (spö) and the Austrian People’s Party (övp). These Muslim candidates from Turkey were from competing religious streams within the conservative Turkish Muslim community. The candidate of spö was Resul Ekrem Gönültaş who was associated with Milli Görüş whereas the candidate of the övp was Hasan Vural who had a close relationship to the akp-allied Union of European Turkish Democrats (uetd). Both parties competed for votes among conservative Muslims who were either in Turkish organisations or close to these organisations.105 In the fight for votes from migrants, there were campaign posters by spö and övp in the Turkish language, whereas some of the campaign posters of övp were bilingual. There were also spö campaign posters showing the federal chancellor, Werner Faymann, in Turkish with such Turkish slogans as “Our Chancellor Werner Faymann. We are with you.” According to spö, these were not official campaign posters but were made by a Turkish business man. The övp candidate Hasan Vural used campaign posters in both languages, German and Turkish. However, the debate circulated not primarily around Islam or Muslims, but rather on the usage of the Turkish language in campaign posters of both big parties, in particular of spö, but also on the affiliation of the candidates to Turkish religious movements.106

103 http://derstandard.at/1381368564689/Wiener-Salafisten-Treffen-Provokation-als-Taktik, accessed 19 December 2013. 104 http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/gastkommentar/1476209/Europa-auf-dem- Pulverfass, accessed 26 November 2013. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/ 1383527/Der-Jihad-eines-Wiener-Salafisten, accessed 10 April 2013. http://derstandard .at/1376535013570/Syrischer-Jihad-auf-Deutsch, accessed 2 September 2013. 105 http://dastandard.at/1376535483937/SPOe-gegen-OeVP-auf-Tuerkisch, accessed 5 September 2013. 106 http://diepresse.com/home/politik/nrwahl2013/1454367/Wirbt-Faymann-auf-Turkisch- Debatte-um-Plakate, accessed 30 September 2013. 66 Schmidinger and Çakır

16 Major Cultural Events

There are no specific Austrian Muslim cultural events but general Muslim festivals are also celebrated. Some of them, like iftar during Ramadan, are also sometimes celebrated in public. In 2013, due to the national parliamentary elections the iftar was an option for collecting votes for the big political parties, spö and övp, that was mainly the case in the official iftar-reception of IGGiÖ. At these iftar-receptions of the IGGiÖ politicians, representatives of political parties, journalists and experts were entertained.107

107 http://dastandard.at/1373514546653/Politisierter-Ramadan, accessed 3 September 2013. Azerbaijan

Bayram Balci* and Altay Goyushov**

1 Muslim Populations

Azerbaijan is a secular country with an overwhelmingly Muslim population. According to official figures provided by Azerbaijani Government, roughly 96%1 (approximately 8,900,000 according to Pew Research Centre)2 of Azerbaijan’s 9.3 million3 inhabitants have a Muslim background. Approximately 65% of local Muslims are considered Shiʿis and 35% Sunnis.4 Although in general Azerbaijanis are strongly attached to their Islamic identity and consider it as an inextricable part of their self-image, the overwhelming majority do not regularly perform religious duties. However, the share of observant Muslims has been continually growing each year since the fall of the Communist regime. Local observers who have monitored developments in the religious realm since the early 1990s estimate that the number of those who strictly observe

* Bayram Balci is Senior Research Assistant in Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (ceri). Since December 2011 he is Visiting Scholar in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington dc. He was Director of the Institut Français d’Etudes sur l’Asie Centrale, (ifeac) in Tashkent and Research Assistant in Institut Français d’Etudes Anatoliennes in Baku between 2003 and 2006. He holds degrees in Political Science and Arab-Islamic Civilisation (Sciences Po Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence) and a PhD in Political Science for a dissertation about Turkish missionaries in Central Asia. ** Altay Goyushov is a Professor at the Department of Turkic and Caucasus People’s History of Baku State University. He has a PhD in History of Islam from the Baku State University, Azerbaijan. For the last decade his research interests have been focused mainly on the issues related to national independence movements, political Islam and Islamic education in the Volga basin, Crimea, Caucasus and Central Asia. 1 u.s. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor International Religious Freedom report 2011, Azerbaijan, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/ index.htm#wrapper, January 2013. 2 http://features.pewforum.org/grl/population-number.php, accessed February 2014. 3 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan www.azstat.org/MESearch/ details, accessed February 2014. 4 u.s. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor International Religious Freedom report 2011, Azerbaijan, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/ index.htm#wrapper, accessed January 2013.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_006 68 Balci and Goyushov their religious duties is in the range of 10 to 25% of the local Muslim population. Exceptions are the months of Ramadan and Muharram of the Muslim calendar, when the number of active worshippers has been visibly increasing in the years since the country’s independence in 1991, particularly among the younger generation. According to the last census of 2009, Azerbaijanis of Turkic origin comprise a nearly 90.6% share of the local population. The other ethnic groups of Muslim background are Sunni Lezgins (2.2%), Avars (0.6%), Tsakhurs (0.2%), Kryts (Grizs) (0.04%), Xinaligs (0.02%), and Rutuls as well as Meskhetian Turks (0.5%) and Volga Tatars (0.4%). Talyshes (1.3%) and Tats (0.13%) are ethnic minority groups of Shiʿi belief. Mixed Sunni and Shiʿi Kurds make 0.2% of the population.5 In general, today practising Muslims can be identified as members of three main religious groups (each of which have smaller subdivisions). These are: a) Shiʿis who are followers of such religious authorities as the Grand Ayatollahs Khamenei, Sistani and others; b) mainstream Sunnis who are followers of various Turkish Sufi-oriented communities like Nurcu, Naqshbandi, Suleymanci and others; and c) the so-called Salafis/Wahhabis.6

2 Islam and the State

Article 6 of the Constitution states that Azerbaijan is a secular state. Article 19 affirms the separation of state and religion while Article 37 guarantees freedom of belief and the equality of all religions in the eyes of the law. The law on the freedom of conscience and religious worship which regulates relations between religion and the state was adopted in August 1992. Significant amendments to this law were made in 1996, 1997, 2002, 2009 and 2011. After 1996, Muslim religious communities were no longer allowed to work under the direction of foreign religious organisations. Furthermore, active clerics were denied the right to become elected officials in state institutions. Only those Muslim clerics who have obtained their religious education in Azerbaijan are allowed to lead religious ceremonies. Articles 300.0.1 and 300.0.2 of the Administrative Code penalise sending citizens abroad to study

5 Official webpage of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, www.president.az/browse .php?sec_id=51&lang=en, accessed February 2014; The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, www.stat.gov.az/source/demoqraphy/indexen.php, accessed February 2013. 6 For a more detailed account, see Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 65–87. Azerbaijan 69 religion or exchanging religious figures without the permission of the executive authority and carrying out religious ceremonies and rituals of the religion of Islam by citizens who have gained religious education outside the Republic of Azerbaijan.7 According to the changes to “The law on the freedom of conscience and religious worship” made in 2009, mosques can appoint preachers only with the official consent of the executive branch of the government. In 2011, a new “Article 167–2” was added in the Criminal Code which sanctions punishment for “Production, sale and distribution of religious literature, religious items and other informational materials of religious nature with the aim of import, sale and distribution without appropriate authorisation.” Since these changes were introduced in the Criminal Code, those who are involved in these kinds of activities, and who formerly could be only punished under the Administrative Code, now face a prospect of imprisonment from two to five years.8 Moreover, amendments to the State Tax Code were adopted by the Parliament in June 2012 and later signed by the President to impose new taxes on import and distribution of religious literature. According to these amendments, “literature with a religious purpose (both hard copy and electronic), audio and video material will require a state-issued verification mark before they can be sold.”9 Although under the Constitution religion and the state are separate, in 2001 the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Associations (scwra) was created explicitly to regulate religious life in the country. According to the amendments made in 2009, only the communities officially registered by this Committee are legally allowed to be present on the territory of Azerbaijan. In December 2011, the Caucasus Muslim Board (cmb), as the only state-designated legal representative of Azerbaijani Muslim

7 www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1648, accessed February 2014; www.mediaforum.az/ az/2011/12/12/PREZ%C4%B0DENT-%C4%B0LHAM-%C6%8FL%C4%B0YEV-D%C4% B0N%C4%B0-QADA%C4%9EALARI-S%C6%8FRTL%C6%8F%C5%9ED%C4%B0R%C6% 8FN-071738356c00.html, accessed February 2014. 8 www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1648, accessed February 2014; www.mediaforum .az/az/2011/12/13/D%C4%B0N%C4%B0-YASAQLAR-C%C4%B0NAY%C6%8FT-M% C6%8FC%C6%8FLL%C6%8FS%C4%B0-D%C6%8F-D%C6%8FY%C4%B0% C5%9ED%C4%B0-092126835c00.html, accessed February 2013. 9 www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1721, accessed February 2014 and http://abc.az/ eng/news/66102.html, accessed February 2013. 70 Balci and Goyushov

communities, received 2 million Manats (approximately 1.98 million Euros) of financial aid from the Azerbaijani government.10 In March 2013, the scrwa approved “Sermon Text Book” prepared by the cmb for preachers who lead Friday ( juma) prayers.11

3 Main Muslim Organisations

By the end of 2013, 565 Muslim religious communities had attained official state registration.12 The law requires all Muslim communities to accept the authority of the Caucasus Muslim Board (cmb)13—a semi-official religious institution established by the Soviet leadership in 1944 as the highest spiritual authority. Described in the law as the Historical Centre of Azerbaijani Muslims, until the early 1990s this institution operated under the name of Spiritual Board of Transcaucasian Muslims. The current head of the Board, a Shiʿi cleric Allahshukur Pashazade, became its leader in 1980. His first deputy, with the religious title of Mufti, is responsible for relations with Sunni communities. In order to be registered as a Muslim community, petitioners must address their application to the CMB. After thorough consideration, the cmb has to petition the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations for registration of the community in question. The CMB possesses sole official responsibility for the appointment of clerics to mosques (although it is required to obtain official consent from the executive branch of government) and the organisation of the hajj pilgrimage. Although registered communities are compelled to accept the formal leadership of the CMB, in reality many of them deny its spiritual authority. In addition, some unregistered communities describe the imposition of the CMB’s leadership by the state as the main reason for their unwillingness to apply for official registration. The leader of the former “Juma Mosque” community,14 Iranian educated Hadji Ilgar, is the most profiled Shiʿi preacher in Azerbaijan. He also leads a

10 http://anspress.com/index.php?a=2&lng=az&nid=132019, accessed February 2014; http://en .apa.az/news/162885, accessed February 2014. 11 www.scwra.gov.az/vnews/68/?, accessed February 2014. 12 www.scwra.gov.az/pages/95/?; www.scwra.gov.az/vnews/130/?, accessed February 2014. 13 www.qafqazislam.com, accessed February 2014. 14 Juma Mosque situated in the historical Old City of the capital. Azerbaijan 71 human rights ngo “devamm” which is a vocal critic of the current government; Hadji Ilgar also supervises an online information agency “Dəyələr” (Values).15 Currently, “Mashadi Dadash” community, headquartered in central Baku, is the biggest Shiʿi congregation due to the popularity of its self-educated but charismatic preacher Hadji Shahin.16 Jailed popular activists Abgul Suleymanov and Zulfugar Mikayiloglu who led the organisations “Milli Mənəvi Dəyərlər” (National-Moral Values) and “Cəfəri heyəti” (Team of Jafarits) enjoy widespread popularity among radically- minded Shiʿis.17 An unofficial community under the leadership of another jailed cleric Taleh Bagirzadeh is also a respected part of local Shiʿi believers. The pro-Shiʿi Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, which came into being just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was stripped of its official registration in the mid-1990s. Although the head of the party, Movsum Samadov, has been under arrest since January 2011, the party still remains the most visible sign of political Islam in Azerbaijan. Since the late 1990s, Saudi-educated Gamet Suleimanov was regarded as unofficial leader of the moderate part of the Salafi community. Under his leadership Salafis were the fastest growing community. A major crackdown was launched by the government against Salafi-leaning communities and included the closure of Gamet Suleimanov’s popular Abu Bakr mosque for prayers (he still resides there, but the mosque is not open for mass prayers) after a terrorist attack in 2008. This seriously damaged the Salafi community’s standing, but Gamet is still considered the most popular Salafi preacher. With the fall of the Soviet Union, religious movements of Turkish origin also made some impressive gains in Azerbaijani society. Due to very successful educational institutions, Fethullah Gülen’s version of the “Nur” movement has been the most effective among Turkish proselytisers operating in Azerbaijan (they own a chain of successful secular high schools, a university and very popular secular college preparatory courses named “Araz”).18 The so-called “Aid Fund for Youth” which is the local subsidiary of the Turkish Mahmud Hudai Foundation (followers of Naqshbandi Sufi order) has also been one of the most successful religious proselytisers in Azerbaijan since the early 1990s.19 They have founded and supervised several madrasas in

15 http://deyerler.org, accessed February 2014. 16 www.ahlibeyt.az, accessed February 2014. 17 www.islamazeri.az, accessed February 2014. 18 http://arazkurslari.com.az/, accessed February 2014. 19 www.gyf.org.az, accessed in February 2014. 72 Balci and Goyushov

various regions of the country since then. This organisation is also a founder of the secular college preparatory courses called “Niyal.”20 Original “Nur” i.e. followers of the late Kurdish cleric Said Nursi, as well as a sect called “Suleymancilar” founded by another prominent cleric from Turkey Suleiman Hilmi Tunahan are also to be listed among the most significant religious movements in Azerbaijan.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to the official website of the scwra, there are 1834 mosques in Azerbaijan.21 The overwhelming majority of the existing mosques were constructed before the Soviet period and reopened after the fall of the ussr. Since 1990, 814 new mosques have been built in Azerbaijan.22 The official website of the scwra also stresses that seven mosques and “pirs” (explained below) were built or renovated by the semi-official charity fund bearing the name of the current president’s late father Heydar Aliyev and led by the First lady.23 The recently renovated Taza-Pir mosque in the capital’s downtown serves as the official headquarters of the Caucasus Muslim Board as well as the Islamic University of Baku. Official Sunni Friday prayers are held by Mufti Hadji Salman at Ajdarbay Mosque in the Nasimi district of the capital. Currently, the Mashadi Dadash mosque in the so called “Kubinka” quarter of Baku city is regarded as the most attended Shiʿi prayer house in the capital, due to popularity of its imam Hadji Shahin. A prayer house called Huseyniyye located in Baku, where ceremonies are led by an influential Iranian cleric and representative of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, Odjaq Nedjat, is also regarded as one of the primary spots where the Shiʿi community regularly comes together. Currently, five major mosques in the capital city Baku and its outskirts are the most important centres of local independent Sunni communities. These are: 1) a mosque built with Turkish funds in the 1990s for the Theology Department of Baku State University and located on its campus (shared by Salafis and Turkish oriented groups); 2) a mosque in “Garachukhur” district on the outskirts of the capital (dominated by Salafis); 3) the ancient “Lezgi mosque” in the old historic centre (primarily serves Salafi community); 4) a

20 www.niyalkurslari.com/, accessed February 2014. 21 http://scwra.gov.az/pages/191/?, accessed February 2014. 22 http://scwra.gov.az/pages/191/?, accessed February 2014. 23 http://scwra.gov.az/pages/191/?, accessed February 2014. Azerbaijan 73 mosque in Mehdiabad town on the outskirts of Baku (also shared by Salafis and Turkish oriented groups); 5) a mosque in Mushfigabad town in the remote Qaradagh district of Baku (the Salafi Centre). In August 2012, a decree was issued by the President to provide land for the construction of a new mosque in cooperation with the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs). The President also allocated an initial 10 million Manats (9.98 million Euros) from the Reserve Fund to start the construction works.24 In addition to mosques, there are an undefined number of so-called hud- jras, husayniyyas and dershanes serving small groups of believers which are mainly located in private houses and apartments. There are also more than 550 so-called pirs or holy sites and graves of saints which attract thousands of pilgrims each year.25

5 Children’s Education

Separate religious classes are not offered in public schools although some basic religious information is provided within the subject called “Life Skills.” Since the early 1990s, dozens of Turkish private schools have opened in Azerbaijan where the basics of Islam are taught as part of the official curriculum (“Culture and Religion” and “Morality” classes). These officially registered and popular private schools are mainly managed by followers of Fethullah Gülen.26 There is also one Iranian secondary school in Baku which has been officially opened to meet the needs of citizens of that country who are temporarily in Azerbaijan, although local children are also allowed to attend this school.27

24 http://xeber.azeri.net/olke/prezident-bakida-yeni-mescid-kompleksinin-tikilmesi-ucun- serencam-imzalayib, accessed February 2014. 25 http://az.apa.az/news/274076, accessed February 2014. 26 The official webpage of Turkish-Azerbaijani schools is www.cag.edu.az, accessed February 2014. 27 This school has been operating in Baku since early 1990s. It has its own building located in the Yasamal district of Baku. The growing popularity of the school in this district (which due to its demographics was labelled by the Azerbaijani government as a fertile ground for İranian religious propaganda) worried local authorities. As a result to ease the pressure of Azerbaijani Government Iranian Embassy moved the school from this area to another district within Baku. It is now located in the Shahriyar Cultural Centre of the Iranian Embassy in the Khatai District. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Education allowed some Azerbaijani students attend this school. But according to regulations, the size of 74 Balci and Goyushov

Azerbaijani officials have been increasingly concerned over the rapidly growing number of worshippers and their rising involvement in political life during the recent years. This has caused the Azerbaijani government to impose some strict measures. Despite government agencies’ tough stance on the issue, unofficial mosque education as well as so-called home education provided by local clerics, remains widespread.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Baku Islamic Madrasa was founded in 1989 by the decision of the Spiritual Board of Transcaucasian Muslims as the first official institution of Islamic education in Azerbaijan. In 1997, it was renamed Islamic University of Baku (iub). Only in 2009, did the Ministry of Education officially grant the iub license of an institution of higher education. It has two Departments: 1) Department of Shariʿa and 2) Department of Islamic studies. According to the information taken from the webpage of the cmb, as of 2012, 1,286 students were enrolled in the University and it had 2,235 alumni.28 The iub has a branch in the northern city of Zakatala, funded and run by the Mahmud Hudai Foundation of Turkey. Since 1992, the Faculty of Theology at Baku State University29 has been providing undergraduate and graduate levels of religious education. There has always been uncertainty regarding the future professional careers of the faculty’s graduates since its foundation in 1992. Initially it was planned that the Faculty would mainly provide public secondary schools with teachers to teach “Basics of Religion” which had been proposed as part of the curriculum. Since this subject has never been officially introduced to the public school curriculum, a core of faculty graduates are working as teachers of Arabic. Some others are pursuing academic careers or working for official state institutions. The faculty was founded on the basis of an agreement between the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Diyanet). There are three officially registered madrasas operating in the cities of Baku, Zaqatala (Aliabad village) and Lenkoran with a two-year study programme. There is uncertainty regarding the status and recognition of their diplomas.

Azerbaijani student body in this school should not exceed 20% of the overall number of students. 28 www.qafqazislam.com/az/biu.php, accessed February 2014. 29 Official webpage of Baku State University Faculty of Theology http://theology.bsu.edu.az/ en, accessed February 2014. Azerbaijan 75

The Ministry of Education is currently working on preparation of regulatory documents for these madrasas. One also needs to mention the presence of dozens of Azerbaijani students abroad, mainly in Iran, Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia. It is widely accepted that Azeri institutions, due to a lack of qualified staff, are not able to provide quality religious education. That is one of the main reasons why many graduates of Azerbaijani religious education institutions prefer to continue their studies abroad. In September 2013, during an official visit to Iran the head of scwra, Elshad Isgenderov, met with Azerbaijani students studying in Qom which is one of the two most important centres for Shiʿi scholarship in the world.30

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Funerals are the most visible sign of Muslim tradition in Azerbaijan. However, there has been a visible decline in this tradition during the last few years due to economic hardships. Mass commemorations of the 1st, 3rd, 7th and 40th days after death as well as every Thursday between the burial and the 40th day were common phenomena, including in urban areas. According to local traditions, family members of the deceased avoided attending any parties or celebrations, particularly weddings, until the first anniversary of the death. However this tradition is also rapidly declining. All ceremonies include the obligatory presence of the local mullah. The attendance at funerals by friends, neighbours, and relatives of the deceased person’s family is almost a binding duty. Some neighbourhoods are provided with buildings specifically constructed to serve the needs of funeral ceremonies of the community. Recently the Caucasus Muslim Board started providing specially equipped and paid venues with full service included for ceremonial dinners within the main mosques of Baku. Depiction of the deceased person on the tombstone has become a widespread custom since the mid-1960s.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Currently, no chaplaincy exists in the state institutions of the Azerbaijani Republic.

30 www.scwra.gov.az/vnews/151/?, accessed February 2014. 76 Balci and Goyushov

9 Religious Festivals

Both ʿId al-Adha (Qurban bayrami in Azeri) and ʿId al-Fitr (Orucluq bayrami) are national holidays and include usually three to five non-working days allocated by the government each year. Animal sacrifices and accompanying ceremonies are an essential part of ʿId al-Adha. Small charitable donations are considered vital to the commemoration of ʿId al-Fitr. Tens of thousands attend early morning holiday prayers each year. Almost completely restricted during the Soviet era, hajj was resumed in 1991. In 2007, nearly 5,700 Azerbaijanis took part in this holy ritual.31 A sharp rise in the number of pilgrims somehow worried the government and only 2,000 men and women were allowed to perform hajj each year following the restrictions imposed in 2009. However officials eased this limitation in 2013 and 3,700 believers participated in hajj that year.32 Each year thousands of pilgrims from Azerbaijan visit tombs of Shiʿi saints in Iran (Mashhad) and Iraq (of Kerbela and Najaf ) as well. Annual mass commemorations of ʿAshura (the death of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Hussain) are another very significant event directly related to the Shiʿi Muslim identity of the majority of Azerbaijanis. Traditionally even in the urbanised areas like the capital Baku and other major cities of the country the public avoids celebrating weddings during the Islamic month of Muharram, within which ʿAshura falls.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

For a long period after independence halal food was certified by the Caucasus Muslim Board (cmb). Only two local brands: “sab meat and dairy”33 company operating in Baku and “Halal Qida” (Halal Food)34 operating in Ganja city had received official approval of the cmb to use “halal” labels on their products.35 However, in early 2011 the State Agency of Standardisation, Metrology and

31 Altay Goyushov, “Islamic Revival in Azerbaijan,” in Current Trends In Islamist Ideology, vol. 7, 2008, pp. 66–82. See www.currenttrends.org/docLib/200811111_ct7.pdf, accessed February 2014. 32 http://en.apa.az/news/200791, accessed February 2014. 33 www.sab.az/indexen.html, accessed February 2014. 34 www.elba.az/az, accessed February 2014. 35 www.milli.az/news/economy/34388.html, accessed February 2014. Azerbaijan 77

Patent (sasmp)36 started challenging the cmb’s right to certify the halal label.37 sasmp insisted that the cmb does not have the necessary equipment to conduct appropriate laboratory work and that only this State Agency possesses sole responsibility for any kind of standardisation by the laws of Azerbaijan.38 In July 2012, sasmp announced that it approved three standards for halal meat. These standards define transportation, storage and sale requirements for halal food. The agency also revealed general requirements for meat and grocery to be labelled “halal.” These new regulations took effect in August 2012 and require only specially trained staff to be employed in the production of halal food.39 Most recently the head of the sasmp told local media that currently there are no halal food producers in Azerbaijan. He continued that in spite of authorisation of the state standards for halal food production a year ago, none of the local producers applied to get the officially approved label.40 There is a chain of Turkish restaurants (“Böyük Fırat”, “Böyük Lahmacun”, “Atom” and others) belonging to Turkish citizen Huseyn Boyukfirat (allegedly follower of well-known Kurdish preacher Molla Sulayman) which provide halal food. Restaurants belonging to this chain are the only ones which are closed during the fasting time of Ramadan.41 In 1991, the Turkish Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation was the first Muslim religious organisation to start its activities in Azerbaijan after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Azerbaijani office of this foundation is operating under the name “Youth Aid Fund.”42 The most successful Turkish business is an education-oriented company “Çağ Öyrətim işlətmələri”43 which is connected to the Gülen movement. Azerbaijan became a member of the Islamic Development Bank in 1992. The idb group has invested over $1.2 billion in Azerbaijan for the implementation of projects in various spheres of the economy.”44 The National Bank of

36 www.azstand.gov.az/index.php?lang=en, accessed February 2014. 37 www.musavat.com/new/%C4%B0qtisadiyyat/93554-%C5%9 EEYX%C4%B0N_%E2% 80%9CHALAL%E2%80%9D_B%C4%B0ZNES%C4%B0N%C6%8F_Z%C6%8FRB%C6 %8F, accessed January 2013. 38 http://az.apa.az/news/329142, accessed February 2014. 39 www.trend.az/news/society/2049555.html, accessed February 2014. 40 http://abc.az/eng/news/73881.html, accessed February 2014. 41 http://buyukfirat.com, accessed February 2014. 42 www.gyf.org.az, accessed February 2014. 43 www.cag.edu.az/v2, accessed February 2014. 44 http://en.trend.az/capital/business/2239011.html, accessed February 2014. 78 Balci and Goyushov

Iran has had its Baku branch since the early 1990s.45 There are a few local banks which have tried to implement Islamic banking in Azerbaijan since independence in 1991. In August 2007, the Bahraini International Investment Bank (iib) acquired an indirect 49% stake in Amrahbank (Azerbaijan).46 In 2009, the ibb announced the commencement of the conversion of Amrahbank to a bank compliant with Shariʿa principles.47 Another local financial institution which practices Islamic Banking principles is “Kövsər Bank.”48 It was the second bank which switched to these principles in the post-Soviet era. One of the major financial institutions of Azerbaijan, International Bank of Azerbaijan (iba), has recently launched its Islamic banking and financing practices as well. The Government of Azerbaijan sent an official request to the Islamic Development Bank seeking professional assistance in setting up Islamic banking options for local Azerbaijani financial institutions.49 There is no special body for collecting Islamic taxes or donations (like zakat, khums (xüms), sadaqa, etc.). For years, the cmb has been unsuccessfully trying to impose its rules or regulations on Muslim taxes. According to Shiʿi fiqh, believers should send their tax (called khums) to their spiritual leader (marji- taqlid). Until the mid-2000s, all Shiʿi marji-taqlids from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon had fatwas allowing Azerbaijani Shiʿi Muslims to keep collected khums for local needs due to economic hardship after the fall of the Soviet Union and the war with Armenia. But since the mid-2000s, special tax collectors appointed by those marji-taqlids have been collecting and sending taxes oversees leaving only a small portion of them for local use. The majority of Sunnis also provide zakat to their local community leaders. The only place where the cmb holds grip is with the so-called “sadaqas” (small donations) and sacrifices donated to the “Pirs” (shrines). But some prominent “Pirs” like “Mir Mohsun Aqa” or “Nardaran” also do not share donations with the cmb and keep them for local communities.

45 www.azerbaijan.az/_Economy/_BankSystem/bankSystem_02_e.html; www.azerb.com/ az-bank.html, accessed February 2014. 46 www.iib-bahrain.com/amrahbank.php; www.iib-bahrain.com/news2008_AMRABANK_ moves.php, accessed February 2014. 47 www.iib-bahrain.com/news2009_Launches_a_Mortgage_Finance.php, accessed February 2014. 48 www.kautharbank.com/; www.kautharbank.com/en/banking/, accessed February 2014. 49 www.azernews.az/business/64209.html, accessed February 2014. Azerbaijan 79

11 Dress Codes

Muslim dress has not been officially limited in public places or within educational institutions, although during the last few years there have been some attempts to impose restrictions on head scarves and coverings in schools and some universities. Currently, administrations of some public secondary schools restrict access of covered female students of Muslim belief to classes. However college and university students do not face any serious limitations in this regard. It should also be noted that since the mid-1990s some religious groups have been appealing, as yet unsuccessfully, to lift restrictions imposed by government agencies on photographs taken for national passports and identification cards which require the face and head to be uncovered. In general, hijab is a marginal issue within the overwhelmingly secular Azerbaijani society and niqab is almost non-existent.

12 Publication and Media

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, dozens of print media outlets of Islamic orientation (some of them very popular) appeared, although none of them proved to be capable of longevity. These are some newspapers and magazines published in Azerbaijan by religious groups:

1) Since 2009, the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations has published its own newspaper called “Society and Religion” (www .scwra.gov.az/docs/170/); 2) “Kəlam” magazine is published by a member of the Council of Qadis under the cmb Miraziz Seyizdzadeh (www.kelaminfo.az/); 3) “İrfan” journal is published by above mentioned “Youth Aid Fund” organisation connected to the Turkish Mahmud Hudai Foundation (www .irfandergisi.com/); 4) The newspaper Nabz (Pulse) is published under the unofficial supervision of the Islamic Party (www.islaminsesi.az/). Print runs for each of these editions are relatively small and do not exceed a few thousand.

There are no religious tv or radio channels in Azerbaijan. As of 2012, two weekly religious tv shows were broadcast: one on the so-called 1st state channel and 80 Balci and Goyushov the other on Public tv. Moreover, religious tv programs broadcasting from neighbouring Turkey and Iran (both in Turkish and Azerbaijani) have long been popular with the Azerbaijani public. Internet media and social networking sites are also actively used by local religious groups. The following are a few representative web sources: the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (www.scwra.gov.az), Caucasus Muslim Board (www.qafqazislam.com/az/index.php), News Agency affiliated with the abovementioned Shiʿi preacher Hadji Ilgar (www.deyerler.org). For a long period, Ojag Nedjat has been the most popular Shiʿi cleric in Azerbaijan. Although he is an ethnic Azerbaijani, he is an Iranian citizen and the official representative of Khamenei (www.ocaqnejad.net). Some other popular Shiʿi web sources in Azerbaijan: www.faktxeber.com (Islamic party), http://ahlibeyt.az/news/ (“Meshedi Dadash” community). Sunni Web sources: www.azerimuslims.com (Azerbaijani Sunnis of Turkish orientation), www.Islamevi.az (Salafi preacher Yashar Gurbanov), http:// ixlasla.com/index.php (Hadji Gamet (unofficial head of Abu Bakr mosque) and other graduates of International Islamic University in Medina).

13 Family Law

The cmb requires all local mullahs to perform nikah ceremonies only if official proof of a state issued registration of marriage is provided. But some reports suggest that a few mullahs, by breaking this regulation, are paving the way for underage marriages and polygamy, which otherwise are very uncommon to Azerbaijani society in general.

14 Interreligious Relations

The government has made great efforts to depict Azerbaijan as a non-violent multi-religious country. This effort is underscored by numerous government- sponsored conferences and workshops that have been held over the last several years. In 2011, the Azerbaijani Government launched the “World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue” under the patronage of the First Lady. In December 2012, the scwra organised an international forum called “State and Religion: Strengthening Tolerance in a Changing World” in order to reinforce the dialogue between Islam and other religions in Azerbaijan and the rest of the world. It is not uncommon to see Sheykhulislam accompanied by both the Rabbi of the Mountain Jewish Community and the head of the local Russian Azerbaijan 81

Orthodox Church on state-sponsored events and local media. However, the official discourse makes a distinction between the so-called traditional and non-traditional religions. For example, Salafis are labelled as non-traditional missionaries. In May 2013, scwra announced the creation of a new semi-official body called “National Tolerance Centre.”50

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Independent religious organisations take a relatively active part in public life in Azerbaijan. Some independent Islamic community leaders vocally comment on both international and internal political issues and have become very popular public figures. The cmb’s leader also frequently appears in the media with his comments on international and domestic matters and his positions on national presidential elections have been called inappropriate by some local observers. The general population appreciates the Islamic aspect of their identity but at the same time is very cautious in terms of the protection of its secular values and is usually wary of signs of religious revival. The Syrian uprising, which started in 2011, sparked hot debate between Sunni and Shiʿi religious groups of Azerbaijan. The Russian conquest of the 19th century and the formation of a local secularly educated elite under imperial patronage had gradually eased long-lasting tensions between the Sunnis and Shiʿis of Azerbaijan. This trend continued and even strengthened during Soviet rule due to the antireligious nature of the regime. The religious revival which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought back religious knowledge, practice and new loyalties and this in its turn restored Sunni-Shiʿi self-awareness. But the events in Syrian became the first major occasion of an open and heated debate between local Sunnis and Shiʿis. It should be noted that social networks along with events of the Arab Spring contributed to that. In 2013, frequent news about deaths of Azerbaijani Salafi fighters participating in the Syrian civil war focussed heavy public attention to this religious group.51 While some Salafi groups in Azerbaijan hurried to distance themselves from jihadists fighting in Syria, the government and some Shiʿi activists

50 http://en.apa.az/news/185625, accessed February 2014. 51 http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/06/syria-s-sectarian-war-puts-stress-on-azerbaijan/ gmml?reloadFlag=1; www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/suriyedeki-azeri-savascilar, accessed February 2014. 82 Balci and Goyushov

including the head of cmb took the chance to launch an anti-Wahhabi propaganda campaign. This was one of the hotly debated issues in 2013 in the local social, electronic and print media.

16 Major Cultural Events

The annual celebration of the Nawruz holiday on 21 March is historically the biggest event in the cultural life of Azerbaijanis. The tradition can be traced to a Zoroastrian belief and commemorates the arrival of a new year, which according to the Zoroastrian tradition comes in spring. Belgium

Nadia Fadil*

1 Muslim Populations

While the first reports indicating the presence of Muslims in Belgium date from the 19th century,1 their presence only became an issue in the second half of the 20th century.2 Most Muslims in Belgium are descendants of migrant workers who came from the Mediterranean basin from the 1960s on. In 1970, some 65,000 Muslim immigrant workers and their families lived in Belgium, and by 1985 this number had risen to 200,000. The exact number of people of Muslim culture or Islamic faith living in Belgium today is difficult to determine, as there is no official registration of the population’s ethnic and religious ties. Until a few years ago, citizenship figures yielded a satisfactory approximation, since the overwhelming majority of the country’s Muslims were foreign

* Nadia Fadil is Assistant Professor at the Interculturalism, Migration and Minority Research Centre at ku Leuven. 1 In 1828, the Turkish Consul of Antwerp Ismaël Hakki Bey Tevfik reported the presence of 5,751 Muslims, half of them of Algerian background and the other half of Asian background; see Panafit, Lionel, Quand le droit écrit l’Islam. L’intégration juridique de l’Islam en Belgique (When law writes Islam. The Juridical integration of Islam in Belgium) (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999), p. 15. 2 Contrary to its neighbouring countries France and the Netherlands, little contact existed between Belgian officials and Muslims during the colonial era as only few Congolese were of Muslim confession. An often forgotten aspect in this Belgian colonial history is, however, that negative representations of the ‘Arab elites’ did exist at the beginning of the 20th century, this as a consequence of their role as slave traders in and presence in valuable mining areas in East Congo. Especially the latter turned into an important source of tension with Belgian officials, which resulted in a war at the end of the 19th century preceding the appropriation of the Congo by the Belgian King Leopold ii (Congo Free State). The idea that the Belgian colony was installed in order to liberate Congolese from Arab slave traders figured as an important—yet often forgotten—legitimising discourse of the colonial enterprise in monuments and schoolbooks throughout the first half of the 20th century. For an analysis of this discourse in schoolbooks, see De Baets, Antoon, “Gedaantewisseling van een heldendicht: Congo in de Geschiedenisboeken” (Transformations of a hero’s poet: Congo in the History Books) in Jacquemin, J.P. (ed.), Racisme, donker continent: clichés, stereotiepen en fantasiebeelden over zwarten in het Koninkrijk België (Racism, a dark continent: clichés, stereotypes and fantasies about blacks in the Kingdom of Belgium) (Brussels: ncos, 1991), pp. 45–56.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_007 84 Fadil nationals. Between 1990 and 2002, however, a series of legal reforms liberalised the acquisition of Belgium citizenship. As a result, more than two-thirds of Belgium’s Muslim population now have Belgian citizenship. The latest, generally accepted, estimates put the Muslim population at between 410,000 and 450,000, which amounts to at least 4% of the country’s total population.3 Today, Moroccan and Turkish ethnic groups account for 80% of the country’s Muslim population. The remaining 20% are other immigrants (and their descendants) from Algeria and Tunisia and more recent arrivals, such as refugees and immigrants from the Balkans (Kosovo and Albania), South Asia (Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Iran), and Sub-Saharan Africa (chiefly, Senegal and Mali). The overwhelming majority of these Muslims are Sunnis. Shiʿis are very much in the minority but there are indications that some Moroccan Sunnis have been converting to Shiʿism since the beginning of the 1980s.4 With regard to the Sunnis, those from Morocco belong to the Maliki rite, whereas the Turkish Muslims are Hanafis (although some Kurds follow the Shafiʿi school). There are also some Alevi Turks and Kurds. The geographic distribution of the country’s Muslim population is very uneven. More than 40% of Belgium’s Muslims live in the Brussels-Capital Region, where they are concentrated in six central boroughs (City of Brussels, Schaerbeek/Schaarbeek, Molenbeek, Anderlecht, Saint-Josse/Sint Jos, and Saint-Gilles/Sint Gillis). It should be noted that Muslim residents account for

3 These are the generally accepted estimates used by the Executive of Muslims in Belgium and various scholars on the basis of data from the National Institute of Statistics ( foreign population from countries with a Muslim majority) and the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Against Racism (official data of naturalisations by country of origin). In November 2010, the Francophone Daily Le Soir reported that sociologist Jan Hertogen estimated the number of Muslims in Belgium at 623,000 on the basis of a demographic survey and German estimates on the number of practising Muslims. The latter method has however been subjected to critique, and is a reason for some scholars to dismiss Hertogen’s estimates, see Le Soir, 14 November 2010. 4 There exist no exact figures but only estimates which vary from a minimum of one thousand (estimates of the Belgian security services in 2001) to a maximum of eight to ten thousand (estimates by the imam of the main Shiʿi mosque of Brussels). I am grateful to Imane Lechkar (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) for these figures. For a further anthropological account on the reality of Moroccan Sunni converts to Shiʿism see Lechkar, Imane, “Quelles sont les modalities d’authentification parmi les chiites belgo-marocains?” (How to understand Sunni Moroccan Belgians becoming Shiʿi) in Maréchal, B. & El Asri, F. (eds.), Islam Belge (Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2012). Belgium 85

17% of the Brussels Region’s population.5 This makes Brussels one of the cities in the Western world with the largest Muslim population. The Muslim presence in the rest of the country is more modest. Only 3% of the population in Flanders are Muslims. This northern, Dutch-speaking half of the country contains some 39% of the country’s Muslims, who are mainly distributed between the region’s two major towns (Antwerp and Ghent) and the former mining province of Limburg. Similarly, in Wallonia, the southern, French-speaking region of the country, Muslims also make up about 3% of the population, living mainly in the industrial areas of Charleroi, Liège, and Mons. They number around 94,000 (or about 21% of the kingdom’s Muslim population). The average age of Belgium’s Muslim population is lower than the national average and it is generally estimated that a third are under the age of 18. Despite a noticeable improvement in the socio-economic situation of some members of the Muslim community since the turn of the century, when it comes to higher education, home ownership and self-employment, a large proportion of Muslims continue to grapple with social problems such as failing at school and unemployment. The level of poverty is estimated at 55.56% for the Moroccans and 58.94% for the Turks, and unemployment balances at around 38%.6 Both communities also belong to the lowest educated segment of the Belgian society, with 63.1% of Turks and Moroccans having no high school degree, and only 6.1% of Turks and Moroccans in higher education.7 Their precarious socio- economic position is also exacerbated by active and passive forms of discrimination in various social domains like housing, education and the job market. Those immigrants of Muslim heritage and their descendants who have acquired Belgian nationality make up part of today’s electorate. Their participation can be important in the municipalities that have a strong population

5 Although the recent estimates by Jan Hertogen assess it at 21%, see www.npdata.be. 6 Van Robaeys, B.; Vranken, J.; Perrin, N.; Martiniello, M. De Kleur van armoede. Armoede bij personen van buitenlandse herkomst (The colour of poverty. Poverty among people of foreign origin) (Leuven: Acco, 2007), pp. 26, 31. This is the first comprehensive study on the poverty level of minorities from Turkish, Moroccan and Italian backgrounds. Data have been drawn from the national household survey which allows for a specific measurement on the basis of ethnic background instead of nationality. These estimates of poverty have been measured on the basis of income, taking the eu poverty line (60% of the median income) as threshold: i.e. 777€/month per household for Belgium. 7 Ibid., pp. 31–32. For a comprehensive study on the unequal school performances between minority and majority in Flanders and Francophone Belgium, see also Jacobs et al. De Sociale lift blijft steken/L’Ascenseur Sociale reste en panne (The social elevator remains broken) (Brussels: Koning Boudewijn Stichting, 2009). 86 Fadil of immigrant origin, noticeably in Brussels.8 As a result, candidates and elected officials of Muslim culture may be found in all political parties and in all elected assemblies. Since the end of the 1990s, some ministers in regional governments and several local councillors of Muslim origin have been active in political life.9 None of these politicians favour their religious identity over their ethno-national identification (Turkish or Moroccan). Indeed, it seems that a significant number of the Muslim electorate tends to vote for candidates according to their national origin. There have been several attempts to create an explicitly Islamic party during the last decade that have for the largest part failed to gain any seats.10 Yet, during the municipal elections of October 2012, a new political party called ISLAM—headed by a Shiʿi convert Radouane Ahrouch—managed to gain three electoral seats in three municipalities of Brussels Regional Capital (Brussels City Centre, Anderlecht and Molenbeek). The relative success of this political party, which centred its campaign on the access to and quality of education and public service, unemployment and discrimination (notably the head scarf ban),11 did not pass unnoticed and raised a large controversy, especially after one of its spokespersons declared being in favour of the introduction of shariʿa in Belgium if a majority would support this.12

8 Pierre-Yves Lambert notes that since the last 2006 municipal elections, there are 147 municipal representatives (unequally spread over the 19 Brussels communes) from a minority community, of which 94 were Moroccans, 22 Turks, 2 Algerians and 1 Tunisian, http://suffrage-universel.blogspot.com/2006/11/combien-dlus-allochtones-dans-les .html, accessed 05 January 2010. 9 Fadila Laanan, the current minister of Culture in the Government of the Francophone Community, is the only sitting minister of Muslim background in any of the Belgian regions while Emir Kir holds a mandate of Secretary of State of Urban Planning for the Brussels Capital Region. 10 On the French speaking side, the best known attempt to create an Islamic political party has been the Brussels based Parti des Jeunes Musulmans led by a convert Jean-François Abdullah Bastin: www.mvjm.be/. It ran in the elections in 2004 gaining 0.93% at the regional elections in Brussels and 3.38% at the local elections in the Brussels commune of Molenbeek St. Jean. In Flanders, the political movement Arab European League launched the Islamic party Moslim Democratische Partij (mdp) at the regional elections of 2004, gaining 0.42% at the Flemish level (the party only ran in the Flemish provinces of Antwerp and Oost-Vlaanderen). 11 See the website of the islam party www.islam2012.be/programme2012.html, accessed 23 January 2013. 12 See “Lijst Islam: Ambtenaar of agent in hoofddoek moet kunnen”, 30/10/12 in www.brus selnieuws.be/artikel/lijst-islam-ambtenaar-agent-hoofddoek-moet-kunnen. Belgium 87

2 Islam and the State

Relations between the state and religions in Belgium are based on constitutional provisions adopted in 1831. Article 19 of the Constitution establishes the principle of freedom of religion and Article 21 the separation of church and state, which is considered to be a relationship of reciprocal non-interference. These provisions actually reflect the Belgian state’s spirit of neutrality towards religious affairs, which differs from the concept of laïcité that assumes a strict separation between the state and religion(s). Belgian law allows the public authorities to recognise and finance various religions. Since the state reform of 2001, the latter has partly turned into a regional competence. Whereas the federal government maintains the responsibility over the salaries of the recognised faiths’ ministers, including those of its chaplains in the prisons and the army; the upkeep of religious buildings has become a regional competence in 2001 and is thus borne by the regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels- Capital). The recognised religions are also given time slots in state broadcasting networks for religious programmes (such as mtro, cf. infra), which are organised on a regional level, while public schools must provide religious education of the recognised religions if asked by a sufficient number of parents. The teachers and inspectors of these classes are on the payroll of the Flemish Region (which has been merged with the Flemish Community) and the French-speaking Community, whose responsibilities include education and cultural affairs. At a local level, municipalities also play an important role in dealing with certain matters concerning the organisation of Islamic religious practices. Issues such as mosque settlement, Islamic sections in cemeteries, the infrastructural organisation of ʿId al-Adha for the sacrifice of sheep or the provision of halal food in public schools are dependent on local regulations and may thus strongly differ across several localities.13

13 Corinne Torrekens in her study offers a detailed account of the relationship between local officials and representatives of mosques and Muslim organisations in the public management of mosques (and the instalment of minarets), the organisation of ʿId al-Adha and halal food at schools. See Torrekens, C., La visibilité de l’islam au sein de l’espace public bruxellois: transaction, reconnaissance et identité (The visibility of Islam in the Public Sphere of Brussels: transaction, recognition and identity). Thèse de doctorat. Bruxelles, Université Libre de Bruxelles/Université Catholique de Louvain, 2008. For more information on the local management of the Muslim presence in the Brussels borough of Schaerbeek, see Manço, U. and M. Kanmaz, “From conflict to co-operation between Muslims and local authorities in a Brussels borough: Schaerbeek”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1105–1123 and for the case of Ghent see Kanmaz, M., Moslims in Gent: De ontwikkeling van gebedsruimtes, moskeeën en islamitische centra 88 Fadil

Six denominations (in addition to the non-denominational Ethical Movement) are recognised today. They are the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant churches, Islam, and Judaism. In order for a religion to be officially recognised, the Belgian state requires that a head of the faith be designated who will become its spokesman with regard to the religion’s secular administration and the representative of its followers.14 Yet, this question of representativeness remains a thorny issue in the case of Islam. The establishment of a representative body that would meet Belgium’s constitutional requirements has been a constant source of tension, both in relations between the state and the Muslim communities, as well as among the Muslim communities. The question of a Belgian representative body for Muslims only turned into an important political matter in the second half of the 1980s. Until then, the Moroccan and Turkish embassies and the Saudi- funded Islamic Cultural Centre figured as the main interlocutors with the Belgian government. Mosques and imams were largely financed by the countries of origin, donations from Saudi Arabia or by the local Muslim communities themselves. The 1980s, however, signalled a shift in perspective among the Belgian authorities: Islam was no longer conceived through a ‘foreign’ lens, but became increasingly linked with domestic concerns about the integration of Muslims. The need for an institutional body, which would not only act as a representative of the Belgian Muslims, but also act as a direct interlocutor with the Belgian government on issues of integration, became an important domestic preoccupation from the 1990s. The establishment of what would come to be known as the Executive of Muslims in Belgium did thus not only emerge from an administrative need for an institutional body that would regulate the operation of the Islamic faith, but also from the quest by the Belgian authorities for an official spokesperson of the Muslim community.15

(Muslims in Ghent: the Development of worship Places, Mosques and Islamic Centres) (Ghent: Academia Press, 2009). 14 The conditions for recognising a religion are: (1) having a large considerable following (tens of thousands), (2) being organised in such a way that a representative organ maintains contacts with civil authorities, (3) being present in the country for a number of decades, (4) fulfilling a social function. See http://theo.kuleuven.be/icrid/icrid_religies/ icrid_religies_index.html#erkenning, accessed March 2012. 15 This is the line of argumentation developed by Lionel Panafit following his thorough historical account and analysis of the institutional recognition of the Islamic cult. See Panafit, Lionel, Quand le droit écrit l’Islam. L’Intégration juridique de l’islam en Belgique (Louvain-La-Neuve: Bruylant Academia, 1999). Belgium 89

Because of the absence of a proper ‘representative’ head, Muslim communities could not access state financing other than for schooling until 1996, when provisional representatives were appointed to prepare for general elections in order to nominate a new representative body.16 In 1998, elections were held which resulted in an executive body for the Islamic faith, called the Executive of the Muslims of Belgium or emb (Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique/ Executief van de Moslims van België). The creation of this body did not settle the matter. Various internal crises beset emb, the causes of which are linked with the heterogeneous composition of the body (both in ethnic and ideological terms), an internal competition between the different ethnic groups and attempts by the Belgian government and Turkish and Moroccan diplomatic authorities to meddle in its affairs.17 The second election organised by the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs in March 2005 to elect a new emb was largely boycotted by the Moroccan community (especially in Brussels),18 and its political and legal aftermath led to a situation wherein internal conflicts and allegations of mismanagement which have led to police interventions regularly paralyse the operation of the Executive, the most recent being in May 2012.19 The institutional organ continues to fulfil its administrative functions and to accompany the mosques and imams in their recognition processes despite the current uncertainty that exists about the modalities for a renewed composition of the board and general assembly of emb. The official mandate of the actual Executive ended in 2009. Since then, several extensions have been

16 The Royal Decree of 3 July 1996 provided for a modest subsidy for the material organisation of the Islamic cult which was 74.500€ in 1996, 495.000€ in 2000, 1.180.000€ in 2005 and 996.000€ in 2007. Figures from Husson, Jean-François, “Le financement du culte islamique en Belgique”, www.cil.be/files/PC7%20Le%20financement%20du%20 culte%20islamique%20en%20Belgique%20JF%20Husson.pdf, accessed 6 January 2010. 17 For a fuller account of these episodes until 2005 see Kanmaz, M. & Zemni, S. (2008) “Moslims als inzet in religieuze, maatschappelijke en veiligheidsdiscours. De erkenning en institutionalisering van de islamitische eredienst in België” in Timmerman, C. & Vanderwaeren, E. (eds.), Islambeleving in de Lage landen, Leuven: Acco/Apeldoorn. 18 Due to a boycott by a large segment of the Moroccan civil society in Brussels of the 2005 elections, the General Assembly ended up being composed of a large proportion of Turks. See Crivellaro, Rachel, “les Turcs raflent la majorité des sièges” (Turks obtain the majority of seats) in La Libre Belgique, 24 March 2005. 19 The latter was the result of a plaint filed by a former member of the board, Isabelle Praille, who challenged the fact that she had been put aside and also accused the current board of mismanagement. See Edimo, Ristel “Le siège de l’executif des Muslmans de Belgique perquisitionné”, 11/05/05 at www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/10581/siege-l-executif- musulmans-belgique-perquisitionne.html. 90 Fadil granted to the successive interim boards while a solution for the renewal of the board is still pending. A large part of the difficulties encountered in renewing the composition of emb has to do with the conflicting views regarding the procedure to follow in this regard. A first scenario, upheld by a majority of the General Assembly, proposes a renewal through the appointment of delegate members from existing mosques. A second scenario, defended by some dissident emb members who have organised themselves as the Democratic Alternative of Muslims in Belgium (Association Démocratique des Musulmans de Belgique—admb), calls for a general and democratic election which they see as the only guarantee to avoid the interventions by Moroccan and Turkish authorities in the existing ga. In 2012, the conflicts between these two tendencies escalated after one of the leading figures of admb, who was put aside in January 2012, filed a lawsuit in May 2012. The question of the renewal of the board of emb has been pending since 2012, but current affairs (appointment and inspection of Islam teachers, administrating the applications of mosques for state funding etc.) are taken up by a temporary board and the Belgian government has granted an allowance of 341,000 Euros in the year 2013.20

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Aside from the official body for the Islamic faith, emb, ethnic socio-cultural associations and federations of all sizes make up a very dynamic Muslim civil society.21 These associations are organised mainly along ethnic lines. Among the Turks, there are a number of federations (which sometimes encompass a large number of local mosques) expressing competing ideological and religious tendencies from Turkey. Moroccan civil society is, in turn, composed of a number of federations and a myriad of associations, including many run by independent mosques and denominational associations, that cater, for example, for young people or Islamic teachers of religion.

20 19 June 2013 Koninklijk besluit tot toekenning van een subsidie van 341.000 eur voor de werking van het Executief van de Moslims van België [Royal Decision for the allowance of a subsidy of 341 for the operation of the Executive of Muslims in Belgium] www.etaamb .be/nl/koninklijk-besluit-van-08-mei-2013_n2013009223.html, accessed 2 March 2014. 21 For an overview of the different (Islamist) networks, movements and organisations within the Muslim community of Belgium, see Maréchal, B., “Courants fondamentalistes en Belgique” (Fundamentalist tendencies in Belgium), Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1 (2008), available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal_fr/2008/issue1/jv3no1a5 .html, accessed March 2012. Belgium 91

The best organised and consequently most influential Turkish Islamic movement over the years has been the Belgian branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Belçika Türk Islam Diyanet Vakfi), known as Diyanet.22 Today, Diyanet unites close to two-thirds of the Turkish mosques in Belgium and receives imams and Islamic teachers trained in Turkey and financed by the Turkish government. The second Turkish Islamic group has been the religious political movement Millî Görüs represented by the Islamic Federation of Belgium (Belçika İslam Federasyonu), the parent chapter of which was founded in Germany in 1973.23 Millî Görüs maintains ties with non-Turkish Islamic groups and various European public authorities and close to a third of the Turkish mosques in Belgium belong to this group. In recent years, organisations connected to Fethüllah Gülen movement have, however, grown in influence and popularity. The vision of the Gülen movement centres on the creation of an economic and intellectual elite of believers, although its officers refuse to call its establishments ‘Islamic.’ A number of its affiliated organisations are organised through the platform fedactio, which groups different kinds of community-based organisations that work on issues of employment, education, welfare etc.24 The movement also runs six primary or secondary schools (the Dutch-language Lucerna Colleges and French- language Ecoles des Étoiles), boarding schools, and religious training centres.25 An important platform of the Gülen movement is the Intercultural Dialogue Platform,26 which largely targets Muslim and non-Muslim elites (often linked to the eu and Belgian establishment) and which has also played a key role in the creation of a Fethullah Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies in 2011 at the kuleuven (the gcis).27 Finally, there is the Belgian Federation of Alevi Associations (Belçika Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu) which represents the heterodox Shiʿi variant of Turkish Islam in Belgium and presents a humanist culture.28 Moroccan Muslims in Belgium are not organised along such clear ideological lines. Groupings do exist, but it is more a matter of individual practising Muslims who identify with a certain religious and ideological orientations rather than clear-cut lines adopted by the mosques. It is thus difficult to

22 www.diyanet.be/. 23 www.fibif.be/. 24 www.fedactio.be/. 25 www.lucernacollege.be/ and www.ecoledesetoiles.be/. 26 www.dialogueplatform.eu. 27 http://soc.kuleuven.be/web/staticpage/3/7/eng/560. 28 www.babf.be/. 92 Fadil offer an accurate picture or clear estimates of the spread of different ideological tendencies within the Maghrebi community. A large part of Belgium’s Moroccan migrants adheres to a traditional Maliki rite, which is also close to the Moroccan monarchy and is followed by most traditional mosque leaders. Religious-political groupings, like the Moroccan Al Adl wal Ihsane, are also represented among mostly higher educated segments of the community.29 The same also applies for spiritual Sufi traditions such as the Moroccan tariqa Boutchichiyya. Pietistic movements like the Tabligh are mostly represented among the lower educated segments of the Moroccans, although their popularity seems to be decreasing. Middle-Eastern tendencies are also well represented within the Moroccan community. Reformist tendencies that are close to the Muslim Brotherhood are well-represented in the Maghrebi community, especially amongst its higher educated segments.30 The influence of the Swiss scholar Tariq Ramadan has been quite considerable since the late nineties in Brussels (for long represented through the network Presence Musulmane), and the role of these new intellectuals is mostly structured through conferences and lectures. A second important sphere of influence is the Wahhabi and Saudi-based scholarly debates which also have a large influence on a segment of the community. More politicised variants of this stream have been developed recently, often in isolation and opposition to the existing leadership. Chief examples amongst these are Sharia4Belgium, a small group that was active from 2010 until its dismantlement in 2012 (cf. public opinion).31 Other organisations along similar lines include Collectif Réflection Musulmane, an organisation that tries to establish political action through Islamic principles and which is based in Brussels. Secular and more liberal- progressive composites of the Moroccan community are equally present, but

29 For a recent analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Belgium and in Europe, see Maréchal, B., The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 30 The designation ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ is a controversial one within the Muslim community, as only few intellectuals and activists actually declare themselves as part of this movement. When referring to the term ‘Muslim brotherhood tendency’, we draw on the work of Brigitte Maréchal who understands the latter as an intellectual school of thought and lose network rather than an organisation in the strict sense of the word (comparable to the school of thought of socialism or Marxism). See in this respect Maréchal, B., The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 31 “Sharia4Belgium stopt. Nu wordt het pas gevaarlijk” [Sharia4Belgium stops. Now things are turning dangerous] in Gazet van Antwerpen, www.gva.be/nieuws/binnenland/ aid1256348/sharia4belgium-stopt-nu-wordt-het-pas-echt-gevaarlijk.aspx, accessed 9 October 2012. Belgium 93 are less formally organised or at least in a non-ideological manner.32 Since the summer 2011, there exists a movement called Collectif Musulmans Progressistes, which seeks to defend a more liberal agenda on questions of citizenship and holds an explicit critical stand towards what they consider extremist tendencies within the Maghrebi-Muslim community. The Moroccan religious associations and mosques are organised in provincial federations in the Flemish region. In 2002, the provincial unions came together to form the Federation of Mosque Unions (fum) and Imams were represented in the League of Imams (Rabitat al-Ulama). These federations figure as main representatives of locally based mosques and act as interlocutors with local authorities. In 2009, Belgian converts to Islam created the Belgian Islamic Centre “De Koepel”. This centre is both a mosque and a socio-cultural organisation. It was first established to guide neophytes in their conversion process but is now known as a mosque in which the sermon language is Dutch. The Belgian Islamic Centre is both visited by converts and other Muslims.33 In the Flemish part of the country, the Moroccan community is also organised along ethnic lines in Federations such as the Federatie van Marokkaanse Verenigingen34 (fmv), which has its main activities in Antwerp, or the association Vereniging voor Ontwikkeling en Emancipatie van Moslims35 (voem), which adopts a mid-way position, profiling itself both as an Islamic and socio- cultural organisation. These ethno-cultural federations fulfil similar functions to the Islamic federations, yet with a focus on organisations organised on an ethno-cultural basis rather than a religious basis. The Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Belgique (icc)), known as La grande mosquée, housed in the grand mosque of Brussels since 1969, is a historical player on Brussels’s Arab Islamic stage.36 It is a creation of the World Muslim League, controlled by Saudi Arabia, and it played a decisive role in Belgium’s official recognition of the Islamic faith up until 1996. The icc continues to have religious authority within certain parts of the North African population and also for the majority of converts. The Centre provides statements of religious advice ( fatwas), grants conversion certificates and organises Arabic language classes and courses in Islamic theology.

32 The socio-cultural centre Espace Magh (www.espacemagh.be/) in Brussels, for instance, figures as an illustration of an attempt to create a secular forum within the Maghrebi community, yet without explicitly framing it in those terms. 33 www.belgisch-islamitisch-centrum.be/. 34 Federation of Moroccan Organisations.—www.fmv-vzw.be/. 35 Association for the development and emancipation of Muslims.—www.voem-vzw.be/. 36 www.centreislamique.be/. 94 Fadil

Besides mosque-based initiatives and khutbas, there are also a number of Islamic socio-cultural organisations that are not necessarily linked to mosques but provide for cultural initiatives from an Islamic perspective and organise conferences on questions of Muslim identity and citizenship on a more local basis. In the context of Antwerp, the organisations Al Mawada (www .almawada) and Assakina sisters play an important role in this regard. Other organisations, which have emerged in recent years, are ‘The arrivalists’ and ‘Freehands’.37 In the context of Brussels, platforms such as Horizons570— which organised throughout 2012 and 2013 conferences on the prophet—and the European Muslim Network hold a similar position. A final set of organisations are those that seek more to group Muslim professionals such as abpm (Association Belge des Professionels Musulmans) on the francophone side (www.abpm.be) or Niya (www.niya.be) on the Flemish side.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to decade-old estimates, there were 333 mosques and prayer houses in Belgium in 2004, all self-financed and with the formal legal status of non- profit associations.38 Flanders accounts for half of the houses of worship, with 167 mosques or prayer houses. There are 89 in Wallonia and 77 in the Brussels Region. Close to half of the mosques are attended and managed by Moroccans. The Turkish mosques account for 42% of the total. The remaining 10% belong to Albanian, Bosnian, Pakistani and other Muslim groups. Mosques are generally prayer houses converted from schools, shops or industrial premises. Only four Islamic places of worship in Belgium are purpose-built according to the classical architecture of a mosque, with one or two minarets and a dome. Twelve other mosques have added a minaret to their renovated buildings. This possibility depends on building regulations and the political will of the local authorities.39 The amplified broadcasting of the call to prayer is generally prohibited in most municipalities, yet some exceptions exist.40

37 www.facebook.com/home.php#!/Arrivalists/info & www.facebook.com/home.php#!/ pages/Free-Hands/142442292484429. 38 Kanmaz, M. & El Battiui (2004) “Report on Mosques, Imams and Islam Teachers in Belgium”, Report of the King Baudouin Foundation (kbs), Brussels—in www.kbs-frb.be/ publication.aspx?id=178192&LangType=1033, accessed March 2012. 39 For some example of local tensions around mosques, see Allievi, S., Conflicts over mosques in Europe—Policy issues and trends, nef, 2009 (available to download at www.nefic.org). 40 In the small francophone town of Visé, the Turkish mosque Mimar Sinan at Cheratte-Bas has been calling to prayers three times a day since its establishment in 1981. See Dorzée, Belgium 95

The official recognition and financial support of mosques turned into a regional competence in 2001. Stipulations on conditions to be recognised and financed are fixed by the regional authorities and mostly apply to the size of the building, number of members and the administrative structure. Candidate mosques must furthermore declare that they will observe the Belgian constitution and human rights, and a positive report by the Belgian security services of the activities of the house of worship is a condition for their recognition. The Flemish recognition criteria are stricter than those applied in the rest of the country: the imams who draw salaries in recognised mosques in Flanders must take courses in ‘citizen-building’ (inburgering) organised by the regional authorities, and Dutch must be the official language of the mosque’s administration. Recognition by the regions entails the regional authorities’ commitment to maintain the buildings, and the federal government, for its part, is responsible for paying the salaries of the imams who officiate regularly in those mosques (some mosques enjoy the services of more than one imam). According to our survey amongst the different regional administrations, there are 39 mosques recognised by the Walloon regional government, 24 by the Flemish government (and four in the process of being recognised), and 14 by the Brussels Regional government.41 Forty imams are recognised by the federal authorities (27 first rank imams, 3 second rank imams and 10 third rank imams).42

5 Children’s Education

The country’s public primary and secondary schools offer the possibility of taking two hours a week of religion classes for the recognised religions or non- denominational ethics classes. Under this general framework, classes in the Islamic religion have been organised in both Dutch- and French-speaking public education since 1975. The teachers of these classes are paid by the public authorities of the relevant language systems. For a considerable period, these teachers came from the immigrants’ home countries and often had insufficient teacher training (they did not have the requisite training) and/or Dutch or French language skills. Specific teams of inspectors (three Dutch-speaking and

Hughes “Le Chant du muezzin au pied des Terrils” (The song of Muezzin at the region of Terrils), Le Soir, 19 December 2009, p. 19. 41 Data from the Regional Authorities of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Regional Capital, February 2014. 42 Data from the Federal Government, Department of Justice and Internal affairs, January 2013. 96 Fadil three French-speaking inspectors) were appointed in 2003, yet even by 2013 close to 700 Islamic religion teachers did not have a clear occupational status. One can thus assume that no standard curriculum exists and that there are inequalities when it comes to payment, seniority, appointments and pensions compared with other teachers within the educational system. Islamic religion classes are given in some 800–900 public primary and secondary schools. These courses are taken by an estimated 30,000 pupils (the general consensus is that this accounts for half of the potential Muslim student body). Over recent years, however, there have been discussions as to the pertinence of organising confessional courses in public schools, especially on the Flemish side of the country. Several opinion makers have defended the idea of replacing such confessional courses by a general, philosophical course that would adopt a socio-historical approach to the study of religions and would be taught to all students. The feasibility of such an initiative, entitled lef (levensbeschouwing, ethiek en filosofie), is currently being examined by a working group of the Flemish com- munitarian school (go!).43 Belgian legislation allows the creation of private denominational schools that are eligible for public financing provided that they meet certain legal conditions. The first such denominational Muslim school was the Al-Ghazali School run by the Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels, founded in 1989, and the second initiative was taken in September 2007 with the opening of the Avicenna Islamic Secondary School in Molenbeek borough of Brussels with a large Muslim population. Also noteworthy, although they refuse the label ‘Muslim school’, are the six Lucerne Schools (run by the Gülen movement) established across the country and which are quite successful. And finally, in September 2013, the elementary school Iqra was opened in Antwerp. The school is an initiative of the Federation of Moroccan organisations (fmv) and can cater for up to 64 pupils. The opening of the school triggered a large amount of media attention and was seen many commentators as further evidence of the growing segregation of the Muslim community. The initiator of this school, Mohamed Chakkar, defended his initiative as one that was open to everyone, although Moroccan-Muslim population figure as the primary target group.44

43 One of the most vocal defenders of this initiative is Flemish moral philosopher Patrick Loobuyck (University of Antwerp), who has written several pieces on this question. See Loobuyck, Patrick (2014) Meer lef in het onderwijs. Levensbeschouwing, ethiek en filosofie voor iedereen, Brussel: vub Press. 44 “Marokkanen krijgen aparte school” [Moroccans receive a separate school] in Gazet van Antwerpen, www.gva.be/nieuws/binnenland/aid1249055/marokkanen-krijgen-aparte- school-in-borgerhout-2.aspx, accessed 27 September 2014. Belgium 97

6 Higher and Professional Education

Almost all imams who officiate in the Turkish mosques have been trained in theological schools in Turkey. Whilst their level of religious training is satisfactory, their French or Dutch language skills are often very poor and, most importantly, they are not familiar with the socio-cultural context of Belgian society or the economic, social, and cultural conditions in which the Muslim populations of immigrant descent live. The situation of the imams in the Moroccan mosques is more complex. In the first years of the immigration, imams would be designated by the members of the community on the basis of their knowledge of the Qur’an and Islamic tradition. These would often also consist of men from the same regions in Morocco, who often enjoyed a minimal training in religious institutions (al ma’ahid al-diniyya) or local mosques in the home country.45 The function of these first imams was mostly to head the prayer and act as administrator for the mosque. Moroccan authorities also provided for imams, either on an occasional (especially during Eid festivities) or permanent basis. Over time, however, the Moroccan Muslim community—especially the second generation—became more demanding towards their imam. Their knowledge of the Islamic tradition and capacity to engage with the daily needs of the community became an important factor of authority and credibility. This also explains the higher authority granted to imams trained in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, who are considered to have benefited from the best training possible. The capacity to engage with the problems emerging from the reality of Muslims as a minority in a non-Muslim context also became an important criterion of evaluation. Yet not only Muslims but also non-Muslims had an increasing interest in the functioning and training of imams, especially after 9/11. Non-Muslim officials and social actors viewed imams as central and influential figures, whose conduct and speeches impact upon the integration of the Muslim community. Whether this perspective holds true is a matter of debate.46 Both the Muslim community’s need for locally trained imams as well as the fear of ‘radical

45 Kanmaz & Battiui, Moskeeën, Imams en Islamleerkrachten in België (Mosques, Imams and Islam Teachers in Belgium) (Brussel: King Baudouin Fondation, 2004), pp. 26. 46 Several scholars have indeed argued that the social role of the Imam is often overesti- mated by the local authorities, which results from a projection of the moral role played by the priests upon the figure of the Imam. See Kanmaz & Battiui, ibid. and Welmoet Boender, Imam in Nederland. Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (Imam in the Netherlands. Viewpoints on his religious role in society) (Amsterdam: Bert De Bakker, 2007). 98 Fadil imams’ by Belgian officials thus stand at the basis of a number of pilot projects to train Islamic religious personnel. In the French-speaking part of the country, the cismoc of the Catholic University of Louvain (ucl) has been offering courses in Islamic Studies based in the social sciences open to all—Muslim and non-Muslim—since 2007.47 The ‘Observatory of the Relations between Religion, organised Secularity and the State’48 organised training for ministers of religion of foreign origin in Charleroi in 2007 with the assistance of federal public funds and the support of the government of the Walloon region.49 In Flanders, the University of Antwerp has started in the academic year 2009–2010 a post-graduate programme for a specialisation in Islam for Islam teachers in collaboration with emb.50 These university-based initiatives exist besides a wide number of private initiatives that have been launched by Muslims organisations.51

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The bodies of most Muslims who die in Belgium, even those who have acquired Belgian citizenship, are sent back to their homelands for burial.52 In order to pay for this, most Muslim families contribute to either commercial or association funds. There are no Islamic cemeteries per se in Belgium. Cemeteries are managed by the municipalities and some of those that have large Muslim populations have set aside specific areas for Islamic burials. There are nine of such Islamic parcels in Flanders,53 three in Wallonia, and two in the Brussels Region.

47 www.uclouvain.be/38784.html. 48 http://oracle.cifop.be/. 49 http://oracle.cifop.be/#form, accessed 16 May 2009. 50 “Universiteit Antwerpen leidt Islamleerkrachten op”, De Standaard, 8 October 2009. 51 For example: Islamitische Universiteit van Europa-Afdeling Gent (European Islamic University, Section of Ghent), www.ifeg.be/ifeg/x; Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: www.faculte-islamique.be/; Académie Européenne de Culture et de Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: www.alkhayria.com/index.htm or the iesi (European Institute for Islamic sciences) based in Antwerp https://www.facebook.com/iesi.Belgium. 52 There exist no exact data on this question, yet it is fair to say that the overwhelming majority of the bodies of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims of the first generation are transferred to the country of origin. The picture is however less clear regarding the younger generations considering their young age, and it remains an open question, to which extent the forthcoming generations will be buried in Belgium rather than in the country of their parents (or grandparents). 53 www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/archief/docu3.htm. Belgium 99

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic counsellors have been able to visit patients in hospitals and inmates in prisons (a third of inmates in Belgium are of the Muslim faith) for years. The prison chaplains have enjoyed recognised legal status since 2005 and as of the end of 2013, there were 18 full-time chaplain positions who are recognised and financed by the Belgian authorities. Yet, in most cases the workload is shared by several chaplains on a part-time basis. In 2007, there were a total of 24 individual chaplains working for the most part on a part-time basis.54 The hospital counsellors are not paid by the state.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslim religious holidays are not granted any official status by the Belgian authorities but are individually observed by Muslims. While most of these holidays generally pass unnoticed, some do become visible and require a minimum of support by local authorities. This is especially the case for the sacrifice on ʿId al-Adha. Slaughtering animals at home is illegal in Belgium and the majority of the country’s Muslims obey this law. Municipalities with large Muslim populations have been trying to organise the ritual sacrifice of ʿId al-Adha since the late 1990s. They set up temporary slaughterhouses (where emb-approved halal butchers officiate) and arrange for the sacrificed animals’ carcasses to be collected, but organisational setbacks emerge in certain municipalities each year. Butchers and breeders are also allowed to make their services available to Muslims at such times. The Executive of Muslims in Belgium provides for slaughtering certificates during ʿId al-Adha, provided that certain conditions are met. ʿId Al-Adha has also traditionally been a source of protest by the animal rights movement and the far right. However, in the recent years, the controversy over this question has extended into a larger debate, especially with the city of Antwerp’s decision to introduce special regulations concerning these festivities in order to stimulate Muslims to stun the animals before slaughtering them. In 2011 and 2012, a separate installation was introduced for the stunning of animals. Yet, this initiative proved unsuccessful as the installation was not used in either year and was consequently abandoned in 2013.55

54 Figures from Said Aberkan—Head Consultant Islamic Chaplaincy, Antwerp, personal communication 3rd March 2014. 55 “Geen verdoofd slachten meer” [No more stunning of animals] in Het Laatste Nieuws, 07/06/13 www.hln.be/hln/nl/2661/Dieren/article/detail/1648005/2013/06/07/Geen-verdoofd- slachten-meer-bij-Offerfeest-in-Antwerpen.dhtml. 100 Fadil

A large controversy emerged, however, after the announcement by the cities of Mechelen and Antwerp to increase their fees or introduce new taxes for the slaughtering of animals, arguing that the operation had become too expensive for the cities. The latter resulted in a prompt reaction by ten Mechelen-based mosques which denounced the absence of consultation on those matters and called upon the Muslim community to boycott the slaughtering of sheep and to donate money instead.56 A large absence of Muslims from school or work is also generally felt during the two main holidays of ʿId Al-Adha and ʿId Al-Fitr (the celebration of the end of the Ramadan fast). This has led some to advocate the recognition of those religious festivities as national holidays. However, this idea has not been seriously considered and in fact has been met with widespread resistance. There exist therefore no official or uniform regulations on these issues. Muslim pupils and students stay at home, either without permission or on presentation of a sick note, which is authorised by the authorities.57 Workers and employees use a day’s leave to participate in each of these two main Islamic holidays. A recent report for intercultural dialogues (cf. infra) proposed to reform the current calendar by replacing three fixed national Christian holidays (Easter, Ascension and All Saints) by three flexible holidays, which could be used by the citizens at the time of their choice.58

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Halal butcheries and halal products are widely available in the main Belgian towns where most Muslims live. Yet, these halal labels for food only partially reflect the reality. While emb has the capacity to grant a certificate to Muslim butchers who request it, it has neither the resources nor the authority to issue a halal label for food products (meat and others) or to control the supply chains

56 “Mechelse moskeeën roepen op tot schapeloos offerfeest” [Mosques in Mechelen call upon sheep-less holiday] in Het Laatste Nieuws, www.hln.be/hln/nl/957/Binnenland/ article/detail/1701002/2013/09/09/Mechelse-moskeeen-roepen-op-tot-schapenloos- offerfeest.dhtml, accessed 9 September 2013. 57 The Flemish government explicitly grants the rights to religious minorities of recognised cults to remain absent on specific holidays, for Muslims being the ʿId al-Fitr and the ʿId al-Adha. 58 Martine Vandemeulenbroucke “Les Assises de l’Interculutralité pour un calendrier de congés moins chrétien”, Le Soir, 9 November 2010. Belgium 101 or the production processes. This issue is currently being examined by a working group set up by emb.59

11 Dress Codes

The issue of wearing headscarves in schools has been on the Belgian agenda since 1989 and discussions continue to be passionate. Until 2009, the wearing of a head scarf or hijab at schools was not regulated, and the education authorities left school principals free to decide upon this matter. Yet, in September 2009, the go! or Gemeenschapsonderwijs (the public schools of the Flemish community) adopted a general and controversial regulation for all its schools (25% of the Flemish schools), which prohibits the wearing of visible religious signs with effect from September 2010. The measure was, however, suspended in April 2010 due to a successful legal charge against it at the Belgian State Council (Conseil d’Etat/Raad van State) which questioned its constitutional grounds. In March 2011, the Constitutional Court advised that the Administrative Board of Flemish Education was procedurally entitled to adopt such sanctioning measures, yet transferred the substantial evaluation of such a measure to the Belgian State Council. On 26 July 2012, the Belgian State Council stated that an evaluation of the proposed ban was no longer necessary considering the fact that the plaintiff was no longer a student in these schools and thus no longer bore the burden of such a ban, and go! had de facto given up upon the idea of a general ban. On 3 February 2012, the board of the go! issued a statement in which it stated that those schools which had not adopted a ban were entitled to maintain their own regulations.60 There exist no exact figures about the number of schools that have adopted a head scarf ban. Estimations are that in the Flemish part of the country about 70% of the schools prohibit the head scarf, while these figures range around 90% in the Francophone part of the country. At the level of the job market, there are no regulations concerning hijab, and employers are free to decide, both in the public and the private sector, upon this matter, although there is an increasing tendency to disallow women from doing so. On 2 January 2013, the labour court of Tongeren sanctioned the Dutch company hema (a well-known chain that sells furniture, clothing and food)

59 Data: Executive of Muslims in Belgium. 60 See press release of boeh of the 27 July 2012: “Raad van State: ‘hoofddoekenverbod’ dan toch geen verbod”, www.baasovereigenhoofd.be/site/content/persbericht-25072012, accessed January 2013. 102 Fadil for firing a temporary employee in March 2011 who decided to wear niqab after she converted to Islam. The company was, however, not sanctioned for breaching religious rights, but rather for failing to have a clear neutrality policy that would allow such a ban.61 Women in white-collar positions with a few exceptions are often prohibited from wearing head scarves in their job in the private and public sectors. One can furthermore find female factory workers and cleaners wearing head scarves.62 In the public sector, the picture is similar. Since 2007, a number of towns (incl. Antwerp, Ninove, Lier, and Boom) have adopted a ban on their civil servants, thus complementing the already existing bans in the Brussels Region. Yet, in May 2013, a pre-existing ban that had been introduced few years ago in Ghent was overturned (with 29 pro and 21 against) through the successive mobilisation of the civil society that enabled a popular voting on this matter. The overturning of the previous ban was viewed as a big success by many minority groups.63 While no systematic regulations exist concerning hijab, niqab (erroneously also known as the ‘burqa’) has been the object of a sanctioning law that was voted on by the Federal Parliament on 23 April 2011 and which makes Belgium the second country to prohibit face veiling. This law, which had been voted a first time in April 2010 yet not been enforced due to the resignation of the federal government and the election of a new parliament, sanctions face veiling with one week of jail and a fine of €137,5. The law was passed with a large majority (with only one dissenting vote and two abstentions) and put in place in July 2011. Two women filed a lawsuit at the Constitutional Court in July 2011 to demand its suspension and annulment, however, the Court rejected these claims and confirmed the constitutional grounds of this law in November 2011.64

61 “Hema overweegt beroep tegen hoofddoekvonnis” in De Standaard, 2 January 2013 www .standaard.be/artikel/detail.aspx?artikelid=DMF20130102_00419503, accessed January 2013. 62 Most famous example is that of Naima Amzil who could work in a food company with her head scarf on since it was compatible with the hygienic rules imposed on all workers who had to cover their hair. Between November 2004 and March 2005, Amzil’s employer, Rik Van Nieuwenhuyse received 7 letters wherein the author threatened to kill Van Nieuwenhuyse if he didn’t fire Amzil. A massive solidarity movement emerged and petitions were set up as a way of solidarity with the threatened employer. The letters ceased after a while and author of the letters was never found. 63 “Gent heeft hoofddoekenverbod weggestemd” in Nieuwsblad 28/05/13, url www.nieuws blad.be/article/detail.aspx?articleid=DMF20130527_045. 64 John De Wit “Kamer keurt boerkaverbod goed” in Gazet Van Antwerpen, 2 April 2010; “Belgisch boerkaverbod goedgekeurd” in Knack, 28/04/11; “Grondwettelijk hof schorst boerkaverbod niet” in De Morgen, 17 November 2011. Belgium 103

12 Publication and Media

A quota of time for broadcasting in the public media is granted to all recognised faiths. Islam is, however, the only religion that does not fully benefit from this right. The Brussels Radio Midi 1 has started allocating two hours on a weekly basis to emb. In December 2010, the Flemish Government approved the allocation of a time slot for Muslims at the Flemish Radio and tv channel (vrt), which is organised as mtro (Moslim Televisie- en Radio Omroep).65 Since September 2011, the channel is given on a monthly basis one hour on the national channel to air its programmes. Most of the programmes deal with current affairs that pertain to the Muslim community and also offer a glimpse on the rich Islamic socio-cultural landscape of Flanders. The French- speaking broadcasting service, on the other hand, is still to grant the Muslim faith broadcasting time.

13 Family Law

There is no system of local arbitration by Muslim law courts in Belgium. Muslim legal systems do, however, regularly intersect with Belgian national regulations, mostly because of the foreign or dual nationality of most Muslim citizens (Moroccan or Turkish). In the case of the Moroccan community, the regulations of Mudawwana (Moroccan personal and family law) have an effect upon the Moroccan-Belgian community, since a large part of Muslims of Moroccan origin, also from the second or third generations, contract their marriages in Morocco or at the Moroccan consulate in Belgium. While this dual legal binding does not necessarily pose problems, there are some cases which are not recognised by the Belgian legal system. This is especially so for matters like repudiation or polygamy, or matters of inheritance or guardianship in cases of divorce, where important differences exist between the Moroccan and Belgian legal systems. While Belgian and Moroccan authorities have been working on bilateral agreements to settle these conflict points,66 the absence of concrete guidelines and regulations on these issues have resulted in a situation where there is no consistency in the way these different legal systems are administered by the judges. The latter is mostly left to the individual judges’ appraisal and their knowledge of the International Private Law regulations. Some

65 www.mtro.be/, accessed January 2013. 66 For an elaborate account of this problematic issue see the work of the Belgian legal scholar Marie-Claire Foblets. 104 Fadil studies show that most judges limit themselves to the Belgian law. Those few who engage with the Moroccan law refrain from doing so in cases that are seen to conflict with the Belgian order (especially equality between men and women which is seen to conflict with practices such as polygamy or repudiation).67 There are some cases, however, where judges simply follow foreign regulations, even when conflicts arise with Belgian principles.68

14 Interreligious Relations

There exist a countless number of interreligious initiatives which aim at fostering ties between Muslims and Christians and strive towards a better mutual understanding. Some examples are the working group ‘Relatieopbouw Christenen en Moslims’ (Construction of Mutual Relationship Christian and Muslims) of the Flemish organisation Kerkwerk Multicultureel. On the Francophone side, the organisation El Kalima (www.elkalima.be) regularly organises conferences and seminars to foster Christian-Muslim ties. Another important actor in the field of intercultural dialogue and exchange is the organisation Islamic Relief, which organises on an annual basis a large Iftar in Brussels and which has turned into an important space of interreligious exchange.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In 2013, the problem of “radicalising Muslim youth” has been at the heart of the media attention all throughout the year. This question is by no means new

67 See Verhellen, Jinske, “Entretiens avec des Juristes Practiciens et Travailleurs Sociaux” in Foblets, M.C. (ed.) Femmes marocaines et conflits familiaux en immigration: quelles solutions juridiques appropriées (Moroccan women and migration or domestic conflicts: which proper juridical solutions?) (Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 1998), pp. 149–211. 68 A concrete case can be found in a decision by a court of Brussels in 1986 where a woman of Moroccan nationality sued her ex-husband for moral harm caused by the fact that he repudiated her and remarried under the Moroccan law. The judge decided against the female plaintiff, arguing that her ex-husband’s actions were in concordance with the Moroccan law and did not have any injurious effect. Marie-Claire Foblets has questioned this decision, arguing that by simply recognizing the effects of the repudiation the judge failed to question the unequal status between men and women. See Foblets, Marie-Claire, Familles—Islam—Europe. Le droit confronté au changement (Family, Islam, Europe. Law confronted with change) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996), pp. 141–142. Belgium 105 and has been a matter of public debate since 9/11. In the last two years, however, this concern with radicalisation has increased in its intensity through the growing visibility of groupings such as ‘Sharia4Belgium’ and the information that Muslim youngsters (mostly of Moroccan origin) were heading to Syria to fight for the Syrian opposition. However, the movement kept attracting a large amount of attention as the news spread that it played an important role in recruiting Muslim youth to join armed insurgents in Syria.69 More recently, the information that Muslim youngsters were leaving Belgium in order to join the combatting forces in Syria emerged as one of the central sources of preoccupation and anxiety. Most of these youths were of Moroccan background and based in Vilvoorde, Antwerp or Brussels. However, a few of them were also Muslim converts, such as Jejoen Bontinck or Brian De Mulder, who became iconic figures representing the despair of parents who saw their children join militant groups. Two narratives seem to foreground most of the news reporting on these issues. The first one tends to represent these youths as victims of malicious manipulators such as Fouad Belkacem’s Sharia4Belgium,70 or Jean-Louis Denis, a Brussels- based preacher who was arrested in December 2013 and accused of recruiting youngsters for Syria.71 Another narrative tends, on the other hand, to frame them as potential terrorists who might endanger the national security after their return. It is from this perspective that several repressive measures have been adopted towards the youngsters returning to Belgium: most of them have been arrested, and the city of Antwerp decided to remove a number of these youngsters from the civil register, which means that they are no longer entitled to social benefits.72 “Radicalisation” has more generally figured as an important point of preoccupation throughout 2013. Several preventive measures have been developed in order to identify and detect further radicalisation of Muslim youth, such as special briefings for police officers in Antwerp on how to recognise radical Muslims (e.g. through the length of the beard),73 or brochures written by the mayors of the four major cities that experienced Muslim youth leaving for

69 Benyaich, Bilal “Het gevaar van Sharia4Syria” in De Standaard, 12 March 2013. 70 See for instance “Belkacem heeft onze jongens weggeplukt” [“Belkacem stole our children”], De Standaard, 10 March 2013, an article about the Muslim community of Vilvoorde reacting to the news that youngsters were leaving for Syria. 71 “Moslimprediker Jean-Louis Denis opgepakt in Elsene”, De Standaard, 9 December 2013. 72 “Dewever: “Enkel zeer zware gevallen ambtelijk schrappen” in De Morgen, 14 June 2014. 73 Verbruggen, Vincent “Politie waakzaam voor mannen met lange baarden”, Nieuwsblad, 30th March 2013. 106 Fadil

Syria.74 In spring 2013, a book on radical Muslim networks in Brussels was published by the political scientist Bilal Benyaich, which attracted a large amount of public attention and reporting on the presence of radical networks in the capital.75 The growing anxieties around “Muslim radicalisation” even resulted in the withdrawal of the recognition of one of the most popular mosques of Antwerp, ‘De Koepel’, by the Flemish Minister of Governance Geert Bourgois in June 2013. The mosque is among the most attended ones in Antwerp and headed by the popular imam Suleyman van Ael who preaches in Dutch and is also considered as one of the leading scholars in the field in Flanders. His Friday sermons, which are widely attended, are livestreamed on the Internet and recorded and put online.76 The decision was met with a large amount of protest and many representatives of the Muslim community stood by the mosque.

16 Major Cultural Events

Over the past few years, a number of large-scale cultural activities have also been organised by Islamic organisations. Muslim artistic events have also been gaining new ground in recent years. Such performances are structured according to specific Islamic ethical rationales both in their message as well as in their format (such as the restriction on percussion). In recent years, not only Muslim organisations but also private Muslim entrepreneurs have been organising similar cultural festivals. An example is the annual Cultural and Islamic meeting (Rencontre Culturelle et Islamique) organised since 2007 by the Brussels collective ‘Les disciples du style’ and which mostly gathers young Muslim women.77 Another important cultural expression to be noted within this category is the emergence of a Muslim hip-hop and R&B scene which has turned into a highly popular musical genre among Muslim youngsters, mostly in urban areas.

74 “Burgemeesters lanceren handleiding tegen moslimradicalisering”, De Standaard, 9th September 2014 www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20130909_00732346. 75 Benyaich, Bilal (2013) Islam en Radicalisme bij Marokkanen in Brussel, Leuven: Van Halewyck. 76 “Bourgeois: Borgerhoutse moskee gevaar voor de maatschappij” [“Bourgeois: mosque from Borgerhout is a danger to society”], Gazet Van Antwerpen, 14 June 2013. 77 I am grateful to Farid El Asri, member of the cismoc at the ucl, for this information. Belgium 107

Other cultural activities are organised by Espace Magh (Maghrebi Cultural Centre in Brussels) and Moussem with its annual festival with artists from all over the Arab world. Theatre has also emerged as a popular medium. The groups Ras El Hanout and diversité sur scène have been quite active advertising and programming cultural activities with Brussels based youth and talent, this in strong collaboration with the Espace Magh. A newcomer in the scene since 2012 is the Flemish website al-arte magazine, an online magazine that tries to offer a perspective on the wide variety of the artistic expressions in the Muslim world and Muslim communities in the West.78

78 www.alartemag.be/. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Aid Smajić*

1 Muslim Populations

According to the census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter bh or Bosnia), conducted in 1991, 1,902,956 (or 43.5%) of the 4,377,033 inhabitants of the country declared themselves as ‘Muslims.’1 That was the national nomination of Bosnian Muslims that in 1993 was replaced by the term “Bosniaks.” Since ethnic and religious identities overlap to a large extent in the case of all three constituent ethnic communities in Bosnia, this figure is usually taken as indic- ative of the number of adherents of Islam, just as most Croats are usually considered Roman Catholic and most Serbs are considered Orthodox Christians. Due to war-related death, expulsion and internal and external migration in the 1992–1995 war, the numbers and demographic distribution of ethnic groups within bh have significantly changed.2 The public is still waiting for the first official results of the census held in October 2013. According to estimates by the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the current population of the country is 3,831,555,3 while the cia World Factbook estimates the total number of Bosnian citizens in 2013 at 3,871,643, of whom 48% are said to be Bosniaks, 37.1% Serbs, 14.3% Croats and 0.6% others,4 and a further more than 1.3 million living abroad.5

* Dr. Aid Smajić is an assistant professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. He holds ba degrees in Islamic Studies and Psychology, a ma in Islamic Civilisation, and a PhD in Social Psychology of Religion. He has published several articles on interreligious relations and religious education in public schools. 1 See details at www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm, accessed 31 March 2014. 2 Cigar, Norman, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing, (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995). 3 Estimated data as of 30 June 2013. For details see www.bhas.ba/index.php, accessed 31 March 2014. 4 Estimated data as of July 2013. For details, see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook/geos/bk.html, accessed 31 March 2014. 5 See Svjetski Savez dijaspore Bosne i Hercegovine (World Association of the Diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina), www.bihdijaspora.com/, accessed 31 March 2014.

It is generally accepted that Islam arrived in Bosnia with the Ottoman armies in the fifteenth century.6 Today Bosnian Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunnis who follow the Hanafi School of Islamic law and Maturidi School of Islamic doctrine. During and after the 1992–95 Bosnian war, the first Salafis, locally known as ‘Wahhabis’, emerged. Their exact number is not known and, contrary to general belief, they control no proper mosques and their initial public presence has been steadily weakening. There are a few Shiʿi Muslims and several pro-Shiʿi associations.7 For many Bosniaks, however, their Muslim identity very often has much more to do with cultural roots than with religious beliefs. Reliable data on the extent of active religious practice of Muslims are

6 For more about history of Islam in Bosnia, challenges and atrocities that Muslims have been facing before, during and after the 1992/1995 war, see a more detailed account in the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 5, (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 124–125, as well as, Marko Attila Hoare, The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day (London: Saqi, 2007); Karčić, Fikret, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1999); Malcolm, Noel, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Imamović, Mustafa, Istorija Bošnjaka (History of the Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998); Filipović, Nedim, Islamizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini (Islamisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Tešanj: Centar za kulturu i obrazovanje, 2005); The International Court of Justice, Press Release 2007/8, 27 February 2008, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’, available at www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=1897&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1, accessed 31 March 2014; Marko Attila Hoare, “Bosnia-Hercegovina and International Justice: Past Failures and Future Solutions”, in East European Politics and Societies, vol. 24 No. 2 (May 2010), pp. 191–205; Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Washington dc: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996); Rezultati istraživanja ‘Ljudski gubici 91–95’ (Results of the Research on Human Losses in 91–95) (Sarajevo: Research and Documentation Centre, 2007) used to be available at www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view =section&id=35&Itemid=126&lang=bs, while at the moment the page is not active, accessed 31 March 2014. But for similar estimation see both the 2005 icty estimate by Tabeau and Bijak and the 2010 estimate by Zwierzchowski and Tabeau at www.icty.org/x/file/About/ otp/War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_100201.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014. For an excellent analysis of these figures see: Marko atilla Hoare, “What do the figures for the Bosnian war-dead tell us?” available at http://greatersurbiton.wordpress .com/2008/01/04/what-do-the-figures-for-the-bosnian-war-dead-tell-us/, accessed 31 March 2014. 7 For some modern changes in the landscape of Islamic religiosity in bh, see Alibašić, Ahmet, “Globalisation and its impact on Bosnian Muslims practices”, available at www.bosanskialim .com/rubrike/tekstovi/000355R021.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014; Karčić, Harun, “Globalisation and Islam in Bosnia: Foreign Influences and their Effects”, in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, vol. 11, No. 2 (2010), pp. 151–166; and Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka (Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u BiH, 2008). 110 Smajić scarce and mostly could be found in post-war empirical studies of religiosity of different Bosnian and Muslims peoples, including Bosniaks.8

2 Islam and the State

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a secular state with no state religion. The state defined its relations with churches and religious organisations in the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations in bh passed in 2004.9 The law provides for freedom of religion and religious non-discrimination, the legal status of churches and religious communities, and the establishment of relations between the state and religious communities. In 2006, the Catholic Church and, in 2008, the Serbian Orthodox Church signed basic agreements with the state, while the Islamic Community in bh (hereafter icbh) in January 2010 submitted its proposal of the agreement and is currently negotiating its contents. Individual religious communities, including the icbh, receive ad hoc funding for their projects, especially for the (re)construction of religious sites. Most of about a dozen religious schools, including Islamic ones, are also regularly supported by public funds. However, the Law on Religious Freedom envisages the possibility of public funding for other expenses too. Apart from concerted but very often unsuccessful efforts by all religious communities to solve the issue of their property that was nationalised under Communist rule,10 the

8 See for example Smajić, Aid, Psihosocijalni aspekti religioznosti kao determinante međunacionalne tolerancije (Psychosocial aspects of religiosity as a determinant of ethnic tolerance), unpublished PhD dissertation (Sarajevo: University of Sarajevo, 2010), and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, The Worlds Muslims: Unity and Diversity (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2012) available at www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/ Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014. Study by Abazović, Dino, Bosanskohercegovački muslimani između seku- larizacije i desekularizacije (Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina between secularisation and de-secularisation), (synopsis, Zagreb-Sarajevo, 2012) is a recent study specifically analyzing religiosity of Bosniaks. 9 For the complete text of the law, see www.mpr.gov.ba/biblioteka/zakoni/bs/zakon% 20o%20slobodi%20vjere.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014. 10 In April 2012, for example, Parliament of the Federation of bh failed to support an amendment to an earlier adopted law on nationalised waqf apartments that would give the ic right to replacement apartments, which altogether caused significant disappointment of the ic administration at the authorities. For reaction of the ic Waqf Directorate see biweekly Preporod, No. 9/971, p. 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina 111 icbh together with the Catholic and Orthodox Churches is currently appealing to respective state ministries to take over paying for pension and health care insurance for their imams, priests and pastors.11 In post-war Bosnia, the increased presence of religion in the public arena is evident. Some welcome the religious revival as a healthy assertion of identity after the decades-long de-Islamisation process during the Communist period, while others see it as a rising threat to the secular and politically fragile state. Increased public visibility has also exposed religious communities to new challenges arising from publicity and public critique. In the post-war period, the icbh has been strongly and regularly criticised by media, very often in a manner it finds unacceptable (see section 15 below). Together with other religious leaders, the representatives of the icbh are regularly invited to attend official ceremonies and celebrations at all levels.12 However, unlike Orthodox priests in Republika Srpska, Muslim clergy never consecrate new public buildings and no Islamic symbols are present in public premises.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Muslim organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (icbh—Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, Zelenih beretki 17, Sarajevo, 71000, tel.: ++387 33533000, fax: ++387 33441800, ww.rijaset.ba). The icbh is, according to its Constitution, “the sole and united community of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own. The

11 See “Report on the Status of the Right to Freedom of Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.1.–31.12. 2008)” published in 2009 by the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herze govina, available at http://mrv.ba/images/stories/documents/Izvjestaj_stanje_prava.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014. 12 For more on the status of Islam in bh as a secular state, see article by Dr Fikret Karčić, one of the leading Muslims thinkers in the country, “Secular State and Religion(s): Remarks on the Bosnian Experience in Regulating Religion and State Relations” in Religion and Secular State: Role and Meaning of Religion in a Secular Society from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives (Zurich & Sarajevo, European Abrahamic Forum, 2008), pp. 15–25. Also see Kovačević, Emir, “The Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Silvo Devetak et al. (eds), Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe (Ljubljana: idse, 2004), pp. 63–68. 112 Smajić autonomy of icbh is based on the religious and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of the Ottoman administration in Bosnia.”13 The icbh is recognised by the state as the institution that has traditionally represented Islam in bh. It is independent in regulating its activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic endowments, publishing, charity, etc.) and the management of its property, and is financed mainly through waqfs, membership fees, zakat (alms duty), sadaqat al-fitr (charitable donation given at the end of Ramadan), the revenue of its profit-generating agencies and donations. The organisational structure of the icbh consists of jamaʿas (community of at least 100 households), majlises (usually a group of no less than seven jamaʿas in one municipality or city), nine muftiates (mufti offices, covering the area of a canton) in Bosnia, including a military one without territorial definition, and 5 mashihats, including mashihats in Slovenia, Croatia, Sandžak in Serbia, Germany and Australia, as well as many other umbrella organisations bringing together Bosnian Muslims on the basis of their ethno-religious identity in the usa and European countries. Riyasat, as the highest religious and administrative organ, is the main executive body of the icbh and is headed by Rais al-ulama (the President of Riyasat and the Grand Mufti or supreme authority in the icbh), a position held by Husein Kavazović since November 2012. The Council of the icbh (Sabor or the icbh’s assembly) is the highest representative and legislative body of the icbh.14 According to the ic constitution, Rais al-ulama is elected by secret ballot by the electoral body consisting of members of the ic Council and Riyasat, the muftis, the presidents of mashihats, the deans and principles of Islamic institutions, the grand imams and the presidents of the executive boards of majlises.15 Traditionally, the procedure of receiving the manshura (document of appointment) takes place in the central Ghazi Husrev Bey mosque in the presence of the electoral body, local and international dignitaries and the public.

13 The Constitution “Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini” (Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1997), Articles 1–4, is available at www.rijaset.ba/english/images/stories/Constitution.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014. 14 For more about the organisation of the icbh, see Karčić, Fikret, “Administration of Islamic affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Islamic Studies, vol. 38, no. 4 (1999), pp. 535–561, and official webpage of the icbh available at http://rijaset.ba/. 15 For other details concerning the election and jurisdictions of the Rais see the ic Constitution, articles 55–61. Bosnia and Herzegovina 113

Apart from the Office for the Bosniak Diaspora, Office for Hajj and Office for Relations with the Islamic World as departments of Riyasat, the main institutions of the icbh include the Waqf or Endowments Directorate (Vakufska direkcija), El-Kalem publishing centre, the Centre for Islamic Architecture, the Muslim News Agency (mina), the Agency for Halal Quality Certification, the Gazi Husrev Bey Library, the Association of Islamic Scholars (Ilmija), the Tariqa Centre and the bir Radio Station established in 2008. Educational institutions managed by the icbh include six Islamic high schools, or madrasas, a secular high school (Bošnjačka Gimnazija—Bosniak Gymnasium) and three faculties (see below). Except for the Gymnasium, all contact details can be found on the icbh website, www.rijaset.ba. Several Sufi orders, mainly Qadiris and Naqshabandis, are active in the country, while Tarikatski centar (the Tariqa Centre) in Sarajevo is an institution of the icbh and is responsible for coordinating Sufi orders as part of the icbh. In addition to the icbh, there are other relatively small faith-based Muslim and Islamic associations with a variety of aims and orientations. Some are missionary, others cultural, scientific, charitable, student or exclusively female. The most significant Islamic charity is the Muslim Charitable Society ‘Merhamet’ (Muslimansko dobrotvorno društvo ‘Merhamet’, Azize Šaćirbegović 112, 71000 Sarajevo, tel.: ++387 33526101, fax: ++387 33526101), founded in 1913, banned in 1946 and re-established in 1990, which has been very active in collecting humanitarian aid, especially during the Bosnian war. Two of the main ngos for Muslim women are the Women’s Education Centre ‘Nahla’ (Ženski edukacioni centar ‘Nahla’, www.nahla.ba), founded in 2000 in Sarajevo, and the Women’s Education Organisation ‘Kewser’ (Ženska edukaciona organizacija ‘Kewser’, www.kewser-zehra.com.ba), founded in 1994 in Zenica. The latter publishes a bi-monthly family magazine, Zehra.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are approximately 1,700 mosques and masjids16 in bh, all run by the icbh. Most Muslim villages and towns with significant Muslim communities have a mosque or masjid, either dating from the Ottoman times or constructed later by local residents. In larger towns, such as Sarajevo, Zenica and Bugojno, a number of mosques were built after the war as a gift from friendly countries

16 In the Bosnian context, a mosque (džamija) is usually expected to have a minaret and a full-time imam. A masjid (mesdžid) is a smaller place for prayer, usually with part-time service and in most cases without a minaret. 114 Smajić such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Jordan, and Kuwait. Many mosques are still under reconstruction after having been destroyed or damaged during the war, while others are newly built. The icbh reports that 613 mosques, 218 masjids, 69 maktabs (teaching facilities), 4 zawiyas (Sufi lodges), 37 turbes (mausoleums) and 405 various other waqf properties were completely destroyed in the war of 1992–95.17 Occasionally, attempts to rebuild a mosque have been halted or delayed by protests or attacks by local communities. Following such a scenario, in 2011 Livno Municipality Council urged the local Majlis of the ic to stop the reconstruction of the famous Ćurčinica mosque, which was destroyed during the last war by Croat forces. The Majlis, however, declined to follow the Council request by referring to the previous decisions of higher legal instances and state institutions that allowed for reconstruction of this centuries-old national monument and a masterpiece of architecture. Apart from in the military, it is difficult to find places built or allocated strictly for prayer in any public institution. The Bosna Bank International (bbi) shopping centre, located in the centre of Sarajevo, is a unique example of a shopping mall offering its visitors prayer rooms for both men and women.

5 Children’s Education

Although the status of confessional religious education (cre) in Bosnian public schools, including Islamic religious education, has varied over time from canton to canton and from entity to entity, today, generally, it is an elective course taught one hour a week in the first two grades of secondary school and one or two hours a week in all grades of primary school. Islamic teachers are approved and usually trained by the icbh but employed and paid by public schools. While the status of cre in Bosnian public schools is no longer questioned, the issue remains of how and in what form to introduce non-denominational religious studies, locally known as Culture of Religions, or History of Religions, in schools.18 In 2008, a basic form of religious education was also introduced as an optional course in public pre-school kindergartens in Sarajevo.

17 For more details see Omerdić, Muharem, Prilozi izučavanju genocida nad Bošnjacima (Addendum to Study of the Genocide against Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), pp. 15–25, 461–463, 473, 476. 18 For more on the status and challenges of religious education in Bosnian public schools, see Open Society Fund bh, Religija i školovanje u otvorenom društvu: Preispitivanje mod- ela religijskog obrazovanja u Bosni i Hecegovini (Religion and Education in Open Society: Bosnia and Herzegovina 115

The icbh runs six Islamic high schools or madrasas: Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (the oldest, founded in 1537) in Sarajevo, Behram Bey Madrasa (founded in 1626, re-established in 1993) in Tuzla, Elči Ibrahim Pasha Madrasa (founded in 1706, re-established in 1993) in Travnik, Madrasa Osman-ef. Redžović (founded in 1992) in Visoko, Džemaludin-ef. Čaušević Madrasa (founded in 1993) in Cazin, and Karađoz-Bey Madrasa (founded in 1557, re- established in 1995) in Mostar. The madrasa programme has changed significantly over the past ten years, transforming them from institutions for training imams and teachers of Islamic religious education into regular high schools with an additional religious curriculum. Around 400 students (roughly equal numbers of boys and girls in recent years) graduate every year from these six schools and most of them go on to study at public universities. Only 10%–15% opt for Islamic studies in bh and abroad, usually in order to work as imams in jamaʿas and teachers of Islamic religious education in public schools, or possibly to go into other jobs at the icbh and its institutions.19 Unlike in madrasas, the curricula of the Bosniak Gymnasium from its first days have focused exclusively on secular education, while implicitly nourishing traditional values of Bosnian Muslims. There are no separate courses or specific emphasis on religious education, beyond the Islamic religious education that is also taught in other public schools.20

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Islamic Community has three major institutions of higher learning. The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo (Ćemerlina 54, 71000 Sarajevo, tel.: ++387 33 251 011, fax: ++387 33 251 044, www.fin.ba), founded in 1977, today offers three different study programmes, including Islamic theology, religious education, and imam training. Some 300 full-time students and a similar number of part-time students are enrolled at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, with Bosnian being the language of instruction. As of the end of 2013, some 778 male and female students had graduated from the faculty in

Assessing Religious Education Model in bh) (Sarajevo, 2009) available at www.skolegijum .ba/static/pdf/4ebbcae44dadd.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014. 19 For more about the current educational profile of bh madrasas, one should look at Machaček, Štepan, “European Islam and Islamic education in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in Südost Europa: Herausgegebe von Südost-Institut, 55, 4 (2007), pp. 395–428. 20 For more about the curricula of the Bosniak Gymnasium, see its webpage available at http://bosnjackagim.edu.ba, accessed 31 March 2014. 116 Smajić addition to 52 Masters and 21 PhDs. The Faculty also offers a Diploma in Islamic Studies, a three-month non-degree programme in Bosnian and English for lay- men and women. The Islamic Education Faculties in Zenica and Bihać were established in 1993 and 1996 respectively as Islamic education academies with two-year programmes to train teachers for Islamic education in public schools. Both acquired the status of university faculties in 2006. The Faculty in Zenica (Juraja N’idharta 15, 72000 Zenica, tel.: +387 32 402 919, fax: ++387 32 402 919, www.ipf.unze.ba) now offers three-year undergraduate and two-year graduate programmes in three different departments, leading to ba and ma degrees in Islamic education, social education and pre-school education. The Faculty in Bihać (Žegarska aleja, 77000 Bihać, tel.: ++387 37 220 162, fax: ++387 37 228 160, www.ipf.unbi.ba) is the smallest of the three and currently offers only ba and ma degrees in Islamic education and, since 2012, an ma in Muslim Chaplaincy. As of the end of 2013, about 800 students had graduated from the Faculty in Zenica, while the Faculty in Bihać had produced around 380 graduates. All three faculties eventually became full member institutions of the public universities of Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać respectively.21

7 Burial and Cemeteries

It has been a traditional practice to have separate cemeteries for the different religious communities in bh. In villages, burial practices have continued to observe the traditional separation, with many cemeteries located near the village mosque. In larger cities, there are mixed cemeteries with separate sections for adherents of different communities. Atheists and non-religious people are mostly buried in mixed public cemeteries. As a consequence of the war, many new shahid (martyr) graveyards have been designated for the burial of both civilian and military Muslim dead. The Potočari Memorial Complex in

21 For more on current Islamic education in Bosnia, see Alibašić, Ahmet and Asim Zubčević, “Islamic education in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa (Islamic Education in Europe) (Vienna: Bhlau, 2009). For a history of Islamic education, see Kasumović, Ismet, Školstvo i obrazovanje u Bosanskom ejaletu za vrijeme osmanske uprave (Schools and Education in Bosnian Eyalet during the Ottoman Administration) (Mostar: Islamski kulturni centar, 1999); Hasanović, Bilal, Islamske obra- zovne ustanove u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1850. do 1941. godine (Islamic Education Institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1850 until 1941) (Zenica: Islamski pedagoški fakultet u Zenici, 2008). Bosnia and Herzegovina 117

Srebrenica, where the victims of the genocide against Bosniak Muslims of July 1995 have been buried, is the biggest of all. The overwhelming majority of Bosnian Muslims perform burial of deceased relatives according to the Islamic law, while many of those living abroad insist on burying their deceased in the homeland. As a result, burial agencies offering clients burial services in line with Shariʿa and transportation of those who passed away in eu countries have been flourishing in the last several years.22 In some instances, these companies are attached to a local majlis as in the cases of Sarajevo and Tuzla majlises.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

‘Chaplaincy’ in the armed forces is organised at all levels of military service for all the main religious communities. The Islamic service for the military is managed by the Military Muftiate (established in 1999), headed by the military mufti, who is nominated by Rais al-ulama. The military mufti appoints 12 military imams and a chief imam, subject to the approval of Rais al-ulama.23 While there is still no official chaplaincy in prison facilities, weekly visits and Friday prayers are organised in some detention centres, mainly by the local branches of the icbh. Chaplaincy in health institutions does not exist, but in some larger hospitals prayer rooms are available.

9 Religious Festivals

Irrespective of the fact that bh does not yet have a state level law pertaining to public holidays, two ʿid or bayram festivals, as well as two (Catholic and Orthodox) Christmases and Easters, are celebrated as public holidays in bh. Both the religious and the secular media cover the celebrations of bayram, with state television broadcasting live from the Gazi Husrevbegova mosque in Sarajevo, where ʿid prayer is led and the khutba (sermon) is delivered by Rais

22 It suffices to have a glimpse at page 63 of the ic newspaper Preporod, which is usually reserved for burial services offers, that often lists no less than six such local and international companies. 23 In 2009 the Ministry of Defence convened a round-table marking the 10th anniversary of the Military Muftiate and subsequently published the collection of research articles presented on this occasion. See Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola “Imamska služba u vojsci” (Memoir from the Round-Table “Imam Service in the Army”) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 2009). 118 Smajić al-ulama or his deputy. Local television stations also often broadcast all-day programmes devoted to bayrams and other traditional festivals. Muslim religious authorities arrange bayram receptions for public and diplomatic dignitaries. The second day of Ramadan bayram is designated as the Day of Martyrs (shuhada’) in remembrance of those killed in the Bosnian war of 1992–95. On this occasion, martyrs’ cemeteries are visited and commemorative programmes are organised by local authorities and the Islamic Community. The ʿid celebrations are famous for their bayram meals (Turkish: Bayram sofra). In order to perform pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, prospective Muslim pilgrims usually take leave from their jobs. According to the ic Office for Hajj, 1,133 pilgrims from Bosnia performed hajj in 2013.24

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

The social revitalisation of religion in the country has been followed by the establishment of various Islam-related businesses offering their Muslim clients finance-based services that would assist them in performing their religious duties and living in accordance with Islamic principles. Currently, such services usually pertain to organisation of hajj, providing halal food, ritual preparing and transporting of the deceased and Islamic banking. At least two local tourist agencies are known for their cooperation with the ic Office for Hajj in organizing hajj for Bosnian pilgrims. Merkez Oil d.o.o. (Mehmeda Spahe 1, tel.: ++387 30525457, http://merkezoil.biz/) is a company based in Novi Travnik, while Biss Tours (tel.: ++387 32246306, www.biss-tours .ba/v3/) operates from Zenica. According to the icbh statistics, in 2013 the hajj of 58 pilgrims was arranged by Biss Tours, while Merkez Oil assisted 50 pilgrims in their hajj.25 Halal slaughter is permitted and many Muslims slaughter animals privately following halal practice. There are also a number of halal abattoirs throughout bh. In February 2006, the icbh established the Agency for Halal Quality Certification (Turalibegova 39, 75000 Tuzla, tel.: ++387 33258427, fax: ++387 35258427, www.halal.ba/site/), which certifies the compliance of food products and respective practices. Since its establishment in 2006, the ic Agency for Halal Quality Certification has been very active in promoting the importance of halal quality for both devout Muslim customers and prospective food

24 Interview with the chief of the Office Halilović, Nezim, in Preporod, no. 20/1006 (October 15, 2013), pp. 14–15. 25 Ibid. Bosnia and Herzegovina 119 producers and sellers. Accordingly, in 2009, the Agency established representative branches in other Balkan countries, while the state institutions in Bosnia agreed to partly subsidise the costs of issuing halal certification for local companies. In 2010, it issued the second version of the Rulebook (bas 1049–2010) which was revised to be more in harmony with the standards of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and broadened its activities to include the certification of catering services too. The international halal forum in Sarajevo is probably to become a regular event after its successful arrangement in two consecutive years, September 2012 and May 2013. As a result of the intensive marketing activities and increasing halal products market, more and more local and regional companies apply for the halal quality certificate in order to guarantee to Muslim customers in Bosnia and other countries in the region or around the world that food production processes in all its phases comply with Islamic principles.26 Finally, Islamic banking has been increasingly gaining in popularity in Bosnia in the last ten years. The main force behind it has been the establishment of Bosna Bank International (bbi) (Trg djece Sarajeva 1, tel.: ++387 33275177, http://bbibanka.com.ba/web/). The founders and main sharehold- ers of the bank are Islamic Development Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank.

11 Dress Codes

There are no special rules on dress code in any institution of learning or public offices that would affect the wearing of hijab, and covered women are not required to take off their scarves for the identification card or passport photos. However, there is evidence of discrimination against hijab-wearing women, especially in some areas of employment.27 In July 2010, representatives of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, currently the strongest Serb nationalist political party in bh, unsuccessfully proposed a bill at the state

26 For an example of eagerness to obtain the halal certification in the case of some Croatian companies exporting food products to Bosnia, see their interview for the ic biweekly newspaper Preporod, No. 9/971, p. 54. 27 For more on the issue as well as the current practice and perception of hijab in Bosnia, see Šeta, Đermana, Zašto marama? Bosanskohercegovačke muslimanke o životu i radu pod maramom (Why Hijab? bh Muslim Women about Life and Work under Hijab) (Sarajevo: Centar za napredne studije, 2011) available at http://cns.ba/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ zasto-marama-za-web.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014. 120 Smajić

Parliament to outlaw niqab. After the 1992–95 war, it has become more common for Muslim women to wear hijab in public, and some women, mostly those who follow the Salafi interpretation of Islam, wear niqab, although this has not been very common in Bosnia since it was banned by the Communist authorities in 1949.

12 Publication and Media

El-Kalem is the publishing house of the icbh established in 1973, soon after the ruling Communist regime eased its restrictions on the activities of religious communities. The oldest printed periodical is Glasnik (the Herald), a bi-monthly official journal of the icbh (founded in 1933, circulation 2,200). The largest and most influential newspaper is the icbh biweekly Preporod (the Revival, founded in 1970, circulation around 25,000, www.preporod.com), which mostly covers current events within the icbh, as well as more daily news concerning Islam and Muslims in bh and abroad. The icbh publishes the annual Takvim, a hijri calendar with accompanying articles on current issues in religion, culture and society (circulation 50,000). The Association of Ulama publishes a quarterly education magazine Novi Muallim (New Muallim, circulation 2,000). The Faculty of Islamic Studies publishes Zbornik fin-a, an annual collection of scholarly papers mainly written by its staff (first published in 1989, circulation 300). The Islamic faculties and madrasas also have their own student magazines, the oldest being Zemzem, the student magazine of Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (first published in 1968, circulation around 1,000). The Gazi Husrev Bey Library (founded in 1537, with a collection of 13,000 Oriental manuscripts, www.ghb.ba/) publishes annals (Anali, first published in 1972, circulation around 500), which include studies and texts in the fields of Islamic studies, history and bibliography. As of 2013, one independent Islamic magazine was published in Zenica: a pro-Salafi Saff (the Line, founded in 1998, www.saff.ba). There are also a few Sufi publications: the quarterly magazine Kelamu-l-šifa (Healthy Speech, first published in 2004, with a variable circulation) and the older periodical, Šebi arus (Wedding Night, first published in 1982). In November 2006, the icbh established a radio and television station bir, which has been broadcasting 24 hours a day since March 2009. The station has been producing radio programmes and a website (www.bir.ba), offering content and information about religious, educational, sporting and political issues. According to its administration, the radio station is one of the seven Bosnia and Herzegovina 121 most listened to stations in bh, with their regional frequencies covering an area inhabited by 1.4 million people.

13 Family Law

Since the abolition of the Shariʿa courts in 1946, only civil marriages are legally valid. However, it is very common to perform a so-called ‘Shariʿa wedding’ after the civil ceremony and in the presence of a local imam. This procedure is recommended by the icbh authorities although Shariʿa only weddings do happen. With regard to inheritance, only civil courts have jurisdiction over the distribution of the property, debts and obligations upon an individual’s death.28 However, the courts do accept prior agreements between heirs in regard to the distribution of the property without investigating the fundamental basis of such agreements.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious relations in the country suffered as a result of 1992–95 war. Consequently, bh has become a focal point for various interreligious activities and projects, generally initiated jointly by various local and international actors. The icbh is a co-founder and member of the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina (irc, Ferhadija 16/1, 71000 Sarajevo, tel.: ++387 33666217, fax: +387 33550060, www.mrv.ba). It was established in 1997 with the joint participation of representatives of the four traditional religious communities in bh, namely Catholics, Orthodox, Jews and Muslims, with the aim of promoting interreligious dialogue and reconciliation as well as to represent

28 Hasani, Mustafa, Tumačenje i primjena normi šerijatskog prava o mješovitim brakovima u BiH u periodu 1930–1940 (Interpretation and application of norms of Shariʿa law concerning mixed marriages in bh during 1930–1940 period) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo) offers a more detailed account and reference sources on the issue of applying Islamic law in family matters. For history of Islamic family law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see also Džananović, Ibrahim, Primjena šerijatskog porodičnog prava kroz praksu Vrhovnog šerijatskog suda 1914–1946 (Application of Shariʿa Family Law through the Practice of Supreme Shariʿa Court from 1914 until 1946) (Sarajevo: Fakultet islamskih nauka u Sarajevu, 2004). 122 Smajić the common interests and activities of religious communities in Bosnia vis- à-vis the state. The current representative of the icbh in the assembly of the irc is Sarajevo mufti Husejin Smajić. According to the Protocol of Cooperation signed between the irc and the Council of Ministers of bh in 2008, the government committed to provide regular annual financial support for the activities of the irc.29 Representatives and members of the icbh are also active at the Interreligious Institute in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ferhadija 16/1, 71000 Sarajevo, tel./fax: ++387 33666776), established in 2007 with the main aim of facilitating communication and cooperation between religious communities in the country and the wider society. The International Forum Bosna (Sime Milutinovića 10, 71000 Sarajevo, tel.: ++387 33217665, fax: ++387 33206484, www.ifbosna.org.ba) and other similar ngos are organisations within which Muslims are active in rebuilding interreligious trust and relations. At the level of daily life, the quality of Muslim relations with the other two constituent peoples, namely the Croats and the Serbs, generally depends on the locale. However, in most parts of Republika Srpska and the Federation, bh two entities established according to Dayton agreement in 1995, where ethnic cleansing and mass crimes against Muslims took place they are generally tense and very often characterised by blatant discrimination against Bosniaks in public institutions, their demonisation by the local media and politicians, open attacks on their rights and property as well as on premises and personnel of the Islamic Community.30

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debates about Islam and the icbh, often initiated through the publications and media of the icbh or the secular mass media, are noticeably present in Bosnian society. While internal debates in 2013 considered reform of the

29 The Protocol is available at www.mrv.ba/images/stories/documents/Protokol.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014. 30 For more details, see the First and Second reports on Islamophobia, discrimination and intolerance in the area under jurisdiction of the icbh prepared by Riyasat for the period 2004–2010 and for 2011, available at http://rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=14627:izvjestaj-o-islamofobiji&catid=2:uncategorised, accessed 31 March 2014. For the recent reactions of Riyasat against discrimination and molesting of Bosniak returnees to Republika Srbska, see www.rijaset.ba/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17287:saopcenje-povodom-napada-na- muslimane-u-zvorniku&catid=203&Itemid=457, accessed 31 March 2014. Bosnia and Herzegovina 123 ic constitution, external ones have been related to several issues, including the general census held in October 2013, ethno-religious relations in bh, infringements on rights of Bosniak returnees to Republika Srbska, and practising Islam in the public sphere. Finally, the establishing of the World Bosniak Congress at the end of 2012 had elements of both, internal disputes between authoritative personalities in the icbh as well as comments coming from the external observers. Accordingly, the long-heralded reform of the ic constitution has been openly criticised by leading personalities in the community for over bureau- cratisation of the ic on the account of its missionary responsibility and transforming Rijaset into an exclusively administrative body by precluding muftis from opportunity to be its members.31 In October 2013, a general census of the bh population was held whereby Bosnian Muslims were given a historical opportunity to declare their Bosniak national identity after years of its forcible equation with their religious denomination. Given the importance of ethno-national identification in the context of the contestation and distribution of political power in post-war Bosnia, the ic took all measures to warn Muslims against possibility of confusing between national and religious identity especially in the face of some external attempts to understate the importance, authenticity and cultural peculiarity of the Bosniak ethnicity as autochthonous Bosnian people.32 In 2013, several events attracted public attention in regard to ethno- religious relations in bh and infringements on the rights of Bosniak returnees to Republika Srbska. Most notably, the decision of the Serb Orthodox Church to continue construction of the church near the Srebrenica Memorial in Potočari in a location without Orthodox inhabitants triggered criticism of Muslims and their political and religious representatives. A considerable part of the international community denounced the initiative of the Church as well.33 Similarly, the decision of local Serb authorities in Višegrad to expropriate land and houses in which more than 70 Bosniak civilians were burned alive by

31 For the content of the proposed constitution, see “Tri nivoa organiziranja iz” (Three level organisation of the ic), Preporod, no. 9/995 (May 1, 2013), p. 5, while objecting reactions of some muftis can be found at “Čije su muftije?” (Whose are muftis?), Preporod, idem, p. 21. 32 Almost all issues of biweekly Preporod in 2013 included some form of notice warning about the importance of the census for Bosniaks and inviting them to accordingly enlist their household members. 33 For some reaction of the local Muslims, their political representatives and international community, see http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/gradnja-crkve-na-budaku-otvara- stare-rane; and www.dw.de/crkva-razdora-nad-poto%C4%8Darima/a-16759439, accessed 31 March 2014. 124 Smajić

Serb forces in June 1992 as well as to remove inscription of genocide from the tombstones of Muslim civilians killed by the same forces and subsequently buried in Muslim cemetery of Stratište triggered a reaction of the ic and Bosniak returnees’ ngos.34 The sporadic practice of some Sarajevo restaurants and shopping centres not serving alcohol during the month of Ramadan has attracted attention, and there have been renewed debates about presence of religion in the public sphere and the consequent possibility of discriminating against irreligious individuals and non-Muslims.35

16 Major Cultural Events

Religious festivals held annually at places called dovišta, ‘supplication sites’ or places for prayer, linked in local legends to miraculous events, attract thousands of men and women from around Bosnia and neighbouring countries. The most important of them is the centuries-old annual gathering of Muslims at the Ajvatovica plateau near the towns of Donji Vakuf and Bugojno in the last week of June, with a two-week cultural, religious and tourist programme. Other prayer sites include: Djevojačka pećina (Maiden’s Cave) near Kladanj where, according to the legend, a young girl let out her soul trying to get water from a scary place and thus proved her courage to local youngsters; Lastavica near Zenica in remembrance of Bogumils who used to praise God for rich har- vests and where they eventually accepted Islam; and the Musalla plateau near Sanski Most where the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed ii el-Fatih led the jum‘a prayer after he conquered the area, thus announcing the arrival of Islam to the region. Concerts and festivals of spiritual music and nasheeds are organised throughout the country by the icbh and other Muslim civic associations on the occasions of religious holidays or Ramadan. An event called Mošus Pejgamberov is organised annually by the women’s association, Kewser, in memory of Fatima, a daughter of Prophet Muhammad, who is revered by pious Bosnian Muslim

34 See biweekly Preporod, no. 22/1008 (15 November 2013), pp. 16–17 and no. 7/993 (1 April 2013), p. 12. 35 See http://issuu.com/casopis.hr/docs/slobodna_bosna_11.07.2013, accessed 31 March 2014; and biweekly Preporod, no. 15/1001 (1 August 2013), p. 14. Bosnia and Herzegovina 125 women. Early in May of each year Sufi orders have their own central gathering in the form of a great mawlid in Blagaj at the spring of the Buna River.36 Since the genocide of Bosniak Muslims in Srebrenica, 11 July is commem- orated as Srebrenica Day. During the ceremony, the collective funeral prayer ( janaza) attended by tens of thousands is performed at the Memorial Centre in Potočari, and newly identified victims of the genocide are buried.37

36 For more on the cultural particularities of Islamic life in Bosnian rural areas, see Bringa, Tone, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton nj: Princeton University Press, 1995). 37 As a sign of recognition of the Srebrenica massacre as an act of genocide targeting Bosnian Muslims, on 7 January 2009 the European Parliament passed a resolution proclaiming 11 July the European Commemorative Day for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 July 1995. The text of the resolution is available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc .do?type=MOTION&reference=B6–2009–0027&language=en, accessed 31 March 2014. The same resolution (M-416) was passed by the Canadian Parliament with unanimous consent on 19 October 2010. For details see www.bosniak.org/canadian-parliament- unanimously-adopts-the-srebrenica-genocide-resolution/, accessed 31 March 2014. us House of Representatives passed similar resolution (H. Res. 199) already in 2005 and its text is available at www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hres199/text, accessed 31 March 2014. Bulgaria

Aziz Nazmi Shakir*

1 Muslim Populations

In 1396, the Second Bulgarian Kingdom,1 founded in 1185, became a core part of the recently conquered Balkan territories of the Ottoman state. Subsequently, Islam spread mainly through a series of resettlement campaigns of Turcoman groups from Asia Minor, aimed at reducing Bulgarians’ demographic superiority and by means of gradual conversion of the local Christian population. It is believed that a considerable part of the Bulgarian aristocracy preserved its ruling status by means of adopting the new rulers’ religion. As for the average non-Muslim subjects, adopting Islam meant certain tax exemptions. In most of today’s Bulgarian lands, the Ottoman rule lasted until 1878, when as a result of the Russo-Turkish War and in accordance with the subsequent Treaty of Berlin, the greater part of the Ottoman Danube Vilayet was transformed into a new autonomous region called Bulgarian Principality.2 The same treaty gave birth to the semi-autonomous Eastern Rumelian Vilayet, that later, in 1885, was incorporated by the Principality. As a result of the First Balkan War in 1912– 1913, significant areas located in the Rhodope region and Western Thrace, populated overwhelmingly by Muslims3 were also attached to the Bulgarian state.4 This process was accompanied by acts of forcible Christianisation of several

* Dr Aziz Nazmi Shakir is currently working as an Arabic language instructor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and School of Languages at Sabanci University-Istanbul. 1 Successor of the First Bulgarian Kingdom (681–1018) to be invaded by Emperor Basil ii and subjected for a couple of centuries (1018–1185) to the Byzantine Empire before being re- established by the Asen dynasty laying the foundations of the mentioned Second Bulgarian Kingdom. 2 For the history of Islam in Bulgaria in general, see: Желязкова, Антонина, Божидар Алексиев и Зорница Назърска (eds), Мюсюлманските общности на Балканите и в България (Muslim Communities in the Balkans and in Bulgaria) (Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (Sofia: imir, 1997); Градева, Росица (ред.). История на мюсюлманската култура по българските земи (History of Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands) (Sofia: imir, 2007). 3 Namely the following settlements: Kırcali (Kardjali), Eğridere (Ardino), Koşukavak (Krumov grad), Darıdere (Zlatograd), Mestanlı (Momchilgrad), Ortaköy (Ivaylovgrad), Dövlen (Devin), Paşmaklı (Smolyan) and Nevrokop. 4 Last but not least, in 1940, South Dobrudja was taken from Romania and given to Bulgaria.

Pomak5 settlements.6 All these events led to mass exoduses of Muslims and changed the religious and ethnic map of the region. Prior to the Russo-Turkish War, the Muslim population (Turks, Pomaks, Roma, Circassians and Tatars) of the Danube Vilayet numbered 1,120,000 and that of Eastern Rumelia 681,000.7 In the period 1956–1985, in accordance with the ruling ideology supporting the idea that people in Bulgaria are nonreligious, the question on confessional belonging was excluded from the national censuses. Right before the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, nearly 360,000 individuals driven away by what came to be known as “the revival process” (or “the renaming”) left for Turkey. According to some expert estimates, during the period of 1990–1996 alone, they were followed by nearly 400,000 others.8 In the last three censuses (in 1992, 2001 and the most recent in 2011), all completed, after Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, items concerning the religious and ethnic affiliation of the population were rehabilitated in the questionnaires of the monitoring programmes. However Pomaks were excluded from the list of ethnic groups found in the census forms,9 and this fact influenced the calculation of the Muslim population negatively. A non-official poll of the National Statistical Institute held in 1992 states that the approximate number of Pomaks at that time was 160,000.10

5 Pomaks: referred to by most Bulgarian historians as Българомохамедани (Bulgarian Muhammadans), are concentrated in the central and western Rhodope Mountains in southern Bulgaria; On Pomaks, see: Todorova, Maria, “Identity (trans)formation among the Pomaks in Bulgaria”. In: Kürt, Lásló and Juliet Langman (eds), Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe (Boulder, co: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 63–82; Memişoğlu, Hüseyin, Balkanlar’da Pomak Türkleri (Pomak-Turks in the Balkans) (Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, İstanbul 1999); Çavuşoğlu, Halim, Balkanlar’da Pomak Türkleri-Tarih ve Sosyo-Kültürel Yapı (Pomak-Turks in the Balkans- History and Socio-cultural Structure) (Ankara: Köksav Yayınları, 1993); Georgieva, Tsvetana, “Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians”. In: Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 12, no. 3 (2001), pp. 303–16. 6 For datails see: Стоянова, Пламена, “Покръстването на българите мюсюлмани” (The Baptizing of Bulgarian Muslims), Анамнеза, Год. І, 2006, кн. 3, pp. 1–10. 7 Şimşir, Bilal N., Bulgaristan Türkleri 1878–1985, (The Turks of Bulgaria 1878–1985), Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986, p. 18; Detailed data about all censuses covering the period (1887–1952) is given in: A. Shakir, “Bulgaria”, Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 5, ed. Jorgen. S. Nielsen, Leiden-Boston, 2013, pp. 144–145. 8 Zhelyazkova, A., p. 12. 9 For details see: Ivanov, Mihail, “Преброяването стана заложник на ВМРО и старите им кавги” (The census became a hostage of vmro and its old quarrels) in www.bghelsinki .org/index.php?module=pages&lg=bg&page=obektiv17927. 10 A. Shakir, “Bulgaria”, In: Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 5, ed. Jorgen. S. Nielsen, Leiden-Boston, 2013, p. 146. 128 Shakir

Nowadays nobody knows the exact number of these people still undergoing an identity crisis (in regards to both their ethnic and religious self-identification), who in the last census instead of the “Muslim” column preferred to join the 409,898 (7.1%) people who chose not to state their ethnic affiliation or the 272,264 (4.7%) persons marking the answer “no religion”.11 The last three censuses (1992–2001–2011) covering the democratic period, show a constant decrease in the number of Bulgarian Muslims; from 1,110,295 in 1991 to 966,978 in 2001, to 577,139 in 2011 (546,004 Sunni, 27,407 Shiʿi, 3,727 neutral) comprising 13.1, 12.2 and 7.8 % respectively of the total population (8,487,317 in 1991, 7,928,901 in 2001, and 7,364,570 in 2011).12 The obvious reason for this decline is again migration. However, this time the main driving factors are not political, but economic. Another explanation for the decrease is the fact that many Muslims rejected displaying their religious affiliation. This argument is strongly supported by the following figures: only 444,434 (of an estimated 588,318) Turks, 67,350 (of roughly 160,000 Pomaks declaring that they are ethnic Bulgarians and 42,201 (of 325,343) Roma declared themselves as Muslims.13 It is hard to believe, for example, that in 10 years the share of Muslims within the Roma community decreased from 40% to 18%.14 Especially, taking into account the fact that Roma were not influenced so much by the common migration processes and they were the only ethnic group that did not decrease in number. Strangely enough, for the first time in the history of censuses in Bulgaria the number of Turks (588,318) exceeds the total number of Muslims (577,139). Besides Turks, Pomaks and Roma, there is a tiny Tatar community with some 4,500 members living in north-eastern Bulgaria. Around 10,000 Arabs, living mainly in the capital Sofia, form the most recent local Muslim community. A considerable number of them came to the country in the 1970s and 1980s as students from Arab states or parties backed by the ussr. In 2013, nearly 5,000 Syrian citizens (of Arab and Kurdish origin) fleeing from the civil war in their native country took refuge in Bulgaria and became one of the most discussed issues in local media.

11 http://censusresults.nsi.bg/Census/Reports/2/2/R10.aspx. 12 www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm. 13 2011 Population Census in Bulgaria (Final Data), pp. 24 and 29 available on pdf at: www .nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf. 14 Zhelyazkova, Antonina. “Trial against 13 imams in Bulgaria”, in: www.imir-bg.org/imir/ reports/Trial%20against%2013%20imams%20in%20Bulgaria.pdf. Bulgaria 129

2 Islam and the State

Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic with no state religion. However, the Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional” religion (Article 13, Paragraph 3).15 In 2002, the National Assembly passed a new Law on Religion (State Gazette, No. 129, of 29 December 2002), introducing a completely new basis for State-religious communities relations. According to this law, the registration of religious institutions has to be done by the judiciary, thus preventing any interference on the part of the executive in the internal organisational affairs of believers. However, the active Chief Mufti Mustafa Hadji Alish considers the Law discriminatory, because unlike the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Muslim community is obliged to register at the Sofia City Court its periodic conferences at which Chief Muftis and members of the Supreme Muslim Council are elected by delegates representing the Muslim community. Therefore, “this requirement gives rise to the legal and political manipulation of the official authorities”.16 This legislation, allowing a Muslim denomination to register and then re-register as a trading company, provides opportunities for legal abuses. This leads to splits in the Muslim community: registrations of several administrations of Muslims and the unsatisfactory functioning of the Chief Mufti as an administrative spiritual-religious body. For instance, in 2008, the court registered at the address of the Muftiate an administrative organisation headed by Nedim Gendzhev, a former chief mufti appointed at the end of the Communist era. Taking advantage of the situation he allegedly succeeded in unauthorised with- drawals from the bank accounts of the Muftiate in the amount of 850,000 BGN (€435,000).17

15 In the last census in 2011, 4,374,135 persons or 60% of the total population determined themselves as Orthodox Christians; the number of Catholics was 48,945 (0.28%), of Protestants: 64,476 (0.87%). These figures reflect the number of people who responded to the religion question. Presumably the real percent of Christians in the common sense is much higher. See: http://censusresults.nsi.bg/Census/Reports/2/2/R10.aspx. 16 This attitude is expressed in a letter of the Muftiate sent on 21 May 2010 to Krasimir Kanev, Chairman of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. 17 This problem is expressed in a letter of the Muftiate sent to the attn. of Mr Serhiy Holovaty, Chairman of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (pace). Hadji, Mustafa, “Glavno myuftiystvo sled demokratichnite promeni” (The Chief Mufti’s Office after the Democratic Changes), in Годишник на Висшия Ислямски Институт (Yearbook of the Higher Islamic Institute), No. 2, Sofia 2010, p. 18. 130 Shakir

Every year, the Directorate of Religious Confessions under the Council of Ministers allocates financial support from the state budget to denominations with a longer historic presence. In the last couple of years, most of the money granted to the Islamic community (in 2013 the amount was around 92,000 €)18 was received through local municipalities and spent for reconstruction purposes.19 Muslims are represented in the public arena by the Chief Muftiate. In March 2013, this institution was visited by the Provisional Prime Minister Marin Raykov. During his visit Mr. Raykov pointed out that Muslims in Bulgaria are an integral part of the Bulgarian nation and that they should be assured that “the wounds of the past will not be exploited.”20

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Bulgarian Muslim community, officially called the Muslim Denomination (Мюсюлманско изповедание), owns a range of well-developed structures. It is administered by the Supreme Muslim Council (Висш духовен Съвет) consisting of 30 members, with its core institution, the Chief Muftiate (Главно мюфтийство, Bratia Miladinovi Str. N. 27, Sofia 1301, tel: +359 29816001, fax: +359 29803058, official site: www.grandmufti.bg; e-mails: press@grandmufti .bg, [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], hac@ grandmufti.bg). The Chief Muftiate is staffed by a team of some 20 employees working in such departments as Waqfs, Hajj, Education, Publishing, Administration and Finances, International Protocol and Public Relations, Irshad (Spiritual and ethic guidance) etc. The managing body of the Muslim Denomination also includes 21 regional muftiates comprised of councils of 5 to 11 members representing the regional departments of the community, and under their ward there are 1,500 local units called boards or trusteeships. The current Chief Mufti is Mustafa Alish Hadji (since 2005). He has three deputies: Vedat Sabri Ahmed (since 2005), Birali Mümün Birali (since 2008) and Murad Pingov (since 2012).

18 http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-obshtestvo/izpovedaniyata_izharchili_29_ miliona_prez_2013a-224053.html. 19 Op. cit.; In 2013, 108,000 bgn (nearly 55,000 €) was used for repairing 23 mosques; See also: Shakir, A. Op. cit., p. 148. 20 http://btvnews.bg/article/bulgaria/politika/premierat-myusyulmanite-sa-nedelima- chast-ot-balgarskata-natsiya.html. Bulgaria 131

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The estimated number of active mosques in Bulgaria is 1,260. There are also nearly 240 small prayer houses called mesjids, and some 50 tekkes and turbes, most of which date back to the Ottoman period. There are no prayer rooms in public institutions. Around 400 of the mosques have been constructed after the fall of the Communism. The Muftiate’s official website published photographs of 28 mosques and prayer houses under construction,21 as well as of 118 that are not in use.22 Some of the latter, dating back to the Ottoman period, need serious restoration and some, against local Muslims’ will, are proclaimed museums or state property and thus deprived of their initial functions. Aimed at changing the problematic status quo of these historical monuments and regaining them as waqfs for the religious needs of the Muslim community, the Chief Muftiate is engaged in a legal fight against the Ministry of Culture and several municipalities. On the long list of the “nationalised” Muslim shrines there are such mosques as Hamza Bey Mosque in Stara Zagora inaugurated as “Museum of Religions” in 2011, Grand Mosque in Sofia, currently used as National Archaeological Museum, Ibrahim Pasha Mosque in Razgrad, and many others. There are several mosques that were expropriated by the state without any official act or legal basis. As a matter of fact, during the Communist era the estate property acts of most mosques vanished, due to the cleansing of this type of documents from the state and local muftiates’ archives. Some of the shrines are in poor condition and the Muslim community is willing to reconstruct them but is denied access to them. Despite worshippers’ protests, Tash Kopru Mosque in Plovdiv is currently used as a restaurant in which alcohol is served. In 2013, for a second consecutive year, the Muslim Denomination organised “Week of the Mosques” (1–7 October) aimed at presenting this type of shrine to non-Muslims. As part of the programme the Deputy Chief Mufti Birali Mümün Birali opened a photographic exhibition of Bulgarian mosques by the promi-

21 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/djamii-v-stroej; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/djamii-v-stroej.html ?start=20. 22 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/mosques-in-history-no-function; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/ mosques-in-history-no-function.html?start=20; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/mosques- in-history-no-function.html?start=40; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/mosques-in-history- no-function.html?start=60; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/mosques-in-history-no-function .html?start=80. 132 Shakir nent photographer Antoni Georgiev titled “Key to the Heart” hosted by the Ministry of Culture.23

5 Children’s Education

Islam was introduced into the curriculum as an elective subject (called simply “Religion-Islam”) in a few public primary schools in regions where the majority of the population are Muslims in the academic year 1997/1998; a year later the subject officially entered the programme of junior high schools (grades 5–8). In 2001/2002 the number of students studying “Religion-Islam” reached its highest point so far.24 The same year, a team of authors directed by the Muftiate prepared a set of textbooks for grades 1–8. In 2003, the Ministry of Education and Science released an instruction permitting a new 12-year curriculum allowing “Religion-Islam” to be taught in high schools. According to the instruction, students under the age of 14 who want to study the subject the coming academic year should apply in advance, before the end of the spring term (i.e. in June) with a declaration signed by their parents; if applicants were mature (aged 14–18), they have to sign the declaration themselves.25 Formally, the state allows children to study their religion and mother tongue but the symbolic number of those who could take the advantage of this otherwise democratic regulation clearly shows that in practice it has not developed any strategy towards supporting this type of educational activity. During the last decade (2002–2013), the number of children from Muslim families exercising their right to study Islam decreased in a geometrical progression and in 2013 reached its minimum. As a result, in regions like Kardjali, Shumen, Aytos, Razgrad, Dobrich, Silistra, Targovishte, Plovdiv, Sliven and Veliko Tarnovo, where most of the Muslim population of the country live, “Religion-Islam” could not enter the school curricula. In 2013, the subject was taught in only 27 state schools to 2,986 pupils (285 less than the previous year) divided in 93 free

23 Бюлетин /Annual Report 2013, Мюсюлманско изповедание Главно мюфтийство, София 2014 (to be published in 2014). 24 Хаджи, Мустафа, p. 16; More information about the content of the subject taught in grades 2–7 can be found in: Фере, Мевлюде, “Анализ на урока по ‘Религия-ислям’”, in: Годишник на Висшия Ислямски Институт (Annual of the Higher Islamic Institute), vol. 1, София 2009, pp. 277–299. 25 Карамолла, Хюсеин, “Предметът “Религия-ислям” в българското училище”, in: сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 9, София 2012, p. 16. Bulgaria 133 elective and 100 compulsory groups.26 The long list of objective and subjective reasons27 for this extraordinary situation can be broadly put down to the combined lack of tutors, interest and financial support. There are three Islamic secondary schools, in Russe, Momchilgrad and Shumen. In 2013, the latter underwent a full reconstruction and opened doors for the 2013/14 academic year with a newly built school complex consisting of a four-storey building with 53 classrooms, including labs and a seminar room, a gym and a boarding house for 150 students.28 The three religious high schools follow the general curriculum for state secondary schools, with extra classes on Islam. The more than 1,30029 young Muslims who have graduated from these schools since their establishment can serve as imams or continue their education in any university discipline they choose. Founded in the first half of the 1990s, from 1998 onwards they became totally dependent on regular subsidies from the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Along with the school curricula, the major unofficial institutions for dis- semination of religious knowledge are the so-called Qur’an courses. In 2013, 654 summer courses were held in more than 500 towns and villages, attended by nearly 8,200 children and adolescents aged 6–18.30 For the first time Qur’an courses were organised in Turkey for a small number of pupils. In addition, the regional muftiates in Blagoevgrad, Smolian, Kardjali, Stara Zagora, Aytos, Shumen and Razgrad opened their doors for yearly Qur’an courses.31 In addition to the numerous Qur’an courses, there is one course for hafizes (memoris- ers of the Qur’an) in Madan. On 5–6 July 2013, the 8th National Competition for hafizes and Qur’an recitation was held in Rudozem.32 In Sofia, there are two private Arab schools (a Lebanese elementary school “Gibran Kahlil Gibran” founded in 1999 and a Palestinian high school “Avicenna”

26 The data is obtained from the Educational department of the Chief Muftiate. 27 For detailed information see: Zhelyazkova, A—Orlin Avramov, Maya Kosseva, Lubomir Petkashev. Educational Problems of Turkish Children in Bulgarian Schools, Citizens for Human Rights, imir, Sofia, 2012. 28 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 2/ 2013, p. 18. 29 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 8/ 2012, p. 7. 30 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 10/ 2013, p. 2. 31 Бюлетин /Annual Report 2013. 32 Ibidem; For video see: http://grandmufti.bg/bg/2011-07-15-16-00-35.html?task=cats& cat=18&sl=categories&layout=listview. 134 Shakir opened in 2006)33 in which most of the students are children from Muslim or mixed (Muslim-Christian) families.

6 Higher and Professional Education

About 1,000 imams serve the religious needs of the Muslim population. Most of the imams are elderly and privately educated, as no official religious training was available during the Communist era. Nearly 100 younger imams are graduates from various Islamic universities in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt.34 Few are trained in the Qur’an courses mentioned above. There is a growing tendency for imams to pursue higher education at the only Islamic higher educational institution so far in Bulgaria, the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia35 (kv. Vrazhdebna, St. 57, No. 6, tel: +359 29456298, fax: +359 28406366; e-mail: [email protected], web: www.islamicinstitute-bg.org). The Institute was founded in 1990 by a decision of the Council of Ministers signed by the Prime Minister36 as a semi-higher institution and started to function with a two year programme, but after a reform in the country’s educational system implemented in 1998, it was transformed into its present “higher” status and consequently the new curricula were based on a new four-year plan. Students who complete their studies at the Institute (250 so far)37 acquire the qualification of “Islamic theologian” and obtain a teaching certificate giving them the right to become imams, vaizes (preachers) and khatibs (pulpit orators), as well as “Religion-Islam” teachers in elementary schools. However, the diplomas issued by the Institute are not recognised by the Ministry of Education and Sciences, as the programme does not meet the requirement of “sufficient number of qualified staff” for state accreditation. The lack of staff is due to the lack of Islamic theologians in the country and this is one of the most serious long- term problems local higher Islamic education faces. For the last dozen years, the Higher Islamic Institute has depended fully on the financial aid provided by the Turkish Diyanet. Thanks to the latter, the Institute offers free education,

33 For details visit: www.avicenabg.com, http://arabwives.wordpress.com and www.golden pages.bg/bg/b/740E23FF-B203-DC11-B6C5–00145E9525E4. 34 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 8/ 2012, p. 7. 35 For the history of the Higher Islamic Institute see: Cambazov, İsmail, Sofya İslam Enstitüsü: Anılar-Belgeler (Sofia Islamic Institute: Memories and Documents), Sofia: Davudoğlu Yayınları, 2005. 36 A facsimile of the decision is published in: Cambazov, p. 27. 37 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 8/ 2012, p. 7. Bulgaria 135 board and lodging to its students and usually two or three of the faculty members are visiting professors from Turkey. Nowadays, the Turkish Diyanet also supports 23 Bulgarian students (10 B.A., 3 M.A. and 10 PhD) studying “Islamic Theology” at different universities in Turkey. Academic courses on the history and culture of Islam and the Middle East are offered on a regular basis by the Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies of Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims are free to perform traditional funeral rites. In regions with large Muslim population, there are separate cemeteries and separate burial plots. Recently, the municipality in Kardjali developed a unique project aimed at providing mobile pre-burial services to Muslims living in isolated villages or urban places without local imams experiencing difficulty organising ceremonies for their dead. A specially equipped truck with an imam on board goes to the address of the deceased and the imam performs the washing and shroud- ing of the corpse inside the truck.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Imams have access to prisons and may visit patients in hospitals, although no special regulation concerning the issue exists. Imams are not allowed in the armed forces as military law bans religious activities on military premises as well as ministry to the armed forces. This has provoked the Muftiate’s objections regarding the fact that priests representing the Orthodox Church regularly inaugurate flags of the Bulgarian Army and perform religious rites at official ceremonies such as opening of schools and other institutions.

9 Religious Festivals

In 2013, Bulgarian Muslims celebrated their religious holidays freely and, in accordance with Art. 173, Para. 4 of the Labour Code, were officially entitled by a decision of the Council of Ministers (on a meeting held 21 Dec 2011) to a day’s holiday for the Mawlid Night, two days for ʿId al-fitr called Ramadan Bayram and three days holiday for ʿId al-adha, or Qurban Bayram. The Chief Mufti announces the beginning of the fasting month Ramadan and greets the 136 Shakir believers at its end followed by Ramadan Bayram, as well as on the occasion of Qurban Bayram on national TV channel “Kanal 1”. During ʿId al-adha in 2013, 2,500 packages with meat from sacrificed animals were distributed among people in need. In the last months of 2013, the Chief Muftiate and the regional muftiates organised several campaigns to support refugees, especially those from Syria, who had just entered the country and since local authorities fell short in hosting them adequately, in the beginning of the harsh winter season many faced hunger and cold (registered refugees receive only 33 € per month to cover personal expenses). Despite financial help from the EU (6.4 million € from the EU’s Refugee Fund plus 2 million € in aid from the Czech Republic and Slovakia), the Bulgarian government has consistently preferred to engage in exacerbating the situation.38 As a result of the campaigns, the Muslim community collected more than 200 tonnes of food and several tonnes of clothing, shoes and other necessities to be handed to the State Agency for Refugees and to the refugee camps situated in Sofia and throughout the country.39

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

During the Socialist period (1944–1989), most Muslims (and especially those living in the cities) did not have the chance to obtain halal food. Nowadays, the notion of halal food is only slowly re-appearing and only a few Muslims in Bulgaria (mainly Arabs) strictly adhere to halal food regulations. Actually, Muslims have a very limited access to halal food through the few local shops, which are supplied by a couple of local firms that perform the ritual slaughter. In supermarkets, there are no special signs indicating whether a certain meat product is halal. Nevertheless, private slaughter is not forbidden. Perhaps as a consequence of the lack of demand, halal food is not available in public institutions. In 2012, the Supreme Muslim Council accepted “A Regulation Concerning the Basis for the Issuing of Halal Certificates” and formed a commission40 empowered to deal with the matters related to the granting of certificates to companies applying for such. From the Chief Muftiate’s

38 Rayna Stamboliyska, “Bulgaria’s Chilly Welcome to Syrian refugees”, In: http://www.open democracy.net/arab-awakening/rayna-stamboliyska/bulgarias-chilly-welcome-to- syrian-refugees. 39 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 10/ 2013, p. 17; Бюлетин/Annual Report 2013. 40 The muftis in whose region the companies applying for a halal product certificate operate are also considered members of the commission. Bulgaria 137 website, we understand that it has issued certificates to “Gradus”, “Kostinbrod” and “Hrenat-Sevlievo” companies exporting chicken to Muslim countries and a couple of other producers for the domestic market: “Musan” and “Merkez”.41 In 2013, the Muftiate granted its Halal certificate to the following companies and trading marks: 1) “Zaharni izdeliya—Varna” OOD specialised in producing chocolates, biscuits, wafers and other sugar products; 2) “Karamela 2000”; and the local manufacturers of dairy products 3) “Rodopeya-Belev” and 4) “Sitovo”.42 The annual hajj organised by the Chief Muftiate was performed by 200 pilgrims in 2013 (150 less than in 2012). Twenty of them, mainly women, participated in a month-long course on Qur’an reading. The group of pilgrims was headed by the Deputy Chief Mufti Vedat Ahmed.43 In 2013, in accordance with a decision of the Hajj Organisation Commission at the Chief Muftiate, for the first time umrah was announced and later (25 April–7 May) performed by 22 pilgrims.44 In Bulgaria, there is no access to Islamic banking due to the absence of local banks offering or applying this type of financial services.

11 Dress Codes

There are no formal regulations prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress, including hijab, (headscarf ) in public places. There have been occasional bans in state schools that require school uniform. Niqab ( face covering) is not part of the dress code of the local Muslim community. As a matter of fact, only a few of its representatives (mainly women living in rural environment and worshippers attending religious ceremonies, such as the prayers performed in mosques) wear traditional Muslim dress. There is no special regulation prohibiting the wearing of hijab in ID card and passport photos. Nevertheless, the ears of their holders should be seen. As a result, there are many cases of photos in which headscarves are put on in a way that ears are left uncovered.

41 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/faq/30-fetvi/646-2010-01-16-17-38-18.html. 42 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 7/ 2013, p. 7. 43 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 11/ 2013, p. 16; See also: Бюлетин/Annual Report 2013. 44 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 6/ 2013, p. 17. 138 Shakir

12 Publication and Media

In the post-Communist period, the most active institution publishing Islamic religious texts is undoubtedly the Chief Mufti’s Office. The long list of printed materials includes a few books by Bulgarian authors and several translations (mainly from Turkish and Arabic, and less so from English), the most important being an academic translation of the Qur’an from 199745 that was approved as “official” and the hadith collection “Gardens of the Righteous” by Al-Nawawi, both carried out by a prominent Arabist Prof. Tsvetan Teofanov.46 Advertisement and circulation of religious knowledge is achieved through the regional muftis’ offices and the community’s website (www.grandmufti.bg). Most of the Muftiate’s publications are very practical and concern the observance of religious rituals. There are also a number of school textbooks and didactic texts such as the series called Religion-Islam and classical guides for religious guidance. The Muftiate publishes a monthly bilingual journal (in Turkish and Bulgarian) Müslümanlar/ Мюсюлмани (“Muslims”) with children’s enclosure Hilal (Crescent), available as pdf files that can be downloaded free of charge.47 As of the end of 2013, on the official website of the Chief Muftiate there were also six e-books,48 70 video-lectures,49 five films50 and 157 fatwas.51 Since 1992, Fethullah-Gülen related Zaman Foundation publishes the newspaper Zaman-Bulgaristan (“Time-Bulgaria”) and a monthly magazine dedicated to the Muslim family called Ümit/Надежда, both being bilingual.52 In 2009, the Higher Islamic Institute started to publish the Annual, the only Muslim scholarly magazine launched in the post-Socialist era.

45 Теофанов, Цветан, Превод на Свещения Коран (Translation of the Holy Qur’an) Главно Мюфтийство на Мюсюлманите в Република България, София, 1997). A second edition was launched in 2006. 46 Имам ан-Науауи, Градините на праведниците (Рияду-с-Салихин) (Gardens of the Righteous). vol. 1 Translation from the Arabic: Teofanov, Tsvetan. Главно Мюфтийство на Мюсюлманите в Република България, София, 2008). 47 See: www.grandmufti.bg/bg/library/downloads/category/1-spisanie-myusyulmani.html. 48 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/library/downloads/category/2-izdaniq-na-glavno-muftiistvo .html. 49 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/2011-07-15-16-00-35.html?task=cats&cat=17&sl=categories& layout=listview. 50 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/2011-07-15-16-00-35.html?task=cats&cat=16&sl=categories& layout=listview. 51 www.grandmufti.bg/en/faqs/30-fetvi.html. 52 http://www.zaman.bg; http://www.umitdergisi.com. Bulgaria 139

There are no separate Muslim television or radio channels. National radio broadcasts a three-hour programme on Islam every Friday. Recently, these programmes have been maintained by one of the deputy Chief Muftis, namely Vedat Ahmed.

13 Family Law

Islamic marriage is practised mainly in villages, after the couples have been married according to civil law. Imams issue certificates to those who conclude an Islamic marriage but the state recognises only marriages contracted in a civil registry office.

14 Interreligious Relations53

Since 1989, and especially in the last few years, the Muftiate has made significant progress in the sphere of interreligious relations. Generally, the Muslim and other religious communities remain relatively closed and focused on their internal problems, preserving the boundaries between them and inter- acting mostly peripherally.54 However, in terms of inter-institutional and personal contacts, everything seems more than optimistic. It is not surprising, for instance, to hear on the news that in a town or village with “mixed” population, Muslims have helped in the construction or repair of a church55 and vice versa.56 Teachers and pupils from Muslim religious schools meet with their Christian counterparts.57 The relations between the local Muslim and Jewish

53 For a general overview, see Zhelyazkova, Antonina, Nielsen, Jorgen and Kepel, Gilles (eds), Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria: A Collection of Articles (in English and in Bulgarian) (Sofia: imir, 1995). 54 See Merdjanova, Ina. “Uneasy tolerance: Interreligious relations in Bulgaria after the fall of Communism”, in: Religion, State and Society, vol. 35, no. 2 (2007), pp. 95–103. 55 For instance, in 2013, Muslims from the local community volunteered in the repair of the church of Dryanovets village in Russe region. 56 For example, the mosque in Malinovo village in Lovech district was repaired with the help of local Christian volunteers and reopened doors on 11 October 2013. 57 On 28th March 2013, Violeta Rogatçeva: “Religion-Christianity” instructor at “Prof. John Atanassov 4th Primary School” and Hanife Musa: Religion-Islam instructor at “Otets Paisiy162nd Primary School” in Sofia organised a public lesson attended by their pupils, students of the Higher Islamic Institute and the Faculty of Theology at Sofia University, as well as the Deputy Chief Mufti Birali and the Bishop of Znepol and Vicar of the Sofia 140 Shakir communities are also rather positive. On 29 August 2013, on the occasion of the Limmud week, the Bulgarian Jewish community organised in Bansko a scientific discussion dedicated to “The Personality of Moses in the Discourses of the Monotheistic Religions” attended by the Deputy Chief Mufti Mümün Birali, Rabbi Aaron Zerbib, Pastor Evgeniy Naydenov and Father Petko Valov, the representative of the Catholic Apostolic Exarchate.58 The long list of interreligious events and demonstrations of goodwill for 2013 form a rich spectrum of activities: during Ramadan the United States Ambassador Marcie Ries organised an iftar to which the Chief Mufti Mustafa Alish, the head of the Central Israelite Spiritual Council Robert Jerassy and the president of the United Evangelical Churches Nikolay Nedelev were invited. In May 2013, the Chief Mufti Mustafa Alish received in Banya Bashi Mosque a delegation of Journées d’Arras, an international NGO bringing together groups of Christians from all of Europe, working within their own churches and institutions, concerned with Christian-Muslim relations. In 2013, the Journées d’Arras took place in Sofia on the topic “Perception of Islam in the Orthodox Churches”.59 On 23 May and 8 June 2013, Christian and Muslim women held a charity bazaar (selling prayer beads, clothing, accessories, paintings etc.) in the square behind Banya Bashi Mosque aimed at providing financial support for the Centre for Medical Care and “St. Ivan Rilski” Nursery in Sofia.60 In recent years, the Students’ Council at the Higher Islamic Institute and the Chief Muftiate, in cooperation with Central Israelite Spiritual Council, the Theological Faculty at Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”, the organisation of the Jews in Bulgaria “Shalom” and ”Ethnopalitra” Foundation have organised interreligious discussions and public lectures dedicated to the philosophical, historical and political relations between the monotheistic religions, hosted by the Media Cultural Centre of the Chief Muftiate (Pirotska Str. Nr. 3, 2nd floor) currently headed by the Deputy Chief Mufti Birali Mümün. In 2013, a series of four discussions took place in the Centre: “Forgiveness in the Monotheistic Religions”, “Sources of Religious Knowledge in the Monotheistic Religions”, “The End of the World in the Monotheistic Religions” and “Ascetics in the

Bishopric John, representatives of the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Culture etc.; For details: сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 5/ 2013, p. 18. 58 Бюлетин/Annual Report 2013. 59 http://affolderbach.de/current-activities/; http://www.grandmufti.bg/en/bulgaria/3512- glavniya-myuftiya-pri-delegatziya-na-organizatziyata-qzhurne-darazq.html. 60 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/news-from-bulgaria/1998-2012-01-16-08-19-03.html. Bulgaria 141

Monotheistic Religions”. Video materials from all discussions can be found and watched online on the website of the Muftiate.61 On 28 February and 6 November 2013, the National Council of Religious Communities in Bulgaria (NCRCB) attended a couple of dinners organised by the Turkish Ambassador Ismail Aramaz. The next diplomat to invite the Council (6 June) was the Armenian Ambassador Arsen Shoyan. NCRCB also visited the Apostolic Nuncio to Bulgaria, Januario Bolonek. On 4 April, the Council was hosted personally by the Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev. On Friday, Saturday and Sunday following this meeting, the representatives of the three monotheistic religions dedicated their liturgies to peace and the shared welfare of the Bulgarian people. As part of its rich schedule of activities in 2013, the NCRCB initiated a meeting with academicians from the Bulgarian Academy of Science and the two sides signed a declaration calling for tolerance between nations, institutions and followers of different religions. In all meetings of the NCRCB, the Muslim community was represented by the Deputy Chief Mufti Birali Mümün and the Secretary General of the Muftiate, Ahmed Ahmedov.62

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In September 2012, the District Court in Pazarjik began a trial against 13 imams, including regional muftis, Qur’an teachers and lecturers. The defendants were accused of preaching “anti-democratic ideology, expressed in opposition to the principles of democracy, separation of powers, liberalism, a rule-of-law state, basic human rights such as gender equality and religious freedom, spreading Salafism and imposing of Shariʿa law.”63 In 2013, the trial continued with a number of court sessions, but the final decision was postponed till 2014.64 On the list of Islamophobic crimes for 2013 reported to the Muftiate, there were 13 incidents (two more than in 2012).65 In most of these cases local Muslim communities were unable to receive consideration and professional commitment from the Ministry of Interior whose investigations, despite being

61 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/2011-07-15-16-00-35.html?task=cats&cat=20&sl=categories& layout=listview. 62 Based on data taken from the unpublished “Бюлетин /Annual Report 2013” of the Chief Muftiate. 63 Articles 108, Par. 1; Art. 109, Par. 2 and Art. 164, Par. 1. of the Bulgarian Penal Code. 64 For detailed information about the trial see: Shakir, op. cit., pp. 159–160. 65 The data concerning the anti-Muslim incidents in 2013 was provided by the pr of the Chief Muftiate: Hayri Emin. 142 Shakir provided with video materials and eyewitnesses’ statements, proved inconclu- sive with all the cases closed with the cliché expression “offender unknown and unrevealed.” However, the two men from the group beating to death Georgi Dimitrov-Metin were arrested and charged with attempted murder with hoo- ligan motives and face a heavy sentence. As a matter of fact, Metin became a target because of his physical resemblance with Arab refugees dwelling in a nearby hostel. Ataka, vmro and other far-right factions have used refugees to ignite xenophobia, and at least three racially motivated attacks have been reported. After an Ataka mp warned the country that Syrian refugees were “cannibals” and that their presence was designed to disguise an “Islamic wave” supported by American and Turkish interests, a group of Syrian refugees filed a complaint before the State Commission for Discrimination. Ataka’s dangerous rheto- ric turned out to be rather “fruitful”: in November, a new nationalistic party was founded promising to “cleanse the country of foreign immigrant scum”. Additionally, according to a poll by Alpha Research conducted in October 2013, 59% of Bulgarians see the influx of refugees as a threat to national security.66 Ultra nationalist factions formed “citizen patrols” to check whether migrants “comply with the law of the state”. Some of these claimed to have official authorisation from the authorities.67

16 Major Cultural Events

In the last decade, the Week of the Prophet’s Birthday entered Bulgaria’s Muslims’ calendar of celebrations. In 2013, all regional muftiates organised different activities dedicated to the “praised week”. There is also an annual Islamic Education Week held in the last week of Ramadan (1–7 August 2013).68 Most of the activities related to these relatively new traditions (such as religious sermons, various musical performances, plays and conferences, competitions) are organised nation-wide by the Chief Muftiate and the Higher Islamic Institute and are financially supported by the Turkish Diyanet. On 7–8 September 2013, the “7th National Competition in Knowing the Basics of the Islamic Religion” was held in the National Palace of Culture in Sofia. The participants were

66 http://alpharesearch.bg/bg/socialni_izsledvania/socialni_publikacii/obshtestveni- naglasi-oktomvri-2013g.807.html. 67 Rayna Stamboliyska, op. cit. 68 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/2011-07-15-16-00-35.html?task=cats&cat=21&sl=categories& layout=listview. Bulgaria 143 students from the Qur’an courses who have won the competitions organised by all regional muftiates. The event was attended by politicians, the ambassadors of almost all Arab states and high ranking officials. On 20 February 2013, the regional muftiate in Shumen organised a Sufi music concert, announced to be the first of its kind, because of the participation of a unique male choir consisting of 22 Sufi singers trained for a relatively short period of 45 days in Todor Ikonomovo village. The event was honoured by the Chief Mufti, the Head of the Supreme Muslim Council Shabanali Ahmed, diplomats from the Turkish Embassy in Sofia and other distinguished guests.69

69 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 3/ 2013, p. 17. Croatia

Dino Mujadžević*

1 Muslim Populations

The last national census from 2011 for the Republic of Croatia provides very reliable data on the number and dispersion of Muslim population and other religions, as well as ethnic groups, in the country. There were 62,977 persons in Croatia, who identified themselves as Muslims, which was 1.47% of the total population of 4,284,889. This is a fairly significant increase from 54,814 persons according to 1991 census and 56,777 (1.28% of the total population) according to 2001 census.1 In accordance with the administrative division of the country, the largest part of Muslim population resides in the capital city Zagreb (18,044; 2,28%) and the following counties (županije):2 Primorsko-goranska (Rijeka; 10,667; 3.60%), Istarska (Pula; 9,965; 4.79%), Sisačko-moslavačka (Sisak; 4,140; 2.40%), Dubrovačko-neretvanska (Dubrovnik, 2,927, 2.39%), Vukovarsko- srijemska (Vukovar; 2,619; 1.46%), Karlovačka (Karlovac; 2,163; 1.68%). Muslims are largely concentrated in urban areas, most notably in the capital and the largest industrial centre Zagreb and other major towns and industrial centres in mainland Croatia: Sisak (2,442; 5.11%), Slavonski Brod (1,173; 1.98%) and Karlovac (705; 1.27%). Muslims are significantly present in ports, industrial and tourist centres of Northern Adriatic: Rijeka (5,820; 4.52%), Pula (3.275; 5.70%), Labin (1,243; 10.68%), Vodnjan (858; 14.02%), Poreč (710; 4.25%), Umag (669; 4.97%), Raša (569; 17.88%), Rovinj (507, 3.55%), Buzet (240; 3.91%) and Buje (207; 3.99%). The historical city of Dubrovnik in the Southern Adriatic also has relatively large Muslim population (2,310; 5.28%). Relatively large population of Muslims live in rural communities situated right next to state border with Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gunja (1,295; 34.70%) and Drenovci (376; 7.27%) in

* Dino Mujadžević, PhD, works as research fellow at Croatian Institute for History in Slavonski Brod. 1 Popis stanovništva, kućanstava i stanova 2011 (Census of the population, households and apartements 2011). The new, as well the previous censuses, are published on the official web site of State Statistical Institute (www.dzs.hr), accessed 31 December 2012. 2 Županija (pl. županije) is Croatian term for administrative region, sometimes translated as district or county. City of Zagreb is administratively and statistically independent from županije system.

Vukovarsko-srijemska, and Vojnić (742; 15.58%) and Cetingrad (418; 20.62%) in Karlovačka županija.3 The largest Muslim ethnic group in Croatia is Bosniaks (31,479; 0.73% of the total Croatian population), who are also the second largest ethnic minority in the country. Among Bosniaks in Croatia, 88% (27,959) identified themselves as Muslims. This traditionally exclusively Muslim ethnic group is composed of immigrants from Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, who came largely in the second half of the 20th century, and their descendants. The number of Bosniaks has increased sharply when compared to only 20,755 Bosniaks according to the 2001 census. This change is not the result of migrations and/or high birth rate, but the product of the transformation of ethnic (narodnost according to Croatian classification) self-perception among the population of Bosnian, Serbian and Montenegrin Muslim roots in Croatia. The relatively high number of persons who identified themselves as ethnically “Muslim” (according to 2001 census 19,677) decreased dramatically in a decade (according to 2011 census to only 7,558). The ethnonym “Muslim” was used until 1993 as the official term for Bosniaks in Bosnia and elsewhere in former Yugoslavia and, sometimes, for other Slavic Muslims in Macedonia and Kosovo. The 1991 census lists 43 thousand “Muslims” in Croatia. It is fair to assume that almost all of “Muslims” of the 2001 census were of Bosniak origin, but due to different factors—such as ignorance about the changed terminology or desire to assimilate into Croatian society by accepting more neutral ethnic identification—they did not identify themselves as Bosniaks.4 This situation has changed drastically due to the propagation of Bosniak ethnic identification, which was one of the main activities of Bosniak minority organisations during the 2001–2011 period. The second largest Muslim ethnic group in Croatia are Croats, ethnic majority of overall Croatian population (3,874,321; 90.42%). In the 2011 census 9,647 Croats (0,002% of their total number) identified themselves as Muslims. The relatively large number of Croat Muslims is the result of ethnic and cultural assimilation of non-Croat Muslim immigrants, and their descendants, from other parts of former Yugoslavia during the 20th century. A large number of Muslims in Croatia are to be found among Albanians (17,513; 0.41% of the total population), a community mainly consisting of immigrants from Kosovo and Macedonia, who settled in Croatia in the second half of the 20th century, and their descendants. 54% (9,594) of Albanians in Croatia identified themselves

3 Popis stanovništva 2011 (www.dzs.hr), accessed 30 November 2013. 4 ŠemsoTanković, Bošnjaci u Republici Hrvatskoj. Bosniaks in Republic of Croatia. (Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 1997). 146 Mujadžević as Muslims, the rest being mainly Roman Catholics. A significant part of Roma population in Croatia (16,975 in total or 0.40% of the overall population) has Muslim roots (5,039; 29% of their total population). The Muslim part of the Roma population in Croatia are immigrants from Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, and their descendants, who like others came in the second half of the 20th century. According to the latest census data, there were also 367 ethnic Turks, immigrants from Kosovo and Macedonia, and their descendants in 2011.5 Muslims in Croatia are almost exclusively Sunni and belong to the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence, with very small numbers of adherents of Naqshbandi, Qadiri and Bektashi Sufi orders. The history of Muslims and Islam in Croatia is very old, but without continuity. The settlement of Ismaeliti—a Muslim population of unclear, but probably largely Central Asian, origin (not to be confused with Isma’ilis as we know them today)—is documented in 1196 in Osijek.6 During the 16th century, Ottomans established their rule in eastern parts of the country (Slavonia, Banija, Kordun, Lika, inner Dalmatia). According to reliable estimates, during the 16th century, around one fourth of the population in Slavonia, the largest and most populous province under Ottoman rule, were Muslims, living mostly in towns. The Muslim population in Slavonia mainly originated from other parts of the Ottoman realm, chiefly Bosnia, and the number of indigenous converts to Islam was relatively small. There are no reliable estimates about the Muslim population for other parts of Croatia. Islamic religious infrastructure, such as mosques, tekkes and waqfs, was fairly developed during the 16th and 17th centuries.7 Ottoman rule in Croatia was terminated after the Habsburg and Venetian conquest at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century. All Muslim population left these areas or was expelled, killed or enslaved. All Islamic religious infrastructure was destroyed or changed for other purposes.8

5 Popis stanovništva 2011 (www.dzs.hr), accessed 30 November 2013. 6 Ive Mažuran, Srednjovjekovni i turski Osijek. Mediaeval and Turkish Osijek. (Osijek: Zavod za znanstveni rad u Osijeku hazu, 1994) p. 50. 7 Nenad Moačanin, Slavonija i Srijem u razdoblju osmanske vladavine. Slavonija and Srijem in the Age of Ottoman Rule. (Slavonsti Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest 2005), p. 43; Nenad Moačanin, Turska Hrvatska. Turkish Croatia, (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska 1999), pp. 146–147, 178–179. 8 For the contemporary plight of Muslim population in lands reconquered by Habsburgs, including Croatia, see autobiografical accounts of Ottoman prisoners in Habsburg captiv- ity, Osman-aga of Temisoara: Der Gefangene der Giauren. Die abenteuerlichen Schicksale des Dolmetschers Osman Ağa aus Temeschwar, von ihm selbst erzählt. The Captive of Infidels. The Croatia 147

Muslims started to return to Croatia from 1878, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy occupied present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, so Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosniaks, were able to settle in other parts of the monarchy. According to the 1910 census, only 204 Muslims lived in Zagreb and other Croatian towns. The Croatian parliament recognised Islam as an official religion in 1916. After the establishment of the South Slavic state (later Yugoslavia) in 1918, Muslims, mostly Bosniaks, began to settle permanently in larger numbers in Zagreb. According to the census of 1931, there were 4,750 Muslims in Croatia, around 3,000 of them in Zagreb. In 1919, a Muslim religious community (džemat) headed by an imam was officially founded in Zagreb. Previously independent, this community officially became part of the Yugoslav Islamic Religious Community (Islamska vjerska zajednica) in 1934. A Shariʿa Court was established in Zagreb in 1935 adjudicating legal issues relating to Muslim marriage, family and inheritance. A mosque in Zagreb was built in 1944 under the pro-Nazi Croatian Ustaša regime, which used it for propaganda purposes. Some imams in Croatia col- laborated with the regime and in 1945, when communists came to power, were severely punished by execution or imprisonment. After legal reform in Yugoslavia in 1946, the Shariʿa court in Zagreb stopped working. In 1948, the communist Zagreb City authorities closed the mosque. Under the socialist regime (1945–1990), Muslims in Croatia continued to operate in a renewed Yugoslav Islamic Religious Community, with the community in Zagreb as the centre of religious life. Croatia achieved independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 and by 1993 the Yugoslav Islamic religious community was officially dismantled and the Islamic Community in Croatia (icc, Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj) started to operate de facto independently. In 1999, Chief Imam of Zagreb, Ševko Omerbašić, became the first Mufti of the icc, and in 2012, Aziz Hasanović, the second one.9

Adventurous Fate of the Translator Osman Ağa of Temişoara, told by himself. (Graz, Wien, Köln: Verlag Styria, 1962). 9 For the history of the modern Muslim community see: Omerbašić, Šefko, Islam i muslimani u Hrvatskoj. Islam and Muslims in Croatia (Zagreb: Mešihat Islamske zajednice u Hrvatskoj), 1999; 2010 (second edition); Hasanbegović, Zlatko, Muslimani u Zagrebu, 1878.–1945. Doba utemeljenja. Muslims in Zagreb, 1878–1945. The Foundation Age. (Zagreb: Medžlis Islamske zajednice u Zagrebu i Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2007), p. 31; Ankica Marinović Bobinac – Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Vjerske zajednice u Hrvatskoj. Religious communities in Croatia.(Zagreb: Prometej, 2008), pp. 285–286. 148 Mujadžević

2 Islam and the State

According to the Constitution, all religious communities are equal before the law and are separate from the state (Article 41).10 The legal status of religious communities is regulated by a law promulgated by the Parliament in 2002.11 According to this law, the government defines its relations with religious groups through special agreements. The agreement with the icc, which is currently the only existing Islamic community in Croatia, was signed in 2002. It stipulates the rights of the icc in terms of mosque construction, freedom of speech and publishing, religious education in public schools, financing, chaplaincy in prisons, armed forces, police, etc. It also gives the icc the right to register marriages. Imams’ salaries, healthcare and pensions are fully paid by the government. The government also supports ethnic minorities through projects such as seminars, publications and other activities.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Community in Croatia (Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj) is the only existing and officially registered Islamic religious community in the country. The icc has established cooperation with the government, city and municipal authorities as well as relations with other religious communities. It consists of an Assembly (Sabor), an executive body called Mešihat, the Mufti of Zagreb and his office, local Muslim communities in various towns (medžlisi) and the Zagreb Islamic high school (Islamska gimnazija). The current mufti of Zagreb and the president of Mešihat is Aziz Hasanović. (Islamic Community in Croatia, Gavellina street 40, 10000 Zagreb. Webpage: www.islamska-zajednica.hr). The icc is in practice an independent religious institution despite its symbolic connections with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina whereby the icc recognises its leader (Reisu-l-ulema) in Sarajevo as the supreme religious leader while the Reisu-l-ulema confirms the mufti as the head of the icc.

10 The latest version of the Constitution of Republic of Croatia is available at web site of Croatian parliament www.sabor.hr, accessed 30 November 2013. 11 Text of this law is published online: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/309118 .html, accessed 30 November 2013. Croatia 149

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are three purpose-built mosques in Croatia: in Zagreb, Rijeka and a third in the village of Gunja in Vukovarsko-srijemska županija. The Muslims of Zagreb made a decision in 1961 to build a new mosque and began construction twenty years later. The mosque was officially opened in September 1987 and since then has been the centre of Islamic life in Croatia. It is part of an Islamic centre which comprises prayer facilities, a library, offices, apartments for imams, classrooms, a restaurant, a youth club, a theatre, Islamic high school premises, etc. In fifteen other cities there are prayer facilities—masjids. Construction of a new mosque and Islamic centre in the city of Rijeka started in September of 2009. The Rijeka mosque was opened on 4 May 2013, with the Croatian President in attendance at the ceremony.

5 Children’s Education

Muslims have the right to organise confessional religious education in all public schools where there are seven or more pupils in a class. The Islamic community in Zagreb has been running an Islamic religious school (madrasa) “Dr. Ahmed Smajlović” since 1992. In 2006, due to low enrolment of new pupils, it was converted to a general Islamic high school. The school’s programme is harmonised with that of the state high schools. It includes Islamic subjects, but a graduate does not receive the title of imam.12 In 2008, the icc, in cooperation with authorities of the City of Zagreb, opened kindergarten “Jasmin”, the first Islamic kindergarten in Croatia, which is housed in the Islamic centre in Zagreb.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Croatian universities do not offer Islamic studies. Plans for an Islamic Faculty as part of the Islamic Centre in Zagreb have been initiated but little progress has been made. Imams are sent abroad for training, often to Bosnia, but also to Turkey and Arab countries.

12 See also: Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka and Marinović Bobinac, Ankica, “Islamische Ausbildung in Europa—kroatisches Modell”, in: Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa / Islamic Education in Europe, Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009, pp. 239–258; http:// ss-drasmajlovic-zg.skole.hr, accessed 30 November 2013. 150 Mujadžević

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have the right to be buried according to Islamic rites. In Zagreb, Muslims have a separate section at the Mirogoj cemetery. In other cities, burial places are usually mixed with those of non-Muslims.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Imams have the right to visit and ask for a separate room for prayer in all public institutions including the police, armed forces, prisons as well as hospitals (Article 17 of the Agreement between the icc and the state). Muslims serving in the armed forces have the right to ask for pork-free food and to be taken to the nearest mosque on Fridays to perform the prayer.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslims have the right to a free day on both major festivals (ʿid; Kurban Bajram, Ramazanski Bajram). In practice, private companies are less likely to grant this right. Both ʿid prayers are broadcast live on the national tv and radio stations. On ʿid day prominent politicians (President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Chairman of the Parliament or Mayor of Zagreb) congratulate publicly Muslims on their holidays and these congratulations feature prominently in the daily news. In recent years some of them have visited the Zagreb mosque to personally greet Muslims and their leaders. On 14 October 2013, Zagreb mayor Milan Bandić visited the Islamic centre in Zagreb on the occasion of Kurban Bajram.13

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Since 2010, the Centre for Halal Quality Certification of the icc has been operating in Zagreb (Tomašićeva 12/2). Certified companies are obliged to label their Halal certified products with the logo. Since 2011, several Croatian restaurants and hotels were awarded Halal certificates by this Centre, but they also offer other types of food and drinks (the full list of certified companies,

13 http://www.soundset.hr/vijesti/zagreb-i-okolica/bandic-u-islamskom-centru, accessed 15 April 2014. Croatia 151 restaurants and hotels can be obtained at the webpage of the Centre: www .halal.hr). Unlicensed slaughter is strictly prohibited by Croatian laws, while qurban slaughter is organised by the icc together with a local meat processing company. There are no specialised halal food stores or restaurants, as well as other Islamic services companies in Croatia. In 2013, 60 persons went to perform Hajj, which is organised exclusively by the icc.14

11 Dress Codes

Civil law does not prohibit women from wearing hijab, though only a few Muslim women wear it. Wearing hijab is allowed on document photographs.

12 Publication and Media

The icc is involved in publishing Islamic books and books related to the Muslim heritage in Croatia, but also publishes occasionally its almanac (Takvim) and monthly magazine (Bilten, www.islamska-zajednica.hr/bilten/bilten_pocetna .php). News about the icc is published on its website www.islamska-zajednica .hr. Muslims usually read religious newspapers imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Imams have regular preaching sessions on national tv and radio stations.

13 Family Law

All family legal issues except registration of marriages are referred to the civil courts. According to the agreement between the government and the icc (2002), Muslim religious marriages administered by the icc are recognised by the state and have the same legal status as civil marriage.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Mufti and other leaders of the icc participate regularly in interreligious conferences of high representatives of religious communities in Croatia.

14 http://islamska-zajednica.hr/nekategorizirano/vratile-se-hadzije, accessed on 15 April 2014. 152 Mujadžević

Representatives of the icc also participate regularly at Interreligious Prayer Meetings organised in Croatia. The icc has very good and continuous cooperation with the Council for Ecumenism and Dialogue of the Croatian Bishops’ Conference.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Due to the cultural proximity of Croatian Muslims and the Christian majority, there are few social tensions and Muslims generally live integrated in Croatian society. Nevertheless, negative prejudices towards Muslims, increased by ethnic warfare between Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia in 1993–1994, still influence part of public opinion, which was visible in resistance by part of the local population to the building of the Islamic Centre in Rijeka. On the other hand, major political factions and relevant media tend to be supportive of and open to the icc and local Muslims, which in 2013 was very evident in the coverage of the opening of the Islamic Centre in Rijeka as the event of the national importance and the building itself was referred to as “the most beautiful mosque in Europe”.15

16 Major Cultural Events

The icc organises an annual European competition in Qur’an recitation in conjunction with the celebration of the anniversary of the opening of the Zagreb mosque in September of 1987 as well as occasional scholarly conferences on topics concerning Islam and Muslims in Croatia. In April 2013, the icc organised the international conference “Social position of Muslim women in Europe” in Zagreb, attended by numerous Muslim and non-Muslim scholars from around Europe.16

15 http://www.jutarnji.hr/u-rijeci-otvorena-najljepsa-dzamija-u-europi-na-svecanost- doslo-20–000-ljudi/1100773/, accessed on 15 April 2014. 16 http://islamska-zajednica.hr/vijesti/drustveni-polozaj-muslimanke-u-europi, accessed on 15 April 2014. Cyprus

Ali Dayıoğlu* and Mete Hatay**

1 Muslim Populations

The Muslim presence in Cyprus dates from the seventh century, but Islam took root, grew, and was institutionalised in the island during the period of Ottoman rule (1571–1878). Cyprus was under British control from 1878 to 1960, when the island gained its independence and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was founded. The RoC was based on a consociational system of power-sharing between the Turks and the Greeks of the island, each community dealing with its own religious affairs. However, this power-sharing arrangement broke down in 1963, leading to a period of intermittent inter-communal violence over the next decade. During this period, the RoC came under the sole control of Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots established their own administration in armed enclaves. A Greek-sponsored coup and the subsequent second Turkish military intervention/invasion in 1974 ultimately led to the island’s present division. Greek Cypriots residing in the north fled to the south of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the south to the north. After the division of the island, the Greek-Cypriot government in the southern part became the only internationally recognised government of the island. Turkish Cypriots in 1983 proclaimed a state in the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (trnc), which remains to this day unrecognised by any country other than Turkey. Although the RoC is constitutionally a bi-communal state, in 2004 it became a member of the European Union (eu) without its Turkish Cypriot part. Turkish Cypriots may carry European passports via the RoC, but the northern part of the island was excluded from the eu’s acquis communautaire.

* Ali Dayıoğlu is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations, Near East University, Northern Cyprus. He researches and writes on the Turkish Muslim minority in Bulgaria and Greece, the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and minorities and Islam in Cyprus. ** Mete Hatay is Senior Research Consultant at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (prio), Cyprus Centre, Nicosia. He primarily researches and writes on the Cyprus conflict, Cypriot cultural history, immigration, Islam and ethnic and religious minorities in Cyprus.

According to the 2012 Demographic Report of the RoC’s Statistical Service Department, the current population in the south, under the RoC-controlled area, is 838,897.1 Of these, 179,547 are foreign residents who do not have Cypriot citizenship. Of these, an estimated 15,000–20,000 are Muslims of various nationalities. During the civil war in Lebanon, many Lebanese fled and settled in south Cyprus, and Cyprus is today an important receiving country for economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from nearby Muslim countries, South East Asia and Africa. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr), 3,696 refugees and 3,492 asylum seekers were living in Cyprus in 2013, the majority of whom were Muslims.2 Cyprus is also home to a number of private universities and colleges that attract international students, many from Muslim countries. Apart from this immigrant and student population, a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots, mostly of Roma origin, moved from the island’s north to the south after the 2003 opening of the ceasefire line that divides the island, especially since Cyprus’s 2004 eu accession.3 However, according to a study, the Muslim population of Turkish Cypriot extraction living in the south still does not exceed 1%.4 According to the 2011 census, there were only 1,405 people who spoke Turkish as their mother tongue among those living in south Cyprus.5 According to the 2011 census results, the total de jure population in the island’s north is 286, 257. The census does not include the rotating population of Turkish military, which is estimated at 30,000–35,000 at any one time. The 2011 census results show that, of the total recorded de jure population, 190,494 were citizens of the trnc, although 31,234 of these gave their birthplace as Turkey.6 While religion was not listed on the census, and even though the majority of the population is fundamentally secular, Turkish Cypriots are officially considered to be Muslims. According to the 2010 u.s. State Department Report on

1 www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/732265957BAC953AC225798300406903?Open Document&sub=2&sel=1&e=&print, accessed 8 March 2014. 2 www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48dba6, accessed 8 March 2014. 3 It is known, however, that around 300 Roma had already crossed the Green Line, sought asylum, and settled in the RoC controlled areas in the late 1990s. See further information regarding the Roma population movement at www.domresearchcenter.com/news/cyprus/ index.html, accessed 8 March 2014. 4 Directorate General Internal Politics of the Union, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future?”, ip/B/cult/ic/2006_061, https://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/espo/ documents/Rapport_parlement_europeen_mai_2007_english.pdf, accessed 3 March 2014. 5 http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/census-2011_cystat_en/census-2011_cystat_ en?OpenDocument, accessed 5 March 2014. 6 http://www.devplan.org/Nufus-2011/nufus%20ikinci_.pdf, accessed 12 January 2014. Cyprus 155

Religious Freedom, approximately 8% of the population in the island’s north attend weekly religious services, and 1.3% attend more than once a week.7 According to a survey carried out in Cyprus in 2011, the percentage of children who had never been to a church in south Cyprus was 1% and the percentage of children who had never been to a mosque in north Cyprus was 38%.8 The 2011 u.s. State Department Report on Religious Freedom indicated that rather than the Turkish Cypriots, it is foreign students, residents, immigrants, and workers of Turkish, Kurdish or Arab origin who celebrate and practice most of the spiritual and traditional aspects of their religions through mosque services.9 At the time of the 2011 census, there were also 80,550 non-trnc citizen immigrants residing in north Cyprus who were nationals of the Republic of Turkey, and almost all of these are Muslims. The majority of this group were either studying in the universities of north Cyprus or working in the island’s construction, tourism and manufacturing sectors. Amongst the latter group, there were many Kurdish and Arabic speakers. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, with most following the Shafi’i school of thought. In addition, there is a large Alevi immigrant population, consisting of Turkish nationals from both ethnic Turkish and Kurdish backgrounds. According to some sources, the total population of Alevis in north Cyprus is around 10,000.10 The majority of Arabic-speaking Turkish nationals are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school but there is also a small population of Alawites or Nusayris (different from Alevis), most of whom are from the Hatay area of southern Turkey. The remaining foreign residents are citizens of other countries, including the United Kingdom (uk), Germany, Russia, Pakistan, Bulgaria, and African countries. Of these, approximately half are Muslim.11 Recently, there has also been an influx of migrants from Central Asian countries, especially Turkmenistan, the majority of whom are women coming to the island to work as domestic labourers.

7 www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148926.htm, accessed 31 December 2013. 8 Yenidüzen, 21 May 2011. 9 u.s. Department of State, The International Religious Freedom Report for 2011—Cyprus- The Area Administrated by Turkish Cypriots. www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/ index.htm?dynamic_load_id=192799#wrapper, accessed 31 December 2013. 10 Ibid. The same figure is also given by Alevis living in north Cyprus. See Konuralp, Tanju, “196 Cami Var, 1 Cemevi Yok” (There are 196 Mosques, not 1 Cemevi), Yenidüzen, 23 April 2012. 11 Hatay, Mete, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno- Demography of Cyprus in the light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census, prio Report 2/2007 (Nicosia/Oslo: prio Cyprus Centre, 2007). 156 Dayıoğlu and Hatay

2 Islam and the State

Article 18 of the 1960 Constitution of the RoC guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion for everyone. It also provides in principle that the administration of the RoC, in the application of the law, will not discriminate against any religion or religious institution. Because of the bi-communal nature of the RoC, provisions are made in the Constitution for the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the institution of Waqf and the Laws and Principles of Waqfs (Ahkamül Evkaf). These religious foundations are among the principle institutions of the Turkish Cypriot community, and historically Waqfs was one of the largest landholders in the island. In the past, funds generated from these properties supported schools and other public works and religious institutions. Article 110 of the RoC Constitution confirms that the control of these properties and their funds belong solely to Waqfs, and any laws and regulations shall be enacted by the Turkish Communal Chamber, which during its years of operation (1960–1963) was comprised of elected Turkish Cypriot deputies. Article 23 of the Constitution secures properties belonging to mosques and other Muslim religious institutions. According to this article, no confiscation, restriction or limitation of ownership rights may take place with regard to such movable or immovable properties without the approval of the Turkish Communal Chamber and subject to the Laws and Principles of Waqfs and for the purposes of town and country planning. Muslim institutions are exempt from taxes and are eligible for government subsidies. However, after 1974, Waqfs lost control over all its properties in the south and operates only in the north. As with all other Turkish Cypriot property in the south, Waqfs property has been placed under the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management, an institution established by the Greek Cypriot-controlled RoC after 1974, following the departure of Turkish Cypriots from the south. After the proclamation of their own state in 1983, Turkish Cypriots approved a constitution by referendum in 1985. Article 1 of the trnc Constitution stresses the secular character of the state, while Article 23 guarantees freedom of religion and conscience. Provisions have been made regarding acquisitions, requisitions, restrictions and limitations relating to Waqf properties in Article 42. According to this article, matters relating to acquisitions and requisitions of Waqf properties are to be regulated by law enacted in accordance with the Laws and Principles of Waqfs. According to Article 131 of the Constitution, all matters relating to or in any way affecting the institution or foundation of Waqf or any Muslim religious institutions shall exclusively be subject to the Laws and Principles of Waqfs and the legislation in force and the laws to be enacted Cyprus 157 by the Parliament. The same article further provides that properties belonging to the Waqf institution shall be exempted from any form of taxation.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Historically, the two primary Muslim organisations in Cyprus are Waqfs (Kıbrıs Vakıflar İdaresi, Nicosia, po Box 118, via Mersin 10, Turkey, www.evkaf.org), which manages the affairs of land and business holdings that have been donated for religious purposes, and Müftü (or Mufti) (kktc Din İşleri Başkanlığı, 1A Site Sokak, Din Sitesi, Hamitköy, Nicosia via Mersin 10, Turkey, www.kktcdinisleri .com), who is the official spiritual head of the community. As explained above, as the representative of Muslims in Cyprus, Waqfs Administration, currently called Waqfs Administration and Religious Affairs Office (Vakıflar Örgütü ve Din İşleri Dairesi), owns all the island’s mosques, cemeteries, tekes and turbes (shrines). Following the 1974 division of the island, Waqfs lost control of all holdings in the south, both religious and commercial, and operates solely in the north. Similarly, although the Mufti is the official spiritual head of the Muslim community in Cyprus, after 1974, his office moved to the north, and until recently he was effectively without power in the south. Because Muslim organisations controlled by Turkish Cypriots moved to the north after 1974, no such Muslim-controlled organisations remained in the south to provide religious personnel and ensure the maintenance and upkeep of mosques. As a result, the office under the Ministry of Interior of the RoC that is in charge of looking after abandoned Turkish Cypriot properties also con- trols most of the Turkish Cypriot religious property. The need to provide such services, especially for immigrant Muslims, until recently had been met by the World Islamic Call Society, an organisation based in Libya. However, due to the crisis in Libya, it is not clear whether the same institute will be able to continue its functions. Moreover, in 2011, the current mufti was allowed to appoint three imams to mosques in the island’s south. These imams are members of the island’s Nakshibendi (Naqshbandi) Sufi order and had already been conducting services in these mosques, but the Mufti made their appointment official and gave them a salary. In addition, the Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus, Chrysostomos ii, when asked about these appointments, gave his tacit approval by remarking that Turkish Cypriots may appoint imams in any of the mosques in the south.12 According to the Mufti, the original plan had been to appoint 15 imams to mosques in the south, though subsequent budget constraints

12 Kıbrıs, 18 August 2011. 158 Dayıoğlu and Hatay made the appointment of only three imams possible.13 It should be noted that although the appointed imams are under the control of the Mufti, the mosques where they deliver their limited services are still administered by the Ministry of Interior or Antiquity Department of the Republic of Cyprus. As explained above, the Waqfs office has been the most important institution responsible for religious affairs in Cyprus. On the other hand, the Mufti, once the spiritual leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, lost his influence during the twentieth century, as the Turkish Cypriot community became increasingly secularised. While once influential in legal and educational matters and in areas such as marriage and divorce, the Mufti lost his historical title and privileges in the 1980s and became the Head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (dra), although he is still known to Turkish Cypriots as the Mufti. His office is under the control of the Waqfs Administration, which is run by a board appointed by the Prime Minister. In addition, until recently, the dra had authority only in the north. Because of the isolation and non- recognition of the north by the south or the international community, these institutions receive significant financial contributions, personnel, and guidance from Turkey. In addition to these official institutions, there are four important religious associations operating in the north. Among these associations, the Association of Universal Love and Brotherhood (Evrensel Sevgi ve Kardeşlik Derneği, eskad—www.eskad.org), the Turkish Islam Cultural Association (Türk İslam Kültür Cemiyeti—http://turkislamkulturcemiyeti.com) and Academy Cyprus (Akademi Kıbrıs Gelişim Platformu—http://www.akademikibris.com/index1 .html) sponsor various activities and programmes, especially for students from Turkey studying in the island. The first organisation was founded in 1996 by a previous Mufti who was educated in Saudi Arabia and espoused a particular interpretation of Islam that emphasises universal peace. The second association, founded in 1983, was influenced by the Turkish-Islam synthesis, popular in Turkey in the 1980s, which attempted to combine nationalism and Islam. Unlike these two older associations, Academy Cyprus is relatively new, founded in 2010. This association has a close and active relationship with the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-akp) government in Turkey and foreign Islamic organisations. In addition to many educational and cultural activities, the association hosted the European Muslim Union’s 2013 meeting in north Cyprus. The fourth important association, Cyprus Science, Ethics and Social Assistance Foundation (Kıbrıs İlim, Ahlak ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Vakfı-kİsav,

13 Kıbrıs, 16 July 2013. Cyprus 159 https://tr tr.facebook.com/pages/K%C4%B1br%C4%B1s-%C4%B0lim-Ahlak- ve-Sosyal-Yard%C4%B1mla%C5%9Fma-Vakf%C4%B1-K%C4%B0SAV/ 541298235882278), related to Milli Görüş, was founded in November 2011. In January 2012, this association leased 200 acres of land belonging to the Waqfs Administration and located in a suburban area of Nicosia. The 30-year lease has a symbolic yearly rent of 100 tl (approximately €33), justified by the Foundation’s plans to build a Külliye, an educational complex around a mosque. In 2013, construction of the Hala Sultan Divinity College, the first religious vocational high school in Northern Cyprus, was completed, while construction began on the Hala Sultan Mosque, both part of this intended religious complex. Certain Sufi tariqas also operate in north Cyprus, the most important being the Naqshbandi tariqa, whose leader, Turkish Cypriot Sheikh Nazım Kıbrısi (Nazim al-Qubrusi), has many followers in Europe, Asia and the Americas. His main centre (dergah) is based in the small town of Lefke, situated in north Cyprus where he used to regularly receive disciples visiting from abroad but has not done this as often in recent years. Along with the Sunni Muslim institutions, there are two Alevi associations whose members mainly are immigrants from Turkey. The larger of the two, the trnc Alevi Cultural Centre (kktc Alevi Kültür Merkezi—www.kktcalevileri .org), acquired land from the government in 2006 to build a cemevi, or Alevi place of worship. Currently, they use the association’s building for their rituals and gatherings. Another significant Alevi organisation is the Cyprus Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Society (Kıbrıs Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği—http://kibrispir sultan.org).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Prior to the departure of Turkish Cypriots from their villages, either during the period of conflict in the 1960s or after 1974, there were 102 mosques in the south as well as four tekes and 148 cemeteries. Since the island’s division, as mentioned above, these properties have been under the control of the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management. Although there has been an interest in the restoration and upkeep of mosques in the past several years, until 2003 few repairs had been carried out. During the RoC’s eu accession process between 2000 and 2003, the RoC spent approximately €100,000 per year. The amount then increased significantly in 2004, following the opening of Cyprus’ checkpoints, the subsequent return of many Turkish Cypriots to visit their villages, and the May 2004 accession of the RoC to the eu. 160 Dayıoğlu and Hatay

From 2004 to 2006, the RoC spent approximately €500,000 each year for the upkeep of Muslim religious properties. In 2008, one United Nations Development Programme (undp)-funded project to list and evaluate religious sites found that 60 mosques in the south were in good condition after repairs.14 The 2011 Ministry of Interior budget for restoration activities was €814,300. Today, only eight of the above mentioned mosques in the south are in use, and these are in towns with immigrant Muslim populations. The mosques in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol have been maintained and run by the Islamic Call Society of Libya. Another small mosque in Limassol has been recently renovated at the request of the growing Turkish Cypriot Muslim community there (mainly Roma). A Turkish Cypriot imam travels from the north to this mosque every week for the Friday prayers, and also on religious festivals. However, this mosque was set on fire by several young Greek Cypriot fanatics in April 2012.15 The government and the archbishop of the Church of Cyprus publicly condemned the attack. The municipality helped restore the mosque, which was fully operational at year’s end. In Larnaca, the Hala Sultan Tekke and Mosque is under the dual management of the Department of Antiquities and the Custodian of Turkish Cypriot Properties. During 2009, the Naqshbandi tariqa received permission to conduct services in the Hala Sultan Mosque on Fridays and during religious holidays. Receiving encouragement from this success, the tariqa proceeded to establish an association in the island’s south with the intent of pressuring the RoC to give control of the mosque to this order. Their application was rejected by the Ministry of the Interior on the grounds that the mosque is now a cultural heritage site and used as a museum.16 The dervish who conducts services in the Hala Sultan Mosque was one of the three imams recently officially appointed in 2011 by the Mufti. It should be noted that the largest Muslim immigrant community lives in Nicosia, where there is only one functioning mosque (Ömerge Mosque). Although two other mosques have been renovated and could be used, they have not been opened for use. Only the Bayraktar Mosque is now open on Thursday evenings for the Naqshbandi order to perform zikr and Friday prayers despite the fact that the mosque is not open for regular prayers. In addition, the authors observed that the two operational mosques are not sufficient to meet the increasing demand of practising Muslims, especially during Friday prayers.

14 See www.cyprustemples.com. 15 http://www.radikal.com.tr/dunya/kibris_rum_kesiminde_cami_kundaklandi-1085105, accessed 18 April 2012. 16 Kıbrıs, 6 January 2011. Cyprus 161

In the north, according to data provided by the former head of the dra, Yusuf Suiçmez, in 2009 there were 182 functioning mosques. Of these, 84 existed before the island’s division, while 48 were churches that had been converted to mosques after 1974. In addition, four buildings previously used as cinemas or schools had been converted into mosques. Suiçmez also stated that between 1974 and 2009, 39 new mosques have been built, and of these 31 were financed by the Directorate of Aid Committee of the Turkish Embassy.17 In recent years, in view of Greek Cypriot and international reactions against the conversion of churches into mosques, more weight has been given to building new places of worship. In those villages and neighbourhoods where new mosques have been built, churches that had been used as mosques ceased to be utilised in this way. According to the Head of the dra, Talip Atalay, as of July 2013, there were 199 mosques and masjids in Northern Cyprus.18 Mosques in Northern Cyprus belong by law to the Waqfs Administration. Although Waqfs collects considerable revenue from its various properties, only 5% of the cost of mosque upkeep and clerical salaries is provided by this Administration. The remaining 95% come from the Ministry of Finance, which in turn requests this amount from Turkey, so the cost of mosque construction, maintenance and staffing, like much of the infrastructure in the north, is provided for by Turkey.19 For instance, in 2012, Turkey granted 10,400,000 tl (approximately €3,466,000) to the trnc to be spent on religious affairs, including construction of new mosques, organisation of religion courses, repair and maintenance of mosques, and purchase of equipment. The total amount spent was 2,185,207 tl (approximately €728,400).20 The striking point was that even though the amount spent was less than the amount allocated, Turkey continued to send money to the trnc for religious purposes.

17 Ernur, Ergül, “16 Yeni Cami için 13 Trilyon” (13 Trillion for New Mosques), Kıbrıs, 7 May 2009. 18 Düzgün, Öntaç, “İlahiyat Liselerine İhtiyaç Var” (There is a Need for Divinity High Schools), Poli, No 136, (21 July 2013), p. 2. 19 Suiçmez, Yusuf, “Din İşleri ve Vakıflar” (Religious Affairs and Waqfs), Havadis, 1 April 2012. Talip Atalay, Head of the dra, announced that as of July 2013 there were 358 officials in the mosques in north Cyprus, 255 of whom were paid by the dra, and 103 of whom were paid by the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia (Düzgün, op. cit., p. 3). Nevertheless, taking into consideration that just like the trnc budget most of the dra budget is financed by Turkey, in reality Turkey is paying the salaries of the majority of the mosque officials. 20 T.C. Lefkoşa Büyükelçiliği Yardım Heyeti Başkanlığı, 2012 kktc Ekonomi Durum Raporu, [Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, Directorate of Aid Committee, trnc’s 2012 Economy Report, (no date)], p. 92. 162 Dayıoğlu and Hatay

While these are the current provisions for mosques, there are no other facilities available for worship, such as rooms allocated to worship in public offices. The reason for this is that the majority of the public servants are Turkish Cypriots, who are fundamentally secular. Nevertheless, there are masjids at the country’s only airport and universities for foreign Muslims to pray. Claiming that the existing masjids could not meet the demand, in April 2012, Near East University (neu), and in August 2012, Eastern Mediterranean University (emu) announced that they were going to build mosques on their campuses. The first concrete attempt in this respect came from neu. On 27 September 2013, the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Cyprus Affairs and the Turkish Head of Religious Affairs attended the ground-breaking ceremony of the neu mosque. A statement made by the University stated that the mosque, which was inspired by Ottoman architecture, was going to be the largest in Cyprus in terms of size and capacity, allowing 10,000 people to worship at the same time.21 Also, the armed forces in the north have their own places of worship and provide their own religious personnel. While the Turkish Embassy’s Aid Committee provided financial aid for the construction of mosques, no funds were provided to Alevis for the construction of a cemevi (Alevi house of worship) because they were not recognised as a religious community. In order to correct this situation, in 2006, the coalition government under the leadership of left wing Republican Turkish Party- United Forces (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi-Birleşik Güçler/ctp-bg) allocated a piece of land to the Alevi community to build a cemevi. Even though the Waqfs Foundation and the dra made an 80,000 tl (approximately €26,600) contribution for the cemevi in 2008,22 this amount was not enough to complete the construction. The Alevi spokespersons stated that after the change in the government in 2009, when the right-wing National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi-ubp) came to power, they ceased to receive aid from the state, and that although they had applied to the Turkish-sector Prime Minister and the Turkish Embassy, their requests had fallen on deaf ears. As a result, the Alevi community has tried to finance the construction of the cemevi through donations or proceeds that came from various events that they organised. However, this was not enough to complete the construction of the cemevi, either. Therefore, as of 31 December 2013, there was no cemevi in north Cyprus.

21 Yenidüzen, 27 September 2013. 22 Yenidüzen, 6 September 2010. Cyprus 163

5 Children’s Education

There are no state-supported Islamic schools in south Cyprus, while instruction in the Greek Orthodox religion is compulsory in primary and secondary schools. However, parents of different faiths may submit a written request for their children to be exempted from this subject. Turkish Cypriot pupils who attend schools in the south, if there are reasonable numbers of them, may receive religious instruction in their own language. Currently, a Turkish Cypriot teacher gives religious lessons in Turkish in Limassol, where most Turkish Cypriots (mostly of Roma origin) in the areas controlled by the RoC live. It must, however, be noted that despite the provisions of the Constitution of the RoC and repeated assurances by the RoC administration to the United Nations (un) Secretary General, to date no Turkish primary school has been opened in the south of the island.23 According to the trnc Constitution, “Religious education and instruction shall be under the supervision and control of the state.” Since 2005, new regulations put religious instruction at the secondary level of primary education under the control of school management committees. As a result, many schools have chosen not to include religion lessons in their curriculum. However, in 2009 compulsory instruction in “religious culture and morality” was put into effect one hour per week from the fourth grade to the eighth grade, but so far the lack of teachers has hampered its implementation in many schools. Therefore, religion and morality teachers started to be recruited from Turkey. Despite the reactions of teachers’ trade unions, as of 31 December 2013, there was no change in this policy. Traditionally, families who wish their children to receive religious instruction have sent them to summer courses in local mosques. In recent years, however, these summer courses have been a source of controversy, twice prevented by laws forbidding the teaching of religion outside school. In other words, imams in mosques are allowed to preach but not to teach. When the National Unity Party came to power in 2009, part of their new government’s programme of 2009 included summer religious courses with Qur’an lessons. The courses began in that year and continued through 2013 without interruption, allowing students who had finished grade three to attend. In 2013, officials of the Ministry of National Education described the course as a

23 On this subject, see Dayıoğlu, Ali, “Kıbrıs’ta Okullar Sorunu ii: Limasol Türk İlkokulu” (The School Problem in Cyprus ii: The Limassol Turkish Primary School), Kıbrıs Yazıları, No. 2, (Spring 2006), pp. 56–69. 164 Dayıoğlu and Hatay three-stage religious theoretical and practical education that was being given in 22 schools and mosques under the title “Summer Term Religion Course.” During stage one, children received education for four days at school and one day at the mosque; during stage two, they spent two days at school and three days at the mosque; and during the third and final stage, they had one day at school and four days at the mosque. Officials noted that the education given in these courses was under the Ministry’s control and that in order to ensure that no unauthorised persons gave instruction, the names of approved instructors had been given to the Police General Directorate. In addition, officials stated that the Ministry had given permission for the practical part of the course, conducted in mosques, to be under the control of the dra. On the other hand, the Cyprus Turkish Teachers’ Trade Union (Kıbrıs Türk Öğretmenler Sendikası- ktös) officials claimed that despite the Ministry’s claims of control, courses were also given at tariqa-controlled mosques and other locations.24

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no institutions of higher education that offer training for imams and other religious professionals in the south. The clergy operating and performing their duties in north Cyprus are attached to two authorities, the dra, (under the control of Waqfs), which is an institution of the trnc, and the Religious Affairs Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. The most significant development in 2013 was the opening of the Hala Sultan Divinity College in the complex of Külliye. This college received significant financial support from the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği-tobb). After the ground-breaking ceremony for the College was held on 20 July 2012, the College was officially opened on 27 September 2013, with the previously mentioned attendance of Turkish officials. On the same day as the College’s opening, construction began on additional facilities, including male and female dormitories and the Hala Sultan Mosque. The Ministry of Education authorities announced that as of September 2013, the College had around 400 students, and that with the completion of the additional buildings a total of 1,200 students would receive education there.25

24 Çağda, Hasan, “Dört Yıldır Devam Ediyor” (It Has Been Continuing for Four Years), Kıbrıs, 11 July 2013. 25 Havadis, 28 September 2013. Cyprus 165

The vast majority of the relatively secular Turkish Cypriot society opposed the opening of the Divinity College. They believed that the opening of the College was part of the Justice and Development Party government’s efforts to establish a more religiously conservative mentality in Cyprus and to assimilate Turkish Cypriots to the Justice and Development Party’s understanding of religious practice.26 Apart from the Faculty of Religious Studies at neu and the Divinity College, Anadolu University, a Turkish university, has an Open Faculty on its north Cyprus campus where there is a theology department at the undergraduate level. In addition, in the 2013–2014 academic year, a religion and ethics education undergraduate programme opened at neu, while the European University of Lefke (eul) announced that it planned to establish an Islam Research Centre.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Only three of 148 Muslim cemeteries in the south are in good condition. In the north, there are over 150 Muslim cemeteries. The land is owned by the Waqfs Administration, which also provides for services conducted in these cemeteries. Maintenance is provided by municipalities.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no rules governing religious assistance in health facilities, prisons or the armed forces in either part of the island. Religious support is usually provided on an ad hoc basis according to need. In 2010, the u.s. State Department Religious Freedom Report noted that the Ombudsman’s Office in the RoC had investigated a Muslim prisoner’s complaints regarding the lack of prayer facilities in the prison. While the Central Prison has both a mosque and an Orthodox church, the Ombudsman’s Office found that these were not open regularly but

26 According to a nationwide survey carried out on the issue by Public Opinion Research and Consultancy Company (kadem), 57.5% of the Turkish Cypriots over the age of 18 were against Külliye and the percentage of those in favour of the project remained at 24.2% (Yenidüzen, 16 June 2012). For more detailed information on the issue of Külliye, see Dayıoğlu, Ali, “Kıbrıs’ta Külliye Tartışmaları: Siyasi Bir Proje mi? Toplumsal Bir İhtiyaç mı?” (Külliye Debate in Cyprus: A Political Project? A Societal Necessity?), Gaile, No. 170, (7 July 2012), pp. 2–3. 166 Dayıoğlu and Hatay only weekly and on religious holidays. In addition, in response to the complaint of a prisoner in the state’s ‘open prison,’ the same office found that the opportunity for religious practice in these facilities was limited but that the state had promised to correct the problem by the end of 2011.27 However, no improvement in these conditions has since been observed. Moreover, Muslims are not allowed to join the military in the south. As mentioned above, the armed forces in the north have their own places of worship and provide their own religious personnel. Clergy visit Nicosia Central Prison, the only prison in north Cyprus, for special activities, especially during the month of Ramadan.

9 Religious Festivals

No Islamic festivals are recognised in the south. However, in 2013, the English School, which has many Turkish Cypriot students who travel each day from the north, allowed Muslim students to have three days-long holiday during the annual Islamic celebrations (bayrams).28 All Islamic festivals are recognised in the north. Because Turkish Cypriot society is for the most part secular, most Turkish Cypriots take part in religious activities primarily during religious festivals, especially the major festivals at the end of Ramadan and ʿId al-Adha (Kurban Bayramı). Although there have been no surveys on the extent to which fasting is practised during Ramadan, it is the authors’ observation that most of those who fast are elderly Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey. Most people, however, actively participate in traditional ways in festivities associated with bayrams. Beginning in the late 1990s, Turkish Cypriots began to celebrate Mevlid Kandili, or the anniversary of the Prophet’s birth, as the Week of the Holy Birth (Kutlu Doğum Haftası), or Mevlid-i Nebi. The Prophet Muhammad’s birthday is fixed as the twelfth day of the third month (Rebi‘ ul-Evvel/Rabi‘ al-Awwal) of the Hijri calendar. It was usually celebrated with mosque illuminations and preparation of special sweets. Although Mevlid Kandili was celebrated previously, under the influence of trends coming from Turkey, this one-day event has become a week-long festival with religious educational activities, including conferences and seminars. In addition, clergy employed by the dra visit

27 www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148926.htm, accessed 3 March 2011. 28 http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/58/news/116177/PageName/guney_ kibris, accessed 2 February 2014. Cyprus 167 the homes of people within their communities to offer them a rose and a book about the Prophet Muhammad. In 2013, north Cyprus celebrated the Week of the Holy Birth with numerous events attended by government officials and the public. The theme for the 2013 celebrations was ‘Human Honour,’ and in conjunction with that an Ottoman military band from Turkey marched and gave concerts in various towns throughout the week. Celebrations further included conferences, plays, and charity sales, the singing of hymns, and recitations of the Qur’an. In addition, there were philanthropic activities, such as blood donations.29 As in previous years, in 2013 Mevlid Kandili was also celebrated in south Cyprus. 400 people attended the celebrations at the Ömerge Mosque in south Nicosia and speeches were made in four languages.30 Several minor Muslim festivals are also celebrated in north Cyprus, including Regaip Kandili, celebrating the night of Muhammad’s conception, Miraç Kandili, celebrating the Prophet’s ascent to Heaven; and Berat Kandili, the Day of Forgiveness. On these days main mosques in the cities are illuminated and the clergy offer special prayers in the mosques. Apart from these, Laylat al- Qadr, the night when the Qur’an was first revealed to Prophet Muhammad and he was given the duty of prophecy, is also celebrated. Laylat al-Qadr falls on the 27th night of Ramadan, and in 2013 it was celebrated on 3 August with recitations of the Qur’an and Mevlid in mosques, along with prayers and sermons. Some mosques stayed open until the morning prayer. A programme was also organised at Hala Sultan Tekke for Laylat al-Qadr. In addition, as in previous years, the month of Ramadan featured numerous events. With the cooperation of the Turkish Red Crescent and North Cyprus Red Crescent and the financial support of the Turkish Embassy, iftar tents were erected in nine towns and cities, and officials announced that they intended to offer fast-breaking meals to 140,000 people.31 What was striking in 2013 was that the iftar tents were set up not only in municipal gardens, as in the past, but also in mosque yards. The North Cyprus Red Crescent officials said that they did this to create an environment suitable to Ramadan’s spiritual atmosphere, together with the hymns and religious conversations after iftar. The officials stated that by doing so a stronger atmosphere of social and cultural solidarity would be created among believers.32 Besides the fast-breaking meals, which

29 For more on the events, see Kıbrıs, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20 and 21 April 2013. 30 Kıbrıs, 31 January 2013. 31 http://www.haberkktc.com/haber/turk-kizilayi-ile-kuzey-kibris-turk-kizilayinin-isbirli ginde-iftar-cadirlari-devam-ediyor-43686.html, accessed 15 January 2014. 32 15 January 2014. 168 Dayıoğlu and Hatay government officials attended in large numbers, private organisations organised Ramadan festivals. Alevis also freely celebrate their own festivals, such as ʿAshura and qurban. During the celebrations many dedes and traditional ashik, or minstrels, are brought from Turkey. In this context, the trnc Alevi Cultural Centre organised the ʿAshura day on 17 November 2013.33 Apart from Alevis, on 24 November, Academy Cyprus organised an ʿAshura event in Kyrenia.34 In 2013, the dra also arranged for 92 people from north Cyprus to participate in the pilgrimage to Mecca, accompanied by three dra officials.35

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food is available in the south because of the immigrant Muslim population. One halal meat provider in Nicosia told the authors that he had reached an agreement with the government slaughterhouse to allow him to slaughter his own meat in this government-monitored area. He estimates that he slaugh- ters approximately 25–30 large animals each week. The dervish at Hala Sultan claimed that he is now allowed to issue certificates for properly slaughtered halal meat.36 All meat slaughtered in north Cyprus under the control of municipal slaughterhouses is considered halal. In north Cyprus, the dra organises travel for the pilgrimage to Mecca. There is only one Islamic bank in north Cyprus, Faisal Islamic Bank of Kıbrıs Ltd (www.faisalislambank.com).

11 Dress Codes

There are no laws or regulations concerning dress codes and hence no prohibi- tions on hijab in workplaces in the south, though there have been some discussions about headscarves in private schools. However, in May 2010, the Minister of Education and the teachers union confirmed the government’s policy that

33 Yenidüzen, 18 November 2013. 34 http://www.akademikibris.com/haber14.html, accessed 15 January 2014. 35 http://kktcdinisleri.com/yeni/?p=2739, accessed 16 January 2014. 36 Düzgün, Öntaç “Kıbrıslı İslam Geri mi Dönüyor?” (Is Cypriot Islam Back?), Poli, No. 122, (14 April 2013), p. 9. Cyprus 169 all students have the equal right to use religious symbols, including wearing a headscarf, at school. In north Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots generally do not wear headscarves, and there are no laws regulating dress. However, in Turkey the headscarf has long been forbidden in universities and other public institutions, and implementation of the prohibition intensified starting in 1997. As a result, many young women from Turkey who wish to wear the headscarf began at that time to come to north Cyprus to study. However, after the ban on wearing headscarves was lifted in many universities in Turkey after 2010, there has been a decrease in the number of students with headscarves coming from Turkey to north Cyprus, a trend which is likely to strengthen following the complete lifting of the ban on wearing headscarves in Turkish universities in 2013. Although the ban on wearing headscarves by the teachers at primary and secondary schools was lifted in Turkey in 2013, news that school principals and teachers prevented head-scarfed trainee teachers from entering classrooms in north Cyprus appeared in the press.37 As of 31 December 2013, no changes had been introduced regarding the matter. At the same time, no bans were placed on the students with regard to this issue. For example, many female students continued their education at Hala Sultan Divinity College wearing their headscarves. Another issue which merits mentioning occurred in July 2011, when the Union of Religious Officials (Din Görevlileri Sendikası-Din-Gör-Sen) expressed concern that some citizens were facing difficulties obtaining identity cards with photos in which they wore headscarves. The Union officials applied to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, demanding that citizens applying for identity cards not be required to submit additional photographs in which they were not wearing the headscarf. In its statement, the Ministry stated that people were under the obligation to submit clearly recognisable photos when applying for identity cards.38 No development has been observed in this regard since 2011. An interesting issue that ought to be touched upon is that a Turkey-based construction company announced in September 2013 that a hotel with a capacity of 1,700 would be constructed in north Cyprus for headscarf-wearing clientele.39

37 Dürüst, Çiğdem, “Türbanlı Kadın Öğretmenlere Hazır mısınız?” (Are You Prepared for Headscarved Female Teachers?), Kıbrıs Postası, 28 November 2013. 38 Kıbrıs, 27 July 2011. 39 Kıbrıs, 2 October 2013. 170 Dayıoğlu and Hatay

12 Publication and Media

The media operate freely in the south, though the local media sources do not publish or air informative content about Islam. Muslim immigrants in the south tend to read newspapers imported from abroad, listen to radio stations from neighbouring Arab countries, and watch Arab and Turkish television via satellite. In north Cyprus, there are no visual or printed media that consistently address religious issues, though some newspapers provide space on Fridays for articles on religion. Also, during the main religious festivals, local television and radio stations air religious programmes. On the other hand, all religious publications including newspapers and periodicals that are published in Turkey are available on sale in the north and it is possible to view television channels with religious content via satellite. In addition to all these, many religious associations can freely distribute the Qur’an and other books with religious content.

13 Family Law

Until 2004, it was prohibited in the south for Christians to marry Muslims. With the RoC’s accession to the eu, however, this law has been changed, and inter-faith marriage is allowed. Both civil and church marriages are recognised by the state, though marriages performed by Muslim clergy are not recognised. In north Cyprus, only civil marriages are recognised by the state. Some Muslims in the north do choose to perform religious ceremonies, but these must be accompanied by a civil marriage in order to be officially recognised. Only people who have been married in a civil ceremony recognised by the state may inherit from each other. Although other forms of conjugal relationship are not recognised as grounds for inheritance between the couple, children of unmarried couples may inherit from both parents.

14 Interreligious Relations

One of the most striking developments with respect to this issue was the establishment of the bi-communal “Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage” at the inter-communal talks that resumed in 2008, with the aim of the protection and restoration of monuments that are part of the immovable cultural heritage in the north and south of Cyprus. Financially supported by the eu, the Cyprus 171

Committee started working in 2008 with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme-Partnership for the Future (undp-pff). In a short period of time general cleaning and strengthening work was carried out on some of the mosques in the south, and some of the churches in the north. Preliminary work necessary for the restoration of these monuments was also carried out. The Committee continued its activities in 2013. In this context, the restoration work on the Denya Mosque in south Nicosia, which had started in 2012, was completed in April 2013, and the restoration work on the Panagia Church in the north was completed in December 2013. In December 2013, the Cultural Heritage Technical Committee announced that restoration work on nine monuments was in progress.40 In terms of relations between the religions, the most significant development in 2013 was the meeting between the Head of dra, Talip Atalay, and Cyprus Orthodox Church Archbishop Chrysostomos ii at the Archbishop’s Palace in south Nicosia on 18 October. Although the two religious leaders had been meeting at Ledra Palace in the buffer zone since 2011, with the participation of the Archbishops of the Maronite Church and the Armenian Church, the RoC gave the Head of dra permission to enter the south for the first time on 18 October 2013. As he was an immigrant from Turkey who had settled in north Cyprus after 1974, a ‘settler’ according to RoC terminology, the Head of dra had not previously crossed the border into the south. After the trnc Administration overturned the ban on the Karpas Bishop Hristoforos’s entry to the north and enabled him to visit the Apostolos Andreas Monastery in October 2013, Archbishop Chrysostomos ii invited the Head of dra Talip Atalay to the south. Another reason for the invitation was that Atalay escorted Hristoforos during his visit to Apostolos Andreas Monastery. Following Atalay’s visit to Bayraktar Mosque and Hala Sultan Tekke, the two religious leaders came together at the Archbishop’s Palace and discussed ‘how religious leaders could contribute to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere on the island.’ In addition, the religious leaders discussed issues such as the restoration of places of worship in Cyprus and the lifting of the political criteria placed on border crossings for worship.41 On 28 November 2013, several Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot political parties visited an Armenian monastery and Orthodox Church in north Cyprus to increase the confidence between the communities in Cyprus and show the importance they gave to the preservation of historical and religious buildings. Only two days later, on 30 November, Şakir Alemdar, the dra’s representative in

40 Kıbrıs, 27 April 2013; Kıbrıs Postası, 23 December 2013. 41 Yenidüzen, 23 October 2013. 172 Dayıoğlu and Hatay south Cyprus and the imam of Hala Sultan Tekke, along with the dra İskele representative, attended the service held at Apostolos Andreas Monastery which was administered by the Bishop of Karpas, Hristoforos. Alemdar stated that they had attended the service to express their support for religious freedom.42 On the same day, the dra Kyrenia representative and the imam of Ağa Paşa Cafer Mosque attended a ceremony in Kyrenia celebrating the 100th anniversary of St. Andrew Church.43 On 23 December, the Head of the dra and the Archbishops of the Cyprus Orthodox Church, the Maronite Church of Cyprus and the Armenian Church of Cyprus came together at Ledra Palace in order to assess the dialogue process pursued among religious leaders in 2013. The General Director of the Waqfs Administration and the imam of Hala Sultan Tekke also attended the meeting.44

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In the north, the ubp government’s programme of 2009 proposed summer religious courses, which included Qur’an lessons. Although this new proposal also produced vehement reactions amongst some fundamentally secularist Cypriots, religious courses were nevertheless implemented. Students who had finished grade three were allowed to attend the courses, and the former head of the dra Yusuf Suiçmez stated that in 2009 around 2,000 applications were received for the courses, most coming from Turkish immigrants living in Cyprus.45 The number and profile of students attending the courses in 2013 remained almost the same. Nevertheless, even though the minimum age for attending the courses was set at ten years of age, the press published reports that the majority of the attendees were children between the ages of five and ten.46 Teachers’ unions, leftist political parties and some associations, primarily Alevis, continued to protest against these courses, arguing that these state-

42 Bulut, Ayşe, “Rumlar Karpaz’a Akın Etti” (Greek Cypriots Flock to Karpas), Kıbrıs, 1 December 2013; Havadis, 1 December 2013. 43 Nasıfoğlu, Ziya, “Girne’de Dinler Arası Hoşgörü” (Tolerance Between Religions in Kyrenia), Kıbrıs, 1 December 2013. 44 Havadis, 24 December 2013. 45 Moral, Aral, “Kur’an Kursu için Kuyruk” (Queue for Qur’an Courses), Havadis, 17 June 2009. 46 Konuralp, Tanju, “Camiye Kütüphane ve Oyun Parkı” (Library and Playground for Mosque), Yenidüzen, 6 July 2013. Cyprus 173 sponsored classes perpetuated the Hanafi-Sunni doctrine and therefore violated the principle of laicism. As a result of these reactions, some families that wished to give their children religious and Qur’an ic education continued to apply to the dra for summer courses, in this case asking that their children be sent to Turkey. In addition to public reaction against the summer religious courses, leftist opposition parties, teachers’ unions and many ngos, led by Alevi associations, opposed the opening of the Hala Sultan Divinity College and the Külliye project, as mentioned above. They argued that pressure from the Justice and Development Party was responsible for the opening of the College, and they demanded the College’s closure. They asserted that the Justice and Development Party was trying to destroy the Turkish Cypriot community’s secular nature and to create a more religious community. Those opposing the College and Külliye cited a speech by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey on 31 January 2013 in which he said, “We want to raise a religious youth.”47 Further evidence to support these claims was the statement made by the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Cyprus Affairs Beşir Atalay during the signing of the Hala Sultan Divinity College Protocol in Ankara on 24 January 2013. Atalay pointed out that religious education should not be neglected in the trnc, where improvements were being made, especially in higher education. He said “As we all know, north Cyprus is a place which needs religious education. With this protocol, this need is being fulfilled.”48 Trade unions and ngos also criticised the allocation of 11,000,000 tl (approximately € 3,666,000) for the repair and equipment of the state schools49 while 12,000,000 tl (approximately € 4,000,000) was allocated for the construction of the Hala Sultan Divinity College.50 Even though it was initially announced that this sum was going to be met mainly by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, and that no expenses were going to be made from the state budget, the circles in question claimed that the Justice and Development Party government, which would not provide the necessary financial support for the state schools in north Cyprus, financed the College through an organisation close to itself. On the other hand, led by the Union

47 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19819295.asp, accessed 31 December 2013. 48 Kıbrıs, 26 January 2013; http://www.eilahiyat.com/index.php/ilahiyat-haberler/2687-hala- sultan-tobb-ilahiyat-koleji-protokolu-imzalandi, accessed 14 January 2014. 49 Menteş, Didem, “Başvuran Öğretmenlerin Nakillerini Sendikayla Birlikte Yaptık” (We Transferred the Teachers Together With the Trade Union), Yenidüzen, 30 September 2013. 50 Yenidüzen, 28 September 2013. 174 Dayıoğlu and Hatay of Religious Officials, various associations and organisations established by immigrants from Turkey supported the opening of the Hala Sultan Divinity College and the Külliye project.

16 Major Cultural Events

In April 2013, various events were also organised to mark the 57th anniversary of the handover of Waqfs from the British colonial administration to the Turkish Cypriot society. In that respect, in eight mosques religious memorial services were held in honour of the souls of those who had made contributions to Waqfs. Various celebrations also were held during this period.51 Apart from these observances and holidays, several municipalities carried out religious events. For example, in 2013, as part of Senior Citizens’ Week, the Municipality of Gönyeli and Famagusta organised trips to Hala Sultan Tekke in Larnaca and Hz. Ömer Tekke in the Kyrenia area.52 Similarly, as part of their ‘Second Life’ project, on 26 September 2013, the Municipality of Kyrenia organised a trip for the elderly to Hala Sultan Tekke.53 In addition to these activities, in 2013, eskad distributed free English Qur’ans in north Cyprus to mosques visited by tourists. The Association authorities claimed that they did this to enable the tourists visiting the mosques to understand better Islam and its beauties.54 The Association also organised a conference titled ‘The Family in Islam’ in Kyrenia on 19 January 2013.55 This was followed by a conference titled, Islam, Sufism and Happiness,’ organised by the Ottoman Culture Research Association on 10 February.56 On 24 May, the Turkish Cypriot Islamic Art Museum opened in Nicosia.57 On 26 August, a collective circumcision was organised in Famagusta with the cooperation of the North Cyprus Red Crescent and the Lions Club.58 On 10 September, the Postal Services Office issued a stamp collection with the theme, ‘Islamic Works

51 Kıbrıs, 13 April 2013; Yenidüzen, 16 April 2013. 52 Kıbrıs, 8 August 2013; Kıbrıs Postası, 28 November 2013; Havadis, 30 November 2013. 53 Kıbrıs, 27 September 2013. 54 Kıbrıs, 8 January 2013. 55 Kıbrıs, 15 January 2013. 56 Yenidüzen, 8 February 2013. 57 Kıbrıs, 25 May 2013. 58 http://www.kizilaykktc.org/content.php?cnt=news&newsID=199, accessed 14 January 2013. Cyprus 175 and Culture.’59 The ‘Mevlana in the Mirrors’ stained glass exhibition opened on 3 December in Famagusta.60 On 17 December, the Şeb-i Arus ceremony, or memorial for the death of Mevlana, was held at the Mevlevi Museum in Nicosia.61

59 Kıbrıs, 8 September 2013. 60 http://www.mhajans.com/yazdir.asp?haber=5185&resim=True, accessed 15 January 2014. 61 Havadis, 19 December 2013. Czech Republic

Štěpán Macháček*

1 Muslim Populations

In the 2011 census, 3,385 people indicated Islam as their religious affiliation. Out of that number, 1,442 mentioned Ústředí muslimských obcí v ČR (The Headquarters of the Muslim Communities in the Czech Republic, umo) as the “church” they belong to.1 The difference between the two figures reflects the fact that Czech official Islamic organisations do not enjoy much authority in the Muslim community. The figures show a slight decrease in overall number of Muslims in the country if compared to the previous census of 2001 where some 3,700 Czechs put Islam as their religion.2 However, the actual number of Muslims is higher, for the declaration of the faith in the census was optional and many Muslims feel uncomfortable identifying themselves with their faith in official documents or just do not feel the need to declare their religion.3 The real number of Muslims in the Czech Republic is estimated at about 11,000 or 0.1% of the total population of the country.4

* Štěpán Macháček is a former research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, now working as a Czech Radio correspondent in the Middle East. He is a graduate in Arabic Philology and the Islamic History. His research was focused on contemporary Islam in the Balkans, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 1 2011 census results for religious affiliation are available at official census website http:// www.scitani.cz/sldb2011/redakce.nsf/i/obyvatelstvo_podle_nabozenske_viry_podle_kraju_ podrobne_udaje/$File/sldb_podrobna_vira.xls, accessed 1 March 2014. 2 A figure given by the Czech Department for Statistics (Český statistický úřad), available at http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/o/4110-03--obyvatelstvo_hlasici_se_k_jednot livym_cirkvim_a_nabozenskym_spolecnostem, accessed 1 March 2014. 3 It is worth mentioning that out of the total Czech population of 10,562,214 in 2011 census, 4,774,323 or about 45% did not indicate any religion while another 3,612,804 or about 34% indicated they do not have any religious affiliation. Also of relevance is the fact that 15,070 Czechs declared themselves as Jediists, followers of the Star Wars film religion, a number that almost five times exceeds that of the Muslims in 2011 census. 4 An estimate widely accepted by both the Czech authorities (see Rýdl, Karel and Marika Uiberlayová, “Education and Muslim minorities in the Czech Republic”, in Holger Daun and Geoffrey Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 247–261 (253), and the Czech Muslim community (see Mendel, Miloš, Bronislav Ostřanský and Tomáš Rataj, Islám v srdci Evropy (Islam in the Heart of Europe) (Prague: Academia, 2007, p. 408). Lukáš Lhoťan cites the Czech Ministry of Interior

The territory of today’s Czech Republic has never been under direct Islamic influence or rule so there is no indigenous Czech Muslim community. Currently, three categories of Muslim residents can be defined: ethnic Czech converts, Czech citizens of foreign origin, and foreigners who live in the Czech Republic on the basis of permanent or temporary residency permits. There are only about 400 Czech converts, who are nevertheless very active in Muslim organisations.5 As Emily Jane O’Dell in her report notes, holiday journeys to Muslim countries can be found behind many cases of native Czechs’ conversions to Islam.6 The second group consists of former students who came from then socialist oriented developing countries to study in the former Czechoslovakia. Some stayed after their graduation and married and later on obtained citizenship. Most of them came from Arab countries, Syria, Libya, Southern Yemen, Iraq and Sudan being at the forefront. This fact explains why a large part of the Czech Muslim community consists of educated people and professionals. Muslims from the third category came mostly after 1989 as students or entrepreneurs. Arab countries (especially Egypt, Syria and Iraq) and the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedonia) are typically their regions of origin, followed by other countries (Chechnya, Turkey, Afghanistan etc.). According to the latest statistics published by the Czech Ministry of Interior, it is obvious that Muslims represent only a small share of the total number of foreigners living in the Czech Republic. Since the statistics do not mention foreigners’ religion, the only way to find out an approximate number of Muslims is to total the numbers of foreigners coming from the predominantly Muslim countries, i.e. the countries where Muslims constitute at least 50 per cent of the population. The most recent data available at the time of writing was for 31 December 2013. The total of foreigners originating from predominantly Muslim countries, with temporary or permanent residency permits, was 18,981, almost the same number if compared to 18,521 in October 2012. Out of the December 2013 figure, however, 9,599 were permanent residents, showing an

estimate of 11,235 Muslims in the country in 2006 (see Lhoťan, Lukáš, Islám a islamizmus v České republice (Islam And Islamism In The Czech Republic) (Pstruží: lh 2011), p. 10). 5 This figure is also a mere estimate put by Mohamed Alí Šilhavý, the late head of the Czech Muslim community, in the late 1990s. Since then, this number has been often taken as the closest approximation. However, Vladimír Sáňka, a representative of umo, claimed in a personal interview in January 2011 that annually, there are tens of conversions of Czechs to Islam. Thus the number of Czech converts is supposed to be increasing. 6 O’Dell, Emily Jane, Islam in the Czech and Slovak Republics: an Invisible Minority Becomes Visible. The report is available at http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/ODell%20Scholar%20 Research%20Brief%202010-2011.pdf, accessed 27 March 2013. 178 Macháček increase if compared to 8,387 in October 2012.7 Given the methodology used, it is not possible to claim these figures as showing exact and actual numbers of Muslims. Many foreigners coming from the predominantly Muslim countries may not be Muslims and many foreigners coming from non-Muslim countries may be Muslims. However, taking into account these imperfections, we can assume that around 8 to 10 thousand foreigners from largely Muslim countries live permanently in the Czech Republic. Anything between 18 and 20 thousand foreigners can be a more or less exact estimation of the total number of foreigners from those countries living temporarily or permanently in the Czech Republic. It means that Muslims represent only a small share of the total of 441,536 foreigners living in the Czech Republic on 31 December 2013.8

2 Islam and the State

Until 1918, the territory of today’s Czech Republic was subject to the laws of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Today the Czech Republic has no state religion and the constitution provides for freedom of religion. Most Czech Muslim organisations are registered with the Ministry of Culture as cultural or social organisations. As such, they are not granted any public funding. The registration of religious communities is regulated by law 3/2002 and represents a two-level registration system. In 2004, the umbrella organisation umo succeeded in gaining the lower level registration as a religious community. For the first time since the end of World War I, Czech Muslims were officially recognised by the state. For more privileges, such as the right to public funding or running religious schools, a higher level registration is required. For this, there are requirements that umo is unlikely to fulfil at the moment (for instance, believers of the community must form at least 0.1% of the total population, i.e. 10,500 for the Czech Republic, which corresponds to the actual number of nominal Muslims in the country, but most of them are not organised and are not in touch with any Muslim organisation). umo has asked the authorities for an exception from that rule since 2002, but the request was rejected.9

7 Statistics of the Czech Ministry of Interior, available at http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/cizinci-s- povolenym-pobytem.aspx, accessed 1 March 2014. 8 Statistics of the Czech Ministry of Interior, available at: http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/cizinci-s- povolenym-pobytem.aspx, accessed 1 March 2014. 9 In the words of Vladimír Sáňka, a representative of umo, published on the internet news site Novinky.cz on 23 February 2009, http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/162064-muslimove-a- krisnovci-se-zlobi-nedosahnou-na-miliony-od-statu.html, accessed 1 March 2014. Czech Republic 179

After the passage of ten years from the date of its registration, umo can ask for higher level recognition once again, and it will probably do so in 2014. umo and other Muslim activities are funded by local believers’ contributions and donations and by foreign organisations.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Ústředí muslimských obcí v ČR (The Headquarters of the Muslim Communities in the Czech Republic, umo) was formed as a Muslim umbrella organisation (www.umocr.cz) in 1991.10 The umo chairman was, until his death in March 2008, Mohamed Alí Šilhavý (born in 1917), a legendary Czech convert and a symbol of Czech Muslims. Since March 2009, the organisation has been led by Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi (of Iraqi origin), while another important person in the organisation is a Czech convert Vladimír Sáňka (for many years a very active and influential person in the Czech Muslim community). The core of umo is an executive council in which every Czech Muslim organisation is meant to have a representative. Geographically, umo consists today of four communities: Prague, Brno, Teplice, and Hradec Králové. However, since the end of the 1990s, the importance of umo has been decreasing at the expense of Islamic Foundations in Prague and Brno, and umo became only a formal umbrella organisation and it continues to be the only Islamic organisation registered as a “church” by the state. Otherwise, umo is not very active and in fact it personally merged with the Islamic Foundations. Officially, umo is headquartered in the mosque of Prague (Blatská 1491, 198 00 Praha 9—Kyje, islamcz@islamcz. cz), having moved there from Šilhavý’s hometown of Třebíč. Before umo was registered with the Ministry of Culture in 2004, several Muslim groups registered as “cultural” or “social” organisations formed a platform for Muslim activities. Some of them have continued functioning until today and have become members of umo. Islámská nadace v Praze (The Islamic Foundation in Prague, inp) has developed since 1989 with the aim of establishing a mosque in Prague and was registered as a company in 2001. After having managed a small prayer room from

From 2002 to 2007, there was an option for religious communities to request this exception called Special Rights (zvláštní práva) and intended for the “historically established world religions” (as opposed to large number of modern sects) with insufficient number of believers in the Czech Republic. In the case of Muslim community, Czech authorities refused the request in 2006. 10 The previous name of this organisation was Ústředí muslimských náboženských obcí (The Headquarters of the Muslim Religious Communities). 180 Macháček

1992 to 1999, it succeeded in opening the first mosque ever built in the capital in 1999. Since 2003, the Islamic Foundation has run an information office in the centre of Prague (Politických vězňů 14, 110 00 Praha 1, www.praha.muslim.cz, [email protected]) with a prayer room, and since 2004 has managed an Islamic centre, also with a prayer room, in the spa city of Teplice in northern Bohemia. Since 1993, the chairman has been Lazhar Maamri, of Algerian origin. The above mentioned Vladimír Sáňka also plays an important role in the organisation. inp is closely connected with Muslimská obec v Praze (The Muslim Community in Prague, a umo branch). While the latter is an association of believers, inp that is in the hands of a few leading persons holds all the property. inp faces a complaint for long-lasting accounting frauds. The complaint was filed by a Czech former Muslim activist Lukáš Lhoťan who expressed his concerns that inp tries to hide suspicious Saudi donors. Since 2004, inp has not submitted annual accounting reports to the registration court, as required by law.11 The percentage of Muslims in Prague who are active in or in a contact with any Muslim organisation is estimated at 15 to 20 percent.12 Islámská nadace v Brně (The Islamic Foundation in Brno, inb) was registered in 1994 as a charitable society with the aim of establishing a mosque in Brno, the second largest city and the main centre of Islamic activity in the Czech Republic. In 1998, it registered as a business and Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi is now its chairman. The same year, an Islamic centre with a mosque was opened and it became the first mosque ever to be built in the country. The Islamic Foundation is based in the mosque (Vídeňská 38a, 693 00 Brno, www. brno.muslim.cz, [email protected]). There is also a believers’ association Muslimská obec v Brně (The Muslim Community in Brno, a umo branch) closely connected to inb. But all property including the mosque belongs to inb, led by a circle of several persons. In 2011, inb also had a problem with reporting its accounting to the court. Here too, maximum 15 to 20 percent of Brno Muslims are estimated to take part in organised community activities.13 Muslimský svaz student a mládeže (The Muslim Union of Students and Youth, mssm) or also Svaz muslimských studentů v ČR (The Union of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic) was founded in 1991 by foreign students

11 A report by Czech newsweb Regiony24 available at http://praha5.regiony24.cz/14- 112000-islamska-nadace-v-praze-celi-trestnimu-oznameni-kvuli-podezreni-z-rozsahlych- ucetnich-podvodu, accessed 1 March 2014. 12 Lhot’an, Islám a islamizmus v České republice, p. 58. 13 Ibid., p. 56. Czech Republic 181 studying in the Czech Republic, the most visible being a Sudanese student of architecture, Muhammad Abbas al-Muʿtasim (www.svazmuslim.cz). It manages prayer rooms in student dormitories. In the 1990s, al-Mu‘tasim and his Muslimská unie (The Muslim Union) was a competitor to inp for becoming a leading organisation of Muslims in Prague. Now, mssm organises summer and winter Islamic congresses and gatherings for Czech Muslims and also runs a correspondence course on Islam. Mainly due to discontent with the mainstream Muslim organisations mentioned above, several other Muslim groups have appeared. In Prague, mostly Turkish speaking Muslims split from the main community and established their own prayer room (Prag Merkez Cami, Pivovarnická 3, Praha 8, tel.: +420 606 141 858, [email protected]). It is supported by Turkish and German financial sources. In Brno, many members of the local Muslim community became disap- pointed with the undemocratic way of Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi’s appointment to the umo chairmanship in 2009 and as the chairman of inb in 2010. These Muslims have joined a recently established platform around Jazyková škola Alfirdaus (Alfirdaus Language School), led by Bader Mea Eknaifith (Masarykova 23, 602 00 Brno, tel.: +420 773 943 164, www.alfirdaus.cz, Facebook profile https://www.facebook.com/AlFirdausModlitebnaBrno). Alfirdaus is registered as a business and offers courses in Arabic and other languages as well as courses on Qur’an and Islam. There is a prayer room at the school. There are indications that this group is mostly Shiʾi Muslims, unlike most of those connected with the inb and Al Rawi.14 Since 2005, there is also a civic association Mozaiky in Prague (Žitná 49, Praha 1, tel.: +420 222 544 145, www.platformdialog.cz, [email protected]) in Prague that popularises the thoughts of Fethullah Gülen and supports translations and publication of his works. In 2007, an association Libertas Independent Agency was established in Brno. It unites mostly Czech Muslim converts as well as some non-Muslims and among its main goals is to fight Islamophobia and to present Islam to the Czech public. One of the founders, a former Czech convert Lukáš Lhot’an, is a vocal critic of the representatives of the Czech Muslim community. The main target of his critical statements is the alleged connection of those representatives

14 A report on this split was published in the local daily Brněnský deník on 18 April 2009, http:// brnensky.denik.cz/zpravy_region/sef-muslimu-novodoby-diktator-z-brna20090418.html, accessed 1 March 2014. 182 Macháček to international Islamist organisations and their moral support to movements such as Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood. Generally speaking, except for the Turkish Prag Merkez Cami, and probably to a certain extend the Alfirdaus centre, the above mentioned organisations do not have a specific ethnic, national or religious character. Their members include both Czech converts and Muslims of foreign origin.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Since 1989, Czech Muslims have come up with several purpose built mosque- building projects, but most have been rejected by local authorities who allegedly ‘responded to the will’ of local inhabitants (on the basis of protest petitions against a mosque in the neighbourhood or city and supported in some cases by local church representatives). Such was the fate of two projects of mosques or Islamic centres in the spa city of Teplice in 1995 and 2004. Both were to be financed by donors from the United Arab Emirates—there are always tens or even hundreds of patients from Arab countries staying in Teplice for prolonged periods for treatment. Another mosque project in another spa town, Orlová in northern Moravia, although it was regarded as doubtful by members of the Czech Muslim community themselves, was rejected by the local authorities in 2004. In the Eastern Bohemian city of Hradec Králové, there was a campaign and petition led by some local politicians against construction of a mosque or Islamic centre in 2010 and the beginning of 2011. Czech Muslims, however, finally succeeded in establishing mosques in the two largest cities, Prague and Brno. In Brno, after a struggle with the local authorities, local Muslims were allowed in 1996 to build the first mosque in the Czech Republic and it was inaugurated in 1998. One year later, a mosque was inaugurated on the outskirts of the capital Prague and this is the only Czech mosque with a professional imam. From 2002 to 2006, the imam was Karam al-Badawi, an Egyptian graduate of al-Azhar University and the Islamic University in Medina. From 2006 to early 2011, the imam has been a Bosnian, Emir Omić (a graduate of the Islamic Faculty in Amman), and, since 2006, also Sheikh Ahmad Al Khadhmi (a graduate of the Islamic Faculty in Sanʿa). The question of building a mosque is sometimes a word game. Even in those cities where “a mosque” was refused by local authorities, Muslim communities established a sort of “Islamic centre” in older buildings adapted to Muslims’ needs. It is the case of Teplice, where since 2009 a prayer hall declared as offices has been adapted, and of Hradec Králové, where the local Muslim community in 2011 bought a former hotel building with the aim to adapt it to religious Czech Republic 183 purposes.15 One has to add the above mentioned Turkish mosque in Prague and a prayer hall of Alfirdaus Language School in Brno. In addition, there are nine prayer houses, mostly associated with student accommodation. The last dispute occurred in the famous spa city of Karlovy Vary in western Bohemia in 2013. The local Muslim community obtained permission from the local council to convert former fire brigade garage in the centre of the city into a training centre. The media and local authorities started to question whether the centre would actually be a mosque and pointed out that permission was not issued for a prayer house.16 Dissenting voices appeared among local residents and in the end the Muslim community did not succeed in purchasing the real estate. The failure was for reasons other than Islam and the Muslim community wants to look for another suitable place. The Karlovy Vary Mayor Petr Kulhánek said he did not share the Islamophobic views expressed by some and would ignore the petition against expected higher level registration of the Islamic Community in the Czech Republic with all religious community privileges.17 There are no special regulations in Czech law concerning the construction of places of worship. Like any other construction project, a mosque must be approved by the local council’s planning department. A project may be rejected on the basis of technical defects but also in consideration of opposition by local people. Approval of a project by local authorities may be conditional on certain modifications, for example, for ‘aesthetic reasons’. The approval of the Brno mosque project, for instance, depended on the exclusion of characteristic features “alien to surrounding architecture”, i.e. a minaret.

5 Children’s Education

There are no Muslim or Islamic schools in the Czech Republic. According to the 3/2002 Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Zákon o církvích a

15 See the news by Czech newsweb Parlamentní listy available at http://www.parlament nilisty.cz/arena/nazory-a-petice/Petice-proti-vystavbe-mesity-v-lazenskem-meste- Teplice-199932, accessed 1 March 2014; see also the blog of Jiří Novotný available at http:// novotnyjiri.blog.idnes.cz/c/154347/Muslimove-lzou-o-vystavbe-nove-mesity-v-Hradci- Kralove.html, accessed 1 March 2014. 16 See the most influential Czech newsweb Idnes on 4 October 2013, available at http:// vary.idnes.cz/modlitebna-muslimu-v-karlovych-varech-dhk-/vary-zpravy.aspx?c= A131004_1984218_vary-zpravy_slv, accessed 1 March 2014. 17 The same newsweb on 30 December 2013, available at http://vary.idnes.cz/muslimove- v-karlovych-varech-dale-hledaji-prostory-pro-modlitebnu-1ds-/vary-zpravy.aspx?c= A131230_2016159_vary-zpravy_slv, last accessed 1 March 2014. 184 Macháček náboženských společnostech), on the basis of which umo was registered in 2004, religious communities have the right to establish their own, state-recognised schools ten years after their registration, but only if they can prove they have at least 10,000 believers in the Czech Republic. umo, however, does not meet these requirements. For the same reason, Muslim children do not have a right to religious education in primary and secondary schools. In one public primary school in Prague, there are Arabic language lessons, attended mostly by pupils from families of foreign origin (Základní Škola Písnice, L. Coňka 40, 140 00 Praha 4; www.zspisnice.info). Courses in Arabic and basics of Islam are organised by the Islamic Foundation in Prague in the Prague mosque and by the language school Alfirdaus. The courses in Islam (similar to catechism) are attended by several dozen children on weekends (about 30 children attend in Prague on Saturdays). The Arabic classes are open to non-Muslim public. Arabic as a language is also offered by several language schools with no connection to the Muslim Community.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in the Czech Republic. Imams serving in Czech mosques obtain their qualifications abroad. Arabic and Islamic studies programmes are offered at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, where Islam is studied from the religious, sociological and historical points of view. Arabic, Turkish, and Persian language courses are also available there. There are Arabic and Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Arts at Western Bohemian University (Západočeská univerzita) in Plzeň and there are also classes in Islam in the religious studies programmes at several other Czech universities.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are two Muslim cemeteries in the Czech Republic. The older one, with about 50 burial places, was established in 1994 in the town of Třebíč, where umo formerly had its headquarters. Ten years later, another Muslim cemetery with a capacity of around 100 burial places was established in Prague in a section of a large cemetery in the Olšany suburb. The ritual washing of the deceased is organised by the Islamic Foundations in Brno or Prague in hospitals or cemeteries at the request of the relatives and prayers for the deceased person are performed. No other special burial facilities or services are available. According to Czech civil law, Muslims, like everyone else, must be buried in a coffin. Czech Republic 185

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Czech army, prisons or hospitals, although Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and for that purpose most of them have a separate non-denominationally decorated space allocated for prayer and contemplation. The Islamic Foundation in Prague has succeeded in opening a small Islamic prayer room in the Ruzyně prison in Prague, where the Foundation arranges the provision of a Friday sermon. In the spa towns of Dubí and Darkov, there are prayer rooms designated mostly for the Arab Muslim clientele of the spas.

9 Religious Festivals

Islamic religious festivals are generally not much publicised, and their celebrations are limited to private homes, embassies and mosques in Prague and Brno. Since 2008, the Islamic Foundation in Prague has been hiring a sports hall for the celebration of ʿId al-Adha, because the mosque was not big enough for the 1,000 Muslims who attended. Representatives of Christian churches frequently come to celebrations to greet Muslims. On average, every year 30 to 50 Muslims from the Czech Republic carry out the pilgrimage to Mecca. Some pilgrims travel at their own expense and use specialised travel agencies in neighbouring Germany or Austria. Since 2008, a few Czech Muslims enjoy the offer of the Saudi king to travel to the pilgrimage at his expense. For example, in 2008, 50 Czech Muslims and in 2010 25 travelled to Mecca at Saudi invitation.18

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

There are not many opportunities for Czech Muslims to obtain strictly halal food. However, the number of halal grocery shops and butcheries is increasing, especially in Prague and Brno. There is a list of Czech halal shops on www.al- islam.cz. Since its registration in 2004, umo has been exempt from veterinary regulations and has been allowed to appoint a Muslim butcher to slaughter animals in a slaughterhouse. This exemption is particularly exercised at ʿId al-Adha.

18 See the article in a daily Brněnský deník available at http://brnensky.denik.cz/zpravy_ region/brnane-putuji-do-mekky-za-penize-20081209.html, accessed 1 March 2014. 186 Macháček

11 Dress Codes

The Czech Republic had in 2013 its first hijab-related problem. Two girls of foreign origin were expelled from health care secondary school for wearing a ‘Muslim scarf.’ According to the director, the school forbids its students to wear any head cover during lessons and it has absolutely no connection to religious affiliation.19 Both girls addressed the ombudsman but no result was made public until the end of 2013. No official rules limit Muslim dress in schools. The school management is therefore free to decide on the matter. Two cases are said to have happened where Muslim women (Czech converts) were fired in 2007 and in 2008 respectively from their jobs because of wearing the hijab. Both worked in government hospitals. One of them won a lawsuit so that the hospital had to allow her to continue her job wearing the scarf. Neither case was publicised, however. On the other hand, it is known that at least one teacher at a primary school and one at university (both converts) wear hijab freely. No Muslim women wearing niqab have been observed in the Czech Republic yet.

12 Publication and Media

The only periodical published by Czech Muslims is Hlas (The Voice) in the Czech language, the magazine of umo. Three to four issues are published per year. The editorial office is in the Prague mosque. The magazine is available online at www.al-islam.cz, however, the last issue available on-line is from 2009. There are several Czech Islamic websites. umo has its informative site www. islamweb.cz with practical information for believers. Other Czech Islamic websites include www.al-islam.cz and www.infomuslim.euweb.cz, both offering useful information and world news seen from the Islamic standpoint and both run by individual believers. Czech Muslim women run a forum on a website www.proislam.org. Czech Muslims also translate and publish books and booklets aimed to bring more information on the faith to Czech Muslim believers. There are three translations of the Qur’an to Czech. Translations of works by Bosnian Muslim intellectual Alija Izetbegović, as well as a few booklets promoting Islam in Czech have also been published by Czech Muslims in recent years.

19 See Czech news website Lidovky.cz on 8 November 2013, available at: http://www.lidovky .cz/muslimske-divky-nemohly-nosit-hidzab-tak-ze-skoly-v-praze-odesly-phx-/zpravy- domov.aspx?c=A131108_210659_ln_domov_sk, accessed 1 March 2014. Czech Republic 187

Several books by Islamic authors like Yousef al-Qaradawi or Bilal Philips were translated and published by Czech Islamic organisations. In 2013 the Czech translation of Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones was published in a critical academic publication.

13 Family Law

Islamic religious marriages are not recognised by the state. Muslims must have a civil marriage to be legally registered. They can arrange an Islamic marriage in the mosque in addition to this, but it has no legal standing. The Islamic Foundation in Prague arranges and registers about fifteen Islamic marriages annually and keeps copies of all Shariʿa marriage contracts in its archive.

14 Interreligious Relations

Relations between Czech churches and Czech Islamic organisations, as well as between believers of other faiths, are generally good. umo and the Islamic Foundations in Prague and Brno organise ‘dialogue meetings’ with representatives of churches and Christian believers, where it is usual for there to be an atmosphere of mutual recognition and understanding.20 Czech Islamic organisations and the Czech Muslim community as a whole try to maintain amicable relations with Czech churches and Christian believers. The approach of Christian churches towards Czech Muslims is usually polite, with some local exceptions when there are plans to build a mosque. On the occasion of his retirement, the former highest Czech Catholic authority, Cardinal Miloslav Vlk, said that Europe was open to Islamisation because Christians were weak in their faith. His words were largely understood as a critique of European (and particularly Czech) Christianity and a compliment to the current situation of Muslim religious life.

20 For example, Czech Muslim community representatives took part in the European Christian Youth Meeting in Jičín on 16 August 2009 (for details, see www.mesita.cz/ node/48, accessed 1 March 2014). Another discussion meeting took place on 17 October 2009, in Nosislav (see www.mesita.cz/node/68, accessed 1 March 2014). 188 Macháček

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In November 2012, a major Czech daily Dnes (Today) published photographs of young Czech Muslims playing with airsoft machine gun models inside the Brno mosque.21 This was the main event sparking a wave of media attention to Islam in the Czech Republic in the following year. The event started discussions on the violent nature of Czech Muslims.22 Several anti-Islamic web sites continued to be active on the Czech scene, the most prominent of them being www.eurabia.cz and a little bit sleepy www.pravdaoislamu.cz which regard Islam as a danger for Europe. In recent years, several Muslims, all of them Czech converts, ran as candidates in local and regional elections, one of them succeeded and became a councillor of the City Council of Kralupy nad Vltavou in central Bohemia. One of these candidates was a woman wearing hijab. However, none of these cases caused any noticeable public attention. It was a paradoxical situation that one of these candidates ran for the Suverenita party that uses the theme Islamic threat to Europe as one of its election topics.23 Another politician of Muslim faith, Hassan Mezian of Syrian origin, was elected as a Member of Upper Chamber (Senát) of the Czech Parliament in October 2012.24 His election campaign made no mention of Islam.

16 Major Cultural Events

No data.

21 http://zpravy.idnes.cz/muslimove-v-brnenske-mesite-strileli-a-fotili-se-u-toho-piq-/ domaci.aspx?c=A121127_1859592_brno-zpravy_taz, accessed 1 March 2014. 22 For example the main Czech National Radio station Radiožurnál broadcasted a 20 minutes long interview with a former Muslim and now a critic of Czech Muslims Lukáš Lhoťan on 28 November 2012, 17:10, available at http://www.rozhlas.cz/radiozurnal/ dvacetminut/_zprava/lukas-lhotan-autor-knihy-islam-a-islamismus-v-ceske-republice-- 1142975, accessed 1 March 2014. 23 Lhot’an, Islám a islamizmus v České republice, pp. 67–69. 24 Mezian’s website is www.mezian.cz. Contact details are available at the Parliament site http://www.senat.cz/senatori/index.php?lng=cz&ke_dni=2.4.2013&O=9&par_3=262, accessed 1 March 2014. An interview with Mezian is available at the website of a major Czech daily Hospodářské noviny http://zpravy.ihned.cz/politika/c1-58019840-take- se-desim-komunismu-rika-levicovy-senator-hassan-mezian-narodil-se-v-syrii, accessed 1 March 2014. Denmark

Brian Arly Jacobsen*

1 Muslim Populations

From the late 1960s, the numbers of Muslims in Denmark has become more significant, primarily as a result of immigration. The migration of Muslims to Denmark can be divided into two periods: The first, covering the years from the end of the 1960s to the early 1970s, was the period when people came to Denmark as labour migrants from the former Yugoslavia, North-Africa, Pakistan and Turkey. The second period, running from the mid-1970s to date, saw the arrival of refugees and families of former labour migrants. The number of Muslims has increased significantly since 1980—from 29,400 (0.6% of the population) in 1980, to an estimated 250,800 (4.5%) in January 2014.1 The Danish authorities do not register individuals’ religious beliefs, apart from the members of the Church of Denmark, so it is generally difficult to gather reliable information on individual religious affiliation outside the Church of Denmark. An estimate of the number of Muslims in Denmark must therefore be based on a number of assumptions about correlations between nationality, ethnicity and religion. Research conducted regularly since 1999, for example, has suggested that only 84% of Iraqi immigrants and their descendants regarded themselves as Muslims in 2008.2 The number of immigrants coming to Denmark has been slightly increasing since 2011, where the new centre-left government gained power and abolished some of the former centre-right government’s tough policies on immigrants

* Brian Arly Jacobsen has a PhD in Sociology of Religion and is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research is mainly in the area of religion and politics and religious minority groups in Denmark. His publications include “Muslims in Denmark: A Critical Evaluation of Estimations”, in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Islam in Denmark. The Challenge of Diversity. (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2012) and “Myths and Facts on the Future Number of Muslims—a Danish Case Study.” Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 1–18. 1 1980 is the first year in which Statistics Denmark has information on both immigrants and their descendants (Statistics Denmark 2014, www.dst.dk). 2 For background data, see IntegrationsStatus 2009: 6 (The status of integration 2009) (Catinét 2009. IntegrationsStatus 10 års fremgang—og hvad nu?. Copenhagen: Catinét Research.) and “Muslims in Denmark: A Critical Evaluation of Estimations”, in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Islam in Denmark. The Challenge of Diversity. (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2012), pp. 165–180.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_013 190 Jacobsen and refugees. This means that the number of Muslims has been growing with around 0.29 percentage points (around 20,000 people) of the total population since January 2011, whereas the estimated increase of the Muslim population in the former four years (2007–2010) was 0.18 percentage points (around 13,600 people) of the total population. The minor increase in Muslim immigrants can be the result of a more liberal immigrant policy, more refugees from Syria and/ or a coincidence.3 Whatever the reason for the slight increase, the statistics on immigrants is being used by the parliamentary opposition to criticise the government’s migration policy as being too liberal.4 The largest ethnic group is Turks (22.2% of all Muslims), followed by Iraqis (10.2%), Lebanese (9.5%), Pakistanis (8.7%), Somalis (7.3%), the fastest growing ethnic group in the last decade, and Afghanis (6.2%). The calculation also includes an estimate of converts and third generation Muslim immigrants (approx. 10,400 as of the end of 2013). Estimates of the number of Danish converts to Islam range between 2,000 and 5,000, and can be reasonably put at 2,500–3,000.5 This estimate does not take account of internal religious differences within Islam and includes groups such as Alevis, Shiʿis and Sunnis. A survey from 2008 (no more recent survey exists) distributes eight different ethnic groups from predominantly Muslim countries as follows: 45% Sunnis, 11% Shiʿis, and 23% ‘Islam, other’, which may include Ahmadis, Alevis and heterodox Sufis (as most Sufis in Denmark consider themselves to be Sunnis).6 The remaining percentage is accounted for by people who said they belonged to other religions or no religion. It is estimated that 20%-25% of Muslims in Denmark (roughly 50,000–62,500 people) are associated with a mosque association, although formal membership numbers are much lower.7 There are no statistics on the geographical distribution of Muslims in Denmark but if they

3 The number of immigrants (excluding descendants) from Syria has more than doubled since January 2011 from 2,440 to 5,824 (Statistics Denmark 2014, www.dst.dk). 4 Cf. e.g. The editorial of the right-wing newspaper Jyllands-Posten: “Åbne døre igen” (Open doors again), 11 January 2014. 5 Jensen, Tina and Kate Østergaard, Nye muslimer i Danmark: møder og omvendelser (New Muslims in Denmark: Meetings and conversions) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 30f.; Jensen, Tina, “Omvendelse til islam i Danmark. Kulturelle forestillinger om (u)renhed og fare” (Conversion to Islam in Denmark. Cultural notions of (un) purity and danger) in: Marianne Holm Pedersen and Mikkel Rytter, Islam og muslimer i Danmark. Religion, identitet og sikker- hed efter 11. September 2001. (København: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2011), p. 151. 6 IntegrationsStatus 2009:163. 7 Kühle, Lene, Moskeer i Danmark: Islam og muslimske bedesteder (Mosques in Denmark: Islam and Muslim places of prayer) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2006), pp. 39, 47. Denmark 191 follow the pattern of immigrants and their descendants in general they live near the large cities in Denmark (Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense).8

2 Islam and the State

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and other laws and policies contribute to the generally free practice of religion, although the Evangelical Lutheran Church, as the national church, enjoys some privileges not available to other religious groups. The national church, Church of Denmark, is the only religious organisation that receives state subsidies or funds directly through the tax system, but the government does grant official status to other religious groups. Prior to 1970, a total of 11 religious communities were ‘recognised’ by royal decree. Since then, the state has ‘acknowledged’ 263 additional religious communities under the Marriage Act, by which the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration (since 3 October 2011) can authorise clergy within non- recognised religious communities to conduct marriages, has a number of tax benefits and other rights. As of the end of 2013, 23 Muslim communities were ‘acknowledged religious communities.’9

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are many different kinds of Muslim organisations in Denmark. The ethnic-religious associations dominate in terms of number and membership. They were the first to be established in Denmark and are often related

8 There is one study of the distribution of religious groups in Aarhus (the second largest city in Denmark with approx. 323,900 citizens in the municipality). This study estimates the number of Muslims in Aarhus at 23,200 in January 2012, which corresponds to around 7.4% of the population in the municipality of Aarhus (Jacobsen, Brian Arly, “Islam og muslimer i Aarhus” (Islam and Muslims in Aarhus) in Religion i Aarhus 2013. En kortlægning af religion og spiri- tualitet (Religion in Aarhus 2013. A mapping of religion and spirituality), (Aarhus: Center for Samtidsreligion, Aarhus University, 2013), pp. 173–181). 9 Alevis are not included in this category. The current eight Alevi associations are categorised as ‘other congregations’ by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse (Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation (Diyanet in Denmark)) is acknowledged as one religious community with 29 congregations, Minhaj ul Quran International Denmark has four congregations and Islams Ahmadiyya Djama’at has two congregations (see www.familiestyr elsen.dk/samliv/trossamfund, accessed 4 January 2014). 192 Jacobsen to a mosque. There are also a number of religious organisations, such as Sufi orders, that transcend ethnicity, and finally there are a growing number of politically oriented associations. In the last decade, some Muslim organisations have started to organise themselves in Muslim umbrella organisations so that they can speak with one voice on issues affecting Muslims in general, such as the establishment of burial grounds or mosques. Ethnic religious associations include the following: Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation (Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse, Poul Bergsøesvej 14, 2600 Glostrup) is part of Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi (www.danimarkaturkdiyanetvakfi.org). It is indisputably the largest Muslim organisation in Denmark and almost half of all Danes of Turkish descent are members of the Diyanet funeral foundation (which has around 28,500 members).10 It was established in Denmark in 1985 and the Foundation’s local mosque associations were acknowledged as religious communities in 2006. According to information from the Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation webpage, around 6,000 are registered as members in the mosque associations, but often membership is valid for an entire family. In 1986, various local Turkish mosque associations formed the Union of Muslim Immigrant Associations (Danimarka Müslüman Göçmenler Teşkilatı, dmgt). The dmgt runs six Turkish mosques in Denmark and between 500 and 750 Muslims in total attend Friday prayers in these mosques. The dmgt website says that 42 different associations are members of the union. The movement is regarded by some observers as being linked to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement.11 Idara Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International Denmark (Bispevej 25, 2200 Copenhagen nv, tel: +45 88429595, www.minhaj.dk) was founded in 1987 as a Sunni educational and cultural centre in Copenhagen. It has around 1,500 members, including children. It was acknowledged as a religious community by the state in 1999. The present spokesperson in Denmark is Qaisar Najeeb. Minhaj Denmark and all its units operate according to the Minhaj-ul-Qur’an movement’s constitution in Pakistan. Several of their mosques are recognised as religious communities. The Islamic Association of Bosniaks in Denmark (Den Islamiske Forening af Bosniakker i Danmark) has five congregations in Denmark (c/o Chairman Abdullah Fejzic, Vesterbrogade 11 C/2, 7100 Vejle). It was recognised as a religious community in 2001 and has around 1,900 members. The Albanian Religious Community (Det Albanske Trossamfund) has around 1,000 members and on an average Friday 210 people visit the mosque for prayer (Vodroffsvej 8,

10 Cf. Annual Report of the funeral fund 2011 (http://danimarkatdv.org/dansk/sayfa-Årsregn skab-af-begravelse-fonden-135.html). 11 Cf. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, pp. 90–91. Denmark 193

1900 Frederiksberg, present chairman is Efet Redzepi). It has the status of a acknowledged religious community. Non-ethnic religious associations include the following: Islamic Cultural Centre in Copenhagen (Islamisk Kulturcenter, Horsebakken 2, 2400 Copenhagen, tel.: +45 38606856) is one of the largest mosques. It was established in the mid- 1970s under the leadership of Imam Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, who was later to become the first president of Afghanistan after the Soviet troops left it in the late 1980s.12 It is an open mosque without membership. Around 80 people visit the mosque on a daily basis for prayer and 600–1,000 people visit the mosque for the Friday prayer. The Alevi association in Denmark (www.alevi.dk) was founded in 1994 in Aarhus. Its present Chairman is Başkan Feramuz Acar and there are today eight local associations and a national youth association. The Alevi associations in Denmark have approximately 1,000 members but some estimates put the number of Alevis in Denmark at about 6,500.13 Six local Alevi associations were acknowledged as religious communities by the state in 2007.14 Besides the six recognised associations, there exist two other local Alevi associations and one youth organisation for the entire country.15 The Islamic Religious Community in Denmark (Det Islamiske Trossamfund i Danmark) or Wakf (Dortheavej 45–47, 2400 Copenhagen nv, tel.: +45 38112225, fax +45 38112226, www.wakf.com) was founded in 1996, when Palestinians in Copenhagen, headed by the charismatic imam Ahmed Abu Laban, who died in 2007, collected money to build their own mosque in Copenhagen. Its present chairman is Hassan Neffaa and the association is primarily made up of Sunni immigrant groups from various countries. It has approximately 300–400 paying members and around 1,000 people listen to khutba every Friday of whom up to 300 are women.16 Wakf is rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and has strong ties to Egypt. Its perception of Islam is closely identified with Arab culture. A Muslim youth movement, Young Muslims in Denmark (Muslimske Unge i Danmark, munida, www.munida.dk), related to Wakf, was established

12 See Abdul Wahid Pedersen “Towards a European understanding of Islam”, p. 246 in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Islam in Denmark. The Challenge of Diversity. (Plymouth: Lexington Books 2012), pp. 245–254. 13 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 138. The Alevi’s own estimation is around 10.000 Alevis in Denmark, cf. www.alevi.dk/. 14 See also Jørgensen, Martin Bak, National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, (PhD dissertation: Aalborg University, 2006), pp. 195–218. 15 Cf. www.alevi.dk. 16 Cf. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 118. 194 Jacobsen in 1995. This is a trans-ethnic movement that aims to provide information on Islam and social activities for its members. Its present chairman is Waseem Rana. The first Shiʿis in Denmark were Twelvers and Ismaʻilis of Pakistani descent. The Ismaʿilis established an association in 1969 (and a mosque in 1970 in Copenhagen) and in 1981 the Islamic Centre Jaffariya (Rådmandsgade 56, Copenhagen N.) became the first mosque of the Twelver branch. It has around 110 members today (plus children). The massive migration of refugees with Shiʿi background fleeing from civil war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war led to new organisations and mosques being established from the mid-1980s onwards. There are around ten Twelver mosques in Denmark, with related associations. The Shiʿi association Ahlul Bait in Denmark is the largest Shiʿi organisation with around 2,000 members (Foreningen Ahlul Bait i Danmark, Vibevej 25–29, 2400 Copenhagen nv). It was acknowledged as a religious community in 2005. The organisation has currently a mosque under construction named Imam Ali mosque with two 32 meter-high minarets and a blue dome at their current address. The Shiʿi Islamic Religious Community in Denmark (Shiamuslimsk Trossamfund i Danmark) was acknowledged in 2003 and has around 650–700 members (Sturlasgade 14 C. 1, 2300 Copenhagen S). There are also a number of Shiʿi oriented organisations. Many Sufi movements are currently experiencing growth, especially among Pakistanis and Turks. They largely keep to themselves. Examples are Tariqa Burhaniyya (Damhus Boulevard 65, 2610 Rødovre), Al-Murabitun and Sufi- oriented Turkish groups such as Nurcu groups and Dialog Forum (Vesterbrogade 52, 1, 1620 Copenhagen V, tel.: +45 32175060), established in 2002, which is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement and has around 100 members. Politically oriented associations include the following: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.dk) is part of the international ‘caliphate’ movement. The organisation receives a lot of media coverage but it is difficult for outsiders to make contact with. Its spokesperson in Scandinavia is Chadi Freigeh. Estimates of its membership numbers are between 50 and 500.17 Some of their public meetings in Copenhagen have attracted crowds of about 1,000.18

17 Estimated by the researcher Kirstine Sinclair in the newspaper Information, 4 March 2003 and Grøndahl, Malene, Torben Rugberg Rasmussen and Kirstine Sinclair, Hizb ut- Tahrir i Danmark: Farlig fundamentalisme eller uskyldigt ungdomsoprør? (Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark: Dangerous Fundamentalism or Innocent Youth Rebellion) (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003), pp. 16, 29, 31. 18 Cf. their latest demonstration against the Youtube amateur movie “Innocence of Muslims” in front of the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen attracted approx. 1,000 on 16 September 2012. Denmark 195

In November 2009, the first Muslim party in Denmark, Muslims of Denmark (Danmarks Muslimer), was founded by a Danish convert Ras Anbessa. Their political agenda is to fight for socially marginalised people. They have been registered at the Ministry of the Interior as a political party but besides that their activities have not been visible to the public yet. There is also a number of Muslim networking organisations. The United Council of Muslims (Muslimernes Fællesråd, www.mfr.nu) was formed in 2006, born out of a desire for a shared representation of Muslim organisations in Denmark. Its chairman is Asmat Mojaddedi and its spokesperson is Mustafa Gezen. It currently acts as an umbrella organisation for thirteen assorted Muslim associations, with a combined membership of up to 35,000. In Aarhus, the second largest city in Denmark, a local umbrella organisation was established in 2006, the Union of Islamic Associations (Forbundet af Islamiske Foreninge, C/O Forening for Moské og Islamisk Center—fmic, Postbok 1028–8200 Aarhus N—tel.: +45 40762758, http://mosquedenmark .org). There are currently eleven member organisations of the association. The purpose of establishing the organisation was to fund a mosque in Aarhus, an activity they still pursue. The present chairman is Sami Saidana. The Danish Muslim Union (Dansk Muslimsk Union, Valdemarsgade 17, 1, 1665 Copenhagen V—tel.: +45 50565908; www.dmu.nu) is also an umbrella body, consisting of five national Muslim organisations and a number of local Muslim organisations. It was formed in March 2008 and the Union’s ambition is to create unity among Muslims across ethnic, cultural, political and religious divides. Its spokesperson is Abdulhamid Sørensen. Muslims in Dialogue (Muslimer i Dialog, Nørrebrogade 32, 1, 2200 Copenhagen N, http://muslimeridialog .dk) was formed by a Minhaj ul-Qur’an breakaway group in 2003 and organises dialogue activities between Muslims and non-Muslims. Its spokesperson is Nihad Hodzic. It is a Sunni association with 440 members, according to its own figures and with four local groups in Aarhus, Copenhagen, Esbjerg and Roskilde. The Danish Islamic Council (Dansk Islamisk Råd, Hermodsgade 28, 1, 2200 Copenhagen N, www.disr.com) is an independent charitable institution, which is a co-founder of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. Its purpose is to bring together Muslim associations to jointly lobby on Islamic issues. Its initiator was the politician Hamid El-Mousti and the first meeting, in 2000, was attended by approximately 30 Muslim associations. Its chairman is Abdelhamid Hamdi. In 2001, a practising Muslim woman and a male non- Muslim social researcher took the initiative in forming the association Forum for Critical Muslims (Forum for kritiske Muslimer, www.kritiskemuslimer .dk). Its website describes its purpose as to “work for a democratic and pluralistic approach to Islam, with particular focus on the visibility of women as 196 Jacobsen agents and public figures in Islam” and, according to its spokesperson, Sherin Khankan, it currently has around 100 members.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to a study in 2006, there are about 115 mosques in Denmark, eleven of them being Shiʿi.19 The Shiʿi Ismaʿilis claim to have acquired rooms for prayer in 1969/70, and the first Sunni mosques were established at the beginning of the 1970s, the first being the Islamic Cultural Centre (Islamisk Kulturcenter) in Brønshøj (Copenhagen) in 1972.20 Today, there are mosques all over Denmark, but they are most numerous in the major cities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Odense. Most mosques are located in former office and factory buildings and are often not big enough to accommodate all the people who want to participate in Friday prayers or other religious activities at the mosque. Three mosques are purpose-built, namely Nusrat Djahan Mosque in Hvidovre— suburban Copenhagen—built by Ahmadis in 1967 and two Turkish mosques on Funen, one built in Odense in 1991 and the other in Svendborg in 2000.21 Several groups are planning to build mosques in their localities. One of the most controversial plans for a mosque is that of a grand mosque in central Copenhagen. In 1981, the state leased a building lot to the Honourable Islamic Committee (Ærværdige islamiske komité). It was a 50-year lease with an annual rent set at 1,000 Danish kroner (roughly €134)—a minute amount for a lot with a central location in the municipality of Copenhagen. The Danish state has a long tradition, going back to the period of absolute monarchy, of handing over building lots to religious communities unconnected to the national church, but politicians from various parties and public bodies have regularly and increasingly forcefully attacked the state’s agreement with the Committee for the Islamic Cultural Centre in Copenhagen, so the lot remains undeveloped.22 In June 2009, the Municipality of Copenhagen accepted the United Council of Muslims as the organisation in charge of the finances and operation of a grand mosque in Copenhagen. In August 2009, the Shiʿi association Ahl ul-Bait in Denmark was also granted permission by the Municipality of Copenhagen to build a mosque in the existing premises of the Imam Ali Islamic Centre on

19 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 65. 20 Ibid. 21 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 63. 22 Jacobsen, Brian A., “Muslims on the political agenda,” in Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. Denmark 197

Vibevej in Copenhagen’s Nordvest district. The mosque is still under construction. The Danish Islamic Council is currently building a mosque in Copenhagen with a budget of approximately 15 million eur financed by a Qatari fund.23 The mosque is due to open in the spring of 2014 and will have Denmark’s first minaret and a dome. The 20-metre minaret will not, however, be used for the traditional call to prayer. The calls to prayer will only be from within the mosque and not from the minaret. That would cause some problems in the local community according to statements from the Council.24 The mosque and adjoin- ing culture centre will accommodate 900 people. The mosque was designed by the Aarhus architect Metin Aydin who says the construction is a synthesis between Nordic minimalism and the traditional white Middle Eastern style.25 Previous plans to build mosques have drawn a lot of reaction in Denmark, but the building of this mosque has caused relatively little public attention.26 According to the architect, it is because of the model chosen in this case that makes the building relatively discreet.27 Roskilde Culture Association (Roskilde Kulturforening, Diyanet) is constructing a mosque planned to open in the summer of 2014. Islamic Centre Haderslev in the Southern part of Jutland is also planning to build a mosque. The prospect has been met with resistance from several local parties including Venstre (The Liberal Party), the Danish People’s Party and the Social Democrats. Since the financing of the mosque will partly stem from Kuwait, the local politicians are worried that radical Islamists will impact the religious direction of the mosque.28 In 2006, the first hospital prayer room in Denmark was established at Rigshospitalet—Copenhagen University Hospital, similar to the hospital church where Muslims too could pray. The construction of the prayer room was an extensive media story covered by major Danish newspapers and tv news channels.29 Today eight hospitals, five universities, some colleges and a few high schools have established neutral prayer rooms. The local institution’s

23 Cf. “Endelig får vi en moské, vi kan være bekendt at vise frem” (Finally we get a mosque, we need not be ashamed of), in Christian Daily, 23 February 2013. 24 Cf. “Denmark to get first minaret”, Politiken, 12 June 2012. 25 Ibid. 26 Cf. “Endelig får vi en moské, vi kan være bekendt at vise frem” (Finally we get a mosque, we need not be ashamed of), in Christian Daily, 23 February 2013. 27 Cf. “Mosque with minaret for Nørrebro,” Denmarks Radio, www.dr.dk, 20 March 2012. 28 Cf. “Haderslev-moske skaber debat” (Haderslev Mosque creates debate), Denmarks Radio, 17 October 2013. 29 E.g. “Rigshospitalet indretter bederum” (Rigshospitalet etablish a prayingroom), Berlingske, 10 May 2006. 198 Jacobsen management may decide themselves whether they want to establish a prayer room. Finally, the United Council of Muslims is now planning a Muslim nursing home. Danish institutions do not always meet the needs of different religious groups according to the Council spokesperson. The nursing home will serve food prepared according to Muslim practices and holidays will be celebrated. The organisation hopes the first home will open its doors in Copenhagen in two to four years followed by others in major towns across Denmark. Both Social Democrats and the Danish Peoples Party were against the plans for Muslim nursing homes.30

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in primary and secondary schools in Denmark is called ‘Christian studies’, and the subject has traditionally been taught on an Evangelical Lutheran basis, with the addition of elements about other religions, including Islam. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from Christian studies on religious grounds, and some Muslim parents do so. There are no national statistics or surveys that can inform about the number of Muslims who do not participate in Christian studies, but local surveys show that it is often only a few Muslim pupils who are withdrawn from classes.31 Since the mid-nineteenth century, it has been possible for a group of parents to establish ‘independent schools’, which are entitled to state support to cover most of their budget. The first Muslim independent school was established in 1978 and since then over 30 such schools have opened.32 Many of them offer Arabic and Islamic studies. There were at least 22 independent Muslim primary schools with a total of 3,967 pupils in January 2012, according to the Ministry of Children and Education—an increase in pupils by 25 per cent over three years.33 This means that the majority of Muslim pupils go to public

30 Cf. “Muslimske plejehjem på vej” (Muslim nursing homes is being planned), Jyllands-Posten 7 July 2010. 31 Cf. “Næsten alle muslimer er med til kristendoms-undervisning” (Almost all Muslims participate in Christianity studies), JydskeVestkysten, 23 June 2012. 32 Shakoor, Tallat, “Formål for muslimske friskoler i Danmark: udviklinger i formålserklæringer og vedtægter i danske friskoler for muslimske børn” (Purpose for Islamic free schools in Denmark: Developments of purpose statements and regulations in Danish free schools for Muslim children), Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, no. 3 (2008), pp. 29–43. Some of these schools have since closed again. 33 Cf. “Nydanskere fravælger folkeskolen”, Politiken, 31 January 2012; Ihle, Annette H., Magt, Medborgerskab og Muslimske Friskoler i Danmark: Traditioner, idealer og politikker Denmark 199 school. The Ministry of Education carried out a study in 2006, which showed that 41% of pupils in Muslim independent schools progressed into upper secondary school, whereas the national average was only 26%.34 Immigrants with Turkish backgrounds opened the first private Turkish-Danish high school in 2011.35 They applied for Turkish language teaching in the high school but were first turned down by the Ministry of Children and Education in January 2012. After a public discussion on the need for Turkish language teaching in Danish high schools the Minister of Education Christine Antorini accepted Turkish language teaching in the school.36 In 2013 the dikev Foundation—an Islamic cultural and educational centre— bought the first Muslim lower-secondary-level boarding school for 14–17 year- olds, Mina Hindholm, in Fuglebjerg on Zealand. It will open in the summer of 2014.37 Most mosques and Muslim associations provide some form of Islamic instruction outside school hours. In the survey on ethnic groups’ values in Denmark from 2006, 82% of Muslim parents thought that religion was an important or very important issue in the upbringing of children. By comparison, 67% of all parents in the survey answered the same.38

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islamic studies are offered as part of Arabic and Middle Eastern studies programmes and at the departments of religious studies at the universities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Southern Denmark (Odense). Discussions about

(Power, citizenship and Muslim free schools in Denmark: Traditions, ideals and policies) (Copenhagen: Research priority area Religion in the 21st Century, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2007), p. 7. In a feature in Jyllands-Posten (5 August 2009) the former Minister of Educational Affairs, Bertel Haarder, stated that the number of Muslim free schools now was 20. 34 “Muslimske friskoler sender flest i gymnasiet” (Muslim independent schools send most of the pupils to upper secondary school), Jyllands-Posten, 16 August 2007. 35 Cf. “Københavns Private Gymnasium” (Copenhagens Private High School), www.kpgym.dk. 36 Cf. “Elever kan nu lære tyrkisk i gymnasiet” (Students can now learn Turkish in high school), Ritzaus Bureau, 21 June 2012. 37 Cf. “Danmark får sin første muslimske efterskole” (Denmark gets its first Muslim boarding school), Kristeligt Dagblad, 3 June 2013. 38 Cf. Etniske gruppers værdier (Ethnic Groups Values), Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration of Denmark 2007. 200 Jacobsen possible imam training have surfaced on a couple of occasions in recent years, but have not led to any formal proposals.39

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Sections within sixteen existing municipal or church cemeteries (all Christian consecrated) have been reserved for Muslim use since 1975. In 2013, a section reserved for Muslims was opened in Sønderborg and in Skive, both cities in Jutland and two new ones will be established in 2014 in Randers, Jutland and Lyngby, Zealand.40 Danish rules on funerals are based on a law of 1975, according to which the authorities can assign burial places for other religious groups. Religious groups also have the right to acquire land for burials. In 1996, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs gave cemetery boards permission for an exemption for the specific funeral rituals of faiths other than the national church. In 2006, a separate Muslim cemetery owned by the Danish Islamic Burial Fund was established outside Copenhagen after some years of lobbying. Today the Muslim cemetery in Brøndby—a suburb of Copenhagen—has more than 400 graves and 6,000 members of the burial support association.41 According to the Danish Islamic Burial Fund, about 350 Muslims die each year in Denmark, and the bodies of about half of them are flown back to their country of origin to be buried.42 The annual rate of Muslim deaths will rise to approx. 2,000 in a few years according to the Burial Fund.43

39 E.g. “Muslimer vil ligestilles via religionslov” (Muslims want’s equal opportunities through law on religion), Christian Daily, 19 November 2012; “S-politiker: Regeringens udspil man- gler imamuddannelse” (Social Democrat: The government’s proposal lacks imam training), Ritzaus Bureau, 27 November 2012. 40 Cf. “Muslimer får deres egen afdeling på kirkegård” (Muslims gets their own section on cemetery), Denmarks Radio/dr.dk, 26 March 2013, “Muslimerne fik deres egen gravplads” (The Muslims had their own burial ground), JydskeVestkysten, 25 October 2013; “Byrådet godkender muslimsk gravplads” (City Council approves Muslim cemetery), Randersidag. dk, 16 December 2013, “Gravgård til muslimer på Lyngby Parkkirkegård” (Burial site for Muslims at Lyngby Park Cemetery), Villabyerne Weekend, 12. December 2013. 41 Cf. “Muslimsk gravplads lever sit eget stille liv” (Muslim cemetery lives its own quiet life), Folkebladet Glostrup-Brøndby-Vallensbæk, 2 February 2011. 42 “Gravplads: Religionsfrihed i praksis” (Cemetery: Religious freedom in practice), Jyllands- Posten, 22 September 2006. 43 Cf. “Den sidste rejse” (The Last Journey), Landskab, 25 April 2013. Denmark 201

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

During the 1990s, there were some short-term projects to establish some form of religious counselling for Muslims in hospitals and prisons, but only in recent years has this been more firmly formalised. There are no imams in the armed forces. According to Danish and European law, prison inmates have the right to participate in worship with a priest or the equivalent of their own faith. The first proper ‘prison imam’ financed by the Danish state was appointed on 1 May 2002.44 A survey from 2006 showed that approximately 20% of the inmates in Danish prisons have a Muslim background.45 In 2005, the first Muslim prayer room was established at Rigshospitalet (Copenhagen University Hospital) and the first imam began to provide pastoral care for patients. Today, there are several imams affiliated to hospitals in major Danish cities.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha are celebrated in mosques and sports centres all over the country. Several schools and kindergartens in the major cities with a large number of pupils with Muslim background either plan holidays during Ramadan or else take it into account in their activities. Since the middle of the last decade, Shiʿis have organised parades through the streets of Copenhagen in connection with ʿAshura, around 1,000 people taking part. These have avoided political statements and mostly call for action against dis- ease and war. Finally, the Danish Muslim Union, Minhaj-ul-Qur’an and other Muslim organisations organise since 2011 an annual Peace March in celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday in Copenhagen with 500 to 700 people taking part. The numbers of pilgrims on the annual hajj is estimated at around 1,300 to 1,500.46

44 “Imam Hansen fra Hatting” (Imam Hansen from Hatting), Nyt fra Kriminalforsorgen (News from Danish Prison and Probation Service), no. 3 (2002). 45 Hansen, Helene “Kirken i fængslet”, Kriminalforsorgen.dk, (2012). 46 Cf. “Saml rigeligt med sten, man kunne jo tabe nogen, før man skal kaste dem” (Collect plenty of stone, one may well lose someone before you throw them), Politiken, 13 November 2011; “Lufthavn hjælper pilgrimme til Mekka” (Airport helps pilgrims to Mecca), Christian Daily, 15 November 2010. 202 Jacobsen

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal slaughter is permitted and halal food is widely available. Denmark is a major exporter of halal meat to the Arab world.47 The permit to perform halal slaughter within certain regulations has also opened a labor market for halal butchers with halal certifications.48 However, there have been political attempts from right- and left-wing parties to prohibit ritual slaughter since the mid-1990s.49 Public institutions decide on a local administrative level whether halal food is to be available and in many schools, hospitals, prisons, nursing homes and other public institutions management has decided to offer halal food in their menus, but often it involves a public debate.50 In Denmark, five hajj travel agents have been authorised by the Saudi Ministry of Hajj with licence to arrange travels to umrah and hajj.51 The Islamic banking and finance institute Amanah has existed for a few years (Kongens Nytorv 15, Copenhagen, www.amanah.dk). They give Muslims in Denmark (and Scandinavia) the opportunity of banking activity that is consistent with the principles of Shariʿa.

11 Dress Codes

Hijab and the like are permitted in public schools and services. The Supreme Court, in a verdict in January 2005, upheld the right of retailers and others to

47 Cf. Jønsson, Signe, “Mod på eksport til Mellemøsten” (Minding export to Middle East), in Eksport Fokus, no. 1, 14 May 2007, Udenrigsministeriet Danmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark). 48 Kühle, Lene, “Mosques and Organisations” in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Islam in Denmark. The Challenge of Diversity, p. 90. 49 Jacobsen, Brian A., Religion som fremmedhed i dansk politik. En sammenligning af italesæt- telser af jøder i Rigsdagstidende 1903–45 og muslimer i Folketingstidende 1967–2005 (The construction of otherness in the Danish Parliament: A comparison of the discussions about Jews and Muslims in the Parliamentary records from 1903–45 and from 1967–2005 respectively), PhD dissertation, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen, 2008, pp. 202–206. 50 Cf. “Hver tredje vil forbyde halalslagtning” (One third of the population will ban halal slaughter), Christian Daily, 21. March 2011; The Danish Peoples Party: “Legislative package for the protection of Danish values”. In the package the party demand that halal meat shall not replace Danish pork in institutions, www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Lovpakke_til_ værn_for_danske_værdier.asp (2007). 51 Cf. Saudi Ministry of Hajj list on www.hajinformation.com/hajj_agents.php?id=10 (2011). Denmark 203 insist on uniform codes without the female head scarf for employees dealing with the public. The Danish People’s Party tried to ban the wearing of the head scarf in Parliament in the spring of 2007, but failed. In the spring of 2008, there was a major political debate about whether female Muslim judges and other public authority figures should be allowed to wear the head scarf with judicial attire. In December 2008, the government proposed legislation that would ban judges from wearing religious or political symbols in court. The law has come to be called the ‘head scarf act’, because its real purpose is to ban Muslim women from wearing head scarves when acting as judges or jurors. The former centre-right government and Danish People’s Party passed the act in May 2009, although the proposal has been met with strong opposition from judges’ and lawyers’ associations. Since 2006, photos in drivers’ licenses and passports are required to show the face of the individual.52 Some educational institutions have decided to ban pupils wearing niqab. The educational institutions argue that the banning of niqab is justified, since face-to-face communication and eye contact is required.53 Subsequently, the Danish People’s Party called for a general ban on niqab in educational institutions.54

12 Publication and Media

There are no Muslim newspapers in Danish, but there are a number of Internet sites where Muslims (and non-Muslims) exchange information of various kinds. The largest Internet forum is Denmark’s United Cyber Muslims (Danmarks Forenede Cybermuslimer, on Facebook), formed in 1998, which as of the end of 2013 had 540 members. Due to the increase in social media websites, internet communication via email groups has declined rapidly and groups such as the abovementioned have lost their significance. Denmark’s United Cyber Muslims is related to one of the oldest websites established to inform Muslims and non-Muslims about Islam in Denmark (www.islam.dk). In 2004, a web-based Muslim newspaper, Sahafa, was launched, but it did not last. There

52 Cf. “Foto, pas og kørekort” (Photo, passport and drive’s license), http://www.politi.dk/nr/ rdonlyres/8E37DFDF-9B14-48E9-A9E2-5F1D171393EC/0/1058_pasplakat_A4_web.pdf. 53 Cf. “Niqab skaber røre på Aarhus Akademi ” (Niqab creates conflicts at Aarhus Academy), Ritzaus Bureau, 29 November 2012. 54 Cf. “Skoleforbud mod niqab breder sig” (School ban on the niqab spreads), Berlingske, 1 December 2012. 204 Jacobsen are also Muslim publishing firms, of which the oldest is Alif Bogforlag, which began to publish books of specific Muslim interest in 1983.

13 Family Law

Danish courts can only refer indirectly to Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. There is only limited scope for the courts to take variations in cultural customs into account in individual cases. According to observers, Shariʿa is practised in some Muslim communities in Denmark, for example in matters of family law, divorce and child custody. There are no official Shariʿa courts in Denmark.55 However, three imams from three of the larger mosques in Copenhagen formed a council that can mediate in family disputes and give religious divorces. A report from 2011 analysed the spread of parallel court systems in Denmark—especially among Muslim immigrants and concluded that the Muslim traditional marriage practice nikah is widespread and of great significance among Muslim minority groups.56 The government passed a law in December 2013 aiming at curbing forced Muslim marriages.57 The government will increase punishments for forced marriages. Although it was reported in 2012 that there had not been a single conviction for forced marriage since the former centre-right government increased the punishment in 2008, the incidents do seem to be increasing. lokk, the association of women’s crisis centres in Denmark, said that the number of women seeking help—either because of honour-related conflicts, a pending forced marriage or the threat of one—rose from 101 in 2005 to 1,038 in 2011.58

55 Cf. “The executioners of Sharia” (editorial), Jyllands-Posten, 31 October 2008, and “Religion and law: The legal system must move with the community”, interview with Jørgen S. Nielsen, Information, 9 September 2008. 56 Cf. Parallelle retsopfattelser i Danmark. Et kvalitativt studie af privatretlige praksisser blandt etniske minoriteter (Parallel legal systems in Denmark. A qualitative study of private law practices among ethnic minorities), sfi, The Danish National Centre for Social Research, 2011, p. 14. 57 Cf. “Unge får ret til hjælp i æreskonflikter” (Young people have the right to help in honour conflicts), MetroXpress 19 December 2013. 58 Cf. “L 143 Forslag til lov om ændring af straffeloven, udlændingeloven og lov om tilhold, opholdsforbud og bortvisning” (L 143 Bill to amend the Criminal Code, Aliens Act and the restraining order, prohibiting, residence and expulsion), Folketinget.dk, 6 February 2013; “National strategi mod æresrelaterede konflikter ” (National strategy against honour-related Denmark 205

14 Interreligious Relations

In 1996, the Islamic-Christian Study Centre was established by a group of Christians and Muslims.59 It has an equal number of Christian and Muslim board members and is currently supported by a number of Christian and Muslim organisations and societies. Its current chairman is Rev. Lissi Rasmussen. The purpose of the Islamic-Christian Study Centre is to build, through cooperation, positive relations between citizens with Christian and Muslim backgrounds and to work for equal citizenship. The organisation’s members cooperate on various projects such as courses on counselling for clergymen and imams, conferences, lectures, study groups, excursions and publications. The Centre works together with a number of research and educational institutions, Christian and Muslim organisations and other ngos on activities in Denmark and internationally. In 1998, the bishops of the Evangelical Lutheran Church appointed a committee whose task was to write a report on the relationship between the Church and Islam. The report, Conversation Promotes Understanding, was submitted in 2000 and there was a particular emphasis on the need for the state church to increase dialogue with Islam on all levels, and that this would require more resources, including diocese priests to strengthen dialogue. The then Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs Margrethe Vestager (the Danish Social-Liberal Party) supported the report and the demand for more resources. One of the lasting results of the committee’s work is the Evangelical Lutheran Church’s sub- organisation Church and Religious Encounter which promotes interreligious dialogue between Lutherans and other religions especially Muslims.60 Some of the main activities are annual meetings between church leaders, including bishops from the state church, and imams from Muslim communities in Denmark in the Christian Muslim Conversation Forum; and friendship dinners at Ramadan and Christmas that Christians and Muslims in Denmark invite each other to. In 2012, the theme of the conference was on the need for a Law on Religion in Denmark.

conflicts), The Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, 2012; “Nye love skal bekæmpe tvangsægteskaber” (New laws to combat forced marriages), bt, 25 January 2012. 59 Cf. Islamisk-Kristent Studiecenter (iks) (Islamic-Christian Study Centre), www.ikstudie center.dk/. 60 Cf. “Folkekirke og religionsmøde” (Church and Religious Meeting), www.folkekirken.dk/ folkekirkens-arbejde/folkekirke-og-religionsmoede/. 206 Jacobsen

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In the summer of 2013, a debate on shaking hands between a Muslim male teacher and female students took place. Female students in Herning, Jutland worried they would not get a fair chance at their final exams after being told that their teacher was unwilling to shake hands with women.61 The public debate spread during June to all Danish media and became one of the most heated debates in 2013. The government was giving mixed signals; on the one hand, the Ministry of Education said there were no rules about whether an examiner should shake hands with a student, and that it was up to the school to make sure exams were properly administered.62 On the other hand, the Minister for Gender Equality, Manu Sareen, encouraged the female students to complain to the Board of Equal Treatment, and the leader of the opposition sympathised with the female student’s critique of the teacher.63 The Board of Equal Treatment was as of the end of 2013 still handling the case. The government promised to give an account on male circumcision before a possible ban.64 The account was published in June 2013 by Sundhedsstyrelsen (National Health Service of Denmark) and concluded that there is so little risk involved in the ritual circumcision of boys when carried out by competent doctors that there is no need to recommend banning the procedure.65 The National Health Service estimates that between 1,000 and 2,000 ritual circumcisions take place every year in Denmark.66 Due to this recommendation the government will not make any prohibition. The subject of religiously-slaughtered animals also filled the newspaper headlines in 2013, as politicians returned to the debate about how far Danish society should go to accommodate Muslim religious norms. The focus of the media attention was the concern that Danes are either eating halal without

61 Cf. “Censor nægtede at give hånd til kvindelige elever” (Examiner refused to shake hands with female students), Herning Folkeblad, 14 June 2013. 62 Cf. “Censor nægtede at trykke kvindelige elever i hånden” (Examiner refused to shake hands with female students), Information, 14 June 2013. 63 Cf. “Løkke forstår vrede over manglende censor-håndtryk” (Løkke understand the anger at the lack of censor-handshake), Jyske-Vestkysten, 14 June 2013. 64 Cf. “Muslimer og jøder frygter omskæringsforbud” (Muslims and Jews fear ban of circumcision), Ritzaus Bureau, 18 July 2012. 65 Cf. “Styrelse frikender rituel omskæring, men kritikere ønsker fortsat forbud” (The National Health Service absolves ritual circumcision, but critics still wants ban), Kristeligt Dagblad, 28 June 2013. 66 Cf. “Omskæring af drengebørn” (Circumcision of boys), Sundhedsstyrelsen, 27 June 2013, see https://sundhedsstyrelsen.dk/da/nyheder/2013/omskaering-af-drengeboern. Denmark 207 knowing it or are forced to eat it at public institutions. In a series of articles, the tabloid Ekstra Bladet reported that almost all Danish chicken are halal, that Hvidovre Hospital has served only halal meat for the past decade and that several day-care centres in Greater Copenhagen have opted to stop serving pork and serve only halal meat.67 The Danish People’s Party expressed horror at the developments and argued that it is simply another case in which Danes are forced to accept foreign religious norms, pointing to the recent case in which an Islamic school examiner refused to shake hands with his female students. The party called for legislation to force public employees to conform to Danish cultural values and norms, and their immigration spokesperson told the public broadcaster Denmarks Radio: “If people don’t conform [to Danish practices] they should be given an official reprimand . . . Most people will then conform but if they don’t, and insist that their culture should be all-dominating, then the severest consequence should be that they would lose their job.” A spokesperson for the Conservative Party, Tom Behnke, sympathised with Henriksen’s suggestion. In Denmark, all animals are sedated before they are slaughtered. Chicken are stunned by being drawn through charged water while cattle are stunned with a bolt gun placed to the animal’s head.68 As a result, the debate over halal has little to do with animal welfare and everything to do with whether Danes should be forced to eat meat that has been prayed over before the animal was killed. Ritual slaughter is one of the most used battlegrounds in the ‘culture war’ on public symbols in Denmark. Writing in her blog for Berlingske, mp Marie Krarup (Danish People’s Party) argued that Denmark should not accept the special needs of a minority (Muslims) because of practical considerations as it would set a precedent that will only lead to more demands for special treatment. She wrote that they will set demands: “ . . . on how to decorate our workplaces, to ban interest payment, to change our calendar to suit the Muslim

67 Cf. “Børnehaver bandlyser svinekød” (Day-cares ban pork); “Nul svin i hele Ishøj” (Zero pork in all Ishøj); “Kun halalslagtet kød på Martha Hjemmet: Det er et naturligt hensyn, som ikke koster noget” (Only Halal meat on Martha home [rest home]: It is a natural consideration that does not cost anything); “Ledende artikel: Svineskræk” (Editorial: Pork fear), Ekstra Bladet, 16 July 2013. The same type of story has been reported several times in the Danish media during the last 20 years. 68 Cf. “Rituel slagtning” (Rituel slaughter), The Danish Veterinary and Food Administra tion, https://www.foedevarestyrelsen.dk/Leksikon/Sider/Rituel-slagtning.aspx#, accessed 20 February 2014. 208 Jacobsen calendar, how to dress in Muslim ghettos etc. . . . If we give in to one demand, we will end up giving in to more.”69 The leading opposition party Venstre (The Liberal Party) argued that the prayer might make all the difference in the world for consumers and are now calling for halal-slaughtered meat to be labelled. Yet the fears of the right-wing parties were not shared by the government. On the issue of labelling halal meat, the acting agricultural spokesperson for the Social Democrats, Orla Hav, said his party will only take it up if consumers demand it: “Our main priority is to inform the public about issues that can affect their health, and about whether the food is organic,” Hav told Jyllands-Posten. “But there are limits to how much labelling can be introduced before it confuses consumers. And the method of slaughter does not rank high for us.”70 The government coalition partner, Radikale Venstre (Social Liberals), was arguing that the debate about halal meat presented no ethical questions regarding animal welfare and was instead founded on “Muslimphobia and xenophobia.”71 Finally, the poet Yahya Hassan’s—whose parents are Palestinian—first collection of poems first novel has caused huge public interest. He became known for his criticism of the Muslim immigrant community, which he accuses of bad parenting. Because of this, Islam’s role in Denmark was once again a topic in the media. He rose to prominence after an initial column in Politiken newspaper was followed up by an appearance on tv.72 The attention he received led his publisher to extend the run of his first poetry collection “Yahya Hassan” and Hassan is now the best-selling debut poetry collection in the history of Denmark with a circulation of more than 100,000 copies. He was honoured as the debut author of the year in a book forum, and a translation of his poems into other languages is also underway. Hassan was attacked by a young man at a train station in November but sustained no serious injuries.73 After his first appearance in the media, Hassan has been subject to threats and is now under the protection of the domestic intelligence agency pet.

69 Marie Krarup: “Er det praktisk at give efter for muslimske særkrav?” (Is it practical to give in to Muslim specific requirements?), Berlingske blog, 26 July 2013. 70 Cf. “I 2007: Venstre i kovending om kød” (In 2007: Venstre in flip-flop on meat), Jyllands- Posten, 26 July 2013. 71 Cf. “Radikale om halal-ballade: Det er muslimangst” (Radicals on halal fuss: It’s Muslimphobia), Ritzaus Bureau, 24 July 2013. 72 Cf. “Digter: Jeg er fucking vred på mine forældres generation” (Poet: I’m fucking angry at my parents’ generation), Politiken, 5 October 2013. 73 Cf. “Forfatter bag anti-islamiske digte er blevet angrebet” (Writer behind anti-Islamic poetry has been attacked), Denmarks Radio, 19 November 2013. Denmark 209

In the integration debate, politicians and commentators have been busy using Yahya Hassan as a symbol to support their own arguments. The right has said “we told you so,” and said it exposes a number of problems beneath the surface that no-one wants to speak about and that his poetry is a symbol of an inadequate integrations policy.74 The left, on the other hand, has welcomed Hassan’s efforts to expose the violence of the ghetto in the language of the people who live there.75 Hassan, though, has proved to be more than just a media phenomenon with a message—Denmark has contributed to the creation of new global literary identities with the Hassan’s debut in Danish. Moreover he has become a symbol of both right and left in the on-going debate on Islam’s position in the Danish society, and at the same time he has become a symbol of immigrants that having an immigrant identity is no hindrance to being Danish.

16 Major Cultural Events

The celebration of ʿId al-Fitr has become a major event for thousands of Muslims in Denmark. It is celebrated in mosques, sports centres and the like and has grown in size throughout the last couple of decades. Many public schools with Muslim pupils also celebrate ʿId al-Fitr.

74 Cf. “Ledende artikel: Yahya Hassan skal ikke stå alene” (Editorial: Yahya Hassan must not stand alone), Kristeligt Dagblad, 19 October 2013. 75 Cf. “Hykleriske forfattere omfavner Yahya Hassan”, (Hypocritical writers embrace Yahya Hassan), Politiken, 23 November 2013. Estonia

Ringo Ringvee*

1 Muslim Populations

The majority of Estonia’s Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. There was also a nascent Muslim community around 170 strong, according to a 1934 census, in the pre-Soviet independent Estonia. It was composed mainly of Tatar immigrants from Russia. The official census in 2011 counted 1,508 Estonian residents older than fifteen years of age as Muslims. Compared to the population and housing census from 2000, the number of Muslims in Estonia had increased by 121 persons from 1,387. The increase could be considered mostly due to conversions and immigration. The two largest ethnic groups among Muslims in Estonia are Tatars and Azerbaijanis. According to the 2011 census, there were 604 Tatars who identified themselves as Muslims and that was 150 persons less than in the 2000 census. Tatars are the traditional Muslim minority in Estonia with the history of almost two hundred years. According to the 2011 census data, the Tatars, although remaining the largest ethnic group among Muslims, for the first time make less than fifty percent of Muslims in Estonia. The second largest ethnic group among Muslims are Azerbaijanis1 with 299 persons. Azerbaijanis settled in Estonia in the second half of the twentieth century and they are also the largest ethnic group among Shiʿis in Estonia. The third largest ethnic group among Muslims are ethnic Estonians. The number of ethnic Estonian Muslims increased by 55 from the year 2000 to

* Ringo Ringvee is an adviser at the Religious Affairs Department at the Estonian Ministry of the Interior. He is also member of the research group of the Centre of Excellence in Cultural Theory at the University of Tartu. His research interests encompass the relations between the State and religious institutions in contemporary Europe. The research on which this article is based was supported by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, targeted financing project SF0180026s11, and the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence in Cultural Theory (cect)). 1 Though technically speaking, Azerbaijanis are not an ethnic group, following the Soviet tradition, Estonian censuses do not distinguish between Azeris as an ethnonym and Azerbaijanis as people of any ethnicity hailing from Azerbaijan.

148 persons in 2011. The number of ethnic Russians also increased by 28 persons and was 107 persons in 2011.2 Although the total number of converts remains around two hundred and fifty, the role in translating religious materials as well as the presence on the Internet of a few female converts has been important. According to Chief Imam Muhhamedšin, the total number of nominal Muslims in Estonia is difficult to estimate but regularly practising Muslims would hardly exceed several hundred. According to him, the average number of participants at Friday prayers in 2013 was between forty to fifty men and twenty to thirty women. The overwhelming majority of Estonia’s Muslims are located in and around the capital city Tallinn. According to the census from 2011, Muslims are the most urban religious group in Estonia with 90% of Muslims living in urban areas.3

2 Islam and the State

Estonia is a secular republic with no state religion or dominant faith. According to the 2011 population census, there were 29 percent of the population who considered themselves affiliated with some religious tradition. Traditionally, Estonians were Lutherans, but today only approximately 10% of the Estonian population identify with the Lutheran faith. Relations between the state and religious organisations are regulated in accordance with the Churches and Congregations Act (passed in 1993, with a new version adopted in 2002), which confirms the constitutional right of freedom of belief and religious practice. All faiths are deemed equal (there is no formal distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ faiths) in the eyes of the state. Religious communities are required to register formally with the state through local courts. Unregistered religious communities are free to practise their religion as long as their activities do not violate public morals and/or disturb public order, but have neither the status nor the rights of a legally registered religious organisations. Registered religious organisations acquire tax exempt status, possibility to apply for the right of their clergy to conduct marriages with civil validity and the right to establish private schools. Muslims (like all other faith communities) have no public representation in state institutions.

2 Estonian Statistics. Statistical Database. Population and Housing Census 2011. http://pub.stat .ee/px-web.2001/I_Databas/Population_census/PHC2011/01Demographic_and_ethno_cul tural_characteristics/08Religious_affiliation/08Religious_affiliation.asp, accessed 20 January 2014. 3 Estonian Statistics. Statistical Database. Population and housing census, http://pub.stat.ee/ px-web.2001/I_Databas/Population_Census/databasetree.asp, accessed 20 January 2014. 212 Ringvee

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The first Muslim congregation officially registered in 1928 in Narva but, along with its sister organisation (registered in 1940) in Tallinn, it was dissolved in 1940 after Estonia was annexed by the Soviet Union. The Estonian Islamic Congregation (Eesti Islami Kogudus), then comprised mainly of Tatar, Azeri, Kazakh and Uzbek elements, re-established itself in 1989 and was registered with the Soviet authorities as Tallinn Islamic Congregation (Tallinna Islami Kogudus) while the name of Estonian Islamic Congregation was used simultaneously. In 1994, after the adoption of Churches and Congregations Act in the Estonian Parliament the previous year, the official name of the Congregation was changed to the Estonian Islamic Congregation. In spring 2009, it moved to its permanent headquarters in Tallinn (9 Keevise Street, Ülemiste, Tallinn) where a 1,000m2 former office building was purchased with a Saudi sponsor’s (reputedly al-Waqf al-Islami) money for the use of the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”, which serves as the main Tallinn mosque. It has rooms for lectures, a tiny library and a reading room, the office of the imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation, and a prayer hall that is open daily. The Centre is headed by the imam Ildar Muhhamedšin (tel.: +372 55947689, www.islam.pri.ee) who was recognised as the Chief Mufti of the Estonian Muslim community in 2002. In 2012, Turkey (i.e. Diyanet) sent an imam to work in Estonia. The imam, whose salary is paid by the Turkish government, has been assisting the local imam in religious services. The activities of Muslim women in Estonia have been the focus of Iman Makhmutova, the wife of Imam Ildar Muhhamedšin, and in 2012 the Association of Muslim Women in the Baltics (Baltimaade Mosleminaiste Ühendus) was established which is closely connected with the Estonian Islamic Congregation and with the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath.” The focus of the Association is on lectures and courses on Islamic subjects for women. In 2013, a family camp organised by the Association took place in Poland. In 1995, a small splinter organisation, Estonian Muslim Sunni Congregation (Eesti Muhameedlaste Sunniitide Kogudus) was formed. This congregation is also Tatar dominated and operates in Maardu town not far from Tallinn. In December 2012, a new Muslim association with a cultural centre “Iqra” (www.keskus.islam.pri.ee) was founded in a university town Tartu in Southern Estonia. The centre is operating in rented facilities where the daily morning and evening prayers as well as Friday prayers are conducted. The active membership is formed by Estonian converts who have been previously actively involved in the functions of the Estonian Islamic Congregation and university students from Muslim countries. In 2013, the Centre was visited by the Dyanet imam residing in Tallinn. Estonia 213

The Estonia–Turkey International Business, Culture and Education Association ‘Eestürk’ that became a registered non-profit association in 2010, represents the Hizmet or Gülen movement in Estonia. The Association Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat in Estonia that was registered in Estonia in 2009 seems to be rather inactive.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Between the World Wars, a house-turned-mosque in Narva served the needs of the Muslim congregation in that town, while in Tallinn the congregation rented an apartment to use for prayers. Since the summer of 2009, the Muslims of Tallinn have had a prayer hall on the premises of the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath” Communal Friday prayers are also held in makeshift mosques in the Kopli suburb of Tallinn and the nearby town of Maardu. Currently, the Friday prayers are held also in Kohtla-Järve. The Islamic Cultural Centre “Iqra” in Tartu provides space for morning and evening prayers and holds Friday prayers as well.

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is optional and non-denominational: pupils are introduced to various faith traditions, though the general context is Christian due to the country’s historical and cultural background. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. Confessional religious education is not provided in public schools. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, the teaching of Islam is entirely extra-curricular and offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend ‘schools’ (in Tallinn and Maardu). At the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”, a dozen or so children attend Arabic language and Islam classes on Saturdays. Materials for religious education of children are published on the website of the Estonian Islamic Congregation and in 2012 an online journal Iqrake for Muslim children in the Estonian language was launched.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are routinely offered at the University of Tartu and at Tallinn University. 214 Ringvee

There is no institution for imam training in Estonia. Two of the five active imams received their higher religious education abroad (in Russia and Saudi Arabia), one (the Diyanet imam) in Turkey and the remaining two are self- taught. Currently, three Estonian-born Muslims are studying Islamic theology in Medina, Saudi Arabia. According to the congregation, there are also three students from the congregation who are studying Arabic in Egypt. Both groups include ethnic Estonian converts. It is unlikely that a need for local imam training will arise in the foreseeable future. In 2013, the Islamic Cultural Centre ‘Turath’ became an approved examination centre for Bilal Philip’s the Islamic Online University.4

7 Burial and Cemeteries

During the Tsarist period, Estonian Muslims (Tatar settlers from inner Russia) maintained their separate cemeteries in Narva, Rakvere and Tallinn. In the first years of the Soviet occupation (1940–1941), they were closed and later destroyed. Since then, Estonian Muslims have been using general cemeteries for burial, where they have a separate section. No request for a separate Muslim cemetery has yet been filed.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation officially serves as a chaplain in reserve in the Estonian armed forces and is occasionally invited to prisons and hospitals to perform rites. Although there is a need for more spiritual guidance in prisons, the main obstacle is the lack of competent personnel.

9 Religious Festivals

There are annual ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha celebrations in Tallinn, Maardu and Narva, which are open to the public. The ʿId al-Fitr communal prayer and ʿId al-Adha are attended by up to 400 persons. In 2013, the Estonian Islamic Congregation organised hajj for six local Muslims.

4 Islamic Online University Website. http://bais.islamiconlineuniversity.com/approved-exam- center.php, accessed 20 January 2014. Estonia 215

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

No specialised halal butchers have opened in Estonia, and the Ministry of Agriculture has expressed its negative attitude to any such plans. In 2012, the Ministry of Agriculture drafted an amendment to the Animal Protection Act that intended to outlaw all ritual slaughtering in Estonia.5 Due to reactions from the Jewish community, the Ministry proposed a solution introducing post-cut stunning. This was accepted by both the Jewish and the Muslim communities. However, according to the amendment, all ritual slaughtering is now limited to regular licensed slaughterhouses only.6 Although halal meat is not available on the menu of prisons and defence forces, there is a possibility for meat-free diet. Some imported halal food (frozen meat and meat products, along with canned vegetables and sweets from Middle Eastern producers) is available in the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath.” The Centre has also organised importing of halal meat from Latvia. Halal meat has also been available at one market in Tallinn and there are restaurants and kebab places in Tallinn and Tartu where halal meat is available.7 The arrangements for hajj are managed by the Estonian Islamic Congregation.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab, mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer. No niqab-wearing Muslim women have been observed. Since 2005, a government regulation allows people to submit personal photos wearing the head scarf for official documents; these principles are also stated in the Identity Documents Act.

5 “Estonia To Change Law On Religious Slaughter,” in The Jewish Week, 5 August 2012. www .thejewishweek.com/news/breaking-news/estonia-change-law-religious-slaughter, accessed 12 August 2012. 6 Loomakaitseseaduse muutmise ja sellega seonduvalt teiste seaduste muutmise seadus (Act to Amend the Animal Protection Act and Associated Acts), Riigi Teataja I, 18.12.2012, 2. 7 For the list of places with halal food see Halal Food in Tallinn & Tartu, www.islam.pri.ee/ index.php?id=920, accessed 13 January 2014. 216 Ringvee

12 Publications and Media

In recent years, the Estonian Islamic Congregation has been publishing books and booklets about Islam in the Estonian language. In 2012, the first original account of being a practising Muslim written by an Estonian convert was published.8 In 2013, three books by Said Nursi were published in Estonian by Rejhan Publications and distributed through the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath.” The websites of the Estonian Islamic Congregation (www.islam.pri.ee/ in Estonian, Russian, and English) and the cultural centre “Iqra” (www.keskus .islam.pri.ee/ in Estonian, Finnish, and German) are run by Estonian converts. The website www.islam.pri.ee has a number of downloadable materials on Islam mostly for children and women as well as lectures on Islam for schools, and other translated materials in Estonian. In August 2009, it started posting a monthly on-line Islamic magazine, Iqra, in Estonian (though prospective authors are also encouraged to submit texts in Russian) and by December 2013 had produced 50 issues. In 2012, a downloadable journal Iqrake: A Magazine for Estonian Muslim Children (Iqrake. Eesti Moslemilaste ajakiri) was launched. The journal is in Estonian and published four times a year. In 2009, the Estonian Islamic Congregation started to publish a newsletter in Russian, As-Salam—Балтийский Мусульманский Вестник (As-Salam— Baltic Muslim Newsletter) for the Muslims living in the Baltic States. The newsletter was downloadable from the website as well as available as a paper version. However in 2013, the newsletter was terminated.

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques. However, the marriage has civil validity only if it is registered with a municipal civil registry office. From 2001, religious associations may apply for the right for their clergy to conduct marriages with civil validity. An imam wishing to serve as a state registrar has to obtain official certification after attending special training. No Estonian imam is yet certified to serve as a state registrar. In 2013, around ten marriage contracts (nikah) were signed under the supervision of an imam. Inheritance can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations provided it is accepted by all parties involved. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the parties is irrelevant in litigation.

8 Nele Siplane Mina olen moslem (I am Muslim.) (Tallinn: Randvelt, 2012). Estonia 217

14 Interreligious Relations

In an overwhelmingly secular society, it is extremely rare for Estonian imams to be invited to multi-religious events and they themselves are not eager to organise such functions. The Eestürk Association representing Hizmet movement carried out interreligious dialogue between Muslims and Christians by organising a visit to Turkey for the representatives of the ecumenical Estonian Council of Churches. This visit also included a meeting with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Generally, there is not much coverage of the situation of Muslims in Estonia in the local media. Occasionally, local Muslim leaders are approached by media to comment on events and processes involving Muslims abroad or Estonia itself. In 2013, a popular television programme Pealtnägija carried a story on ethnic Estonian converts. The discussion continued in newspapers and internet- media. The overall attitude of the media coverage was one of curiosity. In 2013, there was also media coverage of a case in Saaremaa when a well-known female convert and mother of two children visited kindergarten and gave introductory lecture for the staff on Islam and Muslim practices.9 In September 2013, media published news about the campaign for the humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees organised by Muslim and Christian grass-root activists.10 For this, a fair was organised at the Islamic Cultural Centre ‘Turath.’

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantuj is an annual gathering of Tatars and Bashkirs. It takes place over several days with various festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious occasion, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered.

9 ‘Saaremaa lasteaias tuleb islamiteemaline koolitus’ Postimees 1 November 2013. http:// www.postimees.ee/2581994/saaremaa-lasteaias-tuleb-islamiteemaline-koolitus, accessed 20 January 2014. 10 ‘Eesti moslemid ja kristlased koguvad koos Süria sõjapõgenikele abi.’ Estonian National Broadcasting Company News, 04. September 2013. http://uudised.err.ee/v/eesti/b599f194- c05a-4a3c-98a0-22ad180f28ca, accessed 20 January 2014. Finland

Teemu Pauha* and Tuomas Martikainen**

1 Muslim Populations

The annexation of Finland by imperial Russia in 1808 gradually led to the permanent settlement of Muslims on its territory. From at least the 1830s, there were Muslim soldiers, including Kazakhs and Tatars, among the Russian military in several garrisons stationed on the territory of today’s Finland. They practised their religion and were served by garrison imams. Since the 1870s, Tatar Muslims from the Russian Nizhni Novgorod region started to arrive, and they eventually became the first permanently settled Nordic Muslim community. After Finnish independence (1917), Muslims were granted citizenship (1920 onwards) and they were able to organise officially as a religious community when the Freedom of Religion Act came into force in January 1923. By the mid-1920s, the main wave of migration ended following the closure of the Soviet borders.1 Muslim migration remained low, but their numbers gradually grew due to marriage, work, study and international tourism in the post- World War ii period. The Muslim population started to grow rapidly at the turn of the 1990s as the number of unhcr quota refugees and asylum seekers from Muslim countries grew, alongside other forms of immigration. Currently, the largest groups are Arabs (mainly from Iraq), Somalis, Kurds, Turks, Kosovo Albanians, Persians and Bosniaks. The majority of Muslims in Finland are Sunni and about a tenth are Shiʿis.2 By 2011, estimated 60,000–65,000 Muslims

* Teemu Pauha is a doctoral student in comparative religion in the University of Helsinki. His main research interests include psychology of religion and Islam, especially the intertwining of national and religious identities. ** Tuomas Martikainen is a researcher in comparative religion in Åbo Akademi University. He has researched and published widely on contemporary religious and ethnic diversity in Finland and is the author of Religion, Migration, Settlement: Reflections on Post-1990 Immigration to Finland (Leiden: Brill, 2013). The chapter has been written in association with the Post-Secular Culture and a Changing Religious Landscape in Finland Project (Åbo Akademi University). 1 Leitzinger, Antero, Suomen tataarit: Vuosina 1868–1944 muodostuneen muslimiyhteisön menestystarina (Finland’s Tatars: The Success Story of the Muslim Community Formed during 1868–1944) (Helsinki: East-West Books Helsinki, 2006). 2 Martikainen, Tuomas, “Finland”, in Göran Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 76–89.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_015 Finland 219 were living in Finland, that is, just above 1% of the total population of 5.4 million.3 The Muslim average age is very young and about half are under the age of twenty. The Muslim population broadly consists of four parts: (1) the majority (about 50,000) of Finnish Muslims are first generation immigrants;4 (2) the second generation and children of mixed marriages are increasing in number and currently number 10,000–15,000;5 (3) Isra Lehtinen, a long-standing Finnish Muslim activist, estimates the number of converts to be around 1,500;6 (4) the two Tatar congregations had 610 members in 2012, according to official membership statistics provided by the Population Register Centre. There are no representative surveys regarding identification as a Muslim, nor are the majority of Muslims registered in official Muslim communities. Little is known about the religious activity and participation levels of Finnish Muslims, but it has been estimated that around one third are in contact with the mosque communities. The majority of Finnish Muslims live in the capital Helsinki region and other large cities, most notably in Turku and Tampere. The geographical distribution between different ethnic groups is, however, very different.

3 In Finland, people are registered according to their official membership of state-recognised religious organisations (rekisteröity uskonnollinen yhdyskunta). Such Muslim organisations had 10,596 registered members in 2012. These figures significantly under-report religious affiliation among all migrant groups, including Muslims, and there is no survey or census data (the last such census was conducted in 1985) that provides accurate information on the religious affiliation, adherence or identity of immigrants. As a result, numbers of Muslims need to be estimated by using less reliable and direct means. As the majority of Muslims in Finland are first generation immigrants, country of birth statistics are the best available starting point. Comprehensive statistical data on the second generation are only emerging. See Martikainen, Tuomas, “Maahanmuuttajien uskonnollisen taustan tilastollinen arvioiminen Suomessa” (The Making of Statistical Estimates of Immigrants’ Religious Background in Finland), Teologinen Aikakauskirja, vol. 116, no. 3 (2011), pp. 40–54. 4 The basis of calculation of the estimate is presented in detail in Martikainen, “Maahan muuttajien uskonnollisen taustan tilastollinen arvioiminen Suomessa”, pp. 40–54. For this chapter, the calculations were redone to cover the time until 2011. 5 This figure is based on parents’ country of birth data with either a fifth (both parents immigrants) or half (one parent immigrant, the other Finnish) deducted from the number (data from Statistics Finland). These deductions are somewhat arbitrary (see, n. 4) but nevertheless provide a clear standard that can be corrected when more reliable data becomes available. 6 Isra Lehtinen, personal communication, 19 January 2012. 220 Pauha and Martikainen

2 Islam and the State

Freedom of religion was added to the Finnish Constitution in 1919 (revised 1999). The Freedom of Religion Act (1922, revised 2003) provides more detailed regulations on the matter. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church of Finland enjoy a special status as religious organisations with their own legislation. All other religious organisations are dealt with under the Freedom of Religion Act as recognised religious bodies or under the Associations Act as voluntary associations.7 Muslims are organised in both ways, and there also are informally organised groups. In January 2010, there were 29 Muslim communities registered as religious organisations, but not all of them were active (more up-to-date information is not available).8Altogether, there are about 60 mosque associations and some dozen other Muslim associations focused on specific issues, including women, youth and charity. Local organisations have to a varying degree been able to receive public funding, and the Ministry of Education and Culture from 2008 onwards started to fund minority religions that met certain criteria. The Muslim Umbrella Organisation Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto (Islamic Council of Finland, sine) receives its funding from the Ministry of Education and Culture and member organisations. Muslim organisations have little national public visibility, although they are often consulted by public authorities on many issues.9

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Until the early 2000s, the focus of Muslim activity in Finland was mainly local or, in some cases, directed at the countries of origin. Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto (Islamic Council of Finland (sine, www.sine.fi, [email protected]) was established in November 2006 and functions as an umbrella organisation for the representation of Muslims in Finland. In December 2012, sine had twenty-five

7 Muslim groups organised under the Freedom of Religion Act gain recognition as a ‘religion’, and may apply for certain rights, including the right to conduct legally approved marriage. Muslim groups organised under the Associations Act are considered as any other voluntary associations and cannot gain religion-specific rights. Heikkilä, Markku, Jyrki Knuutila and Scheinin, Martin, “State and Church in Finland”, in Robbers, Gerhard (ed.), State and Church in the European Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 519–536. 8 National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland. 9 Martikainen, Tuomas, “The Governance of Islam in Finland”, Temenos, vol. 43, no. 2 (2007), pp. 243–265. Finland 221 member organisations and it is currently funded by the Finnish state with 52,000 Euros annually to cover its basic running costs.10 The activities of sine are still developing, but the society is working, among other things, on issues related to burial and cemeteries, aspects of Shariʿa, media, religious education and youth. The council represents the main mosques (with the exception of the two Tatar communities) and the majority of registered Muslims in Finland. The main division of mosques in Finland is between Sunni and Shiʿi, and the Sunnis are further divided between the Tatars and the newer arrivals. Little information is available about the religious orientations of new mosque communities but most of them follow a traditionalist understanding of Islam. Tablighi Jamaat is prominent in some mosques. In 2007, Suomen Islamilainen Puolue (Finnish Islamic Party, www.suomen islamilainenpuolue.fi) was founded but had failed to collect enough support to be formally registered as a political party. The party represents mainly Salafi Muslims.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are up to 60 mosques in Finland, of which two are purpose-built and owned by the Tatar community.11 A wooden mosque was built in Järvenpää in 1942 and a house with one floor set aside as a mosque in downtown Helsinki in 1960. The Tatars have five mosques (Helsinki, Järvenpää, Kotka, Tampere, Turku). The Islamic Society of Finland was registered in 1987, and it was the first non-Tatar Islamic organisation in the country. Since the early 1990s, several new prayer-rooms have been established. New mosques exist in some 25 cities around Finland.12 Some of the mosques have had problems with neighbours, including complaints of noise and increased traffic, and have moved to new locations. Generally, mosque communities have positive relations with municipal authorities. There have been plans to establish new purpose-built mosques in several locations but so far these have failed because of the lack of funding.

10 Personal information, Islamic Council of Finland, 19 March 2013. 11 Riitta Latvio, Satu Mustonen and Ilari Rantakari (eds.) Imaamit Suomessa: Imaamikou lutusselvitys 2013 (“Imams in Finland: Report of Imam Education 2013”) (Helsinki: Kulttuuri- ja uskontofoorumi fokus ry, 2013), p. 10. 12 ”Missä on lähin moskeija? (Where is the Closest Mosque?), yle Uutiset, 25 October 2013, http://yle.fi/uutiset/missa_on_lahin_moskeija/6894048, accessed 7 February 2014. 222 Pauha and Martikainen

5 Children’s Education

Most education in Finland is provided by the state and there are very few private schools, although the Tatars had their own primary school from 1948 to 1969. In religious education (re) in Finnish schools instruction is given in the religion of the pupils in a non-confessional manner. This means that re is focused on providing information about religion. Religious practice in re is not permitted. Due to the rise in the number of Muslim pupils in the 1990s, several Finnish cities established Islamic re in local schools. The Religious Freedom Act of 2003 made it obligatory to organise re in Islamic and all other minority faiths if at least three pupils asked for it within a municipality. In practice, the situation varies greatly between municipalities, but Islamic re is already well established in all the larger cities. The number of pupils participating in Islamic re has been on the rise, and currently encompasses more than eight percent of elementary school children in Helsinki.13 The Islamic Society of Finland had a private religious school in Helsinki from 2001 to 2005, but the school did not gain official status and was not financially viable. There are, however, some private Muslim kindergartens.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islamic theology and law cannot be formally studied in Finland. Arabic and Islamic studies are offered at the University of Helsinki. In addition, courses on Islam can be found within several disciplines in Finnish universities, most notably in comparative religion at the Universities of Helsinki and Turku and in Åbo Akademi University. No official discussions about imam training have taken place, but the issue has been taken up by the Culture and Religion fokus association, which has arranged seminars and a survey on the topic.14 Training of minority faith re teachers at the Department of Comparative Religion of University of Helsinki has been on-going since 2007. This consists of both pedagogical and Islamic studies and leads to formal qualification as an re teacher in Finland.

13 Onniselkä, Suaad, “Islamin opetus koulussa” (The Teaching of Islam at School), in Martikainen, Tuomas and Sakaranaho, Tuula (eds), Mitä muslimit tarkoittavat? Keskustelua islamilaisista virtauksista Suomessa ja Euroopassa (Helsinki: Savukeidas, 2011), pp. 122–138. 14 For the final report of the survey, see, Latvio, Mustonenand Rantakari, Imaamit Suomessa. Finland 223

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Evangelical Lutheran Church takes care of most cemeteries in Finland. The Tatar Muslims have two cemeteries in the cities of Helsinki and Turku which are not open for use by other Muslims because the Tatars have reserved them for their own members. Discussion on the need for more Muslim burial sites has been taking place since the early 1990s but no long-term solution has been found while interim practices have varied between municipalities.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Chaplaincy in state institutions has traditionally been organised by the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which also has, among others, full-time hospital, military and prison chaplains. The Orthodox Church of Finland and other minority Christian religions have also been active in the field. Islam is increasingly recognised as a religion to be noted in chaplaincy, although Muslim organisations have not provided chaplaincy systematically in these institutions. Several state institutions, including police, armed forces and health care providers, often together with publicly funded immigrant projects, have produced guidelines and information booklets on Islam, but it is currently unclear to what extent these are followed and the quality of these guidelines is very variable.15

9 Religious Festivals

Religious festivals are customarily organised by cultural and mosque organisations in places with larger Muslim populations. Typically, the larger communities hire a locale for this purpose. Time off to celebrate the main festivals is not a legal entitlement.

15 The general regulations of the Finnish Defence Forces, for example, contain information on fasting, praying, and other Islamic religious practices that should be taken into account with regard to Muslim soldiers. See, Defence Command, ‘Yleinen palvelusohjesääntö’, available at www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/0802b480406f9674bed9ff66f99672d5/YlPalvO. pdf?mod=ajperes, accessed 30 January 2014. 224 Pauha and Martikainen

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

In earlier times, Finnish Muslims used the services of a Jewish shop in Helsinki and later halal food was imported into Finland and sold at outlets in mosques and ethnic stores. Today, fresh halal meat is available in Helsinki, where some halal shops currently sell meat slaughtered in Finland. Halal slaughter has occasionally been discussed in the Finnish media and in 1996, the Animal Protection Act provided guidelines for approved halal slaughter in Finland, which require the animal to be stunned simultaneously with the slaughter. There are currently plans to renew the law and a committee has been set up by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in September 2012. A proposal for the new law is scheduled to be presented in the Parliament in 2014.16 There are ethnic shops as well as many mosques around the country that sell products targeted to Muslims. Some specialist shops for Muslim attire as well as beauty shops can also be found in Helsinki. Furthermore, there are some enterprises advertising themselves as “Islamic” and providing language services such as interpretation, translation and Arabic courses.17 The companies marketing to Finnish Muslims are, by and large, small enterprises with a single location. The Internet stores aimed specifically for Muslims in Finland, for example, are very few. So far, no Finnish bank offers services based on Islamic principles.

11 Dress Codes

So-called Muslim clothing, including head scarves, has not been a major topic of public discussion in Finland. For example, girls have the right to wear a scarf at school even though modifications may be required for sport and other activities for safety or hygiene reasons. Employers increasingly have to deal with the issue and some have provided guidelines regarding acceptable clothing at work, for instance in public health care. Head covering can be worn on public documents (e.g., driver’s licence, identity card, passport), but there are regulations on how much of the face should be visible.18

16 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, ‘Tietoa eläinsuojelulain uudistamisesta’, available at www.mmm.fi/fi/index/etusivu/elaimet/elainsuojelulaki.html, accessed 2 January 2014. 17 Lists of companies offering Islamic products and services have been published, for example, at www.shiaislam.info/yritykset_yhteisot.htm. 18 See, Finnish Police, ‘Passport photo guidelines’, available at www.police.fi/poliisi/home .nsf/files/Passikuvaohje_07–02–2007_en/$file/Passikuvaohje_07–02–2007_en.pdf, accessed 24 April 2013. Finland 225

12 Publications and Media

Popular literature on Islam was scarce until the 2000s, but more has been published since then. The professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Helsinki, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, has been especially active and has produced more than a dozen popular books on various topics related to Islam. Few books written by Muslims are published. The Qur’an has been translated into Finnish three times (1942, 1957 and 1995). In 2013, the most recent translation, by Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, was published in its fifth edition. Mosque communities and other Islamic associations increasingly distribute Finnish-language literature and leaflets, which are often translated from other languages. Currently, there are two Finnish-language Muslim periodicals. A Sunni journal, An-Nur, has been published by the Islamic Society of Finland since 1994 and a Shiʿi journal, Salam, by Resalat Islamilainen Yhdyskunta (the Resalat Islamic Community) since 2007. The periodicals contain theological articles and also discuss current affairs. Besides these two, a journal for young Muslims, Umma, was launched in 2010 by sine, but it was discontinued after only three issues. In late 2013, Nuorten Muslimien Foorumi (Forum for Young Muslims) announced that a new journal, Ana, would appear in spring 2014 to continue the legacy of Umma and provide a platform for discussing the life-style options of European Muslim youth.19 Tatars have published a newspaper called Mähallä Habärläre (News from the Community) in the Tatar language since 2004. In addition, several ethnic communities produce journals that include religious material, although this is not their primary focus. Beyond print media, the Internet provides several information and discussion forums for Muslims and on Islam, including Sunnapolku (The Path of Sunna, www.sunnapolku.com), a Finnish-language information and discussion forum on Islam, and Islam Suomessa (Islam in Finland, www.tulevaisuus.org), a Finnish language information portal on Islam. There are also several Facebook groups and blogs aimed at and maintained by young Muslims. Particularly prominent is the Facebook group Suomen Nuorten Muslimit (Muslims of the Finnish Youth, https://www.facebook.com/MuslimiNuoretSuomessa), with over 3,500 followers.

19 Ana Lehti, ‘Ana Lehti’, available at https://www.facebook.com/anamagazine, accessed 2 January 2014. 226 Pauha and Martikainen

13 Family Law

The relationship between family law and Islamic laws and traditions is still taking shape in Finland. The legal committee of sine, mosques and imams provide consultation and settlements in family matters, but there is no overview of how this takes place. Representatives of registered religious organisations may be granted a legal right to perform marriages. A divorce, in contrast, can only be granted by a court, and Islamic divorce has no legal status.20 There have been reports of clashes between the civil divorce processes and informal Islamic practice. Male circumcision has been a topic of heated public discussions, and some Finnish ngos as well as the majority of Finnish medical doctors oppose the practice when carried out solely for religious or cultural reasons. Despite the recommendations of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2003), the position of male circumcision in public health care remains ambivalent and this has led to circumcisions being carried out in private homes, with consequent medical complications.21 In October 2010, the Minister of Health and Social Services announced that a long planned law on male circumcision will not be brought to the Parliament. The issue is not on the current Government programme, and therefore it is unlikely that the incumbent government will take it into consideration. Hence, the ambivalence of the situation continues, and the issue has also been debated in public during 2013.

14 Interreligious Relations

Muslim-Christian dialogue has been taking place since the 1990s. Sporadic one-off events are gradually being replaced by more organised forums. The longest standing activity has been the biannual dialogue between the Church and Islam Committee of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and several Muslims organisations that was established in 1997. The events focus on religious questions and have gathered 20–50 participants on a regular basis.

20 Mustasaari, Sanna, “Islamilainen perheoikeus Suomen oikeusjärjestelmässä”, in Oikeustiede-Jurisprudentia, Vol. xli (2008), pp. 187–266. 21 Sakaranaho, Tuula, Alitolppa-Niitamo, Anne, Martikainen, Tuomas and Tiilikainen, Marja, “Religion in Migration: Studies on Muslims in Finland”, in Vesa Puuronen, Antti Häkkinen, Anu Pylkkänen, Tom Sandlund, and Reetta Toivanen (eds), New Challenges for the Welfare Society (Joensuu: University of Joensuu, Karelian Institute, 2004), pp. 124–139. Finland 227

The Islamic Council of Finland is represented in the Cooperation Forum of Religions in Finland, which is an evolving high-level interfaith network. Also, Muslim organisations, including sine, are and have been represented on Etnisten suhteiden neuvottelukunta (Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations, etno), whose aim is to incorporate minority voices into state administration. Interreligious relations have been moving in a more proactive direction in the 2000s. Since 2001, the President of Finland has initiated meetings between leaders of the Christian, Muslim and Jewish communities on a regular basis. This was one of the background factors leading to the foundation of the Cooperation Forum of Religions in Finland in 2011, which is a high-level Christian, Jewish and Muslim discussion forum promoting societal peace and freedom of religion in Finland.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The media image of Islam is conflict-oriented and gives a violent and aggressive impression of Islam, as has been noted in many studies over the years. This applies particularly to foreign news reporting, while Finnish Muslims are more often represented more positively. Finnish public opinion regarding Islam and Muslims is generally cautious and negative and similar to attitudes towards Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and Scientologists. About half the population express a negative stance, and this view seems to have stabilised over the years. The latest opinion poll was conducted in 2008 and found that 52% of Finns view Islam negatively and only 6% positively.22 In 2013, the major media event concerning Islam was the panel discussion programme Islam-ilta (Islam Evening) that was aired in October by Finland’s national public service broadcasting company Yle. The programme concentrated largely on such controversial issues as gender and sexual equality, Shariʿa, and Finnish Muslims in the Syrian civil war. According to viewer statistics, over

22 Ketola, Kimmo, ‘Uskontotilanteen muutos ja suomalaisten suhtautuminen eri uskon- toihin” (Changes in the Religious Situation and Finns’ Views of Different Religions), in Martikainen, Tuomas and Jalovaara, Ville (eds), Uskonnon ylösnousemus: Kirkon, uskonnon and kulttuurin murros (The Resurrection of Religion: Changes in Church, Religion and Culture) (Helsinki: Magma, 2010), pp. 40–51. 228 Pauha and Martikainen

600,000 people watched at least part of the programme,23 and thousands participated in the online chat organised parallel to it.24

16 Major Cultural Events

Local cultural centres and cultural and religious organisations have run several, small-scale events on Islamic culture since the 1990s. The first major event organised by Finnish Muslims took place in November 2008, when the Islamic Council of Finland in Helsinki put on a two-day “Islam-Expo” attracting 200 participants. The second Islam-Expo was arranged in March 2011 and the third in November 2013. In 2013, the attendance grew to 2,200 from 800–900 two years ago. All three Expos have included panel presentations, exhibitions about Muslim communities and displays of Islamic products.

23 Finnpanel, ‘TV-mittaritutkimuksen tuloksia’, available at www.finnpanel.fi/tulokset/tv/ kk/ohjkan/2013/10/yle2.html, accessed 17 December 2013. 24 Ajankohtainen kakkonen, ‘Islam-ilta on takana—live-chat keräsi netin äärelle tuhansia keskustelijoita,’ available at http://yle.fi/uutiset/islam-ilta_on_takana_-_live-chat_kerasi_ netin_aarelle_tuhansia_keskustelijoita/6896243, accessed 17 December 2013. France

Franck Frégosi*

1 Muslim Populations

Even though there are no official statistics regarding the religious affiliation of the French population, most of the demographic and sociological studies on Muslims living in France estimate that Islam is the second largest religion in France after Catholic Christianity. The figures usually put forward indicate, at the highest estimates, more than five million people of Muslim cultural background, and at the lowest between three and four million.1 The last study, conducted in 2008–2009 counted some 2.1 million Muslims in France.2 The Pew Research Centre in its latest report in 2011 estimated 4,704,000 Muslims in France (7.5% of the total population) and, according to their statistical projections, this percentage will reach 10.3% by 2030.3 The majority of Muslims in France belong to the Sunni denomination, and mainly to the Maliki School which is dominant in the Maghreb area, with the Turkish speaking population as well as Pakistanis belonging to the Hanafi School. We also find the Alevi group among the Turkish speaking population (estimated at 30% of that group) and several groups of Twelver Shiʿis (of Iranian, Lebanese and Azeri origins) as well as an estimated 1,000 Ahmadis.4 Muslims in France are a heterogeneous social and religious reality which includes private Islam of simple believers, visible Islam of strong believers, and a more “virtual” Islam of persons of Muslim culture.

* Franck Frégosi is a senior research fellow at the research centre dres (Droit, Religion, Entreprise et Société), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (cnrs) University of Strasbourg. 1 Bernard, Godard and Sylvie, Taussig, Les musulmans en France. Courants, institutions, com- munautés: un état des lieux, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2007). 2 Interview Patrick Simon in saphir.news, Hana Ben Rouhma, “Mosquées: à 2,1 ou 5 millions, les musulmans manquent toujours de places,” www.saphirnews.com/Mosquees-a-21-ou-5- millions-les-musulmans-manquent-toujours-de-places_a12337.html, accessed 21 March 2011. 3 See: Pew Research Center, The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010– 2030, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2011). 4 Association Musulmane Ahmadiyya de France, 54 Rue Louis et Gérarld Donzelle 95390 Saint Prix, tel.: +33 134160042, www.ahmadiyya.fr.

There are no new available data on how the Muslim population see themselves except the ifop poll for the daily La Croix published in July 20115 which shows a significant development of trends among the different modes of Islamic belonging in France. Over the past ten years, there has been a steady increase in religiosity indicators—such as daily prayer (39%), attendance at mosques (23%) especially by young people, or fasting (71%). According to this latest survey, 39% of Muslims perform the five daily prayers, around 25% the communal prayer on Fridays. A new ipsos poll for the daily Le Monde, the Cevipof (a political studies research centre), and the Jean Jaures Foundation, published on 24 January 2013,6 shows increasing suspicion of Islam among the French population. The poll reveals that 74% of people asked consider the Muslim religion “intolerant” and rather incompatible with French societal values.7 Only 28% of people asked think the same of the Catholic religion. According to this poll, 8 in 10 French judge that Islam “tries to impose on others its way of functioning.” More than half think that Muslims are “for the greater part or partially fundamentalist.” This mistrust towards Islam in France is present in all the categories of age and political adherence. So, 61% of left- leaning respondents and 66% of those younger than 35 think that Islam is not compatible with French republican values.8 The Minister of Interior, Manuel Valls recognises a disturbing rise during the year 2013 of the incidents aiming at Muslims, especially against veiled women.

2 Islam and the State

In the French secular republic there is no official status for any religion, no public funds for religious activities and no religious education in public school. Separate from this system, in the North East of France (Alsace and Moselle) three religious communities (Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism) are recognised religious denominations and organised within the framework of public law, and they are officially supported and financed by state and public local authorities. Although Islam does not appear in this part of France among

5 See ifop for La Croix, Enquête sur l’implantation et l’évolution de l’Islam en France, July 2011. 6 http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-affairs/actualites/2013–01–24-france-2013-nouvelles- fractures#ipsos-video. 7 http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-affairs/paroles-experts/2013–01–25-nouvelles-fractures- religion-musulmane-fait-l-objet-d-profond-rejet. 8 Stéphanie, Le Bars, “La religion musulmane fait l’objet d’un profond rejet”, Le Monde, 25 January 2013, p. 10. France 231 the recognised religions, the Muslim communities based in the area can benefit from public grants for their associations and for the construction of new mosques.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are four major influential Muslims federations:

– The uoif (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, Union of Islamic Organisations of France uoif, 20, Rue de la Prévôté 93120 La Courneuve, tel./fax: ++33 143111060/61, www.uoif-online.com) has a background in the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. This federation promotes both a conservative and a pragmatic Islam adapted to western and secularised societies. About two hundred Muslims associations are connected with this federation. – L’Institut Musulman de la Mosquée de Paris (Muslim Institute of the Paris Mosque, 2 bis Place du puits de l’Ermite 75005 Paris, tel./fax: ++33 145359733/1626, www.mosquee-de-paris.org) represents official Algerian Islam in France. This mosque officially promotes so called “moderate and republican Islam” and strongly supported the banning of the ‘burqa’ from public spaces. – The Rassemblement des musulmans de France (Assembly of the Muslims of France, 111–113, Rue L’escaut, 75019 Paris, www.lermf.com), is a break-away of the former Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (National Federa- tion of Muslims of France), represents one of the two channel of expression of Moroccan Islam and promotes a traditional, pietistic and devotional Islam. – The Union des Mosquées de France (Union of Mosques of France, 65 Rue d’Amsterdam, 75008 Paris, tel.: +33 153161897, fax: +33 153162729, www.um france.fr) created in October 2013, is a breakaway of the rmf. This federation is directly connected with the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs and Habous and concerned with the training of imams in France. – The Tabligh movement is divided into two organisations: the oldest branch is named Faith and Practice (Foi et Pratique)9 and is still the most active. The new one is named Dawah Lillah (e).10

9 Foi et Pratique, Mosquée Omar Ibn Alkhattab, 5 Rue Morand, 75011 Paris, tel.: + 33 143575143, email/webaddress www.foietpratique.org, [email protected]. 10 Mosquée Er Rahma, 52 Rue Paul Vaillant Couturier, Saint Denis 93200, tel.: + 33148237889. 232 Frégosi

The great majority of Muslims related to these federations are of Maghribian origin. Other Muslims have their own federations such as the Turks with the Millî Görüs,11 the Diyanet12 and other minor groups like Süleymanci community, or more nationalist organisations.13 Beside these national federations, there are numerous organisations of lesser importance related to specific ethnic minorities or national groups such as African Muslims or smaller in size, such as Sufi organisations (Alawiyya,14 Naqshibandiyya,15 Shadhliyya, Bouchichiya16), Islamic youth (Union des Jeunes Musulmans/Union of Young Muslims,17 Jeunes Musulmans de France/Young Muslims of France, Collectif des Musulmans de France/Joint Muslims of France)18 or heterodox Muslims such as Ahmadiyya.19 There are also a few emerging organisations such as Salafiyya (twenty to thirty mosques)20 or Habachiyya21 (twenty-two associations) which have their own mosques. Beside these organisations involved in religious matters, there are also a few associations with less influence bringing together secular Muslims.22 These

11 Communauté Islamique du Millï Görüs de France, 64 Rue Faubourg Saint Denis 75010 Paris, tel.: +33 145234150, fax: +33 147703496, email [email protected], www.milligorus. cimgfrance.fr. 12 Conseil des Communautés des Musulmans Turcs de France, Fransa Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi, 17, Place de la Nation 75011 Paris, tel.: +33 0144647771, fax: +0148575416, email: [email protected], www.fransaditib.com. 13 Jean Paul, Touzane, L’islamisme turc, coll. Comprendre le Moyen Orient (Paris: L’Harmattan 2001); Birol, Caymaz, Les mouvements islamiques turcs à Paris (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002) and Samim, Akgönül, “Millî Görüs: institution religieuse minoritaire et mouvement politique transnational (France et Allemagne)”, in Samir, Amghar (ed.), Islamismes d’Occident. Etat des lieux et perspectives (Paris: Editions Lignes de repères, 2006), pp. 63–84. 14 www.aisa-net.com. 15 Centre Soufi Naqshbandi 12, Rue Jean Perrin 93400 Saint Ouen, tel.: +33 665415208, www .naqshbandi.fr. 16 Boutchcichiya, www.saveurs-soufies.com. 17 Union des Jeunes Musulmans de France Centre Islamique Tawhid, 8, Rue Notre Dame 69006 Lyon, tel.: +33 472741869, email: [email protected], www.ujm.fr/contact.php. 18 Collectif des Musulmans de France, email: www.lecmf.org/index.php/contactez-nous, www.lecmf.org. 19 Association Musulmane Ahmadiyya France, 54, Rue Louis et Gerald Donzelle Saint Prix 95390, tel.: +33 134160042, email: [email protected], www.ahmadiyya.fr. 20 Mohamed Ali Adraoui, Du Golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé (Paris: puf, 2013). 21 Association des Projets de Bienfaisance Islamiques en France (apbif), 52, Boulevard Ornano 75018 Paris, tel./fax: +33 142627997, www.apbif.org. 22 See Fédération Mosaïc, 102 Avenue des Champs Elysées 75008 Paris, www.federation mosaic.com/. France 233 organisations try to be a political alternative to religious radicalism. They consider themselves as the rightful modern French Muslims because they are both born Muslims and secular, as the majority of French people are born Catholics but deeply secularised in their daily life. In 2010, the first Muslim Homosexual Association in France (Homosexuels Musulmans de France, hm2f) was created.23 This Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual association fights against homophobia in general and especially religious (Islamic) homophobia and tries to promote an inclusive Islam. This particular organisation is member of the Confederation of Associations lgbtqi European and Muslim (www.calem.eu). The Shiʿi Federation of France (Fédération Chiite de France)24 founded in 2007 by the centre Az Zahra,25 promotes Shiʿi version of Islam and engages in a systematic defence of the regimes of Tehran and Damascus. This centre gave rise to a radical anti-Zionist Party (Parti Anti Sioniste) which has its own news channel named p.a.s l’info. According to the French Shiʿi website Ahl al Beyt (www.ahlelbeyt.blogspot.fr), apart from the centre Az Zahra, three other Shiʿi centres exist around Paris: one in la Courneuve (Centre Mehfide Zeînab),26 another in Montreuil (Centre Al Ghadir)27 and one in Neuilly-sur-Seine (Centre Fatima Zahra).28 One can also mention the association named Fils de France (Sons of France),29 which intends to promote a French patriotic current among Muslims in France. This organisation is considered close to the right wing parties. Rather than boost immigration, this association promotes a project of acculturation of Islam in the French character. This association has been deeply engaged against the proposed law on same-sex marriages. At the national level, the French Council of Muslim Worship (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, cfcm, 270 Rue Lecourbe 75015 Paris, tel.: ++33 145580573, fax: ++33 145582406, www.lecfcm.fr) is the official body which represents the Muslim faith in its relation with the secular state. The General Assembly of this Council is partly elected by the leaders and delegates of 1,600

23 Homosexuels Musulmans de France, Centre lgbt de Paris, 63, Rue de Beaubourg 75003 Paris, tel.: +33 659919012 email: [email protected], www.homosexuels-musul mans.org. 24 www.federationchiitedefrance.com. 25 Centre Zahra France, 1 Impasse Jean Baptiste Lebas 59760 Grande Synthe, tel.: +33 328589214/fax: +33 328252678, email: [email protected], www.centre-zahra.com. 26 www.mehfide-zaïnab.com. 27 www.alghadir.org. 28 wwwfr-beytolzahra-paris.blogfa.com. 29 www.filsdefrance.fr. 234 Frégosi

incorporated mosques and partly appointed by the main Muslim organisations and mosques. On the local level, there are 25 Regional Councils of Muslim Worship (Conseils Régionaux du Culte Musulman, crcm) which are elected the same day as the National Council. These Councils are in charge of questions related to worship, such as building of mosques, cemeteries, halal slaughter, nomination of Muslim chaplains in the army, hospitals and jails, and pilgrimage. The majority of the large Muslim federations of France (except uoif) have decided to accept a rotating collective chair of the cfcm. From 2013 till 2015, the president of the cfcm is Dalil Boubakeur, the Vice-Chancellor of the Great Mosque of Paris. Two historical founders of the cfcm, the Union of Islamic Organisations of France and the Great Mosque in Lyon officially boycotted the last Council elections and no longer participate in the cfcm.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The improvement in the general conditions of the Muslim faith, particularly in terms of the number of places of worship is confirmed by the development of many collaborative projects between municipalities and groups of Muslims to build mosques throughout France,30 justifies the impression that the building of places of Muslim worship in France has become a relatively trivial matter. Many cities have also decided to support the building of mosques in local areas, with public funding in Alsace-Moselle and indirectly in the rest of France. In 2012, the Muslim Homosexual Association in France (h2mf) opened its first mosque in France, At Tawhid, in which all believers are welcome without any limitation of sexual orientation. The mosque is located in temporary premises in the Paris region. The communal Friday prayer with khutba takes place in the evening, continues with a Sufi dhikr session and ends with a meal. Although the question of the construction of mosques seems to have become commonplace, a poll of the ifop of October 201231 for the conservative newspaper Le Figaro saw that 43% of people surveyed were against the construction of mosques, mainly among the voters of the right-wing parties (60%) and of the extreme right party (84%) and only 29% favourable among the left-wing voters.

30 See Françoise Duthu, Le maire et la mosquée. Islam et laïcité en Ile-de- France, (Paris: L’Harmattan, Logiques sociales, 2008). 31 ifop pour le Figaro L’image de l’Islam en France, October 2012, www.ifop.com/media/ poll/2028–1-study_file.pdf. France 235

5 Children’s Education

Several projects for secondary schools of Islamic character have started to appear in France in recent years. Currently, four private Muslim secondary schools work regularly. The first establishment, the Averroès secondary school in Lille, which serves one hundred pupils, founded in 2003, is recognised and receives partial public funding. The second establishment, Al Kindi secondary school of Décines, founded in 2008, is located in a district of Lyon and is not yet under state contract. The third establishment, the Ibn Khaldun secondary school, opened its doors in Marseille in 2009 is on the process of getting a state contract. These schools are considered to be closely related to the uoif. The fourth, the oldest one, La Réussite, is located in inner ring of Paris suburbs, and is totally private. Its founder, Dhaou Meskine, never succeed in obtaining a contract with the state.32 About 45 other private schools or projects are functioning without any state support.33

6 Higher and Professional Education

Muslim higher education and imam religious training in France is only provided by private institutions connected with Muslim federations.34 A specific programme for imams opened in September 2008 at the Institut Catholique de Paris (a private institution) with public funding (a two year study programme) received by imams from the Grand Mosque of Paris (Ghazali Intitute) for specific training in secular matters (French law, French history, sociology of religions and similar). Other Islamic federations have so far ignored this initiative. The Diyanet opened its own private Faculty of Islamic Theology in Strasbourg in 2013. This private institution aims first at training theologians, imams and chaplains intended for Turkish speaking communities living in France (a five- year study programme). It is in search of partnership with French universities and would like to be recognised as the Muslim equivalent of both Faculties of Theology (Catholic and Protestant).

32 See John R. Bowen, L’islam à la française. Enquête, (Paris: Steinkis, 2010). 33 See. http://www.al-kanz.org/2014/06/08/enseignement-musulman/, accessed 12 January 2014. 34 Francis Messner and Anne Laure, Zwilling, Formation des cadres religieux en France. Une affaire d’Etat ? (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2010). 236 Frégosi

In order to promote public training for imams centred on secular issues and law, the French Ministry of Interior has officially decided to give public financial support to a programme on civic education for imams in four public universities (Strasbourg, Lyon 3, Montpellier and Aix-Marseille). As has been done in Strasbourg since 2012, these universities will deliver a Diplôme Universitaire course, based on a one-year programme centred on Religion and Law, History and Sociology. All the courses are taught by scholars and researchers affiliated with public institutions and university faculties.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The public service of funerals and burials is legally governed by the principle of religious neutrality. The communal cemeteries in France (except for Alsace- Moselle) cannot then include any material, physical separation between the faiths; the creation and extension of confessional cemeteries is not authorised. Dealing with the increasing religious diversity, public authorities have managed the problem by way of circulars and interpreted the letter of the law in pragmatic ways. In order to favour the burial on French territory of Muslims without the means of financing the repatriation of their deceased relatives to their countries of origin, a circular dated 19 February 2008 specifies that the mayor has the possibility of gathering together graves of people of the same confession in communal cemeteries, while taking care to respect the neutrality of the public sections and freedom of choice of burial of the families. More than 70 Muslim sections are open in major cities. Strasbourg was the first French city to open (in February 2012) a Muslim public cemetery. As of 2013, it remains the only one of its kind in France.35

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

According to the first article of the Law of Separation of 1905: “The Republic ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees free exercise of faith subject to only the restrictions published hereafter in the interest of public order,” it is the duty of the state to monitor the rules guaranteeing the public practice of worship. So, the provision of chaplains for students in secondary schools as well for soldiers in the army, for patients in hospitals or prisoners in jails is permitted in

35 www.saphirnews.com/Strasbourg-donne-le-jour-a-un-cimetiere-public-musulman_ a10608.html, accessed 8 October 2009. France 237 the French secular system of laïcité. Currently, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Muslim chaplains have legal status in the army and are salaried by the state. Since 2005, the cfcm has nominated head chaplains for armed forces,36 prisons and since 2006 for hospitals.37 In the army, the Muslim Head Chaplain is appointed by the Minister of Defence. He manages 30 military chaplains. The Muslim Head Chaplain for Prisons manages around 147 Muslim chaplains, among them ten female chaplains.38 For hospitals, each hospital can nominate Muslim chaplains and is free to assign him (her) financing.

9 Religious Festivals

Even though religious festivals are never organised by the state, the main Christian and Roman Catholic feasts are included in the official calendar and recognised as public holidays. In public administration, companies or agencies, state schools, employers wishing to attend specific Muslim religious feasts such as ʿId al-Adha, ʿId al-Fitr and Mawlid are allowed leave of absence.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Three main mosques in France (Grand Mosque of Paris, in Lyon and Evry- Courcouronnes) have official consent to name official ritual slaughterers who are allowed to slaughter animals in public slaughterhouses. Finding halal food is nowadays easy: one can find it in supermarkets or in specialised butcher’s shops. Since 2004, once a year, a halal expo takes place in Paris, where multinational and national companies specialised in halal goods present their products. Alongside requests for places of worship, the pluralisation of the French religious landscape has also occasionally resulted in the emergence of particular religious requests, such as the issue of pork-free meals in public schools and, more recently, halal menus. A Circular of August 2011 specifies that in public school canteens “the very great freedom in establishing menus and the fact of planning menus around confessional practices constitutes neither a right for users nor an obligation

36 http://amdp.exprimetoi.net. 37 http://aumonerie-musulmane.over-blog.com. 38 www.saphirnews.com/Aumonier-musulman-On-ne-veut-pas-non-plus-d-imam-au- rabais_a12578.html, accessed 10 May 2011. 238 Frégosi for communities.”39 Equally, cases of parents who provide packed lunches must be examined on a case-by-case basis, without “the religious beliefs of the pupils and their families being used to justify provision of a packed lunch.”40 As for hospitals, the Circular notes that “patients can have the possibility of obtaining meals complying with their dietary regimes in coordination with the chaplain of their faith.”41 Lastly, the Circular specifies “that in practice, the majority of canteens have been proposing substitutes for pork for a long time, and serve fish on Fridays, thereby allowing for certain regulations or religious recommendations to be respected.”42 Islamic banking and finance is still at an embryonic stage. Several banking groups equipped with Shariʿa Boards were created in order to propose Shariʿa- compliant products (musharaka, mudaraba, murabaha, sukuk) designed to meet a set of fundamental and ethical principles based on the Qur’an. The French Institute of Islamic Finance (Institut Français de la Finance Islamique, iffi), established in December 2009, and which has signed agreements of cooperation with the Islamic Development Bank of Jeddah (ibd), nowadays works as a think tank. Since 2010, tax authorisations were published clarifying the fiscal nature of Islamic financial operations and more instructions are being prepared. In 2010 and 2011, Chaabi Bank (a French subsidiary of the Popular Bank group in Morocco) granted the first real-estate loans in compliance with Islamic principles and the first current account compatible with the principles of Shariʿa. Since 2012, there has been a Shariʿa-compliant life insurance policy called Salam Epargne and Investment sold by Swiss Life.43 bnp Paribas group sells also its own Shariʿa-compliant life insurance.44 There are three official Shariʿa boards in France. The first, created in 2008 and connected with acerfi (Audit, Conformité, Ethique et Recherche en Finance Islamique www.acerfi.org), is a committee of six French Muslim scholars (sheikhs and muftis), graduates of different Islamic universities (Al-Azhar, Baghdad). They work closely with aidimm (Association d’Innovation pour le Développement économique et Immobilier, www.aidimm.org, mail contact

39 Ibid, p. 45. 40 Ibid, p. 45. 41 Ibid, p. 46. 42 Ibid, p. 45. 43 www.swisslife.fr/Le-Groupe/Swiss-Life-France/Communiques/Swiss-Life-lance-Salam- Epargne-Placement-le-premier-contrat-d-assurance-vie-conforme-aux-principes-de-la- finance-islamique. 44 www.salamepargne.fr. France 239

@aidimm.com, 12 Rue Sadi Carnot, 93170 Bagnolet, tel.: ++33 695071270). This structure consists of jurists and an expert specialised in the management of savings, and promotes Islamic finance. The second board appeared in 2009 and is connected with the Conseil Français de la Finance Islamique (French Council for Islamic Finance, coffis www.coffis.fr). Its president is a member of the European Council for Jurisprudence, Fatwa and Research in Europe, and the Vice President is the leader of the uoif. The third board is linked with the Comité Indépendant de la Finance Islamique en Europe (cifie, Independent Committee for Islamic Finance in Europe, www.cifie.fr) and has mainly Moroccan connections.

11 Dress Codes

Since the law of 15 March 2004, head scarfs and turbans are now prohibited in public schools, and since the new law of 11 October 2010, full niqab is also strictly prohibited in all public buildings and spaces. The text of this law states in Article 2 that “Public space consists of public rights of way, as well as places open to the public or assigned to a public service”. The law provides fines of up to 150 Euros against any person refusing to comply with the ban on concealing one’s face, possibly combined with the obligation to follow a training course in citizenship. Any adult having imposed on another the wearing of such dress is liable to one year imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 Euros (the amount is doubled if the person forced is a minor). Since the coming into force of the law of 2010, between October 2010 and April 2013, 705 checks were made on 423 women, 661 were the object of verbal warnings. The greater part of the women checked were been born in France, living in Paris region, in the South East of the country and in the region of Lyon. The tensions between close relations of the veiled women (husbands, mothers, friends) and policemen are rather regular and they can occasionally result in violent clashes with the police.

12 Publications and Media

Four main books on Islam in France were published during 2013 that are wor- thy of note. The first book, “Du Golfe aux banlieues: Le salafisme mondialisé,”45 delivers a robust study on the modes of socialisation to Salafiyya in France based on the analysis of about fifty conversations with Muslim activists. The

45 Adraoui, M.A., Du Golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé, (Paris: puf, 2013). 240 Frégosi author Mohamed Ali Adraoui redraws at the same time the intellectual biblio- graphic route of these activists while analysing the doctrinal corpus to which they refer. The second book, “Ces musulmans dont la France ne veut pas,”46deals with the lives and difficulties Muslims face in France, being systematically the target of smear campaigns, strong stereotypes, Islamophobia and of a hardening of the French laicity. The author, journalist Claude Askolovitch, a secular Jew, was a former critic of Tariq Ramadan. In 2012, he resigned from the editorial staff of the weekly Le Point to protest against the caricatured treatment of Islam by this well-known magazine. The third book, “Une autorité religieuse sous contrôle,”47 is dedicated to foreign Muslim imams and is based on an unpublished collection of narratives of lives and practices observed on the ground as well as on the exploitation of the archives of the Home Office. The fourth book, “Etre imam en France,”48 is based on analysis of thirty interviews of imams. It shows the impact of secularisation on Islamic jurisprudence and on the way the imams try to adapt the practice of the religion to the transformations of contemporary society. Every Sunday morning a 30-minute programme on Islam named “Islam” is broadcast by the association Vivre l’Islam (Live Islam) on France Télévisions, a public broadcaster. Apart from this programme, many Muslim television channels are accessible by satellite or by internet like Oumma Tv, a French Muslim tv. The only Muslim print publication worth mentioning is the monthly free magazine Salam news. To find information on Islamic issues in France and all over the world, Muslims in France can go to several French Muslim websites like Oumma.com (www.oumma.com), Saphir.news (www.saphirnews.com) or Mejliss (www. mejliss.com). Several Salafis websites have recently emerged, such as www.salafidefrance. com. This site defends the religious principles of Salafiyya while denouncing the other Muslims tendencies and accusing them of being deviants (Sufism, Tabligh, Muslimbrothers . . .) or even non-Muslim (Shiʿi). This site is managed by a convert (Abu Leyna Al Firanssi).

46 Askolovitch, C., Ces musulmans dont la France ne veut pas, (Paris, Grasset, 2013). 47 Jouanneau, S., Les Imams en France. Une autorité sous contrôle, (Marseille, Agone, 2013). 48 Seze, R., Etre imam en France, (Paris, Cerf, 2013). France 241

13 Family Law

In France, everyone is completely free to marry with the person of their choice, independent of any religious or gender considerations. The Law of 17 May 2013 allows homosexual couples to get married and opens adoption to these married couples. It also recognises same sex marriages performed abroad before the coming into force of the law. It also makes possible the celebration of marriage in France when the future spouses, among whom at least one has French nationality, who live in a country which does not allow same sex marriage. All Muslim organisations, following the example of other religious communities (except Buddhists!) spoke out against this law. Individual Muslims and Muslim associations participated in the diverse protests against this law. Apart from civil marriage, couples have also the choice between two alternative forms of life together—free cohabitation or the Civil Pact of Solidarity (pacs). The issue of religion does not seem to have a role to play in these two types of union, apart from problems relating to children who may be the result of these unions (medically assisted procreation or adoption). On the issue of the recognition of Islamic marriage, most Muslim religious leaders and those responsible for mosques consider that from the perspective of Islamic law the religious ceremony is not absolutely essential in the light of the fact that Islamic law only intervenes after the civil marriage. It does not prevent locally the reality of Islamic marriages (halal marriages) celebrated before the civil union. According to French law, the imam (or the priest) offici- ating such illegal marriages would be prosecuted.

14 Interreligious Relations

Leaders of the main religious groups in France (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and Orthodox) have joined together in the Conference of Religious Leaders in France.49 They hold meetings on a regular basis with a view to issuing common statements on matters of social and ethical importance such as denouncing religious discrimination and political stigmatisation of religious minorities. Many initiatives of religious dialogue exist, of either national or local interest. There are far too many to provide a list here. One may mention a very active Department of Relations with Islam of the Catholic Episcopal Conference (Service national des Relations avec l’Islam, sri, www.relations-catholiques- musulmans.cef.fr/) which regularly broadcasts news bulletins on Islam and

49 La Conférence des responsables de cultes en France: lacrcf.fr. 242 Frégosi

Islamic-Christian relations. A similar structure exists within the Fédération Protestante de France (www.protestants.org/index.php?id=32711), which represents the historical main churches and the associations of Protestant affiliation. An official Iftar supper is organised every year by the cfcm during Ramadan together with leaders of other religious communities and many public authorities. In many French cities one can find local interreligious committees. Most of them are private and informal structures allowing dialogue between all religions and local public authorities.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In 2013, the two main controversies about Islam concerned cases of wearing head scarves in private daily nursery and veiled mothers accompanying their children in school outings. The Court of Cassation in its judgement of 19 March 2013 about the Baby Loup affair (the dismissal of a veiled employee working in a private and non- confessional day-nursery) reiterated that the principle of laïcité applies only to public services including those managed by a private body. The judgment also specifies that although it is receiving public funding and pursuing a mission of general interest, this private day-nursery does not amount to practising a mission of public service. The Baby Loup association could not impose on its employees the obligation of religious neutrality. Reacting to this judgement, mps and the government decided to hold a consultation session on how extending strict religious neutrality to secular associations including childcare facilities,50 this would include religious expressions in these private institutions. A conservative mp went as far as wishing to enforce the management of religious freedom in all private companies. He proposed to insert in the Labour Code an additional article to promote religious neutrality by completely prohibiting any religious expression in private companies. The National Observatory of Laïcité,51 established in April 2013, for the moment shelved these issues in its official proposal on 15 October 2013. The second debate was about the prohibition of head scarf-wearing parents accompanying their children in the school outings directly recommended by a circular of 2012. This circular intended to “prevent that parents demonstrate,

50 On 17 January 2012, the French Senate started its first reading a proposed law which imposes neutrality on all the children’s reception facilities receiving public aid and encouraging it for all others, with the exception of confessional facilities. 51 www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/observatoire-de-la-laicite. France 243 by their attitudes or their words, their religious, political or philosophic beliefs when they accompany the pupils during school outings and school journeys.” All over the country, several Muslim women who wore head scarves and Muslim associations decided to protest against this decision, arguing that the ban on the head scarf in public school prescribed by the law of 15 March 2004 targets the pupils and not the parents. A recent official study published in 19 December 2013 by the Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d’Etat) intends to specify that the mothers participating in school outings are not submitted to the religious neutrality principle. But at the same time, the highest administrative jurisdiction underlines that “the requirements bound to the smooth running of the public service of education can lead the competent authority, as regards the parents who participate in school travels or school activities, to recommend them to refrain from showing their membership or their religious beliefs.”52

16 Major Cultural Events

The major event for Muslims living in France, both religiously and culturally is the annual meeting of French Muslims organised by the uoif around April. In several cities, during the month of Ramadan, many Muslim associations organise iftar dinners open to civil authorities and non-Muslim communities. We have to mention that many Muslims (converts and Muslim natives) are active in the world of rap.53 Prominent examples include Kery James,54 Abd El Malik,55 or Medine.56 In their words they express their perceptions of French society (the deterioration of the life in suburbs, tensions with police, Islamophobia, the extreme right) as well as their personal aspirations (the pursuit of peaceful Islam, struggle against drugs, denunciation of American foreign policy, etc.).

52 www.defenseurdesdroits.fr. 53 el asri f, “L’expression musicale des musulmans européens. Création de sonorités et normativité religieuse”, in Revue européenne des migrations internationales, 2009, vol. 25, n°2, pp. 35–50. 54 www.keryjames.com. 55 www.abdalmalik.fr. 56 www.medine.tv. Georgia

Satenik Mkrtchyan* and Ketevan Khutsishvili**

1 Muslim Populations

Georgia, a Christian country from the 4th century, has had contacts with Islam and Islamic states from the earliest times. Such contacts, especially with the Ottoman Empire and Persia have influenced the ethnic and religious composition of Georgia.1 Islam started to spread in Georgia from the 7th–9th centuries after Habib ibn Maslama al-Fahir occupied Armenia and Georgia in 644–655. The first communities of Georgian Muslims were founded in Tbilisi and Dmanisi. The south of Georgia (Tao-Klarjeti and Samtskhe-Javakheti) underwent a process of Islamisation during the 16th to 18th centuries. In the same period Islam also spread in Abkhazia. Islam was adopted mainly by the social elites. The first Muslims appeared in Tbilisi as far back as the second half of the 7th century, at the time of the Arab conquests. For centuries (especially during the 8th to early 12th) Muslims played a leading political and economic role in the life of the city.2 In the Middle Ages and early modern period, due to intensive contacts between Georgia and the Islamic world Islam was widely introduced in Georgia. In addition, Turkic speaking Muslims began to move into the country, migrants who became known as ‘Tatars’ in the Tsarist era and would then be reclassified as ‘Azerbaijanis’ during the Soviet era.3 By the end of the imperial period (i.e., 1910s), the population of Georgia was 20% Muslim. While the Russian imperial authorities were usually tolerant of Georgia’s Muslims, Soviet authorities were considerably less so. Of the four Muslim Religious Boards to oversee Muslim affairs in the ussr, one for the

* Satenik Mkrtchyan is a PhD student at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia, and works as a researcher at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia. ** Ketevan Khutsishvili is professor in the Faculty of Humanities, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia. 1 Sanikidze, G, and. Walker, W (Ed.), ‘Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia’, bps Working Paper Series, (Berkeley: University of California, 2004), p. 3. 2 G. Asatrian, and H. Margarian, “The Muslim Community of Tiflis (8th–9th centuries)”, Iran and The Caucasus, N 8.1; 2004; 29–52, p. 29. 3 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia, p. 3.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_017 Georgia 245 entire South Caucasus region was based in Baku (Azerbaijan).4 Georgia, like other parts of the Soviet Union, witnessed a notable ‘Islamic revival’ in the Gorbachev era and the early post-Soviet period5 mainly through a renewal of ties with foreign, especially Turkish and Iranian Islamic organisations.6 Georgian scholars have estimated that the number of ‘Muslims’ in the republic in 1989 was as high as 640,000, or 12 % of the total population at the time (5.4 million). However, the 1989 Soviet census did not inquire into religious identity or practices, and the number of Muslims used to be deduced with reference to traditionally Muslim nationalities in the republic. There are also other Muslims, particularly Georgians in the Autonomous Republic of Ajara in Georgia’s southwest. The reliability of the census conducted in 2002, which included a question on religion, remains questionable given the extent of the disorder in the country at the time.7 According to this census8 the number of Muslims in Georgia was 433,784, which constituted 9.9% out of the total population. Among them, ethnic Georgians were 139,124, i.e. 3.8 % of the total. The largest Muslim community is the Azerbaijanis Imamate Shiʿi group—184,761. The majority of Muslims in Georgia are settled in the region of Kvemo Kartli (ethnic Azerbaijanis: 225,657); Ajara (ethnic Georgians: 115,161), Kakheti (ethnic Vainakhs, Avars, Azerbaijanis: 51,256).9 Apart from the census data, different estimates are given by the mass media, Muslim community and academic circles. According to one of the estimates, the total number of Muslims in Georgia is only 300,000.10 The European Stability Initiative gives the number of 430,000 Muslims living in Georgia,11

4 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia, p. 46. 5 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia, p. 46. 6 B. Balci and R. Motika, ‘Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia’, Central Asian Survey (September 2007) 26(3), 335–353, p. 335. 7 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 5., Balci, B, and Motika, R, ‘Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia’, Central Asian Survey (September 2007) 26(3), 335–353, p. 338. 8 The 2002 census partially included Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. 9 The 2002 census. 10 Х. Баиндурашвили, Ислам в посткоммунистическом Тбилиси, Человек постсоветсткого пространства: Сборник материалов конференции. Выпуск 3 / Под ред. В.В. Парцвания.—СПб.: Санкт-Петербургское философское общество, 2005.—С.85–91 (Kh. Baindurashvili, “Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi” in V. Partsvania (ed.), The Human- being of the post-Soviet Space. (St. Petersburg: Philosophical Union of St. Petersburg, 2005) pp. 85–91 (87). 11 www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=321&country_ id=1&slide_id=1, (note: the source is no longer available). 246 Mkrtchyan and Khutsishvili while Azerbaijani mass media provide the number of 500,000 Muslims in Georgia,12 the same number given by the Tbilisi mosque representative.13 In Georgia, there are strong correlations between ethnic groups and religious affiliations, and often, geographic areas,14 which is significant in terms of defining the main characteristics of Islamic practices. This is most clearly the case with the Azerbaijanis, the biggest among the Muslim communities (approximately 284,761, or 6.1% of the population according to the 2002 census), comprising the largest ethnic minority group.15 They are largely Muslim and most of them live in the south eastern region of Kvemo Kartli and Shida Kartli constituting there a majority. Some 15,65416 live in Tbilisi, and 33,600 reside in the eastern region of Kakheti. The majority of Azerbaijanis in Georgia belong to the Shiʿi branch of Islam, although in the Kvemo Kartli religion is rather weak.17 The other major Muslim group consists of the ethnic Georgian Muslims of Ajara. According to the 2006 estimates by the Department of Statistics, 63% of the Ajara population are Georgian Orthodox Christians and 30% Muslim, predominantly Sunnis. Another source, based on the results of the 2002 census, mentions the number of 131,536 for the Muslim population in Western Georgia, which include the Ajara region, as well as the Chokhatauri and Ozurgeti districts in the Guria region.18 Besides the two major groups mentioned, there are

12 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 20 January 2013. 13 n. popuaSvili, “islami”, z. kiknaZe (red.). “religiebi saqarTveloSi” (Tbilisi: saqarTvelos saxalxo damcvelis ofisi, 2008), pp. 336–364. (N. Popuashvili, “Islam”in Z. Kiknadze (ed.), Religions in Georgia. (Tbilisi: Public Defender’s Office, 2008). pp. 336–364. 14 us Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2011: Georgia, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dlid=192811, accessed 20 January 2013. 15 Azerbaijanian sources often speak about 500,000 Azerbaijani population in Georgia based on the “unofficial” sources. (http://en.trend.az/news/society/diaspora/1613337 .html, accessed 20 January 2013.) 16 Sanikidze, though, mentions this number equal to 18,000 (see in Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 21). 17 J. Weattley, Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Kvemo Kartli Region of Georgia, ecmi Working Paper #23, February 2005, p. 5. 18 თ. შიოშვილი, რ. ბარამიძე, მ. ჭიჭილეიშვილი, ჯ. ვარშალომიძე, გ. მახარაშვილი, ყქართველი მულსიმები თანამედროების კონტექსტში (ბათუმიღ ნიკო ბერძენიშვილის ინსტიტუტი, 2010) (T. Shioshvili, R. Baramidze, G. Nizharadze, M. Chichileishvili, J. Varshalomidze, G. Makharashvili, “The Georgian Muslims in the context of modernity” (Batumi: Niko Berdzenishvili Institute, 2010)), p. 9. Georgia 247 other small-scale Muslim ethnic groups: a portion of the Abkhaz population,19 Kists,20 Avars, Tatars, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Tajiks. Kists (a group of the Vainakh people) practise Sufi forms of Islam (Naqshbandi and Qadiri orders). After the armed conflicts in the North Caucasus in the 1990s a group of refugees from Chechnya settled in the Pankisi gorge. Through them Salafi trends have started to be practised in the district. A population of some 100,000 Meskhetians (Meskhs) were deported by Stalin from the south-west during the Second World War. The 2002 census counted about 1000 Meskhetians. As of November 2012, 870 persons out of the total 9.500 persons who applied for repatriation status had already been granted it.21 There are also Muslims, citizens of other countries such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, etc., who are in Georgia, mainly in the capital Tbilisi, working in diplomatic missions, for business, study or other purposes. A 45-day visa-free travel rule between Iran and Georgia has apparently facilitated the increase in

19 Abkhazians were in part converted to Islam throughout the 17th and 18th centuries under the Ottoman domination. Islam has been weak and also mixed with Christian and pre-Christian elements there, though connections with Muslim communities in the North Caucasus, as well as the return of the descendants of the muhajirs (Muslim population who had massively left Georgia during the Tsarist period and later during the Soviet period) from Turkey, appear to have resulted in a modest increase in the role of Islam among the Abkhaz. (See in B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam in Mikheil Saakashvili’s Christian Georgia[1/3]”, www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php? id=177, accessed 8 November 2010 (note: the source is not available any more), Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 21.) Currently Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain outside the control of the central Government, and reliable information from those regions was difficult to obtain, however according to a survey in 2003 16% of the respondents reported to be Muslim. There is no mosque in Abkhazia, awareness of Islam is low and Muslim practices are held modestly. (See in Ал. Крылов, Единая вера Абхазских “Христиан” и “Мусульман”. Особенности религиозного сознания в современной Абхазии, Н. Лежава (ред.), Роль православия в государствах и обществах Грузии и Росии (Тбилиси: Генрих Белл Фонд, 2004), стр. 104–121 (106) (A. Krylov, Common Face of Abkhazian “Christian” and “Muslim”. Specifications of Religious Consciousness in Modern Abkhazia in N. Lejava (ed.) Role of Orthodoxy in the States and Societies of Georgia and Russia, Materials of Georgian-Russian Conference. (Tbilisi: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004) pp. 238–249 (238–241). 20 They live mostly in and around the Pankisi Gorge villages in Georgia’s northeast: Jokolo, Birkiani, Omalo, Middle and Upper Xalatsani, Duisi. The 2002 census gives 7,110 as the number of Kists living in Georgia, while the 1989 census suggests the number 5,455. (See in N. Sardjveladze, N. Shushania, l. Melikishvili, and M. Baliashvili, Tolerance in Multiethnic Georgia: Training Methodology Manual for Educators, (Tbilisi: Mtsignobari, 2009), p. 33.) 21 ecmi Caucasus ensures continuity of the Meskhetian repatriation process, www.repa triation.ge/index.php?m=6&news_id=39, accessed 20 January 2012. 248 Mkrtchyan and Khutsishvili the number of citizens of Iran coming to Georgia. 37,287 entries into Georgia by citizens of Iran were recorded in the first eight months of 201122 reaching the total of 60,000 by the end of the year.23 As of the May 2012, the frequency of Tehran-Tbilisi flights was increased up to nine flights weekly (instead of the earlier six). Some of the visitors from Iran are said not to have only touristic interests, they are also interested in business and trade activities.24 But after some restrictions the number of Iranian visitors has declined. From 1 July 2013 the Georgian government re-imposed visa requirements for Iran. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced this without any explanation.25

2 Islam and the State

The Georgian Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, thought, conscience, belief and religion, and prohibits persecution on the basis of the expression of opinions or thoughts and on the basis of religion or belief (Article 19, paragraph 2). These freedoms are also protected by Georgia’s Criminal Code (Articles 115, 155 and 156), which also penalises unlawful interference through violence, the threat of violence or misuse of authority in the setting up for activities of political, social or religious organisations (Article 166). However, the Georgian Orthodox Church (goc) has a dominant position and enjoys particular relations between it and the State. Article 9 of the Constitution states that, “The state recognises the special importance of the goc in Georgian history but simultaneously announces complete freedom of religious belief and the independence of the church from the state.” The 2002 concordat between the government and the goc gives the patriarch immunity, provides goc clergy with the exemption from military service, allows only the goc the right to staff the military chaplaincy, and grants the goc a consultative role in government, as well as other privileges which are denied to other religious denominations and groups.

22 Georgia Reports 1.79 m Visits by Foreign Citizens, www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23038, accessed 20 January, 2013. 23 საქართველო ირანელ ტურისტებს იზიდავს (Georgia attracts Iranian tourists), http://georgian.irib.ir/%E1%83%90%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83% 98-%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B%E1%83%91%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/%E1 %83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%95%E1%83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%A1%E1%83%9 8%E1%83%90/item/4702 24 Ibid. 25 www.tabula.ge/ge/story/72594-saqartvelos-mtavrobam-irantan-uvizo-mimosvlis- rezhimi-calmxrivad-gaauqma. Georgia 249

Registration of religious organisations became possible—for the first time in 15 years—after the Parliament on 6 April 2005 approved amendments to the Civil Code, allowing religious communities to register with the Ministry of Justice, although they could only register as non-governmental organisations or non-profit private-law associations, a status that some religious communities—among them the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church and the Muslims—regarded as demeaning. However, one Muslim organisation, the Congress of Georgian Muslims received registration on 2 September 2005.26 In July 2011 amendments to the civil code were adopted by the Parliament of Georgia,27 according to which religious groups which have ‘historic ties to Georgia’ or are defined as religions by legislation in Council of Europe member states can be registered as legal entities of public law. Public demonstrations were launched by the goc in Tbilisi to protest the law and to halt its ratification.28 But the law was passed and the protests were channelled in the other directions.29

3 Main Muslim Organisations

During Soviet times the Muslim Religious Board (Dukhovnoe upravlenie) of Transcaucasia (with its centre in Baku) was the only organisation in Georgia representing Muslims, within existing laws and state regulations. The situation has changed in the post-Soviet period. In the 1990s, in parallel with the existing Muslim Religious Board of Transcaucasia (Caucasus Board of Muslims), the Muslim Religious Board of the Ajara-Muftiate was created, situated in the only mosque in Batumi, to be independent from the mentioned Board of Transcaucasia. However, officially the Muslim Religious Board of Transcaucasia has not been abolished, and currently Tbilisi is the residency of the official representative of the Board. Since 2004, the Muftiate has been working on the legal basis of a new charter, which establishes a hierarchical structure of central, regional, and local muftis with their personnel and councils (majlis).30

26 F. Corley, Georgia: Religious minorities still second-class faiths?, November 2005, Forum 18 News Service, www.forum18.org. 27 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23711, accessed 20 January 2013. 28 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23707, accessed 20 January 2013. 29 http://rt.com/news/anti-gay-clashes-tbilisi-421/. 30 Р. Барамидзе. “Ислам в Аджарии” Азербаиджан в Мире 4 (6) 2006, pp. 86–93, (87–88) (R. Baramidze, Islam in Ajara,” Azerbaijan in the World 4 (6) 2006, pp. 86–93 (87–88)). 250 Mkrtchyan and Khutsishvili

In Tbilisi, the Iman (Faith) foundation has an office right in front of the Tbilisi Jumma mosque (35, Botanikuri str., Tbilisi 0105, tel.: +99532 721786).31 It organises Islamic courses, houses a library of Shiʿi literature translated from Persian and a conference room, where religious events take place. The director follows the instructions of a marji’ al-taqlid, in this case the Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran.32 Ahl ul-Beyt, based in Marneuli, is one of the largest and most active organisations. It was founded in 2001 and is officially independent though with informal links to Iran.33 It has been teaching courses on Qur’an, as well as other religious courses related to Shiʿi theology, and has been organising religious holidays and events on other important religious days since 2003. The Al ul- Bayt, an organisation with a similar name but officially separate, has an office in Tbilisi (10, Kalandadze, Tbilisi 0114, tel.: +99558 618653, +99593 966966) is said to be officially a separate organisation, however with similar activities: a small madrasa is in operation, a library of Islamic books, classes in English, a conference hall, etc.34 It belongs to the international network of another marji’ at-taqlid, namely the Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hoseyni as-Sistani of Najaf.35 A Fund for Muslim Revival has been operating in Tbilisi with the aim of fundraising for restoration activities of the mosque and addressing various needs of believers.36 Another Shiʿi scholar with growing influence is the late Fadil Lankarani,37 Grand Ayatollah, scholar and teacher in the Islamic Seminary of Qum for many years. In the paper published by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ecmi) in 2012, a Salafi part of Georgia’s Muslim is also presented, according to which two separate types of Salafi groups can be observed in Georgia: those amongst Azeri population and the Pankisi Gorge Salafis (among Kists). Neither appears

31 During the personal interview, the director declared that the organisation acts independently, though he emphasized the close connections with Iman Foundation and its great support while setting up the local organisation. (Interview conducted by Irakli Pipia, 27 March, 2010). 32 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 343–344. 33 C. Prasad, Georgia’s Muslim Community: A Self-fulfilling Prophecy?, European Centre for Minority Issues Working paper # 58, p. 6, www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/Working_ Paper_58_En.pdf, accessed 20 January 2013. 34 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, p. 7. 35 www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=13865&lang=geo, accessed 20 January 2013 36 Baindurashvili, “Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi”, p. 90. 37 B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam in Mikheil Saakashvili’s Christian Georgia?[2/3]”, www .caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=179, accessed 12 December 2009 (note: the source is no longer available). Georgia 251 to be politicised, both have generally good relations with the State and don’t have political objectives; nor is either associated with terrorism. The report also refers to a diverse number of Salafis in Georgia (estimated at up to 400), however it mentions that it depends on how they are defined and what the underlying perception for the basis of the estimation is. The report also mentions a trend for Salafi ideology to gain ground among unemployed young males deprived of opportunities, mentioning that about 60–80% of young males in Pankisi villages have turned to Salafism based on estimations of local observers. According to the same report, three main centres for Salafi activity have been observed: the Tbilisi suburb Ponichala (some 50 people), within mosques in the city of Keshalo (Marneluli district) and in Karajala (Telavi).38 In September 2011 All-Georgia Muslim Administration, another organisation, gained official registration under the new legal provisions passed two months earlier. The foundation of this organisation is viewed in terms of the Georgian government’s response to the situation with multiple religious influences from outside the country.39 The organisation is officially independent and the founders are former government officials who are ethnic Azeris from the Kvemo Kartli region.40 Since the late 1980s, in Ajara as in other parts of the former Soviet Union and South-Eastern Europe, Turkish transnational religious movements mixing trade, business and mission, have encouraged the re-Islamisation of the formerly Muslim peoples.41 Currently, most of these Turkish movements and Islamic institutions operate without registration either with the Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus based in Baku, or with the Georgian Ministry of Justice, and have an uncertain status preferring to work with their local partners in small madrasas (locally known as medresses).42

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Since independence and especially in the last decade the construction of mosques and madrasas has increased throughout Georgia. According to a

38 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, pp. 11–17. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 347–348. 42 For the description of the movements called Süleymancıs with their Qur’anic schools, Nurcus with their madrasas active in Tbilisis, Batumi, Kutaisi (See in Balci, “Islam in Post- Soviet Georgia”, pp. 347–349) 252 Mkrtchyan and Khutsishvili recent publication by the Public Defender’s Office (2008), there were 286 mosques and prayer houses in Georgia; another five were under construction. However, some mosques (prayer houses) have been functioning with uncertain status and without registration, a fact which makes it difficult to give an accurate figure. Recently, with a decree by the Minister of Culture and Monument Protection of Georgia, a list of monuments have been recognised as monuments of cultural heritage out of which there were 24 mosques in different regions of Georgia (Akhaltsikhe, Aspindza, Adigeni, Dmanisi, Marneuli, and Bolnisi).43 Moreover, in some parts of the Muslim communities (e.g. mountainous parts of Ajara) there are also local religious schools, madrasas, which also serve as prayer houses (see details in section 5). Similarly, in Ajaran Muslim communities various buildings and places serve as prayer houses, amounting to possibly more than 100.44 A recent research published in a bi-lingual book presents 44 mosques functioning in Ajara which are said to have historical and cultural significance, and which serve for worship and study purposes.45 According to the chief editor of the Azerbaijani magazine Gurjistan, during the years of independence more than 30 mosques have been built in Georgia and many others have been renovated counting up to around 160 operating mosques currently.46 In Tbilisi there is one mosque called Jumma, where Shiʿi and Sunni Muslims of Georgia as well as Muslim guests of the capital attend Friday worship.47 A Shiʿi mosque was opened in Ponichala, a Tbilisi suburb, on 17 July 2011, construction of which had been completed with financial assistance from an Ayatollah from Iraq.48 In Batumi (the regional centre of Ajara), there is one operating mosque with a minaret built in the beginning of the 2000s,

43 მ. მეცყვირაშვილი, მეჩეთებს კულტურული მემკვიდრეობის ძეგლის სტატუსი მიენიჭა, (M. Metskhvirashvili, Mosques have been given the status of cultural heritage), http://netgazeti.ge/ge/98/News/9024/.htm, accessed 20 January 2013. For the full list of the monuments, see the decree N 3/86 of the Minister, 20 March 2012, www .culture.gov.ge/text-21.html, accessed 20 January 2013. 44 Р. Барамидзе, “Ислам и его особенности в Аджарии”, Идентичность, власть и город в работах молодых ученых Южного Кавказа. Сборник статей. Ред. Н. Лежава. Тбилиси.: Фонд им. Генрича Белля, 2005, pp. 39–70 (48) (R. Baramidze, “Islam and its Peculiarities in Ajara” in N. Lejava (ed.), Identity, Power and City in the works of the Young scholars of The South Caucasus (Tbilisi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2005) pp. 39–70, (48)). 45 R. Baramidze, The Muslim Monuments of Worship (Ajara), Batumi 2010. 46 Interview conducted by the author, January 2010. 47 By 1996 Shiʿis and Sunnis used to pray in the mosque separated by a curtain, but upon the arrival of a new Imam, Shiʿi Ali Aliev, the curtain was removed. 48 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community,” p. 11. Georgia 253 which is open every day. The exact number of mosques in Ajara or Western Georgia varies from source to source. The website of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara mentions about eleven mosques in the Ajara, Khulo, Shuakhveri, and Kobuleti regions.49 According to a recent publication, the Muftiate of Ajara has 95 mosque schools, 41 mosques, 18 colleges (uchil- ishcha), and two others with uncertain status.50 According to another recent Georgian publication, 128 mosques, 17 prayer houses and 25 seasonal mosques operate in Western Georgia.51 The mosque in the southern city of Marneuli, which opened a few years ago, is now the biggest in Georgia. There are mosques in other cities of eastern Georgia as well, including Mskhaldidi, Dmanisi and Bolnisi. Several mosques operate in Pankisi Gorge in the five villages mostly populated by Kists.52 Many Azerbaijani villages are also home to holy shrines and pilgrimage sites, and the worship of saints (or holy persons) is widespread.

5 Children’s Education

All citizens of Georgia, Muslim or Christian, go to the general, private or public schools, where the curriculum does not include a compulsory course on religion. There are Georgian, Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian schools based on the language of instruction. Azerbaijanis traditionally have frequented Russian and Azerbaijani schools more than Georgian schools. According to Article 13 (2) of the Law on General Education 2005, religious indoctrination, proselytising and enforced assimilation are not allowed to be part of the education process in schools. The Ministry of Education has decided to prepare new textbooks describing the different religions in neutral terms, and to arrange to carry out regular monitoring of the work of the teachers

49 www.adjara.gov.ge/eng/index.php?page=about, accessed 14 January 2012 (since closed). 50 www.islam.ge/rf/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11:2009-12-01-14-13- 08&catid=9:2009-09-30-07-11-30&Itemid=11&lang=ka, accessed 20 January 2013. 51 თ. შიოშვილი, რ. ბარამიძე, მ. ჭიჭილეიშვილი, ჯ. ვარშალომიძე, გ. მახარაშვილი, ყქართველი მულსიმები თანამედროების კონტექსტში (ბათუმიღ ნიკო ბერძენიშვილის ინსტიტუტი, 2010) (T. Shioshvili, R. Baramidze, G. Nizharadze, M. Chichileishvili, J. Varshalomidze, G. Makharashvili, “The Georgian Muslims in the context of modernity” (Batumi: Niko berdzenishvili Institute, 2010)), p. 467. 52 www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=5968, accessed 14 January 2012 (since closed). 254 Mkrtchyan and Khutsishvili concerned53 to ensure full respect for the right to freedom of religion of persons belonging to minorities. Georgian law has no provision for regulating Muslim religious educational establishments and does not recognise documents and certificates issued by them. However as mentioned in the previous section, several educational units, so-called madrasas, have been formed where people, mostly children, can get some elementary Islamic education through informal mosque courses. A Shiʿi madrasa has been working in Marneuli since 1997 on the initiative of local educated Muslims and the Muslim Religious Board of Transcaucasia (Caucasus Board of Muslims). With the leadership of Hajji A. Nabiev, three-year education is offered to the students after their graduation from ninth or twelfth grades, which includes studying traditional Muslim disciplines, Persian, Arabic and Georgian languages, as well as computer literacy. Upon graduation, the students receive a certificate which is said to be relevant for continuing religious education abroad. As of 2010 the madrasa had 30 students from all over Georgia.54A Sunni madrasa in the village of Meore Kesalo was opened in 2000 under the patronage of Turkey. As of the year of 2010 the madrasa had 60 students, Georgians and Azerbaijanis of Georgian origin, in three major groups: a) graduates spending three years in theological disciplines; b) students who are getting prepared for entrance exams in higher education institutions in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia (here the theology discipline part of the programme constitutes only 10%); c) students in the 5th and 6th grade coming to the madrasa and doing their homework there while also receiving elementary knowledge in Islam.55 Three more organisations have been mentioned above which, along with other activities, have training and teaching functions. In the town of Batumi and the surrounding area, six small madrasas controlled by Georgians have been linked to the Süleymanci tradition.56

53 coe Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public acfc/op/I(2009)001, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 10 October 2009. 54 А. Ганич, Мусульманская община Грузии: К вопросу управления и религиозной практики. (A. Ganich. Muslim Community of Georgia: administration and religious policy.) http://kavpolit.com/musulmanskaya-obshhina-gruzii-k-voprosu-upravleniya-i-religi oznoj-praktiki /, accessed 20 January 2013. 55 Ibid. 56 The movement of the Turkish Sufi leader, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959), promotes “everything by the Qur’an, all for the Qur’an” and has actively campaigned for more Qur’anic schools across Georgia as well. Georgia 255

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Soviet Georgia, Muslims had two options to get Islamic schooling: they could either go to the Bukhara College or to the Tashkent College in Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, students from Georgia (as well as from all over the Caucasus) could get their education at Turkish faculties of theology and an Islamic university with Iranian Shiite leanings in Azerbaijan.57 Some young Shiʿis of Georgia headed for Qom or Mashhad or to a lesser extent to Tehran or Qazwin to study theology. According to some estimates (as of July 2011), the number of the Azeri students in Iran from Georgia is between 16 and 20.58 The Islamic University of Baku, which is under the Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus and follows the interpretations of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, has Azerbaijani students from Georgia.59 The Tbilisi Jumma mosque also has an operating madrasa teaching courses for all ages.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Burial rituals are one of those few Islamic practices, somehow preserved during the Soviet period of ‘religious ignorance’, which had led to modest or low religiosity.60 All rural areas and those towns with significant Muslim population, either now or historically, have Muslim cemeteries. There are two Muslims cemeteries in Tbilisi. Very often in Ajara near the mosque, which is generally situated in the central inhabited areas, a local family cemetery or a famous individual’s tomb is to be found. 61

57 B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam?” in Mikheil Saakashvili Christian Georgia [1/3]” at www .caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=177, accessed 8 November 2010 (note; the source is no longer available). 58 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community,” p. 7. 59 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 343–344. 60 About religiosity issues regarding Muslims of Georgia see Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, pp. 6, 24; Saroyan, Rethinking Islam in the Soviet Union, p. 12; Balci and Motika, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, p. 346. 61 Details for burial ceremonies see in Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, pp. 14, 20, 24; Baramidze, “Islam and its Peculiarities in Ajara,” p. 49. 256 Mkrtchyan and Khutsishvili

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Currently, the law does not permit the activities of Muslim clergy in the armed forces, hospitals or prisons. However, the Order 187 of the Minister of the Correction and Legal Assistance of Georgia (30 December 2010) made it possible for the accused/convicted to meet with the representative of the registered religious organisation or/and traditional confessions upon the prior agreement with the establishment of the respective religious organisation.62 The Hajj quota for Azerbaijan and Georgia is 2,500.63

9 Religious Festivals

After the “Rose Revolution” in 2003 it has become a common practice for the President of Georgia or other members of Government to visit mosques and meet with Muslims on the celebrations of ʿId al-Adha (Kurban Bairam), the most popular and widely celebrated festival for the Muslim population of Georgia. In 2012 also the president has publicly congratulated the Muslims living in Georgia on the occasion of Kurban Bayram.64 In Ajara, the Chairman of the Government of Ajara, members of the Cabinet and other officials pay a visit either to the Batumi mosque or to other mosques. Such celebrations are usually marked by the ceremonial slaughter of animals. But none of the Muslim holidays have been declared national holidays or officially recognised as non- working days. Other religious festivals and holidays are celebrated locally with different participation rates and publicity, either in mosques or separately in the families.65 Novruz (Nawruz) is a feast of spring, representing the coming of the New Year. Before Novruz Azerbaijanis celebrate a number of previous days saying goodbye to the old year and welcoming in the new. These days are the four pre- holiday Wednesdays: Su Chershenbe (Water Wednesday), Odlu Chershenbe (Fire

62 Second Report Submitted by Georgia pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ minorities/3_FCNMdocs/pdf_2nd_sr_Georgia_en.pdf, accessed 20 January 2013 63 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community,” p. 15. 64 Mikheil Saakashvili congratulated the Muslims living in Georgia on the Kurban Bayram holiday, www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=7942&i=1, accessed 20 January 2013. 65 See details in Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 14. Georgia 257

Wednesday), Torpag Chershenbe (Earth Wednesday) and Akhyr Chershenbe (Last Wednesday). According to traditional beliefs, water is reborn on the first Wednesday; fire on the second one, earth on the third one. On the fourth Wednesday, the wind opens buds on trees and spring begins.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

The already mentioned modest religiosity of Georgian Muslims (see sections 7, 8 and 9), has had its impact on halal food norms among the wider part of the Muslim population, and there are no formal procedures for halal certification. However, in cases when a family wants to obtain halal meat they would rather go to the open or indoor markets, where they would know traditionally who sells halal food. As for the rural population, they conduct their own slaughter. Additionally, in Tbilisi there are several restaurants and food shops owned by Muslims, chiefly by Turks, who offer halal food. A small shop and a restaurant with a sign Halal has been operating since the beginning of 2011 on Leselidze Street, one of the central and touristic places of Tbilisi as well as on Marjanishvili Street, another popular shopping street in Tbilisi.66 “The Spiritual Administration of Caucasian Muslims” has been dealing with organisation of pilgrimage tours to Mecca and Medina while other Muslim organisations are taking people to the Shiʿi places of worship.67 The recently registered organisation Administration of Georgian Muslims intends to obtain separate quotas for Georgia’s Muslims to undertake subsidised pilgrimage.68

11 Dress Codes

No Muslim dress code is practised and women in hijab are not seen on the streets of Tbilisi or other towns, unless they are guests or representatives of diplomatic missions. Very few women can be seen wearing head scarves on the streets of Marneuli (Kvem Kartli) either.69 In the villages, women, especially the older ones, usually have the habit of covering the head with a scarf.

66 Based on personal observations of the author. 67 Report “Muslim Community of Georgia 2010–2011,” Human Rights Monitoring Group of Ethnic minorities “mrmg,” Tbilisi, December 2011, p. 5. http://en.hrmrmg.info/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/musuulmanebi-eng.pdf, accessed 20 January 2013. 68 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, p. 21. 69 Ibid., p. 9. 258 Mkrtchyan and Khutsishvili

12 Publication and Media

Islamic publication and media sources have been founded and developed mostly in the post-Soviet period. For the most part these sources are for the Azerbaijani minority and a daily magazine is published by the Muftiate of Ajara. There are also several online sources. Recently eight ‘public boards’ with an advisory role were set up, one of them to deal with religious issues.70 The local media for the Azerbaijani population include religion in the broad range of themes. The Muftiate of Ajara publishes a daily magazine “Faith” (Rtsmena).71 The organisation Ahl ul-Bayt, based in Marneuli, publishes a newspaper of the same name.72 There is one newspaper in Georgia published in Azerbaijani and financed by the state (along with the Armenian and Russian ones), Gurjistan, which is a continuation of the Soviet tradition. This is the most popular among the Azerbaijanis of Georgia, and now has a circulation of 2,000 copies.73 In an interview with the editor-in-chief, seven other publications were mentioned, predominantly local and with minor circulation with changing permanence. Though they are not purely religious they include religious issues. Gurjistan covers all the Muslim holidays and events, as well as including a special section of ‘questions and answers.’74 In 2007 a website (www.muslimgeorgia.org ) was started by a group of Georgian Muslims living or studying in Turkey. According to a media publication, this was the first website about Islam in Georgian. The website has also English, Turkish and Arabic versions. The other website about Islam is www. islam.ge which, according to the information posted on it, is for ‘not only to preach the religion, but also to give information about Islam’.75 It has Georgian, Turkish and English versions. A ‘Tolerance Centre’, under the auspices of Public Defender has started a website (www.tolerantoba.ge ). The aims of the website are to create a culture of tolerance by providing information, cognitive, educational and legal support; and promote activities of the agencies under the Public Defender’s Office, namely, Tolerance Centre, Council of Minorities and

70 coe Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public acfc/op/I (2009) 001, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 10 October 2009, p. 29. 71 Popualishvili, “Islam,” p. 360. 72 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community,” p. 6. 73 http://2000-online.ru/news/10646023.html, accessed 20 January 2013. 74 Interview conducted by the author, January 2010. 75 http://2000-online.ru/news/10646023.html, accessed 20 January 2013. Georgia 259

Council of Religions.76 On 5 December 2012 a Facebook group was created as a reaction to the incidents of intolerance targeting Muslims praying practices in two villages in Georgia. The group has the name ‘Solidarity with the Muslim of Georgia’ (სოლიდარობა საქართველოს მუსლიმებს), and has become a ‘portal’ for Muslim-related news and opinions.

13 Family Law

The religious marriage ritual of the Muslims is not recognised by the State. Legitimacy is given only to the civil marriage documents.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Imam of the Tbilisi mosque regards relations with other religious communities as well established and friendly.77 The synagogue, mosque, Georgian and Armenian churches situated side by side on one of the central streets in Tbilisi, are very often cited as an indication of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence and cooperation in Georgian society. Currently, two interreligious councils operate, one at the initiative of the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, the other by the Public Defender of Georgia. The Council attached to Public Defender’s Office, consisting of various religious groups, is a specific discussion forum for religious minorities to consider issues of preservation of identity, defining their needs and structuring their communication with the state.78 Two of the 22 member-organisations of the Council of Religion are Muslim organisations: Administration of Muslims of All Georgia, and Georgian Muslim Union.79 At the end of 2012, two incidents occurred that are relevant to mention in regard to relations between the Muslim and Christian populations in Georgia. Both of them were between the local population of Orthodox Christians and

76 www.tolerantoba.ge/index.php?id=1317642755, accessed 20 January 2013. 77 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 20 January 2013. Interview conducted by the author, December 2009. 78 coe Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public acfc/op/I(2009)001, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 10 October 2009. 79 Address of the Council of Religions under the Public Defender of Georgia to the Government of Georgia, www.tolerantoba.ge/index.php?news_id=320, accessed 20 January 2013. 260 Mkrtchyan and Khutsishvili

Muslim Georgians, the latter settled in these new villages from Ajara region in early 1990s. In the village of Nigvziani (Guria region) and Tsintskaro (Kvemo Kartli region) they were confronted and prevented from performing prayer in a house converted into a place of worship.80 Later, the Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, said in a written statement on December 7 that there were “obvious signs of provocation” in the recent cases of “confrontation on religious grounds” and vowed that “our government will not allow anyone to breach” the principle of freedom of religion.81

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The 2007 Data Initiative of the Caucasus Research Resource Centre showed that 72.1% referred to the importance of religion in life.82 The Muslim community in the country is considered one of the “traditional” confessions (together with the Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholics and Jews) as compared to the other Christian groups who are regarded as “sects”.83 Similarly, the survey showed more tolerance towards Muslims and Jews than towards other groups of Christianity. Specifically, 49.1% of respondents reported their positive attitude towards Muslims, 40.8% of the respondents were familiar with or had contacts with Muslims.84 The National Democratic Institute and the Caucasus Research Resource Centre have been conducting public opinion polls, nationally representative surveys over multiple waves (2010–2012). The November 2012 survey refers to the incident in the village Nigvziani in Guria “where Georgian Muslims are being prevented from holding religious services in a privately owned building.” According to the results of the survey 73% of the respondents were aware of the incident, and 51% out of those being aware were in favour of allowing the local Muslim population “to hold their services in a privately owned building.”85

80 Parliament Confirms New Public Defender, www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25524, accessed 20 January 2013. 81 Ibid. 82 R. Charles, Religiosity and Trust in Religious Institutions: Tales from the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Summer 2009, p. 9 at http://iseees.berkeley.edu/ sites/default/files/u4/2009–08-Charles.pdf, accessed 20 January2013. 83 G. Nizharadze, “Urban population,” pp. 115–119. 84 ibid., pp. 108–109. 85 Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a November 2012 survey carried out for ndi by crrc www.civil.ge/files/files/2012/ndi-Poll-November2012.pdf Georgia 261

16 Major Cultural Events

Nawruz Bayram, which is celebrated by the Azerbaijanis of Georgia, is not a religious holiday in itself, however, this holiday is perceived by the public as mostly a Muslim holiday (see sect. 9 above). On 23 March 2010, President Saakashvili signed a decree declaring Nawruz (21 March) a holiday. Since then, the president has usually visited the region populated with Azerbaijani citizens to congratulate them on the holiday.86

86 www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News?p=6253&i=1, accessed 20 January 2013. Germany

Mathias Rohe*

1 Muslim Populations

The presence of considerable numbers of Muslims in Germany is a relatively new phenomenon if compared with the uk or France. Since the 1960s, thousands of so-called “Gastarbeiter” (guest workers) were attracted to work in Germany with many of them being Turkish nationals, followed by people from the Balkan region (mainly Yugoslavia and Albania). Besides that, there was a continuous immigration of often well-educated people from the Middle East and beyond (mainly from Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Afghanistan), but of a limited number. A third motivation of Muslim immigration was the search for asylum. Their countries of origin are mainly to be found in the Middle East. In addition to that, there are Muslim merchants, students and scientists living in Germany for a shorter or longer period. While initially the “guest workers” and the German administration did not expect their long-lasting presence in the country, it has become evident since the 1970s that large numbers of Muslims have become a part of German society. The majority of Muslims belong to the Sunni denomination (74.1%) but there are also significant groups of Twelver Shiʿis (7.1%, particularly of Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqi origins) which may reach 200,000 persons, as well as ca. 480,000–550,000 (ca. 13%) Alevis, mostly from Turkey, and some 30,000 Ahmadis (1.7%) from Pakistan, the oldest organised Muslim group in Germany.1 As everywhere in the world, their opinions and beliefs range from a very devout attitude to a mere cultural link to Islam; Sufism is widespread, especially among ethnic Turks.

* Mathias Rohe has studied Law and Islamic Studies. He holds the chair for Civil Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law at the University Erlangen-Nuremberg and is the founding director of the Erlangen Centre for Islam and Law in Europe. He has been a judge at the Court of Appeals of Nuremberg and participated in the Deutsche Islam Konferenz from 2006–2013. 1 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees/Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Muslim Life in Germany, Nuremberg 2009, p. 92; cf. www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/en/Publikationen/ Forschungsberichte/fb06-muslimisches-leben.pdf;jsessionid=E0074CE0D683280FCFFD1381 A94057E0.1_cid286?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 23 December 2012. This study is by far the most reliable one in Germany, based on 6,004 interviewed persons. For methodological issues cf. ibid., pp. 34.

There are no official statistics regarding the religious affiliation of the German population. The 2011 census did not provide reliable data regarding Muslims due to the small amount of (non-obligatory) information about religious affiliation.2 According to figures based on representative polls published in 2009, there are between 3.8 and 4.3 million Muslims living in the country. About 2 million Muslims in the country are German citizens. Most of the Muslims—German and foreign citizens—are of Turkish origin (ca. 2.5 million3), more than half a million from former Yugoslavia, over 300,000 from the Middle East (mainly from Iraq and Lebanon), around 300,000 from North Africa, 60,000 from other parts of Africa, around 180,000 from South/Southeast Asia and 70,000 from Iran.4 The number of German converts is unknown; according to a rough estimate, it can be anywhere between 10,000 and 100,000. As a result of the migration history of many Muslims in Germany, there is a concentration in the main industrial areas in Western Germany and in Berlin.

2 Islam and the State

Secularity is the leading principle regulating the relationship between the state and religion, which means individual and collective freedom of religion, religious neutrality of the state and the separation between state and religion. In Germany, a system of secularity accepting of religions prevails. All religious communities enjoy far-reaching rights to act in the public space and to participate in and cooperate with the state on various levels. The underlying idea is that the secular state alone is unable to guarantee the principles it is based on, and that religion may positively contribute to this basis. These principles

2 Cf. the report of Riem Spielhaus, Wer bezeichnet sich als Muslim?, Mediendienst Integration 25.09.2013, available at http://mediendienst-integration.de/artikel/wer-bezeichnet-sich-als- muslim.html, accessed 6 February 2014. 3 The figure was recently changed to 2.9 million due to a new statistical approach: Children born in Germany from two parents of the same foreign nationality are now attributed to this nationality; cf. the statistics of the 2011 census published by the Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden 2011, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, p. 56, https://www.destatis.de/de/Publikationen/ Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshintergrund2010220117004 .pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 10 January 2013. 4 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees/Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Muslim Life in Germany, Nuremberg 2009, pp. 54–76 cf. www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/en/Publikationen/ Forschungsberichte/fb06-muslimisches-leben.pdf;jsessionid=E0074CE0D683280FCFFD1381 A94057E0.1_cid286?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 23 December 2012. 264 Rohe are common in Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, Germany being a federal state consisting of 16 states (Länder), the role of religion in the public sphere is slightly different from state to state. While the most important legislative competence lies at the federal level, the states are in general responsible for administrative affairs. In addition to that, they have prime legislative responsibility in educational, cultural and police issues. Thus, in daily practice, the states are usually the key actors in cooperating with Muslim communities on the ground. Some laws do differentiate between legally recognised/registered religious communities, others do not. In many cases, it is sufficient to be registered as an association under private law, which is easily achieved and this is the case for most of the Muslim organisations, in particular those running mosques and Islamic cultural centres. The prerequisites for being recognised as a religious community according to the laws regulating the cooperation between the state and such communities vary greatly. They are linked to the relative importance of the issue at stake for the state. Article 140 of the Federal Constitution regulates the conditions for religious societies (communities) to apply for the status of a corporation under public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts). Those communities holding this status when the constitution came into force kept their status. Others may apply for it and shall be granted the same rights, if their by-laws and the number of their members give assurances of permanency. The state administrations would usually grant the status in cases when an organisation has already existed for 30 years and represents at least 0.1% of the state’s population (membership has to be clearly regulated), but exceptions and reduced requirements can be applied for from case to case. This status grants far-reaching rights and privileges, e.g. tax exemptions and access to state institutions for collecting taxes (against payment), rights to have members appointed to broadcast advisory boards and to cooperate in matters of youth, social care, the right of refusing testimony in court for those carrying out pastoral care, rights to regulate labour relations and the relations to members including internal jurisdiction, and more. In April 2013, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat has obtained this status as the first Muslim organisation.5 On the federal level, in 2006 the Ministry of the Interior established the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (dik, German Islam Conference) to bring forward a more structured dialogue between Muslims and the state on crucial issues.6 There was a plenum consisting of 15 representatives of the state (federal, state

5 Staatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 13.05.2013, p. 634, no. 488. 6 Information in English is available from the dik website at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz .de/dik/en/Startseite/startseite-node.html, accessed 23 December 2013. For the dik and Germany 265 and communal level) and of 15 Muslim organised and individual representatives. The latter were chosen by the Ministry. After the 2009 elections, the dik was continued in a different setting regarding participants and a more concentrated working program (for details cf. the previous volume).7 Since the last responsible minister was broadly criticised for having little interest in issues beyond security matters, and relevant organisations were excluded, it became clear that the conference would have to be fundamentally re-organised in the new legislation period after the September 2013 elections. A number of topics dealt with in the past (Islamic instruction in schools, Islamic theological studies in universities) have now been devolved to the competent state level. New forms of cooperation on the basis of treaties between the state and single or joint organisations started in 2012 and 2013. The state of Hamburg has signed a treaty with the ditib Hamburg branch, the Schura Hamburg and vikz8 (see section 3.) as well as with the Alevi Community in Germany9 in November 2012. In Bremen, a similar10 treaty was signed on 24 January 2013 with ditib Bremen/Niedersachsen, vikz and the Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Bremen (Schura).11 The treaties mainly confirm the existing legal position and administrative practice concerning Muslim and Alevi communities and individuals (e.g. relating to religious holidays, education, spiritual care in hospitals, prisons etc. the planning and establishment of mosques and the administration of real estate by the religious communities), but certainly create more clarity in daily practice e.g. when confirming the right of Muslim women and girls not to be discriminated against in the labour market due to their religious garments. Single and provisory administrative practices e.g. relating to spiritual care are thus replaced by reliable rules. At the state level, several “round tables” are continuing their work in Baden- Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate to promote concrete projects, in particular regarding pilot projects of Islamic instruction in public schools and

relevant Muslim organisations cf. Rosenow-Williams, Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany, Leiden et al. 2012 (Brill), pp. 378 ss. in particular. 7 Cf. the description on the website, available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/dik/ en/Startseite/startseite-node.html, accessed 23 December 2013. 8 The text is available at www.ditib-nord.de/sites/default/files/staatsvertrag-muslim- verbaende.pdf, accessed 30 January 2013. 9 The text is available at www.hamburg.de/contentblob/3551366/data/download-alevi tische-gemeinde.pdf, accessed 30 January 2014. 10 There are differences due to the fact that in Bremen constitutional provisions regarding confessional instruction in public schools are not in force (cf. art. 141 of the constitution). 11 The text is available at www.rathaus-bremen.de/sixcms/media.php/13/20121211_Vertrag_ fhb_Schura.pdf, accessed 8 February 2014. 266 Rohe

Muslim burials.12 In most of the states, only some of the existing major organisations are involved; in some cases, local Muslim initiatives are accepted as preliminary partners for cooperation. On 25 February 2013, the Federal Ministry of Interior forbade and dissolved two extremist Salafi organisations (an-Nussrah, Gladbeck, and Dawateam Islamische Audios/DawaTeamLiesFfm, Frankfurt).

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The vast majority of Muslim organisations act at a local level, running mosques in particular. Usually they are organised as associations under civil law.13 In some states, regional organisations have emerged in recent years. On the federal level, the major (umbrella) organisations are the following:

– Diyanet Işleri Türk İslam Birliği ditib (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion, Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs) (Subbelrather Strasse 17, 50823 Köln; Internet: www.ditib.de, E-Mail: info@ ditib.de). Presently, ditib is establishing sub-organisations on the state level. It is by far the largest organisation, running nearly 900 mosques all over the country. – Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren vikz (Union of Islamic Cultural Cen- tres) (Vogelsanger Strasse 290, 50825 Köln; Internet: www.vikz.de; E-Mail: [email protected]). vikz has 300 local member communities with more than half of them owning their premises. – Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Islamic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany) (Osterather Strasse 7, 50739 Köln, Internet: www .islamrat.de; E-Mail: via the “contact” icon on the website). Its most important member is Milli Görüş, which is under surveillance by several German services for the protection of the Constitution.

12 Cf. Ministerium für Integration Baden-Württemberg, “Zweiter Runder Tisch Islam kommt in Stuttgart zusammen”, report 03. May 2012, available at www.integrationsministerium- bw.de/pb/,Lde/1584252/?listpage=1584112, accessed 22 January 2014; Ministerium für Integration, Familie, Kinder, Jugend und Frauen Rheinland-Pfalz, report spring 2012, available at http://mifkjf.rlp.de/integration/landesbeauftragter-fuer-migration-und-integ ration/runder-tisch-islam/, accessed 30 January 2014. 13 Cf. Rohe, “On the recognition and institutionalisation of Islam in Germany”, in Marie- Claire Foblets/Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens/Alison Dundes Renteln (eds.), Cultural Diversity and Law. State Responses from around the World (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010). Germany 267

– Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland zmd (Central Council of Muslims in Germany) (Steinfelder Gasse 32, 50670 Köln, Internet: www.zentralrat.de; E-Mail: [email protected]). This is an umbrella organisation of 19 other umbrella organisations, most of them having relatively few members. Some significant member organisations, like the Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland (igd Islamic Community of Germany) which is close to the Muslim Brotherhood ideologically, are under surveillance by services for the protection of the Constitution. In 2002, the zmd published an Islamic Charta defining its positions towards the German state and society (the English version is available at http://zentralrat.de/3037.php).

These four organisations are loosely united in the Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (krm, Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany). It was created parallel to the establishment of the German Islam Conference, attempting to create a unified cooperation partner for the German administration. Nevertheless, the member organisations are far from being united in their interests and goals. ditib enjoys a veto right within the Council. The krm does not have any infrastructure like a website etc. News is usually published by the websites of the member organisations. The krm is also split regarding the participation in the dik (cf. 2. above). The extent to which these organisations are representative of Muslims in Germany is highly disputed. Whereas the government usually would count 15–20% of Muslims to be represented by them, the organisations themselves claim to represent the vast majority of practising Muslims. Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschlands, Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu, (Alevi Community of Germany), aabf (Stolberger Strasse 317, 50933 Köln; www.alevi.com; [email protected]) is a federal umbrella organisation for local and regional Alevi communities. aabf is the only organisation within the spectrum of Islam so far which has been recognised by the state as meeting the legal requirements of a religious community in the sense of Article 7, Section 3 of the German Constitution. It is thus able to co-operate with the state in establishing religious instruction in public schools according to the legal system prevailing in most of the states except Berlin and Bremen. In March 2009, 110 Shiʿi communities created an umbrella organisation called Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinschaften Deutschlands (Islamic Community of the German Shiʿi communities; www.shiitischer-dachverband.de; [email protected]). For the Ahmadis, Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat is a federal umbrella organisation based in Frankfurt/Main (Zentrale der ajm, Genfer Strasse 11, 60437 Frankfurt am Main; www.ahmadiyya.de; [email protected]). 268 Rohe

In 2012, the Liberal-Islamischer Bund (Liberal Islamic Union; www.lib-ev.de; [email protected]) was founded by mostly Muslim intellectuals.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Approximately 2,700 buildings are used as mosques, in addition to an unknown number of Alevi cem houses, probably amounting to several hundred.14 While most of them are established in buildings not originally intended for that purpose, such as former factory buildings etc., some 200 are shaped in more or less traditional mosque architecture, and another estimated 150 of this type are under construction.15 Muslim religious infrastructure is now widespread but still concentrated in the major industrial settlement areas linked to immigration processes in the past (see section 1 above). Many of them still follow ethnic attributions (e.g. the “Turkish,” “Arab”/“Moroccan,” “Bosnian,” “Albanian,” or “Pakistani” mosque) and are run and visited mainly only by those familiar with the respective language. But there are remarkable changes indicating increasing “domestication” in the sense of de-nationalisation of Muslim community life among the second and following generations of descendants of immigrants. The establishment of mosques and prayer houses is one of the elements of religious freedom guaranteed by Article 4 of the Constitution and implemented by court decisions as the need arises. Unlike in Switzerland, it would not be possible in Germany to suppress the constitutional rights of a minority by a democratic majority decision. Contrary to the legal situation, the heated debate on “Muslim integration” in Germany (see section 15 below) has shown that according to representative polls in 2010,16 58.4% of the German population agrees to considerably restrict the religious freedom of Muslims in the country, whatever that exactly might mean.

14 Cf. the vague allusion on the aabf website, available at www.alevitische-bestattungen .de/aabf-alevitische-kulturzentren.php, accessed 29 January 2014. No more precise data are available at present. 15 Cf. Beinhauer-Köhler, Bärbel/Leggewie, Claus, Moscheen in Deutschland, München 2009 (C.H. Beck); Kraft, Sabine, Islamische Sakralarchitektur in Deutschland, Münster u.a. 2002 (lit Verlag); Schmitt, Thomas, Moscheen in Deutschland. Konflikte um ihre Errichtung und Nutzung, Flensburg 2003 (Deutsche Akademie für Landeskunde, Selbstverlag); Sommerfeld, Franz (Hrsg.), Der Moscheestreit. Eine exemplarische Debatte über Einwanderung und Integration, Köln 2008 (Kiepenheuer & Witsch). 16 See http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/07504-20120321.pdf, accessed 30 April 2012. Germany 269

Generally, in the public debate the mosque has replaced the head scarf as a core issue of potential conflict between Muslims and parts of the broader society.17 Particularly projects of major mosques in Cologne, Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich have triggered protests by strange coalitions of extreme right-wing enemies of Islam, small groups of Christian fundamentalists and (former) left-wing personalities like Ralph Giordano, all of them denouncing “Islam as such” to be a problem for German society. Nevertheless, there is a very broad political majority supporting strongly and publicly the constitutional rights of Muslims. Deutsche Islam Konferenz issued a paper on the relevant legal framework including advice on how practically to solve potential conflicts on mosque building.18 Prayer or meditation rooms are available in a number of public institutions, e.g. in state parliament buildings and public hospitals. Due to the religious neutrality of the state, they are not confined to particular religions or confessions and are usually called “room of silence.” In most public buildings, however, there are no such facilities available.

5 Children’s Education

Article 7, Section 3 of the German Constitution, which is valid in all federal states except Bremen and Berlin (for historical reasons, cf. Article 141 “Bremen clause”), declares confessional religious instruction to be a regular subject in public schools.19 It has to be taught in cooperation between the state and the respective religious community. Since 2008–9, the Alevi community has been recognised by several federal states (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Northrhine-Westphalia, Saarland) to have a structure which enables it to cooperate with the state in this

17 Cf. Bärbel Beinhauer-Köhler/Claus Leggewie, Moscheen in Deutschland (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009). 18 Cf. dik, Empfehlungen der dik zum Moscheebau, available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/dik/de/Magazin/Gemeindeleben/AG2Moscheebau/ag2-moscheebau-node .html, accessed 30 January 2014. 19 Cf. the thorough study of Dietrich, Myriam, Islamischer Religionsunterricht (Frankfurt: Lang, 2006) and more recently Irka-Christin Mohr/ Kiefer, Michael (eds.), Islamunterricht— Islamischer Religionsunterricht—Islamkunde. Viele Titel—ein Fach? (Bielefeld: transcript 2009); Kuld, Lothar /Schmid, Bruno (eds.), Islamischer Religionsunterricht in Baden- Württemberg (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2009); Kiefer, Michael /Gottwald, Eckart /Ucar, Bülent (eds.), Auf dem Weg zum Islamischen Religionsunterricht. Sachstand und Perspektiven in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2008). 270 Rohe matter.20 In the state of Berlin, Islamic religious instruction, including Alevi, has been established since the beginning of this decade. The state of Hamburg has introduced an inter-confessional model of “religion for all” under the over- sight of the Protestant Church. Attaining recognition as a religious community in terms of school law is a major goal of the main existing Muslim organisations on both the federal and the regional levels. Since 2003, a number of federal states (North Rhine- Westphalia, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Baden-Württemberg, and Rhineland- Palatinate) have introduced pilot projects of Islamic instruction. The nature of such cooperation is very dependent on the particular state’s practices and expectations, but in all cases Muslims are intensely involved in elaborating the curricula and appointing the teachers. In 2008 Deutsche Islam Konferenz published a detailed paper21 identifying these topics and suggesting solutions. In 2009, the state of Bavaria established Islamic instruction on a state-wide level according to the model developed in the city of Erlangen.22 This model includes more than 270 schools of all educational levels, reaching around 13% of all Muslim pupils within the state. In late 2011, Northrhine-Westphalia introduced a new temporary law operating until 2019, according to which confessional Islamic instruction is introduced in ca. 130 public schools in cooperation with krm (cf. section 3 above). krm is entitled to send four representatives to the relevant advisory board (Beirat), whereas the Ministry of Education nominated another four in consultation with krm.23 Lower Saxony has equally established a model of cooperation with a Muslim council consisting of ditib and Schura Niedersachsen in 2012.

20 Cf. the relevant information on the aabf website, available at alevi.com/de/religionsun terricht/, accessed 6 February 2014. 21 Available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DIK/DE/Downloads/ Sonstiges/2008-IRU-zwischenresumee-der-dik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 30 January 2014. 22 Cf. the official announcement by the School Ministry of 15 January 2010, available at https://www.verkuendung-bayern.de/kwmbl/jahrgang:2010/heftnummer:4/seite:38, accessed 30 January 2014, and the report by the dik “Engagement muslimischer Eltern in Erlangen für islamischen Religionsunterricht, available at www.deutsche-islam-kon ferenz.de/dik/de/Magazin/IslamSchule/Engagement/engagement-node.html, accessed 30 January 2014. 23 Information is provided at the website of the Schulministerium Nordrhein-Westfalen, available at www.schulministerium.nrw.de/docs/Schulsystem/Unterricht/Lernbereiche- und-Faecher/Religionsunterricht/Islamischer-Religionsunterricht/index.html, accessed 22 January 2014. Germany 271

For the first time, the state of Hesse recognised ditib and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat in 2013 as cooperation partners in establishing regular religious instruction in 27 public schools (24 in cooperation with ditib).24 Applications of Muslim pupils for exemption from obligatory classes in swimming where these have been mixed sex have repeatedly gone to court. On September 11, 2013, the Federal Administrative Court25 overruled its former landmark decision of 199426 granting exemptions if they have reached the age of puberty and the school is unable to arrange unisex classes. Three main reasons were given: first, it is now possible in most swimming halls to wear a so-called “burkini” covering the whole body; second, since it has become usual among some Muslim pupils to wear such garments, it has no discriminatory effect; third, all pupils in German society have to cope with contacts with the opposite sex in public space, including those wearing the common kinds of light bathing suits. In sum, if a state decides to organise mixed sex classes, the educational purposes of the school have weight over religious convictions which would not accept the burkini-compromise. The chairman of zmd has publicly supported this decision,27 while a representative of Milli Görüş28 has criticised it. The latter claimed in a broadcast debate with the author29 to speak in the name of “the Muslims” in Germany, while only around 3.5% of the Muslim female pupils applied for exemptions on religious grounds in the past.30 Regarding ritual prayer, the protection of religious freedom includes public schools, and that there is no objection in principle to perform the prayers the way the appellant wanted to. Nevertheless, these rights are limited by the equally legitimate goal to preserve school peace. Meanwhile, the administration

24 Cf. the report of the Hessian Ministry of Culture, available at https://kultusministerium.hes sen.de/schule/bekenntnisorientierter-islamischer-religionsunterricht, accessed 6 February 2014. 25 Decision of 11.09.2013 (BVerwG 6 C 25.12), available at www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/ entscheidung.php?ent=110913U6C25.12.0, accessed 6 February 2014. For details and the practical impact of the decision cf. Mathias Rohe, Muslimische Schülerinnen im Schwimmunterricht, SchulVerwaltung Bayern 2013, pp. 338–340. 26 Bundesverwaltungsgericht dvbl. 1994, pp. 168. 27 Aiman Mazyek, report available at http://islam.de/22812, accessed 30 January 2014. 28 Cf. the report “Muslime bewerten Burkini-Urteil untrschiedlich, available at www.islamiq .de/2013/09/12/muslime-bewerten-burkini-urteil-unterschiedlich/, accessed 30 January 2014. 29 Cf. www.deutschlandfunk.de/wie-viel-religion-vertraegt-schule.1180.de.html?dram:article_ id=261524, accessed 30 January 2014. 30 Cf. Muslim Life in Germany (n. 2), p. 176. 272 Rohe has issued instructions on how to handle the situation by minimising possible conflicts.31 The establishment of private religious schools is granted under Article 7, Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. Several such schools have been established in recent years by organisations close to the Fethullah Gülen movement.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Universities of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Münster and Osnabrück have established programmes to train Muslim teachers and appointed Muslim professors as core staff members since 2003. Some first teaching materials have been developed and published,32 triggering a vivid debate on modern Muslim religious pedagogy among traditionalist Muslims. The legal issues involved are similar to those mentioned above (see section 5). In a broader academic perspective, Islamic theology (called “Islamic studies,” “Islamic religious studies” or “Islamic theology”) aiming at a confession- orientated education and research are established in six universities since 2011. Following the recommendations published by the German Wissenschaftsrat (German Council of Science and Humanities),33 the universities of Erlangen- Nürnberg,34 Frankfurt35 and Giessen36 (joint planning), Münster37 and Osnabrück38 (joint planning) and Tübingen39 have established departments for such studies in close cooperation with existing theology faculties and with

31 Decision from 30 November 2011, available at www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/entschei dung.php?ent=301111U6C20.10.0, accessed 22 January 2014. In the case at stake the Court of Appeal’s factual findings stating considerable conflicts were binding for the Federal Administrative Court, thus the pupil lost his case. 32 Lamya Kaddor/Rabeya Müller/Harun Behr (eds.), Saphir 5/6, Religionsbuch für junge Musliminnen und Muslime (Munich: Kösel, 2008); Serap Erkan et al. (eds.), Mein Islambuch (Munich: Oldenbourg 2009). 33 Cf. www.wissenschaftsrat.de/download/archiv/9678–10.pdf, accessed 30 January 2014. 34 Cf. the website www.dirs.phil.uni-erlangen.de/, accessed 19 January 2014. 35 Cf. The website www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb09/islam/index.html, accessed 19 January 2014. 36 Cf. The website www.uni-giessen.de/cms/fbz/fb04/inst/islamtheo, accessed 22 January 2014. 37 Cf. the website www.uni-muenster.de/zit/Zentrum/index.html, accessed 19 January 2014. 38 Cf. the website www.islamische-religionspaedagogik.uni-osnabrueck.de/, accessed 22 January 2014. 39 Cf. the website www.uni-tuebingen.de/fakultaeten/zentrum-fuer-islamische-theologie/ zentrum.html, accessed 22 January 2014. Germany 273

Muslim representatives gathered in advisory boards according to the German legal system of cooperation in such fields. Some more or less anti-Muslim movements are heavily criticising these developments,40 but the programmes enjoy broad political support. In 2013, a dispute between krm (cf. above 3.) and one of the professors in Münster (Prof. Khorchide) and the university emerged on administrative and theological issues. The financing Federal ministry had rejected one of the candidates nominated by krm for the advisory board, which was perceived as a violation of religious self-determination by krm. Meanwhile, another candidate was accepted, but the board still was not constituted in 2013. Prof. Khorchide published “Islam heißt Barmherzigkeit” (Islam means mercy) which was praised by many Muslim individuals, but criticised by several organisations for “irritating” believers and for alleged theological errors or minority positions. “Expert opinions” of students and low profile “theologians” presented by krm in December 2013 to support the allegations41 were criticised in return by a considerable number of Muslims and non-Mus- lim scholars for their lack of scientific standards. The Pädagogische Hochschule (University of Applied Sciences) Weingarten officially established studies in Alevi religious teaching and pedagogics in October 2013.42 Concerning imam training, the University of Osnabrück has offered a residential programme for 30 imams from 2009–2013, which is now in the process of evaluation. It is unclear whether this course will continue. The University of Erlangen-Nürnberg has developed teaching programmes in a more decentral- ised way in cooperation with local partners. Some Muslim organisations train their imams in internal programmes. State-funded political organisations and a number of bigger cities like Munich, Frankfurt, Berlin and, in 2013, Nürnberg have offered programmes for imams as well, in particular concerning citizenship and social issues. There is a widespread desire among Muslims to profes- sionalise the training of imams, since their role in majority societies as well as broad political support is increasing; but in terms of organisation and particularly financing, no solutions are in sight for the near future.

40 Cf. e.g. statements of the so-called Central council of ex-Muslims in Germany, at www .bild.de/bild/politik/2010/10/14/imam-ausbildung-ein-skandal/sagt-der-zentral-rat-der- ex-muslime.html. 41 Available at http://koordinationsrat.de/media/File/gutachten_krm_17122013.pdf, accessed 6 February 2014. 42 Cf. „Erste Wissenschaftsstelle für „Alevitentum“ an deutscher Hochschule eingerichtet, Alevilerin Sesi 176 (11/2013), p. 30. 274 Rohe

vikz43 has offered imam training courses since the 1980s. ditib has run several training programmes in cooperation with German state institutions related to language skills and integration issues.44 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat opened an institute for imam education (Institute for Islamic Theology and Languages) in Riedstadt/Hessen in 2012. Approximately half of the Ahmadiyya community members in Germany live in the Rhine-Main region close to this institution (ca. 15,000).45 As a reaction by traditionalist organisations to the newly established Islamic theology in universities, a private institute for Islamic religious studies (Europäisches Institut für Humanwissenschaften) was opened in October 2013 in Frankfurt46 in connection to a similar institution in Château-Chinon (France) which is affiliated to organisations and institutions close to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Many Muslims still prefer to be buried in their country of origin. This is due to sentiments of “feeling home” there more than in Germany, particularly within the first generation of immigrants, but also due to relatively high costs for burials in Germany and the lack of appropriate facilities for Muslim burials in their neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Muslims are buried in Germany. There are only a few Muslim cemeteries, but many cemeteries run by the state or by churches have established special Muslim burial areas. Facilities for washing the deceased’s body have been built, and the possibilities of maintaining a grave for more than the usually permitted period of 10–20 years are broadened (while costly). In addition, there is an increasing consensus that graves could be re-used, provided that the still existing mortal remains are buried in a lower stratum of the grave, like in many heavily populated regions in the Muslim world. From a legal point of view, most states require the status of a corporation under public law (Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts, see

43 Cf. The information on the official website (www.vikz.de/index.php/Imamausbildung .html), accessed 29 January 2014. 44 Cf. the report “Imame für Integration”, www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/dik/de/dik/ StandpunkteErgebnisse/ReligPersonal/ImameTheologie/ImameIntegration/imaminteg ration-node.html, accessed 29 January 2014. 45 Cf. the report “Die muslimischen Pioniere. Islamisches Theologie-Institut in Hessen”, taz 17 December 2012, available at www.taz.de/!107557/, accessed 10 January 2014. 46 Cf. the report “Private Islam-Hochschule in Frankfurt”, available at http://brightsblog.word press.com/tag/europaische-institut-fur-humanwissenschaften-eihw/, accessed 6 February 2014. Germany 275 section 2) as a prerequisite for establishing a religious cemetery, which is difficult to obtain. Northrhine-Westphalia has lowered these very strict and thus potentially unconstitutional prerequisites in 2013.47 Other legislation has abolished the duty to bury bodies in a coffin, thus allowing the traditional burial in white linen. A debate on reform suggestions submitted by two opposition parties took place in the Parliament of Hesse on 8 November 2012.48 On 4 December 2012, the governing parties proposed a legal amendment49 allowing burials without a coffin according to Islamic tradition, which came into force in March 2013.50

8 “Chaplaincy” in State Institutions

Chaplaincy in state institutions is run in cooperation between the state and the recognised religious communities which fulfil the necessary organisational conditions. No Muslim organisation has achieved this status so far. Until now, there are mostly provisional solutions on a local level, particularly in hospitals. The state of Lower Saxony signed an agreement with 3 major organisations in December 201251 to create a stable framework of cooperation regarding chaplaincy in prisons. The city of Wiesbaden has run a model project funded by the eu on offering spiritual care and educating suitable volunteers in the main hospital52 and in

47 Cf. Sect. 1 (2) and 2 (1) of the new Burial Law Code, which now permits“religious associationsˮ besides corporations under public law to run cemeteries (https://recht.nrw .de/lmi/owa/br_bes_text?anw_nr=2&gld_nr=2&ugl_nr=2127&bes_id=5166&aufgehoben= N&menu=1&sg=0) accessed 26 March 2014. 48 Cf. the written expert opinions submitted to the State Parliament, available at www.hessischer-landtag.de/icc/Internet/med/fd9/fd930c3e-d990-0931-d3d1- 17052184e373,11111111–1111–1111–1111–111111111111.pdf, accessed 8 February 2014. 49 Hessischer Landtag Drucksache 18/6734 neu, available at http://starweb.hessen.de/ cache/drs/18/4/06734.pdf, accessed 20 January 2014. 50 For a practical example in the city of Rüsselsheim cf. the report “Beisetzung im Leichentuch statt im Sarg”,

9 Religious Festivals

Political authorities increasingly take notice of Muslim religious festivals, sending messages of congratulation or inviting them/accepting invitations, e.g. in the month of Ramadan. Muslim holidays are not legally recognised as state holidays like the major Christian holidays but are legally protected to a certain extent. Employees are in general entitled to apply for leave during the major festivals, pupils may stay away from school for a number of days (during ʿId al-Adha and following the end of the month of Ramadan, during ʿId al-Fitr). The numbers of pilgrims on the annual hajj are unknown.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food can be imported to Germany, which regularly occurs. According to a verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2002,56 Muslims are entitled to apply for an exemption from the general prohibition of slaughtering without pre-stunning according to the Animal Protection Act (Para. 4a Sect. 2). Since then, some Muslim butchers have applied for such exceptions, which were often refused by administrations or only granted under very restrictive conditions. The Federal Administrative Court has repeatedly decided in favour

53 Cf. Rohe, Bedeutung und Perspektiven der Seelsorge im Justizvollzug, to be published in Zeitschrift für Strafvollzug 2014. 54 Cf. the project musa, website available at http://itv-institut.de/laufendes/musa-musl- seelsorge-augsburg/, accessed 8 February 2014. 55 Cf. Protocol of the dif (Deutsches Islamforum), session of 13.11.2012, lit. f). 56 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vol. 104, pp. 337. Germany 277 of Muslim applicants57 but administrative and lower court resistance has not totally ceased yet. In September 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court58 in an unusually clear judgement quashed decisions by the Administrative Court of Giessen59 and the Administrative Court of Appeals of Hesse60 which were unfavourable for the Muslim applicant. Nevertheless, in a questionable decision of November 2009, the Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeals61 stated that the claim of a Muslim applicant to slaughter animals for ʿId al-Adha was taken to be merely culturally based, thus not coming under freedom of religion. Repeated reports confirm that local administrations are handling exemption applications in a very restrictive manner.62 ditib has called on believers to avoid unnecessary pain for the animals to be slaughtered at ʿId al-Adha, declaring that there is no objection to using electric stunning methods before slaughtering the animal.63 In public and social care institutions food not containing pork or alcohol is usually offered. In some cases (e.g. kindergartens with high numbers of Muslim children) there are complaints that no traditional pork meals are offered any more.64 Access to halal food is widespread, since more and more shops, restaurants and supermarkets offer it mainly in the regions with high Muslim population. Regarding Islamic banking and finance, there are no institutions specialised in this sector. Instead, a number of banks and finance services offer sukuk and other forms of Islamic investments, or interest-free accounts. Only in Mannheim

57 Federal Administrative Court judgement from 23.11.2006, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwal tungsrecht 2007, p. 461. 58 Decision from 28 September 2009, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht—Rechtspre chungsreport 2009, pp. 945. 59 Decision from 25 February 2009 (10 L 80/09.gi), available at www.kostenlose-urteile .de/Verwaltungsgericht-erlaubt-Schaechten-unter-Auflagen.news7501.htm, accessed 30 January 2014. 60 Decision from 26 May 2009 (unpublished). 61 Decision from 26 November 2009 (9 ce 09.2917), available at www.kostenlose-urteile. de/Bayerischer-vgh_9-ce-092903-und-9-ce-092917_Tuerkischer-Metzger-erhaelt-keine- Erlaubnis-zum-Schaechten.news8836.htm, accessed 30 January 2014. 62 Cf. e.g. „Streit ums Schächten. Schlachten mit der Stoppuhr“, Frankfurter Rundschau 02.08.2012, available at www.fr-online.de/rhein-main/streit-ums-schaechten-schlachten- mit-stoppuhr,1472796,16779062.html, accessed 9 February 2014. 63 Cf. the message of the Secretary General Sadi Arslan (25 November 2009), published at www.ditib.de/detail1.php?id=180&lang=de, accessed 30 April 2012 (no longer available). 64 Cf. “Keine Currywurst in Kieler Kitas”, Schleswig-Holsteinischer Zeitungsverlag report from 10 November 2012, available at www.shz.de/artikel/keine-currywurst-in-kieler-kitas .html, accessed 30 January 2014. 278 Rohe

(Baden-Württemberg), Kuveyt Türk bank opened a branch in 2010 and applied for a full banking licence in 2012.65 The market for such activities in Germany is considered to be marginal. In Berlin, a “Muslimtaxi” company was set up in December 2011 offering transport by same-sex drivers, and a Muslim auction company was opened.66 In addition, some mosques and organisations are offering services ranging from hajj performance to the organisation of Muslim burials. Internet offers for sales and services seem to cover a considerable part of supply from books, dvds etc. up to religious garment and other merchandise.

11 Dress Codes

Male Muslim dress codes are practically unnoticed by law and in public debate. The contrary is true for the female head scarf. There is a widespread rejection of the head scarf in German society, as it is perceived it simply as an instrument to oppress women and to demonstrate male supremacy. Extremists including anti-Islam feminists like Alice Schwarzer declared it to be “the flag of Islamism”, not distinguishing between actual cases of oppression67 and women wearing the head scarf voluntarily. Several cases of hate crimes against Muslim women wearing a head scarf were reported: in July 2013, in Berlin, a man threw a beer- bottle towards a young Muslim woman after having insulted her because of her head scarf.68 In Koblenz, also in July 2013, a pedestrian refused to call the medical emergency service for a young girl declaring “I will not do anything for such a dirty head scarf-bearer”.69

65 Cf. the report “Anlegen mit Allahs Segen”, Wirtschaftswoche 22.01.13, available at www .wiwo.de/finanzen/geldanlage/islam-investments-anlegen-mit-allahs-segen/7655000 .html, accessed 30 January 2014. 66 Cf. the interview with the founder of both companies Selim Reid “Wir dürfen nicht betrügen”, taz 20 November 2012, available at www.taz.de/!105873/, accessed 30 January 2014, and the website http://muslimtaxi.de/index.php. 67 Cf. for such cases the judgement of the Administrative Court of Karlsruhe (Az. 9 K 4270/07) from 30 April 2009 (residence permit for a shortly married Serbian woman who was forced to wear a headscarf by her Turkish husband who had unofficially entered into a polygamous marriage besides that). 68 Cf. The report “Beleidigt und bedroht—Mann wirft Bierflasche nach 32-jähriger”, Berliner Morgenpost 27.07.13, available at www.rbb-online.de/politik/thema/kopftuch-urteil/ beitraege/berliner-richter-lehnen-anwaeltinnen-mit-kopftuch-ab.html, accessed 4 Feb ruary 2014. 69 Cf. the report “Mann verweigert Notruf für Mädchen mit Kopftuch”, Rhein-Zeitung 30.07.13, available at www.rhein-zeitung.de/startseite_artikel,-Mann-verweigert-Notruf- fuer-Maedchen-mit-Kopftuch-_arid,1017186.html, accessed 4 February 2014. Germany 279

Legally, wearing the head scarf is allowed in public spaces including schools and universities, except for school teachers, according to newer legislation in eight federal states which have banned the wearing of “religious symbols” in public office. Such regulations are neutral in their wording but are clearly aimed at the Muslim head scarf only. The Federal Constitutional Court70 has opened for two ways of legislation: either a general ban of religious symbols or a general permission. It has stressed that in any case all religions have to be treated equally. In contrast to that, the respective laws of some states include exceptions from the ban for culturally accepted (Christian or Jewish) symbols, which is a clear contradiction of the Constitutional Court’s verdict which enjoys legal status according to German law. The Constitutional Court will decide again in 2014, following a Baden-Württemberg teacher’s appeal against the judgement of the Federal Administrative Court. Photos of women wearing a headscarf for id cards or passports are permitted,71 as opposed to the niqab or other forms of garment hindering effi- cient procedures of identification. In Berlin, in 2013, a debate on lawyers wearing head scarves in court has arisen, after four judges had rejected such lawyers in the courtroom. In response, the presidencies of Berlin, Parliament and government representatives declared that lawyers are free to wear head scarves in court, as opposed to judges.72 The regional court of Bremen in mid-2013 decided in a civil case73 that a fitness-studio is entitled to forbid the wearing of head scarves for concrete security reasons and thus refused a claim for damages on grounds of religious discrimination.

70 Judgement from 24 December 2003 (2 BvR 1436/02), available at www.bundesverfassungs gericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602.html, accessed 30 January 2014. 71 Cf. Administrative Courts Wiesbaden 10.07.1984, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1985, pp. 137; Kassel 20 January 2004 (3 G 1916/03) and Administrative Court of Appeals Hessen (7 tg 448/04), report available at www.jurblog.de/2006/06/12/passfoto-mit-kopf tuch-im-lichtbildausweis/, accessed 30 January 2014. 72 Cf. the reports “Alle Parteien einig: Kopftuch vor Gericht ist okay”, Tagesspiegel 06.12.13, available at www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/muslimische-anwaeltinnen-alle-parteien-einig- kopftuch-vor-gericht-ist-okay/9170906.html, accessed 4 February 2014; “10 Jahre Kopftuch- Urteil”, rbb-online 02.11.13, available at www.rbb-online.de/politik/thema/kopftuch-urteil/ beitraege/berliner-richter-lehnen-anwaeltinnen-mit-kopftuch-ab.html, accessed 4 February 2014. 73 Regional court Bremen decision from 21.06.13 (4 S 89/12), report available at www.lto .de/recht/nachrichten/n/lg-bremen-urteil-4-s-89–12-kopftuchverbot-fitnessstudio- kuendigung- verletzung/, accessed 4 February 2014. 280 Rohe

12 Publications and Media

Some Muslim organisations are issuing magazines and brochures on religious issues and are maintaining websites (see section 3 above). Most of them only reach a rather limited number of readers, however. Islamische Zeitung is the only monthly journal. Besides that, some newspapers address the Turkish Muslim community, in particular Zaman, which regularly deals with religious topics and is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement. In addition, there is an emerging scene of publications and internet fora developing, aimed particularly at youths and their culture (e.g. ufuq.de) or women, like the magazine Gazelle (ed. Sineb El Masrar).74 A number of projects were discontinued after short time, indicating that the market for specific religious media is still limited. In German public tv and broadcast, fora like Wort zum Freitag (“Word for Friday”, as a parallel to the Christian “Word for Sunday”), Forum am Freitag and Das islamische Wort were established to enable authentic Muslim voices to be heard by a broader public. There are no specific Muslim-run tv or broadcast offers. Many Muslims would still use media of the countries of origin besides or even instead of German media, particularly Arab and Turkish sources.75 The German Islam Conference provides some information in English in its magazine Muslims in Germany.76 On a scientific level, new journals have been issued by Muslim scholars at some of the universities specialised in Islamic religious studies. The University of Erlangen-Nürnberg has had an internet publication called Zeitschrift für die Religionslehre des Islam (zrli) since 2007.77 At the University of Osnabrück, a print journal called Hikma—Journal of Islamic Theology and Religious Education has been published since 2010.78

74 Website available at www.gazelle-magazin.de/, accessed 9 February 2014. 75 Representative data are available for migrants of Turkish background, but not specifically regarding the religious affiliation of the users or the media contents; cf. the working paper of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Mediennutzung von Migranten in Deutschland, Nürnberg August 2010, pp. 24 s., available at www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/ Anlagen/de/Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp34-mediennutzung-von-migranten .pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 9 February 2014. 76 Available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/dik/en/Magazin/magazin-node.html, accessed 9 February 2014. 77 Cf. the website www.izir.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52&Ite mid=5, accessed 30 January 2014. 78 Cf. the website www.zirt-online.de/, accessed 23 January 2014. Germany 281

In Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate, a new state treaty on Südwestrundfunk (common public broadcast) was signed in 2013, reserving for the first time a seat for Muslims on the board.79

13 Family Law80

Islamic norms (as formulated in the laws of Islamic states) are primarily applicable according to the rules of private international law (pil) within the limits set by public policy (Art. 6 egbgb).81 In family matters, German pil still uses citizenship as an important connecting factor, obliging courts and administrations to apply foreign law to “foreigners” living in Germany even after several generations. Thus, in Germany it is much more often necessary to apply foreign norms than in other European states following the principles of immigration countries, which usually prefer residence as the main connecting factor. This is fundamentally changing for important aspects of pil: the new eu regulations on divorce (Regulation No 1259/2010) and on succession (Regulation No 650/2012) declare residence to be the prime connecting factor. In practice, public policy would lead to the non-application of Islamic legal norms in a considerable number of cases to the extent that they preserve traditional gender inequality and the inequality of religions. According to the German system, these norms are not considered in the abstract, and it is only the result of their application in the concrete case which is taken into consideration.82 Thus, if this result were similar—not necessarily totally equal—to the legal solution the German substantive law provides, the foreign norm can be applied. In consequence, the Court of Appeals of Hamm83 in June 2013 applied Iranian

79 Cf. the report “Neuer swr-Staatsvertrag”, Stuttgarter Nachrichten 04.07.13, available at www.stuttgarter-nachrichten.de/inhalt.neuer-swr-staatsvertrag-landesregierungen- nicht-mehr-im-rundfunkrat.c46f20ea-6663-4bc7-afed-6203d9ec19dd.html, accessed 4 Feb ruary 2014. 80 An overview in English on the application of Islamic norms in Germany is given by the author on the website of the German Islam Conference, available at www.deutsche- islam-konferenz.de/dik/en/Magazin/Recht/islam-recht-node.html, accessed 9 February 2014. 81 Cf. Rohe, Das islamische Recht: Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3rd ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011), pp. 353. 82 Court of Appeals München FamRZ 2013, 36 concerning an Iranian-German inheritance case. 83 Decision of 03.06.2013 (3 uf 267/12), available at https://openjur.de/u/632248.html, accessed 10 February 2014. 282 Rohe divorce law in a case of “delegated repudiation” (talaq-e tafwid) which enabled the wife to pronounce the repudiation against herself according to the matrimonial contract. In addition to that, the application of public policy requires strong factual relations of the case to be decided in Germany. Since the number of German Muslims is increasing and the law of residence has to be applied more often due to legal changes in pil, German substantive law has now to deal with drawing the limits between private autonomous regulations under religious auspices and the limits of good morals, which have to be applied neutrally regarding religion. In particular, cases regarding the restitution of presents in the course of failed engagements or marriages are widespread in German courts. In general, the federal Supreme Court has accepted and enforced mahr (dower) provisions in matrimonial contracts under German substantive law. In sum, dealing with Islamic norms undergoes a shift from pil to domestic substantive law.84 The Court of Appeals of Berlin held that a mahr provision in a marriage contract between a German husband and an Egyptian wife who intended to live in Germany, which was registered in Egypt does not necessarily indicate the choice of Egyptian law, since such provisions might equally be part of a contract under German substantive law.85 In an exceptional case, the Court of Appeals of Cologne86 has prevented the father of a little boy from any contact on the mother’s request, due to previous domestic violence and continuous jihadist propaganda which has already led to punishment and expulsion of the father. Little information is available on the informal sector. Some mosques offer mediation in family conflicts. In a couple of cases known to the author, Muslim refugees and migrants who were unable to procure the necessary documents for an official marriage from their home country resorted to merely religious marriages concluded by imams. These marriages are without any legal standing in Germany but can cause problems if they are socially binding within a marginalised community. Thus, some improvisation is required in cases where such “wives” seek a divorce which cannot be granted by courts due to the lack of a legally valid marriage. The Bavarian Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection set up a working group dealing with the scope and limits of informal and formal Alternative Dispute resolution (adr) outside

84 For details cf. Rohe, Family and the Law in Europe, in: Shah (chief. Ed.), Family, Religion, and Law, to be published with Ashgate in 2014. 85 kg 03.01.2013 (1 va 9/12), available at http://openjur.de/u/598169.html, accessed 10 Feb ruary 2014. 86 Court of Appeals Cologne 15.03.2013 (26 uf 9/13), available at http://openjur.de/u/618834 .html, accessed 10 February 2014. Germany 283 state courts.87 It was not specifically aimed at Muslim adr, which seems to be rare outside some specific milieus, but at all kinds of groups who are keeping their distance from state institutions for various reasons (sometimes the motives are to be found among these groups, while at other times from within state institutions themselves). Some results were published in 2013.88 In May 2012, the German regional court of Cologne89 ruled that male circumcision in a particular case concerning a Muslim boy is punishable under German penal law, even if performed in accordance with medical standards of care. This decision went against a unanimous opinion in the judiciary90 so far, which held this procedure to be lawful. It was based on a short and poorly balanced reasoning, simply stating that the parents cannot validly consent to the harm caused to the child. The court made no attempt whatsoever to weigh up the parents’ motivation of integrating the child into a religious community according to their definition of the best welfare of the child with the (relatively minor) violation of the integrity of the child’s body. This decision caused uproar in the Jewish and Muslim communities and was rejected by most of the political parties and by leading politicians including the Chancellor.91 Legislation aimed at clarifying the permission for male circumcision to be performed according to medical standards of care and without unnecessary harm under German family law passed the German Parliament on 12 December 2012.92 The on-going debate shows an increasingly aggressive secularist tone condemning any religious rites to be backward and irrelevant in a secular society.93 In 2013,

87 Two units were working on monitoring/practical administrative measures and preventive measures, the latter chaired by the author. 88 Cf. the brochure „How the German judicial system works“ in German, English, Türkish, Russian and Arabic, Munich August 2013. 89 lg Köln decision of 7 May 2012 (151 Ns 169/11), available at www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/ koeln/lg_koeln/j2012/151_Ns_169_11_Urteil_20120507.html, accessed 30 January 2014. 90 According to German law of social welfare, the state even has to finance the costs of a decent celebration of the circumcision in case of need, cf. Administrative Court of Appeal Lüneburg fevs 44, pp. 465. 91 Cf. the report “Unstrittene Rechtslage: Kanzlerin warnt vor Beschneidungsverbot,” Spiegel online 16 July 2012, available at www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeskanzlerin- merkel-warnt-vor-beschneidungsverbot-a-844671.html, accessed 30 January 2014. 92 Cf. Entwurf eines Gesetzes über den Umfang der Personensorge bei einer Beschneidung des männlichen Kindes from 05.11.2012, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/11295, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/112/1711295.pdf, accessed 9 February 2014. 93 Cf. the lucid essay of Heiner Bielefeldt, un special rapporteur for freedom of religion and belief teaching an the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg “Marginalisierung der Religionsfreiheit?”, available at www.polwiss.uni-erlangen.de/professuren/menschen 284 Rohe the Court of Appeals of Hamm94 held that under the new law (para. 1631 d Civil Code) a boy of six has to be consulted by the parents and the physician in an appropriate way about his opinion on the procedure before the parents can validly give their consent.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious relations between Muslims and the major churches are well established and intense. The Catholic and Protestant Churches have appointed commissioners for Islamic affairs on the federal level and within their regional entities; their academies regularly organise conferences and meetings for interreligious dialogue. The Roman Catholic Church has issued a paper supporting the establishment of mosques in general, which caused some opposition and even departures by members rejecting Islam. Interreligious festivals and mutual invitations are very common—but usually Muslims would invite Christians more often to their festivals than vice versa. In some parts of the Churches there are anti-Islamic tendencies, in which Islam is perceived to be incompatible with the structure of a secular democratic state. Others would still feel more solidarity with Muslims in view of broad common convictions and interests and preservation of freedom of religion for everybody. Several organisations on the federal, state and local levels are involved in interreligious activities on a regular basis. Koordinierungsrat des christlich-islamischen Dialogs e.V. (kcid, Auf der Weißburg 44, 35418 Buseck, Internet: www .kcid.de; E-Mail: [email protected]) is an umbrella organisation on the federal level; Christlich-islamische Gesellschaft (cig, Alte Wipperfürther Strasse 53, 51065 Köln, Internet: www.chrislages.de; E-Mail: [email protected]) is its oldest member. Interkultureller Rat organises Deutsches Islamforum und Islamforen in den Ländern (www.interkultureller-rat.de/projekte/deutsches-islamforum- und-islamforen-in-den-laendern/, containing also contact information for the seven-state forum; e-mail: [email protected]) on the federal and state levels. There are only very few inter-religious activities including Muslims and Jews bilaterally or multilaterally, e.g. in the remarkable Frankfurt Council of Religions

rechte/un%20Sonderberichterstatter/bielefeldt_beschneidungsurteil_vorabfassung.pdf, accessed 9 February 2014. 94 Court of Appeals Hamm 25.09.13 (3 uf 133/13), available at www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/ hamm/j2013/3_uf_133_13_Beschluss_20130830.html, accessed 9 February 2014. Germany 285

(Rat der Religionen) established in 2009.95 Obviously, the Palestine conflict largely overshadows attempts to come to terms in Germany. Nevertheless, some prominent Jewish voices defended Muslims against attacks on their rights to freedom of religion.96

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There are significant differences between official statements and widespread public opinion concerning Islam. Apart from some small right-wing and fundamentalist Christian extremist groups, all non-extremist political parties and state officials still stress the necessity of distinguishing between Islam as a religion and its political abuse. No anti-Muslim party of any political importance has emerged yet. Some of the right-wing parties openly declare to “safeguard” the rightist political spectrum against extremism.97 In this sense, Chancellor Merkel stressed in a public statement shortly after the former President’s remarks on Islam being part of Germany now, that “in Germany the Basic Law (sc.: the German Constitution) is dominant, not Shariʿa.”98 Factually, this is absolutely correct on the level of legal hierarchies. Nevertheless, the very same Constitution allows and even demands to grant Muslims their religious rights defined by Shariʿa rules; in addition, German Private international law or optional substantive law leads to the application of Shariʿa-based law to a certain extent. Thus, to a considerable extent German law and Shariʿa rules are compatible rather than mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the constitutional principles of equal rights and duties, including the protection of religious freedom, seem to be unknown or misunderstood among the broad public. Besides that, in the course of a broader debate on the integration of migrants, Muslims are often perceived to be the “most problematic” group. In many

95 Cf. www.rat-der-religionen.de/. 96 Cf. e.g. www.zentralratdjuden.de/de/article/2773.html and www.faz.net/s/Rub594835 B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E9660F440C5784B5694417D4BB090538E~ATpl~Eco mmon~Scontent.html, accessed 30 January 2014. But see also the extreme anti-Muslim propaganda of Ralph Giordano, www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1191475994461.shtml, accessed 30 January 2014, or the former porn-writer Broder, Henryk, Hurra, wir kapitulieren—Von der Lust am Einknicken (Berlin: wjs Verlag, 2006). 97 Cf. e.g. Alexander Dobrindt, Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer in www.faz.net/s/ Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E2E5F9ACFEB264FA8BC09CD06708FA7F C~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 30 January 2014. 98 Cf. only the report in www.focus.de/politik/weitere-meldungen/merkel-in-deutschland- gilt-das-grundgesetz-und-nicht-die-scharia_aid_559638.html, accessed 30 January 2014. 286 Rohe cases, social, cultural, and religious issues are simply mixed up. Thus, access to the labour market can be infringed by prejudice, particularly regarding women wearing a head scarf.99 In general, the debate on Muslims is very often linked to security matters. A broad majority in Germany would perceive Islam as such to be backward, ill-prepared for the necessities of the 21st century and potentially violent. After the “Sarrazin debate” in 2010/2011 (see Yearbook 2011), the Salafi movement and the criminal activities of some members, namely in Bonn and Solingen, has been in the focus of the debate in 2013 again. On the other hand, there is still a lot of respect and mutual understanding between most Muslims and non-Muslims in daily life. Obviously, the fear of Islam is much more abstract than related to concrete experiences. This is underlined by the fact that in Eastern Germany, where (except in the state of Berlin) only few Muslims live, the rejection is considerably more widespread than in regions of dense Muslim population. According to representative polls among Germans on the federal level in 2012,100 around 70% of the respondents attributed “fanaticism and radicalism” to Islam, and only 7% “openness and tolerance.” The formulation of these questions is equally popular and problematic, since it remains totally unclear whether they refer to concrete or abstract experiences and information concerning Islam worldwide or only in Germany. In a way, this reflects the broad vague feeling of unease towards Islam and the still widespread phenomenon of the “othering” of Muslims in German society as one of the major results of these polls, whereas concrete problems related to religious issues concerning Germany are rarely formulated. Now, administrations on a federal, state, and local levels are increasingly developing plans and structures for establishing a “welcome culture” (Willkommenskultur) for migrants in general and Muslims in particular, reacting to the widespread fear and irritations in the German public debate on Islam. For the first time, the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution started in 2013 to observe the very active Munich group of the blog “Politically Incorrect,” which distributes anti-Muslim (and anti-Roma, anti-eu etc.) hate

99 Cf. the brochure by the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Bessere Integration von Musliminnen und Muslimen in den Arbeitsmarkt, 2. ed. Nürnberg April 2012, pp. 9, 15 ss. available at www .deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/dik/de/Downloads/Dokumente Plenum/dik-broschuere-pg-a-download.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 30 January 2013. 100 Cf. the report “Die Furcht vor dem Morgenland im Abendland”, faz 22. November 2012, available at www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/allensbach-studie-die-furcht-vor-dem- morgenland-im-abendland-11966471.html, accessed 30 January 2013. Germany 287 propaganda, but avoids other fields of classical right-wing extremism, and the Bavarian branch of the tiny but extremely Islamophobic party “Die Freiheit,” which is directly linked to the blog.101

16 Major Cultural Events

There is a rich religious and cultural Muslim life in several parts of Germany. Many mosques use the holiday of 3 October (Unification day) as a “day of the open mosque” inviting the public for information about Islam. In the month of Ramadan and during ʿId al-Adha, Muslim organisations regularly invite political and social representatives to join their celebrations. In recent years, senior political officials started sending congratulation messages to Muslims for ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha and sometimes organise receptions for them. In some cities, Muslims and representatives of other minority religions are invited together with their Christian colleagues to participate in celebrations on the occasion of the inauguration of public buildings.

101 Cf. the report “Extremistisch statt bürgerlich”, Süddeutsche Zeitung 15.04.2013, available at www.directupload.net/file/d/3229/6hqtzrwp_jpg.htm, accessed 10 February 2014. Greece

Konstantinos Tsitselikis*

1 Muslim Populations

At the establishment of Greece as an independent state (1830), Muslims constituted a very small group within the then borders of Greece with almost no institutional special protection. By 1881 and with the annexation of Thessalia, Muslim communities (numbering about 40,000 at that time) were protected as a minority by the Treaty of Constantinople. In effect, the Ottoman millet system (ethno-religious communal institutional autonomy) was preserved. By the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and with the annexation of the New Territories by Greece, the same status was extended to more than 500,000 Muslims who became Greek citizens. The legal status of the local Muslim communities was consolidated, community schools and the waqfs were kept under their authority, and the muftis acquired advisory jurisdiction on personal matters. After the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, a population exchange took place under the Lausanne Convention (1923) and 450,000 Muslims left Greece for Turkey. 92,000 Muslims with Greek citizenship remained in Thrace (Turkish- speakers and Bulgarian-speakers or Pomaks and Muslim Roma) and 26,000 Albanian-speakers in Epirus (Tsamides).1 The latter were forced to flee to Albania in 1945 at the end of the German occupation. In 1947, when the Dodecanese Islands were annexed by Greece, a population of about 12,000 Muslims (Greek and Turkish speaking) also became Greek nationals. Today, Muslims with Greek citizenship residing in Greece (in total about 105,000) are mainly concentrated in Thrace (about 85,000) and on Rodos and Kos (Dodecanese Islands), with about 2,000 on each of the islands. Another 15,000 have moved/ travelled from Thrace for economic reasons to Athens or other Greek cities. For political and economic reasons in the context of Greek- Turkish confrontations in the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of Muslims emigrated

* Konstantinos Tsitselikis is an assistant professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. He holds degrees in international law and human rights and is co-director of the Series of Studies of the Research Centre of Minority Groups (www.kemo.gr). 1 Tsitselikis, K., “The legal status of Islam in Greece”, in Die Welt des Islams, vol. 44, no. 3 (2004), pp. 402–431 (402).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_019 Greece 289 from Thrace to Turkey and Germany (more than 120,000 Muslims of Greek background are estimated to be living abroad).2 Muslims of Greek citizenship are mostly Turkish-speakers and most of them express Turkish national identity. About 20,000 of them have Pomak (a Bulgarian dialect) as their mother tongue, partly expressing an ethnic Pomak identity, often along with a Turkish (national) identity, and about 5,000 speak Roma (partly expressing an ethnic Roma identity), although most of the Muslim Roma are monolingual Turkish speaking. The identity issue in Thrace has remained controversial. As religion and mother tongue ceased to be a question in the national census after 1951, all the above figures are rough estimates. Immigrant Muslims have had an important presence in Greece since the 1990s as part of the general flow of migration.3 Muslim immigrants come mainly from Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries, and also from Albania. Sunnism is the most widespread form of Islam and is followed by immigrants from Africa, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Arab countries. Shi‘ism is far less common, existing mainly among Kurdish, Pakistani and Iranian communities, while Alevism is found mostly among Turks and Kurds. The 2011 census registered 911,929 non-Greek citizens (52.7 percent were Albanians and 3.7 percent Pakistanis). Of this number, some 250,000 were estimated to be Muslims (this figure does not include Albanians most of whom, although of Muslim background, do not identify with Islam). In 2012, Muslim leaders estimated that among Muslim immigrants, there were about 70,000 Pakistanis, 25,000 Bangladeshis, 20,000 Afghans, 12,000 Palestinians and Jordanians, 15,000 Syrians, and more than 40,000 Egyptians, Iraqis, and others. Such figures are rough estimates, as there is a large number of clandestine immigrants and constant population mobility, while leaders of Muslim associations are tempted to exaggerate numbers to support their own political and social claims.4

2 Hersant, J., Mobilisations politiques, co-gouvernementalité et construction ethnique: Sociologie du nationalisme turc à travers le cas des Turcs de Thrace occidentale (Grèce, Allemagne, Turquie) (Political motivations, co-governance and ethnic building: Sociology of Turkish nationalism with reference to the Turks of W. Thrace (Greece, Germany, Turkey), PhD thesis, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 2007. 3 Marvakis, A., D. Parsanoglou and M. Pavlou (eds), Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα (Immigrants in Greece) (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2001); Christopoulos, D. and M. Pavlou (eds), Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης (Greece of immigration) (Athens: Kritiki, 2006). 4 Data according to leaders of the Muslim communities, To Vima, 31 May 2009. 290 Tsitselikis

2 Islam and the State

According to the Greek constitution (Article 3), the ‘dominant religion is Greek Orthodoxy’. Islam enjoys the status of a recognised religion. In Thrace, three muftiates (in Xanthi, Komotini and Didymoteiho) function as public authorities, financed by the state. As a result of political confrontation between the Greek government and the pro-Turkish minority elite, there have been since the 1990s two ‘parallel’ (though not officially recognised) muftis, elected in Komotini and Xanthi, who exert a strong political influence.5 The imams serving in the mosques of Thrace are supposed to be contracted by the government under Act 3536/2007. So far the imams (hired in each mosque of Thrace) are appointed and paid (out of the waqf income) by the three official muftis and partially by the two elected muftis who are granted financial support from Turkey. After the Ministry of National Education and Religion launched a call for the imam posts in 2008, the muftiates should have made their own selection and sent the list to the Ministry for approval.6 The Ministry had also launched a call for appointment to the secretariats of the three muftiates (Min. Dec. 29424/A3 of 16 March 2009). As the muftiates refused to comply with the requirements for the selection, the Ministry recalled it after a month (Min. Dec. of 16 April 2009). Finally, in 2013, Act 4115 brought a series of amendments to the law on imams who have an extra duty to teach Qur’anic courses in Greek public schools when there is a request from Muslim students. Ambivalent modes of selection and appointment triggered again strong reactions among the minority, and the law remained unimplemented. In effect, the selection of the imams continues to be done in parallel by the ‘official’ muftis and ‘elected’ muftis and no law is applied. The waqfs of Thrace and of the Dodecanese are administered by management committees under the supervision of the local authorities and the government. A new law on the waqfs of Thrace (3647/2008), which provides for elections of these committees, has not so far been implemented. When requested (before a court, in parliament, or in the army), there is provision for an Islamic oath. Act 2190/1994 (as amended by Act 3647/2008) provides for a quota of 0.5% of appointments in the public sector to be allocated to members of the Muslim minority, but it has not yet been implemented.

5 Aarbakke, V., The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace, 2 vols, PhD dissertation, University of Bergen, 2000. Two of the mufti offices have websites: the official one of Komotini (www .muftikomotini.com) and the unofficial/elected one of Xanthi (www.iskecemuftulugu.org). 6 Announcement of the Mufti of Komotini in: www.muftikomotini.com/index.php?m=art &c=18&n=224, accessed 15 November 2010. Greece 291

Members of the minority of Thrace participate actively in political life and they get elected to the national parliament through the main political parties. In the elections of June 2012 three deputies were elected, two with the opposition left party syriza and one with pasok. The new law on the acquisition of Greek citizenship (Act 3838/2010, fek A 49) through jus soli by immigrants’ children (in many cases regarding Muslim immigrants) and the right to vote in local elections were challenged before the High Administrative Court which in a notorious decision ruled that both regulations do not comply with the Constitution (Judgment 460/2013, Plenary). Nea Dimocratia which won the elections of June 2012 and formed a coalition government with pasok and dimar, committed to curtailing the law drastically, so that immigrant children would have restricted access to Greek citizenship. The Parliament is expected to accordingly amend citizenship law in 2014.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There is no central national Muslim organisation, but there are many associations of Muslims of Greek citizenship as well as of immigrant Muslims. Very limited contacts are observed between minority and immigrant associations and these occur only in Athens. In Thrace, there is a number of cultural, educational and sports associations that are Turkish in character, a few regarded as Muslim Roma, and two Pomak. There are also a few that may be identified as Bektashi or Alevi. Two of the most important associations led by the Turkish political and professional minority elite in Thrace are:

– Σύλλογος επιστημόνων μειονότητας Θράκης/Batı Trakya Azınlığı Yüksek Tahsil- liler Derneği (Association of University Graduates of the Minority of Thrace); president: Ecevit Emin (Egnatias 75, 69100 Komotini, tel.: ++ 30 25310 29705). – Τουρκική Ένωση Ξάνθης/İskeçe Türk Birliği (Turkish Union of Xanthi), not yet registered, president: Ahmet Kara (P. Ydras 2, 67100, Xanthi, tel.: ++ 30 25410 23614, email: [email protected], www.iskeceturkbirligi.org).

Minority associations bearing in their title the appellation ‘Turkish’ face a ban by the Greek courts which since 1983 have upheld that such associations should have a clear definition on a religious and not national basis. The Turkish Union of Xanthi is one of these associations that have brought their case before the European Court of Human Rights (Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece, No. 26698/05). Although the Court ruled it a violation of the 292 Tsitselikis right to set up an association without such a limitation, the Greek courts still do not implement the judgments issued by the court in Strasbourg. As already mentioned, in Thrace three official mufti offices operate as public institutions that assume also jurisdictional tasks. They are seen by most of the Muslims as representing the Greek state. Two other ‘parallel’ muftis (in Xanthi and Komotini) are related to a pro-Turkish part of the Muslim minority. In Athens, a number of national associations have been set up by immigrant communities. Most noteworthy are the Ελληνο-αραβικό Μορφωτικό Κέντρο (Arab-Hellenic Centre for Culture and Civilisation) (Kyprou 2 & Pireos str., Moshato 18346, Athens, tel.: ++ 30 2106910492, www.ahccc.gr, email: ahcccgr@ yahoo.gr) and the Ένωση Μουσουλμάνων Ελλάδας (Muslim Association of Greece); president: Naim Elghandour (9 Galaxia str N.Kosmos, Athens, tel.: ++ 30 2106916055, http://equalsociety.com, email: [email protected]). The latter has a supra-national character and a high position as an interlocutor with the Greek authorities. Intra-Muslim dynamics are not obvious, as no clear representative discourse is articulated, but they are all united by concerns about practical problems regarding places for worship and cemeteries. Their survival strategy, faced with an indifferent Greek society and alien Greek Orthodox mainstream ideology, is to keep a low profile while supporting the national (Turkish) character of the minority. Internal divisions regarding interpretation of Islam, the application of Shariʿa, Sunni and Sri‘i Islamic practices, and ethnic origins, occur but without open conflict, under the shadow of the global tensions engendered by the 11 September 2001 event.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

About 300 mosques in Thrace, two on Kos and one on Rodos are officially open and more than 80 unofficial prayer houses function in greater Athens (also in Thessaloniki and other cities) run by immigrant Muslims.7 According to Act 2833/2000 (Art. 7), a mosque should have been built in Paiania (a suburb of Athens) for the Olympic Games. When this law was not implemented, the new Act 3512/2006 provided for the construction of a mosque in Athens (run by a foundation controlled by the state) through state funding. The issue has become of major importance for Muslim communities, especially in Athens. Although the government adopted a law on the technicalities for building

7 Tsitselikis, K., Old and New Islam in Greece. From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), pp. 259–265. Greece 293 a mosque (Act 4014/2011, Art. 29.5, fek A 209), no real progress was noticed in 2013, as the tender for the construction was postponed five times. A group of radical nationalists including Bishop Serafeim of Pireaus filed an appeal against this law at the High Administrative Court. The case is pending. In 2013, immigrant Muslims celebrated ʿId al-Adha in a stadium in Athens made available by the government. The Mayor of Thessaloniki offered Yeni Cami (which is used as a museum or exhibition hall) for the celebration of ʿId al Adha. This was the first ever usage of an old Ottoman mosque by today’s Muslims in a region outside of Thrace, Rhodes and Kos.

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is Greek Orthodox, to which are added occasional modules on world religions, Islam included. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from religious education. In 2013 there were 179 elementary and two high schools as well as two madrasas (high schools with a full mainstream Greek curriculum plus extra Islamic subjects) that provide bilingual minority education in Thrace and were funded primarily by the state and also partially out of waqf income for about 7,500 Muslim students. These minority schools (governed by a special legal regime of a semi-private/ semi- public character), as well as five public high schools, all in Thrace, provide Islamic instruction.8 More than 100 Qur’an courses (kuran kursu) are offered outside school hours by private minority groups in Thrace and in Kos (Platani). A foreign school run by Libya since 1979 caters exclusively for pupils from Arab countries and provides Islamic religious education. In a few immigrant mosques and in the Greek-Arabic educational cultural centre in Athens, Islamic instruction is available to the vast majority of Muslims who cannot afford private school fees and attend Greek public schools, but very few students attend these courses.

8 Baltsiotis, L. and K. Tsitselikis, “Η μειονοτική εκπαίδευση στην Θράκη: Νομικό καθεστώς, προβλήματα και προοπτικές (The minority education of Thrace: Legal status, problems and perspectives)”, in Fragkoudaki, A. and Th. Dragona (eds), Πρόσθεση όχι Αφαίρεση, Πολλαπλασιασμός όχι Διαίρεση. Η μεταρρυθμιστική παρέμβαση στην εκπαίδευση της μειονότητας της Θράκης (Addition vs. Subtraction, Multiplication vs. Division: The Reformative Intervention to the Minority Education of Thrace) (Athens: Metaihmio, 2008), pp. 57–87. 294 Tsitselikis

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islam is offered for non-Muslim students as a subject in the theological schools of Greece over one or two semesters (Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki). Since 1997, due to a special quota, 0.5% of student places in universities are available to Muslims from Thrace: about 700 Muslim students were granted the right to enrol in technical or university schools in 2013. An imam training school was envisaged by Act 1920/1991, but this was never implemented. Some imams are graduates of one or the other of the two madrasas of Thrace or from Islamic faculties in Turkey, while others are self-taught. The Special Pedagogical School of Thessaloniki (epath), the Muslim teachers’ school, was finally closed in 2011. Article 59 para. 10, Act 3988/2011 (fek A 118) foresaw the abolishment of epath by 31 August 2013, thus putting an end to a difficult itinerary of 45 years of controversy and ambivalent results that marked minority education. By 2013, about 20 teachers for the Turkish curriculum of the minority schools were graduating every year from the Pedagogical School of Elementary Education of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. This institutional change meets fundamental pedagogical requirements that were lacking for decades in policy making regarding minority education.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Islamic cemeteries exist only in Thrace, Kos and Rodos, and the lack of a Muslim cemetery outside these areas causes serious hardship for Muslims who have to pay large amount of money so their relatives can be buried in Thrace. The construction of an Islamic cemetery is planned on the outskirts of Athens following the donation of a plot of land by the Church of Greece. However, for bureaucratic reasons and underlying political reluctance, work to establish the cemetery has not commenced up to the end of 2013.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

No prayer facilities for Muslims are provided in state institutions or public buildings. Though no official chaplains are appointed, voluntary initiatives for religious rituals are permitted. Greece 295

9 Religious Festivals

In Thrace, the two main Islamic religious festivals (şestiv and kurban bayram), and the five blessed nights (kandils: ragayip, mevlut, berat, mirai and kadir) are celebrated and led by official and unofficial muftis. Minority schools also officially mark these Islamic religious holidays. In the rest of Greece, the state is neutral on the subject of Islamic celebrations. Employment law grants Muslim workers the right to free time for prayer and religious festivals but implementation of this in practice is limited. Muslim immigrants face practical restrictions in the celebration of religious festivals as there are not enough mosques but they are free to organise celebrations as best they can, using their own resources.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food is freely accessible in Thrace and there are no restrictions. Similarities with Christian Orthodox Easter slaughter practices make kurban (the slaughtering of animals for ʿId al-Adha) socially acceptable. In Athens and other towns, access to halal food depends on personal networking. Some wealthy Muslims import halal food from their homelands. Small supermarkets provide halal food in Athens. These small businesses are owned by Asian and Arab Muslim immigrants who prepare halal meat themselves under the supervision of state slaughterhouses. Six travel agencies from Greece (mostly based in Athens) are approved by Saudi Arabia for organising hajj pilgrimage for a quota of 600 people.9 Because of the economic crisis and the lack of legal travel documentation for many immigrants only 250 people managed to travel for hajj in 2013. Islamic banking is not offered in Greece.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on Islamic dress. In Thrace, the head scarf is widely worn, but pro-Turkish secularist circles tend to be intolerant of Islamic

9 Argo Tours, Kristia Travel, Marine Tours, Grecian Travel, Mid East International Tours, and Green Dome www.hajinformation.com/hajj_agents.php?id=93. The latter, which is the only travel agency based in Thrace (Xanthi) was deprived of its license. 296 Tsitselikis dress, especially as far as the wearing of the head scarf in minority schools is concerned. In Athens, as the active female Muslim population is very limited, cases of intolerance have not been reported. Greek authorities accept photos for official purposes of women with their hair covered as a token gesture to religious freedom.

12 Publication and Media

There are seventeen Turkish newspapers and magazines and seven radio stations broadcasting in Turkish which are run by and for the minority in Thrace. Some, such as Akide, edited by the Muftiate of Komotini,10 have a Muslim ethos and some, such as Gündem,11 have a pro-Turkish orientation. There is one bilingual Greek-Turkish magazine, Azinlikca published by a group with a progressive religious Muslim profile.12 In Athens, five daily and weekly newspapers are published in Arabic and one in Urdu. Many more Albanian newspapers (mostly imported from Albania, but a few printed in Greece in the form of newsletters) circulate in Greece, but they make little, if any, reference to Islam. A few websites promote the discussion of issues related to Islam in Greece. The most important among them is available in three languages (Greek, Arabic and English) run by the Muslim Association of Greece.13 Since 2012 www.alyunaniya.com is also operating as a source of information on Greece and the Arab world for a global audience and the Muslim communities in Greece. Act 3592/2007 on “granting permits for media enterprises” provides that the broadcast and print media should use Greek as the main language, or translation into Greek. Both limitations burden Muslim minority and immigrant papers as they mostly do not use Greek and have low budgets.

13 Family Law

In the context of minority protection, which stems from Greece’s international commitments dating from 1881, 1913 and 1923, Islamic law is applied by the

10 www.muftikomotini.com. 11 www.gundemgazetesi.org. Among others: www.rodopruzgari.com, www.millet.gr, www .batitrakya.net and www.birlikgazetesi.info. 12 www.azinlikca.net. 13 www.equalsociety.com. Greece 297 muftis’ courts of Thrace (Komotini, Xanthi and Didymoteiho) to Muslim Greek citizens covered by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The muftis have jurisdiction (under Act 1920/1991) in specific family law disputes such as divorce, pensions, alimony (nafaqa) and custody,14 and their decisions are automatically ratified by the Greek courts. Although Muslims are in theory free to choose between Greek civil courts and Islamic courts, the overwhelming majority of Muslim family cases are judged by the latter. Areios Pagos (the High Court) in a case regarding inheritance ruled in 2013 that the Islamic Court of Komotini had exclusive jurisdiction over the Civil Court of Komotini. Women rarely apply to Greek civil courts while men overwhelmingly opt for the muftis’ courts. There are no rules to deal with the conflict of jurisdiction. Important issues of constitutional principle, especially with regard to gender equality, are not accommodated in the muftis’ courts. Greek courts adjudicating cases of Muslims of an immigrant background can apply Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. No instances of this have been reported so far.

14 Interreligious Relations

It should be seen as an indicator of the position of Islam in Greece that there are no interreligious relations between Islam and Christianity, except for those of a very limited and strictly private character.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In general the media reflect mainstream attitudes, which are quite indifferent if not hostile to Islam, which, in turn, is strongly linked with Turkey. Recent public debate on Islam in Greece has had two focuses: Thrace and immigrants. The former is related to the broader issue of the minority’s Turkish identity, while the latter occasionally appears in debates around Greece and its

14 Ktistakis, Y., Το ιερό Δίκαιο και Μουσουλμάνοι Έλληνες πολίτες. Μεταξύ φιλελευθερισμού και κοινοτισμού (The Holy Law and the Muslim Greek citizens. Between communitarianism and liberalism) (Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2006), and Tsitselikis, K., “Personal status of Greece’s Muslims: A legal anachronism or an example of applied multiculturalism?”, in Aluffi, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 109–132. 298 Tsitselikis

Orthodox character.15 With regard to Islam in Thrace, religious dialogue and attempts to discuss the application of Shariʿa, or other subjects, are very weak. Issues regarding Islam are discussed by the mainstream media when a ‘problem’ comes up, or out of curiosity about Islamic practices regarding celebrations held by Muslim immigrants in Athens, for example. The issue of the lack of an official mosque and cemetery in Athens has become the most familiar topic of discussion. The issue of the minority in Thrace (and more rarely the Muslims in the Dodecanese) has more political connotations and is presented from this perspective by the media, often linked to the question of Greek- Turkish relations. Gradually, the position of the Muslim immigrants in Greece has attracted publicity and brought to light a series of crucial issues which were absent from the public agenda. On the other hand, state authorities did not take any immediate action to respond to Muslims’ (and other immigrants’) complaints. After a period of almost twenty years in which Muslim immigrants have remained in the shadow of public debate, gradually new voices in favour of the rights of Muslims were reflecting social and legal problems while a fierce anti- Muslim discourse was endorsed by ultra-right political forces. Islamophobic discourses centred on the issue of citizenship, voting in local elections and the mosque in Athens. After a neo-Nazi party entered the Greek Parliament after the elections of May and June 2012, anti-Muslim hate speech and violence has increased considerably. In 2013, almost every day groups of neo-Nazis attack immigrants, mostly Muslims. Especially during Ramadan, such attacks targeted prayer houses (masjids) in Athens.16 On some occasions, harsh verbal attacks by the deputies of Golden Dawn (a neo-Nazi political party that entered the Greek Parliament in May 2012) targeted the Muslim deputies in the Parliament.17 After the leader and a group of Golden Dawn mps were arrested in September 2013 for forming and participating in a criminal organisation, such attacks have receded.

15 Anagnostou, Dia and R. Gropas, “Domesticating Islam and Muslim immigrants: Political and church responses to constructing a central mosque in Athens”, in Prodromou, E., V. Makrides and V. Roudemetof (eds), The Orthodox Church of Greece in the 21st Century: Religion, State and Society in an Era of Transition (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009). 16 www.newsit.gr/default.php?pname=Article&art_id=157084&catid=3. 17 http://neoskosmos.com/news/el/% ce%95%cf%80%ce%B9%ce%B8%ce%B5%cf %83%ce%B7-%ce%A7%ce%91-%ce%ba%ce%B1%cf%84%ce%B1-%ce%bc%c e%bf%cf%85%cf%83%ce%bf%cf%85%ce%bb%ce%bc%ce%B1%ce%bd%- cf%89%ce%bd-%ce%B2%ce%bf%cf%85%ce%bb%ce%B5%cf%85%cf%84%c f%89%ce%bd. Greece 299

16 Major Cultural Events

Cultural events are mostly related to religious festivals, like kurban bayram, şeker bayram and kandil which consist mostly of prayers and socialising in private spaces. Apart from that, cultural events in Thrace include wrestling and running contests in the mountainous Rodopi area, often related to the Alevi-Bektashi calendar. Most important of those are the Seçek/Hilia and Alan Tepe festivals which include a kurban (animal sacrifice and collective meal). Moreover, festivals are organised sporadically by associations related to music and folk dance, often with the participation of folkloric groups from Turkey. Hungary

Norbert Pap*

1 Muslim Populations

Muslims have never formed a significant part of the Hungarian population. In the 9th and 10th centuries, there were a few Muslims, particularly the so- called Kaliz people, who originated from Khorezm and joined the wandering Hungarians with the Kabar Muslims. Buzurman or “Böszörmény” was the comprehensive name for the Muslims in the early Middle Ages and these terms survive in place names. In the era of the kings of the Árpád dynasty, 11th–13th centuries, the so-called Ismaelita immigrants had an outstanding status due to their financial expertise and both their tax-collecting and minting work in the service of the state/king. During the peak, in the 13th century, 40–50 thousand Muslims lived in 210 settlements in the Hungarian Kingdom. It was just 2–3% of the total population, but Europe-wide, the third most significant after Iberia and Southern Italy. Their assimilation was completed in the 14th century. In the 15th century, the Hungarian state came into conflicts with the neighbouring and continuously expanding Ottoman Empire.1From the beginning of the 16th century, with the defeat of the Hungarian army at Mohács in 1526, Hungarian territory, including parts of today’s Croatia and Serbia, became a part of the Ottoman state for 150 years. Transylvania in present-day Romania became liege of the Ottoman Empire, and lived its golden age with religious tolerance (due to this religious tolerance, the Unitarian Church survived only in Transylvania). All the Muslim religious sites in Hungary, such as mosques, minarets and tombs (türbe) date from that time. Similar ethnic and cultural conditions developed in the southern and in one third of the central areas of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. There was no significant Islamisation of the Hungarian people: it was the Bosnian, Albanian and Vlach population mixed with a few Turkish people who formed the Islamic community. In the first decades of the 18th century, the wars of independence continued until all historical territories of Hungary were freed from Ottoman rule, and a relatively peaceful relationship lasting two centuries developed with

* Dr. Norbert Pap PhD, is Associate Professor at the Institute of Geography, University of Pécs, Hungary. 1 Dávid, Géza and Fodor, Pál (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the military confines in the era of Ottoman conquest (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_020 Hungary 301 those neighbouring territories that remained under Ottoman domination. Muslims who remained after the departure of the Ottomans had to convert to Christianity or migrate to the Ottoman realm. The Ottoman Empire became a refuge for soldiers and freedom fighters (e.g. Imre Thököli, Ferenc Rákóczi, Lajos Kossuth and lots of military officers like General Bem etc.) during the wars in the region until the 20th century. A new dimension was opened by the alliance with Turkey during World War i and it also contributed to the legal recognition of Islam (Act xvii of 1916). Between the two World Wars it was mainly Bosnian migrants and a few representatives of the turkophile Hungarian intellectual class who formed the Hungarian Muslim community. Nowadays, the Muslim community is made up of Arab, Turkish, African, Afghan and Iranian immigrants and a growing number of Hungarian converts.2 Some suggest Muslims amount to between 20 and 30 thousands, although this is difficult to document. They are concentrated in Budapest and some other bigger cities (Pécs, Szeged, and Miskolc). According to the estimation of omhs,3 the number of Muslims reached 32,000 in 2010. In 2013, the growth of the number of immigrants was significant—their number increased to 18,000 compared to 2,000 in the previous year. They are housed in several refugee camps.

2 Islam and the State

The Hungarian Parliament passed a controversial new law on religion at the end of 2011 (Act ccvi/2011, Act vii./2012), which reflects significant changes compared to earlier legislation. A liberal system was superseded by much tighter control. The new law has acknowledged only fourteen religious communities, different Christian, Jewish and Unitarian denominations. There were no Muslims among them and the Parliament only allows the acknowledge- ment of new congregations by law if they have a two-third majority support in the Parliament. Critics of the law condemned this as a gratuitously high threshold and as a restriction of religious freedom by the state, which gave rise to international indignation and incomprehension on behalf of some acknowledged congregations. In February 2012, the two most significant

2 Csicsmann, László and Vékony, Dániel, “Muslims in Hungary: A Bridge between East and West?” in Jaroslav Bures(szerk), Muslims in Visegrad (Prague: Institute of International Relations Prague, 2011) pp. 53–67. 3 Zoltán, Sulok. 2010: Muslim minority in Hungary. Paper for the Warsaw Symposium for the Muslim minorities in Eastern- and Central Europe, 8–10 December 2010, Budapest. pp. 76–85. 302 Pap

Hungarian Muslim organisations (hic and omh—see next section) founded the Hungarian Islamic Council. The Hungarian state recognised the Council in the above mentioned law, but registered the hic and the omh as separate legal entities. As the Hungarian Islamic Council is not a legal entity, its activity depends on the member organisations. hic and omh cooperate in matters of education and welfare activities. It is the State Secretary for Religious, Ethnic and Civil Society Relations that is responsible for the relations between the heads of the religious communities and the state. Contacts with some Islamic organisations used to be regular. The outstanding event of 2013 was that the leaders of the Muslim communities were invited to the inauguration ceremony of the new Hungarian President, János Áder.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are two registered Islamic communities in Hungary. The Hungarian Islamic Community (hic, 104 Károly Róbert Street, Budapest www.magyariszlam.hu) is the oldest one which was established in 1988 and its first leader was Balázs Mihálffy. The current leader is a Hungarian Zoltán Bolek, and its members are mainly ethnic Hungarians. Beside religious commitment, nationalism and patriotism are also characteristics of the community. They regularly organise national and international charitable activities; moreover, they maintain Muslim missions in refugee camps and they do missionary work in prisons, too. The Organisation of Muslims in Hungary (omh, Budapest Mosque at 41 Fehérvári Street, Budapest, www.iszlamweb.hu) was established in 2000. The omh also has missions in refugee camps as well as in prisons and is very active in interreligious dialogue (a founding member of the Co-operation Forum of World Religions in Hungary that was set up in 2009, and a founding member of the Council of Registered Eastern Religions set up in December 2013). The omh has three branches, in Szeged, Pécs and Salgótarján. It is a member of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. The leader of the omh, which has many foreign members as well, is an ethnic Hungarian Zoltán Sulok. There are other Muslim groups in Hungary as well that are not registered. The most significant was led by the Egyptian Sheikh Abdu Abdel-Moneim who left Hungary leaving debts behind. Therefore, since July 2011 the group belongs to the omh (Al-Huda Mosque, at 21 Dobozi Street, Budapest). There are two functioning Sufi tariqas. One of them is the Süleymanci (6 Makk Street, Budapest) while the other one is the Fethüllah Gülen movement Hungary 303

(7 Nagydiófa Street, Budapest, www.dialogusplatform.hu/index.php?lang=en). The Dialogue Platform organisation was established in 2005 with both Turkish and Hungarian members. In 2013, a new Turkish cultural association Gül Baba Turkish-Hungarian Cultural Association was established in Szentendre near Budapest (2000 Szentendre, Hunyadi utca 2/a). The Aluakf Foundation (31 Huba Street, Miskolc) maintains a prayer hall. Now defunct, the Islamic Community (ic) was established in 2003. Its religious leader was Dr. Tayseer Saleh (Dar as-Salam Mosque, 29 Bartók Béla Street, Budapest, www.iszlam.hu) until the dissolution of this community in the end of 2011. Now the organisation exists as a foundation. The group follows Salafi tenets.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Mosques and prayer halls are obliged to be registered when they are established and start to function. Dozens of these can be found in the country. However, there are no penalties attached to failure to register a place of regular worship. The most important registered ones are:

– Mosque: 104 Károly Róbert Boulevard, Budapest – Budapest Mosque: 41 Fehérvári Street, 1119 Budapest – The Jami of Pasha Jakovali Hassan: 2 Rákóczi Street, 7623 Pécs – Mekka Mosque: 23 Gogol Street, 6722 Szeged – Dar as-Salam Mosque: 29. Bartók Béla Street, 1114 Budapest – Al-Huda Mosque: 21 Dobozi Street, Budapest – Prayer hall in Miskolc: 30 Huba Street, 3526 – The Jami of Malkocs Bej: 15 Kossuth Square, Siklós – Oratory: Turkish lorry parking place in Kecskemét

5 Children’s Education

Religious instruction for adults and children is freely available in mosques. There is a primary school at 2 Kavics Street, 15th district, Budapest, which is maintained by the Libyan state and allows children to study in Arabic. The omh has its weekend school for Muslim children teaching Qur’an and Islamic subjects with the participation of more than 190 children. The omh used to provide religious education in a state school in the 8th district of Budapest but the number of Muslim children in that school has decreased and Islamic religious education has not 304 Pap been available there since 2013. Apart from this, Islamic religious education is not available for children in state schools. Although the hic is trying hard to establish an Islamic nursery school, its efforts so far seem unsuccessful. There is a Turkish primary school in Budapest, founded by the Government of Turkey (9th district, Kőbánya-Kispest, Cserkesz street).

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no Muslim institution for higher education in Hungary. Hungarian Muslims pursue their religious studies mainly in Turkey and in the Middle East, at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, or in France at Chateau-Chinon, for example. Both omh and hic are registered exam centres for the Islamic Online University (iou). Studies in connection with Islam are available in the following forms: a Master’s Degree programme in Arabic Studies at the Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest, ba and ma programmes in Arabic Studies and canon law at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Altaic Studies and Mediterranean Studies Doctoral programme at the University of Szeged, Modern Islamic specialisation related to Balkan Studies at the Centre of Mediterranean and Balkan Studies of the University of Pécs and Shariʿa law in the Department of Adult Education and Development of Human Resources at the University of Pécs, and some related courses or lectures within the framework of Security Policy Studies at the University of National Public Service, and the ba and ma Programmes in International Relations at the Corvinus University of Budapest.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is a burial ground on Kozma Street, Budapest, next to the renovated cemetery for Turkish soldiers who died in World War i. Besides, there is a well-known Muslim burial place in Sopron and one can find smaller, separate Muslim areas in other public cemeteries in the significant Muslim centres of the country (e.g. Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen).

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

It is primarily the hic that organises visits to prisons and refugee camps in the context of formal agreements. Apart from that, the omh also organises Hungary 305 visits to the same places at regular intervals. Chairman Bolek of the hic has been invited to explain Islam to Hungarian military personnel sent on missions to Muslim countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and other African Muslim countries). President Sulok of the omh, at the initiative of the Ministry of Interior, was invited in 2013 to participate in writing an ethno- sociographical supplementary course book for training officers and law enforcement personnel.

9 Religious Festivals

In Hungary, the Muslim communities celebrate the common Islamic festivals. They do not differ either in ceremonies or celebration from customs in any Arab or Muslim countries (Ramadan, ʿId al-Fitr, ʿAshura, ʿId al-Adha, etc.). These occasions, however, are not recognised as “official” holidays by the state. Hungary was in the past allocated a significant quota of Saudi pilgrim visas for the annual Hajj, and these were shared between the three communities (including the former Islamic Community in Dar al-Salam Mosque).

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

There are many specialist restaurants and shops. Cities like Szeged or Pécs also have shops that offer halal food products. Halal slaughtering is done mostly in slaughterhouses but sometimes occurs in the rural areas of the country. Those who live in the countryside inform each other about the occasional opportunity through the Internet or organise the distribution of halal products among each other.

11 Dress Codes

Hijab and “Muslim” beards are not everyday phenomena in Hungary because of the low number of believers but those who decide to wear them are freely allowed to do that. However, in Hungary, one never sees a woman with full face covering (niqab or burqa). Harassment due to Muslim dress practices is very rare but sometimes occurs and is instigated, for example, by anti-Islamic groups and individuals. 306 Pap

12 Publication and Media

The magazines Hívó Szó (Calling Word) and Új Gondolat (New Thought) are published irregularly. Due to financial problems Új Gondolat was not issued in 2012 but there were two issues in 2013. Mosques, Islamic organisations, foundations, and private persons maintain websites like: www.iszlam.com, www.dialogusplatform.hu/index.php?lang= en, www.iszlam.hu, www.iszlamweb.hu, www.hanif.hu/English/index.htm, www .magyariszlam.hu, www.mohamed.hu . Communities and foundations publish good-quality educational religious books and booklets. The Hanif Cultural Foundation was the most active in its publishing activity. A substantial number of published works are available in the translation of Halima Zsuzsanna Kiss. News related to Hungarian Muslims is rare.

13 Family Law

State laws do not recognise marriage conducted by a religious authority (only). However, mosque leaders give advice based on Shariʿa for those who take part in preparations for marriage. It is possible to have a pre-nuptial agreement but it has no effect outside the mosque. At the same time, Muslims can get married on the basis of Shariʿa, and those marriage contracts may be accepted in some Muslim countries, although not in Hungary.

14 Interreligious Relations

There has been a good deal of religious conversion and numbers of converts have grown in the last twenty years due to a growing number of international contacts. Muslims’ connections with historical churches are regular, though the impact of their conversation is limited due to the huge difference in size. The smaller, Eastern Catholic Churches are more comparable in size. There is no contact with the Coptic Orthodox Church of Hungary, who opened their first church in late 2010 in Budapest. Relationships with the members of the Hungarian Jewish community exist but are rather irregular and are quite sensitive concerning some topics. Hungary 307

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Islam does not have a high profile in public opinion. In political discussions, the issue of Islam usually comes up in relation with terrorism, Hungarian military participation in Afghanistan, and the Palestinian-Israel conflict. In the last few years, mainly in smaller towns, a mild antipathy towards Muslims is noticeable. The opposite is true in university towns where Muslims are visibly present and experiences in coexistence are good. The Hungarian Government identifies Middle Eastern countries as a foreign policy priority. Year by year, more and more students are studying in Hungary from those countries. Lots of them settle down in Hungary after finishing their studies and establish their families.

16 Major Cultural Events

Muslim communities organise lectures on religious themes and summer camps for adults and children on a regular basis. From time to time, they invite foreign Muslim scholars to visit Hungary and to give lectures. There is an interest in Hungary in Muslim arts, too. In 2013, there was an exhibition in the Museum of Applied Arts in Budapest from its mostly Ottoman collection and there were a series of lectures called “Islamic evenings”. The omh participated in the programme with recitation of the Qur’an. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (tika) in 2013 sent several delegations to Hungary to prepare the restoration of Ottoman historical monuments located mainly in Baranya County and the capital city. The first restored monument, the so-called ‘Turkish House,’ was inaugurated the same year in Szigetvár (Baranya). There has been significant press coverage of the historical and archaeological research of the lost tomb of Suleiman the Magnificent in Szigetvár. The burial monument of the emperor was an important spiritual centre in the region in the 17th century. The first results of the research were presented in a conference held on 20 September 2013 in Szigetvár. Iceland

Göran Larsson* and Kristjan Thor Sigurdsson**

1 Muslim Populations1

It is difficult to know when the first encounter between Muslims and Icelanders took place, but there were contacts between Arab traders and envoys and Nordic people from the 9th century onward, so it is not impossible that some Icelanders might have encountered Arab Muslims in earlier times. How the memory of these relations has been stored in the collective historical consciousness of Scandinavians in general and Icelanders in particular, is very much open to question. It is interesting in this regard, that there is a story in Hákonar saga Hákonarson, (written by the Icelandic, Sturla Þórðarsson as part of Konungasögur, or Kings’ Sagas) about the arrival of embassies from the Muslim sultan of Tunis in Norway in the 1260s, after King Hákon Hákonarson had sent envoys to the Sultan with rich gifts. And as there usually were some Icelanders staying at the Norwegian courts in those days, often as poets, and the fact that the chroniclers of the history of the Nordic chieftains and kings were Icelandic, it is not unlikely that the connection is there. According to available historical records and folklore traditions, the first contact Iceland had with Muslims goes back to the summer of 1627, when a group of so-called ‘Turkish pirates’, who had actually travelled from North Africa, raided settlements on the south-west coast, the Westman Islands (Vestmannaeyjar) and the eastern fjords. This episode is of no importance for the composition of the

* Göran Larsson is Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/History of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s Shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), Muslims and the New Media: Historical and Contemporary Debates (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), and the editor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009). ** Kristjan Thor Sigurdsson is a doctoral student and teacher in anthropology at the University of Iceland. His PhD research concerns the Muslim community in Iceland. 1 The data for this country report are primarily based on official statistics, online information published by the Association of Muslims in Iceland (Félag múslima á Íslandi) and media reports. There are hardly any academic studies on Islam and Muslims in Iceland, the main reason being that very few Muslims live in this geographically remote part of Europe. A more detailed overview is found in Larsson, G. and I. Svanberg, “The Faroe Islands and Iceland,” in G. Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009). Unless otherwise mentioned, the data for this entry are based on this book or the International Religious Freedom Report 2011 issued by the us Department of State.

Muslim community in Iceland today, but is significant because it is the first recorded Icelandic contact with Islam and Muslims. These pirates operated from Morocco and Algeria, and were an international mercenary enterprise, common at the time. Some of the enslaved Icelanders remained in North Africa and became Muslims. There are rich contemporary sources from this event, which has established itself as a major nationalistic narrative, being recycled whenever required. This narrative was for example brought out in connection to a planned construction of a mosque. According to information provided by Statistics Iceland 2013,2 the great majority of Icelanders, or 245,000 (76,5%), are members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and 5,2% are members of the so-called free churches, out of a total population of about 320,000. The number of Muslims is estimated at approximately 1,000 to 1,500 individuals. The Muslim community is made up of immigrants of diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2011, “Muslims are concentrated in the capital area (although there are a number of Kosovar Muslim refugees in the small northern town of Dalvik).” With Muslims in Iceland coming from all corners of the world, the largest group are Moroccans, with a sizable number from the Middle East and the Balkans, and an increasing number from Sub- Saharan Africa, as well as from South Asia and South East Asia. In addition to this ethnically diverse community of Muslims in Iceland, there is a small group of converts, “ethnic” Icelanders who have embraced Islam. The majority of the converts are women, originally through marriage, but recently, an increasing number of young males in Iceland have become Muslims. It is difficult to ascertain the number of Icelandic converts, but they are probably not more than 200. Many of the Muslim refugees in Dalvik have moved from there, either to the capital area or back to Kosovo. Most Muslims live in the capital area, but there is a group of Indonesian Muslims in Reykjanesbær, to the south west of the capital. In northern Iceland, in a small fishing village north of Akureyri, called Grenivík, there is a small community of African Muslims, whose number in Iceland has increased in recent years. There is also a very small group of Ahmadiyyah Muslims in Iceland, comprising only a few persons. Most Muslims in Iceland are Sunni, with a small group of Shi’is, but this distinction does not seem to be an issue in Iceland. Finally, there are some who usually are categorised as “cultural Muslims,” or non-practising.

2 Statistics Iceland ( for 1 January 2013), www.statice.is. See www.statice.is/?PageID=1180&src= https://rannsokn.hagstofa.is/pxen/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=MAN10001%26ti=Populations+by +religious+organizations+1998-2014+%26path=../Database/mannfjoldi/Trufelog/%26lang= 1%26units=Number, accessed 21 June 2014. 310 Larsson and Sigurdsson

2 Islam and the State

Even though the state provides for and guarantees freedom of religion, the official religion of Iceland is Lutheranism.3 It is, however, possible to start religious associations as long as they do not involve proselytising or practices that are “prejudicial to good morals or public order” (Article 63 of the Constitution of Iceland). According to Article 62 of the Constitution, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the state church. Consequently, the state pays the salaries of the church’s clergy, who are employed as public servants under the Ministry of Judicial and Ecclesiastical Affairs. All taxpayers over the age of 16 must pay a tax to the Evangelical Lutheran Church or to another officially recognised religious organisation ( for example, to one of the two Muslim organisations). If this is not possible or not desired by the taxpayer, the ‘religious tax’ is paid to the secular university of Iceland (Article 64). Even though the judicial and economic systems favour the Christian traditions ( for example, by observing the days of the Christian calendar as national holidays) and grant the Lutheran Church a privileged position, most Icelanders are generally not that interested in participating in organised religion. Most children are baptised and people usually marry and hold funerals in church, but it seems that the Lutheran religion is primarily seen as an expression of Icelandic culture.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

According to online information provided by Statistics Iceland (see www.stat ice.is /) there are two recognised organisations that promote Muslim interests. The Muslim Association of Iceland (Félag múslima á Íslandi, Ármúli 38, 3. hæð, 108 Reykjavík; www.islam.is/) was established in 1997 by a Palestinian immigrant, Salmann Tamimi, and as of 2013 has 465 members. The Association has been in contact with Muslims in England, Sweden and Saudi Arabia.4 Recently, The Muslim Association of Iceland (mai) elected an “ethnic” Icelander as chairman, Ibrahim Sverrir Agnarsson, and another Icelander has occasionally conducted the Friday sermons. During the month of Ramadan, the mai has received a foreign imam to conduct the religious rituals during the holy month. This arrangement has been in place for a number of years. The other, and more

3 The Constitution of the Republic of Iceland (No. 33, 17 June 1944, as amended 30 May 1984, 31 May 1991, 28 June 1995 and 24 June 1999), http://government.is/constitution/; see especially Articles 62, 63 and 64. 4 This information was retrieved from the homepage of the organisation and its annual report for 2013, at www.islam.is/. Iceland 311 recent association, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Iceland (icci) has recently moved into a building at Skógarhlíð 20, 105 Reykjavík. As of 2013, the icci has 305 members, thus the combined number of Muslims in Icelandic associations is 770, or approximately 50% of the total number of Muslims in Iceland. Both these organisations have websites: mai: www.islam.is; icci: www.icci.is.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The Muslim Association of Iceland and the Islamic Cultural Centre in Iceland have their own houses of worship, with regular evening prayer meetings and weekly Friday prayers that attract a core group of approximately 30–50 and 60–70 individuals, respectively. There are no purpose-built mosques, and until recently the two organisations used rooms for both prayers and meetings, but the icci has recently moved into a building which has been converted to a mosque. The Muslim Association of Iceland has recently been allotted a plot to construct a mosque, which caused huge public debates, pro and con, in both the conventional press and on social media. Facebook groups were established by the opponents as well as the supporters of the project and the discussion bore all the hallmarks of moral panic. The mai had been waiting for over a decade for this, which some Muslims interpreted as indicating that Muslims are treated differently from followers of other religions. The now thirteen year “non-process” on behalf of the municipal authorities in Reykjavík concerning the application for mosque construction had been criticised from several directions before the final decision, most importantly by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ecri, 2012, fourth report on Iceland), which issued a report on implementing human rights in Iceland. Some criticism also came from the us embassy in Iceland. According to the ecri report, perceptions regarding Muslims have degenerated. For the month of Ramadan in 2009, a prayer room was opened for Muslims at the University of Iceland, due to pressure from some Muslim students, but it was not re- established after that Ramadan and not opened again as such. This prayer room was part of a room, originally a chapel, that is sometimes used for multi- religious purposes. Since then, Muslims have not had any special accommodations for religious practices at the University of Iceland. The number of Muslim students at the University is between 20 and 30, but they have not organised an association of any kind. The Islamic Cultural Centre of Iceland rent their building from a Swedish organisation (Al-Risala) that purchased the building in 2012. This association has an Egyptian imam, Ahmed Saddeeq, who is educated at Al-Azhar. There have been some controversies connected to the acquisition of this building 312 Larsson and Sigurdsson and the Swedish organisation. Also, the imam did stir some controversy over his views on homosexuality, which became widely published in the mainstream press, to the consternation of many. The imam said that he had been misunderstood and quoted out of context. According to media reports in 2010, a private group of foreign Muslims tried to buy a house in order to use it as a mosque. This is the same group that purchased the house that the iccs later converted into their mosque. This project was, however, criticised by Salmann Tamimi, the then chairman of the Muslim Association of Iceland as it was perceived as an attempt by so-called foreign and radical Muslims to take control over the Muslim community in Iceland.5 According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2011, more than 1,700 individuals have also joined a Facebook protest group against the building of mosques in Iceland believing them to be a security risk for the country. In 2013, the number of “likes” for each Facebook site was roughly 4000.

5 Children’s Education

The teaching of religion is obligatory in public schools. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2011, teaching for grades 1–10 (ages 6–15) should be based on “the Christian heritage of Icelandic culture, equality, responsibility, concern, tolerance, and respect for human values”. The instruction is, however, open and there have been complaints that teachers have been indoctrinating pupils by overemphasising Christian traditions, even though non-Christian traditions, pluralism and multiculturalism all form part of the curriculum. In response to a report published in 2010, the minister of Education Katrin Jakobsdottir stressed that the school system should be more neutral when it comes to confessions. For example, it is recommended that there should be a general ban for religious representatives from visiting schools and after school clubs in their official capacity.6 It is possible for students to be exempted from so-called Christian classes, but there are no alternatives for Muslim pupils within the school system. Most schools are public institutions,

5 “House purchased for private Reykjavik mosque”, IceNews 9 October, 2010, www.icenews .is/index.php/2010/10/09/house-purchased-for-private-reykjavik-mosque/#more-18495, accessed 21 June 2014. 6 “Icelandic church and schools discuss relationship”, IceNews, 29 October 2010, www.icenews .is/index.php/2010/10/29/icelandic-church-and-schools-discuss-relationship/, accessed 21 June 2014. Iceland 313 and there are no independent or free Muslim schools. Both Muslim associations run Sunday schools for children, as well as periodic lessons in Arabic and Qur’an studies. There are also women’s groups associated with the mosques. Both associations open their doors to guests, especially during Ramadan, to educate and inform both scholars and the public about their operations, and about Islam. Similarly, leaders of both mosques visit schools on various levels to inform and educate about Islam and Muslims.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Theology Department of the University of Reykjavík has religious studies programmes with modules on the history or sociology of religions, but not on Islam as a separate subject. The Department has organised open lectures on Islam together with the us Embassy in Iceland.7 An Icelandic scholar, who lives and works in the United States, Professor Magnús Þorkell Bernharðsson, has taught intensive courses on Islam for many years at the University of Iceland, drawing huge interest. As for the Muslims themselves, there is no training programme for imams in Iceland.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Iceland operates and cares for all cemeteries, to which all the recognised religious organisations and traditions have access. The Muslims usually conduct their funerals in churches and/or other public locations and traditional funerary organisers are utilised to organise the funerals. Muslims have a special area for their burials in one cemetery in Reykjavik.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The prison department does not keep religious data, and there are no arrangements for Muslim pastoral services.

7 “Imam holds open lecture on Islam in Iceland,” Iceland Review, 27 February 2008, www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/daily_news/?cat_id=16539&ew_0_a_id=301632, accessed 21 June 2014. 314 Larsson and Sigurdsson

9 Religious Festivals

There is no detailed information about religious festivals, but the webpage of the Muslim Association of Iceland contains basic information about the celebration of Islamic religious festivals. Both mosques mentioned in section 4 organise festivities for the two most important Islamic festivals, ʿid-al-Fitr, and ʿid-al-Adha. During these occasions, several hundred Muslims gather to celebrate. Many Muslims who do not frequent the mosques come to these festivals, and it is the only time many members of the Muslim community meet.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Until recently, there was no specific information about the availability of halal food in Iceland but, according to Salmann Tamimi, the former chairperson of the Muslim Association of Iceland, there is one Pakistani restaurant in Reykjavík that serves halal food.8 For a few years now, halal slaughtering has been practised at a slaughterhouse in the north of Iceland (Sláturfélag Skagfirðinga) and Icelandic halal lamb is now available in some supermarkets. During the slaughtering season, a few Muslims travel north to Skagafjörður to supervise the halal slaughtering and see that it is conducted in a proper manner. The mosques store some of this meat for Muslims to buy.

11 Dress Codes

Although there are no legal restrictions, there have been some earlier reports about discrimination against Muslim women wearing hijab but, according to the International Religious Freedom Report 2011, there were no reports on this for the year 2011. No information is available for 2013. Information from Muslims themselves indicates occasional instances of harassment due to Islamic dress, mainly the hijab.

8 Iceland Review, 29 July 2008, www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/search/news/Default .asp?ew_0_a_id=309477, accessed 21 June 2014. Iceland 315

12 Publications and Media

The website of Muslim Association of Iceland (www.islam.is) contains general information about Islam, the Qur’an and activities organised by the group. While activity on the homepage is low, the online discussion group for Muslim women (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/kvennafundir/) linked to the webpage is more active. The language used for communication is either Icelandic or English. The website of the icci (www.icci.is) is in English and Arabic, and contains various information concerning Islam and Islamic practices, while the website of the mai (www.islam.is) is mainly in Icelandic. Because there are so few Muslims in Iceland and most of them are of foreign origins (with languages other than Icelandic as their mother-tongues), there is a very small market for translations of Islamic books, and most Islamic publications are therefore limited to online forums, especially those referred to above. There are two translations of the Qur’an into Icelandic, one from 1993, and one from 2013, with the former translated by a well-known translator, Helgi Hálfdánarsson, and seen as the authoritative version. The original version from 1993 was revised in 2003. The other version ( from 2013) was translated by Haukur Þór Þorvarðarsson, an Icelandic Muslim living in Saudi Arabia.

13 Family Law

There is no concrete data available on this, but Icelandic civil law rules over family matters. Polygamy is, for example, prohibited and there are no known cases of so-called Shariʿa courts of any kind. Marriage is conducted according to Islamic traditions, as are other familial ceremonies. But when it comes to law, Icelandic civil law is the only law applied. According to the leaders of the two mosques (personal correspondence), if Islamic legal codes collide with Icelandic civil law, the latter will always overrule the former.

14 Interreligious Relations

The state in Iceland does not directly support any interfaith programmes, but according to the International Freedom Report 2011 a number of churches and religious groups are involved in interfaith and dialogue groups. There are no national interreligious councils, but in 2006 the Forum for Interfaith Dialogue was set up to work for peaceful coexistence and tolerance in Icelandic society. The Evangelic Lutheran Church of Iceland supports this endeavour. The Forum 316 Larsson and Sigurdsson consists of thirteen religious groups registered with the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs.9

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debate about Islam and Muslims is informed by global and international events rather than by local Muslim affairs. Nonetheless, there are indications that there are more negative opinions about Muslims than about immigrants in general.10 Since early 2013, Icelandic Muslims became a hot topic in the public discourse in Iceland, following the fulfilment of a decade-long promise of a plot for mosque construction. This small group, who had been more or less invisible, were suddenly thrown into the limelight with the resulting moral panic. Suddenly, Islamophobia reared its head and public polarisation, with or against the mosque and, by extension, Muslims and Islam, became apparent. It is expected that this story will be continued.

16 Major Cultural Events

Every spring, there is a so-called Multicultural Day in Reykjavík, where sections of different immigrant communities march through the centre of town, each group expressing their distinct cultural characteristics. The Muslims are part of this parade, and following it there is a huge multicultural gathering at the City Hall in Reykjavík. During these festivities, different “cultural groups” showcase different aspects of their heritage. There is no special focus on Muslims here, but they have been very active in introducing diverse Islamic publications, mostly in English, but also in Icelandic, and they have given away copies of the Qur’an to members of the public. For the last few years, the profile of the Muslims has been strong at this festival and the public has shown great interest in what they have to offer. Besides presenting Islamic literature, a wide variety of “oriental culinary delicatessen” has been on offer.

9 “Forum for interfaith dialogue created in Iceland,” The Lutheran World Federation, www .lutheranworld.org/News/lwi/en/1969.en.html , accessed 6 January 2010. 10 Strabac, Z. and O. Listhaug, “Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries,” in Social Science Research 37 (2008), pp. 268–286, especially p. 278. Ireland

Oliver Scharbrodt* and Victoria Montgomery**

1 Muslim Populations

According to Ireland’s most recent census, carried out in 2011, there were 49,204 Muslims in Ireland, a 51% increase on the previous 2006 census.1 Estimates provided by major Muslim organisations in Ireland suggest a figure of around 65,000.2 This means that Muslims now make up at least 1.1% of the total population, which is a significant growth from barely 0.1% just twenty years ago. The Irish census data is quite detailed, providing information on the national background, the geographical spread across the state, occupational and socio- economic status and educational level of the Muslim population, making it possible to draw comparisons with other faith communities and the national average. The Muslim presence in Ireland is extremely diverse without any particular ethnic or cultural group being predominant. According to the 2011 census, a significant number of Muslims come from various Asian (15,376) and African (8,777) countries. While Asian Muslims come primarily from Pakistan (6,662), Bangladesh (2,319), Malaysia (1,373), Iraq (1,081) and Saudi Arabia (1,029), most Muslims from Africa have the Nigerian citizenship (2,088), and the other major national groups are Sudanese (1,470), Somalis (1,178), Egyptians (1,055) and Algerians (1,047). Most European Muslims (2,049) come from outside of

* Oliver Scharbrodt is Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Chester. He led a major research project on Muslim in Ireland from 2008 to 2011, funded by the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Department of An Taoiseach. He co-edited with Tuula Sakaranaho a special edition on Islam and Muslims in the Republic of Ireland of the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 31 no. 4 (2011). He is one of the authors of Muslims in Ireland: Past and Present (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). ** Victoria Montgomery is a research fellow within the School of Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast. She completed a PhD entitled “Identity, Integration and Belonging: Muslims in Ireland,” and is the author of “Are you a Protestant or a Catholic Muslim? The path of Muslim integration into Northern Ireland,” in Javad Rehman and Susan C. Breau (eds.), Religion, Human Rights and International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 489–519. 1 Central Statistics Office. The 2011 Census, available at: www.cso.ie. 2 Fiona Dillon and Tom Brady, ‘Muslims target in “Hate Mail” campaign,’ Irish Independent, 26 November 2013, available at: www.independent.ie/irish-news/muslims-targeted-in-hate- mail-campaign-29783626.html, accessed 13 January 2014.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_022 318 Scharbrodt and Montgomery the eu, primarily from Turkey (1,029), Bosnia and Kosovo (about 800 together). Irish nationals constitute the largest national group within the Muslim population, having risen by 86.7% from 9,761 in 2006 to 18,223 in 2011. Most of these Muslims acquired Irish citizenship either through birth (almost 28% were born in Ireland) or naturalisation. Around 3,543 Muslims (7.2%) describe themselves as of Irish ethnicity, who would be converts or perhaps children of mixed marriages. A ratio of 37.1% of the entire Muslim population in Ireland that possesses Irish citizenship indicates a demographic trend which increasingly disconnects the Muslim population from the phenomenon of immigration and suggests the long-term establishment of a permanent Muslim presence in Ireland. The vast majority (97.9%) of Muslims in Ireland live in urban areas with a significant concentration of more than half of the Muslim population (25,471) in the Dublin metropolitan area. Muslims in Ireland are more likely to be married than the general population and much less likely to be divorced. The vast majority of Muslims in Ireland are Sunni with estimates of 4,000–6,000 Shiʿis living in Ireland. Ireland has also witnessed growing numbers of conversions to Islam, with converts now estimated in the hundreds.3 According to the 2011 census, a smaller percentage of Muslims (38.4%) worked in comparison with the national average (50.1%) which is a reflec- tion of the overall younger age profile of the Muslim population compared to the national average. The percentage of unemployed Muslims (18.7%) was higher than the unemployment rate within overall population (11.7%). With regard to the social class of Muslims in Ireland, they are underrepresented in lower-skilled professions while significantly overrepresented among higher professional workers (15%) in comparison to the national average (7.3%). This overrepresentation within higher qualified professions is also reflected in the higher educational levels among the Muslim population compared to the national average. The data suggests a socio-economic gap within the overall Muslim population which is linked to patterns of Muslim settlement in Ireland post-wwii. Sustained Muslim settlement from the 1950s until the early 1990s was made up primarily of students who came for higher education and then stayed, or those wishing to set up businesses. Thus, they had solid educational and professional backgrounds. The Islamic Foundation of Ireland (ifi), for example, estimates that there are more than 4,000 medical doctors of Muslim background in Ireland. A significant proportion of Muslims is highly qualified, possesses ter-

3 Yafa Shanneik, ‘Conversion to Islam in Ireland: A Post-Catholic Subjectivity?,’ Journal of Muslims in Europe, vol. 1 no. 2 (2012), pp. 166–188. Ireland 319 tiary educational degrees and works as educated professionals on higher salary scales. Ireland’s economic boom since the 1990s has diversified the face of Muslim immigration. Growing numbers of Muslim asylum-seekers have also arrived from Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Somalia and Iraq, as well as large numbers of economic migrants from across the world.4

2 Islam and the State

The Irish Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and freedom of profession and practice of religion (subject to public order and morality) to every person. It also guarantees that the state will not endow any religion or impose any penalties for religious belief.5 Religions and religious organisations are not publicly funded in Ireland. However, religious organisations are eligible for charitable status, which allows for some tax exemptions. Several Islamic organisations such as the ifi, for example, have been accorded the status of a Friendly Society (charitable status). Within the denominational educational system of Ireland, the closest cooperation between the state and religious organisations exists. Most primary and secondary schools in Ireland are privately owned by a church body and publicly funded. While the vast majority of schools are run by religious bodies affiliated with the Catholic Church, there are two Muslim primary schools in Dublin which are funded by the Department of Education and Skills. The Irish Constitution and overall legal culture in Ireland are permeated by a strong religious ethos and have been traditionally shaped by Catholic social teachings. For instance, the Constitution makes blasphemy a criminal offence. In 2009, against substantial public opposition, a Blasphemy Law was passed in the Daíl, the Lower House of the Irish Parliament as part of the Defamation Act which makes it an offence to utter or publish matters that are grossly abusive or insulting thereby causing outrage among substantial adherents of a religion.6 Muslims are, in principle, protected under this law. As part of a general review of the Irish constitution, a Constitutional Convention was established in 2012

4 Oliver Scharbrodt, ‘Muslim Immigration to the Republic of Ireland: Trajectories and Dynamics since World War ii,’ Éire-Ireland, vol. 47, no. 1–2, pp. 221–243. 5 Article 44, Irish Constitution. 6 Defamation Act 2009, available at: www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2009/a3109 .pdf, accessed 13 January 2014. 320 Scharbrodt and Montgomery which recommended replacing the current law which criminalises blasphemy with a more general provision against incitement of religious hatred.7 While the state does not grant any official legal recognition to Muslim organisations, their representatives, as those of other faith communities, are regularly consulted in policy and legal matters relevant to them. The Government, Parliament and other state organs usually invite and consult representatives of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (icci), the major Sunni-mosque organisation based at an extensive mosque complex in South Dublin. This was, for example, the case during public debates around the introduction of a new abortion law in Ireland in 2013. Following the death of a pregnant woman in a hospital in Galway in October 2012 who was denied termination of her pregnancy on legal grounds, as the Irish Constitution prohibits abortion,8 the Irish government and the Parliament prepared a bill to allow abortion when the life of the expecting mother was in danger.9 As part of the preparation of the bill, a public hearing in the Parliament invited representatives from the Catholic Church, various Protestant denominations, a Jewish rabbi and a representative from the icci as well.10 Muslims are given legal protection from discrimination in Ireland. The Equal Status Acts 2000–2004 prohibit discrimination on religious (and other) grounds and aim to promote equality. In addition to these laws, there are several state agencies which enforce equality and work on behalf of minority communities. These include the Equality Authority and the Gardái (police) Racial and Intercultural Office (grio). The grio holds an annual Diversity Consultation Day in order to meet with the representative organisations, personnel and leaders of minority communities in Ireland. This allows for discussion of issues affecting these communities and for the communities to help shape and influence Garda policy and strategy relating to diversity.11 However,

7 Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, ‘Convention recommends replacing blasphemy office,’ The Irish Times, 3 November 2013, available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/con vention-recommends-replacing-blasphemy-offence-1.1582317, accessed 13 January 2014. 8 Article 40, Irish Constitution. 9 Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013, available at: www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc .asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2013/6613/document1 .htm, accessed 13 January 2014. 10 ‘Churches, faith groups and non-confessional bodies attend final day of Oireachtas abortion hearing,’ rte News, 11 January 2013, available at: www.rte.ie/news/2013/0110/362006- last-day-of-oireachtas-hearings-on-abortion/, accessed 13 January 2014. 11 An Garda Síochána: www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=154&Lang=1, accessed 22 January 2014. Ireland 321 despite such initiatives, recent research has shown that there are no means to actually measure and thus combat Islamophobia.12

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The first Islamic organisation in Ireland, the Dublin Islamic Society, was established by Muslim students in 1959. The name was changed in 1990 to the Islamic Foundation of Ireland (ifi) (163 South Circular Road, Dublin, Dublin 8, tel.: ++353 14533242, www.islaminireland.com, email: info@islaminireland. com). The ifi established Ireland’s first mosque in 1976 and moved to its current location in 1983. The ifi has a written constitution and an elected council. Full membership is open to all Muslims in Ireland and every Muslim resident of Ireland is an honorary member. The ifi, on its own website, cites itself as the official representative of all Muslims in Ireland. However, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (icci) (19 Roebuck Road, Clonskeagh, Dublin 14, tel.: ++353 12080000, www.islamireland.ie, email contact via a contact form on the website, www.twitter.com/islamireland) with a large purpose-built mosque and Islamic centre, which regularly welcomes politicians and other visiting groups, has become the public face of Islam in Ireland since its establishment in 1996.13 Funded by the Al-Maktoum Foundation, a private foundation headed by Sheikh Hamdan Al-Maktoum, member of the ruling family in Dubai and Finance Minister of the United Arab Emirates, the icci is organised in different departments and employs around twenty full-time members of staff, primarily from Arab countries, among them an Egyptian imam. Having access to financial resources that no other mosque organisation in Ireland has, it performs a wide range of religious and social functions, such as translation services, marital and funeral services, and maintains a library, a gymnasium and a women’s section. The icci is linked with various European networks of the Muslim Brotherhood such as the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, an umbrella organisation of various branches and affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Europe Trust and the European Institute for Human Sciences. The icci also houses the Secretariat of the European Council for

12 James Carr, ‘Regulating Islamophobia: The Need for Collecting Disaggregated Data on Racism in Ireland,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs vol. 31 no. 4 (2011), pp. 574–593. 13 Oliver Scharbrodt and Tuula Sakaranaho, ‘Islam and Muslims in the Republic of Ireland: An Introduction to the Special Edition,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs vol. 31 no. 4 (2011), pp. 475–476. 322 Scharbrodt and Montgomery

Fatwa and Research which is headed by the prominent Qatar-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (b. 1926).14 The recent trend to create national representative umbrella organisations for Muslims in various European countries has also found its expression in Ireland with the creation of the Irish Council of Imams in September 2006. The Council officially consists of 35 members, all imams in various mosques in Ireland. Chairperson of the council is the imam of the icci. However, the Council does not meet regularly and deals primarily with practical issues affecting Muslims in order to create a certain degree of uniformity in terms of Muslim ritual practices, by agreeing on a date for the start of the month of Ramadan, for example. Its main responsibility lies in providing training sessions and correspondence courses for various imams in Ireland who often lack education in Islamic scholarship. Representing Shiʿi Muslims in Ireland is the Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre (Milltown Bridge, Dundrum, Dublin 14, tel.: ++00353 12604491, http://home page.tinet.ie/~ahlulbyteassociation/). As well as being a mosque, the Centre runs social activities and lectures and acts as the main point of contact for the Shiʿis from Iraq and the Persian Gulf countries. In addition, the Bab-ul-Ilm Society (86 Beach Park, Easton Road, Leixlip, Co. Kildare, tel.: ++353 878547439, www.babulilm.ie) is another group, formed to meet the needs of Shiʿis from South Asia. Other organisations represent specific sectarian or ethnic groups in Ireland. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Association (6–7 Well Park Grove, Galway, tel.: ++353 9168832, www.islamahmadiyya.ie, email: [email protected]) is the Irish branch of the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam and is currently building a mosque in Galway. The Al-Mustafa Islamic Educational and Cultural Centre (31 Coolmine Industrial Estate, Blanchardstown, Dublin, 15, tel.: ++353 18200786, http://islamiccentre.ie, email: [email protected]) provides religious and social functions and participates in building interfaith dialogue. Its imam is a follower of the international Minhaj-ul-Quran movement. Another organisation, which is affiliated with the South Asian Barelvi tradition, is the Irish Sufi Foundation (8–9 Talbot Street, Dublin 1; email: [email protected]) based at the Anwar-e-Madina Islamic Centre. The Muslim Association Forum (tel.: ++353 871828697, www.muslafireland.org; email: [email protected]), which is headquartered at the ifi premises, was originally formed by Nigerian immigrants but is now made up of Muslims from various African countries.

14 Adil Hussain Khan, ‘Creating the Image of European Islam: the European Council for Fatwa and Research and Ireland,’ in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Muslim Political Participation in Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 215–238. Ireland 323 maf runs its own Qur’anic classes and children’s programme and has charity status. Outside Dublin, Muslim organisations can be found in major cities such as the Galway Islamic Cultural Centre, established in 1978 (13 Sandyview Drive, Riverside, Galway, tel.: ++353 91751621, www.gicc.ie ), the Cork Muslim Society, established in 1984 (tel.: ++353 214320301, http://www.cmccmosque.ie/, email: [email protected]), and the Limerick Islamic Cultural Centre (Dooraday Road, Limerick, tel.: ++353 61227054). Like the ifi and icci, these organisations also perform religious and social functions but on a much smaller scale. All of these societies can be contacted via the ifi. The Dublin Welfare Society (http://www.dublinwelfaresociety.ie/), established in 2010, is a Muslim organisation running several projects. One of them is Discover Islam Ireland (163 South Circular Road, Dublin 8, tel.: ++353 1890253330, http://www.discoverislam.ie/index.php, email: info@discoverislam.ie), which engages in missionary activities by organising exhibitions, lectures and seminars on Islam. Muslim Sisters of Eire (http://www.msoe.ie/) is another project of the Dublin Welfare Society which caters for the needs of Irish women converts to Islam by organising educational and social activities. The various universities in Ireland have active Islamic societies with the Irish branch of the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (fosis) (http://ireland .fosis.org.uk/) acting as an umbrella organisation.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Ireland currently has three purpose-built mosques. The first, the Ballyhaunis Mosque in Co. Mayo, was built in 1986 by a local Muslim businessman for the employees of his halal meat factory. The icci in Dublin is a large and impressive mosque which was opened in 1996. Both the icci and the Ballyhaunis mosque are Sunni mosques. Also in 1996, the Shiʿi Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre in Dublin was opened. Commonly referred to as Husseiniyya, it is a mosque and Islamic centre for Iraqi and Gulf Arab Shiʿis primarily. In addition to these, there is also the large Dublin City Mosque—a former Presbyterian church purchased by the ifi in 1983—to which a major extension was added in 2010. Construction is currently underway for a purpose-built mosque in Galway, being the first for Ahmadi Muslims in Ireland. In 2013, planning permission was also granted for a major mosque project in Clongriffin, North Dublin. This €40 million development will include a cultural centre, a prayer hall, offices, a crèche, a bookshop, a library, a mortuary, a conference centre, a restaurant, primary and secondary schools and a fitness centre with a swimming pool. The 324 Scharbrodt and Montgomery mosque will be able to accommodate up to 3,000 worshippers and will be the largest mosque in Ireland upon completion. However, funding for this mosque project has not been secured yet.15 Fundraising for new mosques is also taking place in Galway and in Cork. The Cork Muslim Society has turned a former warehouse into a mosque. While the new mosque was partially opened in 2013, completion of the project depends on securing further funding. For the most part, Muslims use rented or purchased houses and premises on business or industrial estates as mosques throughout Ireland. Securing funding to build, expand and maintain adequate places of worship that cater for the growing number of Muslims is a major challenge for most mosque communities and organisations in Ireland. Other mosques include the Tallaght Mosque, Blackpitts Mosque, the Lucan Mosque, the Blanchardstown Mosque and Condalkin Muslim Centre, all in Dublin. Several mosques are now located in major cities like Cork, Galway or Limerick as well as mosques in Tralee, Ennis, Cavan, Carlow, Dundalk, Kilkenny, Kerry, Clare and Waterford, Portlaoise and Mullingar. There are probably around 30 mosques with an imam and regular Friday prayers in Ireland, half of them in the Dublin wider Metropolitan Area. A list of mosques can be found on the ifi website. In addition to mosques, many hospitals and universities have prayer rooms for their Muslim employees and students. While the main mosques in Dublin and other cities are attended by Muslims of all ethnic and national backgrounds, there is a growing number of mosques and prayer rooms based on particular schools of thought or language. Particularly noteworthy is the growth of South Asian mosque communities. The Blackpitts Mosque provides sermons in Urdu with its imam trained in the Deobandi tradition. The Clondalkin Muslim Centre caters for Muslims from Bangladesh. Pakistani Shiʿis have opened the Azakhana-e Zahra Community Centre in an industrial estate in Blanchardstown, Dublin. There has been increasing opposition to mosques in Ireland, usually related to traffic and planning issues. In Cork, for example, a new mosque that was opened on a busy road close to the city centre in 2013 faced opposition of residents in the neighbourhood who complained of traffic disruptions and noise as well as violations of the original planning permission.16 Similar objections

15 Christina Finn, ‘Ireland’s largest mosque gets planning permission,’ TheJournal.ie, 29 August 2013, available at: www.thejournal.ie/irelands-largest-mosque-clongriffin- 1060199-Aug2013/, accessed 14 January 2014. 16 Eoin English, ‘Planners in row over Cork city Islamic centre,’ Irish Examiner, 18 September 2013, available at: www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/planners-in-row-over-cork-city-islamiccentre-243372.html, accessed 15 January 2014. Ireland 325 were also raised to the new Ahmadi mosque in Galway which is currently under construction.17 In the run up to granting planning permission for the large mosque complex planned in Clongriffin, North Dublin, a local politician opposed the size of the development, arguing it does not meet local development plans.18 While such opposition to mosque projects was rare in Ireland in the past, with the growing number of mosques and their increasing visibility due to their size and location in city centres, public debates around mosque construction have risen in recent years. Even mosques and payer houses that are less visible in residential areas or industrial sites have faced legal challenges, because they are situated in planning areas not designated for places of worship.

5 Children’s Education

There are currently two Muslim primary schools in Dublin which are funded by the Department of Education and Skills. The Muslim National School was set up by the ifi in 1990 and the North Dublin Muslim National School was established in 2001. They follow the Irish school curriculum but have an Islamic ethos, teaching Arabic and Islamic Religious Education. Both schools have large waiting lists but plans to expand have been put on hold due to budget cuts and negative inspection reports of the North Dublin Muslim National School.19 The imam of the Dublin City Mosque and president of the ifi acts as patron of both schools, while the Muslim Primary Education Board manages them on his behalf. There are no Muslim secondary schools in Ireland; so most Muslim children in Ireland attend mainstream Irish schools, the majority of which are denominational. In 2011, the icci highlighted complaints from Muslim parents who allege that children who attend the Muslim primary school in Clonskeagh find it hard to get into secondary schools in the area, and

17 Enda Cunningham, ‘Planners say Muslim group misled them over numbers at Galway mosque,’ Connacht Tribune, 19 August 2013, available at: www.connachttribune.ie/gal way-news/item/1115-planners-say-muslim-group-misled-them-over-numbers-at-galway- mosque, accessed 15 January 2014. 18 Colette Colfer, ‘Ireland’s largest mosque gets approval from An Bord Pleanála,’ The Irish Times, 29 August 2013, available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/religion-and- beliefs/ireland-s-largest-mosque-gets-approval-from-an-bord-plean%C3%A1la-1.1509586, accessed 15 January 2014. 19 Adelina Campos, ‘City’s Muslim school is eyeing up new site as waiting list swells,’ The Irish Herald, 25 August 2010, available at: www.herald.ie/national-news/city-news/citys-muslim- school-is-eyeing-up-new-site-as-waiting-list-swells-2310756.html, accessed 15 January 2014. 326 Scharbrodt and Montgomery that some schools are only accepting Catholics, an allegation denied by the schools in question.20 Religious education is a part of the school curriculum in Ireland, and can often take the form of religious instruction. This is particularly the case at primary level where Catholic children are prepared for communion. However, in recent years there have been initiatives to organise Islamic instruction in some schools, or in a number of schools with large numbers of Muslim pupils, the school has invited someone from a nearby mosque to visit on Fridays and give a khutba to the children.21 Moreover, parents do have the legal right to exempt their children from religious education, although many schools face practical problems in arranging alternative supervisory arrangements for those pupils. In the multi-denominational Educate Together primary schools in Ireland, where an ethics curriculum is taught instead of religious education, the school facilities are made available for religious instruction after school. Recent public debates and policy initiatives to reform the denominational educational system in Ireland with a view to divest a number of Catholic schools from church ownership and to diversify the types of religious and non-religious bodies that assume patronage of schools have led to the establishment of a Forum on Patronage and Pluralism in the Primary Sector by the Minister for Education and Skills in 2011. The ifi as patron of the two Muslim National Schools was also invited to make a submission to the Forum.22 Despite the main recommendations of the Forum to have a more diverse range of patrons and to include the views of parents living in an area, the implications of the report, published in 2012, for Muslim schools and their possible future expansion remain unclear, as the report does not pay much attention to issues around the school patronage of minority faith communities.23 Most Islamic education is provided in weekend schools for Muslim children run by mosques and Islamic societies in Ireland. The icci established the Nur Al-Huda School in 1999 and have since extended it to two areas outside Dublin.

20 Euro-Islam, ‘Muslim families claim discriminatory admission policies of Catholic schools in Dublin,’ Euro-Islam.Info, 7 October 2011, available at: www.euro-islam.info/2011/10/07/ muslim-families-claim-discriminatory-admission-policies-of-catholic-schools-in-dub lin/, accessed 15 January 2014. 21 Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-reading Finland and Ireland, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 404–405. 22 ifi’s submission available at: www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Conferences/Patronage- and-Pluralism-in-the-Primary-Sector/Patronage-Forum-Submissions-November-2011-/ fpp_islamic_foundation_ireland_17nov2011.pdf, accessed 15 January 2014. 23 Report available at: www.education.ie/en/Publications/Policy-Reports/fpp_report_advi sory_group.pdf, accessed 15 January 2014. Ireland 327

It also runs the Libyan school, which follows the Libyan curriculum recognised throughout the Arab world. The ifi runs the Al-Falah Weekend Islamic School as well as the Sunday madrasa and the Children’s Qur’anic School where classes are held in the evenings. There are also weekend schools attached to mosques in Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford among others. These weekend schools are not supervised by the Department of Education and Skills.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The main universities in Ireland offer a variety of courses where issues related to Islam are part of a module. Introductory and more specialised courses on Islam as well as research supervision in Islamic Studies are offered in the Study of Religions Department at University College Cork and the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Studies at Trinity College Dublin. There is no institution in Ireland offering training for imams, although the icci organises correspondence courses with the European Institute for Human Sciences in France. The full-time teaching staff at the Muslim primary schools in Dublin are appointed by the Department of Education and Skills. In addition, there are part-time religious teachers who are privately appointed by the school, and whose salaries are not met by the state but by the schools’ patron.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1976, the Dublin Islamic Society bought a section of the Mount Jerome cemetery in Dublin. However, this was full by the end of the 1980s and in 1990 the South Dublin City Council reserved a section of the Newcastle cemetery in Dublin for Muslim use only. Outside of Dublin, a designated area in St. James Cemetery in Cork has been set aside for Muslims as well as in cemeteries in Limerick and in Gorey, Co. Wexford. In Dundalk, Co. Louth, in April 2011, permission was granted for a designated Muslim burial ground with the potential for another plot in Drogheda. However, the fact that it took six years from when local Muslims first approached the Dundalk Joint Burial Boards has given rise to criticism from local Muslims.24 Since 2013, Muslims are allowed

24 ‘Dundalk finally gets Muslim burial ground,’ Metro Eireann, 15 April 2011, available at: http://metroeireann.com/print-article,2659, accessed 16 January 2014. 328 Scharbrodt and Montgomery to bury their dead according to the Islamic tradition wrapped in shrouds and without a coffin.25

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are currently no Muslim chaplains within the state institutions. However, within the prisons in Ireland and the health service, Muslim representatives will be contacted upon request. There are no Muslim chaplains at universities in Ireland, although most universities have Muslim prayer rooms.

9 Religious Festivals

The main mosques in Ireland organise their ʿId celebrations separately, within the mosque if it is large enough. The icci, for example, has a large hall which is used for ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha celebrations, as well as breaking the fast during Ramadan. Outside of Dublin, the largest ʿId al-Fitr celebration takes place in Cork, where several thousand people attend. The community tends to rent space in order to accommodate such numbers. Apart from children attending Muslim primary schools or adults working for the Muslim organisations, Muslims have no automatic legal right to take holidays during the main religious festivals. This must either be negotiated with schools and employers or, in the case of working adults, taken as annual leave if agreement cannot be reached. There is no information available on the number of pilgrims from Ireland going on hajj.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Ritual slaughter is legal in Ireland, there are many halal butchers in Dublin as well as other Irish cities and halal food is widely available in Ireland. Ireland has a thriving halal industry which exports halal meat and dairy products worldwide.26 Lamb and increasing amounts of halal dairy produce, which are certified by the ifi, are exported from Ireland. Halal certification is also

25 Paul Melia, ‘Muslim shroud burials allowed in new rules,’ Irish Independent, 7 May 2013, available at: www.independent.ie/irish-news/muslim-shroud-burials-allowed-in-new- rules-29246473.html, accessed 16 January 2014. 26 Halal Certification Information is available on the Islamic Foundation of Ireland website, www.islaminireland.com. Ireland 329 carried out by the Department of Halal Certification Ireland (dhci) which was established in 2004 and is linked to the Al-Mustafa Educational and Cultural Centre.27 In May 2010, the dhci started halal certification for bakery products and has approved and certified more than 150 bakery products of bakeries in Ireland and other European countries. In particular in hospitals, halal food is widely available due to the long tradition of medical doctors of a Muslim background working in Irish health services. The Finance Bill, published in February 2010, proposed new measures and tax changes which would comply with Shariʿa law and thus not only attract business from the Muslim world but make it possible for religious Muslims in Ireland to conduct their business as Shariʿa law requires.28 While Ireland has emerged as a major global centre for Islamic finance, there are no specific Shariʿa compliant products available in Ireland. According to the Irish Banking Federation, such products are constrained by a lack of demand, and that to facilitate an Islamic mortgage product, legislative changes would be required in relation to stamp duty, for example.29 In terms of religious ritual, the ifi and icci both arrange funerals and perform the religious rituals. While many of the smaller Islamic organisations do not have the resources of the ifi and icci, they will advise on funeral arrangements and perform the religious rituals. The Saudi Ministry of Hajj approved hajj agents in Ireland are the ifi and Manasik Tours (Dundrum Road, Dublin 4, tel.: ++353 12079618, www.gohajj.ie). The Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre organises hajj trips for the Shiʿi community in Ireland.

11 Dress Codes

Following a public debate in 2008, the Minister for Integration issued guidelines which essentially confirmed that individual schools should decide their own uniform policy but that it should not act to exclude students of a particular religious background. In practice, therefore, this allows for the hijab in Irish schools, although it did not recommend clothing which obscured the face

27 Department of Halal Certification Ireland: www.halalcertification.ie/history_depart ment_of_halal_certification_ie.html, accessed 20 January 2014 28 Edana Richardson, ‘Islamic Finance for Consumers in Ireland: A Comparative Study of the Position of Retail-level Islamic Finance in Ireland,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 31 no. 4 (2011), pp. 534–553. 29 Fiona Reddan, ‘West looks to the East for growth as Islamic finance comes centre stage,’ The Irish Times, 27 February 2012. 330 Scharbrodt and Montgomery

(i.e. burqa and niqab) which was deemed a barrier to communication.30 In 2010, Guidelines on the Inclusion of Students of Other Faiths in Catholic Secondary Schools were circulated around more than 450 Catholic schools in Ireland. The Guidelines prohibit the niqab on the grounds that a teacher would not be able to engage properly with the student. The Guidelines also state that it is reasonable for a female teacher to ask a pupil’s mother to uncover her face for a meeting, on the understanding that no man will come into the room.31 There are no rules limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in other public institutions although in organisations, such as the Garda (police), which have a uniform, Muslims must conform to that uniform, which at present does not include a hijab option. It is now quite common to see Muslim women and men in religious dress, particularly in Dublin. With regard to women, this is mainly hijab and jilbab; women wearing niqab on Ireland’s streets are still quite rare. The issue of Muslim women’s dress has gained more attention in recent years. Despite official guidelines which in principle permit wearing hijab at Irish schools, a case was reported of a school in Dún Laoghaire, which banned a Muslim girl from wearing hijab in 2013.32 A Lithuanian convert immigrant Dunnes Stores employee (a major department store) opened a case for unfair dismissal in 2012 as she was not permitted to wear hijab at work. Eventually, the woman settled her case out of court.33 In addition, although head coverings worn for religious reasons are acceptable in photographs for passport and driving licences, a number of Muslim women were asked to remove their head scarves to comply with new identification procedures at the Garda (police) National Immigration Bureau in Dublin. After the icci had discussions with senior Garda representatives, it was confirmed that Muslim women would not be asked to remove hijab.34

30 Claire Hogan, ‘Accommodating Islam in the Denominational Irish Education System: Religious Freedom and Education in the Republic of Ireland,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 31 no. 4, 554–573. 31 Aiveen Mulally, ‘Guidelines on the Inclusion of Students of Other Faiths in Catholic Secondary Schools’ Joint Management Board [online], available at: www.jmb.ie/, accessed 20 January 2013. 32 Shaun Connolly, ‘Quinn refuses to intervene in veil ban,’ Irish Examiner, 16 August 2013, available at: www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/quinn-refuses-to-intervene-in-veil- ban-240039.html, accessed 20 January 2014. 33 Georgina O’Halloran, ‘Dunnes told Muslim worker she couldn’t wear her hijab,’ Irish Independent, 12 September 2012, available at: www.independent.ie/irish-news/dunnes- told-muslim-worker-she-couldnt-wear-her-hijab-26897009.html, accessed 20 January 2014. 34 Mary Fitzgerald, ‘Muslims asked to remove headscarves for new garda card,’ The Irish Times, 21 March 2012, p. 3. Ireland 331

12 Publications and Media

Most Muslim organisations and mosque communities in Ireland use electronic media running their own websites and using social media such as Facebook or Twitter. The main organisations have extensive websites which contain articles in English, Urdu and Arabic and audio and video resources available to download. The Irish Muslim was the only print publication which was published intermittently and available in halal shops and selected newsagents. It contained articles and opinion pieces about domestic and international issues affecting Muslims. The magazine seems to have ceased publication with the last issue published in 2012.

13 Family Law

Since 2004, any religious body can nominate solemnisers whose marriage ceremonies are recognised under civil law.35 Currently, four imams in Ireland are officially recognised as solemnisers: the imams of the icci, ifi, Cork Muslim Society and Galway Islamic Cultural Centre.36 The married couple sign the official marriage register which the imam returns to the appropriate Registrar in the area. This arrangement implies an indirect recognition of certain aspects of Islamic marital law (e.g. consent of bride’s male guardian, rules about mar- rying non-Muslims), while others are explicitly not accepted (e.g. polygamous marriages). Beyond Muslim marriages, aspects of Islamic family law are not officially recognised by the state.

14 Interreligious Relations

While there is no national interreligious council in Ireland, Muslims participate in interfaith organisations and events. An important interreligious organisation is the Three Faiths Forum of Ireland which was launched in 1999 and aims to increase dialogue and break down prejudices. However, this organisation only includes the three Abrahamic religions. A multicultural organisation, Cois Tine, which works primarily with immigrant communities (www.cois tine.ie) is engaged in Muslim-Christian dialogue. The Dublin City Interfaith

35 Civil Registration Act 2004, available at: www.irishstatutebook.ie/2004/en/act/pub/0003/ sec0045.html#partvi, accessed 20 January 2014. 36 See Register of Solemnisers, available at: www.welfare.ie/en/downloads/Register_of_ Solemnisers.xls, accessed 20 January 2014. 332 Scharbrodt and Montgomery

Forum (http://www.dublincityinterfaithforum.org/) regularly organises events at which Muslims participate. In December 2013, the Mater Dei Institute of Education, a Catholic teachers’ training college in Dublin, held an international conference on the ‘A Common Word’ document.37 Some Muslim organisations have also developed interfaith links, primarily through conferences. In addition to the ifi and icci, the Al Mustafa Islamic Educational and Cultural Centre and the Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre are particularly involved in such initiatives. Another form of interfaith dialogue has been through organised visits to mosques by religious leaders and school children. Many of the mosques in Ireland organise local multicultural days or events.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Due to the very recent growth of the Muslim population and their relatively small numbers, Islam and Muslims in Ireland are not a major issue of public debate compared to other European countries. However, media coverage has increased in recent years usually focussing on topics which also dominate the public discourse in other parts of Europe, such as violent extremism or the hijab. There have been several negative newspaper articles linking Muslims in Ireland, particularly young Muslims, with violent extremism.38 Domestic repercussions of the political upheaval in the Middle East since 2011 have also become issues of public debate. There was some public attention given to young men from Ireland going to fight with the rebels initially in Libya and later in Syria including interviews and commentaries about numbers and motives. This attention increased towards the end of 2012 with the news that Hudhaifa ElSayed, a 22 year old man from Drogheda, died fighting in December 2012.39 The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland came under pressure in 2013 for maintaining its campus in Bahrain despite the government’s crackdown of opposition protests and the detention of Bahraini graduates of

37 Paul Keenan, ‘Mater Dei hosts major interfaith conference,’ The Irish Catholic, 12 December 2013, available at: www.irishcatholic.ie/article/mater-dei-hosts-major-interfaith-conference, accessed 21 January 2014. 38 National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (nccri) (2006), ‘Challenging myths: The Muslim community in Ireland,’ available at www.nccri.ie/pdf/ ChallengingMyths-Muslims.pdf, accessed 21 January 2014. 39 Mary Fitzgerald, ‘Drogheda man dies fighting in Syria’. The Irish Times, 20 December 2012, p. 1. Ireland 333 the College.40 Three daughters and one teenage son of the Egyptian imam of the icci—all Irish citizens—were arrested at the Ramses Square mosque during Muslim Brotherhood protests against the removal of Muhammad Mursi in 2013 and detained for several months.41 The mainstream media have also shown increasing interest in issues to do with Muslims in Ireland over recent years with feature articles on converts, Ramadan or the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. A hate mail campaign in whose course threatening letters were sent to several Muslim organisations and mosques, the two Muslim primary schools and a number of individual Muslims, brought the issue of Islamophobia in Ireland to public attention in November 2013. The letters contained violent threats against Muslims living in Ireland and referred to the planned large mosque in North Dublin.42

16 Major Cultural Events

The icci hosts an annual Qur’an competition attended by several hundred Muslim children from throughout Ireland. It also hosts an annual conference with a different theme each year, which is attended by Muslims from all around Ireland, and an annual women’s conference. The British Council launched the Irish version of ‘Hijabi Monologues,’ an international theatre project which provides an artistic space for Muslim women to tell their stories. The Irish version premiered in Dublin in April and in Belfast in October 2013.43

40 Mary Fitzgerald, ‘College of Surgeons “powerless” in Bahrain, says former campus head,’ The Irish Times, 1 June 2013, available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/college-of-surgeons- powerless-in-bahrain-says-former-campus-head-1.1413807, accessed 21 January 2014. 41 Mary Fitzgerald, ‘Halawa siblings to meet Egyptian prosecutor,’ The Irish Times, 19 August 2013, available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/halawa-siblings-to-meet- egyptian-prosecutor-1.1498114, accessed 21 January 2014. 42 Ed Carty, ‘Justice Minister Alan Shatter condemns Muslim hate mail,’ Irish Independent, 25 November 2013, available at: www.independent.ie/irish-news/justice-minster-alan- shatter-condemns-muslim-hate-mail-29782916.html, accessed 21 January 2014. 43 More information available at: www.britishcouncil.ie/our-work-education-society/hijabi- monologues, accessed 21 January 2014. Italy

Stella Coglievina*

1 Muslim Populations

Except for the settlement of Muslims in Southern Italy during the seventh and eighth centuries, Islam was almost absent in Italy until the 1970s. By the 1970s and 1980s, Italy had begun to attract migrant workers, among them Muslims from North Africa and Albania. Mainly due to immigration flows, Islam is today the second largest religion in the country, after Catholicism.1 There is no official census of religious communities in Italy; according to the latest estimates, the number of Muslims, who are mostly Sunnis, is between 1.5 and 2.2 million (2.5% to 3.5% of the total population of about 60 million).2 Muslims are mainly registered residents without Italian citizenship and they make up

* Stella Coglievina is a PhD Fellow in Ecclesiastical and Canon Law in the University of Insubria (Como/Varese) where she is also a research assistant. Her research activity is focused on anti- discrimination law in the eu and legal regulation of religious diversities. She is the author of Diritto antidiscriminatorio e religione (Tricase (le): Libellula, 2013) and of various papers about religious freedom and non-discrimination. 1 The most recent sociological research about religious communities in Italy, conducted by cesnur (Center for Studies of New Religions), is published in Introvigne M. – Zoccatelli P. (dir.), Enciclopedia delle religioni in Italia, (Torino: Elledici 2013); online version Le religioni in Italia, at www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/default.htm, accessed 2 January 2014. 2 Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2012 (Immigration Statistical Dossier 2012, Roma: idos 2012, p. 192 f.) indicates 1,650,902 Muslims. According to the cesnur survey, Muslim population in Italy includes about 1,360,000 foreign residents and 115,000 Italian citizens (Le religioni in Italia, tab. n. 1 and 5, at www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/introduzi one_01.htm, accessed 2 Jan. 2014). According to the Pew Forum, in 2010 Muslims in Italy are estimated to be 2,200,000 (see Global Religious Futures, 2013, at www.globalreligiousfutures .org/sharable/1822, accessed 2 January 2014). Different estimates are due to different methodology: Pew Forum surveys are based on a self-identification method; cesnur conducted a sociological research monitoring the presence of affiliated and their participation to the worship and activities of local religious organisations and mosques; Caritas Migrantes calculates estimates on the basis of the percentage of Muslim population in the Countries of origin of immigrants (for example, if official data indicates that in Morocco 99% of population is Muslim, the survey calculates that 99% of Moroccan residents in Italy is Muslim). This method seems to be weak in certain aspects (reliability of data on religions in some countries; difference between the nominal/official religious affiliation in the mother country and the real number of adherents to Islam in Italy; etc.).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_023 Italy 335 about 30% of foreign residents in the country.3 Italy’s Muslim community is significantly ethnically diverse; the main countries of origin are: Morocco, Albania, Tunisia, Senegal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Macedonia, and Algeria.4 Muslims who are Italian citizens are estimated to be around 115,000.5 Italian citizenship laws are based on the jus sanguinis principle and provide for strict conditions to acquire citizenship, while obtaining work and residency permits is easier. By consequence, many immigrants who have lived in Italy for years (and their children born there) cannot easily obtain Italian citizenship. The high number of Muslim non-citizens, including illegal immigrants,6 is one of the obstacles to their integration into Italian society; many foreign Muslims are still first-generation immigrants living in poor socio-economic conditions. However, the rising number of family reunifications and the growing number of young Muslims (second and third generation and new families)7 are changing the picture of the Islamic community living in Italy. Muslim groups have settled throughout Italy but tend to be concentrated in urban areas.

3 Different estimates exist about the number of foreign residents in Italy: istat (National Statistics Institute) indicates 4.3 million, without counting irregular immigrants; Caritas Migrantes about 5 million; cesnur counts more than 3 million. 4 See Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2012, op. cit. 5 Le Religioni in Italia, op. cit. www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/introduzione_01.htm. According to the Ucoii, in 2012 Italians converted to Islam were about 70,000 (see http://islamineurope .blogspot.it/2012/05/italy-70-000-converted-to-islam.html, accessed 8 January 2014). 6 The phenomenon of illegal immigration has always been spread in Italy, mostly due to strict immigration laws. In the last couple of years, Italy has attracted irregular flows of immigrants, subsequent to the political and institutional changes in the Mediterranean Region (so-called Arab Spring) and to the conflict in Syria. In 2013 various incidents occurred to immigrants and refugees seeking to reach Sicily by boat. Immigrants without documents are generally detained in the so called “Centres for Identification and Expulsion” and sent back to their country of origin; some of them, however, attempt to escape and to remain in Italy. No precise data exists on the national and religious characters of irregular immigrants, but it is very likely that a percentage of them, especially those coming from North Africa, are Muslims. See www.dw.de/migrants-in-italy-struggle-against-illegal-status-exploitation/a-17168175, accessed 2 January 2014. 7 According to recent data, among foreign residents there is a growing percentage of minors and of children born in Italy. See www.dossierimmigrazione.it/docnews/file/2013_Scheda_ Dossier.pdf, accessed 2 January 2014. 336 Coglievina

2 Islam and the State

Italy is a secular republic with no state religion. Roman Catholics nominally constitute the majority of the population and the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges, stemming from the sovereign status of the Vatican and its historical political authority. According to the Constitution (Articles 7 and 8), relations between the state and religious confessions are governed by bilateral agreements: for the Catholic Church, the 1929 Lateran Pacts as amended in 1984; for non-Catholic confessions, separate accords (intese) with the government. The absence of an accord does not affect a religious group’s right to worship freely and all religious communities are eligible for public funds for the construction of places of worship. However, religious communities without an accord do not have access to direct financial support (system of the otto per mille, a tax of 0.8% on income paid to the Catholic Church and to religious confessions that have reached an intesa), or to certain specific rights (e.g. automatic access by clergy to state hospitals and prisons, the right of employees and students to observe religious holidays, etc.). Islam, like other confessions that have not signed an agreement with the state, is subject to the legislation of 1929 on ‘recognised religions.’ Divisions among the country’s Islamic organisations, as well as the existence of multiple Muslim groups, have hindered the community’s efforts to sign an accord. Some attempts have been made over recent years to regulate relations between the state and Islamic communities, but the political approach has not been coherent and there have been many different solutions following the changes of government. For example, in 2005, a Consultative Council of Italian Islam (Consulta per l’Islam italiano)8 was established at the Ministry of Interior; some documents were prepared in 2007 and 2008, with the aim of reaffirming the values of a secular state and religious freedom9 and encouraging the institution of a federation of Islamic groups to facilitate reaching an intesa,10 but that prospect continues to be illu- sory. In 2010, a new Consultative Committee (Comitato per l’Islam Italiano),

8 Established with decree of 10 September 2005; see www.interno.it/mininterno/export/ sites/default/it/temi/religioni/sottotema003.html, accessed 1 December 2012. 9 ‘Charter of shared values for citizenship and integration’, published by the Government and presented to the members of the Consultative Council (Decree of the Minister of the Interior of 23 April 2007, English translation available at www.interno.it/mininterno/ export/sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_inte gration.pdf, accessed 1 December 2012). 10 Declaration of Intent of 2008 (Dichiarazione di intenti per la federazione dell’Islam italiano), text available at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/ files/15/0679_dichiarazione_di_intenti.pdf, accessed 1 December 2012. Italy 337 made up of 19 members (representatives of Islamic organisations, scholars, professors and journalists who are experts in Islam), was established at the Ministry of Interior.11 The Committee has been performing consultative functions and the Ministry has been listening to their views on some of the current topics.12 After the change of government in November 2011, the Ministry for Cooperation and Integration created, in March 2012, a permanent conference on “Religions, Culture and Integration,” with Muslim organisations and experts in Islam among the participants, but open to all religions. Since a new government is in charge (after the elections of February 2013), no similar attempt has been made.13 At the local level, some municipalities have established consultative forums with representatives of the local Muslim community (sometimes open also to other religions).14

3 Main Muslim Organisations

As Italy’s Muslim community mainly consists of immigrants and various groups that are not ethnically homogeneous and are scattered across diverse geographic areas, there are many Muslim organisations that represent only a fraction of Muslims living in the country. The level of organisation and cooperation between them is low, leaving Italy’s Muslims without a unified leadership. Moreover, the majority of Muslims often participate only in the cultural

11 See olir.it, Osservatorio delle Libertà ed Istituzioni Religiose (Observatory for Religious Freedoms and Institutions, database on law and religion) www.olir.it/news .php?notizia=2459, accessed 12 January 2014. 12 In 2010 and 2011 the Committee published some opinion reports, about the burka ban (www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/19/00036_Comitato_ Islam_-_relazione_Burqa_07_10.pdf) and mosques (www.interno.it/mininterno/export/ sites/default/it/assets/files/20/0457_Luoghi_di_culto_islamici_-_Parere_del_Comitato_ per_lxIslam_Italiano.pdf, both accessed 12 January 2014). 13 Political difficulties of the government coalition, together with other problems, have left many religious issues outside the government agenda until now. A “Vademecum” was published by the Ministry of Interior, not specifically focused on Islam but on “Religions, Dialogue, Integration” (Religioni, Dialogo, Integrazione, Roma 2013, at www.interno.gov .it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/26/2013_06_18_vademecum_esecu tivo_low.pdf, accessed 8 January 2014). 14 E.g. in Milan (see the press release of Co.Re.Is. www.coreis.it/comunicati/comunicato .php?id=37, accessed 8 January 2014). Other consultative meetings are mentioned in the Vademecum Religioni, Dialogo, Integrazione, op. cit., p. 72 ss. 338 Coglievina and religious life of their own mosque or prayer house, and participation in the activities of the various organisations is not so widespread. A distinction can be made between the organisations connected to the representatives of the countries of origin of Muslims living in Italy (“Islam of the embassies”)15 and those promoted by the adherents to one or more prayer houses (“Islam of the mosques”).16 The most important and well-known Muslim organisations are:

– Unione delle Comunità e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (Union of Islamic Communities and Organisations in Italy, ucoii, via Quattro Fon- tane 109, 00184 Roma, www.ucoii.org), established in 1990 and promoted by a former organisation, the Unione degli Studenti Musulmani d’Italia (Muslim Students’ Union in Italy, usmi), created in 1971 by the first Muslim Sunni groups in Italy. ucoii—generally associated to the Muslim Brotherhood— is one of the best known Muslim organisations in Italy, connected with the most important Islamic centres (such as the Mosque of Segrate, Centro Islamico di Milano e Lombardia, which has sometimes promoted initiatives also at the national level, website: http://www.centroislamico.it/centro/chisiamo/chisiamo.htm). Its leadership includes politicians, professionals and other well-integrated people whose national origin (mainly Syrian, Jorda- nian and Palestinian) is often different from that of the majority of Muslims living in Italy. Two relevant organisations linked to ucoii are the gmi— Giovani Musulmani d’Italia (Young Muslims in Italy, Via Faà di Bruno, 2— Torino tel.: +39 1119703145, e-mail: [email protected], www .giovanimusulmani.it/home/) and the admi—Associazione Donne Musul- mane d’Italia (Association of Italian Muslim Women, viale Monza, 50 Milano, www.admitalia.org). – Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy, viale della Moschea 85, 00197 Roma, tel.: ++39 68082258), the organisation that promoted in the 1970s the construction of the Mosque of Rome (website www .moscheadiroma.com). It is connected with embassies of Muslim states (ambassadors are members of the administrative board of the Centre) and with the Muslim World League (the Italian office). It is the only Muslim body officially recognised according to the legislation of 1929.17

15 E.g. the Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy and the uio, see hereafter. 16 E.g. the ucoii. 17 It is worth noting that many Islamic associations in Italy are registered as cultural associations, while Muslim communities have referred to the 1929 Law for the registration of religious bodies only sporadically. The recognition of a religious body is not necessary to Italy 339

– Confederazione Islamica Italiana (Italian Islamic Confederation, contacts through the Mosque of Rome; email: [email protected]) established in March 2012, and fostered by the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia. It gathers around 250 mosques and Muslim associations, mainly related to Moroccan Muslims.18 – Comunità Religiosa Islamica (Islamic Religious Community, Co.Re.Is., via Giuseppe Meda 9, 20136 Milano, tel.: ++39 28393340, fax: ++39 28393350, email: [email protected], www.coreis.it) is mostly made up of Italian converts to Islam and is active in public debate. – Unione Islamica in Occidente (Islamic Union in the West, uio – Italian Branch of the (Libyan) World Islamic Call Society, wics, via del Giorgione 18, 00147 Roma, tel.: ++39 659606683/685, fax: ++39 659601150, email: wicsi- [email protected], www.wics-it.org), one of the first Muslims associations in Italy. It is connected with the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia and it organises some cultural initiatives (such as Arabic courses).

Some of these organisations (above all the ucoii and the Co.Re.Is.) are very active on the political scene, supporting the idea of an Italian Islam and attempting to become a central interlocutor of the state in order to reach an intesa. There are also many other associations at the local level, often connected with the main mosque of the town. Some of them gave birth to federations, as in the case of the above mentioned Italian Islamic Confederation. Others are:

– Partecipazione Spiritualità Musulmana—psm (Muslim Participation and Spir- ituality, email: [email protected], www.psm-italia.it), umbrella-association joined by many local mosques and Islamic centres, whose purpose is to promote spiritual activities rather than to have a social and public role.

worship freely nor to enjoy collective rights, but it would be essential in order to obtain an agreement with the State. 18 See www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/i/islam_21.htm, accessed 12 January 2014. The Confederation is born after a long planning period (the Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy and the Great Mosque of Rome have worked on this project since 2009) and after the establishment of similar bodies at the Regional level (e.g. the Islamic Regional Federation of Lombardia), now melted in this national organisation. It is mainly composed by Moroccan mosques, while the Islamic Cultural Centre it has been closer to Saudi Arabia, at least in the past. See also M. Bombardieri, Una federazione prevalente, in “Il Regno” 10/2012, pp. 313–4 at www.padovaislam.it/files/confederazione_islamica_bombardieri .pdf, accessed 12 January 2014. 340 Coglievina

– Associazione Islamica Italiana degli Imam e Guide Religiose (Italian Associa- tion of Imams and Religious Leaders).19

Among the local and regional organisations, some are well-known and are promoting activities also at the national level, for example:

– caim – Coordinamento associazioni islamiche di Milano (Coordination of Islamic Associations of Milan, viale Monza 50, 20127 Milano; tel.: +39 0287187624; Fax: +39 0287163937; email: [email protected]; http://www .cai-milano.it), a coordination body of Muslim associations in Milan. – Unione dei Musulmani in Italia (Union of Muslims in Italy, u.m.i., corso Giulio Cesare 6, 10152 Torino, email: [email protected], http://umis- laminitalia.blogspot.com/), founded in 2007 by Moroccan religious leaders in Turin, with the aim of representing moderate Islam and developing interreligious dialogue and relationships with other organisations (e.g. Co. Re.Is.).

Another interesting experience at the local level is the “register” of Islamic associations, established in July 2012 by the municipality of Milan, in order to encourage dialogue and relations between local Muslim and public authorities. Shiʿi Muslims, who are a minority in Italy, have two main associations: Comunità Ismailita in Italia (Ismaʿili Community)20 and Associazione Imam Mahdi (via Gualdo Tadino 17, 00181 Roma; tel.: +39 3394968095; email: imam_ [email protected]; website www.islamshia.org). Another association, connected to the latter, is based in Naples (Associazione Islamica “Ahl-al-Bait,” part of the international Association Ahl-al-Bait, via Confalone 7, 80136 Napoli; tel.: +39 081–5441587; email: [email protected]). Some Sufi congregations exist, even if they are not numerically significant.21

19 www.islam-online.it/2011/12/nasce-lassociazione-degli-imam-in-italia/, accessed 12 January 2014. 20 The Ismaʿili Community in Italy is not numerically significant but is one of the organisations appointed by Italian government to consultative bodies (see section 2); they don’t have any website. Contact details of the Association “Imam Mahdi” are: Associazione Islamica Imam Mahdi, Via Gualdo Tadino 17, 00181 Roma; tel.: ++39 3394968095; website www.islamshia.org/, accessed 13 January 2014. 21 A survey on Sufi congregations in Italy can be found at www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/i/ islam_14.htm (cesnur Report, accessed 12 January 2014. It includes some contact details). Italy 341

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are only a few ‘proper’ mosques, with a minaret and purpose-built buildings: in Catania (a historical building, no longer in use), Rome, Segrate (Milan) and Brescia. Between 2012 and 2013 new mosques were opened: a second one in Catania; a new building in Ravenna and the mosque of Colle Val d’Elsa, near Siena (proper building, with a minaret, opened after much criticism and opposition by local inhabitants. Other mosques were opened in Albenga (Savona) and Turin, where pre-existing buildings were converted into places of worship. Muslim groups often gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls, in many cases basements, garages, and disused warehouses. Prayer halls are frequently inadequate, small and with low standards of hygiene and safety. There are over 700 places of Islamic worship (including prayer houses, Sufi prayer halls, etc.) mostly in Northern and Central Italy: 774 according to the National Agency for Internal Information and Security— aisi;22 769 according to research conducted in 2008–2010.23 With regard to future construction, there have often been problems with funding and planning. According to Italian legislation, all religious communities—including those that have no accord with the state—can obtain public funds for the construction of places of worship (see above, section 2). It is for the regional and local administration to approve requests for such funding, as well as to make publicly owned land available for their construction. At the local level, many Muslims report experiencing difficulties in building a mosque and obtaining funding, often because of political concerns (opposition by local authorities to granting permits to groups considered untrustworthy; supposed lack of representation of Islamic communities; concerns about improper use of mosques; objections to minarets near Christian churches or historic places of worship, etc.). In some cities, a building plan has been approved or land granted for a new construction (e.g. in Bologna, Lodi, Genoa), but opposition by political parties24 and the population, as well as the difficulty of raising funds, have often hindered the beginning or completion of works. Sometimes municipalities impose questionable conditions for the construction of a mosque, and also for granting permits for the use of existing

22 www.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/033/004_ rs/ intero_com.pdf, p. 69, accessed 13 January 2014 (data of 2007). 23 Bombardieri, M., Moschee d’Italia, (Bologna: emi 2011), p. 57 ff. 24 Many right-wing Italian politicians, especially those of the Northern League (Lega Nord, a party of the government coalition, widespread in the North of the country) often make controversial remarks about the growth of mosques in Italy. 342 Coglievina buildings (such as disused gyms, warehouses or garages) as places of worship.25 In December 2013, the Administrative Tribunal of Brescia sanctioned as illegal and discriminatory the city plan because of some conditions imposed on Muslim organisations for the building of places of worship.26

5 Children’s Education

As set forth in the agreement between the state and the Catholic Church, public schools provide Catholic religious education, which is optional. Non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class, which is also optional, or they can leave school during those lessons. A minority of pupils opt out of Catholic religious education lessons (around 11%, varying between regions and schools),27 but there are no data about their religious affiliation. Neither are data available on the school attendance of Muslim pupils. All religious communities, including those without an agreement with the state, such as the Islamic community, may use the classrooms of state schools for classes on religious culture if there are substantial numbers of pupils of that religion, and when no places of worship are available (Art. 23 of Decree No. 289 of 1930). The costs of such teaching are paid by the religious community, and a prior agreement with the Director of the Regional School Office is required. In practice, this option has never been taken up by Muslims. Article 33 of the Constitution grants organisations and private citizens the right to found schools and educational institutions without state funding. No Islamic private schools have yet been established under Article 33, but several foreign schools have been founded by the governments of foreign states, including Egypt (in Milan) and Tunisia (in Mazara del Vallo, near Trapani).28 These schools are authorised by Italian law but their curricula (including language classes) are set by the country in question, which may hinder the inte-

25 See further S. Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe, Network of European Foundations, London 2009, at www.alliancemagazine.org/books/mosques.pdf, accessed 12 January 2014. 26 www.olir.it/documenti/index.php?argomento=0&documento=6226, accessed 12 January 2014. 27 Data of Italian Conference of Bishops for the year 2012/2013, available at www.chiesa cattolica.it/pls/cci_new_v3/v3_s2ew_consultazione.redir_allegati_doc?p_id_ pagina=17565&p_id_allegato=57905, accessed 16 January 2014. 28 Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R., “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R. and Zincone G. (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 146. Italy 343 gration of pupils into Italian society. There is no data about how many pupils attend these schools.29 Some cases of ‘illegal’ Muslim schools (i.e., unauthorised private schools) have been reported in past years.30

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Italian universities there is an increasing interest in the study of religion and Islamic culture and society. Several faculties of law provide courses or seminars on Islamic Law. As for imam training, there is no special legal provision and little is known about courses and lessons organised by the various Islamic groups (for example, the ucoii organises its own courses to train imams and community leaders). From 2010 to 2013, a group of Italian universities, associated in the International Forum Democracy and Religion (fidr), organised a course for religious guides and representatives of Italian Muslim communities— Nuove presenze religiose in Italia (New religious communities in Italy)—with the support of the Ministry of Interior.31 Participants (about 20 per year) have attended lessons one weekend per month, in different periods (normally from May to December).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Special and separate sectors of public cemeteries can be reserved for the burial of people belonging to religious minorities. Muslim communities have already taken advantage of this opportunity in cities such as Florence, Ragusa, Turin

29 Ferrari, A., “La scuola italiana di fronte al paradigma musulmano (The Italian school confronting the Muslim model)”, in Ferrari, A. (ed.), Islam in Italia/Islam in Europa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), pp. 194ff. 30 In 2007 the Ministry of Interior has reported 88 unauthorised Islamic schools (in Islamic cultural centres, etc.): see “In Italia 88 scuole islamiche rapporto segreto al Viminale”, La Repubblica, 21 September 2007, available at http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/ archivio/repubblica/2007/09/21/in-italia-88-scuole-islamiche-rapporto-segreto.html, accessed 2 January 2014. 31 The course is intended to give useful knowledge about the religious framework of Italian society and about laws and current problems relating to Islam. Workshops are scheduled in order to discuss how to manage the practical problems of Muslim communities in their relationship with the public authorities. See the website http://fidr.it/progetto1 .asp, accessed 2 January 2014. 344 Coglievina and Milan (where the cemetery is connected with the mosque of Segrate). There is also a Muslim cemetery in Trieste, which was established for Muslim subjects from the Balkans when the city still belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Similarly to what happens for the building of mosques, in some cases the establishment of Muslim sections in municipal cemeteries has faced opposition from local inhabitants.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Clergy of religious denominations without an agreement under Article 8, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution, including Islam, in theory have access to prisons and hospitals to give assistance to prisoners or patients who have requested it. They also have access to military bases to give pastoral care to soldiers who seek it. Religions that have an agreement with the state can benefit from an easier system of access to state institutions (their clergy are recognised by the state and they can freely access public institutions), while Islamic representatives need authorisation to access the facilities. Moreover, as Islam does not have religious ‘ministers’ recognised by Italian legislation, representatives who intend to give religious assistance in public institutions often need a certificate issued by a relevant Islamic organisation. In practice, the situation differs depending on legislation at the local level or on the decisions of each institution. In prisons, for example, Islamic ‘clergy’ normally have to obtain the director’s permission to access and give spiritual care, and sometimes they have trouble.32 Local authorities and hospitals have specific jurisdiction to make provisions for religious support in the health service: in Tuscany, the Hospital of Florence (Careggi) has an agreement with the local Muslim community to cater to the needs of Muslim patients;33 in other cities, Muslim representatives can access hospitals according to the time and rules of the ordinary visits, or they can be authorised by the manager.

9 Religious Festivals

Italian legislation recognises some Catholic festivals and Sunday as a day of rest. The agreements signed between the state and non-Catholic confessions (e.g. the Jewish community, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the Orthodox

32 Source: personal contact with Muslims representatives in Milan. 33 Text at www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=2226, accessed 9 January 2014. Italy 345

Church) give the faithful the right to time off work for religious observance, with the provision that employers’ needs must be taken into account, and allows pupils to be absent from school. Because there is no accord with the state, current legislation does not cover the specific needs of Muslim workers or recognise any Islamic festivals. However, agreements have been reached between employers and the trade unions (mainly through collective agreements) to allow Muslim workers to take part in Friday prayers and to modify their normal working hours during Ramadan.34 In recent years, Ramadan fell in summer, when high temperatures can be reached. The national confederation of agricultural employers (Coldiretti) highlighted the risks for health of Muslim farm workers who were fasting during Ramadan.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

According to the laws currently in force, animals must be stunned before being slaughtered, but an exception has been made for ritual slaughter performed by the Muslim and Jewish communities. With regard to halal food, there is a growing interest in so-called “ethnic marketing,” even though there is no formal regulation about production and certification of halal products. In 2010, a pilot project was launched by the Milan Chamber of Commerce and the Co.Re.Is., with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to create an Italian Halal stamp of certification; the Co.Re.Is., after signing a convention with the competent Ministries (Foreign Affairs, Economy, Health, Agriculture), set up a special body with its own registered brand that is issuing Halal certification for food, cosmetic and pharmaceutical products compliant with Islamic law and with Italian and European health laws.35 Other certification bodies exist, sometimes

34 For example in Ragusa (Sicily): www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=4357, accessed 2 January 2014. Mass media also reported that in Lombardia many employers provide accommodations for Muslim workers, regarding food, holidays and time-off for prayer (see: Menù etnico e pausa preghiera. I diritti degli immigrati in fabbrica “Ethnic Menus and time for prayer. The immigrants’ rights at work”, Corriere della Sera, 13 May 2013, at www .corriere.it/economia/13_maggio_20/di-vico-menu-etnico-pausa-preghiera-immigrati- fabbrica_46d2f8fa-c10c-11e2–9182–3948fb309202.shtml, accessed 2 January 2014). 35 See the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at www.esteri.it/mae/en/ Sala_Stampa/AreaGiornalisti/NoteStampa/2010/06/20100625_firma_Halal_Italia .htm?lang=en, accessed 9 January 2014. 346 Coglievina connected with foreign and international halal authorities, or set up by local Muslim communities, but not officially recognised at the state level.36 There is little data on the availability of halal food in schools, hospitals, prisons or at work, but normally religious needs are taken into account and an alternative meal for Muslims is offered on request. In 2013, a Muslim mp proposed to introduce alternative menus in the Parliament’s canteen.37 With regard to other services, there is an Italian branch of the international charity Islamic Relief,38 which provides an online tool for calculating the zakat. It also raises funds for international projects (e.g. international aid for children or populations in hunger, conflicts, etc.). Islamic banking is not developed in Italy. Some agencies for business support services have begun to investigate the issue39 but at the moment there is no Islamic bank in Italy, nor are Islamic finance tools offered by Italian banks. In Milan, there is a branch of the Arabian Bank Corporation, but it does not offer shariʿa-compliant products, since there is no specific legislation on this.40

11 Dress Codes

There is no ban on wearing head scarves in public buildings and schools. Under a circular issued by the Ministry of Interior (14 March 1995), Muslim women are allowed to wear their head scarves in identity document photos as long as their facial features are recognisable. A 1995 anti-terrorism law, amended in 2005, forbids the wearing of garments, such as a burqa, that can hide a person’s identity; however, it does not mention explicitly burqa or niqab (proposals have been presented with this aim, but not approved). In recent years, despite the

36 For example, the Halal Italy Authority (branch of the Halal International Authority hia), Website at www.halalitaly.org, accessed 9 January 2014. 37 Interview to Kalid Chaouki, Muslim mp, at www.lastampa.it/2013/08/08/italia/politica/ chaouki-la-buvette-del-parlamento-deve-avere-cibo-per-i-musulmani-wAjc59BEoJnuO CIkJScb9O/pagina.html, accessed 9 January 2014. 38 Islamic Relief Italia, website at www.islamic-relief.it/index.php, accessed 9 January 2014. 39 E.g. the dossier of Deloitte at www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Italy/Local%20Assets/ Documents/Consulting/Ricerche%20e%20pubblicazioni/finanza-islamica.pdf, accessed 10 January 2014. In March 2013 a course on Islamic finance took place in Milan, organised by a Chamber of Commerce Agency, in cooperation with the Co.Re.Is. (see the press release in olir.it: http://shar.es/UH9Vh, accessed 10 January 2013) 40 See the 2010 report of the Bank of Italy, Finanza islamica e sistemi finanziari convenzionali (“Islamic Finance and Conventional Finance”), at www.olir.it/areetematiche/news/docu ments/news_2978_qef_73.pdf, accessed 10 January 2014. Italy 347 lack of a general prohibition on wearing the burqa, a number of municipalities have been taking measures against such garments in their police regulations, adopted on the basis of 2008–2009 laws on public security. Some incidents have been reported, especially in northern cities, where women wearing burqas have been asked to remove at least the face veil or fined for wearing niqab in public places. In 2012, the Superior Council of the Magistracy (csm) stated that Muslim women may wear hijab in courtrooms.41

12 Publication and Media

Some Muslim organisations publish books and journals about Islam in Italy (for example Co.Re.Is.: www.coreis.it/pubblicazioni); the Centro Islamico di Milano has a publishing house (Edizioni del Calamo), which has been publishing books and the series Quaderni Islamici42 and a journal (Il Messaggero dell’Islam), now only in digital format.43 The Shiʿi association Ahl al Bait (Naples) has published a series of books and brochures.44 There is little data on the availability and circulation of these publications. A periodical with quite good visibility and circulation is Yalla Italia, a monthly supplement of the magazine Vita (a journal of not-for-profit organisations), edited by a group of young Muslims. There is also a related blog: www.yallaitalia.it.45 Other journals about Islam are published by Catholic centres, with the aim of promoting interreligious dialogue and mutual knowledge: the most known and widespread are Oasis (edited by the “Oasis” Foundation in Venice) and Il dialogo—Al hiwâr (by Centre “Federico Peirone,” diocese of Turin).46 Online publications and websites are undoubtedly the most important and widespread resources on Islam. Main websites and blogs are:

41 The decision of the csm (available at www.csm.it/circolari/120222b_6.pdf, accessed 9 January 2014) followed the exclusion of a Muslim woman wearing the hijab from the Tribunal of Turin, where she was working as interpreter. 42 Old catalogue available at www.edizionidelcalamo.com/old_site.htm, accessed 9 January 2014. 43 www.centroislamico.it/messaggero.htm, accessed 9 January 2014. 44 Catalogue and information at http://digilander.libero.it/ahlalbait/lista%20libri.htm, accessed 9 January 2014. 45 Accessed 9 January 2014. 46 Information at www.oasiscenter.eu/it/rivista and www.diocesi.torino.it/pls/diocesitorino/ v3_s2ew_consultazione.mostra_pagina?id_pagina=24880 respectively, both accessed 9 January 2014. 348 Coglievina

– Islam online, www.islam-online.it (administered by ucoii); – Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, www.giovanimusulmani.it (administered by the Organisation of Young Muslims in Italy); – www.sufi.it, website on Sufism, with documents and news.

13 Family Law

Religious marriages, recorded in the civil status registry, are recognised in law in Italy if performed by a Roman Catholic priest (Art. 8 of the Agreement of 1985 between Italy and the Holy See), or by a clergy person of a denomination that has an agreement with the state, or by clergy authorised by the Italian Ministry of Interior to perform a religious ceremony (Articles 7–12 of Law No. 1159 of 1929). No Islamic ‘minister’ has so far been recognised by Italian legislation, so religious marriages celebrated in a mosque have no legal validity. Muslim couples who want their union to be legally recognised must go through a civil ceremony in addition to their religious marriage. Polygamy is illegal in Italy and repudiation (talaq) as a form of dissolution of marriage has no legal validity. However, some aspects of Islamic family law have acquired some relevance because most Muslims in Italy are foreign citizens, so their family status, as defined in their country of origin, can warrant consideration under private international law. Case law on this issue is very limited. Problems have arisen, for example, in some cases of reunification of spouses in polygamous marriages or in cases concerning inheritance.47 A directive of the National Institution of Social Security (inps) states that Italy will not pay welfare benefits to multiple wives.48 In some cases Kafala (the Islamic legal institution analogous to foster care) has been recognised by tribunals as a form of adoption. The Italian Conference of Bishops has, on some occasions, urged parish priests to discourage Muslim-Christian marriages.49 No data exists on how

47 Some examples can be found in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, pp. 150–155. 48 See www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=3927, accessed 2 January 2014. 49 The official position of the Conference of Bishops on this point is described in I matrimoni tra cattolici e musulmani in Italia. Indicazioni della Presidenza della Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (“Marriages between Catholics and Muslims in Italy. Recommendations by the Presidency of the Italian Conference of Bishops”), April 2005, available at www.chiesacat tolica.it/documenti/2005/07/00010759_i_matrimoni_tra_cattolici_e_musulmani_in_ .html, accessed 10 January 2014. Italy 349 many “inter-faith” marriages exist; the latest surveys on immigration indicate that marriages between Italians and foreign residents are growing.50

14 Interreligious Relations

Most interreligious events in Italy take place between Muslim communities and the majority religion of the country, the Catholic Church; this is also due to the presence of the Vatican in Rome, where many interfaith meetings at international level are hosted.51 In 2013, the election of Pope Francis brought new attention to this issue, as the Pope has often called for dialogue with other religions and met Muslim representatives.52 Religious associations, such as the Comunità di Sant’Egidio, regularly promote meetings and try to spread a “culture of dialogue”, for example with the World Day of Prayer for Peace, proposed for the first time by Pope John Paul ii in 1986. This initiative—often held in Italy—gathers leaders of various religions, including Islam,53 and in 2013 it took place in Rome (29 September–1 October). On 27 October of each year, a “Day of Christian-Islamic Dialogue” takes place, organised by ildialogo.org, a Christian web magazine, and supported by dozens of groups and associations from both faiths. There are various events, held in different Italian cities; in October 2013, the initiative was in its twelfth year. At the national level, Italian Muslim organisations often participate in meetings and debates with the Catholic and other Christian churches, and with Jewish communities. The Italian Federation of Protestant Churches (fcei) also established a special commission in order to promote mutual

50 See www.dossierimmigrazione.it/docnews/file/2013_Scheda_Dossier.pdf, accessed 10 January 2014. 51 For example, the World Islamic Call Society has organised meetings with the Vatican (Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue), and some of these took place in Rome. See www.wics-it.org/cms/view.php?cms_pk=48&dir_pk=2, accessed 16 January 2014. 52 Among other meetings, in December 2013 Pope Francis met the secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (oic), see: www.ncregister.com/daily-news/pope- francis-to-meet-leader-of-international-islamic-group/, accessed 16 January 2014. He also spoke about the situation of immigrants and refugees in Italy, encouraging to dialogue with different cultures and religions (e.g. during his Pastoral trip to Lampedusa, Sicily). 53 Normally the initiative takes place on the 27th of October, the date of the first international meeting of Assisi in 1986. See www.santegidio.org/pageID/47/idLng/1064/ International_Meetings_of_Prayer_for_Peace.html, accessed 16 January 2014. 350 Coglievina relations between Protestants and Muslims in Italy (“Churches’ Commission on Dialogue with Islam”).54 At the local level, many events are organised, mainly between Catholic groups or dioceses and local Muslim communities.55 The Oasis Foundation (based in Venice and established by the now Archbishop of Milan, Angelo Scola), also organises meetings and workshops on intercultural and interreligious dialogue (among others, in June 2013, an international conference on dialogue between Christianity and Islam at the University of Milan).56 Moreover, the theme of interreligious dialogue has been often underlined in scientific and academic debates organised marking the 1700th anniversary of the Edict of Constantine (Edict of Milan, 313–2013).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Generally speaking, there is good coverage of the situation of Muslims in Italy and related issues (building of mosques, religious symbols, etc.) in newspapers and other media. During 2013, however, the mass media focused more on other issues (mainly the resignation of Pope Benedict xvi and the election of Pope Francis and related changes in the Catholic Church) and Islam had less visibility in the public debate about religions.57 The media have often created erroneous impressions and negative stereotypes of Islam, alleging that a huge number of Muslims are fundamentalists, and leading sometimes to a widespread anti-Islamic feeling in the Italian population. Moreover, Muslims and Muslim leaders have little opportunity, compared with other religious communities (especially the Catholic Church) to be heard by the media and the general public. Negative feelings towards Islam are also fuelled by a certain political discourse: often initiative and debates on the situation of Islam are focused only on controversial practices, not necessarily ascribable to religious laws (such

54 Website at www.fedevangelica.it/en/comm/ccedi02.php, accessed 2 January 2014. 55 Among others, the diocese of Padua and Turin have established centres devoted to interreligious dialogue (see respectively: www.padovaislam.it and www.diocesi.torino.it/ peirone/, accessed 2 January 2014); in Milan an interreligious forum exists (website at www.forumreligionimilano.org, accessed 15 January 2014). 56 www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholic-and-muslim-leaders-meet-for-dialogue- on-secularism/, accessed 15 January 2014. 57 L. De Gregorio, Cronache di un anno, olir.it Newsletter n. 12/2013, at www.olir.it/newslet ter/archivio/2013_12_20.html, accessed 15 January 2014. Italy 351 as the burqa, the status of women, incidents of violence in Muslim families, female circumcision, etc.) or the linkage between Islam and international terrorism, contributing to the stereotype of the foreign Muslims as a danger to national security or national identity. As the majority of Muslims are indeed foreign nationals, they are often seen as a group without ties to Italy; the media and political discourse have often fuelled the idea that immigration would result in the growth of the Muslim population and the loss of the Italian identity. In recent years some proposals have been made about the opportunity to grant citizenship to children born in Italy to foreign parents and to make it easier to obtain it for long-term residents (including Muslims). These proposals are strongly opposed by some political parties (rightist Northern League), while Italians in general hold a more favourable view of the issue.58

16 Major Cultural Events

Muslim representatives are sometimes invited (mostly at the local level) to meetings about cultures and religions in multicultural society, or about immigration. Most events are mainly of academic interest59 and participation is still low.

58 Caritas/Migrantes, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2011, Executive summary, at www.dos sierimmigrazione.it/docnews/file/pres2011_inglese.pdf, accessed 15 January 2014. 59 For example, the Forum Internazionale Democrazia e Religioni, after the organisation of the course for Islamic leaders (see above, section 6), continues promoting and organising conferences and meetings about Islam. See: www.fidr.it/news.asp?macro=1&cat=2, accessed 16 January 2014. Kosovo

Besa Ismaili*

1 Muslim Populations

Official census results released in February 2013 show that Kosovo has a resident population of 1,815,606 inhabitants, and a vast majority of its population are ethnic Albanian (93%), with 96% identifying as Muslim.1 Kosovo has been declared secular and neutral2 in terms of religion. This neutrality in matters of religious belief is associated with significant protection and guarantees of religious rights and freedoms.3 According to United Nations Development Programme studies (2013),4 Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe. The unemployment rate in Kosovo is over 40 per cent, and this rate is even higher among the youth and women. The majority of Kosovo Muslims are Sunnis, but small communities of Sufi orders and one community of Bektashis are also present. Bektashis reside in the municipality of Gjakova and gather in the Teqja e Madhe (Grand Tekah). The number of Bektashi believers is not known, but this community enjoys recognition and respect by the society in Gjakova.5 Its leader (Baba Mumim Lama) described the relationships with the Islamic Council of Gjakova as excellent. He complains about the non-recognition by the state authorities, because, as he said, “Bektashis are the fourth recognised religious community in Albania, but in Kosovo they are not recognised as a separate community.” Bektashis in Gjakova have good cooperation with the Kaderi and Saadi Sufi Orders in Gjakova. Other Sufi orders are more present in the municipalities of Rahovec and Prizren. The Malami Sufi Order in Mitrovica currently counts a symbolic number of followers, and custody over the three tekes in the city has

* Besa Ismaili works with the vice-dean to the Faculty of Islamic Studies. She is active in women-related issues and religion in Kosovo, and authored several studies on these topics. 1 See official data from the Agency of Statistics of Kosovo http://ask.rks-gov.net/. 2 Article 2 of Kosovo Constitution, available at: www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/ Constitution1Kosovo.pdf. 3 osce Mission in Kosovo, Community Rights Assessment Report at www.osce.org/kosovo/ 74597, accessed 28 April 2012. 4 See the undp report at: www.undp.org/content/dam/kosovo/docs/Procurement/PPR6_ Anglisht.pdf. 5 Direct interview with Baba Mumin Lama, 20 May 2013.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_024 Kosovo 353 remained with the elders of the families in their family properties. A significant number of activities have appeared attributed to the Shiʿi Community.6

2 Islam and the State

Kosovo is a secular parliamentary republic with no official religion. This neutrality in matters of religious belief is associated with significant protection and guarantees of religious rights and freedoms.7 Legally, it represents an environment accommodating human rights, taking into account the fact that the Kosovo Constitution has incorporated explicitly international human rights norms which are directly applicable in Kosovo apart from its local legislation. This includes: Law on Religious Freedom, Law on Freedom of Expression and the Anti-Discrimination Law.8 The Constitution of Kosovo recognises the Muslim, Catholic and the Orthodox communities as the traditional religious communities. Other religious communities such as Protestants have expressed their dissatisfaction with their unequal status. Religious communities in Kosovo do not receive any funds from the state. Nevertheless the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys special rights granted by the Ahtisaari Plan.9 The Kosovo Government has on several occasions funded their reconstruction of facilities, assigned Kosovo Police to guard their sites and even paid for orthodox religious instruction at schools in the Serbian language in Kosovo.10 They are regarded as a ‘statelet’ within the State of Kosovo.11 On the other hand, Kosovo population and other traditional and non-traditional religious

6 The Shiʿi Community in Kosovo, appears to be more active through few ngos in Prizren (http://kuran-ks.com/), and Al Mahdi Institute in Prishtina. See http://sq-al.facebook .com/pages/Instituti-Al-Mahdi-Kosov%C3%ab/437050229756145. 7 osce Mission in Kosovo, Community Rights Assessment Report at www.osce.org/ kosovo/74597, accessed 28 April 2012. 8 More on the implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law in Kosovo is available at: http:// ks.yihr.org/public/fck_files/ksfile/Executive%20Summary%20of%20the%20report%20 -%20Anti%20Discrimination%20Law%20in%20Kosovo,%20Seven%20years%20on.pdf, accessed 13 March 2012. 9 More on the Ahtisaari Plan see: www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/182_kosovo_ no_good_alternatives_to_the_ahtisaari_plan.pdf. 10 More on all issues related to Serbian Community in Kosovo (governance, administration and education) see: http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Komuniteti-Serb-ne- Kosove-alb.pdf. 11 See article “Serb Orthodox Church a ‘Statlet’ in the State of Kosovo”: www.gjuhashqipe .com/lajmetari/lajmetari2.aspx?id=30145. 354 Ismaili communities believe that the Kosovo Government and the international community have been discriminating against other religious communities when compared to the Orthodox for political reasons.12 A huge debate was sparked at the end of 2013 when the Government sponsored the Draft Law against Noise in the Assembly of Kosovo. The draft law aimed at regulating the adhan and bell ringing. This initiative has been heavily criticised, and the authorities have in response initiated public hearings on this issue.13 The Kosovo Government observes the following religious holidays:14 ʿId al- Fitr, ʿId al-Adha, Easter, Orthodox Easter Monday, and Orthodox and Western Christmas. The International Missions also observe the first day of Ramadan.15 The Islamic Community of Kosovo (ick) as well as the Catholic Church of Kosovo continued their activities as ngos in 2013 as well due to the lack of clarification of their legal status.16 There have been no reports on the status of the law on religious freedoms adopted in 2005, which was part of the legislative agenda for 2012 and 2013.17 Apart from the ick, very few Islam-based ngos are currently operating in Kosovo. This is mainly because Islam-based organisations have been

12 “Opposition mp from “Vetëvendosje”, Liburn Aliu, declared that Kosovo authorities have no access to the Serbian Churches, and this is how a difference is made between the Orthodox Church and other Religious Communities. “Serb Orthodox Chirch is autonomous, it’s a ‘statlet’, our institutions may enter only with prior permission of the church authority, and only if there is a case of human life threat” Article with his interview is available at: http://knninfo.com/?page=1,2,60512. 13 Kosovo Government Draft law on Adhan, see article at: www.telegrafi.com/lajme/ ligj-per-uljen-e-zerit-te-ezanit-ne-xhami-dhe-kambanave-ne-kisha-2–38004. html; and also ‘Law on Ethan goes for public Hearing’, see: www.sitel.com.mk/sq/ ligji-ezanin-shkon-ne-debat-publik-0. 14 State Holiday Days available at: www.rks-gov.net. 15 eu Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and osce Mission in Kosovo. 16 State Department Report on Religious Rights in Kosovo, 2011 states “Religious leaders stated the lack of a mechanism for religious groups to register and obtain legal status created a number of practical challenges. Although many groups found alternative methods, a number of them reported challenges in owning and registering property and vehicles, opening bank accounts, and paying taxes on employees’ salaries,” available at: www.state.gov/ documents/organization/193037.pdf, accessed 4 March 2013. 17 Assembly of Kosovo, Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Gender Equality, Missing Persons and Petitions—Annual Working Plan for 2012—First trimester 2012— Review of the Law on Religious Freedoms, Public Hearings and the proposed amendments, available at: www.votaime.org/komisionet/plani2012/K_DrejtatNjeriut_pp2012 .pdf, accessed 13 March 2013. Kosovo 355 severely scrutinised by authorities and the Kosovo media portrays them rather negatively.18 The Party of Justice,19 which is one of the coalition parties in the Government, has stated in several public appearances that the administrative instruction of the Ministry of Education on head scarf bans should be lifted as it is practically non-effective.20

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main national Muslim organisation is the Islamic Community of the Republic of Kosovo (Bashkësia Islame e Republikës së Kosovës, ick, Bajram Kelmendi St., No. 84, 10000 Prishtina, tel.: ++381 38224024, fax: ++381 38245700, www.bislame.net), which has been headed by the Grand Mufti Naim Tërnava for a second period. The ick has 27 branches around the country (called Regional Islamic Councils).21 The ick is the only independent religious community for all Kosovo Muslims (Albanians, Bosniaks, Turks and rae22 communities), whether living in Kosovo or living and working abroad. For the Islamic Community of Kosovo, 2013 has been another dynamic year. After the elections23 of local representatives in the Islamic Councils24 were

18 Në emër të Zotit (In the Name of the God) article, available at www.telegrafi.com/lajme/ ne-emer-te-zotit-26–5405.html lists the names of journalists and media houses in Kosovo constantly appearing hostile against Islam, imams, faith-based organisations, Islamic Community of Kosovo, head scarves, etc. The article also states some of the common stereotypes and stigmas they use in labelling Islam and Muslims in general in Kosovo. 19 Partia e Drejtësisë (Party of Justice): www.drejtesia.org/voto2010/. 20 On the head scarf question see www.patheos.com/blogs/mmw/2013/02/the-media- and-the-headscarf-kosovo-public-schools-edition-not-the-final-episode/; more on the statements issued and discussed by Party of Justice see the comment available at: www .shembulli.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=293 &Itemid=681&lang=sq&limitstart=60. 21 Kushtetuta e Bashkësisë Islame të Kosovës (Constitution of the Islamic Community of Kosovo) (Prishtina: ick, 2003). 22 Collective term for Roma, Ashkalis and ‘Egyptians’. 23 Elections in ick are held every four years, this year they were organised during January and February 2012. The debate on these elections is available at: www.jetanekosove.com/ sq/Reportazhe-Hulumtuese/Zgjedhjet-ne-Bashkesine-Islame-875; last accessed 24 March 2012. 24 Islamic Councils are the 27 branches of ick in Kosovo municipalities/regions. More on ick organisation and structure is available in English at: http://bislame.net/aboutus/en/ index.html, accessed 28 March 2013. 356 Ismaili held in 2012, on 29 August the President of the Assembly of Kosovo was sacked from his post,25 and a new President was elected. The process of reforms and amendments of the Constitution of ick was completed by the end of the 2013. Numerous amendments have been made to the constitution, but the fuss was related to the change on the number of mandates from the Mufti position, from two to three. Mufti Ternava has been re-elected for the third time as the Head of ick. In his interview with birn, Mufti Ternava declared that “all the heads of other religious communities in Kosovo are elected in lifetime positions” and that “the Islamic Community has the most reformed, transparent and democratic procedures for election of its leadership, with elections running every four years at all levels.”26

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The total number of mosques in Kosovo reached 759 in 2013.27 In the Mitrovica municipality, the foundation was laid for a larger mosque replacing the old one28 which was completed at the end of 2013. The mosque is partially operational, and the opening ceremony is scheduled for early 2014. But the same cannot be claimed for the grand mosque of Prishtina. A long process of project design selection has been made public and displayed in the Grand Hotel premises, and several favourite designers pre-selected.29 During 2013 there was a dispute on the construction of another mosque in Prishtina. The local government issued the license, and after the laying of the foundations the central government revoked the permit.30 Kosovo media closely followed the issue

25 ‘The President of the ick Assembly is discharged’ more available at: http://koha.net/ arkiva/?page=1,13,156077. 26 See interview online video at: http://jetanekosove.com/sq/Intervista/Interviste-me- Myftiun-Naim-Ternava-1079. 27 Interview with Fatmir Iljazi, deputy head of Kosovo Imams in ick, 27/04/2014 at the Presidency of ick, Prishtina. 28 Në Mitrovicë turqit ndërtojnë xhaminë më të madhe në Kosovë (Turks to build the biggest mosque in Kosovo in the city of Mitrovica) the article available at: www.telegrafi .com/lajme/ne-mitrovice-turqit-ndertojne-xhamine-me-te-madhe-ne-kosove-2–14635 .html. 29 All projects in offer competition for the Grand Mosque of Prishtina can be seen in this video: www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtUdTrnvUTs. 30 ‘Kosovo Ministry of Environment suspects the construction permit for the Mosque of Veternik issued by Prishtina Municipality’ more see at: http://koha.net/arkiva/?page= 1,31,158628. Kosovo 357 that ended up in the Administrative Court of Kosovo. Kosovo mosques lack facilities for women, even though female teachers are active in quite a number of the mosques,31 most of them volunteering without regulated employment with ick.

5 Children’s Education

The Islamic high school Alaud-din Madrasa (established in 1952 in the capital of Prishtina with one branch in Prizren and another in Gjilan) continued its work in providing education for both boys and girls, and a total of 300 students had completed their studies by the end of 2013.32 The curriculum combines religious and secular courses. The Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (mest) continues paying the salaries of its teaching staff. The Institute of Hifz (memorising the Qur’an) which was established in Gjakova/ Djakovica in 2005 with the support of the International Istanbul Humanitarian and Cultural Organisation (iiarc—known as the Istanbul Association), continued functioning throughout 2013 with an increased number of students from the previous year. A new, larger dormitory for female students is being constructed in the capital of Prishtina.33 This facility is greatly appreciated by female students, who, unlike their male counterparts, had to pay rent while studying in Prishtina. On-going religious education programmes and Qur’an courses are run at almost all of Kosovo’s mosques.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Kosovo’s first Faculty of Islamic Studies in Prishtina (fis, www.fsi-ks.org) awards the Bachelor accredited degree (equal to university level) earned in Islamic Theology and Studies, training students who have completed courses at a madrasa or similar institution. The Faculty has applied for another master programme accreditation and the process is still pending. The number of

31 Interview with Vaxhida Podvorica, head of Department of Women in ick, 27 April 2014. 32 www.medreseja.org 33 Interview with Mufti Ternava on 15 March 2013 in Prishtina. 358 Ismaili students is increasing annually. Last year 2013/2014 a total of 105 students were registered, out of them sixty are female students.34

7 Burial and Cemeteries

All cemeteries in Kosovo are religious and they are under the control of the municipalities. There are separate cemeteries for Muslims, Catholic and Orthodox. There are no separate Protestant cemeteries.35 In Mitrovica, under the initiative of its mayor all burial and funeral-related expenditures are covered by the municipality as of 2010.36 The same example is followed by several other municipalities in Kosovo, such as Hani i Elezit, Gjilan, Vushtri and others, including Prishtina.37

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The law on religious freedoms38 guarantees the availability of spiritual counselling in hospitals, custody facilities, prisons, and social care institutions. However, officially, ‘chaplaincy’ is still unknown in Kosovo and no imams are appointed to serve in public institutions, whether in the armed forces, police, prisons or hospitals. On the premises of the Kosovo Security Forces hq in

34 Data taken from the Admission and Students’ Affairs Office Officer at fis Mr. Ajet Hoxha, on 15 May 2014. 35 The Evangelical Protestant Community in Kosovo has been complaining and asking for a separate cemetery for its members. This request has not been realised yet. The same concern was reflected in the last two State Department Reports (2010 and 2011) on Religious Freedoms. The State Department’s Report 2012 states that: “Municipalities reportedly regularly ignored Protestant requests for dedicated cemetery space, which resulted in Muslim clerics performing funeral services for Protestants in Muslim-controlled municipal cemeteries.” See more at: www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/#wrapper, accessed 23 May 2013. 36 http://kk.rks-gov.net/mitrovice/News/Lajmet/Nis-mbulimi-i-shpenzimeve-nga-komuna- per-ceremonit.aspx, accessed 25 March 2013. 37 http://prishtina.com/komuna-e-prishtines/prishtina-s-i-p-rballon-shpenzimet-p-r-varri min-e-qytetar-ve-t-saj. 38 Law No. 02/L-31, www.eulex-kosovo.eu/training/hrgi/docs/RE2006_48_ALE02_L31.pdf, accessed 23 May 2010. Kosovo 359

Pristina there is an occasional engagement of the local President of the Islamic Council of Prishtina in the form of leading the Friday prayers for its officers.39

9 Religious Festivals

ʿId al-Fitr’ and ʿId al-Adha’ celebrations are organised every year. Both are recognised as official holidays by the state and all public institutions are closed. Representatives of state authorities and international and diplomatic missions, and the heads of other religious communities attend the reception organised by the Grand Mufti on the day of ʿId. The visits are broadcast, along with other ʿId activities. During Ramadan, representatives of the government and the ick visit each other for iftar, and the ick organises a traditional Qur’an recitation competition, with an international guests.40 Besides the two main festivals, the tariqas also celebrate two annual festivals: Sultan Nawruz at the vernal equinox, and the Day of ʿAshura.’ No distinction is made between Bektashis or Sufis. The traditional Mevlud (mawlid) Evening has been organised on several occasions in Kosovo.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Hajj has been organised by the Islamic Community of Kosovo only since 2011. Having the ick as the sole authority in charge of hajj organisation has also been supported by the government, because, according to the ick and government officials, the private providers are ‘deemed to lack the proper capacities for such a big activity as hajj.’41 A total of 830 pilgrims went on hajj in 2013.42 On the other hand, there were several private agencies organising Umrah visits.43 The Institute of Halal food in the Islamic Community of Kosovo (Kosova Halal Institute established in 2011) in 2013 in a ceremony granted the Halal Certificate to a meat processing company ‘imf Sole Koral.’44 It became the first

39 Interview with the President of Islamic Council in Prishtina, who serves as Khatib at ksf, Mr. Bahri Sejdiu, 24 December 2011. 40 www.bislame.net. 41 Interview with Mufti Naim Ternava on 23 March 2013. 42 Ibid. 43 Travel Agency Royl Travel, more info at www.royaltravel-ks.com/umra.html. 44 Sole Kosova—the first Halal certified company in Kosovo, more at: http://grid.al/read/ news/156810622/4698696/sole-kosova-kompania-e-pare-qe-certifikohet-per-prodhimet- e-mishit. 360 Ismaili company equipped with a halal meat certificate for its meat products.45 Halal slaughter is performed mostly in private butchers’ establishments. Madrasas collect money for collective Halal slaughter for ʿId-Al-Adha and distribute the meat to students in student hostels and to poor families.46

11 Dress Codes

The controversies around administrative instruction by mest (Ministry of Education Science and Technology of Kosovo) continued in 2013, but on a rather non-formal platform. The head scarf issue was part of the public debate, but in a fashioned and balanced manner. The Party of Justice entered the local elections in Gjilan in November 2013 with a head scarfed female candidate, Ms Labinota. She was the first ever candidate with head scarf to run for public office.47 Her appearance has been widely praised, and she is regarded as a ‘strong, moderate and vision- ary young lady’48 competing with male counterparts in the elections. As ldk (Democratic League of Kosovo) won the elections in Gjilan, Ms Labinota was appointed head of the municipal health directorate.49 There have been other head scarfed ladies running in local elections at the local assemblies in Kosovo, and one of them won the position of a local mp in Vushtrri.50 The local elections in Kosovo 2013 brought many other positive and new changes. During the election campaigns all of the political parties were balanced in expressing their position towards head scarf. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (pdk) promised full abolishment of the Administrative Instruction, whereas the Self Determination Movement (Vetvendosje) in Prishtina

45 Interview with Dr Islam Hasani at his office in ick hq on 23 March 2013. 46 “Dituria islame” no. 231, advertisement on the back page. 47 ‘Labinote Demi Murtezi the first headscarved lady to run for local elections’, see more at: www.balkanweb.com/m/kosova/kosove-ne-gjilan-per-pd-ne-garon-nje-kandidate-me- shami-147256.html. 48 Ibid. 49 ‘Head scarfed lady gets appointed as the Director of Health and Welfare at Municipality of Gjilan,’ see more at: www.zeri.info/artikulli/25972/gruaja-me-shami-emerohet-drej toreshe-e-shendetesise. 50 More on Mrs. Dushi at Municipal Assembly of Vushtri check: https://sq-al.facebook.com/ drejtesiaofficial/posts/422214121211932. Kosovo 361 emerged with the promise that all girls over 16 shall be fully respected and equally treated if they choose to wear head scarf.51 After the Self Determination Movement won the elections in Prishtina, a new regime on recruitment and employment procedures was applied. All the interviews and selection processes, especially the ones for the local educational institutions,52 are made public. Thus countering any attempt at personal preferences, nepotism, discrimination or unfair treatment. It was based on this procedure that several head scarfed ladies benefited.53 After the resolution of the head scarf issue in Mitrovica in 2012,54 the procedure was made public and served as a model to other municipalities, and no new cases of school bans have emerged in any other city.

12 Publications and Media

The Presidency of the Islamic Community continues with the publication of the monthly religious, cultural, and scientific review Dituria Islame (Islamic Knowledge) since 1986, the quarterly magazine Edukata Islame (Islamic Education) since 1971, and an annual Islamic calendar, called Takvim, since 1970. Apart from Paqja(Peace) and Argumenti (The Argument), magazines such as Vepra (The Deed), Shenja (The Sign), Vlera (The Value), Lumturia (Happiness) have been added to the number of Islamic-based magazines during 2011, along with Revista Familja from Tirana and Albislam from Skopje. Electronic media with significant Islamic content have been boosted in Kosovo,55 especially in the social media such as Facebook Fun Pages. Tens of Fun Pages appeared on Facebook in an attempt to publicly denounce some ‘Islamophobes and anti- Islamists’56 among Kosovo politicians.

51 ‘Vetvendosje in favour of religious rights,’ see: www.gazetatema.net/web/2011/08/31/ vetevendosje-pro-fese-ne-shkolla/. 52 ‘Order back in public schools’—interview of the Municipal Director for Education in Prishtina, Mr. Jusuf Thaci available at: www.gazetaexpress.com/intervista/interviste-me- jusuf-thacin-do-te-vendosim-rregull-ne-arsim-keqperdoruesit-ne-prokurori-5367/. 53 Fikrete Sallauka Abazi, appointed as pre-school teacher in a public institution in Prishtina interviewed, and another one whom the author of this report could not reach for interview. 54 See Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 5, cr Kosovo, (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 55 Most popular Islamic news websites are: www.mesazhi.com and www.ekuiliber.com. 56 A Fun Page against mps Alma Lama, Vlora Citaku, Shaip Muja etc. similar to pages such as: https://www.facebook.com/pages/T%C3%ab-Gjith%C3%ab-Kunder-Alma-Lames- 362 Ismaili

13 Family Law

Muslims have continued concluding marriage contracts in mosques and obtaining certificates of marriage from the local Islamic Councils (which are not recognised by authorities since 2003). Couples pay an amount of 25 Euros57 for the certificate. However, there is no Islamic court functioning within the Islamic Community of Kosovo.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised the first international interfaith dialogue conference in Peja.58 This major event was preceded by another event starting just a day before on 23 May 2013 namely ‘The Week of Tolerance.’ Prime Minister Thaci held a speech on Holocaust Commemoration Day.59 On 23 May 2013 a plaque was revealed in memory of the Kosovo Jews who perished in the Holocaust. The Plaque is placed in front of the Kosovo Assembly Building.60 A large number of participants were present during the Week of Tolerance and Reconciliation 20–26 May 2013.61 Other minor inter-religious activities were left in the shadows. No member from the informal women’s inter-religious network was present in the Conference. And the Conference largely ignored local stories on the issue but covered mainly global interreligious issues. The next Conference for 2014 is scheduled to be held in Prizren.

dhe-ldk/1424159544512434; or All against restriction of Adhan at: https://www.facebook .com/pages/Te-Gjith-Kunder-Ndalimit-te-Ezanit/694536220586704. 57 Interview with Bahri Sejdiu, President of ic Prishtina, on 23 February 2013. 58 www.interfaithkosovo.org/faith-and-reconciliation-conference-2013/257/ the-2013-international-interfaith-conference-agenda/?lang=En. 59 The Speech of pm Thaci, www.interfaithkosovo.org/week-of-tolerance-events/285/ prime-minister-thaci-s-speech-holocaust-commemoration-event/?lang=En. 60 www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,4,1720. 61 www.interfaithkosovo.org/who-we-are/65/who-we-are/?lang=En. Kosovo 363

15 Public Opinion and Debate

During 2013 the public media in Kosovo devoted quite a lot of attention to the war in Syria.62 But compared to 2012, the Kosovo government silenced its support for anti-government resistance movements in Syria, and the Kosovo fighters and victims received totally opposite media coverage from 2012. While Foreign Minister Enver Hoxha called for nato intervention in Syria,63 by the end of 2013 the whole debate was transformed to the demand that the Kosovar state should remove citizenship from those people who were waging jihad in a foreign country.64 Soon, a draft law was initiated on this matter. Different from Namani’s death in 2012, other victims’ families in Kosovo prepared funeral visits in a more discreet manner. The Islamic Community of Kosovo called on Kosovo youth not to get involved in Syrian War.65 Kosovo media showed frequent videos of mujahedeen fighters in Syria, and the reactions of public opinion66 have been rather negative. But on the humanitarian side there have been several initiatives from the mosques, citizens and ngos to collect aid for Syrian refugees.

16 Major Cultural Events

In 2013 as in 2012 no major cultural event/concert was held either by the government or the Islamic Community. The Presidency of ick claimed it lacked funds for such activities.67

62 On the relevance of Syria War to the Albanians see www.indeksonline.net/?FaqeID= 2&LajmID=25297, last accessed 29 March 2013. 63 Hoxhaj seeks nato Intervention in Syria, similar to nato intervention in Kosovo in 1999, see more at: www.rrokum.tv/?page=1,3,5833. 64 ‘To revoke citizenship to the Kosovars fighting in Syrian War,’ available at: www.shekulli. com.al/web/p.php?id=30552&kat=111. 65 www.bislame.net ‘War in Syria has nothing to do with the religion.’ 66 Public opinion comments at all portals fiercely opposed any involvement of Kosovo youth in Syrian war. e.g. https://sq-al.facebook.com/GazetaZeri/posts/646437458709915. 67 Interview with Ahmet Sadriu, member of the Presidency of ick, on 23 March 2013. Latvia

Valters Ščerbinskis*

1 Muslim Populations

Most Latvian Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian and Caucasus republics, as well as the Volga region moved to the Baltics. The last Soviet census of 1989 reported more than 12,000 people of Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc.) living in Soviet Latvia, although most of them did not practise Islam. Quite a number of them chose to leave Latvia after it regained independence in the early 1990s.1 Official censuses do not include a question on religious identity, so no official figures for the size of the Muslim community in Latvia are available. Unfounded estimates range between 500 and 10,000, but none of them distinguish between nominal (‘of Muslim background’) and practising Muslims. The latest official data available (given by Muslim congregations to the state institutions) shows 340 Muslims registered in 2012, which is obviously too small a number.2 Some estimates suggest the number of nominal Muslims to be in the range of 10,000 but add that only 10–20% are practising. Among them, approximately 200 are converts (most of them Russian speakers). However, the overall estimation seems to be exaggerated as according to the latest statistics, there were some 2,164 Tatars, 1,657 Azerbaijanis, 339 Uzbeks and 241 Kazakhs living in Latvia at the time of the 2011 Census.3 Therefore, the number of approximately 5,000 nominal Muslims in 2013 looks closer to reality. The overwhelming

* Valters Ščerbinskis is Docent at the European Studies Faculty of the Riga’s Stradiņš’ University, where he heads ma program. His research interests include political history of Latvia, history of educated elites and also history of Muslim community in Latvia. 1 For more detailed information on the history of the Muslim community in Latvia, see: Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 5. (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Ščerbinskis, Valters, Ienācēji no tālienes. Austrumu un Dienvidu tautu pārstāvji Latvijā no. 19. gadsimta beigām līdz mūsdienām. (Newcomers from Remoteness. representatives of the Eastern and Southern Nations in Latvia from the End of the 19th century till our days) (Rīga: Nordik, 1998). 2 The Ministry of Justice (2013), www.tm.gov.lv/lv/aktualitates/tm-informacija-presei/ publiceti-religisko-organizaciju-darbibas-parskati 3 Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2012) Population and Housing Census 2011, http://data .csb.gov.lv/dialog/Saveshow.asp, accessed August 28, 2012.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_025 Latvia 365 majority of Latvia’s Muslims are located in and around the capital city Riga, with the much smaller communities in Daugavpils (probably, about 200), Ventspils (probably, about 100–200) and Liepāja.

2 Islam and the State

Latvia is a constitutionally secular republic with no state religion, though Lutheran, Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christians nominally constitute the majority of the population. Moreover, the state makes a distinction between the ‘traditional’ faiths (Lutheran, Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Adventist and Methodist) and the ‘new’ with Islam falling into the latter category. Following the Constitution, the state cannot finance religious organisations, nor can religious institutions or their representatives take part in the governing of the state. Relations between the state and religion are regulated by the Law on Religious Organisations (adopted in 1995). Religious organisations registered with the Board of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Justice attain legal status and certain rights and privileges not available to those that chose to remain unregistered, but there is no obligation for religious communities to register with the state. Religious organisations of ‘non-traditional’ denominations are required to re-register annually for the first ten years of their existence. Ten registered congregations of the same faith can form a religious association or union to represent that religion vis-à-vis the state. Only one such association can register per religion. Association of Latvian Islamic Communities has been in the past decade engaged in the process of registering new like-minded congregations in order to attain the required number of ten to be eligible to form an association. As of the end of 2013, the aim had not been yet achieved.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Ministry of Justice of Latvia records 17 registered Muslim religious congregations as of 2013. The Association of Latvian Islamic Communities (Latvijas islāma kopienas, Brīvības iela 104–22, Riga, tel.: ++371 28298292, fax: ++371 29212512, http://www.islam.lv/,[email protected]) includes the Islamic Information Centre and a prayer hall and is headed by Zufars Zainuļļins. It is the main Muslim organisation in the country and is dominated by Russian-speaking Muslims (Tatars and those with origins in the former Soviet Central Asian 366 ŠčERBINSKIS and Caucasus republics). It has several affiliate (friendly) congregations established with the purpose of forming a union of Muslim congregations, for which the law requires a membership of ten registered congregations, each with at least 20 members. There are several rival congregations with minuscule mem- berships that oppose the establishment of the union under the leadership of the Latvian Islamic Community (Lacplesa Street 36, Riga, [email protected], www.lic.lv). The largest congregation outside Riga is the Daugavpils Islamic Centre (Daugavpils musulmanu draudze “Idel”, Imantas iela 25, Daugavpils) which is also dominated by Russian speakers. There are more or less organised smaller groups of Muslims also in Liepāja and Ventspils.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In the early twentieth century, a prayer hall was opened in Riga but did not survive the Soviet period. A prayer hall in purchased premises in an apartment at Brīvības Street 104–22 was opened in 2005 by the Latvian Islamic Community. In October 2009, a new prayer hall on Ernesta Birznieka-Upīša Street 16–5 was opened by the former imam of the Brivibas Street prayer hall; however it was soon closed. There are at least two other locations in private homes in Riga where some Muslims occasionally gather for communal prayer. The Daugavpils and Ventspils communities have makeshift prayer halls, with Muslims in Daugavpils renting apartments of local Tatar society. Since the early 1990s, there has been much talk of constructing a purpose-built mosque in Riga, and recently the Latvian Islamic Community attempted to organise fund-raising, however, with little success.

5 Children’s Education

Optional religious education (Christian and Jewish, e.g. of ‘traditional’ denominations) is part of the state schooling system. Islamic education (Islam being formally a ‘non-traditional’ religion) is not offered in state schools, but some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. The congregations in Riga and Daugavpils provide Islamic education for young people in improvised informal irregular weekend ‘schools,’ where 10–20 children aged between three and 16 learn basics of Arabic, Islam and Qur’an reading. There are no private primary or secondary level schools run by Muslims. Latvia 367

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on the Middle East (especially Arabic language) are regularly offered at the University of Latvia (Department of Modern Language). Teachers in schools who deal with Islamic history and/ or religious dogmas have either history or religious studies degrees and certificates but not specifically Islamic education. There is no institution for imam training in Latvia. Apparently, all acting imams in Riga and elsewhere are self-taught.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have a separate cemetery (historically together with Karaims) in Riga dating back to the late nineteenth century. Though now rarely used for burial, it is still maintained by the Latvian Islamic Community as the probably only visible evidence of the pre-wwii Muslim community in Latvia. Another historical Muslim cemetery exists near Cēsis where Turkish pows of Russo-Turkish wars in the nineteenth century are buried. Muslims have been assigned a separate section in a cemetery in Riga—Jaunciema kapi, and also a separate section in the Daugavpils cemetery. So far, no need has arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

While Lutheran, Orthodox and Catholic religious services are offered in the armed forces, prisons and hospitals, there are no imams because there are so few Muslims in need of their services. As of 2013, there were negotiations with the Prison Board regarding the necessity to organise Muslim religious services in prisons.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha celebrations in Riga and Daugavpils take place in rented premises. They are open to the public and are attended by between 300 and 500 people. During ʿId al-Adha, animals are slaughtered in rural areas. 368 ŠčERBINSKIS

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Back in 2009, at least three halal cafes opened in Riga. However, by 2013 none of them survived and there was no information on any new halal serving cafes or restaurants. There is, however, at least one food store near the Brivibas street mosque selling halal products from Turkey. Also in September 2009, the Latvian Parliament passed amendments to the Animal Rights Protection Law granting religious communities the right to slaughter animals according to their religious rites. Several Latvian meat processing companies have started practising halal slaughter (primarily for export to Sweden).

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Latvian laws allow head coverings (including hijab) in photos on official documents when certified by the local Muslim community. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab (and a few wear niqab); mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer.

12 Publications and Media

There are no regular Muslim print media in Latvia, though ethnic minorities, among them those of Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris), do occasionally publish brochures and pamphlets with sections related to Islam. One of the few websites run by Latvian Muslims is www.islam.lv (in Russian). The website has an on-line forum (also in Russian). Another website is http://www.islammuslim.lv/ (in Latvian run by Latvian converts to Islam) with an online forum in the Latvian language. www.islammuslim.lv is a virtual place for Latvian speaking converts to Islam and is providing information and to some extent is an organisational tool for the small and dispersed Latvian speaking Muslim community, however it is not updated regularly. A third site with limited material on Islam in Latvian at http://www.islamlv.netfirms.com/. In late 2009 a new Russian language female-focused website “Muslima—zhenshchina v nikabe” (Muslima—a woman in niqab) at www.muslima.lv, with a proselytising tone, was set up with the aim of providing guidance (in the form of question-answer) for (presumably converted) female Muslims. Yet another website in Latvian, http:// parislamu.lv/, has been lately accumulating information on Islam in general Latvia 369 but also in Latvia. http://parislamu.lv/ has an online library with translated and original books on Islamic issues in Latvian in downloadable pdf and Word formats. Finally, http://www.umma.lv/ is a bilingual Russian-Latvian website, also with an online library containing mainly the same books as http:// parislamu.lv/.

13 Family Law

Muslims, like others, have to register marriage at a municipal civil registry office as imams are not authorised to act on behalf of the state. A number of marriage contracts (nikah) are signed every year under the supervision of imams in Riga. Some of them are reported on islam.lv. Inheritances can be apportioned according to Islamic norms if that is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the parties is irrelevant in any litigation.

14 Interreligious Relations

There is very little interaction between Muslim communities and Christian churches. No noteworthy interreligious dialogue events took place in 2013.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is generally very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Latvia. Throughout 2013, just a few items on Islam in Latvia were aired and published in local media, with a much bigger number with a focus on international and security issues.

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantuj is an annual several-day gathering of Tatars and Bashkirs with festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious festival, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered. Liechtenstein

Thomas Schmidinger*

1 Muslim Populations

Islam in the Principality of Liechtenstein is a very recent phenomenon. Muslims immigrated in the last 25 years predominately from Turkey, Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. While in 1990 only 2.4% of the population were Muslims, in 2000 it doubled to 4.8% or 1,593 persons.1 The census of 2010 found 1,960 Muslims, which is an increase of 23%.2 This number also includes heterodox Muslims and the small number of about 30 Baha’is.3 According to that number, Muslims make up about 5.4% of the total population of the Principality. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in Liechtenstein are Sunnis and there is hardly any reference to Shiʿi Muslims in the country. There are some Alevis, but their numbers are uncertain.

2 Islam and the State

Until recently, the legal situation concerning relations between state and religion in Liechtenstein was still based on the laws set up by Prince Johann ii in the 19th century, when Liechtenstein was nearly entirely Roman Catholic. Article 37 of the Constitution defined the Roman Catholic faith as the official religion (Landeskirche) of the Principality, but also guaranteed freedom of religion to other religious denominations. Since the 1990s, debates on the separation of church and state had been going on, but it took until 20 December 2012 for the Principality to establish a new secular legal order by changing the Constitution and passing a new law on religion (Gesetz über die Religionsgemeinschaften). However, in January 2013, the constitutional amendment that is necessary for the full implementation

* Thomas Schmidinger is lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Vienna, the University for Applied Science Vorarlberg and secretary general of the Austrian Association for Kurdish Studies. 1 Liechtensteinische Volkszählung 2000. Religion und Hauptsprache. Band 2; p. 12. 2 www.llv.li/pdf-llv-as-erste_ergebnisse_vz2010, accessed 31 December 2013. 3 www.bahai.li/index.php?src=gendocs&link=GeschichteFL&category=Unsere%20 Gemeinde, accessed 31 December 2013.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_026 Liechtenstein 371 of this new law was suspended because the Concordat between Liechtenstein and the Holy See had not been signed.4 Throughout the whole year the government of Liechtenstein and the Catholic Church continued to negotiate over the Concordat, which caused a delay in the implementation of the new law. The main conflict is about the separation of Church and governmental estates. The state did not want to implement the law before a successful end of the negotiations with the Catholic Church. Both sides announced that they are optimistic about a solution in early 2014.5 However, if the new law gets fully implemented only the Catholic, the Lutheran and the Protestant (Calvinist) Churches will be recognised. Islam, Christian Orthodox and the Baha’i community will not be recognised by the new law. They would have to apply separately for equal status. While the Catholic and the Protestant Churches are financially supported by the state, Islam is not regularly financed. The government has announced that it would be willing to support an Islamic religious community if the two Muslim organisations were to unite.6 Until now, it has not been possible to realise this. In 2004 the European Institute for Intercultural and Interreligious Research (Europäisches Institut für interkulturelle und interreligiöse Forschung) was established by the government. Since then, the Muslim communities have also received some minor funding. The government issues a residence permit for one imam. During Ramadan, a second visiting imam is permitted.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamische Gemeinschaft des Fürstentum Liechtenstein (Islamic Community of the Principality of Liechtenstein, Alleestraße 8, 9495 Triesen) is affiliated to the Dachverband islamischer Gemeinden der Ostschweiz und des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, digo (Umbrella association of Islamic Communities in the East of Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein). The Liechtenstein Türk Birliği7, which runs the Yeşil Camii (Industriestraße 32, 9495 Triesen), is affiliated to the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı and also runs a women’s

4 http://orf.at/stories/2160135/, accessed 31 December 2013. 5 www.vaterland.li/index.cfm?ressort=liechtenstein&source=lv&id=26640, accessed 31 December 2013. 6 www.state.gov/documents/organization/132836.pdf, accessed 31 December 2013. 7 https://www.facebook.com/pages/Liechtenstein-T%C3%BCrk-Birligi/271296286337746, accessed 31 December 2013. 372 SCHMIDINGER organisation (Türk kadınlar dernegi Liechtenstein)8 and a Parents’ Association (Türk Okul Aile Birliği).9 Despite the fact that a significant minority of Muslims of Turkish origin in Liechtenstein are Alevis, there is no Alevi organisation in the Principality. Some Alevis from Liechtenstein participate in Alevi activities in nearby regions of Austria and Switzerland. The activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat, which calls its Swiss branch Ahmadiyya Bewegung des Islams in der Schweiz und in Liechtenstein (Ahmadiyya Movement of Islam in Switzerland and Liechtenstein), that took place in 2009, have not continued since 2010.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are only two prayer houses in Liechtenstein. The Yeşil Camii (Green Mosque) and the Islamische Gemeinschaft des Fürstentum Liechtenstein (Islamic Community of the Principality of Liechtenstein) run both prayer rooms in the village of Triesen.

5 Children’s Education

In the school year 2007/08 Islamic religious education started in five elementary schools. The curriculum was developed by the Institute for Interreligious Pedagogics and Didactics in Cologne (Germany). The government agreed to establish such a pilot project on condition that the teachers would be trained educationalists, the language of education would be German, the curriculum would be supervised by experts, and classes would be controlled by the Schulamt (Department of Education) in accordance with the laws and the Constitution of Liechtenstein.10 An evaluation in 2008 demonstrated that these conditions were fulfilled and the project continued. Until now it is not a regular school subject, but a voluntary project that is taught in the afternoons after regular school lessons. Two teachers were trained in Turkey and Austria and serve the schools in Liechtenstein from nearby Austria. According to Schulamt, for the year 2010/11

8 https://www.facebook.com/groups/61511803093/, accessed 31 December 2013. 9 www.toab.li/, accessed 31 December 2013. 10 http://linewsletter.typo3web.net/fileadmin/newsletter/files/04_07/Islamischer_ Religionsunterricht.pdf, accessed 31 December 2013. Liechtenstein 373 the number was 75,11 in 2011/12 it decreased to 70 attendees12and in 2012/13 this number further decreased to 56 attendees. Due to the pregnancy of one of the two teachers some schools could offer Islamic religious education only for half of the year.13 In 2013/14 only one teacher continued to provide Islamic religious instruction. In the first semester, 39 children took part. In the second semester Islamic, religious education will be offered in two more schools. The Schulamt estimated that additional 15 children will get Islamic religious education in these two schools for one semester.14

6 Higher and Professional Education

As a small country with only one small town Liechtenstein has no long tradition of higher education. The first private university15 opened only in 2000, but until now it has no field of study with specific relevance for Muslims. Neither has the state-run Hochschule Liechtenstein16 any sections that deal with Islam.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is no Muslim cemetery in Liechtenstein. But since the construction of a Muslim cemetery in nearby Vorarlberg (Austria) was initiated, a debate has also started in Liechtenstein about the construction of a Muslim cemetery. Already in 2007 vicar-general Dr. Markus Walser from the Catholic Archdiocese of Liechtenstein17 and Prince Hans-Adam ii issued statements in favour of a Muslim cemetery. In 2008 an opinion poll showed that more than half of the population of Liechtenstein favoured the opening of Christian cemeteries to Muslims, while only 35 % would like to see a separate Muslim cemetery in the Principality.18 Until now only few Muslims are buried at Christian cemeteries. Most of the deceased Muslims are transferred to their country of origin.

11 e-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 29 November 2010. 12 e-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 30 November 2011. 13 e-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 30 October 2012. 14 e-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 8 January 2014. 15 www.ufl.li, accessed 31 December 2013. 16 www.hochschule.li, accessed 31 December 2013. 17 www.erzbistum-vaduz.li/medien/20071105.htm, accessed 31December 2013. 18 Marxer, Wilfried, “Religion in Liechtenstein. Umfrage im Auftrag der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein über Glauben, Religiosität, religiöse Toleranz und das Verhältnis von Staat und Religionsgemeinschaften,” in Beiträge, 40/2008, p. 59, at 374 SCHMIDINGER

The municipalities of Gamprin, Eschen, Mauren and Ruggell opened their cemetery chapel for Muslim burials.19 In the capital Vaduz a section of the cemetery with space for 45 graves adjusted to face Mecca is reserved for Muslims.20 However, even these graves are part of a Christian cemetery. Therefore the discussions about the establishment of a Muslim cemetery continue. In 2013, Hans Peter Walch, the head of the Office of Alien and Passport Affairs and the working group for the Integration of Muslims stated that “Muslims can be buried at any cemetery in Liechtenstein but there is currently no cemetery where they can be buried according to the Muslim rite.”21

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic chaplaincy service in the hospital and the prison in Vaduz is offered by the Yeşil Camii, if requested. As Liechtenstein abolished its army in 1868, there is also no military chaplaincy.

9 Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals have no legal status in Liechtenstein, but they are celebrated by Muslim families and in prayer houses. Friday prayers are held in the two mosques in Triesen.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

As a very small country Liechtenstein has no infrastructure for ritual slaughter. Halal food has to be imported from Switzerland, Austria and Turkey. Officially, Liechtenstein has two so-called Islamic banks, the Liechtenstein Arinco Arab Investment Company and the Islamic Banking System Finance S.A.. Both have their registered offices in the capital Vaduz.22 However,

www.liechtenstein-institut.li/Portals/11/pdf/lib/lib_40_Religion.pdf, accessed 31 December 2013. 19 www.vaterland.li/index.cfm?id=15510&source=lv&ressort=home, accessed 31 December 2013. 20 www.vaterland.li/index.cfm?id=15521&source=lv&ressort=liechtenstein, accessed 31 December 2013. 21 www.vaterland.li/index.cfm?source=lv&id=22935, accessed 31 December 2013. 22 www.islamicweb.com/beliefs/fiqh/bank_research.htm, accessed 31 December 2013. Liechtenstein 375 both banks serve the international ‘Islamic’ banking sector rather than the Muslim communities of Liechtenstein. Internationally known as a tax haven, Liechtenstein also serves to park ‘Islamic’ money as it does for the traditional banking system.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal dress codes that prohibit Muslims from wearing the islamic head scarf. However, only a very limited number of Muslim women wear any form of head scarf.

12 Publication and Media

There are no Muslim newspapers in Liechtenstein. There are only websites and Facebook profiles in German and Turkish of Muslim organisations. Most of the postings at the Facebook profile of the Liechtenstein Türk Birliği and the Türk kadınlar dernegi Liechtenstein and the Türk Okul Aile Birliği—all supported by the Turkish akp-government—are in Turkish. Also most postings at the Facebook profile of the Liechtenstein Milli Görüş Genclik, a part of the European Milli Görüş network, are in Turkish. Their group description explicitly starts with an appreciation of “Milli Görüş Lideri (merhum) Prof. Dr. Necmeddin Erbakan.”23 The Milli Görüş affiliated Islamische Gemeinschaft des Fürstentum Liechtenstein runs two different Facebook profiles.

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted to conduct marriage ceremonies in prayer houses, but only after a civil marriage is registered. Polygamy and the unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) under Islamic law are prohibited.

14 Interreligious Relations

There are few interreligious activities carried out by Catholic and Protestant parishes and the Catholic Archdiocese, the European Institute for Intercultural and Interreligious Research (Europäisches Institut für interkulturelle und

23 https://www.facebook.com/groups/281268961914037/, accessed 10 April 2014. 376 SCHMIDINGER interreligiöse Forschung), the Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Liechtenstein-Institut. The Catholic Opus Dei-affiliated International Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein24 has been active in some interreligious dialogue with Islamic organisations, like the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, isesco.25 But it does not offer any studies related to Islam itself. The Yeşil Camii participated in the ‘day of the open mosque,’ organised by Islamic organisations in Switzerland.26

15 Public Opinion and Debate

As in many European states, debates in Liechtenstein on Islamic terrorism and the role of Islam in public life have also increased since 2001. A survey by the Liechtenstein-Institut demonstrated an overall climate of tolerance. However, Islam is viewed more negatively than Christianity or Judaism.27 Prince Hans-Adam ii has publicly supported the equal treatment of Islam and the right to erect mosques.28 European debates like the ban on mosque minarets in Switzerland or the debates on banning the niqab were also followed in Liechtenstein, but no similar suggestions were made. Contrary to other European countries, there is no right-wing populist or extremist political party that mobilises against Muslims, but there are adolescent Nazi skinhead activities connected with networks in neighbouring Germany, Switzerland and Austria.29 The debate on male circumcision caused by a decision of a German court in June 2012 continued to find echoes in the Liechtenstein media. However,

24 www.iap.li, accessed 31 December 2013. 25 www.iap.li/files/Dialogue%20among%20Civilisations%20and%20Cultures_iap_ Oct_2002.pdf, accessed 31 December 2013. 26 www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/tag-der-offene-moschee-1.3959782, accessed 31 December 2013. 27 Marxer, Wilfried, ‘Religion in Liechtenstein’, p. 26. 28 www.llv.li/llv-portal-informationen/aktuelles.htm?reference=105520&checkSum=5E6381 E59871ADC55DBF1B511DD6A00D, accessed 31 December 2013. 29 See Davolio, Miryam Eser Davolio and Matthias Drilling, Rechtsextremismus im Fürstentum Liechtenstein. Eine qualitative Studie zu Hintergründen und Herangehensweisen im Auftrag der Gewaltschutzkommission des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. (Basel: Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz, 2009). Liechtenstein 377 unlike in Germany and Austria, there was no significant mobilisation against male circumcision by so called ‘new atheists.’

16 Major Cultural Events

There are no typically Muslim festivals and cultural events specific to Liechtenstein. Lithuania

Egdūnas Račius*

1 Muslim Populations

In 2013, finally, the official results of the 2011 Census were made public. The Lithuanian censuses routinely include questions pertaining to religious identification. The 2011 Census returned 2,727 residents of Lithuania as specifically Sunni Muslims1 (no data on Shiʿis is available), or 0.1% of the total population of three million; in the 2001 Census that number stood at 2,860,2 and thus has decreased in a decade by some five percent. Of 2,727 Sunni Muslims in 2011, 1,441 identified themselves as ethnic Tatars3 (or 52.8% of all Sunni Muslims and just 51.6% of all 2,793 ethnic Tatars),4 while 374—as ethnic Lithuanians.5 In the previous, 2001 Census, there were 1,679 ethnic Muslim Tatars (or 58.7% of all Sunni Muslims and 51.9% of all 3,235 ethnic Tatars) and 185 Lithuanians.6 As the total number of Lithuania’s residents who identified themselves as ethnic Tatars in 2001 stood at 3,235 and in 2011—at 2,793, there is a 13.7% decrease in a decade. As of 2011, almost half of Lithuania’s Muslims live in Vilnius and its district, followed by Kaunas, Alytus and Klaipėda districts. Tatars, locally known as “Lithuanian Tatars,” who still make just over a half of Lithuania’s current Muslim population, together with another minority ethnic group Karaims, have been living in Lithuania (especially the south-eastern part of today’s Republic of Lithuania) since the fourteenth century when they started settling in what then was the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, primarily as mercenaries and refugees from the Kipchak Steppes and the Crimean Khanate. The settlers were given land by the Lithuanian rulers whom

* Egdūnas Račius is Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania. 1 Department of Statistics, Gyventojai pagal tautybę, gimtąją kalbą ir tikybą [Population by Ethnicity, Native Language, and Faith] (Vilnius: Statistikos departamentas, 2013–03– 15), p. 14, available at https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/217110/Gyv_kalba_tikyba .pdf/1d9dac9a-3d45–4798–93f5–941fed00503f. 2 Department of Statistics, Gyventojai pagal lytį, amžių, tautybę ir tikybą [Population by Sex, Age and Religion] (Vilnius: Statistikos departamentas, 2002), pp. 204–205. 3 Department of Statistics, Gyventojai pagal tautybę, gimtąją kalbą ir tikybą, p. 14. 4 Department of Statistics, Gyventojai pagal tautybę, gimtąją kalbą ir tikybą, p. 7. 5 Department of Statistics, Gyventojai pagal tautybę, gimtąją kalbą ir tikybą, p. 14. 6 Department of Statistics, Gyventojai pagal lytį, amžių, tautybę ir tikybą, pp. 204–205.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_027 Lithuania 379 they served and allowed to practise their religions, Karaism and Islam respectively. Tatars almost immediately proceeded with mosque building (all in all, well over two dozen mosques were built on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) and established numerous cemeteries exclusively for the burial of Muslims. Although over time Lithuanian Tatars lost their mother tongue, they retained their religion and survived as a distinct ethno-religious, yet well integrated, group. As revealed by the 2011 Census, the lesser half of Lithuania’s Muslims are comprised of three distinctive groups—the second largest group being ethnic Lithuanians (among whom the overwhelming majority are recent converts to Islam and their progeny), followed by descendants of immigrants from the Muslim Central Asian and Caucasian republics who settled in Lithuania during the Soviet period, and, finally, immigrants of recent years, who are still very few.

2 Islam and the State

Lithuania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute a majority (over 77% according to the results of the 2011 Census)7 of the population and the Catholic Church is prominent in the public life of the country. Sunni Islam (the traditional faith of the Lithuanian Tatars) is recognised by law8 (adopted in 1995) as one of the nine ‘traditional’ faiths in Lithuania, and the Muslim community, through its official representative institution, the Muftiate (first established in Vilnius in the inter-war period by the Polish authorities, who then controlled eastern Lithuania, including Vilnius, disbanded in the Soviet years, and re-established in 1998), receives a modest annual state subsidy (just over three thousand Euros, on average) which is used for the maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings. Top state officials routinely send greetings to the Muslim community on the occasions of Muslim religious festivals. As one of the ‘traditional’ faith communities, Sunni Muslims have the right to religious instruction in schools, chaplaincy in state institutions, their

7 Statistics Lithuania (2012) Lithuanian 2011 Population Census in Brief, p. 26, www.stat.gov .lt/uploads/Lietuvos_gyventojai_2011.pdf?PHPSESSID=2d182ca298cf2190e69e0680d700470d, accessed 14 January 2013. 8 Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania (1995) Law on Religious Communities and Associations of the Republic of Lithuania, http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id= 289917, accessed 12 May 2012. 380 RAčIUS religious marriage is recognised by the state as legally binding, and other rights granted by the state exclusively to ‘traditional’ faith communities. Other Muslim denominations (such as Shiʿis) have the constitutionally granted right to freedom of religion and conscience but do not have the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Religious organisations affiliated to non- traditional denominations may seek the status of “religious community recognised by the state” 25 years after their official registration. Apart from an aborted attempt by Ahmadis in the early 1990s, no other heterodox or non- Sunni Muslim religious organisation has yet applied for official registration.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are nine registered (Sunni) Muslim organisations all around Lithuania, though by 2013 two of them (both in the western city of Klaipėda), according to the head of the Lithuanian Muslim community Mufti Romas Jakubauskas, had ceased to function.9 The main Muslim organisation is the Spiritual Centre of the Lithuanian Sunni Muslims—Muftiate (Lietuvos Musulmonų Sunitų Dvasinis Centras—Muftiatas, Smolensko 19, Vilnius, headed by Mufti Romas Jakubauskas, tel.: ++370 67417710, [email protected]), (re)established in 1998 and dominated by Lithuanian Tatars, which serves as an umbrella organisation for basically all other registered Muslim organisations in the country. The Mufti is elected for a term of five years by representatives of local Muslim congregations, which so far have also been dominated by Lithuanian Tatars, though more and more immigrants and converts get drawn into running of the communal affairs. Although elections to the Mufti’s position were scheduled for 2013, due to the lack of quorum no vote at the general conference of the congregation representatives took place and Jakubauskas remained in his position. For some twenty years, the Muftiate was headquartered in a state-owned apartment in downtown Vilnius. In early 2013, the Muftiate and the Turkish Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) established a public enterprise Islamic Cultural and Educational Centre (Islamo kultūros ir švietimo centras) with the Mufti as its director and the representative of the Diyanet in the Baltic States together with the Turkish imam in Vilnius as his deputies. The new entity bought, on the Turkish government’s money, a building (formerly occupied by Balturka, a local Turkish organisation related to the worldwide Gülen Movement) on a relatively centrally located Smolensko street,

9 Interview with Mufti Romas Jakubauskas, Vilnius, 24 January 2014. Lithuania 381 renovated and adapted its two upper floors to the needs of worshippers (with the two lower floors rented to retail shops run by Turks). The premises, next to a spacious prayer hall for men and adjacent room for women, have an office housing administrations of the Muftiate and the local Vilnius Region Muslim organisation, as well as the imam, several classrooms, and a kitchen. In mid-2013, some Lithuanian converts to Islam announced creation of a convert-based Muslim organisation Centre of Lithuanian Muslims Salam (Lietuvių musulmonų centras Salam) and launched their own website, www .salam.lt. One of the first activities of the new organisation was to establish a permanent religious mentorship and counselling service for converts with volunteers on duty throughout the day at the Islamic Cultural and Educational Centre premises. However, this initiative proved to be short-lived and no other activities organised by the Salam Centre took place in 2013, while its website remained in a permanent state of ‘under construction.’ For several past years, the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam has been trying to re-establish its presence in Lithuania by sending missionaries from Germany but so far has had little success. There is as yet no specifically Shiʿi religious congregation.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Though a century ago there were well over a dozen purpose-built mosques, there are currently four (three wooden, built in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,10 and one brick, built in the early 1930s), of which only the mosque in Kaunas (Totorių Street 6) is regularly used for Friday prayers by both local Tatar and foreign Muslims, currently mainly car dealers from Central Asian states. On an ordinary Friday, it has well over a hundred worshippers for salat al-jumu‘a. Since 2012, it has been serviced by a Turkish imam supplied by the Turkish State (through Diyanet) and therefore is open throughout the day. The other mosques, in the villages of Raižiai, Nemėžis and Keturiasdešimt totorių, are open mainly during religious festivals, although during warm sea- sons occasional Friday prayers also take place. In addition, in the capital Vilnius there is a spacious prayer hall (and a separate one for women) at the premises of the Islamic Cultural and Educational Centre, which is also open throughout the day and is used mainly by Turkish

10 The interior of these mosques can be viewed at www.panoramas.lt/index.php? page_id=132&pan_type=242&show=yes&search_katalog=mecete. 382 RAčIUS businessmen, foreign students and several local Tatars. It also has a Turkish state supplied imam. Though Vilnius City Municipality over the past several decades has been offering various plots of land for the purpose of building a mosque in Vilnius, in 2013 the negotiations between the Muslim community (in the person of the Mufti) and the city authorities remained stalled. However, this time, in the words of the Mufti,11 Muslims are happy with the offer of a plot on Sietyno Street on the western edge of the city, though there are many bureaucratic hurdles that still need to be overcome before the actual mosque construction can begin.

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is optional but exclusively Catholic (or, in ethnic Russian schools, Orthodox); non-religious pupils and those of other faiths as a rule are offered an alternative class in ‘ethics’, unless there is a demand for instruction in faith of one of the officially recognised religions (among them, Islam). Instruction in Islam to several Tatar pupils of different ages used to be provided by the Mufti himself in public schools in Nemėžis and Keturiasdešimt totorių villages, which still have a significant presence of Tatars; however, by 2013 there were not enough pupils in any of the schools willing to take the classes of Islamic religious instruction. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, Islamic religious education elsewhere is extra-curricular, occasionally offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend schools, with converts increasingly taking an active role in organising classes and teaching. A Sunday school in Vilnius, at the Islamic Cultural and Educational Centre premises, offers classes to school age children in Islam, Arabic and Turkish. Besides this, some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the state school history curriculum.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Centre of Oriental Studies of Vilnius University offers a ba program in Asian Studies with a specialisation in Middle Eastern studies (every other year). A range of courses on Islam (among them, one on Islam in Europe) and

11 Interview with Mufti Romas Jakubauskas, Vilnius, 24 January 2014. Lithuania 383 the Middle East are also regularly offered at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas and the Lithuanian Military Academy in Vilnius. There is no institution for imam training in Lithuania. There appears to be little need for extra imams as the community is still relatively small. As of 2013, three of the six local acting Lithuanian Tatar imams had received their formal education abroad (one in Lebanon, two in Russia) while the remaining three were self-taught elderly gentlemen. However, according to the Mufti,12 there currently are no local youth willing to pursue formal studies to become imams. Additionally, as indicated above, Friday prayers at the Islamic Cultural and Educational Centre’s prayer hall in Vilnius and (since 2012) Kaunas mosque are led by Turkish imams, provided by Diyanet. No other foreign imams are known to hold prayers.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Tatars have had separate cemeteries since they first settled in Lithuania. Most Muslim cemeteries were located next to mosques. A dozen cemeteries (in the villages of Nemėžis, Raižiai, Keturiasdešimt totorių, and on the outskirts of Vilnius and elsewhere) have survived till the present and some still serve as burial sites for the community’s deceased. A fair number of non-religious Tatars and Soviet-era immigrants use general public cemeteries for burial. Recently, Muslims of the western port city Klaipėda approached local authorities with a request to allocate space for Muslim burials in one of the city’s cemeteries, which the authorities granted in 2011. The Muftiate has also requested a separate section for Muslims at one of the new cemeteries of Vilnius but, as of the end of 2013, no formal decision had been made by relevant authorities.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals, as there is virtu- ally no need for their services, though occasionally the Department of Prisons requests the Mufti’s services. Otherwise, many of such state institutions have a separate room allocated for prayer and contemplation and Muslims can use these spaces for private prayer.

12 Interview with Mufti Romas Jakubauskas, Vilnius, 24 January 2014. 384 RAčIUS

In 2013, the Muftiate and the Foreigners’ Registration Centre came to a verbal agreement to allow the Muftiate to serve the spiritual needs of Muslims housed at the Centre, though a formal agreement had not been signed yet.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha celebrations in Vilnius, Kaunas and village mosques are open to the public, with up to several hundred worshipers attending in each location. In 2013, Kaunas mosque witnessed an exception- ally big group of worshippers of no less than three hundred at the ʿId al-Adha prayer. This was in part due to the presence of Bosnian football fans who were in Kaunas at the time for a football match between the two national teams. A separate sports hall in Kaunas was also rented exclusively for Muslim Bosnian fans, where another two hundred worshipers prayed.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Though in 2012, there were half a dozen certified (by either Mufti or foreign ulama) halal slaughter houses and meat processing companies (like local giants Biovela, Agrovet), by January 1, 2013, they all (except those producing halal poultry, like Kaišiadorių paukštynas) were obliged by a government regulation to discontinue producing halal meat. The decision by the Lithuanian government to ban slaughtering of animals according to the Islamic regulations was promulgated in compliance with eu regulations and was not specifically aimed at Muslims as such. However, the Muslim and Jewish religious communities with a tacit support of the meat industry complained to the government about this decision and during the entire year of 2013 the Lithuanian Parliament was in debates on how to alleviate the situation for the concerned religious communities. Nonetheless, no decision was made in 2013 and the debate is to continue into 2014. Halal poultry is legally produced by a local company Kaišiadorių paukštynas and its products are available in the company’s 53 specialised shops all over the country with two in the capital Vilnius. As of 2013, frozen imported halal meat and its products were available in several supermarkets in the capital Vilnius, two of which were run by Turks. Some individual Muslims traded in both locally produced and imported halal meat products at the premises of the Islamic Cultural and Educational Centre. Lithuania 385

Several kebab-serving cafes around the country had halal meat imported from Germany and sold at whole-sale supermarkets in major cities. No other Islamic services were being offered on an organised business level as of 2013. The Mufti personally supervises annual hajj arrangements and usually heads the delegation of the Lithuanian pilgrims. However, no pilgrims from Lithuania travelled on hajj in 2013 as no visas were allocated by the Saudi state. Local communities take care of the preparation of the deceased for burial and undertake the burying themselves. No Islamic charities, financial, travelling, publishing or educational institutions or organisations have yet been established in Lithuania as, due to miniscule numbers of practising Muslims, there is very little demand for their services.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. By law, Muslim women wishing to be photographed in hijab for official documents only need to supply the state authorities with certification from the Muftiate confirming that they belong to the Islamic faith.13 However, only a handful of Muslim women (chiefly converts) wear hijab in public, and mainly on Fridays while attending prayer. Some foreign Muslim women (mostly Turkish exchange students) wear hijab in public on a daily basis. There is no record of women being observed wearing niqab in public.

12 Publications and Media

The sole printed periodical (back issues of which can be found at http://www .tbn.lt/id-laikrasciu_archyvas.html ) is Lietuvos Totoriai (Lithuanian Tatars), formally a monthly, though lately published on a bi-monthly basis and in 2013 with only a single issue (due to shortage of funding, according to the editor),14 which has had a circulation of 800. It is in Lithuanian with inserts (of translations

13 Lietuvos Respublikos Vidaus reikalų ministro įsakymas dėl Lietuvos Respublikos Vidaus reikalų ministro 2002 m. gruodžio 6 d. įsakymo nr. 569 „Dėl nuotraukų asmens doku- mentams reikalavimų patvirtinimo“ pakeitimo, 2006 m. rugpjūčio 24 d. Nr. 1V-340, www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=281999&p_query=&p_tr2=, accessed 14 January 2013. 14 Personal communication with Adas Jakubauskas, Vilnius, 24 January, 2014. 386 RAčIUS and original texts) in Polish and Russian and is published by the Union of Lithuanian Tatar Communities (Lietuvos totorių bendruomenių sąjunga). The periodical is ethnically focused with occasional articles and information on religion. Like in several previous years, in 2013, the main website (in Lithuanian) run by Muslims for Muslims and people wishing to get acquainted with Islam was http://islam-ummah.lt/index.html/ (opened in October 2010), which by the end of 2013 had an extensive on-line forum with accumulated over 41 thousand posts by almost 340 users. In 2013, the Muftiate took the initiative to publish a four-volume textbook in Islamic studies for children. The original text and layout was taken from a Diyanet-prepared textbook and the translation and the publishing was financed with privately donated money. 500 full colour copies were published in the Lithuanian language, while 1,000 black and white copies, destined for the readership in all three Baltic States, were published in Russian.

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriage in mosques.15 Such marriages are recognised (and should be promptly registered) by a municipal civil registry office. Every year a couple of dozen marriage contracts are signed under the supervision of the Mufti and other imams. Most of the marriage contracts are signed by Lithuanian women residing all over the country and their foreign suitors. Inheritance, if accepted by all the parties involved, can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant. No cases of International Private Law instances have been yet reported.

14 Interreligious Relations

Though there were no significant interreligious dialogue events in 2013, one might mention a photo exhibition “Religious tolerance” and discussion at the

15 Lietuvos Respublikos Teisingumo ministro įsakymas Dėl Teisingumo ministro 2006 m. gegužės 19 d. įsakymo Nr. 1R-160 „Dėl civilinės metrikacijos taisyklių patvirtinimo“ pakeitimo, 2012 m. kovo 26 d. nr. 1R-92, www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id= 421142&p_query=&p_tr2=2, accessed 14 January 2013. Lithuania 387 historic city hall of Vilnius organised in March by the Sultanate of Oman in cooperation with the Muftiate. Several dozen Vilniuscenes took part in the discussion which focused on the need of religious tolerance.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Lithuania in the local media. Sometimes media articles reflect on “exotic” traditions of Lithuanian Tatars, like fasting during the month of Ramadan or burial rituals. But more often local media publishes translated articles on what is regarded as oddities of Muslim cultural traditions in Muslim societies. No opinion poll of relevance was conducted in 2013.

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantujus is an annual Tatar gathering, lasting several days, featuring singing, dancing, games and sports. In 2013, for a third year in a row it took place in Trakai, one of the historic capitals of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and, as always, was open to general public. The event was attended by a hundred or so people. There also are occasional Baltic Islamic camps, mainly aimed at converts, and one took place in Lithuania in 2013. Luxembourg

Sylvain Besch*

1 Muslim Populations

As it is impossible to assess the exact number of Muslims in Luxembourg, since the registration of religious affiliation is prohibited,1 the following estimate is based on the nationalities of people from predominantly Muslim countries.2 As of 1 January 2013, on the basis of nationality alone, the largest groups of Muslim background were as follows: Bosnians—2,303; Moroccans—616; Albanians—502; Turks—487; Tunisians—374; Algerians—331; Iranians—322.3 Such “nationalities” as Montenegrin, Serbian, Yugoslav, Kosovar (8,522 people) include many people of Muslim background, particularly people from Sandjak and Kosovo. Muslims in Luxembourg are concentrated mainly in urban areas: 27% of the members of the biggest Muslim groups4 live in the city of Luxembourg and 43% live in the four biggest cities.5 The municipality of Wiltz, in the north of the country, has a significant Bosniak community (5.4% of the total population). The majority of Muslims arrived in Luxembourg in the 1990s as war refugees. There have been several waves of refugees from the former Yugoslavia: Bosniaks from Bosnia, Albanians and other Muslims from Kosovo, Serbian and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. By 2011, 25% of the Montenegrins and 18% of the Bosnians aged 18 years or over had registered on the electoral roll in order to be able to vote in the municipal elections that year. Currently about 1,000 adults attend Friday prayer regularly in the mosques.

* Sylvain Besch is director at the cefis (Centre d’Etude et de Formation Interculturelles et Sociales) and a member of the Consultative Commission on Human Rights in Luxembourg. 1 Article 15 in the law of 31 March 1979 on the use of data in a databank forbids the collection and registration of data concerning individuals’ activities and opinions in the following fields: politics, trade union activities, philosophical and religious affiliation. 2 Source: Statec; www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/acteurs/statec/index.html. 3 Source: Statec; www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/acteurs/statec/index.html. 4 Concerns the seven nationalities mentioned above. From 2010 to 2012, 1468 persons from these communities as well as individuals originating from Montenegro and Kosovo were granted Luxembourg citizenship (source: Statec). 5 Répertoire général des Personnes Physiques.

2 Islam and the State

There is no state church in Luxembourg, although the Roman Catholic Church is the most important. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, freedom to exercise one’s religion in public and freedom to express religious opinions (Art. 19). The Constitution allows the state to enter into agreements with the various religions6 (Art. 22), which regulate the relationship between the state and the religions. The Constitution is currently under revision. The various agreements confer the status of legal personality on the religious communities. The agreement that will regulate the relationship between the state of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Muslim community7 has not yet been passed into law. Following a resolution of the Chamber of Deputies,8 the government in March 2012 appointed a group of experts to study the relationship between public authorities and religious communities.9 In their report,10 the experts proposed a reform of the system of recognition and financing of religious organisations in relation to the equal treatment of religions.11 On 30 November 2012, the Minister of Religious Affairs presented the submissions of the parties interested in the report.12 Muslim representatives associated themselves with the recognised communities demanding the continuation of the existing system foreseen in the Constitution. The existing recognised communities asked for participation in the working out of a standard agreement granting

6 On 31 October 1997, agreements were made between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Council, the Protestant Church of Luxembourg and the Orthodox Church of Greece, and these came into force on 10 July 1998. Later, agreements were made with the Romanian and the Serbian Orthodox Churches and the Anglican Church of Luxembourg and these came into force on 11 June 2004. 7 www.shoura.lu/?page_id=32 8 Motion adopted by the Chambre des Députés 7 June 2011. 9 The questions posed to the group were: “Do the conventions currently governed by article 22 of the Constitution still reflect the socio-cultural realities of Luxembourg and the principles of equal treatment and respect for human rights as laid down by the Council of Europe? If not, what might be alternative ways of developing relations between the public authorities and the religious communities, taking note, especially, of the experiences and practices of other members states of the Council of Europe?” 10 Rapport du groupe d’experts chargé de réfléchir sur l’évolution future des relations entre les pouvoirs publics et les communautés religieuses ou philosophiques au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. 11 Ibid., pp. 119–120. 12 www.gouvernement.lu/519177/actualites/, accessed 30 November 2012. 390 BESCH equality of treatment to all communities and access to the benefits which the Catholic Church currently enjoys. The Shoura (see section 3 below) should also be involved in the development of this agreement.13 The new government, a coalition between the Liberal Party (dp), the Luxembourg Socialist Workers Party (posl), and the Greens, has announced its intention to reform the relationship between the state and the religions.14 It wants to abolish the existing agreements and open negotiations with the religions, starting a discussion about their financing and redefining relations between the religions and the local authorities. Religions—whether recognised or not—are permitted to create profit and non-profit associations, which can obtain subsidies from the state and the municipality. Some of these associations have already benefited from this to organise public events, particularly through grants from the state (through the Office for Immigration and Integration in the Ministry of Family) or by national and local joint funding in the framework of the European (eu) integration fund for third country nationals. The proposed agreement envisages that the employed clergy, in this case a mufti, would have the status of a civil servant as in other recognised religions. The mufti’s nomination would be approved by the Minister of Religion after the mufti has taken an oath before him. The Shoura can appoint up to five imams and a secretary to assist the Mufti.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Centre Culturel Islamique du Luxembourg, ccil, 2 rte d’Arlon, L-8210 Mamer, tel.: ++352 310060, fax: ++352 26310426, http://www.islam.lu/, e-mail: [email protected]) is the oldest (founded in February 1984) and the most important of the Muslim organisations. A regional branch of this centre was established in February 2007 in Wiltz. It has about 450 paying members of 30 different nationalities, particularly Bosnians (2,000 people, including their families). The Islamic and Cultural Association in the South (44 rue de Luxembourg, L-4220 Esch-sur-Alzette, tel./fax: ++352 26540788, e-mail: [email protected],) was established in March 2002, and its members are mainly Muslims from Sandjak region in Montenegro and Serbia. The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North was created in September 2000 and was initially named the Cultural Centre

13 www.shoura.lu/. 14 Programme gouvernemental, pp. 8–9, www.gouvernement.lu/3322796/Programme- gouvernemental.pdf. Luxembourg 391 of Sandjak. Its main building is in Wiltz (26 rue de Noertrange, L-9543 Wiltz, tel.: 26950680, fax: 26950681, http://www.ccin.lu) and it is mainly frequented by Muslims from Serbian Sandjak. The Association Islamique de Luxembourg (17–19, rue Nicolas Martha, L-2133 Luxembourg e-mail: elmurabitun@hotmail .com) emerged out of the former Islamic Religious and Cultural Center in the West which was mainly composed of Bosniaks from Bosnia, Kosovo and the Montenegrin part of Sandjak. An Islamic association called the Middle Way (Le Juste Milieu, ljm, Al Wassat, 32 Dernier Sol, L-2543 Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, tel.: ++352 26 48 11 53, www.ljm .lu, e-mail: [email protected]) was established in February 2008; its founding members are mostly people of Arab descent. Two other centres, both affirm- ing their collaboration in the national Muslim structures in Luxembourg, are the Islamic Cultural Centre ‘Nordstad’, (Centre Culturel Islamique ‘Nordstad’, 29 avenue de la Gare L-9233 Diekirch e-mail: [email protected]), founded in October 2008, with members mostly from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandjak, and the Luxembourg Islamic Centre (Centre Islamique au Luxembourg, 6, bvd. D’Avranches, L-1160 Luxembourg e-mail: [email protected]), established in December 2008, with mostly Bosnian membership. The Shoura, the Council of the Muslim Religion (Boîte postale 3054, L-1030 Luxembourg www.shoura.lu, e-mail: [email protected]) was established in 2003. New bylaws were adopted by the Shoura in June 2011. The first elections took place on 3 July 2011 among Muslims registered in the six Muslim associations mentioned above with the exception of the Islamic Cultural Centre in the North. The number of votes cast was 649 out of the registered 2,364 (27%), and there were nineteen candidates for twelve seats.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are nine mosques/prayer houses associated with the above-mentioned associations, in buildings in Mamer (1), Esch/Alzette (2), Diekirch15 (1), Luxembourg-Bonnevoie (2), Luxembourg-Gare (1) and Wiltz (2). Three imams are currently employed (by the associations in ljm, Luxembourg. Mamer and Esch/Alzette) and they are paid by the community. Other imams work as volunteers. They are organised in the Assemblée des Imams du Luxembourg (www .shoura.lu).

15 Hall made available to the Centre Culturel Islamique ‘Nordstad’. 392 BESCH

5 Children’s Education

The Catholic Church benefits from an arrangement concerning religious education in primary schools.16 In elementary schools, the Catholic Church organises religious education and the archbishop is the employer of the religious education teachers and responsible for their training. Legislation also provides for religious education in post-elementary schools. Pupils can choose at both levels to take lessons in either religion and ethics or ethics and civics. There is no third option. The religion and ethics syllabus in primary schools assumes the inclusion of intercultural and interreligious topics.17 The major religions are also covered in the syllabus for ethics and civics in primary18 and secondary schools and in history in secondary schools. The new coalition government intends to replace the current courses ‘Moral and social education’ and ‘Religious and moral instruction’ with a single course ‘Values education’. All the Islamic organisations offer Islamic instruction for children and some of them also offer courses for adults in mosques. About 600 children participated in such Islamic education courses in 2013.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Education in Islam is part of the basic education offered by the Institute for Higher Education of Teachers of Religion (Basic theology and History). In 2012/2013 the programme of further education for teachers of religion provided, among other things, a workshop on similarities and differences among Muslims, Christians, and Jews.19 Imams currently in post have all been educated abroad.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are no Islamic cemeteries in Luxembourg, but the Muslim community has at its disposal a parcel of land in the Merl cemetery in Luxembourg City so that they can bury their dead according to Islamic rites. On 14 June

16 Memorial A No. 67, 21 August 1998. 17 Erzbischöflisches Ordinariat, Bildungsplan für den Religionsunterricht in der Grundschule, pp. 14, 15, 20; Praxisteil Zyklus 2, p. 21; Praxisteil Zyklus 3, pp. 30, 31; Praxisteil Zyklus 4, pp. 30, 31; pp. 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30, www.religionsunterricht.lu/dok/bildungsplang.html 18 Memorial A No. 178, 22 August 2011. 19 http://ipr.cathol.lu/fortbildung.htm Luxembourg 393

2013 the local government association (Le Syndicat des Villes et Communes Luxembourgeoises—Syvicol) circulated a letter inviting local governments wishing to arrange such plots in their cemetery to inform Syvicol. The local council of Betzdorf amended its cemetery regulations so as to set aside sites in the cemetery of Roodt/Syre for Muslims.20 The Shoura recommended that Muslims should directly contact their local council leaders demanding local plots for Muslims to be buried according to Islamic rites.21 In 2001, the ccil established a mutual insurance company22 and, when a member dies, an allowance is paid to meet the costs of the funeral service, which is carried out with the assistance of the imam from the ccil. The costs of transporting the coffin to the home country of the deceased can also be met.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Neutral prayer rooms and/or ‘farewell-rooms’ can be found in hospitals. In quite a few hospitals the nursing staff tries to take account of the needs of the various religious communities. Some hospitals provide training and support to make staff aware of different religious backgrounds.23 In Schrassig prison and in the detention centre, Islamic prayers can be organised and an imam visits the institutions regularly. The law on the creation and organisation of the detention centre24 for people without a residence permit specifically stipulates that the religious convictions of the detainees must be respected and provides for the availability of cultural, educational and spiritual activities.

9 Religious Festivals

Before ʿId al-Adha, the Minister of Education informs teachers of the date of the holiday, and asks them to accept parents’ letters asking permission for their children to take a day off school. Employment legislation does not provide for

20 www.betzdorf.lu/2013_09_20_rapport-seance_internet.pdf?FileID=publications %2F2013_09_20_rapport-seance_internet.pdf. 21 www.shoura.lu/?p=676. 22 Memorial B No. 22, 2 April 2001. 23 The Emile Mayrisch hospital in Esch/Alzette has produced guidelines for staff on meeting religious expectations related to death. 24 See articles 3(1) and 12(3) in the law of 28 May 2009 on the creation and organisation of the detention centre, cf. Memorial A No. 119, 29 May 2009. 394 BESCH any specific arrangements, and employees need to book a day’s leave to participate in the religious holidays.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

In principle, halal slaughter is forbidden in Luxembourg25 although an exception is made for slaughter without prior stunning according to certain religious rites.26 The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development has stated that he will not in future approve slaughter without stunning and that he ‘intends to insert a clause to the effect that ritual slaughter is subject to the authorisation of the competent authority’ in a national regulation.27 There are four Muslim butchers’ shops and about ten Balkan grocery stores that sell halal meat, which is also available in the Auchan supermarket in the city of Luxembourg. Muslims also buy halal meat in Belgium, France and Germany. Because of the prohibition of ritual slaughter, some Muslims send money to their home country so that people there who are less well-off can make the sacrifice on their behalf, especially at ʿId al-Adha. The authorities do not intend to enforce the labelling of meat from halal slaughter houses, preferring to reach an agreed solution with the European Union.

11 Dress Codes

The law on compulsory education28 stipulates that, with the exception of teachers of religion and ethics, teachers are not allowed to demonstrate their religious or political affiliation by means of conspicuous dress or symbols. Pupils’ dress is governed by regulations which require that students should dress “correctly” and that “special clothes can be required for lessons in gym- nastics, art, and manual and practical classes.”29

25 Article 8 in the law of 15 March 1983 on animal welfare forbids the killing of animals without stunning, cf. Mémorial A No. 15, 19 March 1983. 26 Article 5 (2) in the grand-ducal regulation of 19 January 1995, cf. Mémorial A No. 8, 6 February 1995. 27 Response to the parliamentary question No. 1996 on halal slaughter, 14 May 2012, www .chd.lu/. 28 Article 5 of the law of 6 February 2009, in Memorial A No. 20, 16 February 2009. 29 Article 6 in the regulation of 23 December 2004, on ‘order and discipline in secondary and secondary professional schools’, in Memorial A No. 207, 30 December 2004 Article 3 in the regulation of 7 May 2009 Concernant les règles de conduite et l’ordre intérieur communs à toutes les écoles in Memorial A No. 98, 14 May 2009. Luxembourg 395

12 Publications and Media

A number of centres disseminate information on Islam through the electronic social media. The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North produces the magazine Diwan in Bosnian, French and German.30

13 Family Law

Civil marriage must precede religious marriage. Luxembourg law provides a legal basis for the annulment of forced marriages. The recognition of a marriage can be refused if the marriage is clearly in violation of the laws of Luxembourg (if it involves polygamy, for example). All foreign legal decisions and acts not sanctioned under a treaty or an eu directive are subject to a formal process of recognition before they can be legally accepted in Luxembourg. Divorce by repudiation is considered to be a violation of public order. It is possible for partial legal recognition to be given; for example, an Islamic divorce may be recognised, but not necessarily its consequences, such as arrangements for the custody of children.

14 Interreligious Relations

An informal interreligious group called Action Groupe Inter-religions (agir) (c/o sesopi, 5 avenue Marie-Thérèse, L-2132 Luxembourg, tel.: ++352 44743517, fax: ++352 44743–515) has existed for eighteen years. Every year it arranges meetings, debates and interreligious prayers.31 Since 2008, the Luxembourg Council of Christian Churches (Conseil des Églises Chrétiennes au Grand- Duché de Luxembourg) has organised, in collaboration with ing-Europe Marathon Luxembourg and agir, the Interfaith-Marathon for a United World in Luxembourg.32 The adult education organisations Erwuessebildung and Katholische Erwachsenenbildung in Trier (keb) arranged a further education course ‘Fit for diversity’ for people working in schools and adult education, police, and the health services to strengthen their intercultural and

30 www.olai.public.lu/fr/fonds-programmes/fei/projets-cofinances/index.html. 31 Especially the fourth interreligious concert held on 24 March 2013 and organised by agir, Cercle interreligieux de Trèves and ErwuesseBildung. www.mywort.lu/centre/ agenda/16942548.html. 32 5th Interfaith Marathon, see: ‎ www.interfaith.lu/Pressemitteilung%202013%20Nr%20%20 5%20E.pdf.‎ 396 BESCH interreligious competence. During this training the participants are able to acquire a fuller acquaintance with the main religions (Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism).33 The Muslim community took part in an interreligious prayer at the Te Deum ceremony on 23 June 2013.34

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debate has been marked by the question of financial support for the Muslim faith. In a letter to the Minister of Religion the Shoura has repeated its demand for recognition claiming discrimination in that Islam, although the second religion in the country, does not have an official agreement. The Centre for Equality (Centre pour l’Egalité de Traitement—cet) has also recommended recognition of Islam on an equal footing in a letter addressed to the new government.35 Before the elections, the Shoura addressed a question to each of the political parties regarding their views on the issue of recognition.36 The media covered the debate on relations between the state and religions, which appeared in the programmes of all the political parties as well as in the coalition agreement (sect. 2 above). The opposition of local residents to the growing numbers of people attending the mosque run by the Juste Milieu (see sect. 3 above) provoked a lot of debate.37 In response to a motion presented by the political parties adr, the Left and the lsap, the mayor confirmed that there was no breach of regulations. The media paid a good deal of attention to the development of Islamic finance in the banking sector.38 In the coalition agreement the government stated its wish to ‘continue to strengthen its links to the Gulf countries and to promote Luxembourg as the leading location for Islamic finance outside

33 www.formation-continue.lu/descriptionformation?idFormation=11845. www.erwuessebildung.lu/index.php/de/component/seminar/?task=3&cid=235; Inter religiöser Dialog auf Augenhöhe, Luxemburger Wort, 8th October 2013. 34 www.shoura.lu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Rapport-dactivite%cc%81s-de-la-Shoura- 2012-2013-Courriers-comptes-etc.pdf. 35 http://cet.lu/category/avis-cet/. 36 www.shoura.lu/?m=201307. 37 Quotidien, Luxemburger Wort 29 and 30 January 2013. 38 www.luxembourgforfinance.lu/fr/place-financiere/produits-services/finance-islamique/ prestataires-services, Tageblatt 27 November 2013, Die erste islamische Bank der Eurozone, www.paperjam.lu/article/fr/eurisbank-banque-du-golfe-pour-luxembourg, www.journal. lu/article/luxembourg-centrede-la-finance-islamique/. Luxembourg 397 the Muslim world.’ The government intends soon to pass a law authorising the issue of sovereign Luxembourg sukuk denominated in Euros to ensure first mover advantage ‘in the Islamic finance sector.’39

16 Major Cultural Events

Various Muslim organisations have arranged events. Non-Muslims were invited to the mosque in Mamer to take part in the breaking of the fast at the end of Ramadan.40 Different centres (Le Juste Milieu, Centre Culturel Islamique du Nord) have organised open conferences or participated in local events. For the first time a travelling exhibition Islam au Luxembourg has been set up by the Centre de Documentation sur les Migrations Humaines. Funded by the olai,41 whose mission is to provide information about the second religion in the country, the exhibition was well received in the media.42

39 Programme gouvernemental, p. 32, www.gouvernement.lu/3300258/29-signature. 40 Luxemburger Wort, 29 July 2013. 41 www.olai.public.lu/fr/fonds-programmes/fei/projets-cofinances/index.html. 42 Quotidien, 5 June 2013 www.migcendo.lu/cgi-bin/apps/base?com=1I3I0I2I&item=8-5729- 7623-X&base=news&page=1. Macedonia

Muharem Jahja*

1 Muslim Populations

The most recent official census (2002) recorded 660,492 Muslims (mainly Sunnis), or around 31% of the total population (2,022,547). Of these, 509,083 (or 77%) were ethnic Albanians, 77,959 (12%) Turks, 53,879 Roma, and 17,018 Bosniaks.1 Albanians, who speak a different language from Macedonian, which is a Slavic language, started converting to Islam with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. Turks are the descendants of immigrants from the Ottoman times. Today conversions to Islam are relatively rare and may number between 20 and 30 in total since the fall of Communism.2 In the official census, Macedonian-speaking Muslims, as they are officially labelled (also informally known as Torbeshi, Pomaks or Gorani, and increasingly likely to self-identify as Turks or Albanians), are classified in the census under the category of ‘other’ and are not included among the country’s Muslims, but they constitute a considerable number (around 20,000), so the total number of Muslims in 2013 was probably over 700,000. The number of Muslims practising on a daily basis might amount to 200,000, rising to 300,000 on Fridays and fasting in Ramadan.3 Almost two thirds of Macedonia’s Muslims are concentrated in the north-western part of the country, in the capital city, Skopje, the second largest city, Tetovo, and in the districts surrounding these cities and others such as Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo,

* Muharem Jahja is a researcher at the Institute for Cultural and Spiritual Heritage of Albanians, Skopje, and a lecturer in the Department for Oriental Studies at the State University of Tetovo. He holds a ba in Islamic Law and an ma in Islamic History. His research and writings relate to the sociology and history of Islam and Albanians in the Balkan region, specifically in Macedonia. He is a PhD candidate at the University of Vienna. 1 The State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 (Skopje: State Statistical Office, May 2005). A new census was conducted in October 2011. However, a few days before the end of the process, it was cancelled because of different interpretations of the legislation and methodology by the government partners. There has been no new attempt by the government to conduct a census. 2 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 3 Interview with representatives of the ircm in Macedonia, Skopje, January 2009.

Kumanovo, Resne, Struga, and Ohrid. The rest live in the southern and eastern parts of the country in scattered communities.

2 Islam and the State

Macedonia’s Constitution describes Macedonia as a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority of the population, 66% according to the 2002 census. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and provides for the right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others. The Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups (Komisija za odnosi so verskite zaednici i religiozni grupi, http://www.kovz.gov.mk), with a director appointed by the government, regulates the legal aspects of the status of the religious communities and religious groups, as well as relations between the state and the religious communities and groups. The Commission has the status of an autonomous state institution. Islam is recognised by the Constitution as one of the five main faiths and is officially represented by the Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia (Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija, ircm).4 The state does not fund religious communities, and all costs related to maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings, as well as the salaries of religious leaders, are paid from private and voluntary contributions of the members of the community and income from waqf institutions. Leaders of the Sunni Muslim community are routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations by the Parliament and the government and at the Presidential palace, but, unlike Orthodox clergy, they are not invited to openings or construction launches of infrastructure or buildings. Other Muslim denominations, such as the Bektashis and Shiʿis, have freedom of religion and conscience but do not hold the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Beside the Bektashis, there are other Sufi tariqas, such as the Khalwatis (mainly located in the cities of Kicevo, Ohrid and Struga), Malamis, Naqshbandis, Qadiris and Rifa‘is (mainly in the capital Skopje).5 The ircm and other Muslim religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions by following a legally prescribed procedure.

4 The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 19. 5 The Constitution of the ircm, Article 55. 400 JAHJA

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Muslim organisation is the Skopje-based Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia (Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija, ircm, Çairska str. no 52, 1000 Skopje, tel.: ++389 23117410, fax: ++389 23117883, www.bfi.mk/, (re)established in 1994 after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It is dominated by Macedonian Albanians. The ircm, which follows the Hanafi legal school,6 is organised into thirteen separate muftiates in the major cities around the country, each headed by a local mufti. The head of the ircm is known as Rais al-ulama (the current Rais al-ulama is Sulejman Rexhepi). Other active organisations include the Skopje-based Foundation Centre of Islamic Civilisation (www.focic.org.mk) and Logos-A (http://www.logos-a.com.mk) which are engaged in translating and publishing religious literature, generally on Islamic thought and Islamic jurisprudence. The main Muslim charity is the Skopje-based El-Hilal (www.elhilal.org). There are dozens of political parties affiliated to Muslim communities in the country, some of which take part in government coalitions and are represented in the Parliament by more than 30 mps out of the total of 123 mps. Their politics, however, are ethnic rather than religious. The Bektashis are organised in a separate religious entity although they are not registered yet. Their application to the Constitutional Court for recognition as a separate Muslim community on the grounds of the protection of their religious freedom was turned down. It is based in Tetovo. Besides Tetovo, Bektashis also live in Gostivar, Kichevo, Ohrid, Struga, Kanatlartsi, Bitola and Resen. Ethnically, most of the Bektashis are Albanians. There are also some Turks and Torbeshi, but no Bosniaks. There are about 5,000 Bektashis in Macedonia, but there are no official statistics on them. Unlike the religious services of other tariqas in Macedonia, the Bektashis are closed to the public, but open to the women within their order. Women can participate in the religious ceremonies together with men. This is not the case with the Sunni Muslims and the Sunni Sufi orders, where men and women are separated during the prayers in different parts of the mosque or in different rooms. In Macedonia, there is a pronounced conflict between the Bektashi and Sunni communities represented by ircm, particularly over the right to use real estate (i.e. brotherhood lodges, including Arabati Baba Teke in Tetovo). In 2012, the court approved one new Muslim religious group, Ehli Sunet vel Xhemat (a Sunni Muslim order previously rejected for registration). Following the 1991 independence and particularly following the Kosovo war of 1999, Saudi Arabia and Gulf-based

6 The Constitution of the ircm, Article 1. Macedonia 401 organisations, some of them with links to Salafi groups, have increased their presence in the country. This has come as a result of the close interactions of Muslims in Macedonia with those in Kosovo, the channel through which the external influence of Muslim organisations—particularly those that can be associated with Wahhabism—reached Macedonia. With imams educated in Saudi universities who chose to orient themselves towards the religious institutions of the Arab world and the study of Arabic, several Saudi-funded organisations and mosques have been established. As a result, a power struggle emerged between the ircm and Wahhabi imams and organisations. The leaders of the ircm have recently (2012) officially recognised the presence of Wahhabis in the country and have conceded that Wahhabis now control some of mosques around the country, particularly in the Muslim parts of Skopje. Their influence, however, has remained marginal and is now waning. Turkey is the most recent external actor, and has allegedly become a key actor in the Muslim landscape of Macedonia. Turkish-based organisations have gradually increased their presence in Macedonia in the realms of religion, culture and education. The majority of Muslims view Turkey as an ally and have shown sympathy toward Turkey’s engagement as a counterbalance to Arab influence in Macedonia. There is a presence of Turkish-based religious organisations in Macedonia (mainly those close to faith-based organisations such as Nurcu, Naqshbandi, Suleymanci, and Milli Görüş) as well as state-related institutions (such as Diyanet, Yunus Emre Institute, and tika. Macedonia-based Muslim organisations generally hold Turkish Islam in high esteem and consider their own practice of Islam as very Ottoman or Turkish.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

It is estimated that there are roughly 600 purpose-built mosques, some from the fifteenth century, of which 570 are regularly used. Twenty-one historic mosques have survived in the capital, Skopje, among which the most famous are those that date from the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, namely the mosques of Sultan Murat (1436), Yahya Pasha (1503), Isa Bey (1475), Mustafa Pasha (1492), Murat Pasha. Other famous mosques include Aladja (painted, 1438) mosque and Saat (clock) mosque in Tetovo; Isaac Kadi mosque (1509), Haydar Kadi Pasha (1565) and Yeni mosque (1558) in Bitola; Charshi mosque in Prilep; Saat mosque in Gostivar; Hayati Baba Tekye and Ali Pasha mosque in Ohrid. Prayer rooms, called masjids by local Muslims, continue to be constructed in a number of places, including in hospitals and penitentiary institutions. 402 JAHJA

A number of waqf institutions that belonged to the ircm were nationalised with the advent of Communism after the Second World War. Despite the denationalisation process after 1991, not all waqfs, including mosques, have been returned to the ownership of the community. The head of the state commission for interreligious relations and religious groups has stated that “returning properties to the local religious communities within the denationalisation process is almost complete, whereby the Macedonian Orthodox Church (moc) got back 85%, while the Islamic Religious Community (ircm) 73% of their properties.”7 There are also tekes that are used for prayer.

5 Children’s Education

The 2008 measure to introduce religious education as an optional course in public schools offered classes in Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism to 11-year-old pupils only, but was annulled in 2009 by the Constitutional Court. The constitutional judges decided that religious education in schools was contrary to Article 19 and the seventh amendment to the Constitution, which provide for the separation of state and church. According to the Court, the Constitution guarantees the right to practise religion, but citizens should not be influenced as to whether or how they should do so. Classes in ‘history of religions’ and ‘ethics’ continue to be offered to 11-year-old pupils and some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum.8 There is a Skopje-based private religious secondary school (Isa Bey Madrasa, www.medreseja-isabeu.com/), established in 1984 and run by the ircm.9 It provides Islamic instruction as a core curriculum subject and has branches in the major Muslim cities around the country, such as Tetovo, Gostivar and Shtip. Isa Bey Madrasa has the status of a secondary school under the auspices of the ircm, but its curriculum is not subject to approval by the Ministry of Education and Science or any other state agency, and as such it is funded not by the state but by the ircm. Graduating students receive diplomas that are equivalent to a secondary school diploma. Graduates go on to enrol at theological faculties as well as at other faculties and departments. Around 60 students

7 Dnevnik, 6 November 2013. 8 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 9 Centre for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe—Southeast Europe (cedime-se), Minorities in Southeast Europe: Muslims of Macedonia (Athens: cedime-se, 2000). Macedonia 403 graduate each year. In 2009, the Ministry of Education and Science announced that Isa Bey Madrasa would become a publicly funded school under the Ministry of Education. The school would then receive funding from the state budget, in addition to donations from other sources. The changes also foresaw alterations to the curriculum, including the introduction of a large number of non-religious courses. However, until the end of 2013, the announced changes had not occurred in practice. No public information is available on the reasons for the delay. Muslim children aged 6–15 are sent to mosques or maktabs (facilities adjacent to mosques) to study the Qur’an and basic Islamic teaching as an extra- curricular voluntary activity.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The main higher Islamic educational institution is the Skopje-based Faculty of Islamic Sciences (Kondovo, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia, http://www.fshi.edu. mk), established in 1997 by the ircm. In 2008, the Parliament enacted a law on higher education institutions of religious communities, providing for the Faculty of Islamic Sciences to be changed from a private institution to a private-public non-profit educational institution. The Faculty is expected to receive funding from the state in the future, in addition to donations from other sources. However, the changes have been delayed for unknown reasons. Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East in non-theological universities or faculties are provided on an ad hoc basis. In the 2009–2010 academic year, the State University of Tetovo launched a degree course in ‘Orientalism’, with courses offered on the history, culture and literature of Islam as well as on Arab and Turkish language and literature. With the current number of students of more than 100, its first graduates are expected to complete their studies in the 2012–2013 academic year.10 Imams receive their formal education from Isa Bey Madrasa, the Faculty of Islamic Sciences or from abroad (mainly Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and earlier Syria).

10 Interview with Adnan Ismaili, Head of Orientalism department at the State University of Tetovo, 12 June 2012. 404 JAHJA

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have separate cemeteries in each town where they live. Most Muslim cemeteries were historically located next to mosques, but cemeteries have increasingly been established away from mosques as space has become limited. Special plots have been allocated for this purpose by Muslims themselves as waqf. Muslim Roma tend to use separate Roma Muslim cemeteries for burial. As the Muslim community grows, a need has arisen for new separate Muslim cemeteries around the country.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no permanent imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals. However, as purpose-built mosques (masjid) continue to be constructed in a number of places, including in hospitals and penitentiary institutions, imams are appointed on an ad-hoc basis. Though provided for by legislation, there has been no practice of chaplaincy involving any of the religions in the country.

9 Religious Festivals

There are annual ʿId al-Fitr (ramazan bayram) and ʿId al-Adha (qurban bayram) celebrations in towns with significant Muslim presence, such as Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Kumanovo, with the main celebration event happening in the capital Skopje. The first day of ʿId al-Fitr is an official public holiday and the first day of ʿId al-Adha is an official holiday for Muslims only. Bayram prayers are attended by the large majority of Muslims and are open to the public. In recent years, they have been attended by the President or the Prime Minister (who are as a rule Orthodox Christians), a practice launched following 2001. ʿId al-Adha is celebrated around the country with thousands of Muslims attending qurban rites. Other festivals include the first day of Ramadan, the Mi‘raj Night, the Birthday of the Prophet, and the Day of Hijra.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

No specifically halal abattoirs have yet been opened, but a number of slaughter houses and local butchers do produce halal meat. Frozen halal poultry is Macedonia 405 available in several supermarkets, mainly imported from Brazil and Slovenia. Individual Muslims sometimes perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers. A number of restaurants owned by Muslims sell halal food using the meat of animals they slaughter themselves. In 2009, the ircm signed an agreement with the Bosnian Agency for Certification of Halal Quality (http://www.halal.ba) for the establishment of a unit within the ircm that will issue halal certificates to companies producing halal food. Halal certificates started to be issued in 2010.11 Only those companies that have implemented haccp (Hazard analysis and critical control point) system in their chain of production are certified by the new system. Major export-oriented Macedonian companies have been awarded a halal certificate. Companies are implementing the halal standard voluntarily, being driven exclusively by their commercial interest. Generally speaking, consumer awareness of halal obligations is low, however awareness on the part of the producers has been increasing and as a result consultancy companies have emerged that offer services to producers on how to set up production systems that meet halal requirements. The Ministry of Economy has allocated subsidies for technical assistance to the enterprises that wish to introduce the halal standard. Travelling to Mecca and Madina for hajj is common practice among Muslims, but mainly among the older part of the population. Travel for hajj is organised by the ircm through air and ground transportation, the latter of which is organised by local travel agencies with visas facilitated by the ircm. There is no Islamic banking or Islamic financial institution in the country as national legislation does not allow it.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Neither are there rules against the wearing of hijab for photographs for id cards. Approximately half of Muslim women, mainly the older generation, regularly wear hijab in public, while the rest wear it mainly when attending prayers or funerals. A few Muslim women in Skopje wear niqab.

11 Interview with representatives of the ircm, Skopje, December 2010. 406 JAHJA

12 Publications and Media

The main Islamic periodical is the monthly El Hilal (Hena e re in Albanian), published in Albanian (formerly also in Macedonian and Turkish) by the ircm. Its main focus is on Islamic religion and monthly Ikre published by students of Isa Bey Madrasa. The mainstream Albanian-language print media (such as the dailies Koha (www.koha.com.mk), Lajm (www.lajmpress.com), Zhurnal (www. zhurnal.mk) and the monthly Shenja (www.shenja,mk), and electronic media (such as Almakos, www.almakos.com) occasionally include news on religion, particularly in the month of Ramadan or at the time of other Muslim festivals. Zaman Macedonia, part of the Zaman daily published in Turkey and associated with the Gülen Movement, publishes a weekly local newspaper in both Albanian and Turkish and regularly includes articles on religion. Websites such as www.bif.mk (administered by the ircm), http://www.fri. org.mk (administered by the Islamic Youth Forum) and http://www.makislam. info are the main websites maintained by Muslims in Macedonia both for the Muslim public and for interested non-Muslims. The main media outlets owned by Muslims and dedicated to general daily political issues include AlsatM tv, era tv and tv2 Macedonian National Television, the state-owned public service broadcaster. These and other outlets do produce religious programmes, particularly during the holidays. The public service broadcaster transmits live the annual ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha celebrations.

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques or muftiates. However, the mosque or mufti certificate is not an official document; the marriage must be registered with a municipal civil registry office. Muslims continue to conduct nikah (religious marriage contract) under the supervision of an imam, with two witnesses from the family and setting of the amount of mahr (dowry) before proceeding to sign a civil marriage contract at a municipal registry office. Inheritance practices among Macedonia’s Muslims favour men over women. Inheritance is not usually apportioned according to Islamic rules, although some Muslims try to do so. Such arrangements are not recognised by the courts. The legal system is entirely secular and affiliation to any creed is irrelevant in legal matters. Macedonia 407

14 Inter-religious Relations

The Macedonian Parliament has a Committee for Inter-Community Relations consisting of nineteen mps, of whom seven members are from the ranks of the Macedonian (Orthodox Christians), and another seven from the Albanian (Muslims) mps, and one member each from the Turks (Muslims), Vlachs (Orthodox Christians), Roma (Muslims), Serbs (Orthodox Christians) and Bosniaks (Muslims). The Parliament elects the members of the Committee, which considers and assesses issues in inter-community relations in the Republic and makes proposals for their solution. The Parliament is obliged to take the Committee’s assessments and proposals into consideration and to make decisions regarding them. Similar committees also exist at the municipal assembly level. In 2013 a ‘Map of Religious Facilities in Macedonia’ was published as well as a book ‘Religion and Culture—inextricable tie between peoples.’ The edition comprises the most important speeches from the Second World Conference on Inter-Religious and Inter-Civilisation Dialogue held in Ohrid in 2010. During 2013, inter-religious relations were marred by school and bus fights among pupils belonging to opposing religions, long-lasting problems with the restitution of religious properties and controversies with regards to building of church in Oktisi and mosques in Prilep and Lazhec as well as a discussion on turning Yeni mosque in Bitola into a museum. Also, the year marked an attack on Nerezi mosque in Skopje and an attack on an imam in Vasilevo.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Citizens of Macedonia are the most religious nation in Europe, according to a global survey conducted by Gallup in 2012 with 90% of the respondents saying they are religious.12 The repercussions of the statement of the head of the ircm of 28 November 2012 that “uniting Albanian territories is God’s wish” continued into 2013. The ircm boycotted the Parliamentary session in which the President of the country delivered his annual address, complaining that the government favoured the Orthodox Church. The ircm also boycotted the Third World Conference on Inter-Religious and Inter-Civilisation Dialogue, referring to its struggles with the state authorities about the reconstruction of an old mosque—

12 mina, Gallup International: Macedonians most religious in Europe?, 30 July 2012. 408 JAHJA

Burmali mosque—in the centre of Skopje, a parcel which has been allocated for construction of a Home for Officers and a hotel, and the return of formerly confiscated real estate. The Coordinative Council for Construction of Burmali mosque reacted against the start of the construction of the Home of Officers and a hotel on the plot which used to belong to Burmali mosque, demolished during Communist times. The ircm has also criticised the construction of Theology Faculty and of St. Clement Church on waqf properties in Ohrid. Another issue has been an initiative by the State Commission for Interreligious Relations and Religious Groups for lowering the sound volume of adhan (call for prayer in the mosques), an initiative which was commented on by the ircm as a manipulation of the beliefs of the people.13

16 Major Cultural Events

There are several ethnic cultural events, but no specifically Islamic cultural events, apart from Nawruz, which is celebrated by the Bektashis. Another major cultural event is Hidrelez, a celebration of spring on 6 May by various ethnic and religious groups, including Muslims.

13 Alsat M, 30 September 2013. Malta

Martin R. Zammit*

1 Muslim Populations

The National Statistics Office (nso) of Malta has never conducted a census that would record the numbers of Muslims in Malta.1 The Imam of Malta’s main mosque (Islamic Centre, Corradino Rd., Paola), Sheikh Muhammad el- Sadi estimates that there are about 6,000 Muslims in Malta, which is 1.44% of the total population of 417,617.2 The majority are Libyan Sunnis, while most of the rest hail from North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. A number of Lebanese and Iraqi Shiʿis worship with the Sunnis at the mosque of the Islamic Centre (Corradino Hill, Paola). Around 2,500 Muslims hold Maltese citizenship. Imam el-Sadi reports that about 500 native Maltese have converted to Islam. Islam reached Malta in 870 ce with the Aghlabid occupation of Malta. Under Norman rule (1091–1194), Muslims co-existed peacefully with the other inhabitants. According to the report of the Royal Administrator Giliberto Abate (c. 1241 ce), out of a total of 1,119 households in the Maltese archipelago, made up, most probably, of crown serfs, 836 (75%) were Muslim (681 in Malta, and 155 in Gozo).3 The Muslims were expelled by the Hohenstaufen King Frederick ii of Sicily sometime before 1250. During the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Islam was practised in Malta by Muslim slaves captured during maritime raids. In modern times, Islam returned to Malta during the 1970s, with the establishment of close political and economic relations with the Arab world, particularly Libya. Apart from being the religion of regular residents from North Africa and the Middle East, Islam is also the religion of a number of illegal migrants staying at various detention and open centres. Although retaining their ethnic and cultural identities, Malta’s Muslims generally integrate well into the Maltese social context. They live in various towns and cities on the

* Dr Martin R. Zammit is a senior lecturer in the Department of Oriental Studies, University of Malta. 1 The inhabited islands of the Maltese archipelago (315.2km2) are Malta, Gozo, and Comino. Source: National Statistics Office, Valletta, Malta. 2 nso figures from the Demographic Review 2010. Valletta, National Statistics Office, 2011. See: www.nso.gov.mt/statdoc/document_file.aspx?id=3173, page 4, accessed 21 January 2013. 3 Dalli, Charles, Malta. The Medieval Millennium, (Malta: Midsea Books Ltd), p. 111.

2 Islam and the State

Malta’s Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state, but provides for religious freedom.4 The main Imam of the Islamic Centre is appointed by the World Islamic Call Society (wics) (see below, section 3) and his appointment is endorsed by the Maltese state. He enjoys substantial autonomy in the local affairs of his community, and he is the official point of contact between the Muslim community and the Maltese administration. In accordance with a protocol between the wics and the government of Malta, the Islamic Centre and its officials enjoy diplomatic immunity. The imam maintains good relations with state and religious authorities, and has regular access to them. Nevertheless, Islam is not recognised by law, and so the Islamic Centre does not receive any state funds, nor do Muslims enjoy any educational, cultural, or social privileges.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

In 1984, the World Islamic Call Society (wics) in Tripoli, Libya, established the Islamic Centre (Islamic Centre, Corradino Rd., Paola pla 9037, Malta, tel.: ++356 21697203, fax: ++356 21697574, e-mail: [email protected]). The Centre aims at providing services for the Muslim community, acquainting the Maltese public with Islam, and fostering interfaith dialogue. It provides religious services in the mosque (which has an area of 225m2 and space for about 500 worshippers), organises seminars and meetings on interfaith dialogue, offers Arabic and English language courses, conducts marriages, assists the poor and needy (including prisoners and refugees), and arranges for the burial of the dead. Apart from the mosque, the Centre includes a conference hall, a library, offices, a playground, and the imam’s residence. The Centre arranges translation and publication of religious literature, organises journeys to Mecca for the hajj, and promotes a number of cultural and social activities, particularly during the month of Ramadan. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat is also represented in Malta. The president of the Malta branch is Mr Laiq Ahmad Atif ([email protected]; www .ahmadija.org.mt).

4 About 95% of the Maltese are Roman Catholics. Malta 411

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Apart from the central mosque at Paola, which is regularly frequented by both local and foreign Muslims, including students, Muslims use other places of worship in the following localities: Birkirkara, Buġibba, Għaxaq, Ħal Far, Il-Marsa, l-Imsida, Tal-Pieta’, San Ġwann, and Żurrieq. The Mater Dei General Hospital, apart from a chapel for Catholic services, also includes a prayer room for other communities.

5 Children’s Education

Whereas Roman Catholic religious education in state schools is guaranteed, neither state nor private schools include Islam in their curriculum. Muslim students who do not wish to attend Catholic religious education classes may take alternative subjects. This situation has prompted local Muslims to establish the Mariam Albatool School. In 1997, the Mariam Albatool School (www. mariamalbatoolschool.com) was established within the Islamic Centre’s pre- cincts at Corradino Hill, Paola. A board of volunteer trustees administers the school, which operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels under Ministry of Education licenses (1998 and 2007). While following the Maltese national curriculum, the school also offers Islamic courses. The school accepts students from all national, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The number of registered students during the year 2013 reached 360, mostly Maltese nationals. The school employs 50 members of staff, mostly Maltese Catholics. It operates both on state funding, which amounts to 300,000 Euros per annum, as well as on donations. The school is constantly expanding and additional facilities will be developed on land adjacent to the Islamic Centre. In addition, the Libyan Education authorities are responsible for the Libyan School at Ta’ Giorni, St Julians. This school is open to Arab students, all of whom are Muslims, and follows the Libyan educational curriculum. Tuition is in Arabic. Moreover, the Libyan authorities are also responsible for the Ta’ Giorni Higher Vocational Institute.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Department of Oriental Studies in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Malta runs academic courses on Islam and the Near East, including, among others, ba, ma and PhD level programmes in Arabic and in Near Eastern Studies. Courses covering Islamic philosophy are also offered at the Faculty 412 ZAMMIT of Theology. Both the Islamic Centre and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat have donated books to the University library. Malta was one of the first countries to offer university scholarships to Palestinian students, and the University of Malta offers mentoring services to Arab students. There is no institution for imam training in Malta. The official imam serving at the Islamic Centre (Corradino Hill, Paola) has received his formal education abroad. It is unlikely that the need for local imam training will arise in the near future.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1874, a Muslim cemetery was built in the town of Marsa at the expense of the Ottoman government—hence its appellation ‘the Turkish cemetery’. It replaced an older Muslim burial ground and is a fine example of Moorish architecture. Till the 1970s, in the absence of any mosque, the Turkish cemetery was also used for Friday prayers. Between 1996 and 2006, a number of Muslim burials took place at the Maria Addolorata Catholic cemetery at Paola. Meanwhile, the Maltese government allocated a piece of land adjacent to the Islamic Centre in Paola to the wics for burial purposes. The land belongs to the Maltese state. The first burials took place there in 2007.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Maltese armed forces. Maltese prisons and illegal migrants’ detention centres have spaces reserved for Muslim worship, and a space has been allocated for multifaith worship at the Mater Dei hospital. The imam of the Islamic Centre presides over prayers in Maltese prisons during the main feasts of the Muslim calendar.

9 Religious Festivals

ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha are celebrated both communally, at the Islamic Centre, and privately. Even though the state does not recognise Muslim festivities, iftar is often attended by senior officials of the Maltese government, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives of the Catholic Church and friends of the Muslim community. ʿId al-Adha is also attended by a substantial Malta 413 proportion of the Muslim community, and several dozen animals are slaughtered at the Maltese Civil Abattoir in Marsa. Three pilgrims from Malta performed the hajj in 2013.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Private halal slaughter is not allowed, and all slaughter of livestock takes place at the official Civil Abattoir. Slaughter at the Abattoir is in line with halal standards but members of the Muslim community are given access to the Abattoir to ascertain that these standards are maintained. Frozen halal meat and other halal foodstuffs are available in most supermarkets and shops. There are at least five halal butchers in Malta catering primarily to the Muslim community, and a local private company offers a variety of halal products. A local travel agent specialises in hajj travel. Islamic banking and finance are not yet available in Malta.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public. The same applies to pupils in local state and private schools. The hijab is worn quite commonly by Muslim women, including university students. There are also a few cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab. For identity purposes, in connection with the issue of identity cards and passports, women are required to uncover their hair, and the niqab is not permitted.

12 Publication and Media

The Islamic Centre regularly publishes books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic belief and practice, including a Maltese translation of the Qur’an.5 Moreover, it has regularly participated in the annual Malta Book Fair organised by the Ministry of Education and Culture. The Mariam Albatool School maintains its own website (www.mariamalbatoolschool.com), and so does the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Malta (http:// ahmadiyyamalta.org/).

5 Zammit, M.R. and M. el-Sadi, Il-Qoran Imqaddes (Tripoli: World Islamic Call Society, 2008). 414 ZAMMIT

The imam, members of his community, and the President of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues.

13 Family Law

On the basis of a special agreement between Malta and the wics, Muslims are allowed to contract Islamic marriages at the mosque of the Islamic Centre, although such marriages are not legally recognised. Subsequently, or sometimes alongside the signing of the Muslim contract, an official from the Marriage Registry administers the civil marriage. The Maltese state only recognises such civil marriage. Islamic divorce documents are not recognised either. With regard to inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved, and they may, on the basis of a will, choose to follow either Islamic law or the secular law of the state.

14 Interreligious Relations

Even though no official interreligious events with Muslim participation were held during 2013, the Islamic Centre is regularly engaged with other religious denominations, especially the Catholics, to promote harmonious relations and fruitful collaboration at all levels.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The local media sporadically cover the situation of Muslims in Malta. Such coverage is often triggered by immigration issues. Occasionally, local Muslims are approached to comment on Middle Eastern issues, or events involving Muslims worldwide. The relationship between the Maltese public and the Muslim community is, in general, unproblematic. Muslims enjoy a substantial degree of tolerance, without, however, being immune to some degree of negative prejudice and racism.6 Such sentiments tend to surface when Arabs are arraigned in court

6 According to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (eu-midis): Data in Focus Report 2: Muslims, published on 28 May 2009, 71% of young North and Sub-Saharan African Muslims in Malta feel discriminated against. The report states: “The high levels of Malta 415 on criminal charges, or when African, Arab or Asian illegal immigrants reach the Maltese islands on dilapidated boats, thus exacerbating an already critical situation at the various detention centres on the island. In general, the Maltese are uneasy with this situation, believing it to have potential negative long-term economic, social and cultural repercussions, especially in view of Malta’s limited size and resources.

16 Major Cultural Events

During the month of Ramadan, a number of cultural, sporting and social activities are usually organised at the Islamic Centre, from early evening till late at night, including talks on various topics given by local and foreign guest speakers, as well as poetry evenings, which are very much appreciated by the members of the Muslim community.

experienced discrimination should be nuanced as they affect primarily asylum seekers, who enter the country in disproportionate numbers to those in other Member States and to the size of the country’s population, as unhcr figures show” (p. 6). The survey can be accessed at: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/eu-midis/eumidis_muslims_en.htm. Moldova

Aurelia Felea*

1 Muslim Populations

The first encounters with exogenous Islamic factors probably took place as early as the 13th–14th centuries. While these encounters lasted for a number of centuries with variable intensity and in various forms, there are no historic Muslim communities and continuous Islamic tradition on the territory of the modern Republic of Moldova.1 The census carried out in Moldova 5–12 October 2004, recorded 3,383,332 inhabitants,2 of whom 3,158,015 people (or over 93% of the total population) declared themselves Orthodox Christians and 1,667 people (0.05%) declared that they were Muslims.3 Policies carried out by the government in the period from 2001 to 2009 in the sphere of identity building (in its ethnic, linguistic and religious aspects), as well as the involvement of the ideological factor in the process of accomplishing the census, has led to the increased questionability of the data published. The leadership of the Islamic community in Moldova states that there are 17,000–20,000 Muslims in the country, 4,000 of whom are Moldovan citizens.4 Muslims temporarily established in the country perform economical, commercial, cultural, diplomatic activities. Students from countries with a predominantly Muslim population study in Chișinău universities. Most foreign students are enrolled at the State University of Medicine and Pharmacy

* Aurelia Felea is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Sciences, State University of Tiraspol, Chişinău, Moldova. 1 A historical sketch on the topic is contained in the country reports (Compartment 1. Muslim Populations) included in volumes 2–4 of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, 2009–2011. 2 This report only contains information on the territories effectively controlled by the Government of the Republic of Moldova and does not refer to the situation in the separatist region of Transnistria, including the city of Bender, unless specifically stated. 3 Recensământul populaţiei 2004, vol. i Caracteristici demografice, naţionale, lingvistice, culturale (Population Census. Demographic, National, Linguistic, Cultural Characteristics) (Chișinău: Tipografia Centrală, 2006), pp. 476–485. 4 The information on the Islamic community is preponderantly based on data of foreign diplomats on the citizens of their countries residing in the Republic of Moldova together with their families: personal interviews conducted by the author.

“Nicolae Testemițanu” and at the Free International University of Moldova (ulim).5 The State University of Medicine and Pharmacy has special representative offices for Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. Of those who graduate from higher educational institutions of Moldova, some, originating from conflict regions and/or married to Moldovan citizens, remain to live here and apply for Moldovan citizenship.6 In the period 2008–2011, asylum seekers in Moldova were from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Somalia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.7 Some of them expressed their intention to depart to other European countries since the local labour market offers them few chances of employment.8 As in the previous years, an influx of refugees from Syria, especially women and children, continued in 2013.9

5 “Diplomele ulim au fost recunoscute în Turcia” (ulim diplomas have been recognizsd in Turkey), 6 June 2013, available at http://timpul.md/articol/diplomele-ulim-au-fost-recunoscute-in-turcia-44480.html, accessed 13 January 2014. 6 Ungureanu, Irina, “Syrian refugee jumps for joy after finding asylum in Moldova,” 19 November 2012, available at www.unhcr.org/50a9f6f56.html, accessed 1 February 2014; Hadei, Vitalie, “Turcul îndrăgostit de Moldova. Șerif Șimșek locuiește de 15 ani în Republica Moldova, le predă copiilor moldoveni și este decis să rămână definitiv la Chișinău. Dacă ar avea cetățenia rm . . .” (The Turk in love with Moldova. Șerif Șimșek has been living for 15 years in the Republic of Moldova, teaches Moldovan children and is ready to stay for good in Chisinau. If he had Moldovan citizenship . . .), Jurnal de Chișinău, no. 7 (1216), 1 February 2013, p. 3. 7 “Asylum statistics 2008–2011”, available at http://md.unhcr.org.ua/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=242&Itemid=254&lang=ro, accessed 1 February 2014. 8 Obreja, Diana, “Salim ar vrea să rămână în Moldova, dar crede că nu prea are aici perspective. El spune că doreşte să plece cât mai degrabă în altă ţară din Europa” (Salim would like to stay in Moldova, but he doesn’t think he has many prospects here. He says he wishes to depart to another country in Europe as soon as possible): available at http://societateapentrurefugiati. blogspot.com/2012/03/salim-ar-vrea-sa-ramina-in-moldova-dar.html, accessed 7 February 2013. 9 For example, the Moldovan Lucia Marin and her 4 children (three schoolchildren and one pre-school) are Muslim refugees from Syria who came for an indefinite period of time to the woman’s native village. The (re)adaption to the Moldovan socio-cultural (linguistic, religious) realities seems to be difficult: Cupcea, Polina, “Din războiul sirian—la luptă în Moldova” (From the Syrian war to struggle in Moldova), 14 February 2013, available at www. zdg.md/social/din-razboiul-sirian-la-lupta-in-moldova, accessed 14 January 2014. 418 felea

2 Islam and the State

The Republic of Moldova is a secular state with no state religion. The most important laws regarding religion and confessional liberty are the following: the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, adopted by the Parliament on 29 July 1994;10 the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and People Lacking Citizenship in the Republic of Moldova;11 the Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organisations;12 the Law on the Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion.13 The Law Regarding Religions and their Component Parts, promulgated on 2 August 2007, was amended by Parliament on 27 December 2011 and renamed the Law on the Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion. In the new edition, the procedure to register religions and their component parts, warning procedures and suspension of their activities was clarified. Registration provides confessional groups with equal status, including permission to: acquire property; open bank accounts; receive, as legal entities, donations from physical and legal entities from within the country and from abroad; hire employees; and obtain authorisations for the building of religious institutions and places of worship. Since October 2007, the registration of religious organisations is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. Confessions were requested to refrain from publicly expressing or manifesting their political preferences (Art. 15.2); campaigning for the elections and/or financial or material support for electoral competitors may lead to the suspension of the group’s activity (Art. 24.2f). The law maintained the provision that “the state admits the particular importance and primordial role of the Christian-Orthodox religion

10 “Constituţia Republicii Moldova” (Constitution of the Republic of Moldova), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 1, 18 August 1994, pp. 5–32. 11 “Lege nr. 275-xiii din 10.11.94 cu privire la statutul juridic al cetăţenilor străini şi al apatriz- ilor în Republica Moldova”, modificată în 1998–2008 (Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and of People Lacking Citizenship in the Republic of Moldova No. 275-xiii of 10 November 1994, with amendments adopted in the 1998–2008 period), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 20, 29 December 1994, pp. 13–14. 12 “Lege nr. 382-xv din 19.07.2001 cu privire la drepturile persoanelor aparţinând minorităţilor naţionale şi la statutul juridic al organizaţiilor lor” (Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organisations No. 382-xv of 19 July 2001), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 107 (831), 4 September 2001, pp. 16–18. 13 “Lege nr. 125-xvi din 11.05.2007 privind libertatea de conştiinţă, de gândire şi de religie”, modificată la 27.12.11 (Law regarding the liberty of conscience, thought and religion, no. 125 of 11 May 2007 amended on 27 December 2011), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 127–130 (3014–3017), 17 August 2007, pp. 8–12. Moldova 419 and respectively the Orthodox Church of Moldova in the life, history and culture of the Republic of Moldova” (Art. 15.5). National religious leaders must be citizens of the Republic of Moldova. Although the legislation confirms equal rights before the law and public authorities as well as the forbidding of confessional discrimination, in practice deviations from these provisions are noted. After years of rejection, on 14 March 2011, the Ministry of Justice officially registered the first Muslim organisation—the Islamic League of the Republic of Moldova (Mufti: Sergiu Sochirca).14 On its Facebook page, the League calls itself “the sole representative of Muslims in the country”.15 The separatist authorities of Transnistria do not recognise the legal status of Islam which it has in other regions of the country. According to the data of the Islamic League, its branch, the Muslim community in the city of Tighina, is composed of ethnic Tatars and Azeris (about 20 people come to study the Qur’an here); the majority are elderly people. The group has performed religious activities for about ten years. In March–April 2013, the Islamic community from Tighina was subjected to some harassment and, subsequently, to check-ups by police and security forces loyal to the separatist Tiraspol regime. The latter took away all the Islamic literature and technical equipment (com- puters) from the community premises.16

14 See http://rson.justice.md/organization/view/5928, accessed 17 February 2014. 15 For a more detailed description of the social context in which the official registration of the Islamic League in the Republic of Moldova and of the occasional celebrations of the event took place, as well as a review of the stated objectives of the League, see the country reports included in volumes 4 and 5 of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, 2011– 2012. See also Popescu, Nicu, “Despre islam, biserică şi guvern . . .” (About Islam, Church, and Government . . .), 23 August 2011, available at http://timpul.md/articol/despre-islam- biserica-si-guvern-23687.html; “Mitropolia Moldovei cere anularea deciziei de înregis- trare a islamului” (Moldovan Metropolitan demands the annulment of Islam registration), 25 May 2011, available at http://timpul.md/articol/mitropolia-moldovei-cere-anularea- deciziei-de-inregistrare-a-islamului-23615.html, accessed 13 January 2014; “Voronin împotriva înregistrării Islamului în Moldova” (Voronin against the registration of Islam in Moldova), available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=e41Mu8wcs_M; “Мусульмане в Молдове” (Muslims in Moldova), available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQU2qgpjz9w, accessed 11 February 2014. 16 See the biased interpretation of some Transnistrian sources: http://rupor-pmr.ru/ news/kriminal-i-proisshestviya/v-parkanah-deystvuet-podpolnaya-mechet, accessed 10 February 2014, and anti-Islamic attitudes in Tiraspol: “О роли радикального ислама в современном мире говорили в ПГУ” (On the role of radical Islam in the modern world was spoken at Transnistrian State University), available at www.youtube.com/ watch?v=nsEtk4Mn7-Q, accessed 28 January 2014. 420 felea

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic League of the Republic of Moldova is the only organisation recognised by the state as a Muslim confessional entity (Mesager street 9, Chişinău md-2009, tel.: ++373 079420046, 079721621, email: [email protected], www.ligaislam.md). Another Muslim community named “Grădinile liniștii” (The Gardens of Peace) (leader: Talgat Mașaev) has public organisation status (Rezeni 1, Ialoveni md-7727, tel.: ++373 79156707, www.islamvmoldove.com). On 29 November 2010, the Ministry of Justice registered a public association “Liga Femeilor Musulmane din Moldova” (the League of Muslim Women in the Republic of Moldova, led by Natalia Tcacenco, Nicolae Sulac street 4/18, Chişinău md 2075). Azeris, Tajiks, Tatars, Turks, Turkmens and Uzbeks, have all established their ethno-cultural communities which claim a common background of Islamic cultural traditions. Most of these organisations are small and have no websites, but many can be contacted via the Bureau for Interethnic Relations (Alexei Mateevici street 109/1, Chişinău md-2009, tel.: ++373 22240385, email: [email protected], www.bri.gov.md).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The only institution functioning on the basis of legal status of the Islamic religion is the mosque of the Islamic League of the Republic of Moldova, built after the official registration of this religious entity. The Gardens of Peace organisation has a more modest location, rented in the area of the Chişinău railway station. Both places host numerous religious activities. Religious service is carried out in them, including the collective prayer on Friday, while on Saturday and Sunday, women take classes of Arabic and teachings of Islam. The mosques are attended by Moldovan and foreign citizens. In the capital and outside Chişinău (particularly in Tighina/Bender) there are a few prayer houses. A group of Turkish citizens have their own centre of religious communication and socialisation.

5 Children’s Education

According to the Moldovan Constitution, state education is secular (Art. 35.8). The Law Regarding Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion stipulates: Moldova 421

“Moral-religious education in state schools of all levels is optional except for the cases stipulated in agreements and conventions on cooperation between the state and religions” (Art. 32.7). On 2 July 2010, following some months of discussion, the government issued Decision Nr. 596, stipulating the inclusion of the subject Religion in the school schedule of primary and secondary education institutions (grades 1 to 9), beginning on 1 September 2010. The course is taught optionally, based on the request of parents or legal guardians of the children if the students wish to study religion.17 Children of Muslim families can acquire basic knowledge of Islam at special meetings organised every Saturday and Sunday, at the premises of Muslim religious and public organisations. Islamic organisations offer children and adults courses of “Arabic literary language, reading and speaking.” On 4 May 2013, the Islamic League organised a competition on the knowledge of Qur’anic teachings among children, and on 7 May, an entertainment day for children and parents at Orheiul Vechi. In recent years, Muslim children have, together with the adults, attended summer camps organised in the country and abroad (in Ukraine), for recreation and to study the teachings of Islam. In the period 12–18 August 2013, the Islamic League in collaboration with the Muslim Women’s League organised a summer school for children at the premises of the mosque.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

There are no Islamic theological institutes in Moldova. History, foreign languages, political science and international relations departments of universities offer courses on the Arab civilisation, the past and the present of countries located in the cultural perimeter of Islam. From time to time, these institutions organise courses of modern Arabic and Turkish languages. The representative of the Islamic League participated in the seminar-training of imams and Islamic activists organised by the osce and dedicated to the issues of criminality based on hatred towards Muslims which took place in November 2013 in Warsaw. An event on a similar topic, in which women participated, was held at the mosque of the Islamic League.

17 Barbăroşie, Liliana, “Interviul dimineţii cu vice-ministrul Tatiana Potâng despre studiul religiei în şcoli” (Interviu with Deputy Minister Tatiana Potang on the study of religion in schools), available at www.europalibera.org/content/article/24700569.html; www .europalibera.org/audio/audio/369612.html, accessed 17 February 2014. 422 felea

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The procedures for creating, maintaining and closing cemeteries are laid out in the government’s Regulation on Cemeteries.18 The regulation on cemeteries stipulates the right of every citizen of the Republic of Moldova to burial and preservation of the grave, according to the traditions of their people. The leg- islature decided, on 27 December 2011, to supplement the Law Regarding the Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion with the following provision: “Religious groups and their component parts have the right to carry out their funerary ceremonies according to characteristic teachings” (Art. 14.3). There are no separate Islamic cemeteries in the country. Muslim dead are usually buried in Orthodox Christian cemeteries. In the cemetery of St. Lazarus, the biggest in the capital of the country, there is a section designated for Muslims, however, it is almost full. The leaders of the Muslim League have raised the issue that the authorities grant a plot to the Muslim community to create its own cemetery in Chisinau.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The Law Regarding Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion establishes the right of religious communities to perform religious service in orphanages, placement centres for children, boarding homes, homes for the elderly and the disabled persons, penitentiaries, military institutions, medical institutions, education institutions, police stations and other institutions, at the request of the people located there and with authorisation from the administration of the respective institutions (Art. 26.2). Inmates at the country’s prisons sometimes contact Muslim organisations, through friends or family, for books and worship-dedicated objects such as carpets19 but there is no permanent Muslim chaplain at any of these institutions.

18 “Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 1072 din 22.10.1998 despre aprobarea Regulamentului cu privire la cimitire” (Government Decision no. 1072 of 22 October 1998 regarding the approval of the Regulations on cemeteries), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 100–102 (373–375), 12 November 1998, pp. 47–50. 19 Personal interviews conducted by the author. Moldova 423

9 Religious Festivals

In the last two years, Ramazan Bayram (ʿId al-Fitr) and iftar dinner were both widely attended at the Islamic League’s headquarters.20 The Embassy of Azerbaijan and the Azeri Congress carried out charitable activities dedicated to Kurban Bayram holiday at a nursing home in the town of Strășeni. In addition, in 2013, the Azeri diplomatic representation offered a charity luncheon for the elderly.21 Animal sacrifices take place during celebration of ʿId al-Adha by various Muslim groups and some of the meat is donated to the poor. Saudi Arabian authorities have offered to send invitations to Muslims from Moldova to perform hajj and to contribute to iftar in the month of Ramadan. In the autumn of 2013, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates financed the participation of three members of the Islamic League from Moldova on hajj.22

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Oriental restaurants offering halal dishes have been operating in Moldova for a long time. It is also known that the people who arrived from Muslim countries to Moldova after the proclamation of its independence bought animals from peasants, especially on the occasion of Islamic holidays. The animals were sacrificed according to their religious canons directly at the premises of the households providing the animal.23 Currently, halal meat is sold in supermarkets and specialised shops. Halal meat is also imported by commercial businesses. Lately, the Moldovan producers became more active too. They show an interest in the local market but also in exports oriented to the former Soviet

20 Moments of the celebration of ʿId al-Fitr can be seen at www.youtube.com/ watch?v=GP4YI4dzpVU and www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVlZmCWxHkA, accessed 28 January 2014. 21 “Caritate în cinstea sărbătorii Kurban Bayram” (Charity to honour the Kurban Bayram holiday), 17 October 2013, available at www.noi.md/md/news_id/29691, accessed 15 January 2014. 22 Eduard Cărăuş interviewed by Tamara Grejdeanu: “Nădejdea fiecăruia care pleacă în pelerinaj este să i se ierte păcatele” (Every pilgrim hopes, by going on his pilgrimage, to have his sins forgiven), available at www.europalibera.org/content/article/25139968.html, accessed 17 February 2014. 23 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 424 felea territories and the Middle East.24 The Islamic League has recently announced on its Facebook page that it has signed a contract with a firm which will slaughter cattle according to Islamic canons and will deliver the meat to the supermarkets in Chișinău.

11 Dress Codes

Women wearing hijab can sometimes be observed in public places. The law does not stipulate special photographs for the documentation of women who do not want to remove the Islamic veil. Muslim women also have the option of being photographed at the office for the documentation of the population by a female photographer. There are no legal restrictions referring to religious clothing in public places. Wearing the Islamic head scarf at the place of work does not cause controversy. However, banks appear to be strongly opposed to the wearing of hijab, although it is allowed for women working in other places, even if they teach at universities.25

12 Publications and Media

The Law Regarding Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion gives religious groups the exclusive right to create mass media for their adherents, to publish, purchase, import, export and spread religious literature (Art. 29.a). During almost two decades, printed materials for the propagation of the Islamic religion were brought to Moldova, including to the National Library, as purchases or donations from Romania, Ukraine and Russia. Due to the fact that the legal framework allows registered religions access to public broadcasting of the essentials of their beliefs, in 2013, the Islamic League sponsored the publication of Islamic literature in Romanian and Russian. The League also uses media resources dedicated to Islam outside the country.26

24 See “Arabii renunţă la oile georgiene în favoarea celor moldoveneşti” (Arabs give up Georgian sheep in the favour of Moldovan ones), 19 November 2013, available at http://timpul.md/articol/arabii-renuna-la-oile-georgiene-in-favoarea-celor-moldove- neti--51330.html, accessed 13 January 2014. Personal interviews conducted by the author. 25 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 26 See www.whyislam.ru/ and http://golosislama.ru/page.php?id=1, accessed 10 February 2014. Moldova 425

13 Family Law

The Family Code, adopted by the Parliament on 26 October 2000,27 stipulates that to be legal, a marriage has to be performed according to the civil regulations (Art. 2.2). Religious weddings have no legal standing. Some Muslim men, most often foreign students, have officially married local women. Such married couples and their children usually eventually leave for the men’s countries of origin. However, there already are young families in which both Moldovan- born spouses and citizens of the country are Muslim converts, a situation that did not exist in the recent past.28 Unofficial data indicate that some marital arrangements take place inside the Islamic communities. On 14 April 2013, the Muslim Women’s League from Moldova held its annual conference on a topic dedicated to the family.

14 Interreligious Relations

The first law on religions of independent Moldova, adopted on 24 March 1992, established, as part of the Ministry of Culture and Religions, a body with consultative functions attended by representatives of every religion in the country; members of this council worked on a voluntary basis (Art. 17).29 The act concerning religion which has been in force since 2007 does not stipulate the activity of a similar structure. According to the Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organisations (Art. 25.2), there is a coordination council operating in the Bureau for Interethnic Relations as a consultative body, among whose members there are also leaders of ethno-cultural associations. Generally, discussions between confessions take place in exceptional situations. Most recently this happened on the occasion of the modification of the Law on Religions in 2011.

27 “Codul familiei nr. 1316-xiv din 26.10.2000” (The Family Code no. 1316-xiv of 26 October 2000), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 47–48 (771–772), 26 April 2001, pp. 4–25. 28 “Muslims in Moldova (Romanian language)”, available at www.youtube.com/ watch?v=3f-_44_fKIc and “Femei musulmane în Republica Moldova” (Muslim women in the Republic of Moldova), available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvjvEfaljvE, accessed 11 February 2014. 29 “Legea despre culte nr. 979-xii din 24.03.1992” (Law on cults, no. 979-xii of 24 March 1992), Monitor, no. 3 (1992), pp. 32–38, here: p. 34. 426 felea

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The public visibility of the people who practise Islam, whether citizens of the country or people temporarily found on its territory, has become more pronounced. A novel element of the last few years is the media coverage of cultural and charitable actions undertaken by Muslims from or in Moldova.30 In the majority of cases, the religious diversity is shown in a favourable light. ngos (Non-discrimination Coalition, Information Centre on Human Rights) which deal with the observance of fundamental human rights in Moldova reported cases of intolerance and violation of confessional freedom and thus increased public awareness.31 In 2013, the mass media covered the beginning and the end of Ramadan, the development and significance of this sacred period in the life of Muslims.32 The annual pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca and Medina and the feast of the Sacrifice were reflected in the newscasts, especially on television. Short but

30 “Caz unic: Cântă în stradă pentru a-i ajuta pe săraci” (A unique case: sing in the streets to help the poor), 25 October 2013, available at http://timpul.md/articol/canta-in-strada- pentru-a-i-ajuta-pe-saraci-50236.html, accessed 13 January 2014: it is about two Muslim children, sister and brother, whose father is originally from Saudi Arabia and the mother from Moldova. They earn money by beating a drum in the centre of Chisinau in order to receive money and donate it to the poor. “The strong connection to Muslim cultural values is due to the fact that once married the mother adopted the Islamic religion [. . .] Both Ali and Jasmine felt the discrimination on their own, but remain loyal to Islam.” See also “Caritate în cinstea sărbătorii Kurban Bayram” (Charity in honour of Kurban Bayram holiday), 17 October 2013, available at www.noi.md/md/news_id/29691, accessed 15 January 2014. The Islamic League organised an event for the collection of aid for refugees from Syria (27 December 2013–3 January 2014): see www.youtube.com/watch?v=kun_-MmW- MQs, accessed 28 January 2014. 31 See http://cido.org.md/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=65%3Areli gia-2011&catid=4%3Abiblioteca&Itemid=6&lang=ro, accessed 10 February 2014; “Se plâng că au fost îmbrânciţi şi insultaţi în plină stradă” (They complain of being pushed and insulted in open street), available at http://curaj.tv/reportaj/cetateni-sudanezi-atacati-in- plina-strada-la-chisinau/, accessed 23 January 2014. 32 “Musulmanii din întreaga lume încep astăzi luna Ramadanului” (The Muslims in the whole world begin Ramadan today), 9 July 2013, available at www.publika.md/musulmanii-din-intreaga-lume-incep-astazi-luna-ramadanului_1485161.html; “Musulmanii din întreaga lume marchează sfârşitul lunii Ramazan” (The Muslims in the whole world mark the end of Ramadan), 8 August 2013, available at www.publika.md/musulmanii- din-intreaga-lume-marcheaza-sfarsitul-lunii-ramazan_1529801.html, accessed 28 January 2014. Moldova 427 informative clips were presented on the number of participants, religious rituals, and security measures taken by the authorities of Saudi Arabia, etc.33 Information sources continue to be thoroughly interested in the evolution of European Islam, the observance of confessional rights, manifestations of xenophobia and Islamophobia on the continent,34 and Islam in the former Soviet territories.35 News from reputable agencies and pertinent political

33 “Milioane de oameni au început pelerinajul de la Mecca” (Millions of people began their pilgrimage to Mecca), 14 October 2013, available at www.publika.md/milioane-de- oameni-au-inceput-pelerinajul-de-la-mecca-video_1631851.html, accessed 28 January 2014; “Peste un milion şi jumătate de musulmani s-au adunat ca să-l ucidă pe Satana” (Over a million and a half Muslims gathered to kill Satan), 15 October 2013, available at www.publika.md/peste-un-milion-si-jumatate-de-musulmani-s-au-adunat-ca-sa-l- ucida-pe-satana_1633561.html; “Milioane de musulmani marchează a doua zi a Sărbătorii Sacrificiului” (Millions of Muslims mark the second day of Sacrifice Holiday), 16 October 2013, available at www.publika.md/milioane-de-musulmani-marcheaza-a-doua-zi-a- sarbatorii-sacrificiului_1635301.html, accessed 30 January 2014. 34 “Londra: A izbucnit ura islamofobă după uciderea unui militar” (London: Islamophobic hatred broke out after the killing of a soldier), 23 May 2013, available at www.jurnal. md/ro/news/londra-a-izbucnit-ura-islamofoba-dupa-uciderea-unui-militar-1151103/, accessed 12 January 2014; “Un protest faţă de influenţa islamului s-a lăsat cu ciocniri între manifestanţi şi poliţişti în Bristol” (A protest against the influence of Islam ended in clashes between the demonstrators and police in Bristol), 15 July 2012, available at www.publika.md/un-protest-fata-de-influenta-islamului-s-a-lasat-cu-ciocniri-intre- manifestanti-si-politisti-in-bristol_941971.html, accessed 28 January 2014; “Graffiti rasiste sau provocatoare pe pereţii a două moschei din Franţa” (Racist or challenging graffiti on the walls of two mosques in France), 4 February 2013, available at www .jurnal.md/ro/news/graffiti-rasiste-sau-provocatoare-pe-peretii-a-doua-moschei-din- franta-1042331/, accessed 14 January 2014; “Germania refuză să acorde dublă cetăţenie imigranţilor din afara ue” (Germany refuses to offer double citizenship to immigrants outside eu), 6 June 2013, available at http://timpul.md/articol/germania-refuza-sa- acorde-dubla-cetatenie-imigrantilor-din-afara-ue-44436.html; “18 ani de la masacrul de la Srebreniţa: Mii de musulmani comemorează victimele” (18 years since the Srebrenica massacre: Thousands of Muslims commemorate the victims), 1 July 2013, available at http://timpul.md/articol/18-ani-de-la-masacrul-de-la-srebrenita-mii-de-musulmani- comemoreaza-victimele-45684.html, accessed 13 January 2014. 35 “Jocurile Olimpice, ameninţate de terorişti” (Olympic Games threatened by terrorists), 4 July 2013, available at www.jurnal.md/ro/news/jocurile-olimpice-amenin-ate-de-terori- ti-1153321/, accessed 14 January 2014; “stratfor: Ruşii, tot mai puţini. Musulmanii din Rusia, tot mai mulţi” (stratfor: Fewer Russians, more and more Muslims from Russia), 10 August 2013, available at http://timpul.md/articol/stratfor-rusii-tot-mai-putini--musulmanii-din-rusia-tot-mai-multi--47016.html; “Tadjikistan. Liderul unui partid de opoziţie anchetat pentru poligamie” (Tajikistan. opposition party leader investigated for polyg- 428 felea analysis by foreign and local analysts was frequently broadcast in 2013. There have also been published texts on the most popular websites that induce racist attitudes, suggest the danger of Europe’s Islamisation, and as a consequence of losing the peculiarities of its civilisation.36

16 Major Cultural Events

Among the cultural events organised by ethnic and religious groups claiming an Islamic historical-cultural basis, several ought to be mentioned: Spring festival, Mother’s day, the National holiday of their birth country or their ancestors’ country.

amy), 13 May 2013, available at http://timpul.md/articol/%28tadjikistan%29-liderul-unui- partid-de-opoziie-anchetat-pentru-poligamie-43650.html, accessed 13 January 2014. 36 Furtună, Dorian, “Schimbarea la faţă a Europei” (The changing face of Europe), 14 August 2013, available at http://vox.publika.md/politica/schimbarea-la-fata-a-europei-504690. html, accessed 28 January 2014; Idem, “Expansiunea islamică în Europa” (Islamic expansion in Europe), 17 September 2013, available at http://vox.publika.md/politica/ expansiunea-islamica-in-europa-505887.html, accessed 30 January 2014. Montenegro

Sabina Pacariz*

1 Muslim Populations

The last official census1 of the population of Montenegro, conducted in 2011, provoked many reactions among the Muslims of the country and resulted in alteration of the official data in 2012. Namely, on 7 February 2012, monstat (Montenegrin Statistics Agency) published the final and official results of the census, whereby certain modalities according to which data was interpreted previously were now corrected by being represented as one total modality (the modalities of religion—‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ are now united in a single modality—‘Islamic’). Therefore, the results published in 2011 were considered as ‘preliminary,’ and the ones from 2012 are treated as ‘official.’ According to these official statistics, there were 118,477 (19.11%) people of Islamic religion in Montenegro at the time of the Census.2 In terms of ethnicity, Muslims self-identify, somewhat confusingly, as: Bosniaks (8.65%), Albanians (4.9%), Muslims3 (3.31%), Bosnians (0.068%) Bosniaks-Muslims (0.029%), Montenegrins-Muslims (0.028%), Gorani (0.031%), Muslims-Bosniaks (0,029%), Muslims-Montenegrins (0,041%) and Turks (0,016%). The Bosniak population is mostly concentrated in the north of the country, in the Sandzak region, although lately it has been gravitating towards the capital. The Albanians of Montenegro mostly live in the south-eastern part, neighbouring Albania, and around the capital, Podgorica. Those who identify as “Muslims” by nationality are present in the central and south-eastern part of

* Sabina Pacariz graduated from the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, Macedonia, Department of Interpreting of English and German languages. She did her M.A. studies at the Marmara University in Istanbul and is about to finish her Master thesis in the field of Migrations of Bosnians from Former Yugoslavia to Turkey in the period 1945–1974. She researches migration, identity and society. 1 www.monstat.org/cg/page.php?id=534&pageid=322 Official web page of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Montenegro. See Popisi/Popis stanovništva 2011/Tabela cg1. Stanovništvo prema starosti i nacionalnoj odnosno etničkoj pripadnosti, accessed 1 March 2012. 2 A more detailed account of the census issues is provided in the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 413. 3 Here national identity differs from religion. In Montenegrin practice, Muslims (with capital M) stands for nationality and ‘muslims’ for religion, a relic of Yugoslav practice.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_032 430 pacariz the country. The concept of “Muslim” by nationality was created in the times of Communist Yugoslavia to refer to all Muslims by religion who were living in the federal Yugoslav republics and recognised the Serbo-Croatian language of the time as their mother tongue. Muslims of Montenegro accepted Islam mostly during the period of Ottoman rule, although the earliest contact with Islam took place during the eighth and ninth centuries, with the arrival of Arab sailors trading on the Montenegrin coast. Islamisation reached its peak in the sixteenth century, in the period of the Ottoman Empire, when local people were converting to Islam in large numbers. It is generally accepted that the conversion of the son of the Montenegrin ruling dynasty Crnojevic especially contributed towards mass conversions.4 After the 1878 Berlin Congress,5 followed by the withdrawal of the Ottomans, local Muslims faced serious pressure from the new Montenegrin state, including forced assimilation, exodus and even persecution. After the Second World War, Montenegro became one of the six federal republics of Communist Yugoslavia. Taking the Communist ideology into consideration, it may be said that officially none of the represented religions was especially privileged. Still, in this period Muslims migrated out of the country in much larger numbers than other religious groups. Another very important period was the collapse of federal Yugoslavia, between 1991 and 1995, followed by much more strained relations between the various religious and ethnic groups, as well as nationalistic political propaganda. The Independence Day of Montenegro, 21 May 2006, bears special significance for the Muslim community of the country, marking a ‘new era.’ It is widely accepted that the majority of Muslims voted for independence and therefore significantly contributed towards gaining it.

4 In 1485, Ivan I Crnojevic sent his youngest son, Staniša, to Sultan Bayazid ii in Istanbul, as a guarantee of his loyalty. Ivan I Crnojevic remained to rule Zeta as an Ottoman vassal until 1490, while his son Stanisa, who through conversion became Skenderbeg, ruled as sanjak- bey of Skadar (part of Montenegro and neighbouring Skadar) from 1513 until 1528. See more in ‘Istorija Crne Gore’ (History of Montenegro), Živko M. Andrijašević and Šerbo Rastoder, (cicg: Podgorica, 2006), p. 40. 5 After the Berlin Congress of 1878, Montenegro held much less territory than it does today. With the Balkan war of 1912, one part of the Novi Pazar Sandžak was included in Montenegro (the cities of Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje, Berane, Mojkovac, Rozaje, Plav, Gusinje, Pec and Djakovica). See more in Istorija Crne Gore (History of Montenegro), Živko M. Andrijašević and Šerbo Rastoder, (cicg: Podgorica, 2006), p. 273. Montenegro 431

2 Islam and the State

According to Article 14 of the Montenegrin Constitution, religious communities are separate from the state and all of them enjoy equal rights and freedoms. The state is secular. Under the jurisdiction of the Commission for Religious Issues, which since 2012 has been a special department within the Montenegrin Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, finances are granted for specific projects of religious communities, although they are insufficient to meet the needs of the Islamic community. There are also certain tax reliefs that the state provides to religious communities in general. In terms of regulating the relations between Islam and the state, the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Montenegro and the Islamic Community in Montenegro, signed by Prime Minister Igor Luksic and head of the Islamic Community Reis Rifat Fejzic on 31 January 2012 is of major importance.6 This document, apart from regulating the relations of mutual interest, also establishes the position of adherents of Islam in Montenegro on a formal legal level.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

All Muslims of Montenegro are organised in a single Islamic Community of Montenegro (Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori, Ul. Gojka Radonjica br 54, pf 42, 81 000 Podgorica, tel.: ++382 20622408, fax: ++382 20623812, www.islam.org.me and, www.monteislam.com).7 The Islamic Community functions through its 14 regional branches. Its main administrative body is Mashihat (Mešihat Islamske zajednice). The head of the Islamic Community is the Chief Mufti (Reis) elected every six years. The current Chief Mufti is Rifat Fejzic, elected to that position for the first time in 2003 and re-elected in 2009.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The first mosque built on the Montenegrin territory was the Sailors’ Mosque in Ulcinj, constructed by African Arab sailors in the 14th century. It was

6 www.monteislam.com/novosti/islamska-zajednica-u-crnoj-gori-i-vlada-crne-gore- potpisale-ugovor-kojim-se-definise-uredenje-medusobnih-odnosa Official web page of the Islamic Community in Montenegro, accessed 28 January 2013. 7 The site was temporarily off-line at the time of going to press. 432 pacariz completely destroyed in 1931, but its reconstruction has been completed recently. The reconstructed Sailors’ Mosque was officially opened in June 2012.8 Most of the 162 mosques,9 out of which 90 were destroyed in the first half of the twentieth century, were built during the Ottoman rule. In the 1980s, mosques began to be rebuilt and 62 mosques had been renovated or newly built by 2013. Nowadays, there are 134 mosques and 4 masjids (mosques without minarets) on the territory of Montenegro. Of noticeable beauty is Hussein Pasha Mosque, built in 1569 in the city of Pljevlja; the biggest is Sultan Murat Mosque in Rožaje, rebuilt in 2008. A new mosque was built in 2013, in the village of Bioca, Municipality of Bijelo Polje, on the foundations of an old mosque, ruined 101 years ago (in 1912, during the Balkan Wars),10 with the support of the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (tika).11 Another important event in 2013 was that the Islamic Community of Montenegro was officially granted permanent ownership of two parcels of land in Podgorica (3,563 m2) and in Bijelo Polje (3,074 m2), previously designated for building central mosques in each city. The land in Podgorica was donated on behalf of the Municipality of the Capital City, while the one in Bijelo Polje was purchased with the joint resources of the Islamic Community and the Municipality of Bijelo Polje. The Islamic Community of Montenegro has also bought a house in the town of Herceg Novi and altered it into a masjid for the needs of organising the religious life of Muslims in the region of Boka Kotorska.

5 Children’s Education

The public education system of Montenegro does not allow for any religious education within schools. As far as the Muslim community is concerned, primary Islamic education is organised within mosques or mektebs12 where imams teach pupils who attend on a voluntary basis.

8 www.monteislam.com/novosti/svecano-otvorena-dzamija-pomoraca-u-ulcinju and www.pobjeda.me/2012/06/02/dzamija-pomoraca-na-pristanu-u-ulcinju-otvorena- poslije-osam-decenija/. 9 Agović, Bajro, Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori (Islamic Community in Montenegro), (Podgorica: Mešihat Islamske zajednice, 2007), p. 71. 10 Agović, Bajro, Dzamije u Crnoj Gori (Mosques in Montenegro), (Podgorica: Almanah 2001), p. 301. 11 www.monteislam.com/novosti/u-bioci-kod-bijelog-polja-svecano-otvorena-dzamija. 12 Mektebs represent various forms of educational activities, held within the mosque complex, which are aimed at teaching the religion of Islam. Montenegro 433

Secondary Islamic education is offered at Madrasa “Mehmed Fatih” in Podgorica, opened in 2008. It is the only Islamic secondary school in Montenegro. Similar to vocational schools, the Madrasa provides a curriculum that includes certain subjects taught in the state high schools, plus religious ones. Another important step forward regards the education of girls. In contrast to previous years, when secondary education was provided only for male students, the school year 2012/2013 saw the first female pupils (seven in total) enrolled for the first time in Madrasa “Mehmed Fatih” in Podgorica. During 2013, all the rough constructions works on the Female Madrasa and the Islamic Centre in Rozaje, and the Female Madrasa and the Islamic Cultural Centre Horizonti in Podgorica were completed. Their official opening ceremony is planned for 2014. On 12 June 2013, the foundations of the Female Madrasa in Ulcinj were laid.13 In June 2013, graduating students from the second generation of the Madrasa celebrated with a gala ceremony on 25 May 2013. Their high school diplomas were in principle recognised by the Montenegrin State University, which allowed them to enrol in higher education. By the official adoption of the amendments submitted in the Montenegrin Parliament by the mps of the parties ‘Bosnjacka stranka’ and ‘forca’ on 30 July 2013, the Madrasa became a part of the educational system of Montenegro and therefore has acquired a status equal with other high schools in Montenegro.14

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no institutions of higher and professional Islamic education. Imams in Montenegro are not obliged to obtain higher education, and few of the Madrasa graduates become imams. The imams who have gained higher education acquired their diplomas abroad, mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Turkey, or Egypt.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims of Montenegro generally practise traditional Islamic burial. In villages and towns where a Muslim population is present, separate Muslim cemeteries

13 www.monteislam.com/novosti/postavljen-kamen-temeljac-za-zensku-medresu-u-ulcinju. 14 www.bscg.me/saopstenja/amandmanima-bosnjacke-stranke-i-force-medresa-mehmed- fatih-uvrstena-u-vaspitno-obrazovni-sistem-crne-gore/. 434 pacariz are usually to be found. Only in bigger cities, where the interaction between the religious groups was much higher, and where religious identity was much less preserved, have Muslims been buried within the general city cemetery. Some graves have kept the traditional local features, typical for Muslim graves, while others have not.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Since 2011, an imam nominated by Mashihat has led the ʿId (Bayram) prayers in the state prison of Montenegro. After intensive negotiations between Mashihat of the Islamic Community and the Ministry of Justice of Montenegro, a nov- elty in the religious liberties was introduced in the prison in Spuz (ziks Spuz). Hence, on 1 November 2013, for the first time a Friday prayer was performed in ziks. It was led by Reis of the Islamic Community, Rifat Fejzic.15 Since then, in an adjusted masjid within the premises of ziks Spuz, the imam Amer Šukurica, designated by the Islamic Community, has been performing the Friday prayer. There are no ‘chaplaincies’ in other state institutions of Montenegro.

9 Religious Festivals

The state of Montenegro officially recognises two Muslim holidays—the two ʿIds / Bayrams. Muslim workers have the right to be absent from work for one day. On that occasion state officials usually publicly present congratulations to the Muslim population. In 2013, the ʿId al-Fitr prayer from Petnjica Mosque, municipality of Berane, and the ʿId al-Adha prayer from the mosque of Dinoša, municipality of Podgorica, were broadcast on the first channel of the Montenegrin National Television.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

There are two food companies in Montenegro that have officially acquired a halal food certificate. “Mesopromet Bijelo Polje” was the first one to gain it, followed by “Gradina Company” from Rozaje. Both companies are involved in the meat production industry. The concept of halal food was for the first

15 www.monteislam.com/novosti/po-prvi-put-klanjana-dzuma-namaz-u-ziks-u-u-spuzu. Montenegro 435 time officially recognised in state institutions in 2012, due to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Montenegro and the Islamic Community in Montenegro.16

11 Dress Codes

Montenegrin laws are not restrictive in any sense in terms of female dress code. The Montenegrin law on id documents allows citizens who wear a hat or a head scarf for national or religious reasons to have pictures in their id documents in such manner.17 Article 14 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Montenegro and the Islamic Community in Montenegro is relevant here, as according to it, “A believer who by nationality, religion or custom wears a cap or head covering as part of a clothing can have his/her picture taken with the cap or other head covering on and may not be discriminated against either directly or indirectly upon seeking employment or as an employee, or in proceedings before state bodies and while part of the educational system as a pupil and a student.”

12 Publications and Media

In previous years, the Islamic community of Montenegro was issuing a periodical named Elif. By an official decision of Mashihat of the Islamic Community, starting in January 2013, Elif was reformatted into a journal, printed in full colour and containing 74 pages of text written in Bosnian and Albanian. Four issues of Elif were published in 2013. Apart from its monthly, the Islamic Community has also published several books with religious content—originals and translations. Its website www. monteislam.com is of huge importance for the Muslim community, since it provides news and information on a regular basis. Since 2012, Islamic Radio “Radio Fatih” has been broadcasting programmes in two languages, Bosnian and Albanian. The radio signal covers the territory of Podgorica and its surroundings.

16 For a more detailed account, see Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 417. 17 Official Gazette of Montenegro—Službeni list Crne Gore no. 12/07. 436 pacariz

13 Family Law

Family matters are under the jurisdiction of civil courts. The state recognises only civil marriages. However, Muslims practise religious marriage ceremonies whereby mahr is fixed in the presence of an imam and relatives.

14 Interreligious Relations

On the occasion of the 1700th jubilee of the Edict of Milan, on 26 April 2013, a roundtable on Religious Freedom in Montenegro took place in Podgorica. Representatives of the Jewish Community, the Islamic Community, the Catholic Church, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as representatives from the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, members of the Montenegrin Academy of Arts and Sciences, the ngo sector and certain political parties participated in the discussions. This was the first event of its kind in Montenegro, covering relations between the state and the religious communities, as well as inter-religious relations, and tolerance and religious freedom, as basic human rights.18

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The controversial decision to honour the Association of War Volunteers 1912– 1918 on behalf of the Municipality of Berane on 21 July (the ‘Day of Berane’), not to mention the invitation on that occasion to the President of Montenegro, Filip Vujanovic, provoked angry reactions from officials of the Islamic Community, as well as from other Muslims living in Montenegro. In particular, Reis of the Islamic Community, Rifat Fejzić, requested reconsideration of the decision to grant the highest award of the government of Montenegro to the above-mentioned association, since in the period 1912–1918 their members killed and forcefully converted many Bosniaks and Albanians in the north of Montenegro. Intense debates were initiated, accompanied by widespread attention in the media. Fejzic asked the Muslims of Montenegro and President Vujanovic to boycott the official ceremony.19 However, the official ceremony

18 www.vijesti.me/vijesti/jovovic-nijedna-crkva-ne-moze-biti-privilegovana-clanak-125551. 19 www.antenam.net/web/index.php/drustvo/875-rastoder-odluka-o-nagradi-opstine-berane-skandalozna, www.sandzakpress.net/crnogorski-reis-fejzic-o-dodjeli- Montenegro 437 of the Municipality of Berane proceeded on 21 July 2013 as planned. President Vujanovic joined the ceremony, where he stated that “the crimes performed in Plav and Gusinje are the dark side of the Montenegrin history. In the years that followed by facing the history we have paid respect to the victims and proved that nurturing the multinational and multireligious harmony of Montenegro is the duty of each of us.”20

16 Major Cultural Events

The Islamic Community of Montenegro usually organises religious concerts (Ilahije i Kaside) in local cultural centres during the two ʿIds and Mawlid as well as for the Muslim new year. A gala ceremony on the occasion of graduating of the second generation of students from the Madrasa “Mehmed Fatih” in Podgorica was also a major cultural event in 2013.21 On 5 March 2013, in a joint organisation of the Islamic Community of Montenegro together with the Islamic Community and Cultural Centre of Plav and Gusinje in New York, Janazah—a funeral prayer in the sports hall in Plav was organised. Under the name ‘Vakat zuluma’ (the times of tyranny), the prayer was performed to mark the passing of 100 years from the forceful conversions and killing of Albanians and Bosniaks in Plav and Gusinje, in the years 1912–1913. Approximately 2,500 Albanians and Bosniaks from Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and from the usa joined the funeral prayer.22 Between 1 and 4 September 2013, the 15th Sports Gatherings of the employees of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region took place in Ulcinj. Traditionally, these gatherings are organised by the Association

nagrade-opstine-berane-podsjecanje-na-rane-devedesete, www.vijesti.me/vijesti/ fejzic-nagrada-dusmanima-crnogorskih-muslimana-clanak-139614. 20 www.vijesti.me/vijesti/vujanovic-zlocin-plavu-gusinju-tamna-strana-crnogorske- istorije-clanak-140078, www.cdm.me/politika/vujanovic-u-beranama-zlocin-u-plavu-i- gusinju-je-tamna-strana-crnogorske-istorije. 21 www.monteislam.com/novosti/medresa-mehmed-fatih-iz-podgorice-ispratila-drugu- generaciju-maturanata. 22 www.monteislam.com/novosti/klanjana-dzenaze-namaz-sehidima-plava-i-gusinja- 1912–1913. 438 pacariz

‘Ilmije’ of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thirteen teams from Majlis and the Muftis of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo participated in the Sports Gatherings, which therefore can be considered international.23

23 www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17555:ulcinj-ugostio- xv-sportske-susrete-uposlenika-iz-e-u-bih-i-regionu&catid=201&Itemid=457. Netherlands

Martijn de Koning*

1 Muslim Populations

After the Dutch East Indies (1949) and Surinam achieved independence, a large number of immigrants of Muslim background from these countries came to the Netherlands, but today the largest groups of Muslims are migrants (and their descendants) who were recruited as labourers from Turkey and Morocco during the 1960s and 1970s, a significant number of the migrants from Turkey being ethnic Kurds. Other large Muslim groups from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia arrived later, most of them seeking asylum from persecution and/ or escaping violence in their home countries. A small group of asylum seekers fled to the Netherlands because of their political-religious activities in countries such as Egypt and Syria. The Netherlands does not hold a census of its population but the government and various scientific institutions do have a long tradition of accumulating statistics. Early assessments made by ‘Statistics Netherlands’ provided estimates of Muslim numbers based on ethnic origins1 but in 2005 and 2006 a new methodology was introduced based upon self-identification surveys2 which has led to a new assessment of the numbers. According to the 2007 figures, there were 825,000 Muslims in the Netherlands at the time, the majority of whom were of Turkish or Moroccan descent. Of the Turkish Dutch people, some 94% described themselves as Muslim and among the Moroccan Dutch the level was 97% with a large variety in religiosity being reported.3 It is estimated that there are about 13,000 native Dutch convert Muslims.4 The Muslim

* Martijn de Koning is a post-doctoral researcher at Radboud University in Nijmegen and University of Amsterdam. His PhD thesis (2008) was entitled “Searching for a ‘true’ Islam: Religious beliefs and identity formation among Moroccan-Dutch youth”. He studied anthropology and his research focuses on Islamic movements, public religion and Muslim youth. See also http://religionresearch.org/martijn. 1 Phalet, Karen and Jessica Ter Wal, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004). 2 Maliepaard and Gijsberts, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2012). 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. For more on converts in the Netherlands, see Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Gender, conversion, and Islam. A comparison of online and offline conversion narratives”, in Nieuwkerk,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_033 440 de koning statistics include Sunnis, Shiʿis, Alevis and Ahmadis. Among the Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch Muslims, 89% identify themselves as ‘Sunni’ while 81% of Somali-Dutch 66% of Afghani-Dutch and 56% of Iraqi-Dutch identify themselves as Sunni.5 This does not mean that the others identify themselves as Shiʿi, Alevi or Ahmadi since all of these groups, in particular, the Turkish-Dutch, Moroccan-Dutch and Somali-Dutch, contain individuals who identify themselves only as Muslim without mentioning a specific branch. In the Turkish- Dutch group, 7% identify themselves as Alevi. Shiʿi Muslims in the Netherlands are mainly part of the Iranian diaspora (81% of the Iranian-Dutch).6 Among the Surinamese Muslims, the Ahmadi-Lahore community is well represented and very active, with its own mosques and a national organisation and very sympathetic press reviews, which present them as ‘liberal’ Muslims. Turkish migrants are divided along other lines: the Milli Görüş movement, the Nurçu and the Suleymançis all have strong networks in Dutch society. The differences between the branches of Islam matter but Muslims are divided predominantly along ethnic lines when it comes to representation and (mosque-) organisations. Most Muslims live in the west of the Netherlands, in the migrant areas of the so-called Randstad area: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Several smaller cities in the east and the south also have relatively large Muslim populations (usually with either Moroccan-Dutch or Turkish-Dutch Muslims holding the dominant position), because of the labour intensive industries that used to operate there. Unemployment among Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch Muslims is high compared with native Dutch people. The recent economic crisis has led to a significant growth in unemployment among non-Western migrants (including Muslims and their descendants). The educational performance among migrants is improving; although the Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch migrants have the lowest levels while younger people in

K. van (ed.), Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 95–120; Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Biography and choice: Female converts to Islam in the Netherlands,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 19, no. 4 (2008), pp. 431–447. 5 Unless otherwise indicated, the numbers in this section are taken from Maliepaard and Gijsberts, (ibid.), pp. 71 and 87. 6 Hessels, Thomas, Iraniërs in Nederland, een profiel (Iranians in the Netherlands, a profile) (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2002), available at www.justitie.nl/images/Iraniers_in_Nederland_tcm74–38879_tcm34–18120.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009; Ghorashi, Halleh, Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the us (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001). Netherlands 441 the Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch categories are better educated (especially the girls).7

2 Islam and the State

The Netherlands does not have a state religion nor does it have a policy of officially recognising religious denominations. However, the relationship between the Dutch state and religion has always been characterised by the state’s extensive involvement with religious expression in public life. In 1917, for example, the ‘school funding controversy’ stimulated the passing of Article 23 into the Dutch Constitution, which established full state funding for religious (Christian) schools and safeguarded the freedom of those schools to determine their own curricula. With this settlement, the foundation for what is known as ‘pillarisation’ (verzuiling) was laid.8 Society was deeply divided into distinct and mutually antagonistic religious and ideological groups, but the overarch- ing cooperation of ‘pillarisation’ at the elite level and the maximum autonomy allowed for each group made stable democracy possible.9 Although the country has gradually moved towards a more secular model since the 1960s, Muslim immigrants have been able to use parts of the ‘pillar’ model in which religious organisations were considered legitimate forms of representation and community organisation. Muslims have the same rights as other religious groups and, if they comply with the same principles as those applied to other religious groups, such as Christians, they can achieve recognition of their claims (although often after considerable struggle). A proposal to ban ritual slaughter was rejected by Dutch parliament (initially approved by the Tweede Kamer, the lower house, but rejected by the Eerste Kamer, the upper house, a body which always reconsiders proposals for new laws). An agreement between the Dutch state, Muslim organisations and Jewish organisations was established to ensure that the welfare conditions of animals are upheld during their ritual

7 Ibid., pp. 87–88. 8 Kennedy, James and Markha Valenta, “Religious pluralism and the Dutch state: Reflections on the future of article 23”, in W.B.H.J. van de Donk et al. (eds), Geloven in het publieke domein: Verkenningen van een dubbele transformatie (Religiosity in the Public Domain: Explorations of a Double Transformation) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 337–338. 9 Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 442 de koning slaughter (a slaughter committed without first stunning the animal) without infringing religious freedom.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There have been several attempts to establish a single representative body for all Muslims in the Netherlands made by both Muslims and the non-Muslim majority. Most of them have failed because of the internal religious differences of the Sunni, Shiʿi and Ahmadi Muslims, and because the Dutch authorities have refused to cooperate with the associations that have emerged from these groups, stating that they are not representative enough of the general Muslim population. After several incidents—for example, when imams expressed controversial opinions about homosexuality and, in particular, after Theo van Gogh was murdered in 2004 by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim—pressure from the Dutch state for Muslim organisations to unite under one umbrella increased significantly. First, the Muslim Contact Agency (Contact Moslims Overheid, cmo, Koninginnegracht 63, 2514 ag Den Haag, Postbus 85518, 2508 ce Den Haag, www.cmoweb.nl) was established, but the Turkish and Moroccan Sunni organisations excluded Ahmadi organisations. cmo unites five Turkish organisations: Islamic Foundation Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, isn, Javastraat 2, 2585 am Den Haag, www.diyanet.nl), Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation (Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie, ticf, Afrikaanderplein 40, 3072 ec Rotterdam, http://www.ticf.nl), both sections of the Milli Görüş movement, and the Foundation Islamic Centre the Netherlands (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland, sicn Suleymanci, Van Lieflandlaan 3, 3571 aa Utrecht, www.sicn.nl). cmo also includes the Union of Moroccan Mosque Organisations The Netherlands (Unie van Marokkaanse Moskee Organisaties Nederland, ummon, Weesperzijde 74, 1091 eh Amsterdam, Postbus 94384), the Surinamese-Hindustani World Islamic Mission (wim, Iqra Moskee, Hoogoord 257, 1102 cn Amsterdam, www.wimnet.org, http://www.worldislamicmission. nl), and the Shiʿi Association (Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging, osv, Postbus 1113, 3260 ac Oud-Beijerland, http://www.shiaparlement.com), which is mainly Iraqi Shiʿi. These organisations claim to represent 369 mainly Sunni mosques and about 500,000 Muslims. Later two other umbrella groups were established: the Contact Group Islam (Contact Groep Islam, cgi, Paul Krugerlaan 16, 2571 hk’s-Gravenhage), which includes Sunni, Shiʿi and Ahmadi Muslims, and the Dutch Muslim Council (Nederlandse Moslim Raad, nmr), a national organisation of Muslims which includes Sunni, Ahmadi and Alevi Muslims. Netherlands 443

cmo and cgi now both function as representative bodies and take part in regular meetings with the Dutch Minister of Integration and Immigration where they are consulted by the Dutch government and information is shared. During the debate about Geert Wilders’ film Fitna, cmo, cgi and their various member organisations played an important role in establishing dialogue between Muslims and Dutch civil society organisations and local and national authorities. However, these Muslim organisations do not have much credibility among Muslim youth, who regard them as cliques of first generation men and as too compliant with the Dutch government and anti-Islam politicians.10 There are several other national organisations including Al Nisa, the national organisation of Muslim women in the Netherlands (Stichting Al Nisa, Postbus 9, 3500 aa Utrecht, www.alnisa.nl), and the Association of Imams in the Netherlands (Vereniging van Imams in Nederland, vin, Van der Vennestraat 20, 2525 cg Den Haag, http://www.imamonline.nl), which has 110 members, mostly of Moroccan descent. Both are Sunni. Islam and Dialogue (Rochussenstr. 221–223, 3021 nt Rotterdam) and Dialogue Academy (Rochussenstraat 221, 3021 nt Rotterdam) are both associated with the Fethullah Gülen movement. Ihsan (Dr. Cuyperslaan 51, 5622 ma Eindhoven, www.ihsannet.nl) is a social work organisation active on the national level. The Islamic Women’s Network (Landelijk Islamitisch vrouwennetwerk, livn, www.livn.nl) is particularly active in activities aimed at interreligious dialogue and the emancipation of women. The National Platform of New Muslims (Landelijk Platform Nieuwe Moslims, lpnm, www.lpnm.info) is a national organisation for Muslim converts (other Muslims are also welcome) which (co-)organises lectures, often with other organisations, and hosts the annual National Converts Day—a one- day conference. Hizb ut Tahrir (www.kalifaat.org) aims to unite all Muslims in one state and revive the caliphate, but it does not seem to be a strong organisation, although it does get a lot of exposure because of particular actions, such as the campaigns against Geert Wilders’ Fitna. The Foundation Islamic Committee of Ahlu Sunnah (Stichting Islamitische Comité van Ahlu-Sunnah is a Salafi

10 Koning, Martijn de, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorm- ing van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Searching for a ‘Pure’ Islam: Religious Beliefs and Identity Construction of Young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008); Ketner, Susan, Marokkaanse wortels, Nederlandse grond: Exploratie, bindin- genen identiteitsstrategieën van jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst (Moroccan Roots, Dutch Soil: Exploration, Belonging and Identity Strategies of Youth of Moroccan Descent) (Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008). 444 de koning organisation which includes As Soennah Mosque in The Hague (Fruitweg 5–9, 2525 ke Den Haag, www.al-yaqeen.com) and El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam (Jan Hanzenstr. 114, 1053 sv Amsterdam, http://www.eltawheed. nl). With other Salafi networks, these organisations have become the most important targets of official counter-radicalisation policies.11 The Hague has one Islamic party, the Islam-Democrats (Islam-Democraten, id, Spui 70, 2511 bt Den Haag, www.islamdemocraten.nl). It has one seat on the municipal council. In the aftermath of the debates about the ban on ritual slaughter, a group of Muslims established the Muslim Consumer Association (Moslim Consumenten Vereniging, Schuttersstraat 34 B 3034 rm Rotterdam, www.dem- oslimconsumentenvereniging.nl) in 2011 to raise awareness among Muslims about issues such as food, halal certificates and the quality of goods and services that cater specifically for Muslims. Several people involved with this organisation also work for Green Muslims (Groene Moslims www.groene moslims.nl). Established in 2010, this association tries to raise awareness of environmental issues among ‘Muslim consumers and entrepreneurs’ in order to stimulate social and environmental responsibility among consumers and producers.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The general policy framework regarding mosques is usually set by the state, but its implementation is a local matter and this means that wide variations exist between municipalities. For example, some municipalities in the past have funded social and cultural activities run by mosques, while others receive

11 nctb (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme bestrijding [National Coordinator Counter- terrorism]), Salafisme in Nederland (Salafism in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2008); aivd (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst [General Intelligence and Security Service]), Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2006); Koning, Martijn de, “Changing worldviews and friendship: An exploration of the life stories of two female Salafists in the Netherlands”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 372– 392; Buijs, Frank, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland (Home Grown Warriors: Radical and Democratic Muslims in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). Netherlands 445 no funds for similar activities.12 Plans to build large mosques in Rotterdam and Amsterdam have caused much debate13 but resistance to mosques seems to be largely unrelated to the kind of mosque that is planned. Features such as the minaret or the call to prayer are negotiable and restrictions are usually already taken into account in the initial plans.14 Currently there are over 450 mosques in the Netherlands; of these, some 245 are affiliated to Turkish organisations (particularly Diyanet with 140 mosques, Milli Görüş with 35 mosques and the Süleymancis with 38 mosques), and 150 are run by Muslims of Moroccan descent. The Surinamese community has 25 mosques which are affiliated to the World Islamic Mission (headquartered in Bradford, uk) and have a Hanafi/Barelvi orientation. In the past they were hostile to the Ahmadi Muslims (also mainly of Surinamese descent), who have five mosques. Other communities, such as the Somalis, have also established their own organisations and have 62 mosques.15 Of the 453 mosques about a hundred are purpose-built.16 A 2012 survey showed that while in 1998 9% of Moroccan-Dutch Muslims visited a mosque at least once a week, by 2011 this had increased to 33% (and among Turkish-Dutch from 23% to 35%).17

12 Landman, Nico, Van mat tot minaret: De institutionalisering van de islam in Nederland (From Rug to Minaret: The Institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: vu Uitgeverij, 1992); Koning, Martijn de, “Institutionele grenzen: De hulpverlening van rcj/Het Woonhuis en moskee Nour (Institutional boundaries: The social work of rcj/Het Woonhuis and the An Nour mosque)”, Sociale Interventie, vol. 11 (2002), pp. 5–14. 13 Eric Roose, The Architectural Representation of Islam: Muslim-commissioned Mosque Design in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009); Landman, Nico and Wendy Wessels, “The visibility of mosques in Dutch towns”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1125–1140; Maussen, Marcel, Making Muslim Presence Meaningful: Studies on Islam and Mosques in Western Europe, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research working papers series (Amsterdam: assr, 2005); Lindo, Flip, Heilige wijsheid in Amsterdam: Ayasofi a stadsdeel De Baarsjes en de strijd om het Riva ter- rein (Sacred Wisdom in Amsterdam: Ayasofi a City Area De Baarsjes and the Struggle for the Riva Terrain) (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999); Sunier, Thijl, “The Western mosque: Space in physical place”, isim [Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World] Review, no. 18 (2006), pp. 22–23. 14 Sunier, “The Western mosque”; Landman and Wessels, “The visibility of mosques”. 15 Douwes, Dick, Martijn de Koning and Welmoet Boender, Nederlandse moslims: Van migrant tot burger (Dutch Muslims: From Migrant to Citizen) (Amsterdam: Salomé/ Amsterdam University Press, 2005). 16 Stefano Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe, p. 30. 17 Maliepaard and Gijsberts, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2012). 446 de koning

5 Children’s Education

There are 41 Islamic schools in the Dutch public education system, one secondary and the rest primary. The secondary school, Ibn Ghaldoun in Rotterdam, was closed after a major exam fraud was discovered (see section on public debate). The total number of 41 schools represents 0.6% of all the primary schools in the Netherlands, and a total of 7,500 pupils (0.5% of all the pupils in the Netherlands or 5% of all the pupils of immigrant origin). Like state run schools and all the other denominational schools established by religious groups, they are funded by the state and are subsumed under the Dutch system of freedom of education and financial equality between denominational and state schools. The Islamic character of the schools is evident in their Islamic ethos, but the school curriculum is the same as other denominational and state schools. There have been reports by the Ministry of Education for several years now about problems in Islamic schools related to the educational regime and, in some cases, problems about anti-integration syllabus content and suspicions of financial mismanagement.18 State schools are not obliged to offer Islamic lessons to their pupils; however, if parents submit a request for Islamic lessons, state schools have to comply and offer these lessons within the regular curriculum. This applies to religious education for Christian children (and others) too. External teachers provide these lessons. Religious lessons in public schools are financed by religious institutions (designated by municipalities as religious outreach organisations) but can be subsidised by municipalities as well, although this often is not the case.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are two Islamic (Sunni) universities, the Islamic University of Rotterdam (www.iur.nl) and the European Islamic University (www.iueurope.com) (also in Rotterdam), but they are not officially recognised as universities. The private learning institute Dar al ‘Ilm (www.daralilm.nl) organises courses, lectures and conferences for Muslims who would like to develop their knowledge of fiqh, the Qur’an and Sunna; they also organise the annual National Islam Congress. Although they are independent, they have a moderate/mild Salafi outlook.

18 Driessen, Geert and M.S. Merry, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Expansion or marginalisation”, Interchange, vol. 27, no. 3 (2006), pp. 201–223; Driessen, Geert and P. Valkenberg, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Compromising between identity and quality”, British Journal of Religious Education, vol. 23, no. 1 (2000), pp. 15–26. Netherlands 447

After long discussions between Muslim organisations and the Dutch state, two academic centres for imam training were established in 2005: the Centre for Islamic Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Free University (vu) Amsterdam (www.godgeleerdheid.vu.nl/en/organisation/faculty-departments/center- for-islamic-theology/index.asp), and the Institute of Religious Studies of the University of Leiden (www.hum.leiden.edu/religion/).19 The Institute for Higher Vocational Studies in Amsterdam has its own vocational degree (hbo) programme for teacher, imam and chaplain training, (www.inholland.nl/ imamislamitischgeestelijkwerker.htm). All of the institutions cooperate with the national umbrella organisations, cmo and cgi. Academic courses on Islamic and/or Middle Eastern studies are offered at Utrecht University (www.uu.nl), Leiden University (www.leidenuniv.nl), the University of Amsterdam (www.uva.nl) and Radboud University Nijmegen (www.ru.nl).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1991, the Law on Burials and Cremation (Wet op de Lijkbezorging) was amended to allow Muslims to bury their dead within 24 hours and without a coffin. The funeral rituals of Muslim migrants have changed since the days of their immigration.20 Nowadays, parts of the ritual, such as the washing of the body, are performed in hospitals, the mosque or in the room where the funeral service takes place, rather than in people’s homes. In 2007, the National Organisation of Cemeteries (Landelijk Organisatie van Begraafplaatsen) published a handbook for Islamic burials.21

19 Landman, Nico, Imamopleiding in Nederland: Kansen en Knelpunten. Eindrapportage van een terreinverkenning in opdracht van het Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (Imam Education in the Netherlands: Opportunities and Bottlenecks. Final Report of an Exploratory Study on Behalf of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences) (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 1996); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Islamic religious education in the Netherlands”, European Education, vol. 38, no. 2 (2006), pp. 76–88. Boender, Welmoet, Imam in Nederland: Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (Imam in the Netherlands: Opinions about his Role in Society) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007). 20 Dessing, Nathal M., Rituals of Birth, Circumcision, Marriage and Death among Muslims in the Netherlands (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001). 21 Handboek Islamitisch Begraven (Handbook Islamic Burials), 2007 (see www.begraafplaats .nl/publicaties, accessed 1 May 2010). 448 de koning

There are more than 80 Islamic burial sites (out of the total 3,500 in the Netherlands) all of them situated within municipal cemeteries. The first one was established in The Hague in 1932. In 2007, the city of Almere founded the first dedicated Islamic cemetery: Raza Ul Mawa. This cemetery is managed by the Foundation of Almere Muslims (Stichting Almeerse Moslims, Edvard Munchweg 2, 1328 ma Almere, www.alraza.nl). In 2012, a second one was established in Neunen and is managed by an Islamic institution: the Islamic Burial Society (Islamitisch Begrafeniswezen Ibw www.stichtingibw.nl) but negotiations with local authorities for the founding of more dedicated Islamic cemeteries are still ongoing.22 In 2012, the Islamic Burial Society opened the first cemetery in Nuenen, in the south of the Netherlands (near Eindhoven). Almere and Nuenen wish to maintain an ‘eternal peace,’ meaning the graves will not be moved. The municipal cemeteries in Utrecht and Zwolle also maintain ‘eternal peace’ for the Islamic section.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are Muslim chaplains (geestelijk verzorgers) in several hospitals, prisons and homes for the elderly and several universities have prayer rooms for Muslims, paid for by the universities. In 2009, the Dutch army recruited two Muslim (one Moroccan-Dutch and one Turkish-Dutch) clerics to give spiritual support to both Muslims and non-Muslims in the armed forces. They are civilian employees but are required to wear a uniform.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha are widely celebrated festivals in Muslim circles. In recent years, ʿId al-Fitr has become a public event as most mosques have opened their doors to include non-Muslims in their celebration of the iftar meal. Several of these iftar events used to take place under the umbrella of the Ramadan Festival, which offered a series of lectures, debates, music events and so on, running alongside the iftar meal celebration. The festival was founded by Mex-it, a commercial organisation for intercultural management,

22 Wojtkowiak, J. and G.A. Wiegers, “Moslims doen het helemaal zelf. Veranderende islamitische uitvaartrituelen in Nederland (Muslims do it all themselves. Changing Islamic burial rituals in the Netherlands)”, in H.J.M. Venbrux, M. Heessels and S.H. Bolt (eds), Rituele Creativiteit (Ritual Creativity) (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2008), pp. 31–44. Netherlands 449 but lately it was organised by the Ramadan Festival Foundation and sponsored by several municipalities, ngos and commercial partners. Since 2011, however, due to a combination of factors such as municipal cutbacks, difficulties in obtaining licenses for late evening programmes and the fact that Ramadan fell in the middle of the summer holidays, the Festival has not taken place. There have been discussions about making ʿId al-Fitr a national holiday but as of 2013 there were no serious plans to implement this. The different dates that ʿId falls on in different Muslim ethnic groups makes it difficult to set a single agreed date for a national holiday and some political parties strongly oppose these plans, calling them the ‘(self-) Islamisation of Dutch society.’

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food is important for many Muslims in the Netherlands. In particular Moroccan-Dutch (94%), Somali-Dutch (83%) and Turkish-Dutch (80%) eat halal food every day. Among Iraqi-Dutch (69%), Afghani-Dutch (66%) and in particular among Iranian-Dutch (34%) the numbers are significantly lower.23 Under Dutch law, animals must be rendered unconscious before slaughter, but exceptions are made for Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter. This is opposed by some political parties and animal rights groups. The eu Directive 93/119/ec24 requiring animals are spared avoidable excitement, pain or suffering during slaughter or killing and related operations, both inside and outside slaughterhouses, will be replaced by Council Regulation (ec) No. 1099/200925 on the protection of animals at the time of killing. According to the old directive, poultry has to be stunned with 100Ma (mili-amperes) by submerging them into an electric water bath. This brings about the risk that the animal will die because of the high frequency while in some interpretations dhabiha animals (for ritual slaughter) can be stunned as long as it is reversible. Therefore, the Dutch state until 2013 condoned a lower amperes in the case of Islamic ritual slaughter. The new eu regulation requires

23 Maliepaard and Gijsberts, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2012), p. 14. 24 Council Directive 93/119/ec of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing. http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/aw/aw_legislation/slaughter/ 93-119-ec_en.pdf, accessed 13 February 2013. 25 Council Regulation (ec) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=oj:L:2009: 303:0001:0030:en:pdf, accessed 13 February 2013. 450 de koning animals to be stunned with 150Ma and Islamic organisations fear this will make dhabiha impossible in the case of poultry. After a conference in 2012 they started negotiations with the Dutch government in order to work out a new agreement by which dhabiha would still be allowed.26 There have been attempts to produce a unified certification for halal food but so far these have not been successful resulting in a lack of trust among consumers. In many cases it is the local imams who decide whether the manner of slaughtering is halal or not and there are companies claiming to be halal without any recognition from Muslim organisations. There are currently a variety of certifications, such as the Halal Feed and Food Inspection Authority (Halal Voeding en Voedsel, hvv/hffia, Postbus 16786, 2500 bt Den Haag, www.halal .nl) and Halal Correct Certification (hcc, P.B. 179, 2300 ad Leiden, www.halal correct.com), which is active in the Netherlands and France. The latter is a member of the World Halal Council (whc) in Jakarta and both are members of the European Association of Halal Certifiers (ahc-Europe) in Brussels. This is an Islamic, independent, non-profit and non-governmental (ngo) institution which aims to create cooperation between, and facilitate activities among, organisations in different European countries; it also strives to be the institution of reference for third parties regarding Halal affairs in Europe. A third organisation is the Control Office of Halal Slaughtering (cohs—Laan van Meerdevoort 53d, 2517 ae Den Haag, tel.: ++31 703469795, fax: ++31 703450033, www.halaloffice.com). cohs is also a member of the World Halal Council.27 In 2012, cmo initiated a plan to establish a unified and more compelling certification. Almost every city with a Muslim minority has at least one or two halal butcher shops. The total number is not clear, but the butchers’ trade association estimates that there are about 3,500 butcher shops in the country, of which 10% are halal. Numerous shops and restaurants sell halal food. Several of the larger supermarket chains have special shelves with halal products. The number of people who go on Hajj every year from the Netherlands is estimated at around 5,000 pilgrims. This number depends on the capacity of agencies approved by the Saudi authorities for organising Hajj travels. The

26 Statement Halal Conference, www.halalcorrect.com/images/upload/files/Statement_ Halal%20Conference2012_Engels.pdf, accessed 12 February 2013. 27 Bonne, K., and Verbeke, W., 2008. Religious values informing Halal meat production and the control and delivery of Halal credence quality. Agriculture and Human Values Vol. 25 (2008), pp. 35–47; Kijlstra, Aize and Bert Lambooij Ritueel slachten en het welzijn van dieren Een literatuurstudie (Ritual slaughtering and animal welfare. A literature study) (Wageningen, Animal Sciences Group Wageningen University, 2008). Netherlands 451

Saudi Embassy in The Hague granted 4,678 Hajj visas in 2012; around 85% for Dutch nationals and the rest for other nationals such as Turkish, Moroccan and Indonesians plus a small number of diplomats in the Netherlands. According to Hajj regulations, the Saudi Embassy in The Hague grants Hajj visas only for Dutch nationals or other nationals who have permanent residence in the Netherlands. There are 16 Dutch travel agents approved of by the Saudi Ministry of Hajj but there are many more active on this market although the Embassy of Saudi Arabia has stated repeatedly that people who travel via unapproved travel agents will be refused a visa for Saudi Arabia.28 Islamic finance and mainly Islamic mortgages had been the topic of discussion within the Dutch government, at conferences and also of research from 2004 to 2008.29 Different financial institutions were interested in the development of this kind of mortgage, such as the commercial banks Rabobank and abn amro. After a few years of investigation, the financial institutions stopped their explorations for different reasons, such as institutional obstacles. Bilaa-Riba, a financial institution which was set up in 2006 as the first Islamic financial institution in the Netherlands, had the aim of introducing an Islamic mortgage but ended its activities in 2008. Until now, there is no such thing as an Islamic financial market in the Netherlands but there have been some developments in recent years. In 2007, abn amro launched an Islamic structured investment product, the llb Top 20 Middle East Total Return Index Certificate. In that same year, the Minister of Finance, Wouter Bos, announced that the country would review its role in the Islamic finance industry and that the government would look into ways to attract Islamic finance to the Netherlands. A year later, Barclays launched three Amsterdam-listed Islamic investment products, trackers that follow the movements on Islamic indi- ces. On May 22, 2008, De Nederlandsche Bank (Dutch Central Bank—dnb) and the Nederlandse Autoriteit Financiële Markten (Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets—afm) published a study on the potential regulatory issues that would have to be addressed when introducing Islamic finance in the Netherlands.30 In that time the Holland Financial Centre started a working group to promote Islamic finance in the Netherlands and to attract investors

28 Ministry of Hajj Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Approved Hajj Travel Agents: Netherlands. www.hajinformation.com/hajj_agents.php?id=13, accessed 20 February 2013. 29 The information on Islamic finance is provided by drs. Rachida Talal. She is a PhD student in Islamic finance at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands and researcher at International Macro Economic Research team of the private commercial bank Rabobank. 30 Verhoef, Bastiaan, Somia Azahaf and Werner Bijkerk. Islamitisch financieren en toezicht: een verkennende analyse. De Nederlandsche Bank Occasional Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (2008). 452 de koning from the international Islamic financial sector to the Dutch market. This initiative came to an end after a few years. During the beginning of the global financial crisis, Islamic finance was not an important topic of discussion anymore in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, at the moment, attention to Islamic finance in the Netherlands is growing again both in public debates as well as in the field of finance. Experts expect that the potential demand for Islamic finance in the Netherlands will rise in coming years as a result of a growth in population, the educational and income level of Dutch Muslims, but also because there are non-Muslims who believe that Islamic financial products would be a better, and in some way a more sustainable, alternative to the conventional financial products that have failed, according to them. Several relevant conferences, such as oikos (February 9, 2012—“Islamic Development Finance”) and De Buren (October 9, 2012—“It’s the Economy, Stupid #5: over Gharar, Riba en Murabaha”) were organised in the last two years where the topic was discussed in depth. In particular, ending the mortgage interest deduction (for income taxes), which is an important Dutch political issue at this moment, is seen as a window of opportunity to introduce Islamic mortgages in the Netherlands.

11 Dress Codes

The head scarf is an important issue in public debate and for Muslim women’s religiosity and identity.31 Muslim girls and women (including lawyers) are allowed to wear hijab in public schools and in public institutions and companies, except for the police force and court of law officials. Under certain con-

31 Buitelaar, Marjo, “Negotiating the rules of chaste behaviour: Re-interpretations of the symbolic complex of virginity by young women of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 462–489; Duits, Linda and Liesbeth Van Zoonen, “Headscarves and porno-chic: Disciplining girls’ bodies in the European multicultural society”, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 103–117; Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (Detroit mi: Free Press, 2006); Bartels, Edien, ‘Eén dochter is beter dan duizend zonen’: Arabische vrouwen, symbolen en machtsverhoudingen tussen de sexen (’One Daughter is Better than a Thousand Sons’: Arab Women, Symbols and Power Constellations between the Sexes) (Utrecht: Jan van Arkel, 1993); Bartelink, Yvon, Vrouwen over Islam: Geloofsvoorstellingen en praktijken van Marokkaanse migrantes in Nederland (Brabant) (Women on Islam: Beliefs and Practices of Moroccan Female Migrants in the Netherlands) (Brabant) (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit, 1994); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Muslim dress in Europe: Debates on the headscarf”, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 35–61. Netherlands 453 ditions, Christian schools may forbid pupils and staff to wear hijab and there are cases of women who have been refused jobs because they wore a head scarf. The Commission for Equal Treatment usually regards these practices as unlawful. The decisions made by the Commission are, however, not binding and should be interpreted as advice based upon the Commission’s interpretation of the law. In recent years, the head scarf issue has been linked with concerns about social cohesion, integration and national identity.32 In 2003, the Ministry of Education prepared an optional dress guideline, but in 2005, the Parliament supported a resolution to ban wearing the burqa in public. After legal problems arose from the application of such a law, the minority government of Christian-Democrats (cda) and Conservative-Liberals (vvd) which was condoned by the anti-Islam nativists of the Freedom Party (pvv), led by Geert Wilders, came up with a new proposal stating that burqa should be banned from 2013 onwards. The collapse of the government in 2012 led to the development of a new plan regarding face-veiling (see public debates section below). The cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht have proposed cutting social benefits to unemployed women wearing a burqa on the grounds that it makes them unemployable in a non-Muslim country.33

12 Publication and Media

In the Netherlands, religious denominations are entitled to their own broadcasting company: a so-called 2.42 broadcasting company which is recognised according to Article 2.42 of the Media Law. Before 2009, there were two Islamic broadcasting companies: the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Moslimomroep, nmo) and the Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep, nio). nmo and nio decided not to renew their licences for 2010–2015 after years of antagonistic relations between them. After five organisations applied for the licence for this period, it was granted to the Netherlands Foundation for Muslim Broadcasting (Stichting Moslim Omroep Nederland, smon) which was an initiative of several national Moroccan-Dutch and Surinamese-Dutch Islamic organisations. One of the major conditions for successfully acquiring the licence was that they would

32 Saharso, Sawitri and Doutje Lettinga, “Contentious citizenship: Policies and debates on the veil in the Netherlands”, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (2008), pp. 455–480. 33 For more on face-veil controversies, see Moors, Annelies, “The Dutch and the face-veil: The politics of discomfort,” in Social Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 4 (2009), pp. 393–408. 454 de koning cooperate with a second initiative: the Broadcasting Company Universal Muslim Association (Stichting Academica Islamica/Omroep Universele Moslim Associatie (ouma). A number of attempts to make this cooperation work were unsuccessful. In 2013, a new initiative was launched: Muslim Broadcasting Company (Moslim Omroep, mo, Postbus 29000, 1202 ma Hilversum, Tel.: +3135– 677 31 46, http://www.moslimomroep.nl). mo was granted a license under the umbrella of the ntr; the broadcasting company responsible by law for information, education, culture, youth and diversity on radio and television. The license will expire in 2016 when all religious broadcasters will merge into one major broadcasting company. There are several small-circulation magazines, such as Al Nisa Maandblad (Al Nisa Monthly, www.alnisa.nl), produced by Al Nisa women’s organisation, which also publishes Anti Wa Anta, a quarterly magazine for children and As Siraata (for young women over 16). Wij Moslims (We Muslims) is published by Momtazah Publishers, one of the publishers that also produce books about Islam in Arabic, English and Dutch. There are bookstores, such as Boekhandel Nour and Islam Boeken (www.islam- boeken.nl), which sell books on the internet and are part of the Dutch Salafi networks; these also included internet television channels Islaam.tv and Dawah-tv .nl. These have ceased their activities and have been replaced by Sunnah-tv.nl Time Media Group (related to the Fethullah Gülen Movement) which publishes Zaman Nederland (www.zamanhollanda.nl), a free monthly newspaper distributed among researchers, universities, Islamic institutions, policy makers and so on. The Ahmadiyya branch has its own monthly magazine, Al-Islaam (www .ahmadiyya-islam.nl) and Hizb ut Tahrir publishes Expliciet (www.expliciet.nl) four times a year. Since 2010, a new monthly newspaper, Muslim Today (Moslim Vandaag) has appeared with its associated website (www.moslimvandaag.nl) which was established by Muslim Media (Moslim-Media; a commercial business) and several Muslim organisations such as Islamic University Rotterdam, cmo, cgi and Ontdekislam.nl (Discover Islam) and Wij Blijven Hier (We are here to stay). The Muslim Voice International describes itself as an independent press agency of the Muslim world, located in the Netherlands. Their main publication is Voice of the Ummah (Stem van de Ummah). There are several mailing lists, discussion sites and mosque sites on the internet. One of the best known Dutch weblogs is Wij Blijven Hier, www. wijblijvenhier.nl); other important meeting places for discussions about Islam and Muslims include Marokko.nl (www.marokko.nl) and OntdekIslam (www .ontdekislam.nl).34 OntdekIslam and lpnm have organised several events

34 Brouwer, Lenie, “Dutch-Muslims on the Internet: A new discussion platform”, Journal of Muslim Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–55; Koning, Martijn de, Identity in Transition. Netherlands 455 together, some with Fadel Soliman, a preacher who is a former member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2010, Nieuwemoskee (New Mosque, www .nieuwemoskee.nl) has presented itself as an Islamic platform for contemporary critical thinkers. The website focuses on encouraging debate about Islam (in the West) and having dialogues with other religious and secular groups about Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands. A new website emerged in 2013: The True Religion (De Ware Religie, dwr, www.dewarereligie.nl) run by militant Muslim activists. dwr supports the Al Qaeda-affiliated rebels in Syria and has close connections to Dutch fighters in Syria. Another new website is The Muslim Newspaper (De Moslimkrant, www.demoslimkrant.nl) which gives a voice to a variety of Muslim writers, journalists, politicians and activists.

13 Family Law

There are no demands by Muslims for the establishment of Islamic family law. So-called ‘informal marriages’ take place, often with Salafi imams offi- ciating, which are not recognised by Dutch law and therefore have no legal effect. Polygamy is not recognised by law, although registering of polygamous marriages contracted outside the Netherlands has occurred. If a polygamist wishes to acquire Dutch citizenship and nationality, he or she must divorce all his or her husbands or wives but one. It is possible for couples to record their relationship in a contract witnessed by a notary as a so-called ‘co-habitation agreement’ which in theory leaves open the possibility for multiple partners. Inheritance can be dealt with in the same way, by registering a will.35 Following debates in the uk, a debate was launched in June 2009 about the presence of ‘Shariʿa courts’ in the Netherlands. After a Dutch television programme reported that Shariʿa law was practised in the Netherlands, with regard to informal marriages, for example, several politicians and opinion leaders took up the issue and called for zero tolerance towards ‘Shariʿa courts’. Radboud University Nijmegen conducted research into the prevalence of

Connecting Online and Offline Internet Practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Youth (London: London Metropolitan University, Institute for the Study of European Transformations (iset), 2008), available at www.londonmet.ac.uk/londonmet/library/c52116_3.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. For an overview of the most important Dutch blogs see: http:/ religionreserach.org/martijn/blogview. 35 Berger, Maurits, “Sharia in Nederland is vaak keurig Nederlands” (Sharia in the Netherlands is often neatly Dutch), Mens en Maatschappij (People and Society), vol. 57, no. 6 (2007), pp. 507–510; Dessing, Rituals of Birth; Dessing, Nathal M., “An Islamic wedding in a Dutch living room”, isim Newsletter, no. 31 (2002). 456 de koning

Islamic arbitration and concluded that there were no formal courts applying Islamic arbitration. A practice of advice and consultation based upon Shariʿa (or particular understandings of it) does, however, exist.36

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue is a long-standing tradition in the Netherlands.37 The number of Islamic institutions specifically focused on interreligious dialogue has remained stable over recent years but there is an increase in the number of general Islamic institutions that also engage in interreligious dialogue (although they are not always labelled as such). More than 75% of the mosques in the Netherlands have been involved in small-scale dialogue activities—during an open day, for example. Many Islamic organisations are also involved in local interfaith councils which include Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Baha’i and other organisations (depending on the local circumstances). Islamic student associations such as Mashriq in The Hague and Rotterdam, and the Muslim Student Association (Moslim Studenten Vereniging) also engage in dialogue activities. National organisations such as Islam and Dialogue, Dialogue Academy (both associated with the Fethullah Gülen movement), Al Nisa, Ihsan, the Dutch Muslim Council and the Islamic Women’s Network are among the most important organisations sponsoring larger dialogue activities, which range from debates and iftars to publishing books. Several Islamic organisations take part in celebrating the anniversary of the Liberation (5 May, end of World War Two), the Day of Dialogue in November and the Charter of Compassion (www .charterofcompassion.org). Interreligious themes also feature prominently on Dutch Islamic websites: Wij blijven hier (www.wijblijvenhier), IslamWijzer (www.islamwijzer. nl), Maroc.nl (www.maroc.nl), Marokko.nl (www.marokko.nl) and Hababam

36 L. Bakker, e.a., Sharia in Nederland. Een studie naar islamitische advisering en geschil- beslechting bij moslims in Nederland (Sharia in the Netherlands. A study of Islamic coun- seling and dispute resolution among Muslims in the Netherlands) (Nijmegen: Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie en Ontwikkelingsstudies Instituut voor Rechtssociologie Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2010). 37 This definition is derived from Greco Idema/Bureau Intermonde. Much of the information here is provided by G. Idema and J. Slomp. For the period before 2000, see also: Slomp, J., “Christians and religious pluralism in the Netherlands”, in Martin Forward, Stephen Plant and Susan White (eds), A Great Commission: Christian Hope and Religious Diversity. Papers in Honour of Kenneth Cracknell on his 65th Birthday (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 200–223. Netherlands 457

(www.hababam.nl). Interreligious websites such as Nieuwwij.nl (www.nieuwwij.nl) and Bruggenbouwers (Bridgebuilders, www.bruggenbouwers.com) are also important in mediating and promoting interreligious dialogue. The current Islam debate, in which anti-Islam politicians and opinion leaders feature prominently, has led to an increase in interreligious dialogue activities which, unlike the past, are no longer restricted to highly educated people.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Syria In the course of 2013, approximately 100 Dutch Muslims travelled to Syria; by the end of 2013, no less than 11 had been killed in battle, 70 were still in Syria and more than 20 had returned; some with experience in fighting, others not. The Dutch state fears that the returnees will engage in violent activities such as terrorist attacks at home. The state has revoked the passports of at least 11 persons who are seen as potential foreign fighters. A passport can be revoked when there are serious suspicions that a person will be engaging in activities abroad that might pose a threat to the Netherlands, such as joining an Al Qaeda affiliated group. Several investigations against so-called recruiters for jihad have been launched. Several minors have been stopped when they wanted to travel to Syria. They are now under supervision of youth care and/or send to a closed residential youth care, a measure usually taken in cases of youth with severe behavioural problems. In October 2013, two individuals suspected of travelling to Syria appeared in court. One was sentenced for attempted murder (but sent to a psychiatric institution because of mental instability) and the second was convicted for preparing an arson attack and disseminating inflammatory texts. The government has proposed a law that revokes Dutch citizenship in the case of terrorist activities. The draft law is now under consultation. The government has invoked ‘sanctieregeling terrorisme 2007-ii’ in four cases and frozen the financial assets of these persons. There is a local municipal approach aimed at intervening in specific cases and in which public servants, local police officers and community workers are trained to detect signs of radicalisation and to intervene when necessary. This approach is still work in progress. All welfare benefits for known Syria travellers have been stopped.

Exam Fraud at Ibn Ghaldoun Almost 150 students in their final year of the secondary school Ibn Ghaldoun, an Islamic school in Rotterdam, had to retake their final exams after four of them stole copies of the national tests for 24 courses. This is often referred to 458 de koning as “the largest exam fraud ever” in the Dutch media. Four pupils of the school were arrested on suspicion of theft and fraud.

Islamophobia Several Islamic organisations and a left wing Moroccan-Dutch organisation have launched a campaign against Islamophobia and strive for recognition of Islamophobia as a separate category for registration of racist incidents.

16 Major Cultural Events

Every year a four day event called Multifestijn, takes place in the old Market Halls of Utrecht, with debates, markets for products, services and jobs, lectures and music. In the past Turkish-Dutch Süleymançi organisation sicn was the main organiser but they withdrew because of disagreement over finances and profits of the event. The other major event organised in 2009, 2010, and 2012 by the Dar al Ilm institute did not take place in 2013, for unknown reason. Norway

Oddbjørn Leirvik*

1 Muslim Populations

Immigrants from Muslim countries started arriving in Norway in the late 1960s. Although a general ban on labour immigration was introduced in 1975, family reunification and the continuing influx of refugees and immigrants have made for a steady growth in the Muslim population in the country.1 The current number of residents with a Muslim background (according to Statistics Norway’s widest definition of immigrants)2 would probably be around 220,000, which is 4.5% of a total population of 5 million. In 2013, 120,800 people (i.e. around 55% of those with a Muslim background) had signed up as members of a Muslim organisation. Approximately 53,000 of these were resident in Oslo, which means that about 8 % of Oslo’s population are now members of a Muslim organisation. A survey among youth in Oslo, conducted in 2012 among pupils in the 9th, 10th and 11th grades, showed that 19.5% gave Islam as their religion, up from 13.2% in 1996.3 Among those Muslims who first came as migrant labourers and later experienced family reunification and growth in Norway, the most numerous group are those with a Pakistani background, who in 2013 amounted to 39,000. In the same year, Turks numbered 20,500 and Moroccans 11,400. Among those who came as refugees and asylum seekers, Somalis

* Oddbjørn Leirvik is Professor of Interreligious Studies at the Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo. He is a specialist in the field of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, and his publications include Interreligious Studies. A Relational Approach to Religious Activism and the Study of Religion (London: Bloomsbury 2014) and Human Conscience and Muslim-Christian Relations: Modern Egyptian Thinkers on al-Damir (London: Routledge, 2006). Part of the content of the present entry on Norway relies on the valuable contribution of Christine M. Jacobsen (a social anthropologist and senior researcher at the University of Bergen) to previous volumes. 1 Gunnlaug Daugstad and Lars Østby, Det flerkulturelle Norge. Et mangfold av tro og livssyn (Multicultural Norway: Many faiths and life stances)”, Oslo: Statistics Norway 2008. An updated bibliography on Islam in Norway is available on Leirvik’s home page: http://folk.uio .no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html#bibliografi. 2 People who themselves migrated to Norway and their children born in Norway, including those with only one parent who was born abroad. 3 Øia, Tormod, “Ung i Oslo 2012 (Youth in Oslo 2012),” nova Rapport7/12, p. 144. www.ungdata .no/id/25829.0 accessed 2 January 2014.

(33,800) and Iraqis (30,600) were the most numerous, followed by Iranians (21,300), Bosnians (17,900), Kosovo-Albanians (15,200) and Afghans (14,600).4 Converts constitute a small percentage (approximately 1.5%) of the Muslim community.5 An entire spectrum of Pakistani (Barelwi, Deobandi, etc.)6 and Turkish (Diyanet, Süleymanci, Milli Görüs) Islamic traditions is now well established, whereas Bosnians and Somalis represent radically different popular traditions.7 Attendance of religious ceremonies and meetings organised by faith communities varies individually and between different Muslim groups: in a survey from 2005–2006, Pakistanis reported an average of 31, Somalis 25 and Turks 23 times a year, whereas the corresponding figures reported by Iraqis were seven and for both Bosnians and Iranians only twice a year.8

2 Islam and the State

Norway is a social-democratic welfare state with a National Church (the Lutheran Church of Norway) which is mentioned as such (literally, “Norway’s people’s church”) in the revised Constitution of 2012. Since the 1960s, religious pluralism has been increasingly accommodated, and a 1964 supplement to the Constitution guarantees that “All inhabitants of the Realm shall enjoy free exercise of religion.” The Lutheran Church of Norway, to which 77% of the population nominally belong, retains a dominant public position, and is almost fully financed from the public purse (including salaries for clergy and much

4 The cited figures refer to country background, not to citizenship. Acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is regulated by a law of 2006 (www.udi.no/templates/Tema.aspx?id=7394), accessed 2 January 2014. 5 No figures are available, but estimates indicate 1,000–1,500 persons. For an account of conversion to Islam in Scandinavia see Roald, Anne Sofie, New Muslims in the European Context: The Experience of Scandinavian Converts (Leiden: Brill, 2004) and idem: “The conversion process in stages: new Muslims in the twenty-first century”. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 3: 2012, s. 347–362. 6 See for instance Ahlberg, Nora, New Challenges—Old Strategies: Themes of Variation and Conflict among Pakistani Muslims in Norway (Helsinki: Finnish Anthropological Society, 1990). 7 For an overview of various tendencies, see Vogt, Kari, Islam på norsk (Islam in Norwegian) (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008 [2000]); Jacobsen, Christine M., “Norway”, in Larsson, Göran (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009), pp. 18–40. 8 Statistics Norway (ssb), “Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005–2006 (Living conditions among immigrants in Norway)”, ssb Rapport 2008/5. The survey was based on interviews with 3,053 non-Western immigrants and descendants of immigrants. Norway 461 of the running costs of parishes, including maintenance of buildings). Under compensatory measures introduced in 1969, every faith and (from 1981) life stance community that registers is entitled to the same amount per member in public funding; this today includes registered Islamic organisations.9 The constitutional amendments of 2012 corroborate the established policy of public funding of the National Church as well as of the other faith communities.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Council of Norway (Islamsk Råd Norge, Storgaten 39 (5. etg.) N-0183 Oslo, tel.: ++47 48486400, www.irn.no), founded 22 October 1993, is the umbrella organisation. An invitation from the Church of Norway to set up a Contact Group between Christian and Muslim leaders in Norway played some part in this process.10 The Council comprises the majority of Sunni Muslim congregations in Norway (according to the web-page, around 40 member organisations, totalling more than 60,000 members). The political authorities have gradually established regular communication with the Islamic Council (as with other established faith communities and their umbrella organisations), and, since 2007, the Council has also received a financial grant from the government which enables the Council to pay a full-time general secretary. Transnational movements such as Tabligh-i-Jamaat, and the Muslim Broth- erhood, several different Shiʿite groups, and a small but active Ahmadiyya community also have a presence. From the mid-1990s, separate youth and students’ as well as women’s organisations have been formed, largely independent of national background.11 In the last few years, several new youth and student organisations, with different theological orientations, have appeared. The fastest growing youth organisation is Islam Net, a conservative group of Salafi orientation which has gained increasingly critical attention from public media as well as from researchers since its inception in 2008.12 Islam Net continues to

9 Registration is uncomplicated and does not require a minimum number of members. 10 Vogt, Islam på norsk, p. 167. 11 See for instance Jacobsen, Christine M., Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway (Leiden: Brill, 2011), and idem, “Religiosity of young Muslims in Norway: The quest for authenticity”, in Cesari, Jocelyne, and McLoughlin, Sean (eds), European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005), pp. 155–168. 12 See Sindre Bangstad and Marius Linge: “IslamNet—puritansk salafisme i Norge”, Kirke og Kultur 4: 2013, pp. 254–272 and Marius Linge: “Den konservative vekkelsen. Om IslamNet, Profetens Umma og salafismens fremvekst i Norge”. Samtiden 4: 2013, pp. 38–53. 462 Leirvik hold large “peace conferences,” aimed at “clarifying misunderstandings about Islam,” and featuring a number of international speakers. In 2012, the smaller and more liberal organisation Ung Muslim (“Young Muslims”), the youth branch of the Rabita mosque in Oslo, also initiated a yearly Umma Conference with international guests.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2009, the total number of registered Muslim congregations was 126.13 A list of mosques, including contact information, is available on the internet.14 The varieties of Norwegian Islam are evident in different kinds of adapted architecture.15 Most of the 40 or so Muslim prayer locations in Oslo are in converted flats, factories or office premises, but seven mosques are purpose-built, four of them by Norwegian-Pakistani organisations (including an Ahmadiyya mosque). In 2013, one Somali, one Kosovo-Albanian and one (multinational) Shiʿi mosque were opened or under construction. There are no purpose-built mosques outside Oslo but there are numerous prayer locations in other cities and towns throughout the country (with particular Muslim concentrations in cities such as Stavanger, Kristiansand and Drammen). Some schools and universities offer prayer rooms within their premises. This practice is, however, considered to be controversial as no national guidelines exist.

5 Children’s Education

Private schools are relatively few in Norway and took in only around 3% of primary school pupils in 2013, which reflects the extraordinary strength of the ‘one school for all’ (enhetsskolen) system. The Urtehagen Foundation runs a couple of Muslim kindergartens in Oslo but there are currently no Muslim private schools. Most mosques offer some kind of Qur’an instruction.16 In public

13 “Norges moskeer”, Vårt Land 18 January 2010. 14 See www.islam.no/islam_i_norge.aspx. 15 Naguib, Saphinaz-Amal, Mosques in Norway: The Creation and Iconography of Sacred Space (Oslo: Novus forlag/The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 2001). 16 For a discussion of Islamic nurture and education, see for instance Østberg, Sissel, Pakistani Children in Norway: Islamic Nurture in a Secular Context, Monograph Series (Leeds: University of Leeds, Community Religions Project, 2003). Norway 463 primary and lower secondary schools, a joint course on religion and ethics was made compulsory for all students in 1997 (called “Knowledge of Christianity with Information about Religions and Life Stances” and from 2002 “Knowledge about Christianity, Religions and Life Stances”).17 Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and secular humanists protested against the initial curriculum because of its strong emphasis on Christianity. After a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the government initiated a revision of religious education (renamed “Religion, Life Stances and Ethics” in 2008) and of the schools’ traditional statutory statement of Christian purpose. Islam has been given increasing space in the religion and ethics curricula for both primary/lower secondary and upper secondary/high school, in line with its growing presence in Norwegian society. In 2013, new controversies arose as the new conservative government decided to increase the amount of time dedicated to Christianity-related subjects. The subjects in question take a historical as well as doctrinal approach to world religions, the ideal being to present each religion on its own terms. Ethics is dealt with as a separate part of the curriculum. In addition, both the ability to engage in dialogue about religion and ethics and familiarity with modern criticism of religion are stated as competence aims.

6 Higher and Professional Education

No initiative to establish a national training programme for imams has been taken in Norway, but the University of Oslo has discussed the possibility of establishing a ‘centre for Islamic studies’ and a proposal was presented to the University in 2007 by a committee which included representatives of the Islamic Council. In 2007, the University of Oslo’s Faculty of Theology set up a programme for continuing education for imams, as well as for other religious leaders with a foreign background, under the heading “Being a religious leader in Norwegian society.” The Islamic Council is part of the reference group for this programme and while the largest groups of participants in the courses have been imams and other categories of Muslim leaders, no imams have received their basic training in Norway yet.18

17 See, for example, articles by Geir Skeie, Sissel Østberg and Heid Leganger-Krogstad in Jackson, Robert (ed.), International Perspectives on Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity (London: Routledge Falmer, 2003). 18 Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “Islam and education in Norway”, in Aslan, Ednan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic and education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau verlag, 2009), pp. 301–324. 464 Leirvik

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Several funeral agencies around the country offer assistance to Muslim funerals. There is also a Muslim funeral agency that provides Islamic funerals in a large part of the country. The Muslim funeral bureau Al-Khidmat is a member of the Islamic Council of Norway, which has a funeral working group to look into the issue of Muslim burial sites. Several ordinary undertakers have developed their competence in Islamic (and other religious) burial traditions. In Oslo hospitals, rooms are set aside for the ritual washing. Muslims in Oslo have been allocated burial sites within existing cemeteries. Conducting of burials in accordance with Muslim burial practices is still not entirely accommodated, however.19 Many Muslim migrants are buried in the country of origin but the proportion buried in Norway is increasing as people develop more important and permanent links with Norway.20

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

A State Report from January 2013 about Norway’s future politics of religion, submitted to the Ministry of Culture, proposed concrete measures to develop more inclusive spiritual services in hospitals, prisons and the military.21 Up till now, state institutions provide only Christian chaplaincy on a regular basis, although the need to provide chaplaincy for minority religions too has been addressed several times. In prisons, some imams have offered chaplaincy on a voluntary basis, but the Islamic Council in Norway as well as a number of other actors have called for a more permanent structure to offer Friday prayers and religious guidance to inmates. In 2008, the Soldiers’ National Conference (Soldatenes landskonferanse) decided to promote a religiously neutral military and to hire imams and personnel from other registered faith communities outside the Church of Norway in the Field Corps, but this has not yet been followed up politically.

19 Plesner, Inger and Cora. Alexa Døving, Livsfaseriter. Religions- og livssynspolitiske utfor- dringer i Norge (Life cycle rituals: Challenges related to policies of religion and lifestances in Norway), (Rapport, Samarbeidsrådet for tros-og livssynssamfunn, 2009) 20 Døving, Cora Alexa, Norsk-pakistanske begravelsesritualer: En migrasjonsstudie, (Norwe- gian-Pakistani Burial Rituals: A Migration Study) (Oslo: Unipub Forlag, 2007). 21 “Det livssynsåpne samfunn. En helhetlig tros- og livssynspolitikk”, nou 2013: 1. Norway 465

The possibility of employing imams in Norwegian hospitals has also been discussed but not yet implemented, apart from a part time Muslim “cultural consultant” in St. Olav Hospital, Trondheim and a team of voluntary providers of pastoral care (including imams) in Ullevål University Hospital, Oslo.

9 Religious Festivals

ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha are celebrated by Muslims throughout Norway. A law of 13 June 1969 guarantees those who are not members of the Church of Norway two days’ leave from work or school per year on the occasion of religious festivals. Sacrificing animals is not permitted, and some Muslims send their qurban donations to Muslims in poorer parts of the world through relief organisations.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

The Islamic Council in Norway has worked actively for a number of years to secure access to halal food for all Muslims in Norway. In cooperation with existing slaughterhouses, methods that satisfy both Islamic and Norwegian regulations have been developed, and halal meat (including beef, lamb and chicken), as well as a range of halal products such as pizzas, burgers, sausages, and cheese is now available on the Norwegian market. Norwegian rules say that the animal must be anaesthetised before slaughter, a practice that has been accepted by the Islamic Council. The issue of anaesthesia was debated in 2009 in relation to the revision of the Norwegian law on animal welfare and new eu directives on animal welfare and religious slaughter. The Norwegian law on animal welfare that came into force in 2010 continued the prohibition on slaughtering without anaesthesia. The Jewish community has lobbied against this prohibition on the grounds that it limits religious freedom, followed, in principle, by the Islamic Council although the Muslim community has generally taken a more pragmatic stand. Although halal meat is available in some public institutions (in state universities, for example), there is still a need to ensure access to halal meat in hospitals, prisons, etc. Access to halal food in shops has increased, as a result of the Islamic Council’s pragmatic cooperation with Norwegian slaughter houses (cf. above). There are no Islamic banking or finance institutions. Hajj travels are facilitated by a travel bureau closely cooperating with the Islamic Council. 466 Leirvik

11 Dress Codes

Repeated calls have been made to ban religious headgear and niqab from (parts of ) public space but there are no general rules limiting Muslim dress in public or for teachers or pupils in schools. In 2007, a debate occurred over the wearing of niqab in institutions of higher education, but the institutions decided against the need for a ban. A suggestion by representatives from the Progress Party to ban face-covering clothing in public space was debated in the Parliament in 2010 but not adopted. In 2012, controversies again arose in relation to face veiling in educational institutions. A student at the University of Tromsø was excluded from class by her professor but the University administration did not adopt a general ban. Oslo City Council and County Board of Østfold have decided to ban the use of niqab in teaching situations at their high schools. The right of employees to wear religious headgear is not explicitly regulated by Norwegian law but nevertheless follows from the dominant interpretation of the Working Environment Act and the Gender Equality Act. The Norwegian Labour Inspectorate defines a refusal to allow religious headgear in the work place as discrimination, and several cases have been reported to the Equality and Discrimination Ombudsman. Hijab has been accommodated in combination with uniforms in the army, the health care system, and customs and excise, and in a few work places (notably ikea, the Ullevål University Hospital in Oslo, and Nortura) there is a hijab version of uniform. In 2008/2009, a debate occurred over whether religious headgear should be allowed in combination with uniforms in the police force. After initially signalling amendments to the police uniform regulations in order to accommodate hijab, the Ministry of Justice and the Police Department decided not to revise the existing rules. On the basis of the debate about the hijab in the police, the Board of Directors of the National Courts Administration initiated a process to regulate the use of religious and political clothing in the court room. After consulting relevant institutions and organisations, the National Courts Administration decided against introducing any new regulations. A suggestion from representatives from the populist Progress Party to instruct the Court Administration to revoke its decision and ban hijab, niqab, burqa and other religious and political symbols for employees at the courts was, in line with the recommendation from the Justice Committee, rejected by the majority in the Parliament in March 2011. The mentioned State Report from January 2013 suggested that religious headgear should be allowed as part of the police uniform and in court rooms.22 As of December 2013, this had not been followed up politically.

22 nou 2013: 1, pp. 149–158. Norway 467

12 Publication and Media

Some Muslim organisations in Norway (including notably the Islamic Informa- tion Association, the Islamic Cultural Centre, the Ahmadiyya, the Idara Minhaj ul-Quran, the Muslim Students’ Association and the conservative youth organisation Islam Net) publish books and leaflets in Norwegian, most of which are translations. There are a number of online sites, of which the most significant is www .islam.no, which provides practical information (on prayer times, etc.), as well as information on ‘Muslim events’ and a number of Islamic issues, and has a very active discussion forum. Several mosques and organisations actively use the Internet, and there are also a number of private-initiative blogs and info-pages about Islam. The web-portal www.imam.no is run by a network of imams and scholars calling themselves Jamiat Ulama Norway (jun) and aims to provide information on Islam and advice in fiqh questions. Social media have become more important, and a number of individuals and organisations are active on Twitter and Facebook. YouTube is also increasingly used for dis- tributing videotaped lectures and seminars. A number of individual Muslim blogs add to this digital landscape.

13 Family Law

By applying to the Fylkesmann (County Governor), mosques can obtain the right to conduct marriages, which are then registered with the City Recorder’s Office (byfogdembete) or the District Court (tingrett). The Norwegian marriage act guarantees the right to divorce but divorces obtained under religious law or the law of other countries may not be recognised. A controversial 2003 amendment to the marriage act, targeting the problem of so-called ‘limping marriages’,23 introduced a new condition for the conduct of marriages, namely that spouses grant each other equal rights to divorce, a move that upset the Roman Catholic Church. Critics have argued that this amendment will have

23 This is when a civil divorce has been granted but one party refuses to recognise it with reference to religious principles and thereby limits the possibility of the other party to remarry. For a discussion of the debates and political processes on ‘limping marriages’, see Ferrari de Carli, Eli, “Muslimske kvinner, haltende ekteskap og skilsmisse: Prosessen rundt politiske initiativ til lovendringer (Muslim women, limping marriages and divorce: The process around political initiatives to change the law)”, Norsk tidsskrift for migrasjons- forskning, vol. 9, no. 1 (2008), pp. 5–26, and idem, “Shariʿa-råd til diskusjon (Shariʿa councils under discussion)”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), pp. 58–72. 468 Leirvik

little practical impact on solving the problem of so-called limping marriages. The possibility of establishing a Shariʿa council or a Muslim divorce council has also been discussed as options for dealing with these issues but has met with considerable resistance from many quarters.24 Currently, several non-governmental organisations offer counselling on family-related conflicts, including ‘limping marriages’. Inheritance is regulated by the law of inheritance. Distribution of inheritance can be public or private; in the latter case the heirs themselves distribute the inheritance, but regulations covering minimum inheritance must be observed.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue is commonly regarded as rather well-established in Norway.25 Since 1993, the Islamic Council in Norway has taken part in regular bi- and multilateral dialogues with other faith and life stance communities in Norway. In addition to its function as an ecumenical body for intra-Muslim consultation, the Islamic Council is a co-founder of the Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities (www.trooglivssyn.no ), in which all the major religious communities in Norway as well as the Humanist Association participate. Through the interfaith council and sometimes directly, it is regularly consulted by the government in matters pertaining to the politics of religion. The Council is also an active and visible participant in public debates about religion and society in Norway, addressing social and ethical issues of common concern. A Contact Group for the Church of Norway and the Islamic Council of Norway was formed in 1992–93.26 Central issues on the Contact Group’s agenda have been religion in school; Muslim minority concerns in Norway;

24 For a critical discussion of legal pluralism in the Norwegian context, see Farhat Taj: Legal Pluralism, Human Rights and Islam in Norway. Making Norwegian Law Available, Acceptable and Accessible to Women in a Multicultural Setting. Phd-thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo 2013. 25 See for instance Leirvik, Oddbjørn, Religionspluralisme: Mangfald, konflikt og dialog i Norge (Religious Pluralism: Diversity, Conflict and Dialogue in Norway) (Oslo: Pax, 2007), and “Christian-Muslim relations in a state church situation: Politics of religion and interfaith dialogue”, in Jamal Malik (ed.), Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre (Münster: lit Verlag, 2004), pp. 101–114. 26 See http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/Kontaktgruppa.htm, accessed 2 January 2014. For the work of the Contact Group, see the special issue of Norsk Tidsskrift for Misjonsvitenskap 4: 2013 Norway 469

Islamophobia; the precarious situation of Christians in some Muslim countries; religion and violence; issues related to gender equality and the situation of women; freedom of expression and moral responsibility; homosexuality; and the question of conversion. Joint declarations have been issued about freedom of religion and the right of conversion (2007),27 against violence in close relationships (2009),28 and on religious extremism (2011).29 Muslim organisations also take part in a number of regional interfaith councils, for instance in the cities of Drammen and Stavanger.30

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The coverage of issues related to the Muslim population and Islam is quite significant in the Norwegian media. Studies indicate that most of the coverage is problem-oriented and stereotypical.31 From the mid-1990s, most media discussions have focused on women-related issues, such as arranged or forced marriages, the question of whether a Muslim woman may marry a non-Muslim man, female genital mutilation, and the head scarf.32 A particularly controversial theme more recently has been the situation of homosexual Muslims and Islam’s position on homosexuality.33 Notwithstanding their continuing moral reservations against homosexuality), in 2009 the Islamic Council publicly denounced harassment of homosexuals. Muslims representing a variety of positions increasingly initiate and participate in public debate. Among the general public, inclusive attitudes compete with anxiety in relation to Islam and Muslims. Figures from the so-called ‘Integration barometer’ (imdi 2012), showed that attitudes towards Muslims and towards the building of mosques had become somewhat less negative than two years before. Four in

published on the occasion of the 20 years’ anniversary of the Contact Group (articles by Oddbjørn Leirvik, Jan Opsal, Anne Hege Grung and Faruk Terzić). 27 See www.kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=149142, accessed 2 January 2014. 28 See www.kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=265872, accessed 2 January 2014. 29 See http://kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=363357, accessed 24 January 2014. 30 See http://www.trooglivssyn.no/index.cfm?id=367830, accessed 2 January 2014. 31 Sindre Bangstad: “Inclusion and exclusion in the mediated public sphere: the case of Norway and its Muslims”, Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale 3: 2013, pp. 356–370. 32 For a discussion of debates on gender and Islam in Norway, see for instance Roald, Anne Sofie, Er muslimske kvinner undertrykt? (Are Muslim women Oppressed?) (Oslo: Pax, 2005). 33 Olav Elgvin, Kristine Bue and Arne Backer Grønningsæter: “Åpne rom, lukkede rom: lhbt i etniske minoritetsgrupper.” (Oslo: fafo report 36, 2013). 470 Leirvik ten, 11 percentage points less than in 2010, expressed scepticism of people of Muslim faith.34 Among the political parties, the populist right wing Progress Party (which received 16.3% of the votes in the 2013 parliamentary elections and was invited to form the new government together with the much larger Conservative Party) has repeatedly warned against ‘Islamisation’ during their electoral campaigns, for instance in 2009, when the party suggested that new and covert forms of Islamisation (snikislamisering—creeping Islamisation) could be identified in Norway. Similar stands have been voiced by groups associated with the New Christian Right, although their warnings against Islamisation have regularly been countered by mainstream Christian leaders.35 Several smaller organisations such as Stop the Islamisation of Norway (sian) and Norwegian Defence League represent a more hostile discourse in public. In recent years, fear of ‘radicalisation’ of Muslim youth has become a recurrent topic in public debate,36 particularly after a 2010 demonstration against another offending Muhammad-cartoon, in which one of the speakers (later to be associated with The Prophet’s Ummah, see below) accused Norway of crusading against Islam and warned of a Norwegian 9/11.37 Public opinion and debate about Islam is still affected by the terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011. Although the nature of Anders Behring Breivik’s violence shocked everyone, including anti-Islamic activists, ideologically his so-called Manifesto borrows extensively from well-known anti-Islamic ideologues, in Europe (for example, the Eurabia discourse)38 and the us.39 Ideological influences from anti-Islamic networks on Norwegian debates have thus received increased critical attention in public debates. Nevertheless, in many Internet debates anti-Muslim sentiments remain unabated.40

34 Integreringsbarometeret 2012. Holdninger til innvandring, integrering og mangfold. Oslo: imdi. (Integration barometer 2012: Attitudes to immigration, integration and diversity). 35 Cf. Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “The cartoon controversy in Norway: The new Christian right and liberal fundamentalism confronting Islam?”, in Mårtensson, Ulrika et al. (eds.), I Ulrika Mårtensson m.fl. (red.): Fundamentalism in the Modern World, volume 2: Culture, Media and the Public Sphere, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 125–146. 36 See Lars Akerhaug: Norsk jihad; muslimske ekstremister blant oss. (Oslo: Kagge 2013). 37 Cf. Lena Larsen: “Striden om Muhammad”, Dagbladet 19 February 2010. 38 Sindre Bangstad: “Eurabia comes to Norway”. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 3: 2013, pp. 369–391. 39 Cf. the report “Fear, Inc. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America.” (Centre for American Progress, 2010). 40 Andersson, Mette ‘The debate about multicultural Norway before and after 22 July 2011’, in Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 19: 4, 418–427; Eriksen, Thomas H.: ‘The Norway 471

In connection with the film “Innocence of Muslims”, in 2012 a new group of mainly young Muslims called “The Prophet’s Ummah” gained public attention for their fierce demonstration outside the American Embassy, rallying some 100 young people some of whom publicly invoked the example of Osama bin Laden. The Islamic Council, on the other hand, simultaneously held a meeting which could be seen as a counter-demonstration, with 6,000 participants including the Bishop of Oslo and the Mayor of Oslo. Critical attention towards jihadi attitudes associated with “The Prophet’s Ummah” continued in 2013, as expressed in both research and journalism.41 The Norwegian Police Security Service has also increasingly voiced its concerns about some young Norwegian Muslims’ involvement in conflicts abroad.42

16 Major Cultural Events

Since 2007, the Islamic Cultural Centre has staged an annual Eid Mela (festival) in Oslo, which attracts around 5,000 visitors. The event includes food, exhibition stalls, children’s activities, and concerts featuring popular nasheed (Islam- oriented songs) artists. Several mosques and organisations host iftar-dinners in Ramadan. In Oslo, there is also a yearly ‘multicultural’ Mela featuring music styles and artists from around the world. In the city of Stavanger, the regional Muslim Council stages an annual Ramadan festival with a broad spectrum of public events.

net of hatred: after Utøya’, Open Democracy Net 6 September 2011 (www.opendemocracy .net/thomas-hylland-eriksen/net-of-hatred-after-ut%C3%B8ya) and Bangstad, Sindre: ‘Whatever happened to Norway’s incitement laws?’ irr Newsletter 20 October 2011 (www .irr.org.uk/news/whatever-happened-to-norways-incitement-laws/), both accessed 2 Jan- uary 2014. 41 Cf. Marius Linge: “Den konservative vekkelsen. Om IslamNet, Profetens Umma og salafismens fremvekst i Norge”. Samtiden 4: 2013, pp. 38–53, and Lars Akerhaug: Norsk jihad; muslimske ekstremister blant oss. (Oslo: Kagge 2013). 42 The Norwegian Police Security Service: “Åpen trusselvurdering 2013”, under the heading “Politically motivated violence: Extreme Islamism” (pp. 4–6). Poland

Agata S. Nalborczyk* and Stanisław Grodź**

1 Muslim Populations

The presence of Muslims in Poland goes back to the turn of the 14th/15th centuries when some Tatars (prisoners of war and refugees from the Golden Horde, officially Muslim from the 13th century)1 were settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (at that time in a shared monarchy with Poland, later forming the Kingdom of Two Nations).2 By the 16th century, they had lost their mother tongue but retained their religion and customs.3 In the second part of the 17th century, a new wave of Tatar settlers was given land in Podlachia (Polish Podlasie, present day north-east Poland).4 When the Polish state regained independence after World War i, only 19 Muslim religious communities with their mosques and cemeteries remained within its new borders. After World War ii and the move of Polish state borders westwards, only a tiny part (about 10%) of the territories settled by Tatars remained within the new Polish state. Post-war migrations dispersed Tatars, resulting in small communities living in Gdańsk, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Szczecin or Wrocław, places far from their original settlements in the Białystok district (north-east of the country) and Warsaw. The Communist regime did not formally revoke recognition of religions but in practice, in an atmosphere generally unfavourable to religion, Tatar communities kept a low profile.5

* Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk is Assistant Professor in the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw. ** Dr Stanisław Grodź teaches in the Department of History and Ethnology of Religion, Faculty of Theology, Catholic University of Lublin. 1 Borawski, Piotr and Aleksander Dubiński, Tatarzy polscy: Dzieje, obrzędy, legendy, tradycje (Polish Tatars: History, Rituals, Legends, Traditions) (Warsaw: Iskry, 1986), p. 15. 2 Tyszkiewicz, Jan, Z historii Tatarów polskich 1794–1944 (From the History of the Polish Tatars, 1794–1944) (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2002), p. 15. 3 Borawski, Piotr, Tatarzy w dawnej Rzeczpospolitej (Tatars in the Erstwhile Commonwealth [of Poland and Lithuania]) (Warsaw: lsw, 1986), pp. 199–202. 4 Sobczak, Jacek, Położenie prawne ludności tatarskiej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim (Legal Situation of the Tatar Population in the Grand Dutchy of Lithuania) (Warsaw-Poznań: pwn, 1984), pp. 34–38. 5 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland: The past and the present”, Islamochristiana, vol. 32 (2006), pp. 229–230, 234.

Muslim foreign students began arriving in Poland in the 1970s. Some of them married locally and stayed. After the changes towards democracy of the late 1980s, they were joined by Muslim refugees, traders and professionals from the Middle East and elsewhere in Asia.6 Some of the immigrants became Polish citizens and some got residence permits. They have been coming primarily from the Arab world (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen) and the Balkans and live mainly in university cities (Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lublin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Kraków, Poznań, Opole, Łódź, Rzeszów). The refugees are mainly from Chechnya,7 Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Iraq.8 There are no official data on the total number of Muslims (the Constitution [Sect. 7, Art. 53] rules out asking a question about religious affiliation in the census). Estimates by various offices and organisations place the number within the range of 15,000 to 30,000 (0.04%–0.08% of the total population). The latest firm figures on the Muslim Religious Union (Muzułmański Związek Religijny, mzr) are from 2002 and give a membership of 5,123.9 The Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, lm) claims about 180 registered members. There are also some Polish converts but no figures are available.

2 Islam and the State

The Republic of Poland is a secular state and various acts of Parliament10 regulate relations between the state and the main religions organisations.11 Other

6 Nalborczyk, “Islam in Poland”, p. 230. 7 For more details, see: Łukasiewicz, Karolina, “Strategies of reconstructing Islam in exile. A case of Chechens in Poland”, in K. Górak-Sosnowska (ed.), Muslims in Eastern Europe. Widening the European discourse on Islam (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2011), pp. 88–107; www.orient.uw.edu.pl/msz/teksty/8_lukasiewicz_Muslimscee.pdf. 8 Settlers, people on contracts and refugees are categorised according to their former/present citizenship, not their religious affiliation. 9 Mały rocznik statystyczny 2003 (Small Statistical Yearbook) (Warsaw: gus, 2003), pp. 135– 137. The statistical yearbooks from 2004 on do not contain any data on mzr membership. In a television programme in early March 2009, the Mufti said that there were about 12,000 Muslim Polish citizens and official residents. 10 For more details, see: Nalborczyk, Agata S. and Paweł Borecki, “Relations between Islam and the state in Poland: the legal position of Polish Muslims”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 22 (2011), no. 3, pp. 349–350. 11 There are 15 of these: 12 Christian churches, the Union of Jewish Religious Groups, the Karaim Religious Union and the Muslim Religious Union (the last two on the basis of the law of 21 April 1936 governing recognition of religions). 474 Nalborczyk and Grodź religious organisations must be registered in the Register of Churches and Religious Associations. On the basis of the law of 21 April 1936, Islam gained official recognition in the Polish state with Muzułmański Związek Religijny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (mzr, established in 1925) as the only Muslim organisation representing Muslims in Poland.12 This law stated that the Mufti (elected by democratic vote), imams and muezzins would receive their salaries from the state.13 The act was not repealed by the government after World War ii or after the democratic changes of 1989, though the 1997 Constitution overruled some of its regulations, relating to financial support from the state, the official seat of mzr14 (until this point still formally located in Vilnius, Lithuania, and the obligation for Muslims in Poland to belong to it15). The act still gives mzr the right to conduct religious education in schools and provides for the teachers to be paid by the state.16 The state does not fund religious organisations, but they can obtain public funding for specific projects. New legal regulations after 1989 made provision for the registration of new Muslim religious organisations; any religious group with at least 100 members can now register with the government. mzr has thus ceased to have the monopoly but has retained its privileged position.17 Two small Shiʿi groups were registered in 1990 and a new Sunni organisation called the Muslim League (Liga Muzułmańska, lm) was registered in 2004.18

12 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Monitor of the Acts of the Republic of Poland), vol. 30 (1936), point 240. Sobczak, Jacek, “Położenie prawne polskich wyznawców islamu (Legal situation of Polish Muslims)”, in R. Baecker and Sh. Kitab (eds), Islam a świat (Islam and the World) (Toruń: Mado, 2004), pp. 186–197. 13 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of the New Acts), Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education) 1432, p. 80. The Mufti received a salary equal to that of a diocesan bishop. 14 For more details, see: Nalborczyk and Borecki, pp. 349–351 and 355. 15 The Communist regime put an end to funding any religious body from the public purse. Vilnius, located within Polish state borders before World War ii, was the official seat of mzr. Compulsory membership in mzr for Tatars was intended to ensure that there was only one Muslim organisation to represent Muslims vis-à-vis the state authorities. 16 For more details, see: Nalborczyk Agata S., “Islamic religious education in Poland— curricula and textbooks”, in Aslan, E. (ed.), Islamic textbooks and curricula in Europe (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2011), p. 183. 17 Borecki, Paweł, “Położenie prawne wyznawców islamu w Polsce (Legal status of Muslims in Poland)”, Państwo i Prawo, vol. 63, no. 1 (January 2008), pp. 72–84 (73). 18 Nalborczyk, “Islam in Poland”, pp. 231–233; Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Status prawny muzułmanów w Polsce i jego wpływ na organizację ich życia religijnego (Legal status of Muslims in Poland and its influence on the organisation of their religious life)”, in A. Par- zymies (ed.), Muzułmanie w Europie (Muslims in Europe) (Warsaw: Wyd. Akademickie Dialog, 2005), pp. 232–233. Poland 475

A petition was submitted on 24 April 2007 by mzr to the Polish government requesting new legislation to regulate the relationship between the state and mzr. The present government acknowledges that the 1936 Act, which is still in force, is anachronistic. However, the negotiations have not resulted in any new regulations yet. The Polish President received an mzr delegation with Mufti Miśkiewicz on the feast of Mawlid (pol. Miełlud) in a series of New Year meetings with representatives of various religious communities. He underlined the Tatar contribution to the country’s independence struggles and wished his guests would enjoy the respect and friendship of other citizens. The Mufti expressed grati- tude for including the mosques of Kruszyniany and Bohoniki in the Polish List of Historical Monuments signed by the President in 2012.

3 Main Muslim Organisations19

Registered religious communities (związki wyznaniowe):

– The Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland (Muzułmański Związek Religijny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, mzr, 15–052 Białystok, ul. Piastowska 13F, 42; tel.: +48 85 732 4023, http://www.mzr.pl) is a Sunni organisation established in 1925. The Mufti of the Republic of Poland and Chairman of the Highest Muslim Board of Muslim Religious Union in Poland is Tomasz Miśkiewicz, who was elected by the council of imams on 20 March 2004 (the first council since World War ii). Apart from his religious/legal functions, he assumes the role of the official representative of Muslims. During the 18th All-Polish Congress of mzr on 17–18 November 2012, the participants voted in favour of separating the office of the Mufti from that of the Chairman of the Highest Board (at variance with the Act of 1936, still in force). They also decided to hold elections for a new Mufti in 2013. In the effect of subsequent actions, the Department of Religious Affairs and Religious Minorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs confirmed the recognition of Tomasz Miśkiewicz as the Mufti of mzr. Though the elections have not taken place so far, members of some communities do not recognise Mufti Miśkiewicz and act in a parallel way to the official structures. Internal tensions have become visible. Membership in mzr is voluntary and open to Muslim Polish citizens and

19 For more details, see: Nalborczyk, Agata S. and Monika Ryszewska, “Islamic Organizations in Poland. From monopoly to pluralism”, in Islamic Organizations in Europe and the usa. A Multidisciplinary Perspective, Matthias Kortmann and Kerstin Rosenow-Williams (ed.) (Basingstoke-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 13–36. 476 Nalborczyk and Grodź

all Muslims who have permanent residence in Poland.20 Some local mzr communities run their own websites (e.g. Bohoniki—www.bohoniki.eu; Kruszyniany—www.kruszyniany.com.pl/ or Gdańsk—www.meczetgdansk.pl/) – Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczy- pospolitej Polskiej, lm, 01–046 Warsaw, ul. Niska 25/43, www.islam.info.pl) is another Sunni organisation established in 2001 and registered on 6 Janu- ary 2004. The Chairman of the General Council is Ali Abi Issa (elected on 10 November 2012). The Mufti of lm, Nidal Abu Tabaq (elected in 2009) is also the president of the Council of Imams (elected in 2012). Membership in lm is open to Muslims with Polish citizenship, as well as Muslims holding a permanent or temporary residence permit. Links to websites of local communities are to be found on the official website given above, apart from the lm Muslim Centre in Kraków—www.cmwk.wordpress.com

Two quite small registered Shiʿi organisations:

– The Association of Muslim Unity (Stowarzyszenie Jedności Muzułmańskiej, 02–679 Warsaw, ul. Pieńkowskiego 4/91, www.shiapoland.pl) was registered on 31 January 1990 and is led by the chief imam Rafał Berger. – Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly (Islamskie Zgromadzenie Ahl-ul-Bayt, 05–840 Brwinów, Moszna 4a, contact address: skr.poczt.108, 05–800 Pruszków; [email protected]; www.abia.pl/) was registered on 17 December 1990 and its chief imam is Ryszard Ahmed Rusnak.

Muslim associations:

– The Muslim Students Society in Poland (Stowarzyszenie Studentów Muzułmańskich w Polsce, ul. Hetmańska 63, 15–727 Białystok, tel.: ++48

20 mzr has traditionally been regarded as a mainly (at times almost exclusively) Tatar organisation, which in fact is not true—15% of members are non-Tatars (i.e. immigrants from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and converts). This fictitious exclusiveness led to the creation of other organisations and associations by non-Tatar Muslims, including Muslim students’ cultural organisations. Formation of the new religious organisation, the Muslim League (lm), was a step further taken by Muslims (of mainly Arab origin and Polish converts associated with them) around the turn of the century. Separate cultural associations continue to exist. Officially, the relationship between mzr and lm is amicable. Some prayer rooms are used by members of both organisations. The emphasis on ‘holding a residence permit’ is intended to maintain an orderly relationship with the state authorities. Both organisations were brought into existence by the will of members of the Muslim community and not at the instigation of or under pressure from any state authorities. Poland 477

856514021, www.islam.org.pl) has branches in Białystok, Poznań, Wrocław and Katowice. – The Muslim Association for Cultural Formation (Muzułmańskie Stowar- zyszenie Kształtowania Kulturalnego, ul. Kolejowa 15, skr.poczt.109, Białystok, http://www.mskk-islam.8m.com). – The Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland (Związek Tatarów Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Bohoniki 23, 16–100 Sokółka, http://ztrp.pl) was established in 1992. Its president is Jan Adamowicz. – Institute for the Study of Islam (Instytut Studiów nad Islamem al. Kasprowicza 24; 51–137 Wrocław; tel.: ++48 713260026; www.isni.pl) was established in 2009. Its President is Tomasz Stefaniuk and the Administrative Director Ali Abi Issa.

Islamic foundations:

– Dunaj Instytut Dialogu (Fethullah Gülen movement), did, ul. Wiejska 18/7a, 00–490 Warszawa, tel.: ++48 224152016, www.dialoginstytut.pl/; registered on 27 March 2009. – The Polish Sufi Jalaleddin Rumi Foundation (Polska Fundacja Sufich im. Dżelaladdina Rumiego), ul. Pogodna 5, 05–502 Wólka Kozodawska/Piasec- zno, tel.: ++48 512460440, www.sufi.org.pl; registered in 2012.

These organisations are involved in various ways in organising religious instruction for their members and for Muslim children, public lectures on various aspects of Islam, and publication of Polish translations of Muslim authors’ works (mainly on ‘religious’ topics). The Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland concentrates on the cultural heritage of Polish Tatars.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses21

There are three mosques (in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany in north-eastern Poland dating from the 18th–19th centuries, and one in Gdańsk that opened in 1990). In Poland, Muslims distinguish between so-called Islamic centres (places for prayer, plus offices, libraries, meeting halls) and small ‘prayer houses’ (places

21 For more details, see: A.S. Nalborczyk, “Mosques in Poland. Past and present”, in Górak- Sosnowska K. (ed.), Muslims in Eastern Europe. Widening the European Discourse on Islam (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2011), pp. 183–193; www.orient.uw.edu.pl/msz/teksty/14_ nalborczyk_Muslimscee.pdf. 478 Nalborczyk and Grodź for prayer), which are almost unnoticeable from the outside. There are Islamic centres in Białystok (Muslim Cultural Centre, ul. Piastowska 13f and another under construction), Warsaw, Lublin, Wrocław, Poznań, Katowice and Kraków. There are prayer houses in Białystok, Suchowola, Łódź, Katowice and Poznań,22 but the total number of them is not known. Some of the Islamic centres and prayer houses named on the official websites of mzr and lm are used by members of both organisations, or used by one but listed by both. A new Centre of Islamic Culture is being constructed by lm in Warsaw (due to be opened for Ramadan 2012 but still not ready as of the end of 2013). Another new Islamic Centre was opened in Katowice in May 2013. Representatives of the mzr Kruszyniany community signed an agreement that begins construction work—with the help of the eu funds—of the Education and Muslim Culture Centre of the Polish Tatars there on 17 July 2013. It is also to play a tourist centre role and cooperate in research with the University of Warsaw and University in Białystok.

5 Children’s Education mzr, as a religious organisation operating under an act of Parliament, has the right to teach religion in public schools and its teachers are paid by the state. The ministerial regulation of 1992 states that a minimum of seven pupils having a particular religious affiliation in the same school is required in order for separate religious education classes to be provided. In 2004, the Ministry of Education approved a school curriculum for Muslim religious instruction prepared by mzr. In Białystok and in nearby Sokółka, Islamic religious instruction is provided for Muslim children in public schools. In Warsaw, lm runs an inter- school group for Muslim religious instruction at primary school level for pupils from Mazowsze district (Warsaw area).23 In other parts of the country, religious education for Muslim children is provided by the local Muslim communities independently of the school system (weekend classes). At school, these children attend ethics classes together with all the others who do not wish to attend Roman Catholic or other religious instruction classes. There are no Muslim primary or secondary schools.

22 www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=16, accessed 24 February 2014. 23 For more details, see: Nalborczyk, “Islamic religious education in Poland”, pp. 183–184. Poland 479

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no facilities to train imams locally and no Muslim higher education institutions. Islam features in the academic curricula of several universities but the courses are mainly run by non-Muslims. Courses on the history of the Muslim world, Arabic language and some aspects of Islamic doctrine are taught. Muslim religious education teachers and imams have to acquire their formal Islamic education abroad ( formerly in Sarajevo, but now elsewhere). lm established Instytut Studiów nad Islamem—isni in Wrocław in 2009. It is meant to provide a “forum for research and communication”. isni sets its goals as: disseminating knowledge about Islam, history and culture(s) of the Islamic world, Polish contacts with the Muslim world; dialogue with Christianity and other religions; building bridges of understanding between representatives of various cultural, religious and ideological traditions; building and sustaining academic links. Several new publications are being prepared, most of them translations. It is notable that some of them focus on the religious aspect of Muslim life, trying to fill a significant void in publications on Islam available in Polish (introduction to the study of the Qur’an; the role of the Qur’an in the life of Muslims. Details are available on the Institute website).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Three Muslim cemeteries are currently in use (just outside Bohoniki, established in the second half of the 18th century; in Kruszyniany, established in the 17th/18th century; and on Tatarska street, Warsaw, opened in 1868). Another two that existed from the late 17th century have been closed (in Lebiedziew after World War i and in Studzianka after World War ii). Two other disused cemeteries still exist in Bohoniki ( from the late 17th century) and on Młynarska street, Warsaw (in use from 1838 to 1868).24 Separate sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in Gdańsk, Wrocław and Poznań.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no Muslim ‘chaplaincies.’ This is due to the fact that numbers of Muslims are small and their needs can be met informally through the community.

24 www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=18, accessed 24 February 2014. 480 Nalborczyk and Grodź

9 Religious Festivals

Muslim religious festivals are not public holidays. Muslims can take a day off provided they make up the time missed. Qurban Bayram (ʿId al-Adha) is celebrated by mzr members in one of the locations in northeast of the country and is a public event. Sometimes non-Muslims are invited as guests. Ramadan Bayram (ʿId al-Fitr) has generally been celebrated more privately, though lm has started a practice of organising a so-called Wieczór ramadanowy (Ramadan evening), an iftar for representatives of Muslim communities and invited non- Muslims. mzr also organised Ramadan Bayram celebration called Podlaskie Dni Bajramowe—Bayram Days of Podlasie, open iftar for Muslims and non- Muslim guests in Warsaw and Białystok, and celebration of Miełlud (Mawlid) and Muslim New Year.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

An Act of 17 May 1989 (Art. 2, Sect 9) allowed recognised religious bodies to produce items necessary to practice their religious duties. That had been interpreted as permission for halal slaughter of animals. It was the Animal Preservation Act of 21 August 1997 (Art. 34, Sect. 5) that allowed officially recognised religious organisations exceptions from the approved method of animal slaughter (i.e. not stunning animals prior to slaughtering). However, an amendment to the Act introduced on 6 June 2002 removed the clause thus preventing religious organisations from claiming any exemptions. It seems that that step was not noticed by the religious bodies and somehow disregarded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development because the ministerial directive on the qualifications of persons authorised to conduct professional animal slaughter and on conditions and methods of animal slaughter issued on 9 September 2004 allowed for exemptions from stunning animals before slaughtering according to “religious customs of the registered religious organisations” (art. 8, sect 2). An agreement signed by mzr with the Chief Veterinary Officer in 2006 was based on that ministerial directive and Act of 1936 (see www.halalpoland.pl—the site is still undergoing reconstruction.)25 This agreement was challenged by lm as incompatible with freedom of religious practice and was revoked. In 2007, lm also gained the

25 At present the website refers the viewers to hp System Quality&Consulting, an official representative of mzr with regard to issues related to halal. Poland 481 right to issue halal certificates.26 In October 2010, all Muslim religious organisations (and the Ahmadiyya) signed two documents at the Chief Veterinary Office—the first one concerning the procedure of issuing certificates on the qualification of a slaughterhouse for the halal slaughter of animals, and the second one describing the rules and conditions of halal meat production. The situation was challenged by animal preservation organisations that brought the case to the attention of the Constitutional Tribunal in 2012. The verdict of the Tribunal from 27 November 2012 declared that Art. 8, Point 2 of the directive by the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development was incompatible with the Animal Preservation Act and with the Constitution. It resulted in banning the halal slaughter of animals in Poland from 1 January 2013. Before that date the Polish authorities informed the European Commission that more restrictive (higher?) standards of animal preservation were in effect in Poland than those to be implemented in the country according to the Council directive No. 1099/2009 of 24 September, 2009. The government attempted to pass an amendment to the Animal Preservation Act, referring to the eu directives, but it was rejected by the Parliament on 12 July 2013. However, Mufti Miśkiewicz acquired a legal opinion stating that the ban on ritual slaughter in Poland is ineffective because the Polish government had not effectively informed the European Commission about more restrictive standards of animal preservation applied in Poland.27 Acting upon this opinion he ritually slaughtered a ram by the mosque in Bohoniki on ʿId al-Adha (15 October 2013) in spite of the presence of some animal rights groups’ activists in the vicinity. Though the latter had not seen the actual slaughtering, they reported a possibility of com- mitting a crime by Mufti to the prosecutor’s office in Białystok. After the feast Mufti himself went to the prosecutor’s office informing that he had ritually slaughtered one ram for the feast. The prosecutor dismissed the case and sent Mufti home. In turn, Mufti reported the animal rights’ activists to the prosecutor’s office for disrupting a religious feast and religious practices (punishable under the Freedom of Conscience and Religion Act of 1989). Though lm also

26 http://rada-imamow.pl/certyfikacja-halal/11-oferta-certyfikacji-halal, accessed 11 January 2013. 27 Prof. Marek Chmaj was the author of that legal opinion. During a press conference the Mufti declared that the celebration of the forthcoming ʿId al-Adha would proceed as usual. He also appealed to the Minister of Agriculture to issue directives allowing ritual slaughter on the basis of the European Commission directive (1099/2009). Muzułmanie: w Polsce dopuszczalny jest ubój rytualny, Polska Agencja Prasowa, 10 September 2013, http:// finanse.wp.pl/kat,1034079,title,Muzulmanie-w-Polsce-dopuszczalny-jest-uboj-rytualny,w id,15970539,wiadomosc.html; accessed 15 September 2013. 482 Nalborczyk and Grodź had a right of issuing halal certificates, they neither participated in the debate, nor took any legal actions, nor protested. Before all that turmoil halal meat was mainly imported. Only few shops and some restaurants with Middle Eastern cuisine offered it in the country. None of the Muslim religious organisations gives addresses of the shops or restaurants with halal food. Some can be found on Internet fora where Muslims exchange opinions and give advice.

11 Dress Codes

There are no regulations restricting the wearing of hijab or niqab. Some young Muslim women, mainly converts of Polish origin but more recently also young Tatar women, wear hijab in public. Historically, Tatar women usually wore hijab only during prayers, something many of them continue doing nowadays.28

12 Publication and Media

Muslim periodicals cover various aspects of Muslim culture and religious matters. Those listed here are all in Polish:

– Quarterly Przegląd Tatarski is published with financial support from the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. Four issues were published in 2013 (accessible on the mzr webpage; in all 20 issues since 2009). – As-Salam (www.as-salam.pl) is published by lm and 29 issues have appeared between 2004 and 2013. It addresses general and local socio-political and religious issues and is aimed at the general reader. Al-Hikmah is older but is distributed mainly among Muslims.

Some official websites contain sections including past and current Muslim publications, like some of the above mentioned periodicals.

– www.muzulmanie.com—ownership not stated, but probably run by members of lm.

28 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Muslim women in Poland and Lithuania: Tatar tradition, religious practice, hijab and marriage”, in Adamiak, E., et al. (eds), Gender and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe (Poznań: Wydział Teologiczny Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza, 2009), p. 66. Poland 483

– www.shiapoland.com/ and www.al-islam.org.pl—the website of the Polish Shiʿi community, run by the members of the Association of Muslim Unity. – http://sites.google.com/site/oislamie—a private independent initiative by a group of Polish Muslim women providing information on Islam using high quality translations and sources; see also: http://muzulmanki.blogspot.com/.

Internet fora include www.islam.fora.pl (1,940 registered users). Some Islamic organisations have their profiles on Facebook (numbers for 31 December 2013):

– Islam po polsku—14,348 fans; Muslim League—828 fans; The Association of Muslim Unity—392 fans; The Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland—313 fans; Islamic Cultural-Educational Centre in Poznań (lm)—1,671 fans; Institute for the Study of Islam—451 fans; Muslim Students Society—599 fans; Tatars of the Republic of Poland (Tatarzy rp)—436 fans

It is clear that lm and organisations associated with it, and the local lm sections are much more active on Facebook than circles connected with mzr. Most of the Facebook activities of the latter are related to the Tatar culture and tradition.

13 Family Law

Only marriages conducted in a civil ceremony at a state registry office are legally valid, so Muslims usually follow the civil ceremony with a Muslim ceremony on Muslim premises. Marriages of couples who are not Polish citizens are valid under international private law, but polygamy is illegal.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Common Council of Catholics and Muslims (Rada Wspólna Katolików i Muzułmanów, www.radawspolna.pl/) was established in 1997 with the aim of fostering friendly relations between Christians and Muslims, and disseminating reliable information about Christianity and Islam and their mutual contacts. The Council is headed by two co-chairpersons (a Christian and a Muslim). Its main achievement has been the introduction of the Islam Day in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which is celebrated on 26 January. This initiative was met by a positive response from the Polish Bishops’ Conference 484 Nalborczyk and Grodź and has been incorporated into the church calendar of events. It is celebrated locally, especially in places where there is a Muslim community.29 In 2013, the 13th Islam Day was marked with the main celebration held in Warsaw. “Assisi in Gdańsk,” an interreligious meeting organised by the Franciscans (ofm) in cooperation with others and held to commemorate the original event of 1986, gathers representatives of various religions for prayer and discussion on an agreed theme. The 8th event was held on 25 October 2013. The Polish Sufi Jalaleddin Rumi Foundation organised an event in Warsaw under the auspices of the World Interfaith Harmony Week in cooperation with a Christian association on 7 February 2013. On 18 May 2013, the Muslim community in Kruszyniany combined its cultural event (Sabantuj) with a religious aspect, adding interreligious prayers for peace in the world. These were attended by the representatives of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches. On 29 May 2013, the official opening of the Islamic Centre in Katowice run by lm was combined with the celebration of the ‘Christianity Day’ among the Muslims in Poland (in relation to the ‘Islam Day’ in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland). Representatives of local authorities and religious communities took part in the event. The organisers intend to hold it annually.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Usually coverage of matters concerning Muslims is scarce, reporting interreligious encounters (e.g. the Day of Islam in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland on 26 January), or highlighting some ‘hot issues’. Ritual slaughtering of animals was brought to public attention several times, as presented above in the section on halal food. The media gave wide coverage of the problem.30 On 25 September 2013, the Polish Roman Catholic Bishops’ Conference issued a statement sharing concern of Jews and Muslims about restricting their rights to freedom of religion, religious practices and customs, including ritual slaughter of animals. The media also reported an unsuccessful arson attempt on the mosque in Gdańsk on 16 October 2013, just a day after Mufti slaughtered the ram in Bohoniki. Public opinion linked these events suggesting a ‘retaliatory act’ on the part of animal rights activists. The imam, who opposes Mufti Miśkiewicz,

29 Grodź, Stanisław, “Christian-Muslim Experiences in Poland”, Exchange, vol. 39, no. 3 (2010), pp. 270–284. 30 www.rp.pl/temat/960322.html, accessed on 22 February 2014. Poland 485 shared that view. The act received widespread condemnation and the city authorities, together with some local institutions and private donors, offered financial help in repairing the damage. There were some attempts at making the local authorities ban the annual (the 27th) Summer Assembly organised by lm in July 2013 in Puławy. That was the first time an attempt at public protest was made, using electronic media to organize protestors with apparently little involvement from the inhabitants of the town. The president of Puławy did not allow the protesters to stage a picket line on the grounds that it intended to disrupt public order. The Assembly went on uninterrupted but there was visible presence of police patrols.

16 Major Cultural Events

“Muslim Culture Days” (Dni Kultury Muzułmańskiej)—a series of occasional cultural events were organised in various cities (Gdańsk, Białystok, Wrocław, Poznań) in previous years. A number of events on aspects of Tatar culture were held in various locations:

– Sabantuj—an annual Tatar gathering (with songs, dance, games and sports) on 18 May 2013 in Kruszyniany; – a series of meetings promoting Tatar culture—‘Wschód Kultury’ (‘The Rise of Culture’; the Polish word ‘wschód’ may also refer to ‘East’/‘Orient’) in Białystok—a debate about Muslims in Poland, a lecture about Islamic art, poetry recitation evenings, tasting of Tatar dishes on 25–29 May 2013; – Tatar Culture Festival in Lublin-Tatary on 30 June 2013; – 5th Encounter with the Tatar and regional culture—archery workshop, film show about the history of Tatars, family games—on 13 July 2013; – a Tatar ball was held in Białystok on 9 August 2013 on the first day of the Ramadan Bayram holiday as a part of the programme of the 8th Podlasie Bayram Days; – Tatar Festival on the 330th anniversary of the Battle of Vienna and the Tatar settlement in Podlachia region—10–11 August 2013 in Supraśl; – xv Letnia Akademia Wiedzy o Tatarach Polskich (15th Summer Academy of Polish Tatar Lore) organised by the local action group Szlak Tatarski (Tatar Trail) together with the local Muslim religious community in Bohoniki and local authorities in Sokółka, 10–11 August 2013; – vi Dance Workshops of ‘Buńczuk’ ensemble financed by public funds, 1st edition ended on 19 May 2013, the 2nd on 8 December 2013. 486 Nalborczyk and Grodź

The Muslim Religious Community in Białystok organised a celebration on the occasion of National Independence Day on 8 November 2013 that included a communal prayer for the welfare of the country, recitation of Qur’anic surahs by youths, a talk on Tatar history and joining the city celebrations of the Independence Day. The Wrocław section of lm organised ix Muslim Culture Days on 18–19 May 2013 and the mosque ‘open doors day’—http://www.dni-kultury.pl/. mzr Islamic Centre in Warsaw organised an ‘open doors day’ with a lecture, discussion and refreshments for the public on 7 December 2013. Portugal

José Mapril* and Nina Clara Tiesler**

1 Muslim Populations

In past years the estimates of the size of Portugal’s Muslim population from institutional representatives as well as researchers indicate a population between 48,000 to 55,000 people. Among these 8,000 were Ismaʿili while the majority population was mainly Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin from Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and a smaller part composed of Muslims coming from other countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Morocco, Senegal and India. According to some institutional representatives, especially members of the Islamic Community of Lisbon (the main institution of representation of Islam in the public sphere), the presence of Muslims in the country exceeded 60 thousand people but due to the economic climate and the harsh economic conditions several of its members have emigrated to countries such as uk, Switzerland, Angola, France, Mozambique, among others (see earlier volumes of the Yearbook). According to the “official” figures, stemming from the immigration control/ monitoring service (sef, Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras), the number of residents from countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Morocco, Senegal and

* José Mapril is post-doctoral research fellow at cria, iscte-iul and a visiting lecturer at the New University of Lisbon. He finished his PhD in Anthropology at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, in 2008, with a thesis on Transnationalism and Islam among Bangladeshis in Lisbon. In past years he worked on Islamic education in Portugal and is currently beginning a new research on national imaginaries and transnational political networks among Bangladeshis in Portugal. He is the author of the forthcoming (2012) book Transnacionalismo e Islão: uma etnografia entre Portugal e o Bangladeche, Lisbon, ics and ‘The patron and the madman: migration, success and the (in)visibility of failure among Bangladeshis in Portugal’, Social Anthropology, 19(3), pp. 288–296. ** Nina Clara Tiesler is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (Centre of Excellence) and coordinator of the Luso-Afro-Brazilian research network on Muslims in Lusophone Areas (mel-net). She holds a PhD in Comparative Studies of Religion and has researched on Muslims in Europe since 1990. She is author of Muslime in Europa. Religion und Identitätspolitiken unter veränderten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen (Muslims in Europe. Religion and identity politics in new societal settings), (Berlin: Lit- Verlag, 2006) (in Portuguese: A Morada de Ser. Europa, Muçulmanos e Políticas de Identidade, Lisbon: ics, 2011), and editor of Islam in Portuguese-Speaking Areas, Lusotopie, 2007.

India were, in 2012 (the latest available data) 12,820. This figure represents a slight increase when compared to 2011 but still very far from the 13,537 registered in 2009 (for the explanations see Yearbook 2012).

2 Islam and the State

The Constitution, which recognises freedom of religion and conscience and prohibits all discrimination in this respect, provides for a system of equality and separation between the State and religious denominations. However, the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed privileges not granted to other religious groups.1 A decisive change came with the Religious Freedom Act of 22 June 2001, with important improvements for religious minorities implemented from 2006 on. For instance, this act allows Islamic instruction in public schools, depending on the number of pupils/parents who require it (minimum ten). In practice, there is currently no public school in Portugal with enough Muslim pupils of more or less the same age who could benefit from this offer. Before the implementation of the new law, the cil (Islamic Community of Lisbon), as well as smaller Islamic communities and other religious minorities, could only be officially recognised as “associations in private law.” The State’s Commission for the Coordination of the Lisbon and South Tagus Region (ccr, Commissão de Coordenação da Região Lisboa e Sul de Tejo) contributed to this phase of ongoing constructions/improvements with 40% of the total costs. Later, in 2004, the cil received minor funding from the City Hall of Lisbon (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa) to support the daily costs of the Central Mosque. Various donors had made the first phase of construction of the Central Mosque possible, which was concluded in 1985 (the year of its inauguration, see Section 16 below about the 25th anniversary): the City Hall had offered the land (as it did later also for a cemetery in Lumiar, see Section 7), various Muslim majority countries had contributed with financial donations, as did the community members themselves.2 Once it was possible, the cil converted to a registered religious community. It meant obtaining a legal status substantially equal to the one of the Catholic Church, including agreements with the State with regard to marriages (see below) and the optional benefit of the voluntary consignment by individual tax payers of 0.5% of income tax, but no general public funding. This was

1 Ibid. p. 291. 2 For details see N.C. Tiesler 2001, “No Bad News from the European Margin: the New Islamic Presence in Portugal,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12(1), pp. 71–91, p. 79. Portugal 489 also done by Bangladeshis in Portugal who created the Islamic Community of Bangladesh (cib). Several inequalities remain, as privileges depend on the number of adherents of the religious groups and on the duration of their establishment in the country, with a minimum of 30 years required. Whenever the main Islamic communities (Sunni and Ismaʿili) celebrate an anniversary or a special occasion, the Portuguese State is often represented at the highest level. Besides that, former Presidents of the Republic and also the present President have all been given the status of Honorary Members of the cil, and the current cil President was one of the consultants to the President of the Republic during his visits to India, Turkey and other countries. During the visit of the Dalai Lama to Portugal in 2007, the cil which organised and hosted a huge interreligious meeting in the Central Mosque, with the Dalai Lama being the guest of honour—an important event, taking into account that the Portuguese government had been facing the same problems as other governments regarding the impact on official relations with China.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Mesquita Central de Lisboa, founded 1985, (Rua da Mesquita in Bairro Azul (à Praça de Espanha), 1070-283 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 213874142 / 213879184; fax: ++351 213872230; e-mail: [email protected]; www.comunidadeislamica .pt) has as its Imam Sheikh David Munir. This is the home of the Islamic Community of Lisbon (cil) and provides space for meetings and projects of other associations of Muslims. Comunidade Islâmica de Palmela (Av. Vila Amélia, lote 171, 172, Cabanas, 2950–805 Palmela, tel.: ++351 212110530, fax: ++351 212110539, email: cipalmela@ hotmail.com). Centro Cultural Ismaili e Fundação Aga Khan (Rua Abranches Ferrao, 1600- 001 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 217 229 000, fax: ++351 217 229 045, email: nationalcouncil@ netcabo.pt). The Aga Khan Foundation Portugal is currently running a capacity development project, called K’Cidade.3 Its objective is to improve individual (education, integration into the labour market, citizenship training programs) and community (child care, children’s education) capacities in urban contexts. Comunidade Shi’ta de Portugal (Ithna Ashari) (Avenida das Forças Armadas, 11 D, Almada; tel.: ++351 218106030; email: [email protected]).

3 In Portuguese pronunciation, this concept reads “capa-cidade”, as such including the term “city” in the term “capacity.” 490 mapril and tiesler

The Baitul Mukarram mosque, Rua do Benformoso, 119—1°/2°/3°, 1100-083 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 917385367. In 2004, Muslims from Bangladesh founded the Baitul Mukarram mosque (named after Dhaka central mosque), also known informally as “Mesquita do Martim Moniz” or “Mesquita do Benformoso.”4 It is managed by the Islamic Community of Bangladesh, an association formally recognised by the Portuguese state. Association des Disciples de Serigne Touba au Portugal (Rua de Macau, n° 4 R/C, 1170-136, Lisboa, tel.: ++351 932407559). It is an association linked to a Mouride cult and inaugurated a prayer hall in the downtown district Anjos in 2010. Associação Multicultural e Islâmica (Rua luis gomes n° 11, 2700-529, Mina, Amadora) was founded by Luso-Guineans from Conacki and Bissau and their objective is to organise not only religious services and classes but also to teach Portuguese.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2013, the Lisbon City Hall announced the construction of a new square in downtown Lisbon, called Mouraria, which will have a purpose built mosque, with a minaret and a specific floor for women. To be built next to it, the Islamic Social Centre will develop several activities. The complete budget is €3 million and the mosque will be administered by the Bangladeshi Islamic Community. In general, this new project is seen with mixed feelings by the local population. Some are worried that the necessary demolitions will lead to the loss of several jobs—several businesses will disappear if the Mouraria square goes through. Besides this, new project that still does not have any dates for its beginning; the main mosques/prayer halls in country are: The Mesquita Central de Lisboa, Rua da Mesquita in Bairro Azul, 1070-283 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 213874142 / 213879184; fax: ++351 213872230; e-mail: info@ comunidadeislamica.pt; www.comunidadeislamica.pt. The Mesquita Aicha Siddika de Odivelas, Rua Prof. Dr. Abreu, Lote 190 2675, Odivelas, tel.: ++351 219327474. The Baitul Mukarram mosque otherwise known as Mesquita do Benformoso, rua do Benformoso, 119—1°/2°/3°, 1100-083 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 917385367.

4 For a more comprehensive account of the historical process behind the creation of this mosque see Mapril, José, “ ‘Bangla masdjid’: Islão e bengalidade entre bangladeshianos em Lisboa,” Análise Social, vol. xxxix, no. 173 (Winter 2005), pp. 851–873. Portugal 491

The Mesquita da Tapada das Mercês, Praceta Francisco Ramos da Costa, garagem n° 6 A, Tapada das Mercês, email: [email protected], telemóvel, tel.: ++351 962644819. The Mesquita de Coimbra, inaugurated in 1991, Rua Bernardo Santareno, Lote 201—Cave Quinta da Stª Apolónia, 3000, Coimbra, tel.: ++351 239492683, fax: ++351 239491345. The Mesquita Central do Porto Hazrat Bilal, Rua do Heroísmo, 223, 4300— 259 Porto.

5 Children’s Education

Children’s education was institutionalised at the same time as the main Islamic institutions in Portugal gained visibility and importance. Until the 1980s the transmission of religious ideas was mainly a family responsibility. They would be helped by private tutors who would organise informal collective classes to teach the recitation of the Qur’an, ethics, and ritual aspects. With the creation of the main mosques, religious education became increasingly institutionalised. Currently, most mosques and prayer halls organise Islamic instruction classes (locally known as madrasas or madresas, which refers to religious instruction classes) to a wide range of publics. These classes are taught in different languages, according to the national and linguistic origin of the congregation, and using different educational materials. During most of the year, these Qur’anic classes take place on weekends while in the summer they are organised on a daily basis. A recognised, private secondary Islamic school—the Colégio Islâmico— exists in Palmela (in Lisbon metropolitan area). It has about 200 pupils, with nearly 10% of them being non-Muslims and it provides both a secular and a religious curricula. In 2009, it achieved the status of being the best school in the national ranking of public and private secondary schools (see Section 12). Part of the tuition fees for this school can be deducted in taxes, depending on the family income, and, as of 2011, the school implements the Cambridge International Curriculum. Another educational institution is the Darul’ulum Kadria-Ashrafia de Odivelas (Rua D. Nuno Álvares Pereira, 14-B, 2675, Odivelas, tel. & fax: ++351 218133282) which is part of the Association for the Islamic Education in Portugal. It was created in 1997 with three objectives: (i) preserve the values of Islamic culture and religion; (ii) cooperate closely with the Islamic communities in Portugal; and (iii) contribute to the active role of Muslims in Portugal and in Lusophone countries. It reproduces a South Asian Sufi inspired version of Islam, namely of Barelwi inspiration. 492 mapril and tiesler

One consequence of the recent family reunifications among Muslim groupings from South Asia and African countries is that the number of small, local community projects which focus on children’s education has increased over the past years. Religious curricula are increasingly combined with academic training, including alphabetisation, language classes (Portuguese or, in the case of children e.g. from Guinea Conakry, French) and general capacity training (computer courses etc.).5 This is also true in other mosques in the country where Portuguese language classes are taught to recently arrived migrants.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Religious Freedom Act (No. 16/2001) regulates the figure of the imam in detail, equating imams with Roman Catholic priests in terms of legal status, and providing for the possibility of setting up specific training institutions.6 Imam training is partly provided at the Islamic school of Palmela. Some imams have received their education in the uk, in Pakistan, in Guinea-Bissau and in Bangladesh. In any case, according to main institutional representatives, currently hardly anybody goes abroad. Above all, only a few are pursuing higher Islamic education because the market for imams is indeed very small.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is no exclusively Islamic cemetery in Portugal, but several municipal cemeteries reserve areas for Muslims and their communities (Odivelas, Feijó). Officially since 2005 (and since 1998 in practice), such an area exists at the cemetery of Lumiar (a district of Lisbon), donated by the Municipality of Lisbon and open to Muslims from all over Portugal (it is to be used by Sunni and Ismaʿili Muslims, alike). Whenever a burial is to take place in the Islamic sections, the Islamic Community of Lisbon is responsible, together with family members of the deceased, for the ritual cleansing and preparation of the body. Furthermore,

5 For a more comprehensive view see Mapril, José, (2010) ‘Bons muçulmanos’: Educação Islâmica e cidadania na área metropolitana de Lisboa in Vilaça, Helena e Pace, Enzo (eds.), Religião em Movimento. Imigrantes e diversidade religiosa em Portugal e Itália, Porto, Estratégias Criativas, pp. 37–54. 6 Leitão, p. 300. Portugal 493 there is a specific funerary company that usually works with the Islamic community of Lisbon. In spite of this infrastructure, the burial place is a matter of contention. For some, usually Portuguese citizens or with family attachments to the country, the burial is frequently in the Islamic sections of Portuguese cemeteries. For others though, namely Bangladeshis and Guineans, there is a concern to bury the bodies in the country of origin. In order to do so, several informal associations or key figures collect money among other fellow countrymen.7

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The Religious Freedom Act grants members of the Islamic and other communities the right to practice their religion in special situations, such as in military service, public hospitals, and places of imprisonment. If the need arises in hospitals, the Commission of Social Affairs (Comissão de Assuntos Sociais) of the icl provides special care and support for the individuals and their families which includes, of course, the visits of an imam. With regard to prison, imams made visits on an informal basis until the official protocol was registered in the Diário de República I/185 (23 September 2009), and took effect only from 13 November 2009 on. Since then, community members, for example, provide late night meals to prisoners during the month of Ramadan.

9 Religious Festivals

The dates for the two main religious festivals—ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha— are usually established by the Comissão de Lua (Commission for moon observation), composed of several ulama and imams, which is a committee of the Islamic Community of Lisbon. The information is then passed on to other institutions in the country. In spite of this, among other Muslim populations it is also frequent to celebrate these two main occasions according to the calendar in their home countries. In 2013, the Baitul Mukarram mosque and Islamic Community of Bangla- desh (bci) the main prayers of ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha in a Lisbon downtown square—Martim Moniz. This was initially organised by the Probashir

7 See Mapril, José e Saraiva, Clara (forthcoming), “Le lieu de la bonne mort: transnational- ismes funéraires entre migrants du Bangladesh et de la Guinée-Bissao”, Revue Européene des Migrations Internationales. 494 mapril and tiesler

Community Bangladesh, an association created in 2011, but which is currently inoperative. On both occasions, more than two thousand Muslims of South Asian and African backgrounds gather to pray in the square.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Ritual slaughter according to Islamic tradition is permitted, according to a spokesman of the cil, since 1975. The first halal butcher was established in 1982. Today there are at least seven halal butcher shops in Lisbon, three in Odivelas, two in downtown square Martim Moniz, one in Laranjeiro, and another downtown in Alvalade (owned by a non-Muslim), and two in Porto. Halal chicken is available at the major shopping malls/supermarket chains (Continente, Jumbo and more recently Recheio). At least twelve halal restaurants exist in the main cities, nine of them in Lisbon. The Halal Institute of Portugal was recently created with specific objective of certifying products as halal—and thus allowed to Muslims. Its main offices are located in Quinta do Anjo, Barreiro—Website: http://halal.pt/—and it has certified several companies linked to olive oil (Galo), icecreams (Iguana Beach) and canned food (BeHalal), among many others. This institute also organises seminars in several mosques in order to discuss issues related with what is halal and what is haram. Every year, more than 200 pilgrims travel for the Hajj. The programmes are either organised by individuals with connections to travel agencies in England who arrange for all-inclusive packages or through a travel agency in Lisbon, “Fly Well” (Rua Fernandes da Fonseca, n°1 5ª andar, sala 805—Centro Comercial da Mouraria—110–238, Lisboa, http://www.grupoflywell.com/contactospt. html), which sells packages for the occasion. This agency also has branches in Amadora and Odivelas.

11 Dress Codes

A law which targets the banning of religious dress is neither discussed among political parties, nor in the public and press in Portugal. According to spokes- men of the cil, the use of the head scarf or other special dress at school and workplaces has not caused any conflict or controversies. In the Portuguese context, the Qur’anic concept of the “modesty of the woman” does not translate into the use of specific dress codes. Consequently, the latter is not a very Portugal 495 common practice, neither among women nor men, apart from the occasions of religious festivals and visits to the mosque.

12 Publications and Media

In 2013, Muslims continued to take part in two television programmes on the public channel rtp 2, namely the programmes “A Fé dos Homens” and “Caminhos.” The length of these programmes continues to be seven minutes for “Fé dos Homens” and twenty five minutes for “Caminhos.” In 2013, the Islamic community continues to organise two radio programmes, with the same names as the tv ones, at a public broadcasting station (Antena 1). In total, during 2013, the Islamic community was responsible for 186 minutes of tv programs and 1152 minutes of Radio broadcasting. The cil runs a website (www.comunidadeislamica.pt) and some younger community members have activated a chatroom (www.aliasoft.com/forumis lam) where one can also submit questions to be answered by the imams. Several blogs are used by young Muslims (muculmana.blog.com; islamicchat.blogspot. com; Portugal-islamico.blogspot.com). Some of these virtual spaces are also frequented by Portuguese-speaking Muslims from outside Portugal (mainly from Brazil, but also from Mozambique or Portuguese Muslims who live in the uk). There is currently only one printed journal, Al-Furqan, which is also available online (www.alfurqan.pt). It has a long-standing tradition, is a private initiative and not related to the cil. During the last year, it even disappeared from the shelves of the book store at the Central mosque. The cil publishes newsletters and other occasional grey literature and provides updated information on several matters on the above named community’s website.

13 Family Law

As noted above, since Islamic communities (and other religious minorities with long-standing tradition in the country) can register and be recognised as religious communities (and not only as associations in private law, as used to be the case until 2006), they can perform religious marriages which, by submission of respective declarations, will be accepted by civil law. In spite of this, among several sectors of Muslims in Portugal, namely among migrant populations (e.g. Bangladeshis), marriage ceremonies are usually performed in their countries of origin and not in the main Portuguese Islamic institutions. 496 mapril and tiesler

14 Interreligious Relations

Portuguese Muslims look back at a long tradition of interreligious relations, the latter having been informally established among leading personalities of different religious minorities already under Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique. The closest “cooperation” partner during the early years in Portugal had been the Jewish Community. This relationship had been maintained during the negotiations about the new law of Religious Freedom which took place in the early 1990s and gained official character with the founding of the Abrahamic Forum (Forum Abraâmico de Portugal) in 2007 which joins Muslim, Jewish and Catholic representatives and is linked to the Three Faiths Forum (www.threefaithsforum.org.uk) with links to groups worldwide. The Abrahamic Forum organises cultural events (including lectures and debates) and assistance to people in need (of any religion and also for “the ones who might not profess any religion at all”). Such assistance is mainly organised through a task force composed of young people from the three religions joining hands to work with a selected Portuguese ngo and making food available. During 2013, the campaign entitled “Soup for everyone” (sopa para todos) continued. During thirteen Fridays (every two months), between 7.30 and 9 pm, the Lisbon central mosque served in its canteen a hot meal with freshly baked bread and soup to all those in need. The programme was organised in close cooperation with several civil society institutions. The costs are covered by donations and part of the zakat collected at the mosque.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

During 2013, media coverage about Portuguese Muslims was centred on the celebrations of the main dates of the Islamic calendar, namely the beginning and end of Ramadan—“Muçulmanos iniciam mais um ramadão”, Expresso, 9 July 2013—and the celebrations of the Feast of Sacrifice—“O Mundo Muçulmano está em Festa”, Revista Sábado, 16 October 2013. Media coverage also focused on the 45th anniversary of the Islamic Community of Lisbon—“Comunidade Muçulmana: Levantar o véu para soprar 45 velas”, Jornal i, 21 December 2013—and the conversion of young Portuguese to Islam in Switzerland and how they relate Islam to the celebrations of Christmas— “Portuguese muçulmanos na Suiça: entre o Islão e a tradição do Natal”, Jornal Sol, 24 December 2013. Portugal 497

16 Major Cultural Events

In 2013, the major cultural event was the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the Islamic Community of Lisbon (1968–2013). The Lisbon central mosque was visited by Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho and the event was extensively reported in the media. The “Dinner Debates of the Al-Mutamid Philosophy Club,” a monthly initiative in close collaboration with the Religious Studies Unit of Universidade Lusófona (see Yearbook 2012), has continued throughout 2013. The main themes addressed were: the influence of Arab culture in contemporary Portugal, the banking system and Islamic ethics, the trafficking of human beings, among many others. Romania

Irina Vainovski-Mihai*

1 Muslim Populations

The first Muslim communities in Romania were formed (mainly in northern Dobrudja and along the lower Danube) in the fourteenth century when Ottoman rule was established in the region. Dobrudja remained part of the Ottoman Empire for five centuries. After the Russian-Romanian-Ottoman War (1877), Romania gained its independence and the Treaty of Berlin (1878) acknowledged Dobrudja as part of Romanian territory. As a result of the economic and political conditions in the early twentieth century, Turks and Tatars migrated massively from Dobrudja to Turkey. While the census of 1879 recorded Muslims as representing 56% of the population in the Dobrudjan county of Constantza, the census of 1909 indicated that the percentage had dropped to 10.8%.1 Since its establishment as an independent state, the Constitutions of Romania and special laws have guaranteed the rights of certain religious groups, in addition to Orthodox Christians who represent the majority of the population. The law on religious denominations adopted in 1923 listed the Muslim faith among the recognised ‘historical faiths’.2 The establishment of the Communist regime (1948) introduced many formal changes with regard to the recognition of religious denominations, but put them under strict state control. Between 1948 and 1989, the Communist state acted systematically to impose atheism and limit the impact of religious creeds on society. After 1959, education in the Tatar and Turkish languages was gradually eliminated and in 1967 the Muslim Theological Seminary was closed.

* Irina Vainovski-Mihai is Associate Professor in Arabic Literature at Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest. She holds a degree in Arabic language and literature and a PhD in Philology. She has published studies in Arab literature, comparative literature and intercultural stereotyping. 1 Schmidt-Rösler, Andrea, “Dobrudscha”, in Weithmann, Michael (ed.), Der ruhelose Balkan. Die Konfliktregionen Südosteuropas (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993), pp. 94–106 (101), quoted in Bara, Maria, “Relaţii interetnice dintre creştinii ortodocşi şi musulmani în Dobrogea. Studiu de caz: Medgidia şi Cobadin (Muslim-Orthodox Christian interethnic relations in Dobrudja. A case study: Medgidia and Cobadin)”, Philologica Jassyensia, vol. 2, no. 1 (2006), pp. 93–104 (95). 2 Gillet, Oliver, Religie şi naţionalism (Religion and Nationalism) (Bucharest: Compania, 2001), p. 6.

Today, the majority of Muslim communities in Romania live in Dobrudja and are mainly made up of the historical ethnic groups. The results of the 2011 census (published in July 2013) recorded 64,337 Muslims in Romania (out of the total population of 20,121,641), of whom 26,903 declared themselves as ethnic Turks, 20,060 Tatars, and 6,281 Romanians.3 Compared to the previous census (2002), the overall number of Muslims has slightly decreased (from 67,257 to 64,337),4 along with the general trend of population decline. But it is noteworthy that the comparison between the two censuses reveals that, while the percentage of Turks and Tatars within the whole population remained the same (0.1 for each),5 the number of the persons who listed themselves as being ethnic Romanian of Islamic faith almost doubled (from 3,310 in 2002 to 6,281 in 2011). This is due, on the one hand, to immigrants who acquired Romanian citizenship and declared themselves as Romanians, and, on the other hand, to conversion (mainly women, upon marriage). As for the regional distribution, Dobrudja has a sizeable Muslim population (90% of ethnic Turks and 96% of ethnic Tatars live in the Dubrudjan county of Constantza).6 The main Muslim ethnic groups, Turks and Tatars, follow Sunni Islam. After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, new Muslim groups appeared in major cities such as Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj and Timisoara. These groups are made up of Middle Eastern businessmen, former students who studied in Romania before the fall of the Communist regime, and refugees. They are mostly Palestinians, Kurds ( from northern Iraq and south-eastern Turkey), Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians. These new communities have not joined the old Muslim communities in Romania, and the two groups live almost parallel lives,7 so discussion does not run around the question of who is a Muslim, but rather what kind of Muslim someone is and to which extent.8 After Romania’s accession to the eu (in 2007), the number of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa increased. According to a Eurostat

3 www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/sR_TAB_14.xls, accessed 24 March 2014. 4 Ce ne spune recensământul din anul 2011 despre religie? (What Does the 2011 Census Tell Us about Religion?) (Bucharest: Institutul Naţional de Statistică România, October 2013), p. 6. 5 Recensământul populaţiei şi locuinţelor. 2011 (Population and Housing Census: 2011) (Bucha- rest: Institutul Naţional de Statistică România, July 2013), p. 9. 6 www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/REZULTATE-DEFINITIVE- RPL_2011.pdf, accessed 24 March 2014. 7 Grigore, George, “Muslims in Romania”, isim Newsletter, 3 July 1999, p. 34. 8 Kozák, Gyula, “Romániai muzulmán intézmények diskurzusa az identitásról és integrációról (The discourse of Muslim institutions from Romania on identity and integration)”, Korunk, no. 5 (May 2009), pp. 54–61 (54). 500 Vainovski-Mihai report issued in March 2013, in the year 2012, there were 2,510 requests for asylum mainly from citizens of Algeria, Morocco, and Pakistan.9

2 Islam and the State

Romania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Chris- tians constitute the majority (according to the 2011 census, 16,307 million).10 The Islamic faith community, as one of the 18 religious denominations recognised by law (Law 489/2006), is considered a public-utility legal entity.11 Costs are covered primarily from the Muslim communities’ own income. Through their officially recognised national leadership and the representative body (the Muftiate), Muslims can receive material support from the state for maintenance of mosques, monuments and other communal buildings. According to the law, the Muftiate is the only religious institution that represents the followers of the Islamic faith in Romania and has the right to organise pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. Any other individual or legal entity that wishes to organise pilgrimages must have the Muftiate’s approval.12 The Synodal Council (Roma- nian: Consiliu Sinodal, Turkish: Şura-i Islam), headed by the Mufti, makes decisions regarding the functioning and organisation of the Muslim community. According to the same law of 2008, the Synodal Council is made up of the Mufti, four members nominated by the Democratic Union of the Turkish- Muslim Tatars in Romania (Uniunea Democrată a Tătarilor Turco-Musulmani din România, udttmr), four members nominated by the Turkish Democratic Union of Romania (Uniunea Democrată Turcă din România, udtr), the principal of the Kemal Atatürk High School (Colegiul Naţional Kemal Atatürk) and 15 clerics.13 The udttmr and the udtr are two of the eighteen political

9 Statistics available on the webpage of the Romanian National Council for Refugees at www.cnrr.ro/attachments/article/145/Comunicat_Eurostat.pdf, accessed 2 March 2014. 10 Ce ne spune recensământul din anul 2011 despre religie? (What Does the 2011 Census Tell Us about Religion?) (Bucharest: Institutul Naţional de Statistică România, October 2013), p. 6. 11 “Hotărâre de guvern privind statutul cultului musulman (Government Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination)” on the website of the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs www.culte.wbd.ro/library/files/biserici/statutul_cultului_musulman .doc, accessed 24 March 2014. 12 Cf. Chapter iii, Art. 3.e and Art. 4(1) of the “Government Decision regarding the Recogni- tion of the Muslim Denomination”, officially published on 25 June 2008. 13 List of the present members available on the Muftiate’s website at www.muftiyat.ro/ muftiatul/organizare, accessed 24 March 2014. Romania 501

parties and cultural associations representing ethnic minorities in the Roma- nian Parliament. The Mufti must be a Romanian citizen, born in Romania and with no other previous citizenship, and a graduate of an Islamic theological institute in Romania (or abroad, provided his qualification is recognised by the Romanian state). Because the position of the head of a religious denomination is regarded as equivalent to a high-ranking public position, after being elected by the Synodal Council, the Mufti is confirmed by a decree of the President of the Republic.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The traditional (Sunni) Muslim community engages in public activities mainly through the Muftiate (Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, Constantza, tel./fax: ++40 241611390, www.muftiyat.ro; https://www.facebook.com/Muftiatul) together with the udttmr (Str. B.P. Haşdeu, nr. 53, Constantza, tel./fax: ++40 241616643; ++40 241520186, http://uniuneatatara.ro/organizare) and the udtr (Constantza, Str. Crişana nr. 44, tel./fax: ++40 241550903, www.rdtb.ro/). Although the Muftiate has a longer history in the region of Dobrudja, it has functioned as the only institution representing Muslims in Romania since 1943. The present Mufti, Murat Yusuf (b. 1977 in Medgidia, Constantza), was first elected to this position in 2005 and was re-elected in June 2010.14 He studied in Romania and Turkey, holds an ma in Comparative Religion and is currently a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Orthodox Christian Theology (University of Constantza).15 Newly established associations and foundations16 dominated by immigrants from various ethnic backgrounds are also actively engaged in public activities, charities, translating and publishing religious literature, and teaching Arabic. The main such organisations are:

– Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre Foundation (Fundaţia Centrul Cultural Islamic Semiluna, Bucharest, sector 6, Str. Munţii Gurghiului, nr. 50–52, www.musulman.ro/);

14 www.muftiyat.ro/muftiatul/organizare/muftiu (The Muftiate of Romania), accessed 2 March 2014. 15 http://teologie.univ-ovidius.ro// (Faculty of Theology, University of Constantza), accessed 2 March 2014. 16 See the National Registry of Foundations, the Ministry of Justice, available at www.just.ro/ Portals/0/wwww/files/registrul_ong/Fundatii21022014.pdf, accessed 3 March 2014. 502 Vainovski-Mihai

– Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre (Fundaţia Centrul Cultural “Isla mul azi”, Bucharest, sector 2, Şos. Colentina, nr. 373; Constantza, Str. Maior Şofran, nr. 11, http://www.islamulazi.ro/forum); – Muslim Sisters Association (Asociaţia Surori Musulmane) (at the same address as the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre in Bucharest and Constantza, http://femeiamusulmana.blogspot.com/); – Tuna Foundation (Fundaţia Tuna, Bucharest, Bd. Regina Maria, nr. 34, http:// www.tuna.ro); – Islamic and Cultural League in Romania (Liga Islamică şi Culturală din România), with the main branch in Bucharest (Bucharest, sector 2, Str. Fabrica de Gheaţă, nr. 14, http://www.islam.ro) and others in Cluj-Napoca (Cluj-Napoca, str. Pastorului, nr. 17), Constantza (at the same address as the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre) Timisoara (str. Dr. Ioan Mureşan, nr. 15), Iasi (str. Morilor nr. 20), Craiova (str. Grigore Pleşoianu, nr. 11); – Association of Romanian Converts to Islam (Asociaţia Românilor Convertiţi la Islam, 617036 Rediu—Bira, Jud. Neamţ, www.arci.ro/).

The most active of them appear to be the Islamic and Cultural League and the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre, formerly Taiba Foundation. According to the spokesperson of the latter, the name has been changed to make it more meaningful for non-Muslims and to allow for more activities and departments.17 Both organisations have several websites—one dedicated to children, Islam for Children (Islamul pentru copii, http://islamulpentru copii.wordpress.com/)—as well as blogs and Internet discussion groups in Romanian, handbooks on Islam in Romanian, stands in book fairs, charitable activities, and Internet broadcasting (see Section 12 below).18 Most of the other organisations are offshoots of the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre, apart from the Tuna Foundation, which is linked to the Gülen Movement. Under the Law of Denominations (489/2006) and particularly the Government Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination (officially published on 25 June 2008), all Islamic ngos, associations and foundations need to be endorsed by the Mufti. However, in 2010, the mufti expressed his opinion that many of these associations are harmful to traditional Hanafi Islam in Romania because of their alleged persistent propaganda and conservative views, which come from Arab schools of Islam, and also that they have

17 “Another name”, Radio Islam, available at www.radioislam.ro/en/news-archive/277-radioislam-another-name-.html, accessed 2 March 2014. 18 See a report of activities for 1998–2010 at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sfu_EFtH5Zs, accessed 2 March 2014. Romania 503 taken advantage of legal ambiguities and the need for religious education after the collapse of Communism.19 The Taiba Foundation rejected this opinion and accused the Mufti and the Synodal Council of libel.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In Romania, there are 77 purpose-built mosques. Ten of them are historical monuments and still in use. The oldest, Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Mangalia, was built in 1590. The Big Mosque Carol i in Constantza, commissioned by King Carol i of Romania (1866–1914) and erected in 1910, was the first reinforced concrete building in Romania.20 The oldest mosque in the capital Bucharest was initially built in 1900. In 1956 the Communist regime disassembled and rebuilt it in another location a year later.21 In Bucharest, in addition to the main mosque, it is estimated that there are fifteen other mosques funded by foreign residents,22 but these are in fact prayer halls adjacent to the buildings of associations and foundations established in the capital city and principal towns.23

5 Children’s Education

The Law of Education, adopted in 1995, introduced religion as a compulsory subject in public schools. Pupils can express their wish to take courses in a

19 “Daca musulmanii ar respecta ceea ce scrie in Coran ar exista unitate (There would be unity if Muslims respected what is written in the Qur’an)”, interview with the mufti, Ziua de Constanta, 25 November 2010, available at www.ziuaconstanta.ro/rubrici/ interviu/%22daca-musulmanii-ar-respecta-ceea-ce-scrie-in-coran-ar-exista-unitate%22 .html, accessed 24 March 2014. 20 See a detailed presentation on the site of the Muftiate at www.muftiyat.ro/monumente/ 111–2/ and post #2 on the website of the Association of Romanian Converts to Islam at http://forum.arci.ro/thread-1227.html, accessed 2 March 2014. 21 For a presentation of the mosque see post #1 on the website of the Association of Romanian Converts to Islam at http://forum.arci.ro/thread-1227.html, 2 March 2014. 22 Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2007), p. 155, available at www .euro-muslims.eu/islam_in_europe_en.pdf, accessed 2 March 2014. 23 For a presentation of the Ar-Rahman Mosque (created in the building of the Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre) see post #3 on the website of the Association of Romanian Converts to Islam at http://forum.arci.ro/thread-1227.html, accessed 2 March 2014. 504 Vainovski-Mihai

particular religion, those under 18 being spoken for by their parents or guardians. Pupils are exempted from attending religious education classes if they declare themselves to be non-religious. According to the new Law of Education (Law of National Education 2011/Ch. i, Art. 18.3), only persons authorised by the Ministry of Education and the heads of the legally recognised religions can teach religion in public schools. Islam is also taught in mosques and by religious and cultural associations on an extra-curricular and private basis. There are a number of private schools functioning under the auspices of such associations. Two that are worth mentioning are the Jerusalem School (Madrasat al-Quds www.jerusalemschool .ro/), under the patronage of the Islamic and Cultural League; and the Crescent School and Kindergarten (Şcoala şi Grădiniţa Semiluna, www.ourhappykids .ro), under the patronage of the Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre. In 1996, a Turkish high school (in Romanian: Colegiul Naţional Kemal Atatürk, in Turkish: Kemal Atatürk Ulusal Koleji, Medgidia, str. Română, nr. 2, tel.: ++40 241 818105, https://ro-ro.facebook.com/kolejimiz) was opened in Medgidia, a city with a sizable Turkish and Tatar population, which is now functioning with the joint support of the Romanian and Turkish governments ( for example, the pupils in the boarding school are financially sustained by Turkey; the courses of Turkish language and Islam are taught by visiting teachers from Turkey).24 The school comprises several sections, including theology. A similar institution existed before the Communist period and was closed in 1967.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at several universities and consist of a general overview within courses on Arabic language, history of Arab culture and civilisation, history of Arab literature, and political studies. All holders of academic degrees in Islamic theology have studied abroad, as no such higher education qualifications are offered in Romania. Diplomas

24 Gülşen Ismail, “De vorbă cu noul director adjunct, despre Colegiul Naţional “Kemal Atatürk” din Medgidia” (Speaking with the new vice-principal of the Kemal Atatürk High School in Medgidia), Interetnica, 28 October 2011, available at http://interetnica .ro/de-vorba-cu-noul-director-adjunct-despre-colegiul-national-%E2%80%9Ckemal- ataturk%E2%80%9D-din-medgidia, accessed 2 March 2014. Romania 505 issued abroad are subject to the recognition by the Romanian Ministry of Education after endorsement by the Mufti.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Muftiate owns 108 cemeteries. In some cities, e.g. Bucharest, there is an acute need for a cemetery, while in others, e.g. Constantza, there is need for additional provision. The creation of a Muslim cemetery in Bucharest was put on the Municipality’s agenda some ten years ago. At present, Muslims who die there are usually taken to Constantza (250 km away) for burial. The matter seemed to have been settled after the Mayor of Bucharest promised in 2008 to allot the Muslim community a plot of land for this purpose on the outskirts of the city, but until now the situation has been subject to delay. In March 2012, the Muslim Synodal Council voted for a document meant to legally regulate the organisation and the functioning of the Muslim cemeteries.25 The initiative came after some lavish family vaults were erected in the Muslim cemetery of Constantza.26

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the armed forces. The Muftiate can assign an imam to visit a prison inmate at the inmate’s request and at the Muftiate’s expense. The same applies to patients in hospitals. Most prisons and state hospitals have Orthodox Christian chapels. In hospitals in the towns of Dobrudja, where there is a significant number of Muslims, quotations from the Qur’an are often displayed on the walls of the wards.

25 “Regulament de organizare şi funcţionare a cimitirelor musulmane din România” (Regulations for the organisation and functioning of the Muslim cemeteries in Romania), available on the Muftiate’s website at www.muftiyat.ro/muftiatul/regulament-de-orga nizare-si-functionare-a-cimitirelor-musulmane-din-romania/, accessed 2 March 2014. 26 “Lux dincolo de moarte. Cavouri musulmane cu geam antiglont, in Cimitirul Musulman din Constanta” (Luxury after death. Muslim vaults with bulletproof windows in the Muslim Cemetery of Constanta), Stirile ProTv.ro, 23 December 2011, available at http:// stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/lux-dincolo-de-moarte-desi-religia-le-cere-modestie-cavouri-musulmane-cu-geam-antiglont.html, accessed 2 March 2014. 506 Vainovski-Mihai

9 Religious Festivals

The divergence between the traditional Muslim communities in Romania and the new communities is also reflected by the discussions regarding the date when the month of Ramadan begins and ends. While the majority of Muslims in Romania follow the calendar agreed by the Muftiate and the Department of Religious Affairs in Turkey (Diyanet), some follow the prescriptions of Islamic foundations and associations, which apply the Saudi official calendar.27 The annual ʿId al-Fitr (Turkish: Şeker Bayram) and ʿId al-Adha (Turkish: Kurban Bayram) celebrations take place in the main cities (with popular music concerts, etc.) and in villages with a significant Muslim population. They are open to the public. During Ramadan, iftar dinners offered by Turkish and Arab restaurants are open to the public. Non-Muslims participate in events organised in public places (including sharing food), while in the regions without a historical tradition of Muslim-Christian coexistence they attend iftar meals in restaurants only if accompanied by a Muslim, being wary of behaving inap- propriately. Large-scale iftars are also organised in cities with a quite small Muslim population. On 11 July 2013, the udttmr hosted in Constantza an iftar in the presence of Mufti Murat Yusuf and the American diplomat Kendra Pace, recently assigned to her mission in Romania.28 Following an old tradition of the us Embassy meant as recognition of the common Abrahamic heritage, the American Chargé d’Affaires to Bucharest, Duane Butcher, organised an iftar dinner, to which representatives of every religion in Romania were invited.29 An estimated 150–200 Muslims perform the annual hajj, but there are no official data available. The pilgrims are supported financially by the Muftiate, as well as by the foundations Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre and “Islam Today” Cultural Centre. Most of them travel by bus to Bulgaria and Turkey, where they join other groups of pilgrims.

27 Vlad Teodorescu, “exclusiv evz. Interviu cu liderul spiritual al musulmanilor din Româ- nia. Şi anul acesta, Ramazan la două capete!” (exclusive evz. Interview with the spiritual leader of the Muslims of Romania: This year again a Ramadan with two boundaries!), evz.ro, 9 July 2013, available at www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/1046523.html, accessed 2 March 2014. 28 “u.s. Embassy representatives, present at the first Iftar dinner in Constanta”, Ziua de Constanţa, 22 July 2013, available at www.ziuaconstanta.ro/english/latest/u-s-embassy-rep resentatives-present-at-the-first-iftar-dinner-in-constanta-464395.html, accessed 2 March 2014. 29 “Chargé d’Affaires Duane Butcher’s Remarks on the Occasion of the Iftar Dinner, August 2013,” 7 August 2013, on the site of the us Embassy in Romania, http://romania.usembassy .gov/policy/charge/pr-08082013.html, accessed 2 March 2014. Romania 507

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

In the main cities, there are several halal food shops with both Muslim and non-Muslim customers, as well as numerous ethnic restaurants (which offer halal food and do not serve alcohol). The meat for the shops and restaurants is supplied by halal slaughter houses functioning in Romania and certified by the Muftiate. Generally, halal food is not available either in public institutions or in the supermarkets. As the Orthodox Christian tradition has several fasting annual periods and two weekly fasting days (Wednesdays and Fridays), during which abstention includes animal and dairy products, Muslims may choose among the food labelled as “de post” (“for fasting”). Usually, Muslims do not buy meat from general stores and supermarkets but from the Arab and Turkish stores. Small Arab and Turkish food stores, most of them carrying the name of “măcelărie halal” (halal butchery), have been flourishing all around Romania. They cater both to Muslims in search of halal products and to non-Muslims looking for spices, special flavours and ingredients. In the cities with a sizeable Muslim population, fast food restaurants and pizzerias started to accommodate their menus by including, for example, “Muslim Pizza” (which had as an ingredient traditional Turkish dried beef and mutton sausage). Islamic banking and finance is present in Romania through the Bank of London and Middle East and the European Islamic Investment Bank, which have the right to provide services without the establishment of local branches. 30 The Foundation for Islamic Services in Romania (Fundaţia de Servicii Islamice din România, Bucharest, sector 2, Şoseaua Fundeni, nr. 9, www.fsir.ro), with branches in seven towns, offers shelter and meals for those in need.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools, but it is mostly in villages with a large Muslim population that women wear head scarves. In recent years, many new converts adopted Islamic dress codes and the head scarf.31 No women have been observed wearing niqab. As there are no regulations restricting the head scarf in the photos attached to official

30 See the List of foreign banks exercising the freedom to provide services within the territory of Romania on cross-border basis on the website of the National Bank of Romania at http://www.bnro.ro/files/d/Registrebnr/xls/AlteIC_En.xls, accessed 23 March 2014. 31 Daniela Stoica, “New Romanian Muslimas: Converted women sharing knowledge in online and offline communities”, in Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska (ed), Muslims in Poland 508 Vainovski-Mihai documents, signals of the increasing number of requests coming from women in Dobrudja to wear the hijab when photographed for their identity cards are evident in media coverage of the issue.32

12 Publications and Media

The main printed media are the monthly Hakses (The Authentic Voice), published by udtr (Constantza 8700, Bd-ul Tomis nr. 99, bl. so, ap. 3, tel./fax: ++40 241550903; online issues: http://hakses.turc.ro/#gsc.tab=0) and the periodicals published by the udttmr: Karadeniz (The Black Sea, on-line issues: http:// uniuneatatara.ro/publicatii), Kadinlar Dunyasi (The World of Women) and Cas (The Youngster) all three with the same address (Constantza 8700, Str. Stefan cel Mare nr. 66, tel./fax: ++40 241616643). Back issues are also available online at: www.tatar.ro/publicatii.php?arhiva. The website http://www.tatar.ro, although it focuses on information about the Tatar community, also offers extended articles on Muslims in Romania in general. Zaman Romania (www.zaman.ro) is the online local edition of the Zaman newspaper. Launched in 1993, it is published in Romanian and Turkish and has a special section for news from Dobrudja. An entirely separate Romanian edition was launched in February 2013. In March 2009, the udtr, the udttmr and the Muftiate opened a broadcasting station, Radio T, in Constantza with programmes in Romanian, Turkish and Tatar, which adds to the already long-running similar programmes aired by the local station of the state-owned Romanian Broadcasting Society (Societatea Română de Radiodifuziune, srr). Webcasting is used increasingly: video clips (in Romanian or with Romanian subtitles) on dailymotion (www.dailymotion .com/AsociatiaSuroriMusulmane), YouTube (www.youtube.com/islamulazi, www.youtube.com/muhlisun) and Ikhwan Tube (www.ikhwantube.org/), and audio streaming on websites such as Radio Islam (www.radioislam.ro/radio .html). The web portal Islam Romania (http://islamromania.ro/), administered by the Islamic and Cultural League and the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre, presents information from diverse sources in the Romanian language and offers downloadable books in Romanian.

and Eastern Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, Faculty of Oriental Studies, 2011), pp. 274–277. 32 T.G. Horia, “Cu vălul islamic pe cartea de identitate” (With the Islamic Veil on the Identity Card), evz.ro, 19 February 2012, available at www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/cu-valul-islamic-pe- cartea-de-identitate-967063.html, accessed 23 March 2014. Romania 509

13 Family Law

The Romanian legal system is secular. According to the Civil Code, marriages are only recognised if they are performed and registered by a state (secular) authority. Marriages in mosques (as in the places of worship of other religions) have a rather ceremonial function. In litigation, a non-denominational pre- marital contract may be taken into account. The Civil Code prohibits polygamy but marriages are recognised if they were legal in the jurisdictions where they were contracted. There are circumstances (almost exclusively among Arab expatriates) when marriages contracted in countries with legal systems different from the Romanian are officially recorded as such in the Romanian civil status register. Painful litigation (mainly over custody of children) emerges in cases of separation when the spouses bring to court the laws of their respective countries. Generally, such cases are not resolved because they end with two separate court decisions pronounced under different legal systems.

14 Interreligious Relations

Muslim festivals and special events are regularly attended by non-Muslim representatives of local authorities. Government agencies, such as the Department for Interethnic Relations (Departamentul pentru Relaţii Interetnice, www.dri.gov.ro/) and non-governmental institutions, such as the Intercultural Institute Timisoara (Institutul Intercultural Timişoara, www.intercultural.ro/rom/index.html) are promoting dialogue through symposia, publications and websites, such as Intercultural Calendar (Calendar Intercultural, www.calendarintercultural.ro/index.php), comprising both ethnic and religious festivals. Probably as a result of the long tradition of coexistence with Muslims, those who are long-established in Romania are regarded as familiar, while outsiders (i.e., Muslims from other countries, including the Balkan countries), are regarded with suspicion (even if contact is indirect, through media coverage, etc.).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Media coverage concerning Muslims in Romania at the national level focuses almost exclusively on significant events (cultural exhibitions, ethnic festivals and public performances) (see also Section 16). The regional media (in Dobrudja) covers in detail the life of the community, as it addresses a broad 510 Vainovski-Mihai audience and presents both religious and ethnic points of view. Internal debates within the community and tensions between the version of Islam professed by the historical Muslim community and that professed by newcomers are irrelevant to the non-Muslim population and not understood by them. Media focus on Islam tends mostly to be related to international events, and presentations and debates about international Islam-related subjects are usually presented by non-Muslim commentators, Middle East experts and ad hoc analysts.

16 Major Cultural Events

Nawruz, the annual spring holiday, is observed with public festivities organised by the Turkish and Tatar minorities, as well as Kurdish immigrants. There are several other festivals and contests with a mainly ethnic dimension, such as Küreş (traditional Tatar wrestling) and Hîdîrlez (a Turkic spring festival). While the Parliament rejected a proposal to institute Nawruz and Hîdîrlez as legal holidays, on 5 May 2011 the Day of the Tatar Language was celebrated for the first time, after the Parliament voted in favour of establishing it as an official annual feast. Russia

Elmira Akhmetova*

1 Muslim Populations

There is no official record of the number of Muslims in the Russian Federation as the 2010 census did not include a question about religious beliefs. However, according to that same census, the total number of members of Muslim ethnic groups indigenous to Russia is about 15 million, and there are significant numbers of labour migrants from Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose expatriates form a significant portion of the approximately eleven million (both, officially registered and illegal) labour migrants in Russia.1 According to Ravil Gainutdin, the Head of the Russian Council of Muftis (rcm) as well as the Head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of Russia, 80% of labour immigrants in Russia are Muslims by cultural background.2 Accordingly, the rcm estimates that there are over 20 million Muslims in Russia, which is about 14%–15% of the total population (about 143 million as of August 2013). According to the report of the Pew Research Centre’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, among self-identified Muslims of Russia, about nine in ten (89%) profess their faith in God and the Prophet Muhammad, while 44% say that religion is very important in their lives.3 Islam first entered the region when in 641 a Muslim army under the leadership of ‘Abd Rahman ibn Rabi’a al-Bakhili reached the Southern Caucasus. In 685–6, Arabs took the town of Derbend, which subsequently became the focus for the Islamisation of the north-eastern Caucasus, referred to as

* Elmira Akhmetova has a PhD in History and Civilisation from the International Islamic University of Malaysia (iium) and is a Research Fellow at International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (iais), Malaysia. Her recent publications include Islam in Russia: Historical Facts and Current Developments (Kuala Lumpur: iais Malaysia, 2013). 1 “Skol’ko v Rossii Migrantov,” www.kommersant.ru/doc/2284497, accessed 29 December 2013. 2 http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2009/03/11/2323_type63378type63381_214089.shtml, accessed 19 December 2013. 3 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity,” August 9, 2012, pp. 8 and 38–39. See www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_ Affiliation/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf, accessed 16 January 2014.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_038 512 Akhmetova bab al-jihad (the gateway of jihad).4 In the other part of modern Russia, particularly, the upper Volga basin, Islam gradually took root through trade and other economic relations with the Muslim world. The first Muslim state on the territory of modern Russian was the Bulghar Kingdom,5 which voluntarily recognised Islam as an official state religion in 922 in the presence of a delegation sent by the Abbasid Caliph Ja‘far al-Muqtadir Billah.6 From there, Islam spread to other parts of modern Russia. The second wave of the spread of Islam in Russia took place during the period of the Golden Horde (Altyn Urda), which was established in 1242 as a result of the Mongol invasion of the Bulghar Kingdom and other neighbouring territories. Under the rule of Uzbek Khan (1312–42), Islam became the official religion of the state and, from the mid-fourteenth century until the demise of the Golden Horde in 1437, the Volga Bulghar elite dominated the cultural and Islamic discourse of the empire. At the beginning of the fifteenth century a number of independent Islamic khanates (or states), including the Kazan, Crimean, Siberian, Noghay, and Astrakhan khanates, emerged from the gigantic Golden Horde. From the sixteenth century, these Muslim states were conquered one after another and incorporated into a newly centralised Muscovite state of proto-Russians. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Russian advance had reached the Northern Caucasus too. Today the majority of Muslims live in their historical territories of the Volga-Urals basin, western Siberia and the Northern Caucasus. Other parts of Russia, including large cities such as Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod and St Petersburg also have significant Muslim populations. The Muslim population of Moscow alone is widely estimated to be more than 2 million (about 20% of the total),7 and St Petersburg’s Muslim community is approximately 700,000 (out of a population of about 4.78 million, according to the 2010 census).

4 Galina Yemelianova, “Islam in Russia: An historical perspective,” in Hilary Pilkington and Galina Yemelianova (eds), Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and Private Faces (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 28. 5 The Bulghar Kingdom existed in the Middle Volga region, a territory of the modern republic of Tatarstan, from the eighth century until the Mongol invasion in 1236 ce, See www.onislam .net/english/politics/europe/425970.html, accessed 16 January 2014. 6 Marjani, Shihabetdin, Mustafadu al-Akhbar fi Ahwali Qazan wa Bulghar (Useful information about the conditions of Kazan and the Bulgars) (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nashriyaty, 1989), pp. 124–130; Wimbush, Enders, “Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, in John Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 271–272; Yemelianova, Galina M., Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 7. 7 “Moscow’s Muslims Find No Room in the Mosque,” www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe- 17436481, accessed 21 January 2014. Russia 513

Russia’s Muslims belong to more than 40 ethnic groups,8 such as Volga Tatars, Siberian Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Bashqorts, Dargins, Balkars, Avars, Karachays, Circassians, Kabardins and many others. In the Dagestan region alone, there are tens of indigenous Muslim ethnicities. The majority of Russia’s Muslims follow two Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence—the Hanafi and Shafi’i madhhabs. Muslims of the Volga-Urals region and the Nogais, Karachays and Balkars in the Northern Caucasus follow the Hanafi madhhab, while Muslims of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia are Shafi’is. Shiʿis are a small minority to be found almost exclusively in the Caucasus, among Azeri Turks and the Azeri diaspora and part of Dagestan’s small Muslim ethnic group, Lezgins. Ethnic Muslims are predominant in seven out of the 21 republics of the Russian Federation: Bashkortostan and Tatarstan in the Volga-Urals region, and Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay- Cherkessia in the Northern Caucasus.

2 Islam and the State

The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates that Russia is a secular state and that “no religion can be established as the official or compulsory [religion]” (Article 14). It guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to profess individually or collectively any religion or not to profess any religion, and freely to choose, possess and disseminate religious and other convictions and act in accordance with them (Article 28), and prohibits “all forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, language or religious grounds” (Article 19). The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience, a supplemental law on religion, does not recognise a state religion either, but its preamble identifies Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism as traditional religions and recognises the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture. Islam is routinely affirmed to be part of Russian society by the Russian authorities and political leaders. During his visit to Ufa in November 2011, the then-President Dmitry Medvedev stated that: “Our huge country is a common historical moth- erland for the Christians as well as Muslims; not one of them arrived here from

8 If we include the tiny ethnic groups of the Caucasus region, this number may be even higher. For example, President Medvedev, during his visit to the Grand Mosque in Moscow on 15 July 2009, noted that 57 of Russia’s 182 ethnic groups identify themselves as Muslim. 514 Akhmetova outside, but did accept Christianity or Islam here, on this land.”9 Citing the significant role of Muslim statesmen, artists, scientists, soldiers and businessmen in Russian history, the current Russian President Vladimir Putin, during his meeting with muftis in Ufa on 22 October 2013, emphasised that Islam shines in Russian culture.10 The central and provincial muftiates are on good terms with the Kremlin and the regional leadership. The Russian government assists Muslim institutions by financing some educational programmes and cultural events. In the wake of the Russian Extremism Law of 2002, adopted by the Russian government after the declaration of the us-led global ‘war on terror’, cases of discrimination and violation of Muslims’ rights under the pretext of ‘fighting against religious extremism’ or ‘Islamic terrorism’ have significantly increased in Russia. Dozens of mainstream Islamic books such as the Riyadh al-Salihin (The Gardens of the Righteous), Forty Hadiths of Al-Nawawi, Mizan al-Amal (Balanced Criterion of Action) of Imam Ghazali, Jizn’ Proroka Muhammada (The Life of the Prophet Muhammad) of Ibn Hisham and al-Mubarakfuri, parts from the Risale-i Nur of Said Nursi have been indiscriminately banned in various district courts in Russia for allegedly inciting interreligious and interra- cial hatred and promoting exclusivity and superiority on the basis of religion. In 2012 alone, more than eighty different classical and contemporary Islamic books on ethics, theology, jurisprudence and Sufism were banned in compliance with the verdicts of several district courts. On 20 September 2013, a court in the Russian city of Novorossiysk banned the Russian translation of the Holy Qur’an by Elmir Kuliyev. A number of Muslim organisations, movements and societies such as Hizb al-Tahrir, Jamaʿa al-Tabligh, Nurcular ( followers of Said Nursi), the so-called ‘Ahl as-Sunna’ and others have been banned in Russia as being ‘extremist’ and “contradictory to the traditional Hanafi madhhab”. These bans have inevita- bly led to the arrests of dozens if not hundreds of Muslims in Russia on allegations of belonging to “extremist groups.”11 In February 2013, a Kaliningrad

9 “O tom, Kto Rodnoi, a Kto Prishliy, Rasskazal Prezident Rossii,” www.islamnews.ru/news- 98641.html, accessed 15 January 2014. 10 “Islam Shines in Russian Culture: Putin,” www.onislam.net/english/news/europe/465089- islam-shines-in-russian-culture-putin.html, accessed 21 January 2014. 11 On the banning of Islamic books and organisations, see Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: The battle with ‘religious extremism’—a return to past methods?”, http://forum18.org/ Archive.php?article_id=1288, accessed 21 January 2014; idem, “Russia: Religious freedom survey, October 2008”, www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1196, accessed 21 Janu- ary 2014; Akhmetova, Elmira, “Time to burn Islamic books: Russia 2008”, www.onislam .net/english/politics/europe/443176.html, accessed 10 December 2013; “Fabrication of Russia 515 court banned works by the Turkish theologian Said Nursi, who is apparently considered so dangerous that 13 people have received criminal sentences for possession of his writings, according to Geraldine Fagan.12 In practice, only the Hanafi madhhab is considered acceptable and traditional in Russia while other schools of thought and fiqh, apart from the Shafi’i madhhab (which can be tolerated as indigenous Muslims of the Northern Caucasus), are ‘non- traditional’ and unwelcome.13 Pressure on Muslims to follow only the traditional Hanafi madhhab significantly increased in the Republic of Tatarstan in 2012 after an attempt on life of the Mufti, Ildus Faizov, and assassination of his deputy, Valiullah Yaqupov. The monopoly of the Spiritual Directorate and regional authorities over the religious practices of Muslims arouses feelings of suspicion about everyone who does not follow the ‘traditional’ Hanafi madhhab. Consequently, the rivalry between government backed traditional Islam and the followers of other Islamic schools had significantly widened in the last few years. At least ten of Russia’s imams and muftis were assassinated in 2012, and, in most of the cases, the responsibility for their murders was put on Jihadi groups of North Caucasus and Hizb al-Tahrir. Bracing to host the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi in February 2014, the cases of arrest of Muslims on allegations of being involved in terrorist activities had significantly increased. In June 2013 alone, Moscow police detained more than 300 worshippers after rounding them up during prayer at a Muslim prayer room in the Russian capital. In December 2013, Russian police arrested dozens of young Muslims allegedly belonging to an undefined “non-traditional Islamic group” on suspicion of arson attacks in November against Christian churches in Tatarstan. Several cases of allegations of police torture of detained Muslims in an effort to make them confess to crimes were registered in Tatarstan in 2013.14

‘Islamic extremism’ criminal cases in Russia: Campaign continues”, www.memo.ru/2008/ 09/04/0409082.htm, accessed 10 January 2014; and Ruslan Kurbanov, “Banning Hadiths and Seerah in Russia,” www.onislam.net/english/politics/europe/457866-banning-hadiths-and- seerah-in-russia.html, accessed 16 January 2014. 12 Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: Six-Month ‘Extremism” Sentence for St Petersburg Nursi Reader,” www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1872, accessed 21 January 2014. 13 The Oslo-based Forum 18 News Service also reports on the existing Hanafi monopoly in Russia (see Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: Any school of Islam, as long as it’s Hanafi,” www .forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1324, accessed 21 January 2014. 14 “New Committee to Protect Rights of Tatarstan’s Detained Muslims,” www.rferl.org/ content/tatarstan-torture-committee-muslims/25223569.html, accessed 21 January 2014. 516 Akhmetova

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The voice of the Russia’s Muslim population is mainly represented by three Islamic structures. The most influential among them is the Russian Council of Muftis (Soviet Muftiyev Rossii, rcm, 7, Vypolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, tel./ fax: ++7 4956814904, www.muslim.ru), founded in July 1996 by the decision of the first Assembly of the Heads (muftis) of Regional Spiritual Boards of Russia, which elected Ravil Gainutdin, the Head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of Russia (Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Evropeiskoi Chasti Rossii), as its first chairman.15 The rcm is an umbrella organisation that unites religious Muslim associations in the Russian Federation on a voluntary basis. Among its main tasks are: consolidation of Muslim religious organisations of the Russian Federation with the aim of finding solutions to problems affecting the whole Muslim community in Russia; coordination and mutual assistance with respect to activities organised by individual religious boards; clarification of the Council’s official position with regard to various issues in relations with public authorities on federal and local level, organisations representing other confessions, international and foreign organisations; organisation of Hajj, conferences, public relations campaigns concerning the Muslim population, the government, and the non-Muslim population. The second in importance, but also the oldest, Muslim religious organisation is the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims (csbm) of Russia and European countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Tsentral’noe Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Rossii i Evropeiskix Stran sng, csbm, 50 Tukaeva str., 450057, Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, rf, tel.: ++7 3472508086/2508079 http://cdum.ru). It was established in post-Soviet Russia in 1992 and is headquartered in Ufa, Bashkortostan; its head is Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin. The origins of the csbm go back to 1788, when the Empress Catherine ii ordered the establishment of the ‘Ufa Spiritual Gathering for Mohametan Law.’ Regional Muslim religious boards are registered with either the rcm or the csbm and every local Muslim community must be affiliated to a regional Muslim religious board in order to be officially recognised as a legal organisation. These two organisations enjoy equal rights and status in the government structure and are recognised by the state as umbrella Muslim organisations of Russia. A third large Muslim organisation in Russia is the Coordinating Centre of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus (Koordinatsionniy Center Musul’man

15 Hunter, Shireen, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), p. 56. Russia 517

Severnogo Kavkaza, ccmnc, 49 Ostojenka str., 119034, Moscow, rf, tel.: ++7 4992552147, email: [email protected]). It was established in 1998 and unites almost all regional Muslim religious boards of the North Caucasus region.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Mosques or prayer houses are to be found in almost every Russian city and town that has a Muslim community. Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the rcm, estimates that at least 7,200 officially registered mosques are functioning in Russia at the moment and their number continues to increase.16 In regions with a Muslim majority, there is a boom in mosque construction. In the small Republic of Dagestan alone, with a population of about 2,577,000, more than 1,700 mosques are registered. In November 2013, Muslims of Tatarstan celebrated the opening of the 1,524th mosque in the republic. The first mosques that opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union have often been reconstructed on the historical sites of old mosques, which were confiscated and in some cases destroyed by the regime in the 1930s. The biggest mosques in Russia are the recently-built Qul-Sharif Mosque located inside the Kazan Kremlin, Tatarstan, and Ahmad Kadyrov Grozny Central Dome Mosque located in the capital of Chechnya. There is no official record of the number of prayer houses (musalla, known in Russia as molel’niye komnaty) in the Russian Federation. They are commonly single rooms opened in universities, schools, workplaces, hospitals, prisons and in small towns with a Muslim minority. In 2013, Muslim prayer rooms began functioning in the Vnukovo and Domodedovo International Airports, Moscow, and in Kazan International Airport, Tatarstan. More mosques and prayer houses, however, are needed for practising Muslims in many regions of Russia, especially in Moscow. There are currently four mosques in Moscow, which together can accommodate only a few thousand believers. The fifth mosque of Moscow, the Cathedral Mosque (7 Vypolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, Russia, tel.: ++7 4956814904), which was originally built in 1904 by local Muslims and remained open even during Soviet times, was destroyed in September, 2011 due to restoration works, which are expected to be completed by 2015. According to the City Interior Affairs Department (guvd) records, about 150,000 Muslims gathered in four mosques of the city to perform the ʿId al-Fitr prayer in 2013. Since mosques could only accommodate several hundred, worshippers had no choice but to pray wherever they could find space, even several blocks away from the mosque itself. The same happened in other

16 See Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, p. 13; Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, pp. 137–138. 518 Akhmetova

Russian cities. Construction of new mosques is therefore a burning issue for Russia’s Muslims. There are no restrictions in Russia, including Moscow and St Petersburg, on the adhan being called outside the mosque, although it is usually conducted discreetly.

5 Children’s Education

The 1997 law on religious freedom establishes the secular nature of public school education in Russia. However, in July 2009, then-President Medvedev announced the first national plan to teach the basics of major religions and secular ethics in Russian schools. Since September 2012, pupils are offered the choice of studying one of Russia’s four federally recognised religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism or Judaism—or a course in comparative religion. Russia’s Muslim children can learn about Islam in maktabs (mektebe in Russian) or Sunday schools and private Islamic schools, which are expected to follow the state school curriculum. The first such school, the Islamic Usmaniyya school, was opened in Kazan in 1995 (38 Musa Bigiev st., 420047, Kazan, tel.: ++7 8435119364). In addition to all the compulsory secular subjects, the pupils there also study Arabic, Qur’an recitation, tafsir, basics of fiqh and theology. There are currently around 120 pupils studying at primary and secondary levels. Muslim children who do not have the option of attending an Islamic school may get basic knowledge about Islam at maktabs or Sunday schools in mosques in the cities and some villages. Some madrasas (see section 6 below) also have their own maktabs. For example, the Mahinur madrasa operates a number of maktabs and summer schools, where children, in addition to enjoy- ing themselves, study Arabic, Qur’an, basics of fiqh, and stories of the prophets and rightly guided caliphs.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Presently, more than 90 registered professional and higher education Muslim institutions exist in Russia. Professional Islamic education is carried out primarily in madrasas.17 There are currently over twenty licensed madrasas in the

17 The term madrasa in the modern Russian context usually refers to a higher Islamic educational institution, equivalent to a higher technical college or specialist high school. Students enrol at the madrasa after completing the secondary school programme. Russia 519

European part of Russia, excluding the Northern Caucasus region.18 Eight are in Tatarstan, seven are branches of the Russian Islamic University set up by the csbm in various regions, and three are run by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan. In addition, the Spiritual Boards of Muslims of the European part of Russia, Saratov and Nizhniy Novgorod each have one madrasa.19 Russian Islamic University established by the csbm in Ufa has several regional branches: Khadji Tarhan in Astrakhan, Bilyar in Ulyanovsk, Nur in Samara, Husainiya in Orenburg, Nurul-Islam in Oktyabrsk, and Gulistan in the village of Shigirdani in Chuvashiya. The three madrasas, all quite small, established by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan, the rcm, are Imeni M. Sultanovoi madrasa (3 Sotsi- alisticheskaya str., Ufa, tel.: ++7 3472–723858) and Galiya (3, Mustay Karim str., Ufa, tel.: ++7 3472–721987), and Nur al-Iman in Sterlitamak (73 Bogdan Hmel- nitskiy str., 453100, Sterlitamak; tel.: ++7 3473–252223). The Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European part of Russia runs the Moscow Spiritual Islamic College (7 Vipolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, tel.: ++7 4952–844704), Sheikh Said madrasa in Saratov, and Mahinur in Nizhniy Novgorod (6, Kazanskaya Naberezhnaya str., Nizhniy Novgorod). There are no madrasas for women only in European part of Russia, but the Muhammadiya madrasa in Kazan (34 Gabdulla Tukay st., 420021, Kazan, tel.: ++7 8432931706), the Fanis in Yutazi (24 Pushkin st., Urussu, Yutazi district, Tatarstan, tel.: ++7 8559326907), and the Nur al-Iman madrasa in Sterlitamak accept both men and women as full-time students, using separate classrooms, and all madrasas accept women as part-time students. Male madrasa graduates can receive diplomas as ‘imam-khatib,’ ‘Islamic sciences teacher’, ‘Arabic language translator’ and ‘teacher of Arabic language and Islamic ethics.’ Female graduates can qualify as ‘teacher-advisor’, ‘teacher and translator of Arabic language’ and ‘teacher of Arabic language and Islamic ethics’. Study programmes last from two to five years and the diplomas are recognised by the state. The majority of madrasa graduates enrol at Islamic universities in Russia to obtain higher religious education. Higher Islamic education in Russia is provided by Islamic universities and institutes. According to Damir Mukhetdinov, there are sixteen higher Islamic

18 The exact number of madrasas in the Northern Caucasus is unknown, but is in the hundreds. 19 Muhetdinov, Damir, “Sovremennoe medrese dlya Sovremennoi Ummy (Modern madrasa for a modern nation)”, in D. Muhetdinov (ed.), Problema Stanovleniya i Razvitiya Musul- manskogo Obrazovaniya v Postsovetskom Prostranstve (The Question of the Establishment and Development of Islamic Education in Post-Soviet Space) (Nizhny Novgorod: Knijniy Dom Medina, 2009), p. 11. 520 Akhmetova educational institutes and universities operating currently in Northern Caucasus Republics.20 Another three institutions of higher Islamic education are located in central parts of the Russian Federation: Moscow Islamic University (Moskovskiy Islamskiy Universitet, 12 proyezd Kirova, Moscow, tel.: ++7 4953513067, www.miu.su), Russian Islamic University, Kazan (Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet, riu, 19 Gazovaya str., Kazan, Tatarstan, tel.: ++7 8432– 775536, www.e-riu.ru), and Russian Islamic University, Ufa (Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet, 5 Chernyshevskogo str., 450077, Ufa, Bashkortostan; tel.: ++7 3472– 519787, http://rio.bspu.ru). The biggest and best established Islamic university in Russia is the riu in Kazan. Currently about 500 students (male and female) from twenty regions of Russia and from former Soviet Republics (Commonwealth of Independent States) are studying at this university. It also has a centre for memorisation of the Qur’an and its own mosque. Practically all madrasas and universities have their own buildings and student hostels and there are currently about 3,000 Muslims studying at Islamic tertiary educational institutions. Tuition at all educational institutions is free. In addition, hostel accommodation is free, and full-time students are given three meals a day free of charge. About us$10–12 million a year from the federal budget are spent to support Islamic education in the country.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslim cemeteries exist in all parts of the predominantly Muslim republics and also in Muslim populated villages in other regions, such as Orenburg, Saratov, Yekaterinburg, Penza and Chelyabinsk. Special sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in most Russian cities, including Moscow (e.g. Perepechenskoe Cemetery) and St Petersburg (Novovolkovskoe Cemetery, established in 1820). When no special areas are available locally, relatives bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries in neighbouring regions. Most of the ethnic Muslims take the observance of burial customs seriously. Russia’s Muslims widely practise the custom of the Qur’an Ashy (literally ‘Banquet of the Qur’an’) on the third, seventh, fortieth and fifty-first days and the first anniversary after the funeral. On those days, the family of the deceased invite relatives and everyone who took part in the funeral to a meal, and verses from the Qur’an are recited by the local imam or, in the case of

20 See, Damir Mukhetdinov, “Sistema Rossiyskogo Islamskogo Obrazovaniya: Puti Razvitiya,” www.idmedina.ru/books/islamic/?1982, accessed 21 January 2014. Russia 521 female gathering, by the most knowledgeable woman (abystai). Prayer (du’a) is said for the deceased and his/her family, and gifts of money (sadaqa, usually a very small amount) are distributed among the guests and those who took part in the funeral ceremony. Men and women usually gather separately. Recitation of the whole Qur’an and the slaughtering of an animal as a sacrifice (qurban) in the name of the dead person are also widely practised.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There have been officially appointed Muslim chaplains in some units of the Russian army in the Northern Caucasus since 1 February 2010, and this is planned to expand to other regions in coming years. In some places imams pay occasional visits to the armed forces, and Muslim religious representatives are often invited to new soldiers’ swearing-in ceremonies. Some private hospitals in Moscow, Kazan, Ufa and cities of the Northern Caucasus have prayer rooms for Muslim patients and staff. There is a Muslim prayer room in the military hospital in Orenburg regularly attended by an imam from the local Karavan- Saray mosque. There are no officially appointed Muslim chaplains in prisons, although some prisons in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Nizhniy Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Mordovia, Penza, Sverdlovsk and other regions have mosques and prayer houses with regular imams, usually appointed from among the detainees. In the prisons in Tatarstan alone, there are currently seven mosques and eight prayer houses with libraries and basic Islamic teaching facilities.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslim religious festivals ʿId al-Adha (Qurban Bayram) and ʿId al-Fitr (Uraza Bayram) are public holidays in almost all the predominantly Muslim federal republics. Muslims living in other regions can usually take a day off work, provided they make up for their absence later. The Russian President officially congratulates Muslim citizens on their religious festivals every year. On festival days and during the month of Ramadan, Muslim communities organise fundraising for local orphanages, prisons, hospitals, old people’s homes and homes for the disabled. In Moscow, the rcm organises the so-called Shater Ramadana (the Ramadan Tent), a cultural charity project, where diplomats from Muslim countries, as well as local Muslim and non-Muslim political leaders, activists, scholars, public figures, the media, representatives of other religions and soldiers, as well as ordinary citizens, are invited to attend cultural programmes 522 Akhmetova and share iftar with Muslim religious leaders. Public cultural events, such as lectures, competitions, sports and performances, are often organised at these times. On festival days, Muslims also often visit cemeteries and pray for deceased family members, and during Qurban Bayram, Muslim charities, such as the Solidarity Foundation (Solidarnost, 11, 71 Dubininskaya str., 115054, Moscow, tel./fax: ++7 4957873307 www.solidarnost.su) organise the slaughter of sacrifi- cial animals and distribute meat to orphans, elderly people, the disabled and others in need. The Muslim New Year, the ‘Blessed Night’ and especially the Prophet’s birthday (Mawlid Bayram) on 12 Rabi’ al-Awwal are also widely celebrated. During the Mawlid Bayram (and through the whole month) Muslims gather together for talks and Friday sermons on the life and importance of the Prophet Muhammad, and to read from the Qur’an and perform qasidas (Arabic poems about the Prophet Muhammad, particularly the Burda), prayers and munajats (nashids). Charitable donations, gifts and sweets are distributed and congratulations are exchanged with relatives and neighbours. 16,564 Muslims of Russia performed hajj in 2013.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

There are no restrictions in Russia on slaughtering of animals according to Islamic regulations. Halal certification is carried out by Muslim religious authorities, who issue halal certificates to food manufacturers and suppliers. In 2002, the rcm established the centre for Halal Standardisation and Certification. In 2011, the administrative structure of the rmc formed the Economic Department. According to Madina Kalimullina, Director of the Economic Department, the Department annually certifies more than 40 enterprises in different spheres of production.21 Halal standards have been recognised by the governments of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Most regional Muslim religious boards have established halal committees for the development and promotion of halal standards. They issue the halal logo, control its usage, and notify the authorities of the illegal use of the halal sign on manufactured products. Halal restaurants and shops are widespread in predominantly Muslim Republics. A number of confectionary and bakery companies in Tatarstan produce halal cakes, sweets, chocolate products and pastries and, in 2009, the

21 “Halal Industry Thrives in Russia,” www.onislam.net/english/news/europe/467357-halal- industry-thrives-in-russia.html, accessed 22 January 2014. Russia 523

Mustella Talir Group in Kazan began producing cosmetics with a halal logo.22 Halal meals are provided in twelve Tatar schools and sixteen kindergartens in Kazan and in all schools and kindergartens in Nizhnikamsk, another large city in Tatarstan. In Kazan alone, meat with a halal logo is sold by a number of supermarket chains such as Bahetle, Metro, Edel’veis, Perekrestok, Real and Patterson. Also, almost every mosque has its own shop, where visitors can buy halal food, Islamic garments and literature. In cities with a minority Muslim population, halal food, mostly meat and processed meat products, is usually available at local mosques. Imported halal goods may be found in major supermarkets. In Moscow, there is a halal supermarket called “Apelsin” (Apt. 1, House 3, Gos- pitalniy val, M. Semenovskaya, Moscow, www.apelsinmarket.ru). A famous Russian newspaper Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts) stated that the manufacturing of halal products in Russia increases by 30–40% annually.23 On 19 November 2010, Halal Industrial Park “Baltach” was launched in Baltach district of Tatarstan (www.hip-baltach.ru). This first halal business park in Russia currently produces processed meat products and plans to house 20–30 small halal manufacturers in future. By 2011, about forty companies of Bashkortostan had obtained certificates to produce their production such as confectionaries, meat products and cosmetics with a halal logo. The Fourth International Halal Exhibition in Moscow—Moscow Halal Expo 2013—was organised by the rcm with the support of the Russian Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Moscow City Administration on 13–16 June 2013 in the All-Russia Exhibition Centre (vvc). More than 100 Russian and foreign companies from thirty different countries such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Palestine, Tunisia, Iran, Uzbekistan, the Philippines, Spain, Malaysia and Indonesia took part in the exhibition displaying food and beverages, cosmetic products, medicine, Islamic books and clothes. A seminar on Islamic finance, banking and insurance as well as Islamic business meetings were held during the exhibition. There is no Islamic bank in Russia, but Islamic banking, finance and insurance have become a popular topic among Russia’s Muslims within the last few years as alternative financial solutions, especially after the last global economic and financial crisis. International and domestic conferences and seminars were organised in different cities of the country discussing the principles of Islamic economic system, and prospects of founding Islamic banks in Russia. The most noteworthy among them is KAZANSUMMIT—International Islamic

22 www.talir.ru/catalog.php?parent=32, accessed 22 January 2014. 23 Svetlana Morozova, “Halal 2.0: Osobennosti religiousnoi Edy,” www.aif.ru/food/article/ 44962, accessed 2 January 2014. 524 Akhmetova and Finance Summit, which takes place annually in Kazan (http://kazansummit.com). The last Summit in October 2013 hosted about 650 participants from 13 regions of Russia, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The participants were investors, financial officers, bankers, Sharia experts, lawyers and politicians.

11 Dress Codes

Muslim women wearing head scarves are no longer an unusual sight. There were no legal restrictions on the wearing of Muslim dress in public until 2013. In 2002, Muslim women won a court case that allowed them to be photographed with the head scarf for identification documents. There are also some cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab, particularly in the Republic of Dagestan. However, wearing black, particularly black hijab, is taboo among Muslim Tatar women, as black is traditionally the colour of mourning. Yet, in October 2012, the wearing of hijab triggered a controversy in Russia after five Muslim students were banned from attending classes in their school in the village of Kara-Tyube in the southern Stavropol region. Later the Stavropol regional court ruled to ban headscarves in schools. On 10 July 2013, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation confirmed the validity of this ruling issued by the Stavropol regional court. In October 2013, President Vladimir Putin commented on the issue, explaining that the authorities must respect the beliefs of citizens but must base their decisions on the secular nature of the state. From 1 September 2013, a new law on education came into force, which established the requirements for a school uniform chosen by the school administration. According to this law, every school has the right to decide what its students may or may not wear.

12 Publications and Media

Within a short period of the collapse of the ussr, Russia witnessed a boom in the field of Islamic literature and periodicals, as well as a proliferation of Islamic books and audio and video materials produced in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or the United Kingdom. Within two decades, a number of publishing houses, such as Iman in Kazan (27 Qayum Nasiyri str., Kazan, 420022, tel./ fax: ++7 8432–934292 http://musliman.ru) and Ummah in Moscow (http:// ummah.ru) have become Russia’s leading specialist Islamic publishing houses and Islamic books are appearing in increasing numbers and improved quality. Annual Islamic book fairs have become customary. Russia 525

Among other influential Muslim publishers is the Medina Publishing House in Nizhniy Novgorod (www.idmedina.ru), which produces four academic journals and a newspaper; it also aims to produce a 12-volume encyclopaedia, Islam v Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Islam in the Russian Federation) by the year 2015. By 2013, six volumes had appeared in Russian. In addition, it has produced important books on fiqh and also organises international and local symposia, conferences and seminars. In Tatarstan alone, there are about 25 Muslim publishing houses producing newspapers and magazines amounting to 66,000 copies per year in both the Russian and the Tatar languages. The major ones are: Islam info, Iman, Vera and Umma. The Spiritual Board of Tatarstan issues the Islam Nury (Light of Islam) newspaper and a magazine called Deen ve adap (Religion and Ethics). In 2003, the Muslim Journalists’ Union was set up under the auspices of the rcm and with the support of the Russian Journalists Union. In 1997, the rcm, together with private individuals, established the tv Com- pany Islamskiy Mir (Islamic World, www.islamtv.ru), which in 2007 launched the first Islamic internet channel in Russian, Islam tv. The channel currently broadcasts daily for fourteen hours online. Its programmes include Islamic lectures, documentaries, news, children’s programme, sermons, etc. Islamskiy Mir also produces audio, video and printed Islamic materials. In August 2009, during his meeting with political and religious leaders of the Caucasus region, then-President Medvedev stressed the necessity of creating an Islamic satellite channel under Russian state television. The launching of the first Russian-language Islamic tv channel in Russia, Al-rtv, took place in August 2012. This channel seeks to promote dialogue among the different Muslim ethnic groups in Russia and advocates ‘moderate’ Islam. It broadcasts in all regions of the Russian Federation. In addition, since 2002, Russian state television has been broadcasting a weekly programme called Musul’mane (Muslims) which is devoted to the traditions, customs and culture of Russia’s Muslims, and state radio stations have similar programmes. Muslim leaders often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues. The most popular Islamic websites are http://golosislama.ru, www.islam.ru, http://islamnews.ru, http://ansar.ru, http://umma.ru and http://islamrf.ru.

13 Family Law

Russian law does not recognise Muslim marriage contracts conducted in mosques or divorce certificates issued by local imams. Russia’s Muslim couples usually first perform nikah rituals and then on the same day or later have a civil 526 Akhmetova marriage ceremony at state offices, which is the only form of marriage recognised by Russian law. Both ceremonies are widely celebrated by the Muslim community. Regarding inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved to either follow Islamic law or the secular state law.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious relations in the Russian context mean interactions between the followers of the minority creeds such as Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and the dominant Russian Orthodox Christianity, with its centre, the Moscow Patriarchate. All these religions have coexisted on the territory of the Russian Federation for over a thousand years. Over time, there have been periods of peaceful relations, competition and even ruthless confrontations, especially between the victorious Orthodox Christians and their Muslim subjects. This deep-seated historical antagonism as well as recent developments such as war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the emergence of anti-Russian feelings in the Muslim-majority republics of Central Asia and Caucasus, the two Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2000, and, most importantly, the events of 11 September 2001 have played an important role in creating the stereotypical image of Islam as an aggressive, militant religion, associated with separatism, terrorism and drug-trafficking. This stereotype was adopted by the great part of Orthodox believers and the Russian Orthodox Church authorities. On 23 December 1998, the Interreligious Council of Russia (Mezhreligiozniy Sovet Rossii) was founded at the initiative of the country’s religious leaders. This council unites all the country’s traditional religious associations and has undertaken an important role in coordinating social projects with religious organisations. In recent years, the movement for peace, dialogue and co-operation between Muslims and Christians has become quite popular in Russian educated circles. On 13–17 November 2013, the Third International Scientific Forum “Islam in a Multicultural World” was held at the Institute of Oriental Studies and International Relations of Kazan (Volga Region) Federal University. Russia’s Muslims and their umbrella organisations are engaged in various local and international interfaith activities. Organising round tables, seminars, conferences and public lectures on interreligious dialogue, greeting followers of other faiths at their religious festivals and inviting them to iftars and other Islamic festivals has become a tradition in modern Russia. Joint sports, cultural and religious events between followers of different faiths also occasionally take place. Russia 527

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Along with the beginning of the us-led ‘war on terrorism’, the Russian Federation adopted a new law “On Fighting Extremist Activity” in June 2002. The Beslan school siege in September 2004 was a turning point in the emergence of the politics of hatred towards all things Islamic in Russia.24 The Russian media and cinema industry also adopted a hostile stance towards Islam and Muslims and played a vital role in creating a negative image.25 Sergey Sobyanin, the Mayor of Moscow, warned Russian Muslims in 2013 that no permissions would be granted to build new mosques in Moscow, which is home to about 2 million Muslims. These negative developments have had an overwhelming impact on the security, rights and well-being of Russia’s Muslims. In fact, the most integrated traditional Russia’s Muslims such as Tatars and Bashkirs, whose religious adherence is not noticeable, do not face serious adverse public opinion on the part of the non-Muslims. Muslims of the North Caucasus region and Central Asian immigrants, however, are unwelcome in Russian cities. This intolerant nature of the ethnic Russian population toward Muslims from the Caucasus is evident in the opinion polls conducted by Russian Public Opinion Research Centre in May 2010. 29% of respondents acknowledged their antipathy towards Caucasian nations due to fear of terrorism. Another opinion poll conducted by the Fund of Public Opinion (fom) in August 2012 showed that 23% of respondents acknowledged their antipathy, while 53% of respondents demonstrated their neutrality toward Islam and Muslims in general.26 Moreover, in recent years, ethnic Russian nationalism has increased. The reported skinhead attacks have been mainly directed against immigrants from Central Asia and are largely confined to a few cities such as Moscow, St Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod. According to the figures provided by sova Centre for Information and Analysis, at least 20 non-Slavs were killed and another 173 were injured in 2013 at the hands of neo-Nazi gangs and racist groups.27 In 2013, several serious ethnic clashes between Slavic racist gangs and immigrant groups in Moscow region broke out.

24 Hunter, Shireen; with Thomas, Jeffrey and Melikishvili, Alexander, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 6. 25 For instance, in the most recent Russian movie Orda (international title is The Horde, 2012, director Andrei Proshkin) the Tatars, who are the largest Muslim group in modern Russia, are portrayed as barbarians, brutal, bloodthirsty and evil-minded people. 26 http://fom.ru/obshchestvo/10652, accessed 21 January 2014. 27 “Racism and Xenophobia: Preliminary Summary for 2013,” www.sova-center.ru/en/ xenophobia/news-releases/2014/01/d28754, accessed 22 January 2014. 528 Akhmetova

16 Major Cultural Events

The diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds of Russia’s Muslim population give rise to numerous cultural events throughout the year. They range across sporting, arts and religious events, and attract local as well as international participants. The major arts event is the Kazan International Festival of the Muslim Cinema (the previous name before 2010 was Altyn Minbar—The Golden Minbar), which takes place annually in the capital city of Tatarstan. This event is mainly sponsored by the government of Tatarstan, and has become internationally recognised. Another annual event, which brings together diverse Russian Muslim communities, is the celebration of the acceptance of Islam by the Volga Bulghar Kingdom, organised by the csbm in June since the 1990s. Several thousand Muslims from all parts of Russia28 gather at the ruins of the ancient city of Bulghar (present-day Spasskiy district, Tatarstan) to perform prayers and make special supplications for their forefathers. The Russian Islamic Book Fair, where major Muslim publishers exhibit their new publications, takes place annually in June in Kazan. Qur’an recitation competitions for men, women and children are organised by Muslim communities every year in various parts of Russia. The main event is the Moscow International Qur’an Reciting Competition, which attracts participants from Muslim countries and Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries. Thirty six participants from Arab countries, France, Sweden, the uk, Malaysia, Indonesia, Finland, South Africa, the usa, Central Asia and Russia took part in the 2013 competition. Serbia

Almir Pramenković*

1 Muslim Populations

The Muslim population in Serbia is a native populace that has for centuries inhabited particular parts of the country. The ethnic composition of Serbian Muslims consists of Bosniaks, Albanians, Turks, Roma and Serb converts. They are geographically dispersed with concentrations in particular regions: in certain parts of the country they are the dominant group and in some other parts they present larger or smaller religious and national communities. Two regions with a Muslim majority population are Sandžak, where the Bosniaks are concentrated, and Preševo Valley, which is predominantly populated by Albanians. In the capital city Belgrade, there are more than one hundred thousand Muslims of all nationalities, while Muslim enclaves in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina consist of post-1945 settlers and Muslim Roma population. In other Serbian cities, a sporadic presence of Muslim population is recorded, whose genesis might be observed from three streams: remnants of former indigenous Muslim population (Mali Zvornik, Užice); internal migrations, usually due to existential reasons during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes until the breakdown of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; and the Roma population subject to frequent migrations.1 Some data suggest that Muslims in Serbia appear in the 10th and 11th centuries, but there is sustainable evidence confirming that the first major islamisation in these parts began with the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. After establishing firm rule within the Balkan Peninsula, the Ottomans established two major administrative parts: Rumelian and the Bosnian velayet (governor- ate). Novi Pazar Sandžak, as a territorial and administrative part, fell under the Bosnian velayet, and the rest of Serbia to the Rumelian one. With the gradual weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the conditions of the Muslim population were continuously worsening. After losing their territories, Muslims were dis- placed, assimilated or otherwise victimised. This has resulted in cities with

* Dr. Almir Pramenkovic is associate professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Novi Pazar. 1 For more on the matter, see Društveni i državno-pravni kontinuitet Sandžaka-Geneza muslimana u Sandžaku i njihova kretanja kroz historiju (Sarajevo, Udruženje Bošnjaka porijeklom iz Sandžaka, 1996); Memić, Mustafa, Bošnjaci-muslimani Sandžaka i Crne Gore (Sarajevo, 1996); Imamović Mustafa, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo, Preporod, 1998).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_039 530 Pramenković previously majority Muslim population today to be completely ethnically cleansed from it. For example, in 1868, 34 mosques were destroyed in Užice and 24 in Smedrevo. Altogether, between 270 and 300 mosques were destroyed, leaving in Belgrade only Bajrakli mosque on Dorćol. A similar destiny befell Šabac, Niš, Vranje and other cities which became part of the Principality of Serbia.2 During the twentieth century, an aggressive policy of discrimination, assimilation and ethnic cleansing of Muslims was carried out. On several occasions agreed emigrations to Turkey took place, some encouraged by the state appa- ratus. One of the important international documents that allowed such a thing is the so-called Gentleman’s Agreement of sfry and the Republic of Turkey from 1954. During the rule of the communist one-party system of the federation of Yugoslav republics, Serbia’s Muslims were subjected to various forms of harassment, from the closure and demolition of mosques, through abolition of madrasas and mektebs, seizure of waqfs, nationalisation of private property, prohibition of the performance of religious duties, arrests, forced labour, torture and execution of practising Muslims, the ban on wearing the hijab,3 show trials against Muslim intellectuals,4 to discrimination regarding education, employment and professional training. According to the national census from 2002, the population of the country was 7,498,001. The Muslim population in Serbia counted 239,658 which constituted 3.2 % of the total population.5 According to the 2011 census, the population of the country had decreased to 7,120,666, which is 377,335 less than in 2002,6 while the Muslim population was found to stand at 222,828. Some Muslim organisations consider these statistics to be inaccurate and estimate that the real number of Muslims is over 500,000. It is generally held that there are over 120,000 Muslims in Novi Pazar while according to the census that number is only 81,545.7 It is similar in other Sandžak cities, Preševo Valley, Vojvodina, Central Serbia and other places. It is important to point out that

2 Imamović, Mustafa: Historija Bošnjaka, pp. 328–331. 3 The law prohibiting wearing of hijab adopted in 1949. 4 See: Dupljak, Rifat, Young Muslims in Sandžak (Novi Pazar, Historical Archives, “Ras”, 2003). 5 Republički zavod za statistiku, Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova 2002. godine, Knjiga 3, p. 12. 6 Republički zavod za statistiku, Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova 2011. godine, p. 15. http://media.popis2011.stat.rs/2011/prvi_rezultati.pdf. 7 Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova 2011. godine, p. 15. Serbia 531 the Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS) boycotted the census held in 2011 due to many irregularities which led to many people not taking part in the census. Muslims in Serbia are Sunni and follow the Hanafi school of Islamic law and Maturidi school of Islamic doctrine, with very small number of followers of Sufi orders. There are four Sufi tekkes, all in Novi Pazar. During the 1990s, the first Salafis, known as ‘Wahhabis’, emerged. The exact number of them is not known and they run two private masjids in Novi Pazar.

2 Islam and State

Serbia is a republic without a state religion and according to the Constitution all religious communities are equal before the law and separate from the state.8 The Office for Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities takes care of religious affairs. Since relatively recently, the Office operates within the Ministry of Justice.9 The Constitution of Serbia states that religious communities are equal and separate from the state. The Law on Churches and Religious Communities (2006)10 regulates the issue of state-church relations. The law distinguishes between seven traditional religious communities, including the Islamic community, and all other communities. These seven enjoy the privilege of having inherited their legal status from the days of the Kingdom of Serbia, which the Republic of Serbia automatically recognised. This does not prevent the Serbian government from being an actor in the current dispute within the Muslim community. Furthermore, the law particularly mentions the historical role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the development of the national identity of the Serb people. In practice, the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys a privileged status and plays an important social and political role in the country. Overall, there is a significant gap between law and its implementation. At the Unification Council (“Objediniteljski sabor”) in Novi Pazar in 2007, the Islamic Community in Serbia was formed in the presence of many distinguished guests and delegates. One of the resolutions of the Council was that the Islamic Community in Serbia is a part of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Contrary to the stipulations of the law, the state has

8 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, article 44. For the complete text of the law, see www.searchmobileonline.com. 9 See www.searchmobileonline.com. 10 http://www.mv.gov.rs/cir/images/stories/pravna_akta/zakon_o_crkvama_i_vz.pdf, accessed 22 April 2009. 532 Pramenković

recognised a parallel Islamic community of Serbia (ics). ICiS (Islamic community in Serbia-Mesihat) receives sporadic state funding for its projects.11 The issue of property of ICiS that was nationalised under communist rule is not resolved yet. Besides, respective state ministries do not pay pension and health care for imams and professors of the Faculty of Islamic studies and the Secondary Islamic school although the Law on Churches and Religious Communities stipulates that employees of religious communities are entitled to have health care and pension security paid by the state.12

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Muslim organisation in Serbia is the Islamic Community in Serbia (Islamska zajednica u Srbiji, Gradska 1, 36 300, Novi Pazar, tel: +381 20 315 452, fax: +381 20 331 722, www.islamskazajednica.org). The Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS) today is organised into the following muftiates: Sandžak muftiate, Preševo muftiate and Belgrade and Novi Sad muftiate, with its headquarters in Novi Pazar. Upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 1991–92, the united Islamic Community in Yugoslavia dissolved too. A separate Islamic Community of Sandžak (Mešihat islamske zajednice Sandžaka) was established on 30 October 1993, while the Muslim community in the rest of the country remained organised only at regional and local levels. After the Islamic Community of Sandžak had completed the system of its own institutions, it started a project of putting together all parts of the Islamic community in Serbia which came to fruition in 2007.13 Today the structure of ICiS is composed of jama‘at (congregation of at least 100 households), whose members are Muslims over 18 years of age living in the area; majlis (higher organisational unit that covers at least 5 jama‘ats), four muftiates: Muftiate of Sandžak for the area of Sandžak with the headquarters in Novi Pazar, Muftiate of Preševo for the area of Preševo Valley with the headquarters in Preševo, Muftiate of Belgrade for the area of Belgrade and central Serbia with the headquarters in Belgrade, and Muftiate of Novi Sad for

11 Izvjestaj o radu Mesihata Islamske zajednice u Srbiji (2013). 12 Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, clan 29. For the complete text of the law, see www.minoritycentre.org. 13 Edah Bećirbegović, “Organizacija Islamske zajednice u Srbiji, Organizacija islamskih zajednica u regionu (Sarajevo: Udruženje ilmijje iz u BiH, 2008), p. 39. Serbia 533 the area of Novi Sad with the headquarters in Novi Sad; Mešihat (the highest religious and administrative body in the Islamic community) based in Novi Pazar; President of mešihat—chief mufti (represents the ICiS inside the country and abroad); and Assembly (the highest representative and executive body of the ICiS).14 The current mufti of Sandžak and chief mufti is Muamer Zukorlić. ICiS is an independent religious institution with its symbolic connections with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina. ICiS recognises the Bosnian rais al-ulema as its supreme leader while the rais al-ulema confirms the chief mufti as the head of the ICiS. The main institutions of ICiS include the Faculty of Islamic studies, the Sec- ondary Islamic School ‘Gazi Isa-beg’, the kindergarten and mektebs ‘Reuda and Wildan’, the School of Noble Qur’an, the publishing house ‘El-Kelime’, a media centre, the Agency for Halal Quality Certification, the Centre for charitable work, the Islamic cultural centre ‘Altun alem’, women’s association ‘Merjem’, and the Muslim Youth Club. Apart from the ICiS, Merhamet (Muslimansko humanitarno drustvo Mer- hamet Sandžak, Kragujevacka, 12, 36 00 Novi Pazar, Srbija, tel/fax.+281 20 331 960) is the most significant organisation. Merhamet was established in 1991 and works on providing assistance to people irrespective of their religion, nation or race.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are approximately 190 mosques and masjids in Serbia: around 120 in Sandžak, 60 in southern parts of Serbia and one in each of Belgrade, Nis, Mali Zvornik, and Subotica. In Novi Sad two new mosques are being constructed and a few in Novi Pazar. There are eight masjids (mosques without minarets) in Vojvodina where authorities do not permit building of minarets. Many mosques have been newly built, in particular over the last two decades while many older ones have been reconstructed. The Islamic centre in Delimeđe (Tutin municipality) is believed to be the biggest mosque in Sandžak with multiple facilities and with the tallest minarets in Europe (two minarets of 85 meters each).

14 For more about organisation of ICiS, see Ustav Islamske zajednice u Srbiji www.mesihat .org. 534 Pramenković

5 Children’s Education

The first Islamic schools in Serbia came along with Islam and the Ottomans. Thanks to the waqf institution from the 15th to 20th centuries, the educational system in Serbia used to consist of mektebs, madrasas, and rushdia schools. The oldest Muslim educational institutions were mektebs (or kuttab). After the Ottoman conquest of the Balkan countries in the mid-15th century, the first mosques and at the same time the first mektebs were established. Later the first madrasas were built as schools of middle and higher tier. In the second half of the 19th century, the Ottoman state started a reform of its school system with the aim of introducing secular education. In 1864, the first secular school—rushdia was established.15 With the departure of the Ottomans from the Balkans the ties between Istanbul and the Balkans were severed and the network of formal Islamic educational institutions fragmented and often was completely destroyed. Religious schools were abolished by force. Among the 11 Sandžak madrasas, only a madrasa in Novi Pazar operated to the end of Second World War, when the communists prohibited its work. Since the 1990s, there has been a revival of Islamic education in Serbia. Mosque education (commonly known as mekteb) is the least formal of the four but reaches most Muslims. It is mostly meant for 6 to 15 olds although adult mosque education is not unheard of. In addition to basic knowledge about Islamic doctrine, rituals, and ethics, pupils in the mosques memorise a certain number of Qur’anic suras that will enable them to perform required daily prayers. Some learn how to read the Qur’an. By the age of 15 most children stop attending mosque education. It is not known how many children attend mosque education in Serbia. In 1991, a section of Alaudin madrasa from Pristina was formed in Novi Pazar, and in 1994 it became an independent secondary Islamic school that afterwards was renamed after the founder of Novi Pazar and Sarajevo, Isa-beg Ishakovic.16 This madrasa was initially called Sinan-beg madrasa and was established in the 15th century and closed down in 1946 by Yugoslav authorities. In 1996, the ICiS widened madrasa facilities by establishing a secondary Islamic school for girls in Rožaje (nowadays in the Montenegrin part of Sandžak). Such a school for girls was an unprecedented case in all the history of Muslims in Serbia.17

15 Mitar Papić, Školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme Austrougarske okupacije (1878–1918) (Sarajevo, 1972), pp. 37. 16 http://www.medresa.net. 17 Mevlud Dudić, Sandžački Azhar—Monografija “Gazi Isa-beg” medrese u Novom Pazaru. Unpublished ma theses. Serbia 535

In 2013, 392 pupils attended madrasa (179 males and 213 females out of whom 147 in Novi Pazar and 66 in Rožaje department). In 2013, the madrasa produced 76 graduates.18 Religious education in public schools was introduced in 2001/02 following joint efforts by the Orthodox Church and other churches and communities, including the Islamic Community in Serbia.19 The law guarantees the right to religious education in elementary and secondary public and private schools. In public schools, Islamic religious education is an ‘optional-compulsory’ subject, which means that pupils may choose the subject but may then not later withdraw. It is taught by Muslims trained and licensed by the ICiS and paid by the state in the person of the Ministry of Education. The subject is offered once a week in all the grades if there are seven or more interested pupils.20 As of 2013, approximately 80% of religious teachers in public schools came from the ics after teachers from the ICiS were unjustly expelled.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The first higher education institution in modern Serbia—the Islamic pedagogical academy—was formed by the Islamic Community in Serbia in 2001. It was transformed into the Faculty of Islamic Studies in 2006 (www.fis.edu .rs). Since the academic year 2013/2014, three majors are offered: Shariʿa and Law, Pedagogy and Communications, and Islamic Studies. It provides training mainly for future imams and Islamic religious education teachers in madrasa and public schools.21 In 2013, the Faculty was attended by 114 students with 21 graduating. In the teaching process of the Faculty 38 teaching personnel are involved.22 A few of them are visiting lecturers from Bosnia and Macedonia.

18 For more about the matter, see Izvještaj o radu Mešihata Islamske zajednice u Srbiji (2013). 19 In Serbia, religious education was introduced under chaotic circumstances, shortly after the democratic changes following 5 October 2000, to which it was directly linked. The previous regime of Slobodan Milosevic had rejected all initiatives seeking the introduction of religious education into state schools, in spite of the numerous concessions and policy changes toward the church made since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 20 Zorica Kuburić and Milan Vukomanović, “Religious education: The case of Serbia”, in Zorica Kuburić and Christian Moe (eds), Religion and Pluralism in Education: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans (Novi Sad: ceir, 2006) pp. 107–138. 21 http://www.fis.edu.rs. 22 For more about the matter, see Izvještaj o radu Mešihata Islamske zajednice u Srbiji (2013). 536 Pramenković

The number of lecturers from Sandžak is getting bigger year after year so the need for visiting lecturers is declining. In addition to these two institutions, the ICiS runs the International University of Novi Pazar (www.uninp.edu.rs), which is formally registered as a waqf. It is a secular university with several faculties and branches in a number of towns throughout Serbia, which are attended by both Muslim and non- Muslim students.23 The Faculty of Islamic Studies is an affiliated member of the University. A year after the establishment of the International University the state opened the State University with the same faculties and departments. The State University passed the process of accreditation in exception- ally short time though it lacks teaching staff and library, whereas International University has been held in uncertainty for five years although it possesses a new building, modern teaching equipment, highly qualified teaching staff and meets all European standards.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Religious communities have separate cemeteries so there is no single case of Christian buried in Muslim cemetery or the opposite. Muslims are buried in accordance with the regulations of Islam. Muslims who do not have a cemetery in their city (for example Belgrade) are buried in the nearest city in which there is a cemetery. Muslims in Sandžak and Preševo Valley do not have any problems with the burial of deceased on Shariʿa lines except that the municipal authorities manage them, and not the Islamic community. The overwhelming majority of those living abroad bury their deceased in their ancestral home- towns. As a result of that, many burial agencies have been established to provide funeral services in accordance with Shariʿa.

8 Chaplaincy in State Institutions

There is still no official chaplaincy in prison facilities. There are merely visits to inmates during Ramadan when Islamic literature is distributed and lectures are organised. Prayer room or official smaller masjid can be found in Niš prison only. They have been visited by officials of the ICiS more frequently due to inmates’ request for religious services. Chaplaincy in health and other institutions does not exist.

23 Savić, Svenka, “Some notes on Islamic Education in Serbia”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Bohlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 449–456. Serbia 537

9 Religious Festivals

The public holidays in Serbia are defined by a law of national and other holidays. The employees of Christian, Muslim and Jewish religions, in additional to national holidays, are allowed days off work on some of their religious holidays. Muslim religious holidays include Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.24 Both Eid prayers are broadcast by two local tv stations (Sandžak and tv Jedinstvo), where Eid prayer is led and a sermon (khutba) is delivered by chief mufti, while the state tv station covers celebration of Bayram in Bayrakli mosque in Belgrade which is not run by the ICiS. In 2013, there were no Bayram receptions in Mešihat arranged by chief mufti. Instead, on the first night of Eid al-Adha fireworks were organised in the city centre of Novi Pazar attended by tens of thousands of Muslims.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Halal slaughter is allowed and a high proportion of Muslims slaughter animals privately in accordance with Islamic principles. The Agency for Halal Quality Certification was established in 2007 and operates within the framework of the ICiS as a branch of the central agency based in Tuzla (Bosnia). Since its establishment, awareness of halal requirements among Muslims and non-Mus- lims likewise has been raised greatly. Beside companies such as ‘Zlatiborac’ (Mackat), ‘Yuhor’ (Jagodina), ‘Vindija’ (Plandiste), ‘Topiko ad’ (Vrbas), dairy farms ‘Maestro’ (Kovacevac), ‘Puratos doo’ (Belgrade) that already have halal certificate, the following companies started the process of getting the certificate in 2013: ‘Carnex doo’ (Vrbas), dairy farm ‘Somboled doo’ (Sombor), bakery ‘Pons’ (Cacak), hotel ‘Solaris Resort’ (Vrnjacka Banja), ‘Frikom’ (Belgrade), slaughterhouse ‘Pavlovic’ (Cuprija), factory for the production of chips ‘Pestova sh.p.k’ (Pristina), hotel ‘Atlas’ (Novi Pazar) and a company for the production of meatpie ‘Enco doo’ (Novi Pazar).25 In order to perform hajj, Muslims are allowed to get leave of absence from work. In 2013, according to annual report of the ICiS, 114 pilgrims from Serbia performed hajj.26

24 Zakon o državnim i drugim praznicima u Republici Srbiji (Službeni glasnik rs, 2011). 25 Izvještaj o radu Mešihata Islamske zajednice u Srbiji (2013). 26 Izvještaj o radu Mešihata Islamske zajednice u Srbiji (2013). 538 Pramenković

11 Dress Code

Wearing hijab is permitted, and covered women can get identification cards or passport photos without taking scarves off. Also, covered women are accepted in educational institutions and public offices. In Sandžak province Muslim women do not face problems wearing hijab while in central Serbia it is almost impossible to wear hijab where religious bigotry and hatred are still evident. Only few women can be noticed in cities of Sandžak wearing niqab.

12 Publication and Media

El-Kelimeh is the publishing house of the ICiS established in 1996, which is presently one of the leading publishing houses in the region. El-Kelimeh is the legal founder of the Islamic Community’s official journal Glas Islama (Voice of Islam) first published in 1997, the only Muslim print medium in Serbia which has been continuously published and has had more than two hundred issues. Thanks to the Glas Islama, four other periodic print journals have been created: Islamska misao (Islamic thought) first published in 2007, a journal of the Faculty of Islamic studies; Univerzitetska misao first published in 2007, a scientific journal of the International University of Novi Pazar; Softa first published in 1998, a journal of Gazi Isa-beg’s madrasa students; and Talib first published in 2009, the Faculty of Islamic Studies students’ journal.27 Islamic radio Refref operates within the Media Centre of the ICiS and the tv station Universa within the International University. In addition to numerous mosque libraries, the Islamic community established two nationally significant libraries: Gazi Isa-beg and the University Library.

13 Family Law

Despite the fact that marriages administered by imams are not recognised, as only civil marriages are valid, Muslims practise Shariʿa marriage in the presence of an imam. Mainly, imams give Shariʿa marriage certificates to newly- weds although it does not have any legal consequence. It is difficult to say how many Shariʿa marriages were conducted in 2013.

27 For more about the matter, see www.islamskazajednica.org. Serbia 539

When it comes to inheritance, distribution of the property after someone’s death can be carried out only in civil courts. The courts do not question the way in which the property has been distributed.

14 Interreligious Relations

The dissolution of Yugoslavia was extremely violent. For ten turbulent years, from 1991 to 1999, bloody conflicts of various intensity broke out, affecting relationships among the people. There is no particular inter-religious council between religious communities so their mutual cooperation has been ongoing through meetings taking place on special occasions. The cooperation between religious communities is gravely hampered for political reasons. As a multi-confessional and multi-religious region, Sandžak is a good example of peaceful coexistence. Despite many historical conflicts and wars no single incident has taken place on the basis of religion or race.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Mešihat and the Faculty of Islamic Studies organise conferences and debates on different occasions. One of those was held in the premises of the Faculty of Islamic Studies (13 December 2013) under the title ‘With education towards coexistence’. Participants were mainly professors of the Faculty.28

16 Major Cultural Events

The ICiS organises religious festivals, the most important of which are festivals staged on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, on the occasion of the birth of the Prophet Muhammed and Hijra, anniversary of the establishment of the School of Qur’an (9 April), anniversary of establishment of Faculty of Islamic studies (12 May), and Graduation day of the Secondary Islamic School ‘Gazi Isa-beg’ (date varies). An event called Šehidska dova na Hadžetu (4 September) is organised in memory of 2,000 citizens of Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin who were killed by communist authorities on 28 November 1944.

28 http://fis.edu.rs/page/2/. Slovakia

Jaroslav Drobny*

1 Muslim Populations

Accurate data on the number of Muslims in Slovakia still are not known. At the latest census of the population in May 2011, the Muslims in Slovakia, as well as members of other religious groups which are not registered by the state as recognised religious communities, had the opportunity to claim allegiance to their religion by ticking the box “other” and adding their religion into the empty line in the census sheet. The results of this census of the population were published in July 2012,1 however, they did not provide any new data on the number of the Muslims in Slovakia. Muslims are included in these results in the category “other,” if they also stated their religion, or in the category “unknown,” if they did not state their religion in the census. Despite the fact that the first Muslim communities appeared on the territory of Slovakia already in the 10th century, and a part of today’s southern Slovakia belonged to the Ottoman Empire for almost 150 years, the majority of Muslims in Slovakia are recent immigrants. A smaller component consists of converted Slovaks and those who were born in Slovakia to Muslim immigrant parents. The emergence of the modern Muslim community in Slovakia should be linked to the occupation and annexation of Bosnia (1878/1908) by Austria- Hungary. The first wave of Muslim immigrants, who settled on the territory of (not only) Slovakia was from Bosnia. In most towns only few individuals settled, only in bigger cities did more numerous communities (comprised of several dozen of persons) arise. Slovakia as part of Czechoslovakia was among the industrially and educationally best developed countries in the Socialist bloc, which from the 1950s and 1960s allowed a high number of students, also

* Mgr. Jaroslav Drobný, PhD, is a graduate of History and Arabic Philology at the Comenius University in Bratislava. His PhD thesis was on the Arab reports on Islam and Islamised ethnic groups in the Carpathian basin from 9th to 13th century. He lectures at the Department of Classical and Semitic Philology of the Comenius University. 1 Juhaščíková, I., Škápik, P., Štukovská, Z.: Základné údaje zo Sčítania obyvatel’ov, domov a bytov 2011. Obyvatel’stvo podl’a náboženského vyznania. (Basic data from the Census of Population and Housing 2011. Population by religion.) Bratislava, 2012, www.scitanie2011.sk/ wp-content/uploads/EV_v2-N%C3%A1bo%C5%BEensk%C3%A9-vyznanie.pdf, accessed 17 March 2014.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_040 Slovakia 541 from Muslim countries, to study at its universities. The majority of these students came from Arab countries which had good relations with the Socialist countries. Some of these students stayed to work in Slovakia, and they also often founded families here. It is this group with their family members which forms the basis of the Muslim community. In the 1990s, they were joined by Muslim refugees from the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Muslims from the Balkans (mostly Albanians) lived there during the Communist period as well, running small restaurants or selling sweets and ice cream. Muslim community sources say there are about 4,000–5,000 Muslims, with only about 10% of them actively practising the faith.2 As estimated by the Islamic Foundation, around 4,700 Muslims live in Slovakia, of whom 1,500 are Arabs (students and naturalised citizens from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Palestine), 1,000 from Macedonia, 240 Afghans, 300–400 Muslims from the former ussr, 200 from Bosnia, 200 from Kosovo, 200 from Africa (mostly from Somalia), around 400 from other parts of the world and approximately 350–500 Slovak converts (mostly Slovak women, married to Muslims of foreign origin).3 Most Muslims and Islamic activities are concentrated in the capital Bratislava, with small numbers living in the cities of Košice, Martin, Nitra, Levice and Piešťany.

2 Islam and the State

In the Slovak Republic, there is no official state religion, but because of the high number of followers (62% of the inhabitants), Roman Catholicism is considered to be the dominant religion. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic guarantees freedom of religion and gives the right to change religion or faith, and also the right to renounce any religion. The registration of churches and religious communities is not mandatory, however, the legal right to build places of worship, perform public church services and carry out other activities belongs only to registered churches or religious communities. The registered churches and religious communities receive state contributions and subsidies for salaries of their clergy. They have

2 Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 1, 2010, p. 305. 3 Lenč, J., Štefančík, R., Mladí migranti v slovenskej spoločnosti. Medzinárodná migrácia, mosli- movia, štát a verejná mienka. (Young migrants in the Slovak society. International migration, Muslims, state and public opinion.) Brno, 2012, p. 159. 542 Drobny the right to visit prisons and hospitals and to provide there the spiritual service to their own members. The Act on Registration of Churches and Religious Societies (adopted in 1991) was amended in May 2007. According to the amendment of the Act, the registration of a new religion requires at least 20,000 members of the respective religious community permanently living on the territory of the Slovak Republic. In addition, these 20,000 members must submit a “solemn declaration” confirming their membership, knowledge of the fundamental articles of the respective faith, birth certificate number, permanent address and supporting opinion on the registration of the community. The Act in the former wording allowed registration of religious organisations on the basis of the petition of 20,000 people. Fourteen churches and religious communities, which legally existed in the country before the adoption of the Act on registration of churches and religious societies in 1991, were exempted from the criterion of the compulsory membership basis. Although the Muslim community existed in the country already before 1991, but as it was never properly registered the Act of 1991 did not recognise its status of a registered church or religious society. Because of the small number of members, according to the amended Act, the registration of a Muslim organisation today is practically impossible.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Foundation in Slovakia (Islamská nadácia na Slovensku, po Box 247 Bratislava 814 99, www.islamweb.sk) is generally regarded as an official institution of the Muslim community. It was established in 1999 by Moha- mad Safwan Hasna, Artan Qineti and Akram al-Haiwan. The foundation publishes a bulletin called Al-Islam and runs a number of Facebook pages and groups. The Association of Friends of Islamic Literature (Združenie priatel’ov islam- skej literatúry, Žabotova ulica č. 2, 811 04, Bratislava) was founded by Abdulwahab Al Sbenaty. Al-Sbenaty was also a founding member of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies (Inštitút blízkovýchodných štúdií), established in 2006, and the Muslim Community in Slovakia (Komunita muslimov na Slovensku, Žabotova 2, 81104 Bratislava). The Muslim Foundation in Slovakia (Nadácia moslimov na Slovensku, Podkolibská 1, Bratislava) was established in 2009 by Ammar Qari and Chiboub Hidbani. This organisation is presumed close to Salafi movements. Slovakia 543

The Foundation al-Huda (Nadácia Al huda, Hemerkova 33, Košice) was founded in 2010 by Mohamad Farah in Košice (second largest city in Slovakia).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Bratislava is one of a few European capitals without a mosque. Long-time efforts to build an Islamic cultural centre, which would also include a mosque, have not been successful till now. The main reasons are administrative barriers in the approval of construction. In 2009, the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia opened an Islamic cultural centre, called the Cordoba Centre for Intercultural Dialogue (Cordóba centrum pre medzikultúrny dialóg; Obchodná 31, Bratislava) in central Bratislava. The centre has a prayer room and a library. The Muslim Foundation in Bratislava (with a Salafi background) in 2010 opened an Islamic Culture Centre (Islamské kultúrne centrum, in February 2013 it moved to a new location—Peterska 2, Ružinov, Bratislava) with a prayer room. In 2010, the Foundation al-Huda in Košice opened a prayer room “Masjid alhuda,” on Gudernova 3, Košice. In addition to the prayer premises managed by Muslim organisations, Muslims in Slovakia have the opportunity to participate in joint prayers on private premises, which entrepreneurs (mainly in the restaurant industry) occasionally provide. Some of them are unofficially affiliated with the Gülen movement.

5 Children’s Education

Primary and secondary schools in Slovakia provide lessons in religious education, which are organised by officially registered churches and religious communities. Islam is not registered, so no Islamic religious education can be given. For those who do not wish to attend classes in an officially recognised (mostly Catholic) religion, classes in ‘ethics’ are provided, which include some coverage of history of religions. The Islamic Foundation organises several courses (including on the internet) on the religion of Islam. Muslim pre-school children also have the opportunity to attend private kindergartens, where the education is in the spirit of the Islamic faith. 544 Drobny

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in Slovakia. The Islamic Culture Centre (Muslim Foundation in Slovakia) is an approved exam centre4 of the Islamic Online University (iou).5

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is no official Muslim cemetery in Slovakia. The only burial place assigned to Muslims is part of the large municipal cemetery, Slávičie údolie, in Bratislava. Islamic burials have taken place there for several decades. There are several dozen burial places and the Muslim community now faces the problem of the lack of space—a general problem in the capital, which is not specific to the Muslim community. Members of the Islamic Foundation perform burial rituals. In other cities Muslim funerals require specific agreements with the management of cemeteries. It is their decision whether or not to allow Muslims to bury in graves oriented towards Mecca in a separate part of the cemetery.6

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Muslims (as a non-registered religious community) cannot perform any of these activities in government institutions and services.

9 Religious festivals

No data.

4 www.islamskecentrum.sk/index.php/aktivity/pravidla-nariadenia, accessed 12 March 2013. 5 www.islamiconlineuniversity.com/. 6 www.pohrebnictvo.sk/zvyklosti-v-islame/, (Practices in Islam. The dying, death and funerary rituals) accessed 14 January 2014. Slovakia 545

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Muslims in Slovakia have access to halal food in several stores with imported ‘Oriental’ food. Some restaurants and many fast food stalls in Bratislava and a few other Slovak cities serve halal food.

11 Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting or limiting the wearing of typical Islamic clothing by women, including hijab and niqab. No dress code incident has so far been reported.

12 Publications and Media

The only printed Islamic periodical publication is Al-Islam magazine, published bimonthly (6 issues + special edition) by the Islamic Foundation. The Islamic Foundation has its own website (www.islamweb.sk), which is the official medium of the Slovak Muslim community. The Association of Friends of Islamic Literature and the General Union of Muslims in Slovakia have a joint website (www.islam-sk.sk); the Slovak translation of the Qur’an by Abdulwahab Al Sbenaty is available here, as well as on the website www.koran.sk, managed by Mr Al-Sbenaty. The web page of the Muslim Foundation in Slovakia (www.islamske centrum.sk) is under construction. Both the Islamic Foundation and the Muslim Foundation issued publications about Islam in the Slovak language.

13 Family Law

Islamic marriages are not officially recognised by the state. Muslims perform Islamic marriage ceremonies but must also have a civil marriage in order for the marriage to be registered. Some Muslim countries recognise marriages conducted by the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia. 546 Drobny

14 Interreligious Relations

No data.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Although Muslims in Slovakia constitute a tiny proportion of the population and are fully integrated with the majority, most Slovaks show clear aversion toward Muslims. At the end of 2013, an unknown author published a “hoax”7 on social networks about the planned construction of a mosque in the centre of Bratislava. A widespread and emotional debate ensued, which was dominated by Islamo- phobic views. The leadership of the Muslim community has repeatedly dis- tanced itself from such discussion policies. This fictional case got to the media8 and subsequently sparked discussion in the opinion pages about Muslims in Slovakia.

16 Major Cultural Events

No data.

7 https://www.facebook.com/pages/Me%C5%A1ita-v-Bratislave/426655397462673?fref=ts, accessed 15 February 2014. 8 http://aktualne.atlas.sk/prva-mesita-v-bratislave-stat-nebude-internetovy-vymysel-vsak- spustil-vlnu-odporu/slovensko/spolocnost/, (Mosque in Bratislava will not stand. But internet hoax triggered resistance) accessed 12 March 2014. Slovenia

Christian Moe*

1 Muslim Populations

According to the census data, 47,488 Muslims made up 2.4% of Slovenia’s population in 2002. The real figure was likely higher, as the religion of 23% of the population was not known, but not much higher, judging by the census data on (ethnic) nationality. The figure did not include short-term guest-workers. By the time of 2011 census, which no longer provided data on religious or national identity, the total population of the country had grown by 4.4% and the number of immigrants by 59,000. The Islamic Community estimates a membership of over 7,500 families. Friday prayer attendance is estimated at upward of 1,000 in the capital and 100–200 in major towns.1 About 4,000 people join the central prayer events during the two Bayrams. For centuries, Slovenes encountered Muslims primarily as Ottoman armies. In World War i, Bosnian Muslims fought for the Habsburg Empire on Slovenian soil. Significant numbers of Muslims first arrived from the 1950s onwards as internal labour migrants from other parts of Yugoslavia, settling in the capital and in industrial towns. In the 1990s, after Slovenian independence, they were joined by refugees from Bosnia. Muslims began to organise themselves in the early 1960s, the first local council was founded in Ljubljana in 1967, and the Islamic Community in Slovenia was registered in 1976.2 Of those who identified themselves as Muslims by confession in 2002, some 74% also declared themselves Bosniaks, Bosnians, or Muslimani (the Yugoslav- era category of ‘Muslims in the national sense’);3 they originated mainly from

* Christian Moe is a freelance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights and religious reform. He recently co-edited Gender Equality in Muslim Family Law (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). 1 Interview with ic secretary Nevzet Porić, 16 January 2014. 2 Pašić, Ahmed, Islam in muslimani v Sloveniji (Islam and Muslims in Slovenia) (Sarajevo: Emanet, 2002), pp. 103–106. 3 On these overlapping identities, see Kalčič, Špela, “Changing contexts and redefinitions of identity among Bosniaks in Slovenia”, Balkanologie, vol. 9, no. 1–2 (December 2005), pp. 149–171. The leading ethnography of Muslims in Slovenia is Kalčič, Špela, Nisem jaz Barbika: Oblačilne prakse, Islam in identitetni procesi med Bošnjaki v Sloveniji (I Am Not a Barbie Doll: Dress Practices, Islam and Identity Processes among Bosniaks in Slovenia) (Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za etnologijo in kulturno antropologijo, 2007).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_041 548 moe northern Bosnia or the Sandžak region. They were followed by Albanians (11%), mainly from Kosovo and Macedonia; Slovenes (6%); people of unknown nationality (ca. 4%); Roma (ca. 2%); and Montenegrins, Macedonians, and others (ca. 1% each).4

2 Islam and the State

Slovenia is a secular state. The 1991 Constitution provides inter alia for freedom of conscience and for the separation of the state and religious communities. Religious communities are registered by a state Office for Religious Communities. In 2007, the Islamic Community became the fifth Slovenian religious community to conclude a separate agreement with the state detail- ing its legal status and rights.5 The Religious Freedom Act (2007) replaced a Communist-era law on religious communities with a more accommodating model providing inter alia for state-funded spiritual care in public institutions. Some provisions of the Act were struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2010; a small amendment in 2013 provided new registration criteria but did not make new provisions for hospital or prison chaplains.6 The state refunds part of the mandatory social security payments for religious employees, including imams on the payroll of the Islamic Community. The ic also benefits from an arrangement that lets individuals designate up to 0.5% of their income tax as donations to ngos or religious communities of their choice. The state may grant minor sums to religious communities as direct material support, but the ic has received none for years. Its limited capacity and property restricts the ic’s opportunities to get public funding for social programmes or for maintaining cultural heritage. There has been no public financial support for the mosque project (see Section 4).

4 Komac, Miran (ed.), Priseljenci: Študije o priseljevanju in vključevanju v slovensko družbo (Immigrants: Studies on Immigration and Inclusion into Slovenian Society) (Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 2007), p. 536 (Table 10). 5 See documentation in Čepar, Drago (ed.), State and Religion in Slovenia (Ljubljana: Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious Communities, 2008). 6 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, decision no. U-I-92/07–23 of 15 April 2010 amendment to the Religious Freedom Act, Official Gazette no. 100 (6 December 2013) p. 10973. Slovenia 549

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Community in the Republic of Slovenia (Islamska skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji, Grablovičeva 14, SI-1000 Ljubljana, e-mail: mesihat@islamska- skupnost.si, tel.: ++386 12313625, fax: ++386 12313626, www.islamska-skupnost .si), headed by Mufti Dr. Nedžad Grabus, is the main religious organisation that represents Islam, employs imams and organises the religious life of nearly all Slovenia’s Muslims in seventeen local communities. It is a branch of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stands for Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School (see Bosnia-Herzegovina in this volume for details). Its membership is multi-ethnic, but the large majority are Bosniaks. Mufti Grabus is in his second mandate, lasting until 2015.7 Noteworthy cultural initiatives in the ic’s orbit are the Zemzem women’s group (address: same as the ic), which inter alia organises an annual food festival and events in commemoration of Srebrenica; and the Averroes Institute (Grablovičeva ul. 14, p.p. 2725, 1001 Ljubljana, tel.: +386 12313625, www.averroes .si), which hosts lectures, book launches and similar events. The ic established a humanitarian organisation, Al Baraka, in 2013. The Muslim Community of Slovenia (Slovenska muslimanska skupnost, MCS, Ledina Center room 33, Kotnikova 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel.: ++386 14304866, fax: ++386 14304866, www.smskupnost.si) was registered in 2006 by the former Mufti Osman Đogić. The MCS, which claims some 500 members and sympathisers,8 is independent of Bosnia, but similar to the ic in ethnic make-up and doctrinal orientation. A small Salafi association for the promotion of Islamic culture,9 which is not registered as a religious community, has two local chapters (Resnica-hak, Cesta Maršala Tita 68, Jesenice, tel.: +386 4082 0521, e-mail: resnicahak@gmail .com; El-iman, Dunajska cesta 190, Ljubljana, tel.: +386 4016 6402; both at www .resnica-haq.com).

7 A collection of the Mufti’s speeches and writings was recently published in Nedžad Grabus, Sožitje je naša pot: Intervjuji in govori muftija dr. Nedžada Grabusa 2006–2010 (Coexistence Is Our Way) (Ljubljana: Kulturno-izobraževalni zavod Averroes, 2011). 8 Osman Đogić, personal communication. 9 This group is briefly discussed along with the two registered communities in Mari Jože Osredkar, “Teološki in kulturološki razlogi za islamski pluralizem v Sloveniji” (Theological and cultural reasons for Islamic pluralism in Slovenia), Bogoslovni vestnik, vol. 71, no. 3 (2011), pp. 357–367. 550 moe

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

On 14 September 2013, the foundation stone was laid for the future Ljubljana mosque and Islamic cultural centre at a mass open-air ceremony attended by top Slovenian and Bosnian public figures. Slovenia has no purpose-built mosque with a minaret, though Muslims have sought to build one in Ljubljana since 1969. After many years of political and bureaucratic delay, including two failed anti-mosque referendum initiatives, a location was finally zoned and the ic bought most of the land from the city in 2008. The ic’s activities since have largely revolved around paying off the resulting debt, which they did in 2013 with a grant from the Emir of Qatar, and preparing for the eventual construction of the mosque. By the end of 2013, the ic had secured a construction permit and was about to hold a tender for the construction, which was expected to take three years and cost at least 12 million Euros. Local congregations have prayer-houses of varying quality. The ic has a house on the outskirts of Ljubljana, used for meetings, prayers and a halal restaurant. The MCS has a space in the city centre. A new property tax announced in 2013 seemed likely to strain the finances of religious communities, though the main Churches and Islamic Community reached a compromise with the government that buildings used specifically for worship would be exempt. Explicitly multi-faith prayer rooms are rarely provided in public institutions. Homes for the elderly and hospitals usually have chapels attached. Confessional activities are not permitted on school premises.

5 Children’s Education

There is no religious instruction or other confessional activity in public schools. An optional non-confessional course in religions and ethics exists, but is not widely taught. There are no separate Muslim schools. Religious communities may establish private schools (eligible for 85% state funding if they teach the public curriculum), but due to limited demand and resources this is not on the agenda of the ic. Some Slovenian youths attend Islamic boarding schools (madrasas) in Croatia (Zagreb) or Bosnia. Islam is taught to about 1,300 children in mekteb classes organised outside school hours in seventeen towns by local congregations of the ic. The younger children now learn from Slovenian-language textbooks, while the older are still taught in Bosnian; many parents prefer the latter to maintain cultural ties to their erstwhile homeland.10 Mekteb education has been a dynamic field in

10 Interview with Porić. Slovenia 551 recent years, with new educational approaches in the classroom as well as outside it, such as a children’s camp in Kranjska Gora in May 2013. Some adult religious instruction is also offered; in Ljubljana, for instance, 65 persons took an introductory course, and 25 persons completed a first-level course in 2013.11

6 Higher and Professional Education

Slovenian imams have typically received their higher Islamic education at institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ic holds some internal training courses, and the Egyptian embassy has arranged short-term scholarships to Al-Azhar University in Egypt; occasionally Slovenian imams also attend other courses abroad. Slovenian universities have only recently begun to offer Religious Studies, and there is no separate course in Islamic Studies. Some relevant courses are found in departments of sociology, anthropology and theology. Teacher training for the optional school subject on religion is offered jointly by the Faculty of Arts and the (Catholic) Theological Faculty in Ljubljana.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Imams may officiate at burials. The lack of Muslim cemeteries is a concern in many places. Cemeteries are publicly owned and, while a few towns have allotted separate cemetery sections for Muslims (Jesenice, Maribor, Celje, Kranj, Krško), most, including the capital, have not. An important heritage site to Slovenian Muslims is a cemetery for Muslim troops from Bosnia who fought for Austria-Hungary in World War i at Log Pod Mangartom.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The 2007 Religious Freedom Act guarantees the right to pastoral or spiritual care for hospital and nursing home patients, detained persons, police and the army. The Act’s provision for direct state employment of chaplains in hospitals and prisons, however, has been ruled unconstitutional. The right to provide such care is also stated in the ic’s agreement with the state. The ic has raised

11 For background, see Moe, Christian, “Islamic education in Slovenia”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2008). 552 moe the issue with the authorities, but Muslim spiritual care in state institutions remains ad hoc and informal, and receives no public financial support. One imam makes regular prison visits at the ic’s expense. The ic also provides spiritual care for foreigners at the Aliens Centre in Postojna during Ramadan.

9 Religious Festivals

No Muslim festivals are public holidays. Celebration of the two Bayram holidays is publicly recognised by official greetings and a nationally televised short address by the Mufti. For lack of a mosque or other suitable facilities, the central communal Bayram prayers have to be held in rented sports halls. Open-air religious events such as iftar and Ramadan prayers are held on the future mosque site. Mevluds (mawlids) and other events are also held to mark other important dates in the Muslim calendar (e.g., Muslim New Year, blessed nights). Forty-four pilgrims from Slovenia went on hajj in 2013.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal products are not generally available in grocery stores, and the few specialised vendors that exist have not satisfied consumers; a shopping trip to Austria is a common solution. The ic certifies products of several Slovenian food companies as halal, but these are chiefly for export. The law requires the animal to be rendered unconscious before slaughter, and after a 2013 amendment, exceptions may no longer be granted for ritual slaughter.12 Private slaughter is allowed for personal consumption, but there are hardly any rural Muslims. Schools do not readily accommodate wishes for pork-free school meals. Several companies offer Muslim funeral services, most prominently the Velenje-based Babajić funeral company. Islamic banking or other financial services have not been developed; however, the Slovenian investment fund Ilirika in 2010 launched an Islamic fund targeting the Bosnian market.

12 Animal Protection Act, ZZZiv, art. 25; amend Official Gazette no. 23/2013 (18 March 2013), p. 2975. Slovenia 553

11 Dress Codes

While some older women may wear traditional head scarves, and new Islamic dress (often colourful) with hijab was adopted by some young women in the 1990s, most Muslim women do not cover their heads except on religious occasions.13 Niqab is worn only by a handful. The law does not regulate religious attire, and hijab in schools has not been an issue. Passport photo rules allow exceptions for religious headwear, as long as the face is shown. Slovene politicians have not joined the burqa-banning bandwagon, whereas the ic leadership has spoken out against “burqas” as an obstacle to education.

12 Publications and Media

The ic operates a website (www.islamska-skupnost.si), occasionally publishes the Amber internal newsletter (six issues by 2013), and distributes the (Bosnian) Preporod bi-weekly. The Salafis have launched several websites for a broad public, only to close them for lack of funding after a few years; they continue to maintain one main website (www.resnica-haq.com). Other Slovenian media that are not specifically religious reach a Muslim audience and include Islamic contents, as they report on everything of interest to the Bosniak community. They include the biweekly student radio broadcast Podalpski selam (Salaam under the Alps), the website www.bosnjak.si, and Bošnjak magazine, which currently appears once or twice a year.

13 Family Law

Family law is secular, and a valid marriage can only be performed by a public registrar in a secular ceremony. Couples may choose to have an additional religious ceremony. The ic encourages and registers Islamic marriages (‘Shariʿa weddings’) performed by imams. Unofficial Islamic marriages exist,14 though the ic discourages the practice. A new family law was defeated in a March 2012 referendum. The ic had joined the Catholic Church in opposing the law over provisions for same-sex partnership and adoption.

13 See generally Kalčič, Nisem jaz Barbika. 14 Kalčič, Nisem jaz Barbika, pp. 64–66. 554 moe

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue and cooperation take place on an ad hoc basis. There is no permanent interreligious institutional framework, except that the state Office for Religious Communities convenes regular consultations with representatives of religious communities. In the last few years, however, there have been joint appearances of the three major churches (Roman Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, and Evangelical) and the Islamic Community, most recently in 2013 over property tax. The Islamic and Jewish communities have also made common cause in defence of infant boy circumcision. Mufti Grabus is a frequent participant in dialogue events at home and abroad, and was elected vice- president of the World Conference of Religions for Peace in December 2013. The Averroes Institute promoted its new book based on an inter-cultural dialogue event with Slovenian and Bosnian academia.15 (See also Sections 15 and 16.)

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The major Muslim media event in 2013 was the laying of the foundation stone for the Islamic cultural centre and mosque in Ljubljana. There was also media coverage of Muslim holidays, the hajj, the Bosnian Food Festival, and local reactions to global controversies. In recent years, the ic has taken on a more public role by joining the Roman Catholic Church in successful public opposition to bills on family law and on religious communities (see sections 2 and 13). In 2012–13 Muslim ritual practices came under public debate as ritual slaughter was banned and the legality of underage male circumcision was questioned by Slovenia’s human rights ombudswoman.

16 Major Cultural Events

The most successful event in terms of public outreach may be the annual Bosnian Food Festival in the centre of Ljubljana, organised by the women’s group Zemzem; in 2012, they also presented traditional coppersmithing from Bosnia. A photo exhibition depicting modern Muslim life in Oman was held in Ljubljana in 2013. Some local events showcased Bosnian immigrant culture or promoted multi-cultural dialogue.

15 Nedžad Grabus and Denis Striković, eds., Z dialogom do medsebojnega spoštovanja (Ljubljana: Kulturno-izobraževalni zavod Averroes, 2012). Spain

Jordi Moreras*

1 Muslim Populations

The contemporary presence of Islam in Spain is a result of the settlement of different immigrant communities arriving in the late 1970s from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan and the Middle East. But the Spanish case also presents the peculiarity of the North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla, where a significant Muslim population has resided for centuries. Counting religious affiliation is prohibited by the 1978 Spanish Constitution (Article 16.2), therefore the number of Muslims in Spain is a subject of estimates that are not always based on reliable criteria. According to statistics on foreign residents of Muslim origin, there were 1,174,437 Muslims resident in Spain as of June 2013.1 This represents a small increase over the previous year due to the slowdown of migration caused by the economic crisis in Spain. To this figure must be added 160,982 people of Muslim origin who have acquired Spanish nationality from 1958 to 2012. This means a total of 1,335,419 Muslims, amounting to 2.8% of the total Spanish population. The Observatory Andalusi,2 an entity created by the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain in 2003, suggests another calculation of the Muslim population, namely 1,732,191 (3.6% of the total Spanish population). This is detailed as follows: Muslim population of Ceuta and Melilla (31,383 and 31,952, respectively); Muslim converts (21,176); foreign residents of Muslim origin (1,163,839); naturalised Muslims (162,754); and descendants of

* Dr. Jordi Moreras is Professor of Social Anthropology at the Faculty of Humanities, University Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain). He is the author of Musulmans a Catalunya. Radiografia d’un islam implantat (Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2008) and Actors i representacions. L’associacionisme d’origen marroquí a Catalunya. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009). 1 Immigration Observatory, Ministry of Employment and Social Security. See http://extra njeros.empleo.gob.es/es/Estadisticas/index.html, accessed 25 April 2014. The four main countries of origin are Morocco, Pakistan, Algeria and Senegal. 2 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31 de diciembre de 2013. (Demographic study of the the Census of Muslim citizens in Spain conducted 31 December 2013) (Madrid: Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, 2014. See http://oban.multiplexor.es/index.html, accessed 25 April 2014.

Muslim families (314,147).3 According to the estimates in this report, 32.8% of the Muslim population residing in Spain are Spanish citizens.

2 Islam and the State

The 1978 Constitution defines the Spanish state as following a principle of non- confessionalism (aconfesionalidad), which guarantees religious freedom and establishes cooperative relationships with representatives of religious denominations. There is no state religion, but the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges not available to other faiths. This framework of religious freedom was developed in law in 1980. In April 1992, a Cooperation Agreement between the Spanish State and the Islamic Commission of Spain was signed. This agreement marks a milestone in the recognition of the Muslim presence in Spain, as it allowed for the creation of a specific legislative body to regulate the basic principles of the Muslim community’s practice of religion. The Social Democratic Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) government proposed in 2008 the amendment of the Religious Freedom Act. The strong opposition of the Catholic Church and the right-of-centre People’s Party (Partido Popular) stopped this initiative. Since the arrival of the government of the People’s Party in November 2011, legislative reform of this type has not been raised again. Before coming to power, some leaders of the People’s Party (for example, the Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy) expressed very critical views on Islam, which they considered a religion of foreigners and intolerant of women. Since coming to government, the party’s policy towards Islam and other religious minorities has been a very low profile topic. For instance, 2012 marked the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Cooperation Agreement with the Islamic Commission of Spain. The Ministry of Justice, citing reasons of budget- ary constraints, did not consider it necessary to organise any official event. It was finally announced that, on 31 January 2013 an official ceremony would be held in Madrid with representatives of major religious minorities, sponsored by the kaicid Foundation (King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, based in Vienna). With regard to Islam, the Spanish government continues to promote cultural activities in Muslim communities through the annual grants programme of the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia). The grants for projects presented by Muslim communities have

3 This data is questionable, since Spanish nationality is not obtained automatically by being born in Spanish territory, if both parents are foreigners. Spain 557 suffered a major cut due to the economic austerity measures of the Spanish government. While the Islamic Commission of Spain received 623,000 Euros in 2010, the following year this figure dropped to 592,325, and in 2012 to 450,000. To oversee the implementation of the aid a working committee with the name of Ibn Khaldun Fund was established in May 2012. The Catalan Autonomous Government (Generalitat of Catalonia) maintains its intention to reform the law on places of worship approved in 2009. This law is intended to regulate the opening of places of worship and to prevent conflicts that in recent years have arisen around the establishment of Islamic centres in Catalonia. This reform affects the reservation of public land for new places of worship (which would be no longer required), and introduced a provision in the conditions of these new places of worship “that [they] must respect the architectural features, culture, tradition, history and artistic elements” of the region (provisional text of the reform). Different religious communities, not only Islamic, have spoken out against this reform.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

In 1992, on the occasion of signing the Cooperation Agreement with the Spanish State, the Islamic Commission of Spain was created, with the de facto union of the two major Muslim federations: the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (feeri, www.feeri.es) and the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (ucide, http://ucide.org). The feeri was created in 1989 and until 2006 was managed by members of the Junta Islámica,4 an organisation made up of Spanish converts, with Mansur Escudero5 as president. The ucide was created in 1991 by Riay Tatary Bakri, of Syrian origin, who in 1971 had created the Muslim Association of Spain (Asociación Islámica de España), which manages the Abu Bakr mosque in Madrid. Since then, Riay Tatary continues to chair the federation that brings together the majority of Muslim communities in Spain. The president of feeri is Mounir Benjelloun, one of the main leaders of the ‘Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) movement in Spain. In October 2009, he replaced the previous board made up of members of the Union of Muslims of Ceuta, who were linked with the Moroccan government’s official policy.

4 Junta Islámica is an Islamic religious association established in 1989. This entity maintains Webislam (www.webislam.com), the main portal on Islam in Spain, and the Instituto Halal, dedicated to the certification of halal products. 5 Mansur Escudero, one of the most prominent figures of contemporary Islam in Spain, founder of Junta Islámica, died on October 3, 2010, in Almodóvar del Río. 558 moreras

In December 2013, there were around 1,300 Islamic religious institutions in the Register of the Ministry of Justice, and 42 Muslim federations. According to data from the Observatory of Religious Pluralism,6 there were 1,274 mosques in Spain as of June 2013. In the absence of development following the 1992 Cooperation Agreement, and the lack of operational capability of the Islamic Commission of Spain, various Islamic organisations called for the modification of the representation model of Islam in Spain. In December 2009, the Commission had registered 23 Islamic federations. In the early months of 2010, the Spanish government proposed to begin a process of electing Muslim representatives at the regional level, which then must choose the board that should lead a renewed Islamic Commission of Spain. This proposal has sparked an intense debate within Muslim communities, generating new organisational initiatives and new strategies for cooperation between associations. In April 2011, twelve Islamic federations created the Spanish Islamic Council.7 The Council is chaired by a board of eight members, whose mission will be performing the tasks necessary for the legalisation of documents and the implementation of the new entity. Five of these members belong to the ucide, including Riay Tatary, the federation president. Also elected were Yusuf Fernandez (Secretary of the Spanish Muslim Federation, feme), Mounir Benjelloun (secretary of the Islamic Federation of Murcia, firm) and Amparo Sánchez, President of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Valencia, the first woman to chair an Islamic entity in Spain. The new board was created due to the failure of the Islamic Commission of Spain (composed exclusively of the two federations, ucide and feeri), which remained closed to the incorporation of new federations and Muslim communities, despite the provisions in the Agreement of Cooperation of 1992. The decree passed by the Socialist government in October 2011, amending the first Article of the Cooperation Agreement of 1992 which states that Islamic religious entities may be incorporated in the Islamic Commission without having previously belonged to one of the two previous federations, provides legal support to the proposal of the Spanish Islamic Council. In October 2012, there were 35 registered religious organisations in the Ministry of Justice that were linked to the Islamic Commission. On 18 November 2012, at a meeting of the standing committee of the Islamic Commission, Mounir Benjelloun was proclaimed President with the support of the other Muslim federations against ucide, the main Islamic federa-

6 See www.observatorioreligion.es. 7 See www.consejoislamico.es/. Spain 559 tion which represents two thirds of mosques in Spain. During the year 2013 there remained a precarious balance between the chairs of the two Islamic federations, which recalls the situation of the establishment of the Islamic Commission of Spain in 1992.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The 2013 report of the Observatorio Andalusí estimates that in Spain there are some 1,279 Muslim places of worship, fourteen of them major Muslim centres. There are no substantial differences from the official estimates (see above). The spatial integration of Islam in Spanish society manifests a strong contrast between the great Islamic cultural centres, along with their architectural form clearly identifiable, with their minarets, and prayer rooms in garages that were opened on the initiative of small immigrant communities, without any symbols that might identify them as religious centres in the public space. The para- dox is that while these well-known centres are part of the urban landscape of cities where they are located, it is the prayer rooms that despite their invisibil- ity receive social opposition to their location. The analysis of conflicts around the mosques in Spain8 should refer to two dynamics of creation of these religious centres: the first, induced and operated externally, through the intervention of Muslim countries to finance the construction of these centres, and the second, through a process of self- organisation of religion by Muslim communities of immigrant origin. These dynamics cannot be presented as unconnected, but they incorporate different logics and interests. Between the 1980s and the early 1990s, five new Islamic centres were opened in Spain, sponsored by several Muslim countries: the Mosque of the King Abdulaziz at Marbella, Malaga (1981); the Abu Bakr Mosque in Madrid (home of the ucide)(1983); the Omar ibn al-Jattab Mosque, or Islamic Cultural Centre of Madrid (popularly known as the mosque of M-30, a highway that circles Madrid) (1992); the Islamic Cultural Centre of Valencia (1992); and the mosque of Fuengirola, or Suhail Islamic Community (1994). During the rest of the 1990s no Islamic centres were opened. However small prayer houses proliferated throughout the Spanish landscape, which are indic- ative of the first settlement of Muslim communities of immigrant origin on the Spanish territory. In the early 2000s, two new Islamic centres in Andalusia were

8 See Jordi Moreras, “A mosque in our neighbourhood!” Conflicts over mosques in Spain,” in Stefano Allievi (ed.), Mosques of Europe. Why a solution has become a problem. (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2010. 560 moreras launched. First, in July 2001 the Cultural Association Azzagra built a mosque and the Centre of Andalusian Studies in La Puebla de Don Fadrique (Granada), with the financial support of Shaykh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasim, Emir of Sharjah. Second, and after two decades of polemics concerning its placement in the Albaicin neighbourhood, in July 2003, the Great Mosque of Granada was officially inaugurated. Various Muslim-majority countries (Libya, Morocco, the Arab Emirates, and Malaysia) eventually contributed to its construction. The centre is managed by members of the Murabitun (a Sufi movement inspired of Darqawi’s brotherhood, founded by the Scottish Muslim convert, Ian Dallas, in the 1970s). Finally, the last major Islamic centre was opened in Malaga in August 2007, which occupies over 4,000 m2. Its construction has cost about €22 million, provided by Saudi Arabia. The Suhail Foundation owns this new mosque which can accommodate over 1,000 worshipers, and has nursery, audi- torium, rooms for men and women, and translation service.

5 Children’s Education

The only Islamic school in Spain is the Umm al-Qura school, which forms part of the Madrid Islamic Cultural Centre complex. It provides pre-school, primary and secondary education. The school was recognised by the Spanish state in April 1998 and has 400 students and 24 teachers. With regard to public schools, in 1996 the Spanish state and the Islamic Commission of Spain signed an agreement to include Islamic religious education in the national educational system.9 Despite the fact that the agreement established that this teaching should have begun in the 1996–97 school year, its application was in fact delayed until the 2003–04 school year, when it began in some Autonomous Communities (regional authorities) to which the transfer of responsibility for education had not yet taken place (Ceuta, Melilla, Aragon, Valencia, and Madrid). According to the Observatorio Andalusí, in the 2013–2014 school year there were 243,437 Muslim students in the Spanish educational system, and 46 teachers of Islamic religious education. According to ucide, the full implementation of this agreement would require 400 teachers.10

9 See Roson, Javier, Sol Tarrés and Jordi Moreras, “Islamic religious education in Spain”, in Alvarez Veinguer, A., G. Dietz, D.P. Jozsa and T. Knauth (eds), Islam in Education in European Countries: Pedagogical Concepts and Empirical Findings (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 2009). 10 Observatorio Andalusi (2014). No official data are available on the number of students who have received Islamic religious instruction. One of the problems for the development of this education is the rejection by various regions to implement these programmes. Spain 561

Parallel to the development of this more formal Islamic religious education, the communities themselves have put forward various religious socialisation initiatives, focused on children, youth and women, and based on a traditional model of religious transmission (kuttab, or Qur’anic schools). Many of these initiatives are considered by parents to be complementary to the education their children receive in school, even though they are outside of the structured, formalised school environment. In 2006, the ucide, with funding from the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence, published a textbook on Islam Descubrir el Islam (Discovering Islam) for primary education. In 2009, they edited the material for secondary education.11

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

As a result of the history of al-Andalus, there is a long tradition of Arab and Islamic studies in Spain, including in many departments in Spanish universities and research centres (such as the universities of Madrid, Granada, Barcelona, Sevilla and Alicante). A recent shift to the study of contemporary Islam has generated new initiatives in training and interdisciplinary research in other academic fields. The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the right of Muslim communities to open training colleges. The only example was the International University Ibn Rushd of Cordoba, founded in 1992, but closed as a result of the loss of institutional and financial support, after the death of its director, Ali Kettani, in 2001. This institution offered courses in Arabic language and Islamic sciences taught by Muslim teachers. With regard to the training of imams, the first formal initiative began in the 1980s at the initiative of various associations and Islamic centres in Spain. After the Cooperation Agreement of 1992, the Islamic Commission of Spain began an internal consultation to propose a training programme for imams. Due to internal disagreements, no projects have been completed. The Spanish university system has undertaken two initiatives to train imams and Muslim leaders. The private University Camilo José Cela has organised, with Junta Islámica, an online course on Islamic culture and religion offered to the general public. This course was previously (from 2006) organised by the National University of Distance Learning (uned, www.uned.es), and in 2010 organised its fifth cycle. Secondly, in January 2009, the uned, sponsored by the Foundation Pluralism and Coexistence, initiated a training programme for Islamic religious leaders under the title “Islam and democratic principles.”

11 Riay Tatary (dir.), Descubrir el Islam. 6° de Primaria. (Madrid: Editorial Akal, 2013). 562 moreras

The third cycle was developed in 2011 in Madrid, Valencia and Terrassa (Barcelona). By 2012, these two courses had been abandoned. In 2012, Junta Islámica created Educa Islam (www.educaislam.com), a distance learning centre dedicated to the teaching of Islam in its different dimensions. Some of the courses offered are academically recognised by the University Carlos iii of Madrid. The Muslim communities have organised different training courses for imams: in Catalonia, the Islamic and Cultural Council of Catalonia has, since 2006, run a training programme specifically for imams, coordinated by the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs, with support from the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia. Similarly, the Muslim Federation of Murcia has, since 2007, organised several training sessions with teachers and imams from Belgium, France, Spain, Morocco and Egypt. The Muslim Federation of Valencia has organised various training sessions for imams since 2010.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The need to provide space for the Muslim population in municipal cemeteries has arisen recently, with the increasing settlement of Muslims in Spain. Until now, the existing cemeteries were those in Ceuta and Melilla (whose Muslim cemeteries were managed by the different communities in both cities), historical cemeteries (like those in Seville and Granada, opened in 1936 by the Franco regime to bury Moroccan troops who fought in the Civil War), and cemeteries that belonged to the governments of Muslim countries and were used for their employees or citizens (such as the cemetery of Griñón in Madrid, which has now reached its capacity). In Andalusia, various groups of Spanish Muslims have always called for spaces, which were ultimately acquired and maintained on personal initiatives; they did not always provide appropriate conditions and are filling rapidly. Since 1992, the Cooperation Agreement has recognised the right of Muslims to make use of sites in public cemeteries. Currently, there are twenty-nine Muslim burial places around the country. 12 However, there are not enough spaces and this leads to a significant number of families returning the bodies of their deceased to their home country. Recognition of the right to an Islamic burial is conditional on there being no

12 For an overview of the Muslims burials in Spain, see Jordi Moreras-Sol Tarrés, “Les cimetières musulmans en Espagne: des lieux de l’altérité”, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, vol. 28: 3 (2012), 13–26. Spain 563 contravention of other legal principles, which require the use of a coffin, and burial 48 hours after death. In April 2007, the Barcelona City Council opened a room in one of the local funeral homes to perform mortuary practices that are required by Islam. The Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia released in 2008 a “Guide to the respect for diversity of beliefs at funerals,” and in 2009 “Recommendations for the management of religious diversity in cemeteries,” addressed to the municipalities. The “Handbook for municipal management of religious diversity,” developed by the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence in 2011, recommended the reservation of spaces in the cemeteries for the burial of Muslims and the legal recognition and accommodation of Islamic burial practices. In Andalusia since 2001, Muslims can bury their dead directly in the ground without a coffin. In 2013, the Foundation Pluralism and Coexistence published a guide with recommendations on cemeteries and funeral services13 and in 2013 established a programme of support for the ade- quacy of sections of municipal cemeteries for the burial of deceased members of religious minorities.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Articles 8 and 9 of the Cooperation Agreement of 1992 regulate Islamic pastoral care in public hospitals, prisons and the army. In 2006, the Spanish government developed the regulations that facilitate this care. However, unlike that provided by the Catholic Church, Muslim pastoral care is still inadequate and is offered on a voluntary basis. In the case of hospitals, there are difficulties in the spiritual care of Muslim patients, especially in the treatment of the bodies of the deceased. In December 2005, the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia published the “Guide to the respect for diversity of beliefs in hospitals,” and in 2011 the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence also published a “Guide for religious diversity management in hospitals.” In Spanish prisons, as of 2011, there were some 7,758 Muslim prisoners. An agreement was reached in October 2007, which states that Muslim chaplains will be paid by the Spanish state, provided they gather a group of ten or more prisoners. The imams in charge of this service must be accredited by the Islamic Commission of Spain. According the Observatorio Andalusi, nine imams offer religious care services in Spanish prisons.

13 See “Guía para la gestión de la diversidad religiosa en cementerios y servicios funerarios”, by Jordi Moreras and Sol Tarrés (Madrid: Observatorio del Pluralismo Religioso, 2013). 564 moreras

The fear of the influence of radical imams who may visit prisoners has led to efforts to control pastoral care there. Prison authorities have in mind the reports by the Spanish National Intelligence Centre, which determine the ade- quacy of these imams. Police sources estimate that 2% of Muslim prisoners are showing signs of radicalisation. The Military Honours Regulation still states the obligation of Spanish soldiers to participate in Catholic religious events. The Defence Ministry in July 2009 introduced a new draft of the regulation, more consistent with the principle of non-confessionalism, and with the growing presence of non-Catholic soldiers (Muslims, especially in Ceuta and Melilla). The new regulation will make attendance at religious military ceremonies voluntary.

9 Religious Festivals

Article 12 of the Cooperation Agreement recognises the right to take time off to celebrate the major Muslim festivals by prior agreement between Muslim workers and their employers. Prisons organise cultural and religious activities during the month of Ramadan. The celebration of the major prayers for ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha is becoming increasingly visible in neighbourhoods and towns with a substantial Muslim presence. City councils tend to assign public facilities or public streets for these celebrations. From 2010, the celebration of ʿId al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adha have become official holidays in Ceuta and Melilla, by agreement of the local governments with the local Muslim communities.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

The 1992 Cooperation Agreement recognises the right of Muslims to apply for food produced in accordance with Islamic requirements at public facilities such as schools, prisons and the army. So far there have been no major problems regarding this law, partly because these institutions have developed alternative menus. The emergence of initiatives for producing and marketing halal products is beginning to take shape in Spain. In the neighbourhoods of the large cities, where populations of Muslim immigrant origin are concentrated, a good number of halal butchers and grocery shops can be found as well as other types of establishment offering products and services that specifically target the Muslim community. All these commercial initiatives are in response to an incipient demand for these products on the part of the Muslim community, Spain 565 which then generates an infrastructure of production and distribution. In view of the potential of this new market, and as a way of guaranteeing the proper use of the term ‘halal’ to describe these products (as Article 14 of the 1992 Cooperation Agreement states), the Junta Islámica has promoted the creation of the Instituto Halal (Halal Institute, c./ Arco, n°13 Almodovar del Río, 14720 Córdoba, www.institutohalal.com), which since 1999 has been certifying and regulating the use of the halal label.14 For some time now, Muslim communities have been asking the political authorities for the facilities necessary for slaughter on ʿId al-Adha. Various political institutions have developed recommendations to comply with current health regulations, but variations exist across the country. While some regions provide sites for sacrifice (Ceuta, Melilla and Aragon), others threaten severe financial sanctions against those who slaughter animals outside the slaughterhouses. Meanwhile, Muslim families continue discreetly to carry out the ritual sacrifice in private.

11 Dress Codes

There is no legal restriction prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public places such as schools and workplaces. However, since 2002, there has been some controversy regarding the wearing of hijab in schools, as well as some complaints about the police’s refusal to photograph Muslim women with hijab when preparing identity cards.15 However, since November 2009, a regulation of the Ministry of Interior has allowed Muslim women to wear hijab in these photographs. Since the xenophobic party Platform for Catalonia (Plataforma per Catalunya) put forward in 2007 a motion to ban the wearing of the burqa in Vic (Barcelona), representatives of other political parties have referred to the desirability of establishing a limit to use of clothing by Muslim women. In 2010, fifteen municipalities in Catalonia passed motions against the use of face covering in public spaces. The first was Lleida, which included in their municipal laws a ban on niqab in public buildings such as municipal offices, schools and hospitals. The motions against the burqa responded to a strategy of restrictive immigration policy in a political context marked by regional and municipal

14 The Halal Institute is a facility for companies to certify their products as halal, but it does not organise the halal trade. 15 Ramírez, Ángeles, La trampa del velo. El debate sobre el uso del pañuelo musulmán (Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, 2011). 566 moreras elections. Meanwhile, the use of the niqab is rare among Muslim women. The Catalan Autonomous Government (Generalitat of Catalonia) submitted a draft law to ban the wearing of niqab or full face covering in public spaces, based on security reasons and personal identification. Throughout 2013 there have been a series of work sessions in the Parliament of Catalonia, where most political groups have expressed their willingness to support this future law.

12 Publication and Media

Since the appearance of the first Islamic religious associations in Spain in the 1970s, there have been numerous initiatives to edit and publish journals. Some have had a very short life span while others have been irregular. Various Muslim communities have published translations of the Qur’an, doctrinal treatises and essays on contemporary Islam through publishing houses such as Junta Islámica, Editorial Kutubia Mayurqa, and Madrasa Editorial. It is interesting to note that in recent years some Muslim converts (such as Yaratullah Monturiol, Abdennur Prado, Abdelmumin Aya or Jalil Bárcena), have begun to publish with non-Muslim publishers. Muslim community leaders appear only occasionally in the media, in the context of conflicts involving Islam and Muslim communities. Since 1985, Spanish state television has broadcast “Islam Today”, produced by Mohamed Chakor, a Spanish journalist of Moroccan origin. More recently, Catalan public television broadcast live the final prayer of Ramadan in 2006 and the ʿId al- Adha prayers in 2007. Both programmes were discontinued in 2008. Muslim communities cannot be involved in setting the agendas for Catalan public television but are sometimes consulted on certain topics such as Muslim women and the hijab, or Islamism. The Internet has been adopted by the Spanish Muslim community as an alternative way of expressing their views. There is a significant Muslim blogo- sphere, and the main internet portal is Webislam (www.webislam.com) (created in 1997 by Junta Islámica). ucide also has its own website (http://es.ucide .org) and a blog (www.islamhispania.blogspot.com). Another prominent internet portal is Nurain Magazine, coordinated by the Socio-Cultural Association Nurain based in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (www.nurainmagazine.info/). Red Musulmanas (www.redmusulmanas.com/) is an independent website made by individuals and associations whose goal is to share and exchange information related to initiatives to empower Muslim women. The year 2013 saw the consolidation of two television initiatives that were born the previous year: first, Hispan tv (www.hispantv.com), a brand sponsored by Iran, which aims Spain 567 to address the Muslim communities in Spain and Latin America; secondly, Cordoba International tv (www.cordobainternacional.com), with Saudi funding, and has leading experts and reviewers. Both channels have consolidated through social networks like Facebook or YouTube. From another point of view, the Muslims from the West Programme of Casa Árabe (http://mdocc.casaarabe.es/) offers a comprehensive and updated list of links of Islamic websites in Spain.

13 Family Law

The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the validity of a marriage celebrated in accordance with the form established by Islamic law but the marriage must be registered in the Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths to be fully valid.16 Polygamy is not recognised in Spanish family law, although some instances of polygamy have occurred, especially among groups of Gambian and Senegalese origin. The main problems in relation to family law have to do with divorce by repudiation (talaq), a practice that is not recognised in Spanish law, which poses serious difficulties for divorced women.

14 Interreligious Relations

Since the 1970s, numerous activities related to Islamic-Christian dialogue in Spain have been held. Many of them had the implicit support of the Spanish Catholic Church, following the principles of the Second Vatican Council. The evolution of the Church’s participation in these activities has to do with the development of the Muslim community itself in Spain (especially accelerated since the immigration of the 1990s) and with the change of the Vatican’s doctrinal approach in relation to Islam.17 The initiatives in favour of dialogue and mutual understanding which have been carried out long before the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 have since multiplied throughout Spanish territory. The most influential are the activities of inter-religious dialogue which, in addition to the doctrinal content, make the presence of representatives of these groups actively visible with reference

16 Motilla, Agustín, El matrimonio islámico y su eficacia en el Derecho español (Cordoba: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Córdoba, 2003). 17 For a synthesis of these activities, see Jose Luis Sánchez Nogales, El islam en la España actual (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2008). 568 moreras to Spanish society. Their intervention as mediators in resolving some local conflicts about the location of Muslim prayer sites has at times been very positive, making these initiatives seem viable and credible. The economic crisis in Spain has increased the number of interfaith initiatives providing social care programmes to unemployed people. Many soup kitchens have been opened, where members of different religious communities are involved as volunteers. Financial constraints have also limited other interfaith initiatives, which in previous years had been sponsored by government.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Spanish society appears to be having trouble coming to terms with the cultural contributions of certain groups, particularly Muslims. This perception of “otherness.” which is a combination of the accumulation of old stereotypes and the introduction of new images and demands, interferes with carrying out a debate on the Muslim presence in Spain and the place it is to occupy in Spanish society. One crucial factor that makes the full recognition of Islam difficult may be the insistence of many citizens on seeing the Muslim presence in Spain as a result of certain migratory cycles rather than as a result of a process by which a religious minority has been created. Islam is still seen as an import, an alien reality, in clear contradiction to the understanding of Islam as a permanent presence, which was one of the motivating factors for adopting the Cooperation Agreement. Due to the impact of the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks, the old stereotypes were replaced by a feeling of diffuse and unpredictable threat that is, however, implicitly related to concrete faces and a concrete presence. In the context of the current financial and economic crisis, negative perceptions about Muslim communities have increased. Entities such as sos Racism or the Movement Against Intolerance have warned of the consolidation of Islamophobic attitudes. The European report prepared by Amnesty International, Europe: Choice and prejudice: Discrimination against Muslims in Europe (April 2012), analysed the case of demonstrations against the opening of mosques in Catalonia and other controversies related to Muslim communities.18 An indicator of the increasing consolidation of xenophobic discourse is increasing statements by political and media columnists, in relation to certain Islamic practices, such as the wearing of hijab. Another example

18 See Amnesty International “Choice and prejudice. Discrimination against Muslims in Europe,” (2012) (www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR01/001/2012/en). Spain 569 is the growth of extreme right parties (such as the Platform for Catalonia, which has achieved political representation in fourteen municipalities), with an openly xenophobic discourse that has spread to other more moderate political forces. In the regional elections of November 2012, the party returned to present a political programme against the “Islamisation” of Catalonia. Although the party lost 15,000 votes compared to previous elections, during the election campaign it had the support of leaders of other European xenophobic parties. The monitoring report on Islamophobia prepared by the Observatory Andalusí19 focuses on indicators that show the consolidation of anti-Muslim sentiment. It is estimated that these could increase in the current economic crisis.

16 Major Cultural Events

Cultural events related to Islamic tradition tend to be linked to multicultural rather than specifically Islamic initiatives. Since 2006, Casa Árabe (Arab House)20 in Madrid annually organises an extensive programme of cultural and artistic activities, including debates on contemporary Islam. The city council of Barcelona has also joined this initiative with the cultural festival “Nights of Ramadan” in 2008 and 2009. In 2009, the Arab House published the book Muslims in Spain. Reference guide, commissioned by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (odihr) of the osce (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe). This guide is intended for the media to improve their understanding of the realities of Muslim communities in Spain. In 2010, Arab House released the English version of this guide.

19 Observatorio Andalusí. Institución para la observación y seguimiento de la situación del ciudadano musulmán y la islamofobia en España (Madrid, 2012). 20 Casa Árabe (www.casaarabe-ieam.es) is a public institution established in 2006 as a centre for the study the Arab world and as a point of support for Spanish diplomacy in relation to Arab countries. It is a consortium established through an agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish International Cooperation Agency, the Government of Andalusia, the Community of Madrid and the municipalities of Madrid and Cordoba. Sweden

Göran Larsson*

1 Muslim Populations

The last official census to include information about religious affiliation was collected in 1930, and 15 individuals were recorded as ‘Muslims and other Asian religions’ in that year.1 If we look more closely into the data it is clear that the number of Muslims could have been between 11 or 4 individuals, depending on how the statistical information should be read and analysed.2 However, larger numbers of Muslims started to arrive in the 1960s and 1970s, and the figure for today varies between 350,000 and 400,000 out of a total Swedish population of approximately 9,550,000. This estimate is not supported by hard evidence as it is, on the basis of protection of individual freedom, against the law to collect personal data on religious belief, and official bodies are not allowed to maintain records that include potentially sensitive personal information. The figures are therefore necessarily problematic, but they suggest that Muslims constitute approximately 4% of the population. According to the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (sst), the number of practising Muslims (i.e. practising on a daily or at least regular basis) is estimated at 110,000. This estimate is probably on the low side, and 150,000 is probably a more realistic figure.3

* Göran Larsson is Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/History of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), Muslims and the New Media: Historical and Contemporary Debates (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), and editor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009). 1 Svanberg, I. and D. Westerlund, “Från invandrarreligion till blågul Islam? 50 år av organise- rad muslimsk närvaro (From immigrant religion to blue-yellow Islam? 50 years of organised Muslim presence)”, in I. Svanberg, and D. Westerlund (eds), Blågul islam? Muslimer i Sverige (Blue-yellow Islam? Muslims in Sweden) (Nora: Nya Doxa, 1999), p. 13. 2 For more info, see Otterbeck, J. “De femton—eller hur många muslimer fanns det i Sverige 1930”, Religionsvetenskapliga kommentarer. Retrieved from http://religionsvetenskapligakom mentarer.blogspot.se/2014/01/de-femton-eller-hur-manga-muslimer.html, accessed 13 January 2014. 3 Larsson, G. and Å. Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden. Integration or Fragmentation? A Contextual Study (Münster: lit Verlag, 2008).

The Muslim community in Sweden is heterogeneous and encompasses a large number of ethnic, religious and political outlooks, as well as a wide range of different languages. Muslims have come to Sweden as both economic migrants and asylum seekers, and their educational background is varied. Up until the mid-1980s, the Turkish component was numerically the largest, but today it is not possible to say that one ethnic group dominates the Swedish Muslim scene and it would be incorrect to analyse, present or view the Muslim community in Sweden as a homogenous phenomenon or a static group. It consists of large groups of Turks, Arabs (from Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc.), Somalis, Iranians, Bosnians and a growing proportion of Swedish converts. Roald estimates the total number of converts to Islam in Sweden at between 1,000 and 3,000, though as there are no reliable data, this figure too must be considered as provisional only.4 The great majority of Muslims have settled in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö, the three largest cities in Sweden, and approximately 50% of all Muslims in Sweden live in Stockholm.5 However, Muslims have also settled in other parts of Sweden when opportunities for employment have arisen. Estimates of the number of Muslims living in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are also generally uncertain.6

2 Islam and the State

Since 1951, freedom of religion has been guaranteed in the Constitution, and the Muslim community is able to organise various welfare, religious and cultural activities under the laws of association. The Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (sst, www.sst.a.se) is the authority, under the Ministry of Culture, that provides religious minorities with state funding and it describes its grants as being divided into three categories:

4 Roald, Anne Sofie, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’: Muslims in Sweden”, in Y.Y. Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 102. 5 Stenberg, L., Muslim i Sverige: Lära och liv (Muslims in Sweden: Teachings and Life) (Stockholm: Bilda, 1999), p. 67. 6 Larsson, G., Muslims in the eu. Cities Report (Sweden): Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2007), www.eumap.org/topics/minority/ reports/eumuslims/country/sweden, accessed 4 November 2009. 572 larsson

– Organisational grants enabling ‘parishes’ to hold religious services, offer pastoral care and provide education; – Working grants to support specific areas that the state wishes to subsidise, e.g. the Hospital Church and theological training at certain seminaries; – Project grants, aimed at stimulating new forms of activity and cooperation.

In 2012, the six Muslim organisations recognised by the sst received sek 6,757,000 (778,385 Euros) in grants. The sst also supports spiritual care within the medical/hospital sector, and in 2012 granted sek 6,315,000 to be distributed among the religious communities the sst has recognised. Out of this sum, the six Muslim organisations received only a small proportion (around sek 385,000).7 Economic support from the state is based on the principle that religious associations form important popular movements that contribute to society. However, it is the government that decides which religious communities are to be entitled to state grants. In order to receive this support, religious groups must guarantee and observe the principles of democracy and equality and ‘Swedish values’. Muslim organisations can also receive economic support from local municipalities, but there appears to be no collected information about this support. Registration also makes it possible to use the taxation system to collect dues from members, but if this provision is adopted, the state automatically reduces the economic support that the organisation can receive from the sst. In 1963, the Swedish government decided to give anyone who had lived in Sweden for more than five years the opportunity to apply for citizenship8 and in 1976, the right to vote and stand in local elections was extended to anyone who had lived in Sweden for three years. In the 1990s, the question of dual nationality was debated, and in 2000 the citizenship law was amended to allow dual nationality.9 On the basis of existing data, it is not possible to estimate the number of Muslims who hold Swedish nationality, but it is likely that many Muslims are full citizens of Sweden. It is the mother’s nationality that determines the nationality of the child, but if the father is a Swedish national, the child can apply for Swedish citizenship, even if the mother is not Swedish.

7 Personal e-mail from sst (2013-01-23). 8 See, for example, Roald, A.S., “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’.” 9 Ibid., pp. 103–104; Lappalainen, P., Analytical Report on Legislation: Raxen National Focal Point Sweden (Vienna: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004), p. 5. Sweden 573

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Even though Muslim communities in Sweden are split along ethnic, political, economic and religious lines, a number of initiatives towards the formation of Islamic and Muslim umbrella organisations have been taken since the early 1970s. Today there are six umbrella organisations that operate nationally, and it is claimed that they serve approximately 75% of all Muslims in Sweden. However, this estimate is difficult to substantiate with hard facts, and the calculation is based on the statements of these six organisations. Besides the umbrella organisations it is also necessary to stress that a number of international Muslim organisations and networks are active in Sweden and that the Swedish Muslim community is heavily influenced by international developments and discussions. The first national Muslim organisation, the Union of Islamic Congregations in Sweden (Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige, fifs, Kapellgränd 10, se-116 25 Stockholm, www.fifs.se), was set up in 1974. It later split because of internal tensions and criticisms, and in 1982 a new national organisation emerged under the title Swedish Muslim Union (Sveriges Muslimska Förbund, smf, Kyrkbacken 14, bv se-169 62 Solna). Despite further tensions and conflicts over money and influence, the two organisations have been able to co-operate under an umbrella organisation called the Swedish Muslim Council (Sveriges Muslimska Råd, smr, www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se). It is difficult to associate the three organisations with specific Islamic opinions, but it is clear that the ideology or ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood movement have influenced the smr. The establishment of Muslim organisations in Sweden is also linked to international developments. For example, the beginning of the 1980s saw the establishment of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (Islamiska Kulturcenterunionen, ikus, Box 61, se-191 21 Sollentuna), an organisation heavily influenced by the Süleymançi movement and its counterpart in Germany. The Swedish Islamic Assemblies (Svenska Islamiska Församlingar, sif, Moränvägen 13, se-136 51 Haningen) was founded in 2002. The Islamic Shiʿi Communities in Sweden (Islamisk Shiasamfund, iss, Box 690, se-175 27 Järfälla, www.shiasamfund.se/sida1.html) is the first umbrella organisation for Shi ʿi Muslims in Sweden. In addition, it is also possible to identify a large number of ethnic and religious organisations, both local and national. For example, Bosnian (Bosniakiska Islamiska Samfundet, Barnarpsgatan 39 G, se-553 33 Jönköping, www.izb.se), Shiʿi, Ahmadi (Nasir Moské, Tolvskillingsgatan 1, se-414 82 Göteborg, www .ahmadiyya.se) and Sufi organisations have been established in various 574 larsson

locations and a number of youth organisations have also been set up with the aim of representing Muslims in Sweden (especially those born and raised in Sweden). The most significant of these is Young Muslims of Sweden (Sveriges Unga Muslimer, sum), but it is also important to mention the Eritrean Young Muslims of Sweden (Sveriges Eritreanska Unga Muslimer, seum, www.seum .nu) and the Muslim Youth Organisation of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Bosnien- Hercegovinas Muslimska Ungdomsförbund, bemuf, www.bemuf.org). “Islamic Peace Agents”, a project run by the educational associations Sensus and Ibn Rushd, should also be highlighted. Ibn Rushd (Brännkykagatan 111B, se-117 26 Stockholm, www.ibnrushd.se) is the first recognised independent educational association with a Muslim profile. The results from the Swedish Muslim Congregation, a project lead by Professor Klas Borell at Mid-Sweden University, indicate that Muslim congregations in Sweden are very active and give support to their members. Study classes, introductions to Swedish society, and dialogue with municipalities and other organisations are part of the daily work of the general Muslim congregation.10

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are seven purpose-built mosques in Sweden (five Sunni mosques, in Malmö, Uppsala, Göteborg and two in Stockholm), one Shi ʿi mosque in Trollhättan, and one Ahmadi mosque in Göteborg (this is the oldest mosque in Sweden, having been opened in 1975/1976). In Gävle, Västerås and Sundsvall, Muslims have adapted old churches and converted them into mosques. This demonstrates the difficulty in drawing a clear distinction between so-called purpose-built mosques and ‘basement’ mosques. There are plans to build mosques in Eskilstuna, Jönköping, Karlskrona, Växjö and Örebro, and a mosque is already under construction in Skövde. The most recent purpose-built mosque was opened in Göteborg in May 2011. When a Muslim organisation applies for permission to build a mosque, it is the relevant town council that issues the building permit. However, the economic difficulties associated with the building of a mosque are clearly illustrated by the fact that the Muslim congregation in Umeå (Northern Sweden) decided to halt their plans to build a mosque. The organisation had for several years been planning to build a mosque, but in 2012 they shelved the plans because of financial problems.

10 An English summary of this project can be downloaded via professor Borell’s webpage, see www.miun.se/sv/universitetet/Organisation/Institutioner/soa/Om-institutionen/ Medarbetare/Forskare/Klas-Borell/. Sweden 575

In the three largest cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö), the number of ‘basement mosques’ is estimated at approximately 20 in Stockholm, 15–20 in Göteborg and 10–15 in Malmö. But these figures are changing rapidly and there is no official record.

5 Children’s Education

Religion is a compulsory subject in the Swedish school system, but is required to be taught in a balanced and neutral way, and pupils should not be indoctri- nated into any specific religious system. Consequently, Islam should be presented as just one religion among many. Nevertheless, some textbooks have been criticised for being anti-Muslim and negative about Islam.11 All teachers (no matter what their own personal beliefs) must follow the curriculum and teach pupils about religion without any attempts at indoctrination. In addition to traditional Islamic communal education, which takes place in the mosques (e.g. the Friday sermon, the teaching of the Qur’an and other types of study circle), the setting up of so-called independent, private or ‘free’ schools is the most distinctive characteristic of Islamic religious education in Sweden today. Since the school reform of 1992, it has become much easier to receive support and financial subsidies from the Swedish state to establish independent schools. These schools are obliged to follow the national curriculum, but they can be influenced by particular pedagogical or religious and cultural profiles, although they should “not have a content which deviates from the value premises of Swedish society.”12 In addition to the national syllabus, the independent Islamic schools also teach Islam in a normative manner. However, this freedom does not allow them to present their religion in an “unbalanced or indoctrinating way,” and pupils must follow the national curriculum for religious education. This means that they have to learn about other religions, world views and ethical outlooks, and that religious education cannot be restricted to Islam or Muslim doctrines or rituals. Generally, education on Islam is confined to a few extra hours per week.13 Permission to

11 Otterbeck, J., “What is reasonable to demand? Islam in Swedish text-books”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (2005), pp. 795–812. 12 Daun, H. et al., “Educational strategies among some Muslim groups in Sweden”, in H. Daun and G. Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 191. 13 On the content of religious education in Muslim independent schools in Sweden, see Berglund, J., Teaching Islam: Religious Education at Three Muslim Schools in Sweden 576 larsson start an independent school must be granted by the Swedish National Agency for Education. By 2010, the number of confessional independent schools was estimated at 68, of which nine were Islamic/Muslim.14 The first Muslim independent school was started in Malmö in 1993. When an independent religious school is recognised by the state, it receives 85% of the support given to public schools. However, it is important to stress that the overwhelming majority of pupils with a Muslim cultural background still go to municipal schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

A large number of universities and university colleges offer courses in history of religions, Islam and Middle East studies, and there are a substantial number of researchers engaged in critical, academic study of Islam and Muslims.15 In 2009, the Ministry of Education finalised an inquiry into the possibility of starting a training programme for Muslim clerics or imams in Sweden. The inquiry came to the conclusion that there was no need for a specific training programme for Muslim spiritual leaders. It was argued that the existing educational system could satisfy the current needs and the state should not take part in confessional training programmes.16 In 2012 Uppsala University inaugurated and installed its first professor in Islamic theology and philosophy. Besides its academic foundation, this professorship should also facilitate and contribute to the development of an Islamic theology in Sweden.17 Among many other things, Ibn Rushd, the Muslim educational association, organises courses in the field of religion, culture and language. One of its aims is to strengthen the identity of the Muslim community and inform non- Muslim Swedes about Islam and Muslim cultures. In 2009 the Kista folk high

(Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009). See also Larsson, G., “Islamic religious education in Sweden”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 403–421. 14 See http://www3.skolverket.se/friskola03/l_sok_i_be_p.aspx?skolkategori=GR&inriktning= B1&bidrag_enl=+&profil=&lan=&kommun=&tamed=G&omgang=&B1=Skick, accessed 11 November 2010. 15 See, for example, Larsson, G., “Islam and Muslims in the Swedish media and academic research, with a bibliography of English and French literature on Islam and Muslims in Sweden”, European University Institute Papers (rscas No. 2006/36), 2006. 16 sou 2009: 52 Staten och imamerna. Religion, integration, autonomi (The State and the Imams: Religion, Integration, Autonomy) (Stockholm: Fritzes, 2009). 17 See www.uu.se/press/pressmeddelanden/pressmeddelande-visning/?id=1825&area=3&t yp=pm&na=&lang=sv, accessed 31 January 2013. Sweden 577 school outside Stockholm was started with a Swedish Muslim profile and the school aims at combining, strengthening and developing a Swedish-Islamic identity and they have an ambition to start a training programme for imams.18

7 Burials and Cemeteries

Muslims living in or close to larger Swedish cities have no difficulty in finding a burial site that follows prescribed Islamic norms. The practical organisation of burial sites, regardless of religious affiliation, is still in the hands of the dioceses belonging to the Church of Sweden through the Cemetery Administration (Kyrkogårdsförvaltningen).19 There is no prohibition on Muslims being buried in a shroud rather than a coffin (as many Muslims require), and certain local offices of the Cemetery Administration, as in Malmö, specifically permit Muslims to be buried in this way.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

No Muslim religious leaders are employed by the state in the health service, prisons or armed forces. However, through grants from the sst and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, imams and other religious leaders receive small grants to perform these kinds of social services. Since 2006, the sst is also funding a hospital imam at the Skaraborg hospital in Skövde (25%) and since 2008 the sst has paid for three 25% positions as coordinators for Muslim healthcare.20 It is nevertheless clear that most of the work in hospitals, prisons and other social institutions is done on a voluntary basis, and that there is a great imbalance between non-Christian denominations on the one hand and the Church of Sweden and other Christian denominations on the other hand, which have a long history and an established platform for such work.

9 Religious Festivals

Even though the major religious festivals, like the celebration of Ramadan and ʿId, are highlighted by the media in a positive and neutral way, they are not

18 On this school, see http://kistafolkhogskola.se/. 19 Larsson and Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden, p. 336. 20 sst, Årsbok 2009, p. 16. 578 larsson recognised by the state. Muslims have to apply for leave to celebrate the ʿId/ bayram religious festivals, and the employer has discretion as to whether an employee should be given time off.21 The question of fasting and its impact on pupils and students is often discussed in relation to the educational setting. But we lack academic or scientific data on how fasting and the celebration of Ramadan affects the students and their performances at schools.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal slaughter without stunning has been prohibited by law since 1937. Methods of slaughtering animals are not regarded as a religious issue but one of animal rights. There have been some attempts to organise halal methods of slaughter that comply with Swedish law (e.g., giving the animal an anaes- thetic before it is killed), but this method is not accepted by all Muslims. There is, however, no difficulty in finding halal food in Sweden, and there is easy access to imported meat. There are no data on the availability of halal food in schools, public institutions or hospitals, but it is clear that most institutions have become aware of the fact that Muslims have certain requirements, and so-called ‘Muslim alternatives’ are generally available.

11 Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting Muslim dress, but there have been some debates about women wearing hijab and niqab in the health-care sector, in schools, in the police, etc. The niqab has also been extensively discussed in the media in 2009/2010 and some politicians have argued that it should be banned, but no law has been passed as of 2012.22 The debate has often been focused on health issues, integration and practicalities rather than on religion, but it is clear that many Muslims perceive the discussion about the hijab and sometime the niqab as being coloured by Islamophobia and xenophobia. In January 2012 The Swedish National Agency for Education came to the conclusion that a general ban against the full veil (niqab) in school was against the freedom of religion law and that the Swedish school system should be open

21 Berglund, J. and S. Sorgenfrei (eds), Ramadan: En svensk tradition (Ramadan: A Swedish Tradition) (Lund: Arcus, 2009). 22 Danielsson, S. and L. Pettersson, “Fel dölja ansiktet i öppet samhälle (It is wrong to cover the face in an open society)”, SvD, 16 October 2009. Sweden 579 to all pupils. However, if the niqab was a danger to the pupil—for example in laboratory classes—it was possible for a teacher to hinder the pupil from wearing the full veil. But the Swedish National Agency for Education stressed that all teachers should strive for equality and that most practical problems could be solved and the school should try to find a solution that was acceptable for both teachers and pupils. The Muslim designer Iman Aldebe, who among many things took part in the reality show, Project Runaway Sweden, received death threats in 2012 after she had designed a so-called police hijab (i.e. one that could be used by female Muslim police officers). The aim of the project was to illustrate that Swedish society had become multicultural and religiously plural.23

12 Publications and Media

Reports from the end of the 1990s have demonstrated that Islam, Muslims and the Middle East are generally associated with negative opinions and stereotypical media reporting. There is no current research on how Islam and Muslims are depicted in the media, but it is generally believed, at least among Muslims, that the Swedish media have a negative bias towards them. In 2012, Swedish television broadcast a documentary about Islam and equality that demonstrated that many mosques and imams in Sweden supported patriarchal structures and were breaking Swedish law by neglecting domestic violence and polygamy. The programme was filmed with a hidden camera. In a follow-up programme broadcast in January 2013, the problem was not solved and many critics argued that Islamic organisations and mosques should be stripped of the economic support they receive from the state and the municipalities. Many Muslim leaders argued, however, that the programme should be seen as an illustration of general negative opinions about Islam and Muslims in Sweden.24 Most Muslim media are confined to the Internet (websites, blogs, discussion lists, etc.), and there are probably over 50 Swedish Islamic websites, such as www.islamguiden.com. The al-Ghazali institute (http://al-ghazali.org/sidan/) has recently translated a number of Arabic and English books into Swedish (including Martin Ling’s book on the Prophet Muhammad and a collection of hadith texts). In addition to journals and books published by Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims, the Ahmadi community has published a large number of Swedish

23 See www.aftonbladet.se/nojesbladet/tv/article15531821.ab, accessed 31 January 2013. 24 www.svt.se/ug/kampen-om-koranen, accessed 31 January 2013. 580 larsson translations of Ahmadi books (for example, a book on dhikr in the Ahmadi community).

13 Family Law

No exceptions are made to the laws of Sweden, which Muslims must follow. Consequently, Islam has no distinct legal status. Muslim leaders (imams) can apply for a permit to conduct marriages and serve as surrogate civil servants. If the imam is approved by the state and has the correct papers, the marriage is accepted as legally binding in Sweden. Sweden does not apply a so-called double marriage rule (i.e., that one must go both to the mayor or city hall and to one’s own religious or ideological organisation). Some Muslim communities have tried to develop specific Islamic marriage contracts and forms for divorce, inheritance, etc. that comply with both Islamic and Swedish law, but hardly any information about these documents is available.

14 Interreligious Relations

In the city of Gothenburg, a network for peace and dialogue including people of various religions (Jews, Christians and Muslims) organises lectures and a football match for peace annually on 11 September (since 2009). Similar activities were also organised in other Swedish cities. Currently, the Church of Sweden is funding a priest in Gothenburg who is working explicitly in interfaith relations, and in Stockholm it has set up a centre for religious dialogue (Centrum för religionsdialog, Västra trädgårdsgatan 2, Box 16345, se-103 26 Stockholm, www.svenskakyrkan.se/default.aspx?id=663471) and an interfaith centre was opened in Gothenburg in 2012 (Interreligiösa centret, Kyrkogatan 25, se-411 15 Göteborg, http://interreligiosacentret.se/). The centre is funded by the city of Göteborg. Dialogslussen, an organisation close to the Turkish Gülen movement, is also active in interfaith dialogue work in Gothenburg (Gustaf Dalénsgatan 8, se-417 05 Göteborg, www.dialogslussen.se/).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Several studies indicate that many Swedes have negative views and precon- ceptions about Islam and Muslims, and Muslim leaders report instances of Islamophobia. Since 2006, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention Sweden 581

(brå) has included Islamophobia as a specific category in its report on hate crimes. For the year 2011, 5490 hate crimes/incidents were reported (43% out of 650 anti-religious hate crimes were reported as Islamophobic) and compared to earlier reporting the figures is higher than the year before. Both the number of anti-religious hate crimes and the total number of reported hate crimes are on the rise.25 During 2012, anti-Muslim demonstrations were organised by supporters of the so-called counter-jihad movement in Stockholm and the Dutch politician Geert Wilders who has expressed strong anti-Muslim opinions took part in a meeting in Malmö.26 The Swedish artist Lars Vilks was also invited to an anti- Muslim meeting in New York organised by Pamela Geller and the anti-Muslim organisation, sion (Stop Islamization of Nations).

16 Major Cultural Events

No reported data

25 Hatbrott 2011. Statistik over polisanmälningar med identifierade hatbrottsmotiv (Hate crimes 2011. Statistics relating to offences reported to the police with an identified hate crime motive) (Stockholm: brå, 2012). For an English summary of this report, see www.bra.se/download/18 .1ff479c3135e8540b29800020067/2012_Hate_crime_2011_summary.pdf, accessed 31 January 2013. 26 See http://expo.se/2012/counterjihad-rorelsen-samlas-i-stockholm_5109.html; www.dn.se/ nyheter/varlden/vilks-deltar-i-islamfientligt-mote and www.tryckfrihet.com/geert-wilders- till-malmo-och-tryckfrihetssallskapet/, all three accessed 31 January 2013. Switzerland

Andreas Tunger-Zanetti* and Mallory Schneuwly Purdie**

1 Muslim Populations

Prior to 1960, Muslims were rare among the Swiss resident population. That changed with three waves of immigration. The first wave, in the late 1960s, brought male workers mostly from Turkey and Yugoslavia with no particular intention to stay permanently. The second wave came in the late 1970s, after Switzerland allowed these workers to bring in their families. From this point on, Islam became a lasting reality. The last influx consists of foreigners seeking asylum from oppressive dictatorships, civil wars, famines and other kinds of distress in countries south and east of the Mediterranean. It started in the 1960s and is more a continuous process than a wave, with peaks during the Balkan wars and after the Arab Spring. From 1850 to 2000, every 10 years, Switzerland carried out systematic national censuses including a question on religious affiliation. Due to economic and political reasons, the systematic national census was abandoned and the population is now censed annually through the communal registries. This decision has a direct impact on the quality of the data collected for religious affiliation, since not every community gathers data on religious affiliation in the same way. Since these data are scarcely exploitable, they are completed with a random sample of 200,000 respondents. Potential informants have to be permanent residents, aged above 15 years old and living in private households. As such, it excludes asylum seekers, refugees, diplomats and a considerable number of expatriate workers, as well as inmates and people living in social and medical institutions. Considering what precedes, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office published a lower figure of Muslims for 2010 than for 2000, namely 295,798 (margin of appreciation: 1.8%). Taking into account that in the 2000 census 39.2% of Muslims in Switzerland were under 20 years of age, the number can be extrapolated to 450,000 for 2013 corresponding to 5.5% of the total Swiss

* Dr Andreas Tunger-Zanetti is coordinator of the Centre for Research on Religion at the University of Lucerne. ** Dr Mallory Schneuwly Purdie is present president of the gris (Group of researchers on Islam in Switzerland, www.gris.info). She is affiliate researcher at the Institute for social sciences of contemporary religions at the University of Lausanne.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_044 Switzerland 583 population. The percentage is slightly higher in the German-speaking parts than in the French- and Italian-speaking parts of the country. A large majority of the country’s Muslims live in industrialised areas. Swiss nationality is acquired by descent and not by birth on Swiss territory. Foreigners, including those born in Switzerland, must generally have lived for a total of twelve years in Switzerland before they can apply for Swiss nationality (including three consecutive years over the past five years); the years spent in the country between the ages of ten and twenty are counted double. A federal referendum in 2004 eased access to Swiss citizenship for the descendants of immigrants. Since 2000, the proportion of Muslims with Swiss citizenship has risen from 11.7% to approximately 35%. It was 31.4% in 2010 according to the official figures for those aged over 15, but it is most probably higher for those up to 15 years old. Still, the majority of Muslims in Switzerland hold foreign nationalities, some 30% from one of Yugoslavia’s successor states, followed by Turkey (around 16%, Alevis included), North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (all below 5%).1 Muslim communities in Switzerland are 80% Sunnis, 7% Shiʿis, 8–11% Turkish Alevis.2 Research estimates that less than one fifth of the Muslim population is regularly observant.3 The majority of Muslims in Switzerland are either irreligious or selectively religious. In other words, most of the Muslims in Switzerland are not religiously active in their everyday practices nor with reference to their personal and collective identity.

2 Islam and the State

Switzerland is a secular state. Its Federal Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of belief and conscience (§15) and equality before the law. However, in §72, it delegates church-state relations to the competence of the cantons (states). The only two cantons that have clearly separated state

1 For more details, see www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/05.html. On young Muslim men in Switzerland see: Müller, Monika: Migration und Religion. Junge hinduistische und muslimische Männer in der Schweiz (Wiesbaden: Springer vs, 2013). 2 Suter Reich, Virginia, Zwischen Differenz, Solidarität und Ausgrenzung. Inkorporationspfade der alevitischen Bewegung in der Schweiz und im transnationalen Raum (Zürich: Chronos, 2013), p. 82. 3 Giugni, Marco/Gianni, Matteo/Michel, Noémi: Entre demandes de reconnaissance et politique d’accomodation: les orientations culturelles, sociales et politiques des musulmans en Suisse. Research report, Bern, fns, 2010. Available online: http://www.nfp58.ch/files/downloads/ Schlussbericht_Giugni.pdf, accessed 27 January 2014. 584 Tunger-Zanetti and purdie and religion are Geneva and Neuchâtel. All the others have granted special status to the Roman Catholic Church and to the Reformed Church, nine of them also to the small Old Catholic Church and six to Jewish congregations. The special status usually includes privileged access to schools, hospitals and prisons as well as the possibility to levy a tax. Most Islamic umbrella organisations declare the privileged status as their long-term goal. Two Alevi organisations have been the only ones to obtain official recognition so far (without the right to taxation) from the Parliament of the Canton of Basel-Stadt in 2012.4 On 8 May 2013, the Federal Council published a “report on the situation of Muslims in Switzerland.”5 The report focused especially on the fields of contact between Muslims and the authorities. It essentially stated that the Swiss Muslim population is very heterogeneous, mostly non-practising and very secular, that the situation and contacts rarely cause any problems and that the publicly mediated image of Swiss Islam is often distorted. The government does not see a need for major policy changes, but identifies a few areas for targeted measures. In 2013, a ruling by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ended a political move in the canton of Thurgau openly directed against the Qur’an being used in classrooms. In 2011, right-wing activists had collected 4,466 signatures of citizens demanding prohibition of the use of “misogynous, racist or murderous” textbooks in state schools of their canton. The cantonal parliament declared the initiative invalid on 19 December 2012. The activists appealed to the Federal Court which dismissed the appeal on 28 August 2013, on the grounds that the initiative was discriminating and that the cantonal parliament was correct in declaring it void.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The situation described above means that there is still no official representation of all Muslims, neither on the national nor on the cantonal level. In eleven cantons, however, there are umbrella organisations uniting the majority of local associations and acting as interlocutors for authorities and civil society

4 For a legal assessment see Loretan, Adrian/Weber, Quirin/Morawa, Alexander H.E.: Freiheit und Religion. Die Anerkennung weiterer Religionsgemeinschaften in der Schweiz (Münster: lit, 2014). 5 Schweizerischer Bundesrat: Bericht des Bundesrates über die Situation der Muslime in der Schweiz, Eidg. Justiz- und Polizeidepartement. Bern. Available online: http://www.ejpd.admin .ch/content/dam/data/pressemitteilung/2013/2013-05-08/ber-d.pdf, accessed 25 January 2014. Switzerland 585 on issues such as cemeteries, construction of mosques, etc.6 Another type of umbrella organisations coordinate local associations of the same ethnic and ideological background all over Switzerland. The most influential ones are İsviçre Türk Diyanet Vakfı, www.diyanet.ch; İsviçre İslam Toplumu, www.sig-net.ch; Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse, www.rabeta.ch; Conseil Islamique Suisse, www.iman.ch; Verband islamischer Kulturzentren (Birmensdorferstrasse 273, 8055 Zürich). A third type of non-local organisations is the Union of Albanian imams in Switzerland (www.uais.ch), founded in January 2012, as well as organisations for women or for burial services. There are two umbrella organisations aspiring to the role of the unique representative player on the national level: Föderation islamischer Dachorganisationen der Schweiz (fids, Federation of Islamic Organisations of Switzerland, Bahnstrasse 80, 8105 Regensdorf, www.fids.ch), headed by Dr. Hisham Maizar and bringing together twelve cantonal and/or ethnic organisations described above; and Koordination Islamischer Organisationen Schweiz (kios, Coordination of Swiss Islamic Organisations, no website) with Dr. Farhad Afshar (Kappelenring 44c, 3032 Hinterkappelen, kios@bluewin .ch) as its spokesperson. The kios brings together the cantonal umbrella organisations of Basel, Berne and Zurich. fids and kios, though rivals, have formed a common front against the younger Islamischer Zentralrat Schweiz (Islamic Central Council Switzerland, www.izrs.ch). The iccs was founded on 25 October 2009, one month before and as a reaction to the referendum on minarets and is attractive especially for the second and third generations. One of the public objectives of the iccs states is “to unite the majority of practising Muslims institutionally and to represent them in the future.”7 On the local level, nearly every one of the 240 mosques and prayer halls is under the responsibility of an association or a foundation. Most of them have a section for the youth8 and for women.

6 For an overview with only few lacunae see: www.islam.ch/joomla/index.php/linksamm lung/28-kantonale-verbaende-in-der-schweiz, accessed 15 January 2014. For an academic analysis of the whole field see Monnot, Christophe (ed.): La Suisse des mosquées. Derrière le voile de l’unité musulmane (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2013). 7 www.izrs.ch/vision.html, accessed 27 January 2014 (authors’ translation). See also Schneuwly Purdie, Mallory: “Performer l’islam, dessiner les contours de ‘la communauté islamique’. Le ccis comme performance d’un islam ‘authentique’.” In Monnot op. cit. (see preceding note), pp. 151–172. 8 On Muslim youth groups in Switzerland see: Endres, Jürgen et al.: Jung, muslimisch, sch- weizerisch. Muslimische Jugendgruppen, islamische Lebensführung und Schweizer Gesellschaft (Luzern: Universität Luzern, Zentrum Religionsforschung, 2013). 586 Tunger-Zanetti and purdie

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Switzerland has some 240 mosques and prayer halls. Only four of them show features of Islamic architecture, in particular, a minaret: Zurich (inaugurated in 1963, run by the Ahmadiyya movement), Geneva (1978, financed by Saudi Arabia), and more recently in two converted industrial buildings in Winterthur (2005, run by Albanians) and Wangen (2009, run by Turks).9 On 29 November 2009, Swiss citizens in a national referendum decided to prohibit the construction of minarets in Switzerland. Building permission for the fifth minaret, planned by the Albanian congregation in Langenthal, was issued, but not realised before the vote on the minaret ban and revoked by the administrative court of the canton of Berne in 2012 on grounds not related to the new constitutional clause. New Islamic centres planned from the outset without a dome or minaret, have been built in Wohlen (Aargau) in 2007, Volketswil (Zurich) in 2012, and in Egnach (Thurgau) in 2013. Two more are in an advanced stage of planning, both with domes (Grenchen and Wil). The remaining mosques are mainly prayer halls with nothing but a sign- board as outward indication of their Islamic function. Most have facilities such as a small library and/or cafeteria. Prayer rooms in public institutions are still few and generally designed to accommodate all faiths with the qibla indicated for Muslims.

5 Children’s Education

The question of religious education is the responsibility of the cantons. Each canton has its own system of teaching in religion or about religion according to its cantonal constitution and laws. Along with the federal standardisation of mandatory school programmes,10 mandatory non-confessional classes are slowly becoming the rule. These classes take the form of introduction to the history or the study of religions, are taught by school teachers and are mandatory for all pupils independently of their religious affiliation.11 In French speaking Switzerland, Agora Edition ( former Enbiro Edition) develops pedagogical

9 www.religionenschweiz.ch/bauten/en/e-index.html, accessed 27 January 2014, and Haenni, Patrick/Lathion, Stéphane (eds): Les minarets de la discorde (Fribourg: Infolio/ Religioscope, 2009). 10 HarmoS for French speaking Switzerland and Lehrplan 21 for the German speaking part. 11 In some cantons, e.g. Fribourg, a confessional religious education given by staff of the churches during the school schedule still exists. Switzerland 587 tools for teaching about religion at school for pupils aged from 6 to 14. Their books and booklets propose non-confessional introductions to the “world’s five main religions” (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism). Controversies may erupt, for example in the canton of Valais where it is less accepted that Islam is a subject in state schools, even when taught in a purely informative way. In the German-speaking part of Switzerland there is as much variety in the types of teaching in/about religion at the secondary level as at the primary level.12 Muslim children are socialised in religious matters, depending on their parents’ initiative, through the family or at the preferred mosque, which may offer an introduction to Islam, the Qur’an and Arabic by the imam or by volunteer teachers, albeit often poorly trained. Until now, Muslim pupils (like pupils from other religious communities) are not given any time off school to attend such classes, which therefore often take place during the weekend or in the early evening. Islamic instruction in public schools (beside the regular classes) is possible in some cantons even without official recognition of the respective community and only depending on consent of local authorities. So far, qualified Muslim teachers teach Muslim children in four municipalities (since 2002, in Kriens, Ebikon and Turgi/Obersiggenthal, since 2010, in Kreuzlingen).13 These classes are optional and given in German to all nationalities together. A research report on religious education was published in summer 2009.14 There is a consensus about the need for trained teachers of Islamic religion, but no specific initiative so far for a training course. The scarcity of Islamic education in public schools is due to a combination of factors: weak Muslim organisations depending on voluntary donations, lack of qualified Muslim teachers, and fear of Islamophobic reactions. Secular classes are usually unaffected by Islam-related problems. Schools have guidelines for handling common issues related to religious attitudes such as holidays, dress, food, physical education, swimming lessons or school camps.

12 For a recent overview see Jödicke, Ansgar: Unterricht zum Thema Religion an der öffentli- chen Schule (Teaching about religion in public schools), final report, pnr 58 (Collectivités religieuses, Etat et société), Freiburg, 2010. www.nfp58.ch/e_projekte_jugendliche.cfm? projekt=106, accessed 27 January 2014. 13 The Kreuzlingen classes are extensively documented on www.viuk.ch. 14 Formation en Suisse des imams et des enseignant-e-s en religion islamique (Training in Switzerland for imams and teachers of Islamic religious education), pnr 58 (Collectivités religieuses, Etat et société) (Berne, 2009), German and French version available on www .nfp58.ch. 588 Tunger-Zanetti and purdie

Few cases end up before the courts, causing disproportionate media attention (cf. section 15). In March 2013, one of several families in and around Basel appealed to the European Court of Human Rights against a ruling of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in 2012 confirming that pupils could not be excused from mixed-sex mandatory swimming lessons in the state school on religious grounds; the case is pending. Confirming its stance, on 11 April 2013, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of a Shiʿi family in the canton of Aargau. The family had refused to let their daughters go to swimming lessons although classes were gender-separate, the burkini was allowed and physical contact with the male teacher was avoided. The court attached more weight to the mandatory character of the swimming classes and the integration of the pupils than to religious conviction.

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Switzerland, there are a number of university departments in Islamic studies: in Geneva, Berne, Zurich, and Basel. They are slowly beginning to broaden the spectrum of research topics from the philological, historical, civilisational and sometimes political aspects towards a contemporary view of the Islamic world. Islam in Europe is primarily a research topic of some Departments of Religious Studies (Universities of Lausanne, Fribourg, Lucerne and Zurich). Since imam training has become a political issue, the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation appointed experts to discuss models for a future training programme for imams and other Muslim key persons. In November 2013, the University of Fribourg proposed the creation of a national centre on Islam and Society. This centre would be part of the Faculty of Theology. It would aim at regrouping national competences on Islam and giving theological, political, cultural and social insight on Islam. It would develop an education not only for imams, but also for Muslim chaplains or religious teachers. The programme could take the form of a Master’s degree and would be addressed not only to Muslim students, but also to students who, in their future professional practices, will be in contact with Muslims. The University of Fribourg intends to launch this programme in fall 2014.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

As a federation of states, Switzerland has left the issue of cemeteries to the cantons, which usually allow the individual local authorities to find the solution Switzerland 589 that best suits their population. A number of Muslim cemeteries have been established in recent years. The oldest was started in Petit-Saconnex in Geneva in 1978. It was not until 2000 that other major cities began to define and establish sections suited for Muslim burials. Meanwhile, there are areas reserved for Muslims in cemeteries of most of the largest cities as well as in some smaller municipalities such as La Chaux-de-Fond. Negotiations and planning are under way in the cities of Neuchâtel, Fribourg, St. Gallen and Lausanne. The debates relative to Muslim cemeteries are often difficult and negotiations sometimes fail: in June 2013, the municipal parliament of Schlieren near Zurich refused to establish an area reserved for Muslims in its cemetery; in the autumn of 2013, the commune of Montreux followed suit. In other municipalities, local Muslim associations are waiting for a more appeased climate before they formulate any requests in this regard. Usually Muslim residents of neighbouring cities or villages can also be buried in these sections provided the authorities of the two municipalities have signed a general agreement. Demand for burial places is low so far, because the majority of first generation Muslim immigrants still prefer to be buried in their country of origin. Muslim organisations usually provide personnel to prepare the body for the funeral. When there are no local regulations governing the details of funeral rites, local parishes or civil authorities usually do their best to find a solution acceptable to the family.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Although Swiss chaplaincies are bi-confessional (Roman Catholic and Evangelical Reformed), the Christian chaplains offer their services to everyone, regardless of their religious affiliation. Specific arrangements for Muslims, such as Friday prayers, exclusively depend on the goodwill of institutional authorities. As such, the Swiss Army, prisons, schools and hospitals provide spiritual assistance, based on Christian principles, to any users (soldiers, inmates, pupils, patients) who request it. However, a recent research15 shows that the situation in large penal institutions (over 100 places) has evolved. The research reveals that the spiritual needs of Muslim inmates are taken into consideration: Friday prayers are organised on a regular basis (weekly to once a month), arrangements for observation of Ramadan are made, attention is given to the menus

15 Becci, Irene et al.: Enjeux sociologiques de la pluralité religieuse dans les prisons suisses, pnr 58 (Collectivités religieuses, Etat et société) (Berne, 2011), available on www.nfp58.ch. 590 Tunger-Zanetti and purdie

(avoiding pork and alcohol), prayer rugs are authorised, etc. This research recommends not only a more systematic involvement of imams in the spiritual care of inmates, but also to raise awareness of prison staff of Islam and related issues through further education in order to counter gross stereotypes. In various cantons (Vaud, Geneva, Fribourg, Zurich),16 local Muslim associations are developing specific spiritual care for Muslims. Nevertheless, they encounter difficulties in accessing Muslim patients, soldiers or inmates since Islam does not benefit from a public recognition status.

9 Religious Festivals

No specific arrangements exist in Switzerland concerning Muslim religious holidays. However, Muslims are sometimes allowed to take days off work for Islamic festivals unless this would cause serious economic difficulties for the employer, and school children will usually get one or two days off upon request depending on the local guidelines. ʿId al-Adha and ʿId al-Fitr are widely celebrated in mosques or in meeting halls rented on those occasions. There is no legal right to a reduction of working hours during the Ramadan fast, but arrangements can be made with the employer on an individual basis. Pupils fasting during Ramadan are exempted from gym class because of the risk of fainting or dehydration.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Slaughter without prior anaesthetisation is not permitted, although exceptions are made for special events. Halal food imported from France, Italy, Germany, Austria and New Zealand (60% of lamb meat) is readily available at food stores. However, some butchers sell meat which has been slaughtered by a Muslim as halal, although the animal had been stunned. Halal meat is rarely offered in prisons or hospitals. Official statistics for 2013 show an imported quantity of 312 tons of halal beef (permitted: 350) and of 159 tons of halal mutton (permitted: 175). The biggest contingent (161 tons of beef ) was bought by Halal Import sa in Basel, one of seven importing companies.17 Halal certificates for any products usually originate from foreign certifiers. Business and services under explicitly Islamic

16 See for example www.aumoneriemusulmane.ch, accessed 27 January 2014, in Geneva. 17 www.blw.admin.ch, accessed 25 January 2014. Switzerland 591 headings are rare.18 This applies also for Islamic banking. The only bank working entirely according to Shariʿa principles was Faisal Private Bank, Geneva, founded in 2006, but they stopped their banking activities in 2012 because of low demand. Several other banks have an Islamic window. Hajj and ʿUmrah are organised by the major Islamic umbrella organisations cooperating with travel agencies authorised by the Saudi embassy. Hajj is organised by the major Islamic umbrella organisations in collaboration with authorised travel agencies. Some 1,700 hajj visas are issued by the Consular Section of the Saudi Embassy in Switzerland every year.19

11 Dress Codes

There has been fierce debate on the subject of religious dress all over Switzerland. In an early phase, emotions were higher in the French part because of the impact of events in France and a similar perception of laïcité. Since 2009, the German- and Italian-speaking parts have had their own debates. Legally, hijab is permitted at school for students and pupils but prohibited in most cantons for teachers. Certain political forces try to impose further restrictions. As the result of a case in Geneva that went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it was established that the principle of laïcité, which applies in Geneva, entitles the canton to forbid the wearing of ostenta- tious religious symbols, such as hijab, by its officials. On 22 September 2013, voters of the Canton of Ticino approved a popular initiative presented in 2011 by a right-wing politician Giorgio Ghiringhelli with a 65% majority of the votes. The new clause still needs approval by the Federal Parliament to take effect. Once enacted, it will prohibit any kind of disguise in public places in general terms, but was admittedly aiming at the Islamic niqab. The same political forces that initiated the minaret ban have repeatedly announced a similar initiative at the federal level, although the number of niqab-wearing resident women can be estimated at no more than a few dozen. Disputes over head scarves worn by girls in two municipal schools were resolved in 2013. In Heerbrugg (Canton of St. Gallen) two newly arrived Somali girls were first denied permission to attend class because rules of the local school prohibited any covering, religious or non-religious, following a ‘recommendation’ of the head of the cantonal Department of Education. Broad media coverage led the local school commission to change its stance realising that the

18 See the category “Musl. Unternehmen” on www.islam.ch, accessed 25 January 2014. 19 Information given by the Consular Section to the authors on 18 February 2013. 592 Tunger-Zanetti and purdie rule would probably not withstand judicial examination. A few weeks later, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled in a similar case in Bürglen (Canton of Thurgau) that the local school had been wrong in banning head scarves, because a ban would infringe upon fundamental rights.20 This in turn could only be done when a cantonal law specified its conditions. A third case is pending in St. Margrethen (also in Canton of St. Gallen); in the meantime the girl is allowed to wear the head scarf in school by decree of the presiding judge. Schools allow Muslim girls to wear ‘burqini’ for swimming lessons; however, this may conflict with regulations of public swimming pools. Heads carves are permitted on photos in id cards and passports as long as the face remains visible from the chin to the hairline.21

12 Publication and Media

Muslims do not have their own programmes on either nation-wide television or radio. However, there are a certain number of religious programmes in which Islam is discussed in an inter-religious context. Muslims are particularly active with websites of their own making. Since roughly 2012, young Swiss Muslims are increasingly making use of the possibilities offered by the Internet for spreading independent religious audio and video content at minimal cost (examples are http://radiodawa.ch/ and http://radiouahid.fm). Among the regularly updated Muslim websites with rich textual content are: Islam en Suisse (www.islam.ch); Gesellschaft Schweiz—Islamische Welt (www.gsiw.ch), Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Zürich (www .vioz.ch); l’Union vaudoise des associations musulmanes (www.uvam.ch); l’Union des organisations musulmanes de Genève (www.uomg.ch); Stiftung Islamische Gemeinschaft Zürich (www.sigz.ch); Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeindschaft (www.sig-net.ch); Centre Islamique de Genève (www .cige.org/cige); Islamic Central Council Switzerland (iccs, www.izrs.ch). One project of the iccs’ is to create a tv channel.

20 Ruling 2C_794/2012, dated 11 July 2013. 21 www.schweizerpass.admin.ch/content/dam/data/passkampagne/definitivefotomuster tafel220906.pdf, accessed 27 January 2014. Switzerland 593

13 Family Law

In Switzerland, as in other European countries, polygamy is illegal; nevertheless, sometimes international private law permits some exceptions. For example, sometimes employees of international companies or local government officials migrate to Switzerland with their whole family, that is, with more than one wife. Conflicts may also arise in inheritance law or in cases where women are called to testify in Swiss courts.22 Marriages can only be formalised according to civil law. Research on family law and on the consequences of increasing legal diversity has received more attention since the foundation of the Centre for Islamic and Middle Eastern Legal Studies (cimels) at the University of Zurich in 2008 (www.rwi.uzh.ch/oe/cimels.html).

14 Interreligious Relations

Since 1992, the Interreligious Working Group of Switzerland (www.iras-cotis .ch) counsels religious communities on practical questions (e.g. residency permits for staff, rooms), coordinates their activities and publicly promotes interreligious encounters through a “Week of Religions” held every year since 2007 in the beginning of November. In 2013, iras-cotis issued public statements on the ‘burqa vote’ in the canton of Ticino and the ruling of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in the Bürglen case (see section 11). Currently, one Muslim woman and one man are among the eight members of the committee. The Swiss Council of Religions (scr, www.councilofreligions.ch) established in 2006, aims at the promotion of religious harmony and freedom on a more political level. To date, the council only comprises representatives from Abrahamic religions and exercises a purely symbolic role. Dr. Hisham Maizar, one of its three Muslim members, has been elected president for the period 2014–2016. Partly as a reaction to the scr, which initially was comprised of only men, women of the three Abrahamic religions founded the Interreligious Think Tank (www.interrelthinktank.ch) in 2008. They work on theological questions of social relevance. In 2013, the think tank published a practice-oriented guide for interreligious dialogue.23

22 Pahud de Mortanges, René and Tanner, Erwin (eds), Muslime und Schweizerische Rechtsordnung (Muslims and Swiss law) (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 2002). 23 Interreligiöser Think-Tank: Leitfaden für den interreligiösen Dialog (Basel: Interreligiöser Think-Tank, 2013). 594 Tunger-Zanetti and purdie

Bern, the capital, is home to the unique House of Religions (www.haus-der- religionen.ch). After stages in provisional premises, currently at Laubeggstrasse 21, and difficult fundraising, construction work at Europaplatz started in 2012. Once finished, the complex will comprise prayer rooms for Alevis, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus and Muslims as well as a common meeting space, offices, apartments and a hotel. In most cantons and bigger cities, round tables of religions are active in organising meetings, public debates, and joint prayers, often on the Federal Day of Thanksgiving, Repentance and Prayer (mid-September).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debate continues to be marked by features noted during the months before and after the minaret ban decided by the Swiss electorate in a referendum on 29 November 2009.24 The debate remains highly emotional. Issues widely discussed in 2013 were head scarves and dispensation requests from mandatory swimming lessons in state schools, initiatives to ban the niqab in the Canton of Ticino (cf. sections 5 and 11) and possibly elsewhere, but also local plans to build a mosque or to establish Islamic sections in cemeteries (cf. sections 4 and 7). Another phenomenon is the hysteria fuelled by the same circles and amplified by mainstream media every time the Islamic Central Council of Switzerland (cf. section 3) announces a public event. In 2013, it was the annual assembly held on 21 December in Geneva which especially received media attention; the Federal authorities banned the scheduled speaker, tv- preacher Muhammad Salah, from entering the country.

16 Major Cultural Events

The main regular event with Muslim participation is the interreligious “Week of Religions”, held each year at the beginning of November (cf. section 14). Many prayer halls would then have a “Day of open doors,” some would also

24 On the Swiss debate, put in perspective with other Western European cases see: Behloul, Samuel-Martin and Leuenberger, Susanne and Tunger-Zanetti, Andreas (eds): Debating Islam. Negotiating Religion, Europe, and the Self (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013). On the ban and its broader context: Adrian Vatter (ed.): Vom Schächt- zum Minarettverbot. Religiöse Minderheiten in der direkten Demokratie (From banning kosher slaughtering to banning minarets. Religious minorities in direct democracy) (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2011). Switzerland 595 delegate a spokesperson to a podium or a children’s choir to an interreligious gathering. In 2013, fewer mosques arranged a “Day of open doors” as a result of low demand in the preceding years. Some local associations (Lausanne mosque) organise “Ramadan table” or “Special Ramadan Night” where they invite the neighbourhood as well as local representatives of authorities or churches. Umbrella organisations (e.g. uvam) also use iftar dinners, ʿId al-Fitr or ʿId al-Adha for inviting representatives of political, economic and religious authorities. Since 2011, the Islamic Central Council of Switzerland organises an Annual Conference where they invite (sometime controversial) speakers from around the world. These conferences constitute the largest events organised by Muslims for Muslims in Switzerland. In 2013, in Geneva, around 2,000 people attended the conference. Young activists are increasingly beginning to organise events for their peers: On 23 November 2013, Zurich-based Ummah (www.ummah.ch), assisted by German activists, organised the first Swiss poetry slam contest, ‘I,Slam.’ Turkey

Ahmet Yildiz*

1 Muslim Populations

The census conducted by the Turkish Statistics Institution (tÜİk), as of 31 December 2012, recorded the population of Turkey at 75,627,384.1 Following the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1924, the nation-building process envisaged a thoroughly homogeneous population in religious and ethnic terms. The extreme sensitivity of the state elites has led to the ethnic and religious affiliations of the population being excluded from the official census since 1965, so we do not have official data for these factors, but there have been some significant surveys, the most important of which was conducted in 2006 by the Milliyet-konda company.2 This survey found that there were 55,484,000 self-identified Turks (76.03% of the population), 11,445,000 Kurds (15.68%) and 6,460,000 people from other ethnic groups (8.3%). The same survey also indicates the religious demography of the Turkish population and found that around 99% of the Turkish population identify themselves as Muslim. In terms of denominational affiliations, Sunni Hanafi Turks comprise 82.14% of the total population, Sunni Shafi‘is 9.06% (of whom 72% live in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, 76% are Kurds, 13% Turks, and 10% Arabs). Alevis comprise 5.73% of the population (some four and a half million people),3 and

* Ahmet Yıldız is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Research Centre of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. He has specialised in Kemalist and Kurdish nationalisms as well as the role of Islam as a socio-political determinant in Turkish democracy. He contributed the article “Problematizing the intellectual and political vestiges: From ‘Welfare’ to ‘Justice and Development’ ” in Cizre, Ümit (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London: Routledge, 2008). 1 TÜİK figures available at www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do;jsessionid=8BkBST8Mqm6jk jGy62kDDRhbddwzBB2xh44Z2vqWzgYydfFVdK5M!-1305499384?id=13425, accessed 15 January 2014. 2 Milliyet-konda, Biz Kimiz? Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması 2006 (Who Are We? Survey of Social Structure 2006), www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2006_09_konda_Toplumsal_Yapi .pdf, accessed 15 January 2014. 3 International Religious Freedom Report 2012 of us Department of State suggests this figure to be between 15 million and 20 million Alevis by ascribing it to “academics”. See us Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2012, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/ irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper, accessed 15 January 2014.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_045 Turkey 597 are 43% Turks, 42% Kurds and 7% Arabs, with the remaining 8% of various other ethnicities. About a third of all Alevis live in Istanbul with other major concentrations in central Anatolia and the Mediterranean region. Ja‘faris are the country’s principal Shiʿi community and number around 500,000 (concentrated mostly in eastern Turkey and Istanbul).4 Overall, Hanafis and Shafi‘is regard their Sunnism as a powerful common denominator, while Alevis consider themselves a distinct group. In a survey carried out in 2006 by two prominent political scientists from the University of the Bosphorus, respondents were asked to reply, on a scale of 1 to 10, to the question: Where do you locate yourself in the continuum from ‘Islamist’ to ‘secular’? In reply, 20.3% of respondents identified themselves as ‘secular’, 48.5% as ‘Islamist’ and 23.4% as somewhere in between. One should not forget, however, that the meanings ascribed to the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘secular’ are vague, so these results are open to interpretation.5

2 Islam and the State

Under its Constitution, Turkey is a secular state providing for freedom of belief and worship, and freedom to privately disseminate religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. Turkish laiklik (laïcité) not only prescribes a separation between religion and the state but also requires religion to be kept under state control. Accordingly, state policy imposes some restrictions on religious groups and on religious expression in government offices and state- run institutions, including universities, symbolised in the ban on wearing the Islamic head scarf. Article 219 of the Penal Code prohibits imams, priests, rab- bis and other religious leaders from “reproaching or vilifying” the government or the laws of the state while performing their duties. As a corollary of the principle of laïcité, there is legislation against insulting any religion, interfering with a religion’s services or damaging religious property. The Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister’s office, administers Sunni Muslim religious facilities and teaching courses. The Diyanet is responsible for regulating the operation of the country’s registered mosques and employing

4 us Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2012, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/ irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper, accessed 15 January 2014. 5 Çarkoğlu, Ali and Binnaz Toprak, Değişen Türkiyede Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey) (Istanbul: tesev, 2006), pp. 29–31, 38–39. 598 yildiz local and provincial imams, who are civil servants, and also covers the costs of utilities at registered mosques. Some groups, particularly some Alevi associations, claim that Diyanet policies reflect mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs and accuse the Diyanet of bias since it does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership and does not cover the costs of utilities of Alevi ‘cem houses’ because they are not formally recognised as places of worship.6

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The establishment of political parties based on religious affiliation is legally forbidden. Thus, in legal and official terms, there is no religious political party. Parties attesting special importance to Islam express this leaning in indirect ways. Accordingly, it is known that the Felicity Party, currently not represented in the parliament and apparent heir of the National Outlook Parties is a party with an Islamic background. The Justice and Development Party (jdp), the party in power since 2002, is a conservative democratic party and an offspring of the Virtue Party, a party with a National Outlook. While Sunni religious sen- sitivities are represented by these parties, the main heterodox group, Alevis, are mainly represented in the secularist Republican People’s Party. There is also a ban on the establishment of Sufi brotherhoods (tariqas). Though this ban remains de jure, however, it is not so de facto. For instance, Mevlevi and Bektashi orders continue to hold official endorsement and Naqshabandi and Qadiri Sufi groupings as well as neo-Sufi religious groupings, namely Nurcus and Suleymancis, have social representation in various civil society organisations. The oldest of these in Republican Turkey are the Nurcu movement founded by Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (d. 1960), and the Suleymancis originally led by Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan (d. 1959), the establishment of both dating back to the 1930s. Sufi and other mystical religious-social orders,

6 Upon the written question submitted by the Tunceli deputy Hüseyin Aygün, from the main opposition Republican People’s Party, (rpp) the Presidency of the Turkish Grand National Assembly restated the current official position that Cemevis are not among the recognised places of worship in Islam. See, for example, www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/22126869 .asp, accessed 15 February 2013. In 15 May 2012, a motion by Ali Özgündüz, a deputy of the Republican People’s Party from Istanbul, on the “Re-Organisation of the Places of Worship” was debated in the Plenary and the demand of its direct inclusion to the agenda was rejected. See www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tasari_teklif_sd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_ no=98884, accessed 28 February 2014. Turkey 599

brotherhoods and lodges (cemaats) are banned under the “Law on the Closure of Religious Shrines and Dervish Convents and Prohibition of Some Titles” of 30 November 1925 but tariqas and cemaats have nevertheless remained active and widespread. Some prominent political and social leaders continue to associate with them and other Islamic communities. Calls for the lifting of this ban are part of the on-going agenda in Turkish politics,7 but Kemalists and neo-Kemalists are resolutely against the growing power of brotherhoods in the political and social life of the country. Alevis in Turkey are organised in various forms, which represent basically two lines, traditionalists and reformists. While traditionalists use more Islam- rooted idioms and language, the reformists are more secular and equipped more with a political language. Alevi organisations of the first form are individual associations or foundations, gathered around Cemevis (Alevi places of culture and religious rituals), such as Şahkulu Sultan Vakfı, Karaca Ahmet Sultan Derneği and Vakfı, Erikli Baba Derneği, Garip Dede Derneği. Alevi organisations of the second form are composed of associations or foundations with multiple branches like Hacı Bektaş Veli Dernekleri and Pir Sultan Abdal Dernekleri. The third form is foundation-Cemevis linked to central foundations, namely Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı. All these organisations serve as centres for cem and culture. The umbrella organisation for Alevi groupings is Alevi Bektaşi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Federation of Alevi-Bektashi Unions of Turkey).8 Apart from miscellaneous non-official Islamic groupings, the most important official organisation is the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Eskişehir Yolu 9. km. Çankaya-Ankara, tel.: ++90 3122957000; www .diyanet.gov.tr/), an official institution established by Law 429 of 3 March 1924, the same day as the abolition of the caliphate. It represents the highest Islamic religious authority in the country. According to Article 136 of the Constitution: “The Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” It is empowered to regulate

7 Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ of Justice and Development Party in an iftar organisation by the World Ehl-i Beyt Foundation on 22 November 2012 referred to this state of affairs, and expressed his willingness that someday this ban be removed. For his speech, see “Başbakan Yardımcısı’ndan tarikat açıklaması,” (A Statement Regarding Tariqats by Deputy Prime Minister), www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21985765.asp, accessed 21 February 2013. 8 www.guvencabdal.com/aleviligin_inanc_esaslari_hakkinda_soz_sahibi_olan_kurumlar- t373.0.html, accessed 11 April 2012. 600 yildiz issues concerning Islamic belief, rituals and morality and to provide society with religious guidance. Other notable Islamic organisations are as follows:

– Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (The Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs), Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak No. 72/B, 06640 Kocatepe, Ankara, tel.:++90 3124171235, fax: ++90 3124181900, E-mail: [email protected], web: www.diyanet vakfi.org.tr/) was established on 13 March 1975. It is a tax-exempt foundation, has the right to collect donations without prior permission, and is the biggest foundation in Turkey in terms of its financial resources. Its purposes are to support the activities of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, to enlighten and guide the population in religious matters, to build mosques and to work towards strengthening social solidarity. The prestigious Islam Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopaedia of Islam), the first of its kind in the Muslim World, is a product of Islami Araştırmalar Merkezi (the Islamic Studies Centre, isam), İcadiye Bağlarbaşı Cad. 40, Bağlarbaşı 34662, Üsküdar- Istanbul, tel.:++90 2164740850, fax: ++90 2164740874, www.isam.org.tr/) established by the Foundation. – Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekküller Vakfi (The Foundation for Turkish Volunteer Associations, tgtv), Otakçılar Mh. Savaklar Cd. No: 1, 134050, Edirnekapı/ Eyüp/Istanbul, tel.:++90 212534040708, fax: ++90 2123104679, e-mail: tgtv@ tgtv.org, web: www.tgtv.org ) was established on 22 January 1994 and is based in Istanbul. It is an umbrella organisation made up of 700 foundations, associations and unions that have Islamic and Turkish nationalist leanings. – There is a network of organisations linked to the Gülen Community, the so- called “cemaat”, a neo-Nurcu movement, founded and led by a retired preacher, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi, now living in the usa, including Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (the Journalists and Writers Foundation) Tophanelioğlu Caddesi, Aygün Sokak, Altunizade Plaza No: 4 Altunizade/ Üsküdar/İstanbul, tel.:++90 2163399196, fax: ++90 2163399149, e-mail: bilgi@ gyv.org.tr, web: www.gyv.org.tr ), established on 29 June 1994. The Foundation has three important organisational components through which it conducts its global outreach: the Dialogue Eurasia Platform, the Abant Meetings and the Intercultural Dialog Platform. – Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (the Anatolia Youth Association), Sokullu Mehmet Paşa Cad. No: 184 Dikmen, 06000 Çankaya, Ankara, tel.:++90 3124801844–45, fax: ++90 3124801569, e-mail: [email protected], web: www.agd.org.tr) is the successor of Milli Görüş Vakfı (the National Outlook Foundation), the most important social organisation of the National Outlook Movement. It was founded in Ankara in 2002 and has 700 branches throughout the country. Turkey 601

It follows the ideology and programme devised by the founder of the National Outlook, Necmettin Erbakan (d. 2011).

There are numerous socially and financially powerful Islamically-oriented charitable associations that have become widely known and acquired popular support. Areas of their activities include: social aid, food aid, care of orphans, housing and clothing aid, vocational training, and support for educational and health facilities. The prominent charitable associations are: İnsani Yardım Vakfı (International Humanitarian Help, ihh), (www.ihh.org.tr), Kimse Yok Mu? (Solidarity and Aid Association), www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/, Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), (www.denizfeneri.org.tr), Cansuyu (www.cansuyu.org.tr) and Yardımeli (www.yardimeli.org.tr).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2012, there were 84,684 mosques in Turkey.9 The total number of registered mosques/masjids in public institutions is 956.10 More than 60,000 mosques are village mosques. Almost all mosques have an imam. City mosques have also an azan and tasbihat reciter called muezzin. Istanbul is the city housing the greatest number of mosques whereas Tunceli holds the least. The most famous are those built in Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultans, called Selatin mosques, while the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara is the most important to have been built in the Republican period. Mosques are open during prayer times. In the intervals between prayers most mosques are generally closed. If they have a small section reserved for prayer, one may use it for that purpose only. In recent years, there is a strong sensitivity to keep the mosques open all day but this is still not applied in all mosques. In recent years, women attendance at daily prayers in mosques has been rising. Many mosques have special places allocated for the use of women only. There is a strong awareness to keep mosques open to women and children and hence to modify the existing mosques accordingly.

9 See www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/kategori/istatistikler/136, accessed 13 January 2014. 10 This figure is taken from the Presidency of the Religious Affairs Human Resources Management Database, a non-public source. The breakdown of the mosques/masjids in public institutions is as follows: hospitals 53; schools 82; other public institutions 432; Qur’an Courses 143; in the premises of the office of muftis 114; Diyanet in-service training centres 12; universities 80, ibid. 602 yildiz

5 Children’s Education

The 1982 Constitution established compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools within the framework of the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, developed by the military government in response to leftist movements. In January 2007, the religious education curriculum was changed so as to include a very basic introduction to Alevism. In 2011, however, in line with the relevant European Court of Human Rights decision, school curricula was revised so as to cover many aspects of Alevism starting from the grade four till the last grade of high schools.11 Only Diyanet is authorised to provide courses in religion (Kuran Kursları) outside school, although clandestine and unofficial private courses do exist. After the 1997 military coup, students who have completed the first five years of primary school might enrol in Diyanet’s Qur’an classes at weekends and during summer vacations. Only children aged 12 and older could legally register for official Qur’an courses, which included 32-week courses, summer Qur’an classes and classes for memorising the whole Qur’an. All these restrictions were removed by Article 15 of the Decree No. 653, dated 17 September 2011.12 Since 1997, it has been compulsory for children to attend eight years of schooling, after which those who wish to receive Islamic religious education may continue their studies at Imam-Hatip high schools (lycees), which cover both the standard curriculum and Islamic theology and practice. There are currently 708 such secondary schools attached to the Directorate of Religious Education.13 Although they date back to 1924, Imam-Hatip schools were only named Imam-Hatip high schools in 1973, when they were authorised to provide education for both vocational and undergraduate study under Article 32 of the Basic Law of National Education of 1973. During the so-called “28 February 1997 post-modern coup”, the secondary school sections of these schools were closed down and the high school sections became four-year lycees providing only vocational education. As a result of this change, graduates of these schools were effectively barred from entrance to universities, apart from faculties of theology, and the number of students attending them fell from 500,000 to 60,000 in the span of just five years. In July 2009, the regulation that dis-

11 See “Alevilik Müfredata Daha Geniş Girdi,” (Alevism Has Entered the Curriculum More Comprehensively), http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/alevilik-mufredata-daha-genisgirdi/ gundem/gundemdetay/09.09.2011/1436332/default.htm, accessed 10 January 2012. 12 See the Official Gazette, 17 September 2011, No: 28057. 13 http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/istatistik/meb_istatistikleri_orgun_egitim_2012_2013.pdf, p. 118, accessed 13 January 2014. Turkey 603 criminated against students from vocational schools, including Imam-Hatip high schools, was changed by the Higher Education Council so as to provide them with equal opportunities in university entrance examinations without restricting the university programmes they could apply for outside their vocational specialisation.14 After the repeated cycle of the removal of the ban and the annulment of the removal by the High Administrative Court (Council of State), the Higher Education Council finally removed the ban on 1 December 2011.15 This decision however was again put before the court by two mps of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party.16 The Parliament approved the law modifying Article 45 of the Law on Higher Education remov- ing the application of differing quotient in the university entrance exams for the graduates of vocational schools including the Imam-Hatip Schools. This change provided for the application of an equal quotient in the calculation of the success rate for the determination of the total points. Accordingly, all lawsuits regarding the quotient application became null and void.17 Many religiously devout citizens consider the religious instruction provided in state schools to be inadequate and most families who enrol their children (especially girls) in Imam-Hatip schools do so to expose them to more extensive religious education, not to train them as imams. On 30 March 2012, the “Law Changing the Primary Education and Education Law, and Making Changes in Some Laws” was accepted by Parliament. This law created a big controversy and met with a fierce opposition of the main opposition Republican People’s Party but in the end was approved by the Parliament. The law defined the duration of the compulsory education as 12 years. It strati- fied the duration of primary, secondary and lycee education as four years, and reintroduced the secondary part of Imam-Hatip Lycees.18 Apart from state-provided religious education and instruction, there are hundreds of private schools affiliated to Islamic associations. These schools are not designed as Islamic religious schools but provide a more conducive

14 www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=872057&title=meslek-liselilerin-katsayi- magduriyeti-sona-erdi, accessed 18 November 2009. 15 “YÖK: Katsayı Kaldırıldı,” http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/yok-katsayi-kaldirildi/gundem/ gundemdetay/01.12.2011/1469625/default.htm, accessed 10 January 2012. 16 See “chp’den Danıştay’a katsayı davası,” (The Lawsuit to the Council of State by chp), http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/chp-den-danistay-a-katsayi-davasi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/ 20.01.2012/1491268/default.htm, accessed 18 February 2013. 17 For the relevant law number 6287, see www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6287.html, accessed 18 February 2013. 18 www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6287.html, accessed 18 February 2013. 604 yildiz environment for Islamic socialisation. Many of these schools are very popular and most are affiliated to the Gülen community. Boys and girls are usually taught together in the education system, in both public and private schools. Students are strictly forbidden to wear the head scarf in both primary and secondary schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are 60 theology faculties offering undergraduate programmes.19 Curricula of theology faculties include courses in three subject areas: Basic Islamic Sciences, Philosophy and Sciences of Religion, and Islamic History and Arts.20 In 2013, the General Board of the Higher Education Council (YÖK) decided to remove courses of the history of philosophy and to combine courses of the history of Islamic theology (kalam) and of Islamic law schools (mazahip). This decision aroused severe criticisms both from religious and secular segments of the public. In the end, YÖK withdrew its decision.21

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The TÜİK does not produce statistics on the number of Muslim cemeteries in Turkey. Municipalities deal with all issues related to Muslim funerals in accordance with Islamic practice and relevant legislation,22 including burial and cemeteries. Muslims in Turkey face no problems in observing Islamic burial practice or in creating and maintaining their cemeteries.

19 This figure lists only the faculties that accept students. See http://eilahiyat.com/index .php/ilahiyat-dkab/rakamlarla-ilahiyat-istatistikleri, accessed 14 January 2014. The number of established theology faculties has reached around 100. 20 http://eilahiyat.com/alphacontent/kyazarlarinmenu-260/79-dodr-bilal-gkir/693-ahiyat- tefsir-ve-bologna-si-.html, accessed 8 April 2012. For the curricula of theology faculties, also see www.divinity.ankara.edu.tr/lisans_programlari.php, accessed 18 February 2013. 21 Radikal (A National Daily), 15 September 2013, p. 5. 22 For the relevant national legislation regarding funeral services and cemeteries, see, for example, Belediye Kanunu (2005), www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5393.html, accessed 16 March 2009. Turkey 605

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Religious services in prisons date back to 1974 but were not well enough organised and established to be called ‘chaplaincy.’ However, under a protocol signed between the Ministry of Justice and the Presidency of Religious Affairs on 15 May 2001,23 Diyanet officials provide religious services in prisons on a weekly or monthly basis.24 Since then, 10,000 copies of the Qur’an have been distributed in prisons. According to 2012 Activity Report of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, there were 140 Muslim chaplains in prisons.25 According to 2013 figures, there were 207 prison chaplains with tenure and more than 400 unpaid chaplains.26 No religious services or spiritual guidance are provided in hospitals, and most hospitals do not have proper places of worship for patients. In 1995, religious services began to be provided by volunteers in some state hospitals but this was stopped by the Council of State at the request of the Ankara Chamber of Doctors on the grounds that it violated the principle of secularism.27 There is a core army chaplaincy structure but this is reserved for times of war and no army chaplains have been appointed since the 1974 war in Cyprus.28

23 For the protocol between the Diyanet and Ministry of Justice see, www2.diyanet .gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/isbirligiProtokolleri/Adalet%20Bakanl%C4% B1%C4%9F%C4%B1.pdf, accessed 28 February 2014. 24 See Kaya, Talha, “Cezaevi Vaizliği (Prison chaplaincy)”, in T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Başkanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu Religious Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 2 (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 158–159. 25 See www2.diyanet.gov.tr/StratejiGelistirme/Faaliyet/2012%20Y%C4%B1ll%C4%B1k%20 Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf, p. 14, accessed 28 February 2014. 26 See www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/Sayfalar/Cezaev%C4%B1H% C4%B1zmetleri.aspx. 27 See Başar, Serpil, “Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının Yürüttüğü Cami Dışı Din Hizmetleri Kapsamında Hastanelerde Din Hizmeti İhtiyacı (The Need for the Hospital Chaplaincy within the Context of the non-Mosque-based Religious Services),” in T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Başkanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu (Religious Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 1 (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 621–623; also see, İlhan, Ayşegül, “Dünya Hastanelerinde Din Hizmetleri (Hospital Chaplaincy in the World),” http://mtgahlatt42.blogspot.com.tr/2010/12/dr- aysegul-ilhan-dunya-hastanelerinde.html, accessed 28 February 2014. 28 See Acar, Erkan, “Din İşleri Subayı Ataması NedenYapılmıyor? (Why are No Military Officers Appointed as the Army Chaplains?),” Zaman, 11 May 2005. 606 yildiz

9 Religious Festivals

Turkey observes Qurban Bayram (ʿId al-Adha) and Ramazan Bayram (ʿId al-Fıtr) as national holidays (the first lasting 3.5 days, and second 4.5).29 Since the 1980s, the week that includes 20 April is celebrated as the Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Kutlu Doğum Haftası), pioneered by Diyanet. The theme of the 2013 celebrations, selected by the Presidency of Diyanet, was “The Honour of Man—We are honoured by the presence of the Prophet.”30 In addition, there are other holidays known as kandils that are religiously important and celebrated, though not officially recognised.31 Apart from kandils, the Day of Ashura is observed by both Sunni and Alevi Muslims and all prepare a traditional dessert known as ashura to share with their neighbours. In 2010, for the first time in the Republic’s history, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan joined the commemorations held by the Ja’fari Community in Istanbul.32 Similarly, the Turkish State television, trt, broadcast several short videos inspired by the Shi ʿi-Alevi culture during that month. The Hajj service is regulated according to the Saudi country quota stipulating as one to 1,000 in proportion to the total population. In 2013, the actual figure happened to be 56,396.33 The relative decrease in numbers with respect to the previous years is related to the Saudi renovations in the Ka’aba premises which led to a decrease in country quotas.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Food in Turkey is usually prepared according to halal regulations, but in recent years there have been suspicions that some meat products are mixed with pork without being so labelled, a matter of serious concern for the great majority of the population. The Turkish Institute of Standards (tse) is working towards

29 For the relevant legislation regarding religious holidays, see “Ulusal Bayram ve Genel Tatiller Hakkında Kanun. Kanun no. 2429 (Law on National and Public Holidays. Law no. 2429)”, Official Gazette, no. 17284, 19 March 1981, www.alomaliye.com/ulusal_bayram_ ve_genel_tatiller_.htm, accessed 6 May 2010. 30 See http://kutludogum.diyanet.gov.tr/, accessed 14 January 2014. 31 For Diyanet’s kandil activities, see www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/ Sayfalar/KandilProgramlari.aspx, accessed 28 February 2014. 32 http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?i=292884, accessed 08 January 2011. 33 The figure is taken from the Presidency of the Religious Affairs Human Resources Management Database. Turkey 607 a system whereby food products can be certified halal upon request.34 In 2011, a law “Law on the Ratification of the Founding Agreement of the Islamic Institution of the Finance of International Trade” was passed by the National Assembly of Turkey.35 The law provided for the legalisation of halal certification by tse and also favourable treatment in terms of the financing opportunities by the Islamic Development Bank. In a public opinion poll conducted in 2010, 66% of the interviewees gave positive response to the question “Will the existence of the halal certificate upon a product affect your buying choices?”36 There is no restriction on the slaughter of animals in accordance with Muslim religious and hygiene regulations, provided that the place be allocated for slaughter by the local (usually municipal) authorities in accordance with the Law on the Protection of Animals.37 The Hajj and ‘Umrah organisations are done under the supervision of the General Directorate of the Hajj and ‘Umrah Services attached to Diyanet. Since 2006, in accordance with the Saudi Hajj quotas, 60% of the pilgrims go to Hajj via Diyanet while 40% is allocated to the A type travel agencies.38 Hajj travel is organised by a joint committee of the ministries headed by Diyanet since 1981.39 Hajj travel has been exclusively done by air since the first Gulf War of 1990–91. Islamic banking in Turkey dates back to 1985, when Turgut Özal’s government passed legislation for interest-free banking. The first ‘participation bank’ was Albaraka Türk, established in February 1985, followed by Faisal Finans two months later. In present-day Turkey, there are four banks offering Islamic financial services: Albaraka Turk (www.albarakaturk.com.tr/, Saray Mahallesi Dr. Adnan Büyükdeniz Caddesi, No: 634768 Ümraniye/ İSTANBUL, tel.: ++90 2166660101, fax: ++90 2166661600), Bank Asya (www.bankasya.com.tr/ Asya Katılım Bankası A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü, Saray Mah. Dr. Adnan Büyükdeniz Cd. No. 10 34768, Ümraniye / İSTANBUL, tel.: ++90 2166335000 Pbx, fax: ++90

34 Malatyalı, “Helal gıda nedir, ne değildir (Halal food: What it is, and is not)”, tse Standart Dergisi, Eylül 2007, pp. 6–8. 35 See the Official Gazette, 10 March 2011, No: 27870. 36 www.haber7.com/haber/20101214/Salam-ve-sucukta-guvenmiyoruz-ama-satin-aliyoruz .php, accessed 08 January 2011. 37 For the Law on the Protection of Animals, see www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/1386 .html, accessed 7 March 2009. 38 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2012 Yılı Performans Programı, p. 83; see also www.genchacilar .org/sayfalars.asp?pageID=IcerikseDetay&id=206&grup_id=12, accessed 24 February 2003. 39 www.haberx.com/diyanetten_karayolu_ile_hac_aciklamasi(17,n,11117574,890).aspx, accessed 21 February 2013. 608 yildiz

2166335050), Türkiye Finans (www.turkiyefinans.com.tr/tr/) and Kuveyt Turk (www.kuveytturk.com.tr/pages/tarihce.aspx). These banks have an umbrella organisation called Union of Participation Banks in Turkey (Türkiye Katılım Bankaları Birliği: www.tkbb.org.tr/, Kısıklı Cd. No: 22 Altunizade Üsküdar / ISTANBUL, Türkiye, 34662; tel.: ++90 2166519435 (pbx), fax: ++90 2166519439).40

11 Dress Codes

The wearing of head scarves was banned for civil servants in public buildings in 1982 and in universities in 1984. The debate on this question revolves around whether the head scarf is religious attire or a political symbol, and whether it should be banned to protect the secular foundations of the state or permitted on the basis of individual freedom of religion as a corollary of secularism. The ban is the result of the various decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court, although there is no law explicitly banning the wearing of head scarf in universities. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkish universities had the right to ban the head scarf, while in February 2008, the Parliament passed constitutional amendments designed to lift the ban on wearing head scarves on university campuses. However, on 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments violated the secular nature of the state and were therefore unconstitutional.41 In 2011, the ban on the use of photographs with head scarf in the exams held by ösym as well as head scarf wearing in universities was removed by YÖK, and this decision was widely observed.42 In 2013, all bans regarding the

40 www.tkbb.org.tr/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=82, accessed 25 February 2013. 41 Şentop, Mustafa, “Headscarf ban: A quest for the solution”, seta Policy Brief 8, March 2008, available at www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=7253&q=the-headscarf- ban-a-quest-for-solutions Mustafa_Sentop.pdf, accessed 6 May 2010. For the relevant legislation, see Article 17 of the Law on Higher Education, No. 2547, issued in the Official Gazette, 6 November 1981, No. 17506. For the relevant legislation regarding the wearing of the headscarf in state institutions, see the Articles 5 and 10 of the Regulation on the Dress of Public Employees, issued in the Official Gazette, 25 October 1982, No. 17849. 42 Only in very exceptional instances, there was insistence on the continuation of the ban. See, for example, a news about Ege University of İzmir, “Rektörden ‘Başörtülüler Giremez’ Duyurusu,” “From Rector: Hijab wearers cannot Enter,” Zaman, 6 April 2011. Turkey 609 use of head scarf in universities and public sector were removed.43 There is no restriction for photos with hijab either on identity cards44 or in passports.45 Apart from the hijab issue, there is also a ban on the wearing of religious attire by men of religion outside their places of worship. Only the leaders of non-Muslim religious communities and the President of Diyanet are entitled to wear their religious attire in public.46

12 Publication and Media

There is an important representation of religious concerns, interests and claims in the media. Currently, the most widely sold daily newspaper is Zaman, which is known to be affiliated to the Gülen community. Apart from Zaman, dailies such as Yeni Şafak, Türkiye (İhlas Group), Milli Gazete (Felicity Party), Anadolu’da Vakit, Yeni Asya (a Nurcu Group) are known to be affiliated to religious groups. There are also ‘Islamist’ columnists who write in some mainstream, non-religious newspapers such as Bugün, Star and Radikal. Aksiyon news magazine is among the most widely read Islamic weeklies. Among the national television channels sensitive to religious concerns, Samanyolu (run by Hizmet Movement/Gülen community) is among the top five most watched national television channels. Kanal 7, tgrt Haber (İhlas Group), Ülke tv, Kanal A (a Naqshabandi group Muradiye)), tv net, Mehtap tv (Hizmet Movement), tv 5 (Felicity Party), Hilal tv (a group of devotees gathered around Mustafa İslamoğlu), Semerkand (the Sufi Menzil group) and Dost tv (a Nurcu group) are known to be affiliated to Muslim religious groups. There are, of course, various representations of Islamic topics on other television channels too. Two news agencies with religious roots, Cihan Haber Ajansı (Cihan News Agency, cha, affiliated with Hizmet Movement) and İhlas Haber Ajansı (İhlas News Agency, İha, affiliated with İhlas Group) are among the most important news agencies in the country. Burç and Dünya fms (Hizmet Movement), Radyo 15 (Menzil group), Akra fm (a Naqshabandi group İskenderpaşa), Moral fm (a Nurcu group), tgrt fm (İhlas group) may be counted as national radio stations with an Islamic orientation.

43 For the process, see section 15 Public Opinion And Debate. 44 www.nvi.gov.tr/Sik_Sorulan_Sorular,Sorular.html, accessed 25 February 2013. 45 www.epasaportrandevu.com/node/26, accessed 28 February 2014. 46 For the relevant legislation, see the Law Banning the Wearing of Some Attires (Law No. 2596), issued in the Official Gazette, 13 December 1934, No. 2879. 610 yildiz

13 Family Law

The Turkish Civil Code prescribes equality between men and women in all respects, including role-sharing within marriage, although the husband is considered to be the de facto head of the family. In practice, however, polygamous relationships and, more frequently, purely religious (i.e. officially unregistered) marriage ceremonies, still take place. The Civil Code does not recognise religious marriage contracts, and no religious rituals are permitted during the official, secular wedding ceremony, but a religious marriage ceremony commonly takes place parallel to the official procedures. Muslims in Turkey are not permitted by law to conduct marriage ceremonies in mosques, nor are imams entitled to register marriage contracts. ‘Honour killings’ and early religious marriages still occur. Adultery is not considered a crime, but is seen as a factor to be considered in divorce cases. According to the civil code, men and women are equal in terms of their entitlement to inheritance. The legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant in litigation. In practice, however, in more traditional areas females are often prevented from receiving their share of an inheritance, or receive a smaller portion than male members of the family.

14 Interreligious Relations

The most important interreligious occasion is the attendance of the President of Religious Affairs and the religious leaders of non-Muslim minorities, i.e., Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews, at iftar dinners during the month of Ramadan. In terms of public opinion, there is strong support for interreligious dialogue on part of both Diyanet and some Muslim communities, particularly the followers of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. Some neo-Kemalist and nationalist religious groups vehemently oppose the interreligious dialogue discourse on suspicion of underlying missionary activities, imperialism and alleged syncre- tism. Overall, there are few serious problems between communities of different religions. The locus of problems in terms of interreligious relations is not between communities but between the state and communities. In 2013, in order to enhance the understanding between Muslims and Christians, the Theology Faculty of Ankara University and the German Eugen Biser Foundation, a Foundation established for interreligious dialogue, jointly Turkey 611 prepared a dictionary of “Islamic-Christian Concepts.”47 On the third day of ʿId al-Adha, Muslim and Christian men of religion came together in the historic village of Dara near Mardin around “the table of civilisations” under the spon- sorship of Kimse Yok mu? aid association affiliated with Gülen movement.48 On August 13, an Orthodox religious ceremony attended by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch was held in Sümela Monastery of Trabzon reopened after 88 years.49

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The heated points of public debate in Turkey have been the compulsory religion courses in primary and secondary education, the status of Diyanet as a constitutional institution and its composition, the recognition of cemevis as places of worship, and the wearing of head scarfs in state and semi-public organisations like law offices. 2013 witnessed radical transformations regarding the experience of religious life and religious liberties accompanied to some extent with sharp public debates. The most important development was the removal of the ban on head scarves in the public sector. On 24 January, the 8th Division of the Council of the State removed the ban on female lawyers having their heads covered at the work.50 The democratisation package launched by the government on 30 September introduced the removal of the head scarf ban in the public sector including female mps in the Parliament.51 The removal of restrictions was put into practice on 8 October.52 On 31 October, four female mps from the ruling Justice and Development Party attended the parliamentary sitting with their heads covered for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic. There was no serious tension or debate regarding the issue because the main

47 Sabah (A National Daily), 20 October 2013, p. 19. 48 Zaman (A National Daily), 18 October 2013, p. 4. 49 Anatolian Agency, Yıllık 2013 (Almanac 2013), p. 161. See also Radikal (A National Daily), 16 August 2013, p. 2. 50 Anatolian Agency, Yıllık 2013 (Almanac 2013), Ankara, 2014, p. 19. 51 Ibid., p. 186. 52 Ibid., p. 193. See also Zaman (A National Daily), 09 October 2013, p. 15. 612 yildiz opposition Republican People’s Party has decided beforehand to keep silent vis-à-vis this initiative.53 The prohibition of retail sale of alcohol between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., the restriction of the advertisement of alcoholic beverages and promoting of alcohol in movies and tv series produced a prolonged controversy. The political opposition and secular elites argued that the government interfered in the sphere of private life while the government countered this argument by pointing that the sale and consumption of alcohol is not banned; on the contrary, the relevant law targeted the protection of children, youth and family against the damages caused by alcohol. The relevant legislation came into practice on 9 September.54 The public opposition led by a youth segment sensitive to secular lifestyle turned into a public riot, during which bus stops, pavements, banks and public buildings were vandalised, starting from 31 May until the first week of June as a protest against turning the Gezi Park in Taksim into a shopping mall. Alevi associations and some media outlets and big business also lent notable support to demonstrators. Police reacted violently and the event found full coverage in the international media. The government accused protesters of being Islamophobic, which led to the revival of a long forgotten discussion on the secularist-religious divide.55 Under the rubric of “the Mosque-Cemevi (Alevi worship place) Brotherhood,” the construction of a complex of buildings in Mamak-Tuzluçayır Ankara involving both a mosque and a cemevi was started as an initiative by the Cem Foundation and Hacı Bektaş-i Veli Foundation for Culture, Education, Health and Research under the auspices of the Sunni Gülen Movement. While the initiative aimed at the development of a more sympathetic mode of relations between Sunnis and Alevis, some Alevi groups strongly criticised this effort on the grounds that it was an assimilationist manoeuvre.56 The ending of the monopoly of Turkish Aviation Association on collecting leathers of the sacrificed animals was an historic change because in the

53 Ibid., p. 207. See also Hürriyet (A National Daily), 01 October 2013, p. 18, and Radikal (A National Daily), 31 October 2013, p. 13. For Prime Minister Erdogan’s statement see Türkiye Gazetesi (A National Daily), 02 November 2013, p. 13. 54 Ibid., pp. 108 and 176. See also Hürriyet (A National Daily), 09 September 2013, p. 9. 55 Ibid., pp. 110 and 114. 56 Zaman (A National Daily), 07 September 2013, p. 3. See also Radikal (A National Daily), 02 September 2013 p. 7. Turkey 613 recent past this was one of the issues at the core of secularist-religious divide in Turkey.57

16 Major Cultural Events

The Islamic practice of circumcision takes place in Turkish tradition at the age of 6–8. It has become the occasion for major family celebrations with attached ceremonial activities in which the boy is dressed in colourful, often military- style, clothes. The month of Ramadan preceding ʿId al-Fitr creates a special atmosphere throughout the country and book fairs organised by the Diyanet Foundation have become a part of this. Hajj, occurring at the same time as ʿId al-Adha, also creates a very particular countrywide religious awareness. The Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet celebrated in the third week of April under the auspices of Diyanet, the Hacı Bektaş Festival in August celebrated by the Turkish Alevi community, and Ashura, complemented by the Muharram fast, particularly marked by Shiʿis, may also be cited as important cultural events. The Commemorative Ceremony for Mevlana, the great Sufi saint (1207– 1273), held every year in Konya, the ancient Seljuk capital, in the month of December, is one of the world’s greatest spectacles. More than a million people visit the city for this festival of Sema (dance by the ‘Whirling Dervishes’).

57 HaberTürk (A National Daily), 27 September 2013, p. 24. Ukraine

Elmira Muratova*

1 Muslim Populations

The number of Muslims in Ukraine is the subject of a certain amount of specu- lation. Muslim leaders and other interested parties insist that there are 1.5–2 million Muslims in the country, although the 2001 national census recorded only 436,000 Muslims by birth (0.9% of the population).1 There are 40 ethnic groups that traditionally practise Islam, the biggest being Crimean Tatars (248,000), Volga-Ural Tatars (73,000) and Azerbaijanis (45,000). The Crimean Tatars constitute about 57% of all Ukrainian Muslims. They are the only indigenous Muslim people of Ukraine, having settled in the territory of the modern Crimean Autonomous Republic in the early fifteenth century. Today the Crimean Tatars live mostly in the Crimea, Kherson and Zaporozhe regions. The Ukrainian communities of the Volga-Ural Tatars appeared during the industri- alisation of the Donbas area in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Today they predominantly live in the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson regions. The majority of the Azerbaijanis settled in the eastern regions of the country—Donetsk, Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk.2 The history of Islam in Ukraine is related to the history of the expansion and development of the religion on the Crimean Peninsula. Islam came to Crimea with Muslim traders and Sufi missionaries from Asia Minor in the ninth to eleventh centuries. During the Crimean Khanate (1443–1783) Islam became the state religion. For several centuries, Crimea was the centre of Muslim culture in the region, and a huge number of mosques, madrasas, mektebes (elementary schools), and mausoleums were built. By the end of the eighteenth century, there were about 1,600 mosques, 25 madrasas and a lot of mektebes

* Dr. Elmira Muratova is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University, Simferopol, Ukraine. 1 cd “Natsional’nyi sklad naselennya Ukrainy ta yogo movni oznaki za danymi Vseukrains’kogo perepisu naselennya 2001 roku” (cd “National make-up of the Ukrainian population and its language features based on the 2001 All-Ukrainian census”) (Kiev: Derjkomstat, 2003). 2 Bogomolov, A. et al., Islams’ka identichnist’ v Ukra’ini (Islamic Identity in Ukraine) (Kiev: ames Publishers, 2005), pp. 16–23.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_046 Ukraine 615 in Crimea.3 The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century was a considerable blow to the independent and consistent development of Islam. The mass emigration of the Crimean Tatars resulted in many villages being abandoned and mosques, madrasas and mektebes closed down. By 1914, there were only 729 mosques left in Crimea and the number of Muslim clergy fell to 942.4 The Soviet regime delivered the final blow to the development of Islam in Crimea. By 1940, there were no active mosques on the Peninsula; many were closed on the pretext that they were in a poor condition and turned into clubs, grocery stores, schools, etc. In May 1944, the remaining Muslim population of Crimea (about 200,000 people) were deported from their homeland to the Soviet Central Asian republics. The return of the Crimean Tatars (about 13 per cent of the Crimean population in 2011) and collapse of the ussr contributed to the current Islamic revival in Crimea.

2 Islam and the State

Ukraine is a secular state where religion is separated from the state. According to the relatively liberal law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations” (Pro svobodu sovisti ta religiini organizatsii) passed in 1991, a religious community may be registered if it has a minimum membership of ten adults over the age of 18. On the basis of this law, 597 Muslim communities had been registered in Ukraine by early 2012.5 The legislation on religion also includes two acts which were issued to help religious organisations to repos- sess property taken from them by the Soviet regime. They are the Presidential Edicts “On measures to return religious property to religious organisations” (Про заходи щодо повернення релігійним організаціям культового майна)

3 Aleksandrov, I., O musul’manskom dukhovenstve i upravlenii dukhovnymi delami musul’man v Krymu posle ego prisoyedineniya k Rossii (On Muslim clergy and Muslims affairs’ spiritual administration in Crimea after its annexation to Russia) (Simferopol: Tipografiya Tavricheskogo gubernskogo zemstva, 1914), p. 8. 4 Krichinsky, A., Ocherki russkoi politiki na okrainakh: k istorii religioznykh pritesnenii krymskikh tatar (Essays on Russian policy at the margins: towards a history of the religious oppression of the Crimean Tatars) (Baku: Izdanie soyuza musul’manskoi trudovoi intelligentsii, 1919), chapter 1, p. 43. 5 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine, 1 January 2012 (Form #1), Department of Religions and Nationalities Affairs, Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, http://mincult.kmu.gov.ua/mincult/doccatalog/document?id=278229, accessed 10 January 2014. The updated information on the Muslim communities will be available in March 2014. 616 muratova issued in 1992 and “On urgent measures on the final settlement of the negative consequences of the totalitarian policy of the former ussr toward religion and restoration of violated rights of churches and religious organisations” (Про невідкладні заходи щодо остаточного подолання негативних наслідків тоталітарної політики колишнього Союзу РСР стосовно релігії та відновлення порушених прав церков і релігійних організації ) issued in 2002. Under this legislation, Ukrainian Muslims have regained a significant part of their religious property. National religious policy is viewed positively by Muslims, but there is dissatisfaction with the policies of local authorities. For example, Crimean Tatar leaders complain that the Crimean authorities have discriminated against Muslim communities, accusing them, among other things, of sabotaging the above mentioned Presidential Edicts, treating representatives of Orthodox Christianity and Islam unequally with respect to involvement in state and regional events, not giving official recognition to the Muslim festivals of Oraza- bayram (ʿId al-Fitr) and Qurban-bayram (ʿId al-Adha).6 Dissatisfaction with the policies of local authorities can also be found in other regions of Ukraine where Muslims face problems with land allocation for mosques and cemeteries. In March 2012, tension between the local Muslim community and the City Council over the building that previously was a mosque happened in the city of Nikolaev.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Ukrainian Muslim organisations fall into three categories: spiritual boards, charitable organisations and political organisations. As of 2013, there were seven Muslim spiritual boards in Ukraine:

– The Crimean Muslim Spiritual Board (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Kryma, dumk, 4, Kurchatova St, Simferopol, Crimea, tel./fax: ++380 652274353, www.qirimmuftiyat.org.ua) was established in 1992 in Simferopol. It is one of the biggest Muslim spiritual centres in Ukraine. By January 2014, it included 353 officially registered Muslim communities (56% of the total number in Ukraine) and is often called the “Crimean Tatar Muftiate.”

6 Muratova, Elmira, Islam v sovremennom Krymu: indikatory i problemy protsessa vozrozh- deniya (Islam in Present-day Crimea: Indicators and Problems of the Process of Revival) (Simferopol’: Elinio, 2008), pp. 174–175. Ukraine 617

– The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Ukrainy, dumu, 46, Luk’yanovskaya St, Kiev, 04071, tel.: ++380 444651877, www.islamyat.org) was registered in 1992 in Kiev. It includes 118 Muslim communities of various ethnic backgrounds registered in different regions of Ukraine. Since its inception, it has had only one leader—Sheikh Akhmed Tamim, a naturalised Lebanese of Ahbashi background.7 – The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Centre (Dukhovny Tsentr Musul’man Ukrainy, dtmu, 1, Prospekt Marshala Zhukova, Donetsk, 83071, tel./fax: ++380 622521815) was created in 1995 in Donetsk. It coordinates the activities of 26 Muslim communities established mostly by Volga-Ural Tatars who live chiefly in the Donbas area. – The Religious Board of Independent Muslim Communities of Ukraine “Kiev Muftiate” (Religioznoye Upravleniye Nezavisimykh Musul’manskikh Obshin Ukrainy “Kievskiy Muftiat”, runmou, 10-A, Nevskaya St, Tatarskiy Dom, Kiev 03062, tel./fax: ++380 444496546, http://muftiyat.com.ua) was registered in 2007 in Kiev. It unites 28 registered and 16 non-registered Muslim communities of the Volga-Ural Tatars who did not want to join any of the existing spiritual boards and has strong connections with Russian Muslim leaders. – The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board “Umma” (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Ukrainy “Umma”, dumu, 25-A Dehtyarivska St, Kiev, 04119, tel.: ++380 444909900, www.umma.in.ua) was established in 2008, also in Kiev. By 2013, it included 23 Muslim communities of multi-ethnic origins (with many members native Ukrainian or Russian converts to Islam). – The Crimean Muslim Spiritual Centre (Dukhovny Tsentr Musul’man Kryma, dtmk, apt. 39, 60 Let Oktyabrya St. 20, Simferopol, 95000, tel.: ++380 501314601, http://dcmk.org) was created in 2010 in Simferopol. It unites 14 Muslim communities of the Crimean Tatars who disagree with the position of the dumk. Ideologically, it is close to the leadership of the dumu. – Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board “Unity” (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Ukrainy “Ednannya”, dumu, Donets’ka St. 10, Makeevka, 86100, tel.: +380 501063926) was created in 2011 in Makeevka. It unites 11 Muslim communities of multi-ethnic origin (many of them native Volga-Ural Tatars) in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine (three of them in Crimea) and has strong connections with Russian Muslim leaders, especially mufti Talgat Tadjuddin.8

7 See http://2000.net.ua/2000/forum/9652, accessed 10 January 2014. 8 Although almost three years have passed since the creation of the Board there is no information about its activity, periodicals or web-sites. 618 muratova

Among the charitable organisations, one of the most active is the All-Ukrainian Association of Public Organisations “Alraid” (25-A Dehtyarivska St, Kiev 04119, tel.: ++380 444909900, www.arraid.org). It was established in 1997 and has 20 member organisations in various regions of Ukraine. Ideologically, it gravitates towards the European Council for Fatwas and Research (ecfr). The organisation contributes to the development of Islamic education and mosque construction, and initiates charitable projects to help the poor, orphans and widows. “Alraid” cooperates closely with the Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board “Umma”. An active political organisation is the Hizb ut-Tahrir (http://hizb.org.ua). Although it is not officially registered, its followers (mostly Crimean Tatars) organise conferences (there have been eight all-Crimean and twelve regional conferences during the last five years), political actions (meetings in support of the Caliphate, people of Syria, against the film “Innocence of Muslims” and alleged persecution of Muslims in Russia) and control some Crimean mosques. It represents the so-called ‘Islamic opposition’ to the national Crimean Tatar Mejlis and dumk.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

As of the end of 2013, there were 154 mosques in Ukraine. About 110 mosques (96 of them in Crimea) were built after the collapse of the ussr and 44 historical mosques have been rebuilt, renovated and returned to believers (38 of them in Crimea). There are another 780 buildings throughout Ukraine in use as Muslim prayer spaces.9 In Crimea, in 2013, a new mosque was built in Krasnoleskoe village in the Chernomorsk Region and two historical mosques, in Bogatovka village in the Sudak Region and in the city of Bakhchisarai, were renovated. The construction of the minaret of the mosque in Saki was finally completed.10

9 Report on providing of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine religious buildings and apartments adjusted for prayer on the 1 January 2014 (Form #2), Department of Religions and Nationalities Affairs, Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, http://mincult.kmu.gov .ua/mincult/uk/publish/article/354806, accessed 19 April 2014. 10 She odna musulmans’ka gromada Krymu zabespechena mechet’yu (One more Muslim community in Crimea got its own mosque), http://islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/13830/ visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 10 January 2014; Meshkantsam Sudaka povernuli ikh molitvu i istoriyu (The citizens of Sudak had been retuned their prayer and history), http:// islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/13675/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 10 January 2014. Ukraine 619

5 Children’s Education

The school system in Ukraine is separated from the church so religious subjects used not to be taught in schools. However, several years ago the Orthodox Church introduced a subject “The basics of Orthodox culture” to be taught on an optional basis in Ukrainian schools. This initiative met with opposition from Crimean Muslims who did not want their children to take this subject at school, and the Crimean Tatar organisations designed the programme of a subject “The basics of Muslim culture”, which is now taught in schools where the language of instruction is Crimean Tatar. In 2013, the dumk, in cooperation with two universities in Crimea, published a textbook “Islam in the History and Culture of Crimea” which is now used in the classes of the subject. There are 150 Qur’an or Sunday schools in Ukraine where basic Arabic and the fundamentals of Islam are offered to anyone wishing to attend.11

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

There are seven Muslim secondary-level educational institutions in Ukraine which provide imam and hafiz training with currently approximately 230 students.12 The biggest madrasa in Crimea, “Kalai”, founded in the village of Azovskoye by the private foundation Aziz Makhmud Hyudai, has been functioning since 1998. It runs a three-year course that is free for students and has separate departments for men and women. Subjects taught include the Qur’an, the fundamentals of worship, Islamic ethics, the life of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic law, Sufism, Turkish and Arabic. On graduation, students normally receive a diploma that qualifies them as imams.13 There are also two hafiz schools in Crimea which concentrate on teaching students to memorise the whole Qur’an. One has functioned since 2002 with the support of Alraid and the other since 2008 with the help of Aziz Makhmud Hyudai. There were two other institutions in Crimea that previously functioned as madrasas (“Seit- Settar” and the Higher Islamic madrasa) but were later downgraded to ‘Sunday schools’. The madrasa in Kiev was established by the runmou “Kiev muftiate”

11 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine, 1 January 2014 (Form #1), http://mincult.kmu.gov.ua/mincult/uk/publish/article/354806, accessed 19 April 2014. 12 Ibid. 13 Muratova, Elmira, “ ‘He who pays the piper calls the tune’: Muslim sponsors of Islamic revival in Crimea”, Religion, State and Society, vol. 37, no. 3 (2009), p. 268. 620 muratova with the support of Russian Muslims. In 2010, dumk opened a new madrasa in Saki (Crimea). It has a single male department designed for 20 students. There is one Islamic university in Ukraine, founded in Kiev in 1994 by dumu. It has the Department of Shariʿa and the Basics of Religion and the Department of Education and Eastern Linguistics. The programme is based on materials provided by the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects (www .aicp.org).14 Eighty-two students were studying there in 2013. After graduation, graduates get diplomas as imams and teachers of Islam and usually work in Muslim communities and centres under the jurisdiction of dumu.15 In 2013, an official examination centre of the Islamic Online University (www.islamiconlineuniversity.com) was opened at Alraid office in Kiev. Twice a year students can take exams there.16

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are no major difficulties where there are significant Muslim populations, as in Crimea, but in other places the situation is quite sensitive. In the major cities, such as Kiev or Kharkov, it is quite difficult for commercial reasons to acquire land for use as a cemetery, so Muslims often have to bury their dead in public cemeteries without sections set aside for Muslims. Since the 1990s, there have been several dozen acts of vandalism (desecration of graves) at Muslim cemeteries in Crimea.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams or priests in state institutions—hospitals, prisons or armed forces. However, imams on their own initiative visit Muslims in prisons to lecture on Islamic topics. For example, such activity is carried out on a regular basis in Simferopol. For several years, during the month of Ramadan, Islamic leaders of dumu ‘Umma’ and Alraid have been organising meetings

14 Bogomolov et al., Islams’ka identichnist’ v Ukra’ini, pp. 80–81. 15 “Islamskiy universitet pri Duhovnom upravlenii musul’man Ukrainy” (Islamic University under the Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board), www.islamyat.org/religioznoe-obra zovanie/islamskiyi-universitet.html, accessed 10 January 2014. 16 “V Ukraini vidkryvsya ofitsiinii ekzamenatsiinii tsentr islams’kogo online universitetu” (The official examination centre of Islamic online university was opened in Ukraine), http:// islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/12467/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 10 January 2014. Ukraine 621 with prisoners to support them by giving religious books, food and other presents. Imams in Crimea are usually present during the swearing in ceremony of army recruits where they address the Muslim recruits.

9 Religious Festivals

Oraza-bayram (ʿId al-Fitr) and Qurban-bayram (ʿId al-Adha) are celebrated communally at Islamic centres and privately. They do not have official status like some Orthodox festivals. Muslims, however, insist that the state should adopt a neutral position towards the major religions in Ukraine. In 1993, the Council of Ministries of Crimea took a decision to declare the first day of Muslim festivals a holiday for Muslims. This gave Muslims the right to a day off work or school, while the rest of the Crimean population has to follow their regular schedule. At the initiative of the Crimean Tatars, on 20 October 2010, the deputies of the Crimean parliament requested the President of Ukraine and the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament to introduce amendments to the Labour law in order to give Muslim festivals a regional status in the Peninsula.17 In 2013, the issue was raised by the deputies again but the decision has not been taken yet. Ukrainian Muslims also celebrate Mawlid—the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. In 2013, the celebrations were organised in Crimea (by Alraid and the dumk), in Donbas area (by Alraid and the dumu “Umma”). During the last seven years Alraid and the dumu “Umma” organised religious caravans in the cities of Eastern Ukraine during which they presented lectures about the life and personality of the Prophet Muhammad.18 In 2013, 158 pilgrims (among them 45 women) participated in hajj.19

17 Seitkhalilov Y. Neobkhodimo zakrepit’ v zakone sovmestnoe prazdnovanie khristianskikh i musul’manskikh prazdnikov (The joint celebration of Christian and Muslim festivals should be fixed in the law), www.qha.com.ua/haber.php?id=80598, accessed 10 January 2014. 18 “Karnaval dukhovnoi ta etnichnoi samosvidomosti” (The carnival of spiritual and ethnic self-consciousness), http://islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/12550/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 10 January 2014. 19 “Prochany usikh krain u peredchutti khadju” (Piligrims from all over the world in pre- sentiment of hajj), http://islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/13550/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 10 January 2014. 622 muratova

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food is not available at public institutions in Ukraine but the halal industry is well developed in areas with significant Muslim populations—in Crimea, Kiev, Kharkov, and Donetsk. There are places in the markets, special shops and cafés where Muslims can buy halal products. For example, there are about ten fashionable cafés and restaurants in Crimea that serve Crimean Tatar cuisine compliant with Islamic norms. The situation is different in Western Ukraine, where the number of Muslims is rather small. The Muslim spiritual organisations intend to regulate the halal industry.20 In 2008, the Credit union La riba (“No usury”) was created in Simferopol by a Crimean Tatar banker Yunus Ablyamitov. The organisation works as an Islamic bank using individual shares in business. By 2013, it had more than 300 clients, the majority of whom are small businessmen.21

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public, including in educational establishments. But while opportunities are ample for other professions (education, medicine, etc.), not many businesses in Ukraine are prepared to hire a woman in hijab.22 It is quite common to see women wearing hijab in the streets of Crimea, especially among the younger generation of the Crimean Tatars. However, the Ministry of Interior has issued an instruction that hijab may not be worn for photographs used for passports. This was strongly opposed by Crimean Muslims and, at the end of 2009, they started to collect signatures on a petition to challenge the instruction through the courts. There were several court hearings of the case brought by Crimean Muslims against the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine in 2010. The last one took place in June 2010 and ended with the Ministry of Interior’s instruction being upheld.

20 www.trademaster.com.ua/134/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1152&cHash=3881a786a9, http://islam .com.ua/news/6248/, accessed 10 January 2014. 21 The credits under Shariʿa laws started to be given out in Crimea, http://islam.in.ua/3/rus/ full_news/9368/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 10 January 2014. 22 Muslim women navigate cultural, religious divides with beliefs intact, www.kyivpost .com/news/guide/general/detail/78131/#ixzz0wllDWasx, accessed 10 January 2014. Ukraine 623

12 Publication and Media

Four of the spiritual boards in Ukraine have their own periodicals. The dumk publishes the newspaper Hidaet (Straight path) and the journal Istochnik mudrosti (The source of wisdom), the dumu the newspaper Minaret, runmou “Kievskiy Muftiyat” issues the journal Ukraina i Islamskiy mir (Ukraine and Islamic World), and the dumu “Umma” publishes the newspaper Umma (http://umma.in.ua/?cat=54). The “Alraid” Association issues the newspaper Alraid (http://gazeta.arraid.org) and runs a number of websites. Hizb ut- Tahrir publishes the newspaper Vozrodzdenie (Revival, http://vozrojdenie. crimea.ua) and has a website. Every Friday, representatives of the dumk participate in a television programme Ezan Sedasy (The voice of azan) in which they talk about the basic tenets of Islam and current issues in Crimean society. Another religious programme called Klyuch schast’ya (The key of happiness) was started on Crimean tv-channel atr in 2012. The head of the dumu, Ahmed Tamim, conducts a weekly tv-programme Minaret. In 2013, the dumk published several books, among them Hadith tarikh ve usul’ (The history and methodology of hadiths), Pergamberler tarikhi (The history of the prophets), etc. Alraid initiated a new information and analytic project ArabPress (http:// arabpress.net.ua) to provide information on the Arab world, its everyday life and relations with Ukraine and other countries. In 2013, an online guide-book imuslim (http://imuslim.net) was created to provide information on location of mosques, restaurants, shops, schools, hotels and monuments in all regions of Ukraine. In 2012 a translation of the Qur’an into Ukrainian was done by Myhailo Yakubovych. It was made in accordance with requirements of the King Fahd Complex for the printing of the Holy Qur’an (Medina).

13 Family Law

Besides civil marriage, Ukrainian Muslims contract Islamic marriages, nikah, which may be conducted in a mosque or at home by an imam, who after the ceremony issues a certificate. These certificates are not recognised by the state.

14 Interreligious Relations

The leaders of Muslim spiritual centres are members of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations created in 1996 in Kiev. This 624 muratova is a representative interfaith consultative body which initiates meetings with high-ranking officials to discuss various issues of religious life in Ukraine. For example, a current issue is the question of improving the existing Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations. In 1992, an interfaith council called “Peace is a gift of God” (Mir—dar Bozhii) was created in Crimea. The dumk was a member of this council until 2000, when a conflict arose between the Muslim and the Orthodox communities (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) over the massive project for erecting crosses in Crimea. Several Crimean mosques became an object of vandalism in 2013. In March, the building of the dumk was vandalised with swastika and abusive inscriptions. In October, on the eve of Qurban-bayram, two mosques, one in the city of Saki and the other one in the village of Rovnoe in Krasnogvardeisk Region were set on fire.23

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Coverage of Islam in the non-Muslim media is mostly within the context of extremism and terrorism associated with Muslims at the international level. It often happens during election campaigns in Crimea that politicians use the ‘Islamic card’ in order to mobilise the pro-Russian electorate by appealing to anti-Tatar or anti-Islamic feelings.

16 Major Cultural Events

There are annual competitions in Qur’an recitation organised by Alraid and the dumk. In 2013, there were two such competitions with all-Crimean and all-Ukrainian status. There is also a competition of research dedicated to Islam organised by the Ukrainian Centre of Islamic studies with the support of Alraid. In 2013 this institution also supported the organisation of women’s seminars and round tables on the role of women in Muslim society and a summer school for orphans.

23 Chergova vytivka vandliv skolykhnula kryms’ku gromadskist’ (One more vandal act dis- turbed the Crimean public), http://islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/12437/visibletype/1/ index.html, accessed 10 January 2014. United Kingdom

Dilwar Hussain*

1 Muslim Populations

The census of 2011 revealed an overall figure of 2.7 million Muslims (4.8%) in England and Wales (this figure obviously excluding Northern Ireland1 and Scotland).2 The Scottish Muslim population in 2011 was 77,000 (1.4%) and the isolated figure for Muslims in Wales was 45,950 in 2011. Islam is the second largest religious grouping in the United Kingdom. The largest Muslim population was in London with just over 1 million residing within the Greater London area and forming 12% of the population there. Only in one borough of London, Tower Hamlets, was the Muslim figure (34.5%) larger than the Christian figure (27.1%). There are now estimated to be around 100,000 converts to Islam in Britain (Independent, 4 January 2011). The 2011 Census showed an increase in most of the minority faiths, though the most numerically significant increase was in those declaring ‘no religion’ (now 25.1%, up from 14.8% in 2001). Historical contacts between the British Isles and the Muslim world date as far back as the 8th Century, shown by artefacts such as coins attributed to King Offa of Mercia (d. 796) that bear Arabic inscriptions. Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales (1386) makes reference to Islam and other contacts can be traced through maritime and trade treaties dated to the time of Queen Elizabeth i. There is also evidence of some coffee houses and baths in London that may be connected to a Muslim presence and references to ‘Turks’ and ‘Moors’ in London in the early 17th century. The first Chair of Arabic was established in Oxford in 1636 and the first translations of the Qur’an are attributed to Alexander Ross (1649) (from French) and George Sale (1734) (from Arabic). The first significant numbers of Muslim settlers in the uk were mainly ‘lascars’ (merchant navy sailors) of Arab, Somali or Indian heritage who jumped ship or were stranded having been employed by British companies

* Dilwar Hussain is an Associate of the Centre of Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge. 1 Belfast Islamic Centre’s annual report (2009–10) estimates 8–10,000 Muslims living in Northern Ireland: www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk/nr/images/doct/bic%20Annual%20 Report_2009-2010%20%282%29%20%283%29.pdf, accessed 18 May 2012. 2 www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/detailed-characteristics-for-local-authorities- in-england-and-wales/sty-religion.html, accessed 15 April 2014.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi ��.��63/9789004283053_047 626 hussain such as the East India Company.3 The lascars settled in port locations such as London, Liverpool, South Shields and Swansea, with some eventually moving on to major industrial cities.4 The end of World War ii saw significant migration to the uk from its former colonies, including those regions of the newly partitioned Indian subcontinent from which chain migration had been established by the lascars, as well as Indian soldiers who had fought in World Wars i and ii. As a result, thousands of Muslim men of mainly peasant farm- ing background took up unskilled work in British factories and mills from the 1950s. Most Muslims now living in the uk are the British-born descendants of immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. According to the 2011 census Pakistani heritage Muslims form 43.2%, Bangladeshi heritage Muslims form 16.5% and Indian heritage Muslims form 8.3% of the overall British Muslim population. Other smaller groups come from West and East Africa (the latter usually stemming from late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Gujarati migrants to present-day Kenya, Uganda and beyond), Cyprus and across the Middle East. More recent arrivals have been refugees, especially from Somalia, Bosnia and Iraq. The Somali migration adds a slightly different intra-European flow of peoples, with individuals and families settling in Britain after having originally arrived in countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden. Due to the migration patterns and rural origins of many, Muslim communities often have low incomes, poor health and housing conditions, limited educational success and relatively high unemployment amongst men and low participation in the labour market amongst women.5 Prison populations of Muslims are also disproportionately high with the figure reaching 14% in 2013.6 East African Asians tend to be more socially mobile, and London, where 38.9% of all Muslims in Britain are settled, is host to a high number of affluent citizens, often of Arab origin. Outside London, Birmingham has the highest total number of Muslims (234,411 representing 21.8% of the population), but northern towns such as Blackburn (27%) and Bradford (24.7%), as well as other towns in the south such as Luton (24.6%) and Slough (23.3%) also have significant concentrations.

3 Ansari, Humayun, The Infidel Within: The History of Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present (London: Hurst, 2004). 4 Halliday, Fred, The Yemeni Community in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992). 5 Peach, Ceri, “Muslims in the 2001 census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disad- vantage”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 4 (2006), pp. 629–655. 6 www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/number-of-muslims-in-prison-doubles-in- decade-to-12000-9222237.html, accessed March 2014. United Kingdom 627

Most Muslim migrants of the 1950s and 1960s entered the uk with the nationality of countries within the Commonwealth of Britain’s former colonies. These Commonwealth citizens had full political rights and could thus vote and stand as candidates in local and national elections. During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority were able to acquire uk citizenship (Britain allows multiple citizenship), and children born in the uk acquire citizenship by birth. Currently, the vast majority of Muslims in Britain are uk citizens; the exceptions are those who have arrived as refugees from outside the Commonwealth since the 1980s. There are currently eight Members of Parliament (mps) of Muslim backgrounds (six Labour, two Conservative) and eleven members of the House of Lords.

2 Islam and the State

There is no common legal or constitutional regime governing the status of religion in the uk: each constituent country has its own arrangements.7 Although there is no written constitution, the accumulated legal tradition, and most recently the Human Rights Act (1998), guarantees freedom of religion and religious practice within the limits of public order. There is no established religion in Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland although in the case of the latter the monarch has a privileged status in relation to the Reformed (Calvinist) Church of Scotland. In England, the monarch is the head of the Church of England.

Until the last decade or so, the official uk response to migrant communities had not been formulated in terms of religion.8 The Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976 were designed to combat discrimination on grounds of ‘race’ and ethnic origin but the courts did not interpret this to include religion (although Jews and Sikhs, based on case law, were protected as ‘ethnic’ groups). During the 1980s, policy-making under the rubric of multiculturalism eventually offered greater, if ad hoc, local recognition for Muslims in arenas such as education, especially where there was a large community. In 1992, under a Conservative administration, the Department of Environment, in collaboration with the Church of England and the Interfaith Network for the uk (ifnuk), formed the

7 Weller, Paul, Time for a Change: Reconfiguring Religion, State and Society (London: T&T Clark, 2005). 8 Modood, Tariq, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). 628 hussain

Inner Cities Religious Council (icrc) as the first government forum for multi-faith representation on a national level and with a view to tapping into religious communities’ resources as a part of urban regeneration.9

From 1997 onwards, the New Labour government engaged ‘faith’ much more publicly and controversially.10 An Act of 2006 finally made it an offence to ‘incite to religious hatred’. Following the events of ‘7/7’ (the terrorist attacks on London of 7 July 2005), state relations with Muslims have been conducted most significantly in terms of counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST)11 including a ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (pve, Prevent) strand, which from 2007 saw £80m of public money spent on over 1000 projects in demographically significant local areas (bbc News Online, 7 June 2011).12 The Prevent strategy is shared between different government departments, though led by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (osct) based in the Home Office. In early 2009 a revised Contest strategy was introduced and in July 2009 a cross-party Select Committee began an inquiry into aspects of Prevent work. The findings were published on 16 March 2010 and the Chair of the Committee suggested that the Prevent programme is backfiring in local communities. In November 2010, under a new Coalition Government, the Home Secretary announced another review of the entire Prevent strategy, stating Prevent “isn’t working as well as it could be” and it needed to be “effective and focused.” Prime Minister, David Cameron, affirmed the view that the biggest threat to the uk remained al-Qaeda related ‘Islamist extremism’. While he was careful to distinguish this ideology from ‘Islam’, he advocated a ‘muscular liberalism’ based on universal rights, equality and integration, reiterating earlier political comment throughout the 2000s that the ‘hands off tolerance’ of state multiculturalism had failed to communicate a strong vision of the nation to diasporic Muslim youth. This sentiment was taken further in a 2012 document that articulates the coalition government’s approach to ‘Integration’.13 Nevertheless, the Integration strategy

9 McLoughlin, Seán, “The state, new Muslim leaderships and Islam as a resource for engagement in Britain”, in Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin (eds), European Muslims and the Secular State (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 55–69. 10 McLoughlin, ibid. 11 The Contest strategy has four sub-strands: Prevent (dealing with community facing activity), Pursue (surveillance and policing), Protect (development of national infrastructure and resilience) and Prepare (mitigating the impact of a terror attack). 12 Cf. also Lewis, Philip, Young, British and Muslim (London: Continuum, 2007) which dis- cusses the response of various Muslim organisations to the issues raised by ‘7/7’. 13 Department for Communities and Local Government, Creating the Conditions for Integration (London: clg, 2012). See: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ United Kingdom 629 has not been very pronounced and through 2013 very little could be heard of it aside from funding awarded to projects such as Near Neighbours (see below). The extremism agenda received renewed attention following the murder of a British soldier, Lee Rigby, in May 2013 on the streets of Woolwich, London. The Prime Minister immediately announced the formation of an ‘Extremism Task Force’ and this produced a brief report in December 2013.14 Related to the discussions around countering extremism, a mirror policy area has been the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain. One extreme mani- festation of this was that Mohammed Saleem, an elderly Muslim worshipper, was killed in Birmingham by a young Neo Nazi in April 2013. Furthermore, the immediate reaction to the Woolwich murder was a rise in activity of movements such as the English Defence League (edl), though this did sub- side over the rest of the year. An ‘All Party Parliamentary Group’ looking into Islamophobia15 was convened in 2010 and has been gathering evidence. The ‘Tell mama’ (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks)16 project was established in 2012, with government funding, in order to ascertain and record the level of anti-Muslim attacks and to gather case histories. The project recorded a spike in anti-Muslim sentiment in 2013, both from their own reporting and citing data from the Metropolitan police.17 Their data shows that more than half of the incidents (58%) targeted Muslim women and that there was Far Right support linked to over half (54%) of all the cases. Perhaps the most blatant of these have been arson attacks on an Islamic centre in North London and a boarding school in South East London. It is also telling that support for the English Defence League’s Facebook page rose from 23,570 ‘likes’ to 80,000 in 24 hours after the murder of Lee Rigby and to over 140,00018 over the next few days. The last few years has seen a decline in government funding across the board with the economy in crisis. The coalition government has favoured more selective and centralised forms of grant funding moving to support the creation of a ‘Big Society’19 amongst the mainstream voluntary sector and a grant called

uploads/attachment_data/file/7504/2092103.pdf. 14 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tackling-extremism-in-the-uk-report-by- the-extremism-taskforce, accessed December 2013. 15 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/register/islamophobia.htm. 16 http://tellmamauk.org/. 17 http://tellmamauk.org/news/page/5/ (accessed January 2014). 18 A number that rivals the likes of a mainstream political party such as the Labour Party, which had 146,000 likes on its Facebook page at around the same time. In the case of the Labour Party, this was gathered over a number of years. 19 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/big-society-faqs-and-useful-links. 630 hussain

‘Near Neighbours,’20 managed by the Church Urban Fund, amongst the faith sector specifically, as well as continuation of (more limited) Prevent funding to local authorities to tackle extremism.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

It is impossible to single out a few Muslim organisations as the ‘main groups’ where there is still a dynamic picture and developments and shifts are still emerging. Most organisations have relatively poor infrastructure and so may fluctuate considerably in their output, impact and longevity. The most prominent Muslim umbrella organisation in terms of representation remains the Muslim Council of Britain, which claims 500 affiliated organisations (mcb, po Box 57330, London e1 2wj, tel.: ++44 8452626786, www.mcb.org.uk). Founded in 1997, the year that New Labour came to power, it quickly established itself as the first Muslim port of call for a government keen to link faith and social action.21 Closely associated with the mcb, in 2007, Scottish Muslims announced an umbrella body to represent their interests, the Muslim Council of Scotland (mcs, 27 Arlington Street, Glasgow, g3 6dt, tel.: ++44 7999333850, www .mcscotland.org). There is also a Muslim Council of Wales (Broadway House, Broadway, Cardiff cf24 1pu, tel.: ++44 2920487667, www.muslimcouncilwales .org.uk/index.html), while the main organisation serving Muslims in Northern Ireland is the Belfast Islamic Centre (bic, 38 Wellington Park, Belfast, bt9 6dn, tel.: ++44 2890664465, www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk/nr), established in 1978. A major Twelver Shiʿi group with roots in Iraq, the Al-Khoei Foundation (Stone Hall, Chevening Road, London, nw6 6tn, tel.: ++44 2073724049, http:// al-khoei.org) represents Shi’a Muslims in Britain and overseas, as does the World Federation of Khoja Ithna Asheri Muslim Communities (Wood Lane, Stanmoore, Middlesex, ha7 4lq, tel.: ++44 2089549881, https://www.world- federation.org), a grouping of the majority Indian heritage Shiʿi community of the uk. The mcb fell out of favour with the New Labour government, however, when it failed to wholeheartedly back the so-called ‘war on terror’. After ‘7/7’ especially, relations between the mcb and New Labour deteriorated significantly with the media and think-tanks of the left and right exposing the ‘Islamist’ heritage of some mcb activists and affiliates and criticising its decision to refuse

20 www.cuf.org.uk/near-neighbours. 21 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships”. United Kingdom 631 attendance at the national Holocaust Memorial Day.22 The mcb received at least some public funds until early 2010 (Telegraph, 16 April 2011). Nevertheless, unconvinced that the mcb could effectively challenge radicalisation and violent extremism, from 2005 onwards the government sought to broaden the range of Muslim organisations it engaged, most especially traditionalist Sunnis and Sufis.23 The British Muslim Forum (Eaton Hall, Retford, Nottinghamshire, dn22 0pr, tel.: ++44 1777706441) claims to embody the largest number of Sunni (especially Pakistani Barelwi) related networks, with 500 member mosques/organisations and particular strongholds in the English North and Midlands. Launched in 2005, it benefitted from pve funds to build up capacity, representing a belated attempt to respond to the numerically somewhat less significant but hitherto better-organised and higher profile Deobandi network, as well as the much smaller Jamaʿat-i Islami related rivals working on a national level through the mcb. Historically, Barelwi networks have been highly fragmented in terms of allegiances to various Sufi sheikhs and ‘ulama’ (religious scholars). Similarly, the Sufi Muslim Council (2a Wanlip Road, Plaistow London e13 8q, tel.: ++44 2070555355, http://sufimuslim.homestead.com), was also launched with government support in 2006.24 One of its founders, Haras Rafiq, went on to form the ‘counter-extremism’ body, Centri.25 However, despite being prepared to periodically adopt positions openly criticising ‘Islamist’, ‘Salafi’ and ‘Wahhabi’ influenced organisations, the bmf and smc have been generally inactive, with one respected insider describing the Barelwis of the uk as ‘beleaguered and dysfunctional’.26 Outside the sphere of representational politics, a plethora of organisations are active, often at more local levels. Perhaps the most present of the broadly Sufi / Traditionalist network activists has been the Radical Middle Way (www .radicalmiddleway.org) a group that organises a range of events with a generally

22 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4582736.stm. 23 McLoughlin, Seán, “From Race to Faith Relations, the Local to the National Level: The State and Muslim Organisations in Britain” in Axel Kreienbrink and Mark Bodenstein (eds.) Muslim Organisations and the State—European Perspectives, (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010), pp. 123–149. 24 www.iengage.org.uk/component/content/article/758-lord-ahmed-queries-government- funding-of-the-sufi-muslim-council-, accessed 27 May 2012. 25 http://conservativehome.blogs.com/platform/2011/02/haras-rafiq-at-long-last-we-have- a-prime-minister-who-rightly-makes-the-distinction-between-islam-an.html, accessed 18 May 2012. 26 www.musharrafhussain.com/wp.../5.-Maulana-Shahid-Raza-OBE.pdf, accessed 25 May 2012. 632 hussain spiritualist angle. The Islamic Society of Britain (isb) (26 York Street, London w1u 6pz, tel.: ++44 3003651098, www.isb.org.uk) advocates a stronger British Muslim identity nationally while mosques such as the East London Mosque and London Muslim Centre (82–92 Whitechapel Road, London e1 1jq, tel.: ++44 2076503000, www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk) serve very local communities. There are also specialised groups emerging that advocate gender equality, others that offer counselling services, others that teach Arabic language, leadership or media skills, and others such as the Quilliam Foundation (qf, po Box 60380, London. wc1a 9az, tel.: ++44 2071827280, www.quilliamfoundation.org) which has an ‘anti-extremist’ and ‘anti-Islamist’ agenda. Having been first proposed in 2006 following the recommendations of the pve working groups in 2005, the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (minab, 20–22 Creffield Road, Ealing, London, W5 3rp, tel.: ++44 2089937141, www.minab.org.uk) was finally launched in 2009. As a self-regulatory collaboration between organisations representing many key Muslim constituencies (mcb, mab, bmf and al-Khoei), it claims to be an independent, community- led, non-sectarian body to promote good governance and improve service standards in mosques.27 As with the bmf and smc, minab seems to have made little headway thus far with its declared objectives. The Muslim Institute, originally established in the 1970s, has experienced a revival and a renewed agenda since December 2009. Establishing a new legal structure, the group’s focus is on becoming “a network dedicated to pluralistic thought, creativity, excellence and high achievement.”28 The network has managed to attract a diverse range of voices around its more cerebral agenda and produces a regular journal, Critical Muslim, edited by the popular writer and cultural critic, Ziauddin Sardar. Other important organisations operating on the national level include a plethora of relief organisations that have fast become the best resourced of all Muslim organisations in the uk, the largest, Islamic Relief, raised over £63 million pounds in 2012 from voluntary donations according to its 2013 Annual Report. Of that income, around 27% was sourced from the uk29 and a further £64 million came from grants and overseas donations. It should be noted, however, that about 40% of Muslim charities, according to a 2007 estimate by the

27 http://minab.lmnocouk.netdna-cdn.com/images/stories/Documents/ minab-Constitu tion-Standards-012011.pdf, accessed 18 May 2012. 28 www.musliminstitute.org/about-us/overview. 29 http://islamic-relief.net/reports/sources-of-funding/, accessed 1 November 2013. United Kingdom 633

Charity Commission of England and Wales, had an income of less than ten thousand pounds.30

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The first mosques founded in the uk were in Cardiff in 1860 and Liverpool in 1887, while the first purpose-built mosque was established during 1889 in Woking, Surrey, by Hungarian Orientalist, Dr Gottlieb Leitner.31 However, as post-war immigration began to impact in the early 1960s, there were only a dozen or so mosques listed with the Registrar General, most being conversions of existing buildings including terraced housing. More recently, many mosques have been purpose-built. In 2009 there were 870 officially registered in England and Wales,32 although several hundred may not have full planning permission, and other estimates suggest that the total number of mosques and Islamic centres in Britain is as high as 2000.33 While formal religiosity has increased amongst Muslims in diaspora, the growth of increasingly multi-functional mosques from the 1970s and 1980s onwards accompanied the reuniting of families, which in turn raised issues concerning the transmission of Islam.34 Over the years, mosque building has also aroused opposition in wider society. Significant campaigns to stop the building of new mosques have been seen in a number of towns and cities, often led by Right Wing groups such as the English Defence League or the British National Party.35

5 Children’s Education

Until 1870, the churches dominated educational provision in the uk. Despite the clear secularisation of schooling, the place of religion has continued to

30 www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/about_us/faithmus.pdf. 31 Gilliat-Ray, Sophie Muslims in Britain: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 184. 32 www.brin.ac.uk/figures/#NumberMosques, accessed 18 May 2012. 33 Gale, Richard, “Representing the city: Mosques and the planning process in Birmingham, uk”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1161–1179. 34 McLoughlin, Sean, “Mosques and the public space: Conflict and co-operation in Bradford”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1045–1066. 35 http://conciliocic.org/news/22-who-you-gonna-call-mosque-busting-with-gavin-boby- by-h-s-lane. 634 hussain be recognised in key Education Acts (for example, 1944, 1988 and 1996).36 Religious Education (re) is compulsory, as is a daily act of collective worship, but individual students can be withdrawn by their parents. Since the 1970s, re syllabi, which have a locally agreed element, have had a more multi-faith emphasis and included content on Islam. In 1988, however, there was a restate- ment of the expectation that re and collective worship should reflect the nation’s Christian character. Teachers of the subject are professionally trained (and at secondary level subject specialists); they do not require the approval of religious authorities or need to belong to any particular religion. Over the years, most state schools, which still teach the vast majority of Muslim pupils, have sought to accommodate the needs of ethnic and religious minorities. This applies to such matters as school uniform, where individual schools and local authorities have generally been flexible. More contentious, but usually resolved, are issues around appropriate dress for physical education and swimming, music (where some conservative Muslim groups have opposed such teaching), halal meat and religious holidays. Around one-quarter of publicly funded schools are managed by the Church of England (4598) and the Roman Catholic Church (2010), with much smaller numbers of other schools.37 Since 1997, six Muslim primary and five Muslim secondary schools have been admitted to this ‘maintained’ sector in England. A number of Islamic schools have applied to become ‘free schools’ (on the Swedish model backed by the Conservative party), although so far only two have been approved. A small percentage of Muslim children attend Islamic independent schools—the Association of Muslim Schools (www.ams-uk.org/, established in the 1990s) currently lists 167 uk Muslim schools in total on its website and it estimates that about 5% of Muslim children attend a Muslim school. Outside the state and independent sectors, Muslim children receive Islamic education during the late afternoon or weekend in community based supplementary schools, usually at local mosques or associated ‘madrasas’. Concerns have been raised, internally and externally of the Muslim community, about the quality and style of teaching in some madrasas. Reform of such institutions has also increasingly become a concern of local authorities required to address child welfare and protection issues. The Institute of Public Policy Research surveyed 179 madrasas and conducted interviews and workshops with teachers, pupils and parents in a bid to shed more light on an

36 Halstead, Mark, British Muslims and Education (Budapest and New York: Open Society Institute, 2005). 37 www.education.gov.uk/aboutdfe/foi/disclosuresaboutschools/a0065446/maintained- faith-schools, accessed 18 May 2012. United Kingdom 635 estimated 2000 institutions said to be teaching 250,000 children.38 The report, Inside Madrassas, mentioned that 26% had over 140 pupils attending each week, while 38% had an income of less than £10,000 a year, 90% of this coming from parents; 70% had been operating for six years or longer. It concluded that while madrasas are valued and have potential, teaching standards are poor and the curricula narrow, something the government should seek to address through greater regulation.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Since ‘7/7’, and particularly since it emerged that Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab, who attempted the 2009 ‘Christmas Day bombing’ on a flight headed to the us, had been a student at the University of London, there has been much focus on ‘radicalisation’ and politicisation of Muslims at university level. A more general window on the experiences of British Muslims at uk universities is provided in a study of 5,523 Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage students of Business Studies based on data from the National Student Survey, 2008–10: ‘British Muslim students get comparatively low A-Level grades, overwhelmingly enter post-1992 universities (former polytechnics), live at the parental home during term-time, and are decreasingly satisfied with the quality of the higher education which they receive.”39 Islamic Studies is offered at a large number of universities, usually in the context of departments of Arabic and Middle East Studies or Religious Studies, with positions sometimes funded by wealthy patrons from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and beyond. As well as traditional Western and Islamic scholarship, some universities now also offer Islamic studies components in conjunction with the professional training of teachers and youth workers. The Higher Education Funding Council for England designated Islamic Studies a strategically important subject following a review of all aspects of ‘Islam at Universities in England’ in 2007.40 There is no imam training as such at publicly-funded universities, but several private Islamic colleges offer both part-time and residential courses

38 www.ippr.org/publications/55/8301/inside-madrassas-understanding-and-engaging- with-british-muslim-faith-supplementary-schools, accessed 25 May 2012. 39 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/british-muslim-students-experience-of-higher-education/, accessed 18 May 2012. 40 See www.hefce.ac.uk/whatwedo/kes/sis/islamicstudies/ for details, including a link to Dr A. Siddiqui’s report, accessed 27 May 2012. 636 hussain

leading to the status of imam, while some prospective imams also complete a degree abroad at an institute such as Al-Azhar University in Cairo, or Medina University. Most of the domestic private colleges are established on the Darul Uloom (dar al-‘ulum) model of the Indian Deobandis.41 Other courses are offered by the Muslim College in London, the Cambridge Muslim College, the Islamic College, London and al-Mahdi Institute, Birmingham. The Islamic Foundation (www.islamic-foundation.org.uk), a research and training organisation in Leicester,42 founded the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (www.mihe.org.uk) in 2000, which offers postgraduate degrees and certificates in Islamic Studies, Muslim Community Studies and Islamic Banking and Finance Management. In 2012 it also introduced an undergraduate programme aimed in large part at graduates from Muslim educational institutions.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Although there is still some movement of the remains of the dead of migrant origins back to their homelands for burial, most British cities and towns have cemeteries with areas reserved for Muslims although these are rapidly filling up. Perhaps this in part explains the emergence of dedicated Muslim burial sites such as mcb affiliate, the Gardens of Peace Muslim Cemetery Trust in Essex. Despite tensions with government in other regards, since 2001 a representative of the mcb is the only Muslim to sit on the Ministry of Justice’s Burial and Cemeteries advisory group. Leicester is home to the Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire (www.mbcol.org.uk/, established 1994), one example of a local body that negotiates with local authorities to provide for Muslim needs. As well as a widespread expectation that the burial take place within 24 hours of death, such organisations have also sought to clarify Islamic requirements that the deceased be ritually washed by members of the family or community (many mosques now have such facilities) and laid in the ground facing Mecca, as well as buried without a coffin where requested. As public markers of a minority presence, graves and cemeteries sometimes also come under physical attack by vandals and those with more racist and politicised motivations.

41 See Lewis, Philip, Islamic Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994/2002) and Gilliat-Ray, Sophie, “Educating the ‘ulama: Centres of Islamic religious training in Britain”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006), pp. 55–76. 42 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships”. United Kingdom 637

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

In the uk there are Muslim chaplains, male and female, employed full-time or part-time in Higher Education Institutions, the National Health Service and other public services, as well as the Prison Service, Police, Armed Forces and industry. On-going research at Cardiff University43 reports that many chaplains are Darul Uloom graduates and denominational, others more ecumenical. The Prison Services uk now employs 233 full-time and part-time imams or chaplains (120 in full time employment and the remainder on sessional contracts) in English and Welsh prisons44 and while they are required by the state to take a more active role in combating terrorism, the religious nature of their role can also raise suspicions in the workplace. Prison chaplains have an extensive network of support and mentoring, most especially in terms of the Muslim Chaplain’s Association (www.mca-hmps.co.uk/). There is also an Association of Muslim Chaplains in Education (www.amced.org.uk/). Markfield Institute of Higher Education runs a Certificate in the Training of Muslim Chaplains. In the armed forces, the Muslim Chaplaincy division works closely with the Armed Forces Muslim Association and, especially since the Woolwich attack in May 2013, has been increasing its outreach work to raise awareness of the Muslim engagement in Britain’s armed forces. In 2013, there were 650 Muslims serving in the armed forces.45

9 Religious Festivals

Some 18,000–25,000 Muslims travel from Britain for the Hajj in Mecca every year, while the pattern of life in Muslim neighbourhoods is transformed during Ramadan (about two months before the time of Hajj). Trips for Umrah (the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca) are also held throughout the year. Annual ʿId al-Adha and ʿId al-Fitr celebrations are held throughout the uk, usually organised by local mosques and Islamic centres. Large halls or gymnasiums are sometimes rented to accommodate the significant number of people attending and some mosques will hold repeat ceremonies for the ʿId prayers.

43 www.cardiff.ac.uk/share/research/centres/csi/research/muslimchaplaincyproject/index .html, accessed 18 May 2012. Gilliat-Ray, Sophie. 2010 ‘Bodyworks and Fieldwork: research with British Muslim chaplains’, Culture and Religion 11 (4): 413–432. 44 Information supplied by hm Prison Service. 45 Information supplied by the Muslim Chaplain to the Armed Forces. 638 hussain

In recent years, there have been celebrations of ʿId al-Fitr in Trafalgar Square dubbed ‘Eid in the Square.’ Amongst Sunni Barelwi and Sufi communities especially, ʿId Mawlid al-Nabi is also celebrated with public processions, speeches, recitations of the Qur’an, poetry (na’at) and song (nashid) in praise of the Prophet Muhammad on the anniversary of his birth as well as the celebration of ‘Saints days’ (urs) marking the lives of various saints from Sufi traditions. Shi ʿi Muslims in particular commemorate the death of the Prophet’s grandson, Hussain, on the day of Ashura (10 Muharram), although some of the more physical aspects of matam (ritual- ised mourning) have come under close public scrutiny. It is common practice for employers and institutions in both the public and private sectors to allow Muslims to take the religious festivals as part of their statutory holiday entitlement, especially as religious discrimination legislation in the uk encourages employers to be sensitive to the requirements of religious festivals and creates some provisions for protection of daily worship rituals. However, given divergent sources of religious authority at home and overseas, there has long been a tendency for different denominations to hold celebrations such as ʿId al-Fitr on different days. Some cities have attempted to co-ordinate religious holidays because of their impact on schools and workers in general.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Since the 1970s, animal rights groups have campaigned against exemption from animal slaughter regulations on religious grounds, but failed in the face of opposition from Jewish, Muslim and other lobbies. As the uk prepared to implement a new eu regulation on the protection of animals at the time of killing, from 2013, a number of meetings with Muslim and Jewish organisations have taken place recently.46 However, there are no plans to make religious slaughter illegal. In 1994, the Halal Food Authority (109, Fulham Palace Road, London, W6 8ja, www.halalfoodauthority.co.uk), which has roots in the now largely defunct Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (www.muslimparliament.org.uk/), was established to scrutinise and certify the Islamic slaughter of meat in the uk. The hfa lists approved and delisted members. The hfa allows for animals to be stunned before slaughter, a process that can be carried out mechanically. Indeed, according to the rspca, around 75–90% of halal meat in the uk is

46 www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN01314.pdf, accessed 27 May 2012. United Kingdom 639 pre-stunned.47 Elsewhere it is suggested that 25% of cattle and 7% of sheep are slaughtered without prior stunning.48 The Islamic legitimacy of stunning is disputed by the Halal Monitoring Committee (hmc, established 2003, www .halalmc.co.uk), which maintains that for meat to be halal animals should be fully conscious at the time of slaughter, with no machinery involved. This is allowed in the uk but can only take place in a slaughterhouse. In 2003, the Food Standards Agency (fsa) had agreed guidelines for Halal slaughter with Muslim leaders and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (defra), but to date there is no unified seal of assurance for Halal food. For some non-Muslims, including secular and Sikh groups, there is a concern that not all of this meat is being marked as produced using halal slaughter methods, despite its very wide use by commercial outlets and public institutions. 49 However, ‘there is no legislative requirement for products to be labelled as Halal . . . [indeed] there are practical difficulties in establishing traceability to identity method of slaughter to the point of consumption.’50 There are a variety of businesses catering for a growing ‘Muslim market’ domestically as well as trying to attract sales from abroad. Perhaps the most widespread of these relate to the food and finance industries. Estimates suggest that ‘about 40% of poultry and 25–30% of lamb consumed in the uk meets halal specification.’51 Despite the lack of a single agreed standard, halal food outlets are now quite easily available in most of the larger towns and cities in the uk. The Islamic finance sector has also experienced some growth over the last decade. The uk is currently the largest Western hub for Islamic finance initiatives, with an estimated $19bn of assets.52 London has actively marketed itself as an important location and Western gateway for Islamic investment, considering the growing interest in Islamic Finance and the market globally. This has also gained support from Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Council

47 www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?blobcol=urlblob&blobheader=application/pdf&blobkey =id&blobtable=rspcablob&blobwhere=1109267162636&ssbinary=true, accessed 27 May 2012. 48 www.dialrel.eu/images/factsheet-assesment-practices.pdf, accessed 18 May 2012. 49 www.sikhsangat.com/index.php?/topic/58824-halal-food-authority/, accessed 27 May 2012. 50 www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN01314, accessed 18 May 2012. 51 www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2010/09/23/123611/Meat-industry-defends-halal-slaughter-policy .htm, accessed 27 May 2012. 52 McKenzie, Duncan, Islamic Finance. Financial Markets Series, (London: TheCityuk, 2012) and https://www.gov.uk/government/news/opportunities-for-islamic-finance-in-the-uk, accessed 1 December 2013. 640 hussain of Britain.53 The key target is to attract inward investment from the Muslim world, particularly the Gulf countries as well as Malaysia and Indonesia, but a small market also exists domestically. This has attracted cross party political support and in 2003 initiatives were undertaken to create a more compatible regulatory framework for Islamic finance, including the removal of double taxation (stamp duty), and the extension of tax relief on Islamic mortgages.54 Bonds (sukuk), funds and insurance (takaful) services are also emerging. In 2013, 49 sukuk products (with an estimated value of $34bn) were listed on the London Stock Exchange (lse). According to 2011 data, seven exchange trade funds and two exchange trade products were also listed on the lse.55 An annual international takaful summit has taken place in the uk since 2007 in order to raise market awareness of Islamic insurance services and the 2013 World Islamic Economics Forum took place in London in October, the first venue outside the Muslim world. There are six ‘Shariʿa compliant’ banks and an estimated 20 conventional banks that have set up windows in the uk to provide Islamic financial services. The Islamic Bank of Britain (ibb) is the only Islamic bank with a high street presence. It has five branches and caters for around 50,000 customers.56 To service the Islamic finance sector around 25 major law firms provide legal services in Islamic finance and management consultancy firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, kpmg, Ernst & Young and Deloitte have established Islamic finance teams in London providing to offer advice. Courses in Islamic finance and banking are offered by at least ten universities and business schools, as well as private institutions such as the Markfield Institute for Higher Education.

11 Dress Codes

Across the uk, it has long been common to see Muslim women wearing the dupatta (South Asian style scarf/head covering) and hijab (headscarf), while the niqab (face veil), jilbab (long and loose garments, coat) and other forms of modest dress have become a more familiar sight in the last decade. Many young, headscarf-wearing Muslim women ‘are working modestly in relation to mainstream fashion trends, not through wearing so-called ethnic or traditional

53 www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/mcbBriefingLondonandIslamicFinance.pdf. 54 www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1658&Itemid=93. 55 McKenzie, Duncan (2012) op cit. 56 Ibid. United Kingdom 641 clothing . . . [they] expect to express every aspect of themselves through participation in consumer culture’ (cf. www.hijabstyle.co.uk; www.hijabshigh.com; ‘some showcase fashions that only show the face, hands and feet’) (Guardian, 16 June 2011). There is no legislation limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in uk public institutions, and questions of uniform in schools are a matter for individual school managers (see section 5 above). Schools, local authorities and employers have been successfully sued for imposing dress codes that directly or indirectly discriminate in terms of race and ethnicity. However, in 2006 the House of Lords upheld a decision that a schoolgirl in Luton who wished to wear a jilbab could not do so as it was not part of the agreed uniform.57 Both the armed forces and the police have an approved version of hijab for Muslim women. That face-covering marks a significant boundary in attitudes to Muslim women’s dress codes in the uk was illustrated by a 2011 YouGov online poll of 2,258 British adults. It found that two-thirds would ban the burka even though the Home Secretary had said that the uk government had no intention of following France which banned wearing it, the niqab and other face-veils in public.58 The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2010, published in 2011 also revealed that 69% of all respondents (and 83% of over-55s) felt that a bank, for instance, should be able to insist that a female Muslim employee remove a (face) veil, but only 23% said the same of a headscarf, 24% of a turban and 15% a crucifix.59 In 2013 the debate around the niqab was stirred up again when Liberal Democrat Home Office Minister, Jeremy Browne, called for a ‘national debate’60 on the niqab. Around the same time, a Conservative mp, Philip Hollobone, presented a private members’ bill to ban face covering in public.

12 Publications and Media

There were uk-based Muslim periodicals in the early twentieth century but it was only after the consolidation of significant post-war immigration in the 1970s that a number of titles such as Arabia, Afkar, Impact International, the

57 R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School, House of Lords 2006, ukhl 15: www .bailii.org/uk/cases/ukhl/2006/15.html, accessed 27 May 2012. 58 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/burka-britain/, accessed 26 May 2012. 59 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/scottish-social-attitudes-discrimination-module, accessed 18 May 2012. 60 www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/sep/16/debate-muslim-veil-lib-dem-minister, accessed October 2013. 642 hussain

Jang and the Crescent established themselves.61 In the 1980s both Saudi Arabia and Iran sponsored English-language magazines that were published out of London. However, the longest running Muslim newspaper in circulation is The Muslim News (established, 1989; po Box 380, Harrow, Middlesex ha2 6ll, www.muslimnews.co.uk). The Muslim Weekly is a more recent newspaper published from east London. For many years another significant player was Q-News magazine (established 1992, ceased publication in 2006 but with some back issues accessible online at www.q-news.com). A more recent title was emel Magazine (established 2003 and suspended publication in 2013; Canfield Place, London, nw6 3bt, www.emelmagazine.com), which originally had its roots in the Islamic Society of Britain (isb, www.isb.org.uk/) and focused on Islamically inspired culture and lifestyle for Muslim professionals. In 2013 Channel 4 ran a series of short programmes spanning the month of Ramadan. Aside from this special feature, Muslims have appeared on a range of mainstream media (radio and television) including current affairs programmes as well as documentaries. Over the last decade the number of community (Islamic) satellite television channels broadcasting from the uk has also grown. The Islam Channel (established 2004), for instance, is said to be ‘watched regularly by three in every five British Muslims.’62 Other specifically ‘Islamic’ labelled channels include Noor tv (established 2006), Ummah Channel (established 2009) and Takbeer tv (established 2010) and two Shiʿi channels, Hidayat and Ahlulbayt, (both established 2009). Iran’s English language platform, Press tv, includes a regular show hosted by Tariq Ramadan. A number of other channels are either broadcast from abroad (such as Aljazeera) or are domestic ethnic focused channels such as Bangla tv and these may intersect with a domestic Muslim audience. There are over 20 local community radio stations authorised by the Radio Authority that serve a Muslim audience, particularly during Ramadan (24 are mentioned on the Radio Ramadan website).63 The first of these was set up in Bradford during the early 1990s. Online activity is very prolific (though hard to measure precisely), including streaming audio and video services. Conventional sites such as YouTube and Vimeo are frequently used by many activists, preachers and social commentators to self-broadcast messages digitally. ‘Diary of a Badman’ a satirical series

61 www.britishcouncil.org/scotland-enews-june-2006-british-muslims-book-mailing.pdf, accessed May 2012. 62 www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/islamchannelreport.pdf, accessed 27 May 2012. 63 www.ramadan.co.uk/radio-ramadan.php, accessed 1 December 2013. United Kingdom 643 by HumzaProductions had over 50 million views from 2009–2013,64 mainly popular among youngsters. Blogs, Facebook messages and Tweets have also taken up some of the space previously occupied by more conventional printed methods of communication among Muslim activists. Newer forms of dissemi- nation via the Internet such as Instagram and Vine are also showing up in list of the resources used by Muslim activists.

13 Family Law

Marriage in England is a civil status but the right to conduct a marriage can be delegated to an appropriately registered religious official by the local Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (priests of the Church of England have the ex officio right to formalise marriages). An increasing number of mosques now have such an official, or else register the building for the conduct of marriage, so that a civil official can be in attendance to formalise a wedding conducted according to Islamic practice. With local variations, the situation is similar in the other parts of the uk. However, apparently, significant numbers of Muslim marriages (nikah) in the uk take place outside this official framework. In partnership with minab the Ministry of Justice is seeking to raise awareness with imams concerning the implications of this should a relationship fail, or a partner die e.g. in terms of inheritance tax relief, widows’ pensions, property rights, custody of children and passports. While since 2008 the Muslim Institute has made a model nikah contract available (http://muslimmarriagecontract.org/) outlining key rights and responsibilities especially in terms of gender equality, it is still not well known or used in Muslim communities (Guardian, 12 October 2011). The persistence of Muslim religious and cultural marriage practices in a non-Muslim state, most especially in respect of polygamy, divorce and disputes involving children, also creates a number of potential conflicts with the English legal system.65 One response has been the establishment of licensed Muslim arbitration tribunals in London, Bradford, Manchester, Birmingham and Nuneaton (under the 1996 Arbitration Act, see www.matribunal.com/), all

64 www.youtube.com/user/HumzaProductions/about, accessed 1 January 2014. 65 See, for example, Poulter, Sebastian Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Menski, Werner, “Muslim law in Britain”, in M. Koga, M. Naito and T. Hamaguchi (eds.), From Migrant to Citizen: South Asian Communities Overseas (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 2000), pp. 294–318. 644 hussain of which seek to provide Islamic solutions that both parties consent to within the requirements of English law. Indeed, law firms have begun offering advice from specialists in Muslim family law alongside civil law. However, there is a concern that such tribunals cannot be guaranteed to protect women’s rights,66 and how they relate to the operation of a number of Shariʿa councils in the uk (see also Islamic Sharia Council, www.islamic-sharia.org/ and Muslim Law (Shariah) Council, www.shariahcouncil.org/). In 2011 Baroness Cox, backed by an alliance of some Christians, secularists and women’s groups such as the Muslim Women’s Network uk (www.mwnuk.co.uk), proposed a Private Members’ Bill in the House of Lords which would outlaw any court conflicting with the British legal system: ‘some tribunals applying Sharia are going well beyond their legal remit, and some rulings are being misinterpreted as having the force of uk law’ (Independent, 20 June 2011; Telegraph, 7 August 2011). The Bill passed readings in the House of Lords in 2012 and 201367 and is currently awaiting further debate, though it doesn’t seem to have won support from the leadership of the political parties.

14 Interreligious Relations

A key focus for inter-religious activity in Britain has been the Interfaith Network of the uk (ifnuk, www.interfaith.org.uk). Founded in 1987, it now has links to interfaith fora in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as the English regions and localities. In collaboration with the dclg, and following the publication of Face to Face and Side by Side—a Framework for Partnership in our Multi Faith Society (2008), Interfaith Week (www.interfaithweek.org/) was first held in 2009 in England and Wales, though a similar event had run in Scotland since 2004 (www.scottishinterfaithcouncil.org) around St. Andrew’s day (30 November). In 2013, 347 events in England, Wales and Northern Ireland

66 N.B. secular activism in this regard in terms of the One Law for All campaign (www .onelawforall.org/) and the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain (www.ex-muslim.org.uk/). See also, Bano, Samia ‘Cultural translations and Legal Conflict: Muslim women and the Shariʿa Councils in Britain’ in (eds) A. Hellum, S. Ali and A. Griffiths, Transnational Law and Transnational Relations, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 67 http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/arbitrationandmediationequalityservices .html, accessed 1 December 2013. United Kingdom 645 were held from 17–23 November, mainly led by local organisations with a focus on dialogue but also celebration, education and social action.68 Muslim individuals are involved at all levels of inter-religious activity, but member organisations of the national body of the ifnuk include the bmf, mcb and minab, as well as the Islamic Cultural Centre, Jamiat-e-Ulama Britain, World Islamic Mission and the Islamic Foundation. The last named of these established an Interfaith Unit in 1977, both to pursue faith-based dialogue in a secular society but also to monitor post-colonial Christian missionary activity world-wide. Muslims also participate in more bi-lateral interreligious activities, especially across the Abrahamic traditions, for example, through the Christian Muslim Forum (www.christianmuslimforum.org) and other organisations such as the Three Faiths Forum (www.3ff.org.uk). Local groups have proliferated in the uk since 2001 and many large cities now have a local interfaith gathering or a ‘faith leaders’ forum. Due to traditional hesita- tion in state funding of faith activities, many of these forums have remained quite small and self-funded. Since the 1997 Labour Government there were some changes in the approach to funding as faith groups and networks became increasingly viewed as helpful in the provision of social and community services. As mentioned above, the Near Neighbours fund has created a specific grant scheme for nurturing very local interfaith activities. The fund currently uses four Christian centres for ‘Presence and Engagement’69 and is limited to a number of localities in the uk.70 A similar scheme called Together in Service (www.togetherinservice.net) was also launched in 2013, with the support of the government (Communities and Local Government Department), to provide small grants for multi-faith social action projects. Other social action interfaith projects include Mitzvah Day (www.mitzvahday.org.uk), the Big Iftar71 and Dine@Mine (www.dineatmine.me/about). Academic centres for interfaith study and engagement include the Derby Multi-faith Centre,72 the Cambridge Interfaith Programme73 based at the University’s Faculty of Divinity and which has a special emphasis on ‘scriptural reasoning,’ and the Woolf Institute’s Centre for the Study of Jewish-Muslim

68 www.interfaithweek.org/index.php/component/zcalendar/?viewid=11&date=2013-11, accessed 1 February 2014. 69 www.presenceandengagement.org.uk/. 70 www.cuf.org.uk/near-neighbours/grants/places. 71 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ministers-take-part-in-the-big-iftar-at-mosques- across-the-country. 72 www.derby.ac.uk/virtual-tours/multi-faith-centre. 73 www.interfaith.cam.ac.uk/en/sr. 646 hussain

Relations,74 also based in Cambridge. There are also initiatives in other locations such as the St Philips Centre and the Markfield Institute for Higher Education.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public opinion on Muslims remained varied in 2013, with news about the involvement of some Pakistani men in organised child sexual abuse gangs hit- ting the newspapers throughout the year among other negative headlines, not least of all the Woolwich murder. The Islamic Society of Britain launched a ‘Community Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation’ (caase) (www.caase.org .uk) in order to educate people around the issue and encourage faith leaders to speak out clearly and categorically with a message of zero tolerance in cases where Pakistani men were found to be involved. Baroness Warsi spoke out at the beginning of 2013, saying that according to research “fewer than one in four people now believe that following Islam is compatible with a British way of life.”75 This is contrasted with research among Muslims that showed 83% were proud to be British, compared to 79% of Britons overall. She also mentioned that data from the Association of Chief Police Officers shows that 50–60% of all reported hate crimes of a religious nature in Britain are now against Muslims. From the same dataset 49% agreed with the statement ‘there will be a clash of civilisations between Muslims and native white Britons.’ Despite the fact that the same researchers showed that British Muslims are more likely (79%) than other groups in British society (Christians: 69%; Hindu: 77%; Sikh: 76%) to feel satisfied with British democracy.76 British Muslims are also just as likely as other groups to feel a duty to vote.77 An interesting contrast was found when critical views about Muslims in this dataset were analysed according to age. Whereas 77% of the over-60s viewed Islam as a danger to the West, the figure among 18–24 year olds dropped to 38%. And

74 www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/cmjr/. 75 www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/baroness-warsi-fewer-than-one-in-four- people-believe-islam-is-compatible-with-british-way-of-life-8464026.html. 76 www.ethnicpolitics.org/comparisons-religiongenderage/comparisons-political-parti cipation/satisfaction-with-british-democracy-comparisons/. 77 www.ethnicpolitics.org/comparisons-religiongenderage/comparisons-political-parti cipation/duty-to-vote-comparisons/#graph2. United Kingdom 647 whereas 65% of the older group reject the suggestion that Muslims are compatible, this figure declines to 31% among the younger cohort.78 A survey later in the year among young people, conducted for the bbc, asked about different religious groups and 27% said they did not trust Muslims (16% said the same about Hindus or Sikhs, 15% about Jewish people, 13% for Buddhists and 12% said they did not trust Christians).79 According to a YouGov survey, 52% of people said it was wrong of British television station, Channel 4, to mark Ramadan by playing the Adhan (call to prayer) during some of their Ramadan programming.80 And a further YouGov poll for The Sun newspaper showed that 61% of British adults agreed with the statement, ‘the burka should be banned in Britain,’ while 32% disagreed.81 Feelings varied dramatically across the political spectrum and also by age. Under 40s, for instance were much less likely to agree with the ban than their older counterparts. Going back to the issue of a ‘clash of civilisations’, nearly two-thirds of people surveyed after the Woolwich attack believed there would be a ‘clash of civilisations’ between British Muslims and white Britons.82 However the same YouGov poll provides some evidence that Britain remains a tolerant country and that far-right sentiments are marginal—63% believed the vast majority of Muslims are good British citizens (up 1% from November in the previous year). There was also an increase from 24% to 33% in the proportion who believed that Muslims are compatible with a ‘British way of life.’ 65% said that most people tend to get along well with each other on the whole and eight in ten Britons perceived the terrorist threat as ‘low.’83 Other data that came out in 2013 showed that, on average, Muslims donate more to charity than other religious groups. Data collected by icm for The Times newspaper84 found that Muslim donors gave an average of £371 each, Jewish donors: £270, Protestants: £202, Roman Catholics: £178 and atheists: £116.

78 http://nottspolitics.org/2013/03/18/the-generation-gap-in-britains-attitudes-towards- islam/. 79 www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/24204742. 80 http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/07/04/public-oppose-ch4-muslim-call-prayer/. 81 http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/09/18/most-still-want-ban-burka-britain/. 82 www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/25/woolwich-attack-islam. 83 http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/05/26/public-calm-face-terror/. 84 www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/faith/article3820522.ece. 648 hussain

16 Major Cultural Events

Aside from the religious festivals mentioned above, cultural events and festivals include the annual Muslim News Awards85 and a range of local and national arts and cultural events and exhibitions, for example the Mica Gallery86 and the exhibitions of Mohamed Ali, a graffiti artist and founder of ‘Aerosol Arabic’.87 There are also emerging performances and shows by theatre groups such Khayaal88 and Arakan Creative.89 Over the last two decades the isb has organised ‘Living Islam Festival,’ a summer festival for families involving entertainment, activities and lectures.90 isb also organised Islam Awareness Week 2013 (established 1994) across England and Wales on the theme of ‘the things we have in common.’91 The Global Peace and Unity Event (gpu) (www.theglobal unity.com/about/) organised by Islam Channel is one of the largest events in the British Muslim calendar, with around 100,000 people attending, and took place in London in November 2013. A ‘Srebrenica Memorial Day’ was initiated on 11 July 2013, with support from the uk government,92 spear-headed by a charity called Remembering Srebrenica (http://srebrenica.org.uk).

85 www.muslimnews.co.uk/awards/. 86 www.micahome.co.uk/. 87 www.aerosolarabic.com/. 88 www.khayaal.co.uk/. 89 www.arakancreative.co.uk/. 90 www.livingislam.org.uk/, accessed December 2013. 91 http://iaw.org.uk/pages/page.php?id=past. 92 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-holds-first-memorial-day-for-the-victims-of- the-srebrenica-genocide, accessed 1 December 2013.