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2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/18/11 6:00 PM Page 26

2.2

Democratic Republic of Congo

This was a difficult year for the United war (notably ), broke with him and at- Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic tempted a similar ouster, but this time without Republic of Congo (MONUC), despite the ef- success. Resulting from the stalemate in the forts made in 2009 to weaken and dismantle conflict and considerable external pressure, the armed groups operating in the eastern part of war ended with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agree- the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and ment in July 1999. Signatories to the agreement despite improvements in regional relations. included the Congolese parties and the neigh- Over the course of the year, the security boring states involved in the conflict. situation in the east deteriorated significantly The withdrawal of most foreign troops as new alliances between Congolese and for- shortly after the signing of the agreement cre- eign armed groups emerged in North and ated a power vacuum in rebel-held territories, as both the Forces Démocratiques de Libéra- and a third war began behind UN-monitored tion du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resist- cease-fire lines in northeastern Congo. This ance Army (LRA) continued their deadly reprisal war was fought between ever-smaller groups— attacks against civilian populations in the foreign and domestic—that have since become and . significant actors in the illicit activities in that Meanwhile, a six-month popular insurgency region. In June 2003, following a national dia- emerged in the western province of Equateur, logue and a series of regional agreements, a and the national army—the Forces Armées du government of national unity—consisting of République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)— leaders representing almost every local actor in continued its predatory practices against civil- the wars—was sworn in. This transition culmi- ians. In March 2010, the relationship between nated in a UN-supported national election in MONUC and the government of the DRC 2006. was narrowly elected pres- reached crisis levels, as called for the ident after two hotly contested rounds of voting. to withdraw all of its peace- Four years after that landmark election, the keeping forces by mid-2011, two years earlier UN mission in the Congo—renamed the UN than UN planners had anticipated. Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO)—has entered its fourth and, some expect, final phase. Phase one was the initial Background UN deployment of a small observer mission in The conflict in the Congo can be seen as three 1999 following the second Congo war—the interlocking wars. The first began in September one that erupted in August 1998. Its initial man- 1996 as an invasion (of what was then ) date, authorized by Security Council Resolution by a coalition of neighboring states. The inva- 1279, was to support the implementation of the sion ousted President Mobutu and replaced him Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. with Laurent Kabila in May 1997. The second Phase two coincided with the political tran- Congo war broke out in August 1998 when a sition in the Congo begun in 2003. By 2004, similar configuration of neighboring states, some MONUC had grown into a substantial inte- of whom had been Kabila’s patrons in the first grated mission with the mandate to support the

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government of national unity, the transition, and

the complex and expensive national electoral DEMOCRATIC process held in 2006. REPUBLIC OF THE The mission’s third phase began in 2009 CONGO when, in keeping with its reinforced mandate, MONUC entered a more robust peacekeeping phase, focusing largely on the unfinished busi- ness of the stabilization of eastern Congo. A se- ries of joint military operations with the Congo- lese national armed forces against armed groups in the east yielded mixed results and came

under heavy criticism for its failure to protect 0 300 km civilians. Most significantly, these joint mili- 0 200 mi tary operations, conducted with a national army known for human rights abuses, exposed the operational tensions in the mission’s multiple DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE * In addition to its Kinshasa headquarters, MONUSCO maintains mandates called for in Resolution 1856. CONGO liaison offices in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Bujumbura (), (), Kampala (), (Rwanda), The UN mission entered its fourth and Lusaka (Zambia), and (). final phase on 28 May 2010 when the UN Se- curity Council adopted Resolution 1925, sub- stantially reconfiguring the UN mission in the Congo and reframing the force as a stabilization UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the mission. Resolution 1925 authorized the with- Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) drawal of up to 2,000 troops from the country, Authorization and 30 November 1999 (UNSC Res. 1279) further concentrated the mission’s attention on Start Date civilian protection and military operations in SRSG Roger Meese (United States) the east, and established a reserve force that Force Commander Lieutenant-General Chander Prakesh can react, in principle, to incidents throughout (India) the country. Coming on the heels of efforts by Police Commissioner Abdallah Wafy (Niger) the Congolese government to see a substantial Budget $1,369.0 million reduction in the UN’s presence, Resolution 1925 (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) marked the beginning of a process that, barring Strength as of Troops: 17,112 the resumption of regional hostilities, will osten- 31October2010 MilitaryObservers:715 sibly culminate in the mission’s departure. Police: 1,181 International Civilian Staff: 948 Local Civilian Staff: 2,782 From MONUC to MONUSCO UN Volunteers: 597 For detailed mission information see p. 203 Signs of the growing tensions between the gov- ernment of DRC and MONUC were evident throughout the latter half of 2009 amid interna- tional concern over the deteriorating security situation in the country and the inability of the instead called on MONUC to begin withdraw- Congolese armed forces and the UN mission to ing its forces in June 2010 and complete the protect civilians. drawdown by June 2011. This was a sudden de- On 4 March 2010, during a UN technical as- parture from Kinshasa’s earlier request that the sessment mission to the DRC to discuss a grad- UN submit a plan for the progressive drawdown ual, three-year disengagement plan that had been of the mission by 30 June 2010, the country’s proposed earlier by the UN, President Kabila fiftieth anniversary of independence. It also 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/18/11 6:00 PM Page 28

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underscored the degree to which the relation- that takes into account a drawdown in mid- ship between MONUC and the Kinshasa gov- 2010 of 1,700 troops. ernment had deteriorated over the course of the The mission’s new, twelve-month mandate year. further concentrates the military force of the Understandably, the DRC government UN mission in three provinces in the east— sought to satisfy a domestic constituency still North and and Orientale—and turns searching for a peace dividend from the 2006 over the other eight provinces to MONUSCO’s transition. Announcing the withdrawal of the civilian components to support peace consoli- world’s largest peacekeeping mission on the dation and stabilization efforts. Under the new country’s fiftieth anniversary of independence mandate, the further withdrawal of UN troops would send a powerful message that the DRC is conditional, to be geared to conditions on the has made progress and that the country is mark- ground and to a joint assessment exercise of those ing a new beginning—a key message of na- conditions with the DRC authorities. Largely tional pride for an incumbent president entering approached as a confidence-building exercise, the 2011 electoral-campaign cycle. However, the first joint assessment missions were held in violence and serious human rights abuses by July and August 2010. While some reports sug- armed groups and national security elements gest that this process has established a good basis alike continued throughout the country, prompt- for improved communication with the DRC gov- ing a public outcry that discussions about with- ernment, others have criticized the process as drawing UN forces on an accelerated timetable rushed and its methodology flawed as it lacks a were based on political considerations rather mechanism to allow civil society to comment on than on a realistic assessment of conditions on the findings. the ground. Given the limited capacity of Congolese armed forces to take over security responsibili- Political Developments ties, a precipitous withdrawal of MONUC forces On 4 April 2010, a budding insurgency that had would create a dangerous power vacuum, espe- emerged a few months earlier in the western cially in the east, and risk whatever progress had province of Equateur—the Enyele insurgency— been made to date. The stalled national security swept into Mbandaka, the provincial capital of sector reform process underscores the risks to Equateur, catching Congolese authorities and civilians should MONUC pull out too rapidly UN peacekeepers alike by surprise. The insur- and without achieving the objectives set by the gents were able to occupy the airport almost Security Council in its mandating resolutions. without resistance and killed one UN peace- This is highlighted by the FARDC’s inability to keeper before the Congolese army and MONUC hold territory “cleared” of armed groups and by contingents forced them to withdraw the fol- the continued human rights abuses committed lowing day. The attack was by no means the by integrated FARDC units, especially in areas most deadly of the insurgency, nor its largest of the Kivus dominated by the Congrès National battle: in late 2009, attacks on the sector capital pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). of Dongo Centre had killed numerous civilians After extensive diplomatic pressure, Kin- and caused massive displacement. However, the shasa softened its position on the drawdown significance of an unforeseen, unopposed at- and the MONUSCO compromise was reached. tack on a provincial capital outside the volatile A former United States ambassador to the DRC, eastern part of the country was not lost on ob- Roger Meese, replaced Alan Doss on 1 July servers, and many were left scrambling to ex- 2010 as head of the new stabilization mission. plain the unexpected events. As of 31 July 2010, the mission’s total strength Born of local grievances and backed by a stood at 19,685 uniformed personnel, a figure wide array of opposition forces both inside the 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/18/11 6:00 PM Page 29

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country and in the diaspora, the Enyele insur- gency was projected into an environment in Equateur ripe for unrest. Notable factors were the presence of former DPP security forces (Jean- Pierre Bemba’s Division de Protection Prési- dentielle) in Gemena and Congo-; the prevalence of hundreds of disgruntled, un- employed, and demobilized soldiers; and an ongoing institutional crisis in Equateur’s pro- vincial government and sense of political ex- clusion under both President Laurent and Pres- ident Kabila. Although the Enyele insurgency ended with its leader’s arrest in neighboring Congo- Brazzaville, the factors that allowed it to metas- tasize on a national scale persist. Deep-seated grievances and tensions among some commu- Katrina Mason/Reuters nities in Equateur remain unresolved, as in other A Ghanaian peacekeeeper stands guard in front of the local port in the provinces. These grievances include a growing DRC’s northern Equateur province of Mbandaka, 13 April 2010. frustration with political repression, combined with the absence of effective state governance and authority. In Bas-Congo Province, tensions implementation of the March 23 agreements between the popular politico-religious move- between the government and armed groups in ment Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) and government the Kivus remains at a standstill. New alliances authorities continue unabated since the so-called of convenience between residual Congolese BDK massacres of March 2008 by state security and foreign armed groups and between them services. In Katanga, two potential threats to and Congolese army officers are locked in fierce stability include a possible resurgence of his- competition for control over lucrative mining toric, interethnic violence and, to a lesser extent, interests. These intense rivalries have devastat- a revival of secessionist sentiments. Endemic ing consequences for civilian populations in the poverty, the competition for economic resources, region. Attacks on civilians routinely include and the return of displaced populations remain sexual violence, lootings, and abductions, and potential sources of conflict across much of the continue to result in one of the highest rates of country. displacement in today. While progress has been made in some In North and South Kivu Provinces, tar- areas on the national economic front—for ex- geted FARDC military operations against the ample, roads are being built thanks to bilateral Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda agreements; economic growth is up; and the (FDLR) and their Mayi-Mayi allies are ongo- DRC has reached the Heavily Indebted Poor ing, some with the support of MONUSCO, de- Country (HIPC) completion point, wiping out spite limited results in neutralizing the FDLR. millions of dollars of national debt—these other The FLDR and Mayi-Mayi groups continued broader dynamics are likely to challenge the their reprisal attacks against civilian popula- successful implementation of any stabilization tions, especially in mineral-rich Walikale terri- strategy in DRC that assumes all areas but east- tory between July and September 2010, when ern DRC to be free of civil unrest. civilians were looted, killed, raped, and kid- That said, the bulk of the current violence napped. CNDP-integrated FARDC units have is concentrated in eastern Congo, where the themselves been accused of targeting civilians 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/18/11 6:00 PM Page 30

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and are considered by many humanitarian agen- groups from the political economies and crimi- cies as some of the worst perpetrators of sexual nal networks that sustain them. The UN expert violence in the region. In , the ADF- groups have been an effective tool for investi- NALU (an alliance between the Allied Demo- gating and exposing those involved in the illegal cratic Forces and the National Army for the Lib- exploitation of natural resources. However, fol- eration of Uganda) has reportedly reemerged and low-up has been inconsistent, and arrests have been the target of FARDC military operations. been difficult and few. In Orientale Province, the Lord’s Resistance With regard to the security sector reform Army (LRA) continues to operate between the process, the DRC authorities have expressed a northeast of the DRC, the Central African Re- preference for bilateral arrangements and have public, and southern . The group routinely limited the role of the new UN mission to train- attacks civilians and is accused of carrying out a ing police battalions and supporting military repeat of its December 2008 “Christmas mas- justice. sacres” again in December 2009, when it killed As 2010 drew to a close, the DRC entered more than one hundred civilians in remote vil- into a new electoral dynamic, and the 2011 lages in Haut- and Bas-Uélé. On 13 December election cycle is likely to provide significant 2010, the mission announced that it would re- challenges to MONUSCO’s stabilization ef- deploy 900 peacekeepers to the Dungu district forts. The election calendar announced by the of Upper Uele region in preparation for poten- Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) in tial “holiday season” attacks. Of concern also is September 2010 calls for the first round of the impact that the 2011 referendum process in presidential elections together with legislative Sudan might have on the LRA dynamic. Joint elections to be held on 27 November 2011, FARDC and Uganda People’s Defence Forces with a second round, if necessary, together with operations targeting the LRA continue, with provincial elections, to follow on 26 February MONUSCO logistical support. The regional 2012. As in 2006, local elections will again be threat presented by the LRA, however, and the delayed, this time to the second half of 2013, if remoteness of northern Orientale Province have they are held at all. Local elections are signifi- severely challenged MONUSCO’s increasingly cant in any effort to decentralize governance in limited resources and its ability to effectively the DRC, and they are constitutionally man- protect civilians targeted in reprisal attacks. dated, yet they continue to be postponed and The mission’s failure in July and August left unfunded. 2010 to respond to more than 300 rapes com- The calendar itself is already raising the mitted by FDLR and Mayi-Mayi fighters in re- prospect of conflict as it leaves a gap between mote villages in the Walikale region of North the end of President Kabila’s current mandate Kivu—a mere twelve kilometers from a nearby and the start of the mandate that will be given MONUSCO base—demonstrates that the DRC to the newly elected president. This and the de- remains a challenging environment for civilian lays in the handover of responsibilities from the protection. While the mission acknowledged its transitional CEI to the post-transition electoral failure to respond and has since instituted sev- institution, the National Independent Electoral eral new measures to improve communications Commission (CENI), risks creating a constitu- with remote villages, budget cuts that have ac- tional crisis, which already is being exploited companied the shift from peacekeeping to sta- by spoilers. Unlike in 2006, there is no interna- bilization and the anticipated loss of fourteen tional mechanism like the International Com- attack helicopters by the end of 2010 will only mittee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) to further complicate MONUSCO’s ability to re- assist the Congolese parties to negotiate a solu- spond to threats against civilians. tion out of the crisis. Since the 2006 election, Part of the challenge of any stabilization international policy in the DRC has been frag- strategy in the DRC will be delinking armed mented and largely bilateral. 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/18/11 6:00 PM Page 31

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Also unlike 2006, the resources likely to be The UN mission’s Radio Okapi is perhaps available for the conduct of these elections will one of the most significant potential legacies of be far more limited. The current budget for the the mission. Launched in 2002 during the inter- 2011 election cycle stands at $715 million, nearly Congolese dialogue in Sun City, Okapi was $100 million more than the record-setting cost created to provide the Congolese public with in- of the 2006 DRC elections. Of that, the DRC formation on the humanitarian situation and po- government has pledged nearly $400 million, litical transition. Since then, it has taken up a cen- but it has yet to deliver, and early indications tral role in the DRC’s media community, both by from the international community show that providing breaking news from remote areas to Congo fatigue among donors is real. That, com- the rest of the country and by empowering inde- bined with the constraints imposed on treasuries pendent journalists to report on sensitive issues. around the world by the global economic reces- From its conception, Okapi was intended to out- sion, means that the international community is last the UN mission. However, many questions unlikely to foot the bill for this election. still surround Okapi’s future: how can its contin- The implications of these resource con- ued independence and operation be ensured? straints are enormous for MONUSCO, which is Regional relations in the Great Lakes, for committed to providing logistical and technical the most part, have improved in the past year. support for the elections. The recent repatria- The DRC’s rapprochement with Rwanda has tion of MONUSCO aircraft has already had a been fragile but has persisted and provided major impact on the mission’s air mobility and some useful avenues for regional cooperation. operational capacity. The significance of ensur- Relations with , on the other hand, have ing credible elections for peace consolidation deteriorated over an ongoing dispute to do with in the DRC cannot be overstated, and it is cru- off-shore oil concessions. cial that the government of DRC and the inter- The publication in October 2010 of the UN national community signal to Congolese voters report mapping the most serious violations of a strong commitment to democratic principles. human rights and international humanitarian law Yet the current context of a strong but increas- committed within the territory of the DRC be- ingly unpopular incumbent, a divided opposi- tween 1993 and 2003 strained the Kinshasa- tion, a smaller UN mission with far less capacity, Kigali relationship. The report’s findings that and severe Congo fatigue among donors risks Rwanda had committed acts of in the putting the mission in a position of ultimately DRC during the course of the Congo wars was signing off on a potentially flawed process. met with harsh criticism in Kigali and with a While most discussions surrounding the threat to withdraw Rwandan troops from UN manner and timing of MONUSCO’s drawdown peacekeeping operations. Reaction to this land- have focused on the security situation and mark report in Kinshasa was mixed. On the one armed conflicts, both domestic and interna- hand, its findings and many of its recommenda- tional actors have expressed concern at an in- tions were welcomed, but official reaction was creasing trend of harassment and intimidation muted, lest this destabilize relations with Ki- of human rights defenders and journalists. Doc- gali. Concerns about the impact of the mapping umented by the UN and NGO community alike, report on regional relations were echoed inside this pressure has continued unabated as the the UN and plagued the official release of the country approaches national elections in 2011. report. Concerns have been raised that as the UN with- draws from the western part of the country, and eventually from the country as a whole, the po- Conclusion litical space its presence provides for journal- The security situation in eastern DRC in partic- ists and human rights defenders to operate will ular remains of serious concern. Various coali- diminish. tions of entrenched armed groups compete over 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/18/11 6:00 PM Page 32

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lucrative natural resources. This situation con- While there has been no further discussion of tinues to take its toll on Congolese civilians a drawdown of blue helmets, in the environment and also on UN mission personnel. Four peace- of the DRC the planning of the mission’s stabi- keepers and two civilian staff were lost in clashes lization strategy will be a challenge: while the with armed groups in 2010. Moreover, the Easter volatile security context has not changed, there Day attack by Enyele insurgents in Mbandaka is has been change to the enabling domestic polit- a further reminder of the risks to stability else- ical situation in which the mission operates. The where in the DRC where institutions of state au- celebration of Congo’s fiftieth anniversary of in- thority are weak. The persistence of human dependence this year and the national elections rights abuses by FARDC elements remains one next year provide an opportunity to begin the of the greatest sources of insecurity in the coun- difficult conversation about what long-term in- try, yet the enforcement of President Kabila’s ternational engagement in the DRC will look zero-tolerance policy with regard to indiscipline like, post-peacekeeping. within FARDC ranks remains limited.