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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Article Kardan Journal of Social Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Sciences and Humanities Reasons, Objectives and 2 (2) 26–43 Ramifications ©2019 Kardan University Kardan Publications Kabul, Afghanistan https://kardan.edu.af/Research /CurrentIssue.aspx?j=KJSSH Sidiqullah Sahel Abstract The ideological rivalry between USA and USSR, as exponents of Capitalism and Communism respectively, led to cold war between the two super powers where they focused on finding a buffer state for their antagonism. Afghanistan became victim of the same rivalry where the two powers strived to preserve their hegemonic interests by funding, financing and arming their allies. Soviet Union invaded the country for preserving socialism and strengthening communist bloc, which astonished the world and reacted to the invasion as threat to peace, Afghans too resisted the invasion and with the help of foreign allies successfully defeated USSR, but the woes of Afghanistan did not reduce after the withdrawal of red troops, and the dreams of millions of Afghans for establishing a peaceful and prosperous government were all belied. The miseries continued after the breakdown of communist regime, and the holly fighters turned their guns on each other for acquiring power, which pushed the country into civil wars and formation of Taliban and radicalism. Keywords: Cold War, Saur Coup, Soviet Invasion, Afghanistan, Warm Water, Mujahideen, Geneva Pact, Civil Wars Mr. Sidiqullah Sahel is Lecturer at Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardan University, Kabul Afghanistan. 26 Sahel (2019) Introduction Afghanistan had always been the focal point for invaders and conquerors in order to strengthen their grip on countries of South Asia, for the purpose to be achieved every aggressor tried to capture the country, throughout ages, either by suppressing them through coercion or Brining the tribal leaders to join hands with the Aliens.1 Mughals Conquered Kabul in 15th century in order to reach India, their rule lasted for almost three decades in the region until Safavid Dynasty took over Herat province in western part of the country and moved towards Kandahar in the same decade, when Mughals were ruling over Kabul.2 It was not only this that the country has suffered and was used as a buffer state during the great game between East India Company (Britain) and Czarist Russia during 19th century, henceforth the country went through three wars with British forces in 1839, 1879, and 1919 respectively, also known as Anglo-Afghan wars.3 The story does not end here, super powers of the time once again found Afghan soil conducive for their proxy wars, and this time the war was not a typical imperialist one but was an ideological conflict between Communism and Capitalism.4 Ahmad Shah Durrani, aka Ahmad Shah Abdali, the architect in chief of the modern Afghanistan, and his family ruled Afghanistan for 226 years until King Zahir Shah, the last Monarch of Afghanistan, was dethroned by Muhammad Dawood Khan on 17th July 1973 through a bloodless coup, and established a Republican form of Government.5 Dawood lost the support of clerics, tribal heads and rural population since he portrayed himself as a progressive nationalist and a pro-Socialist. In doing so, he was inclined towards Soviet Union in early days of his government. Since he acquired power with the assistance of Afghan Communists, mostly members of PDPA, he gave more value to them, by appointing them in key military and government posts, and failed to form an inclusive government.6 Dawood received economic and military aid from Soviet Union, and during his first visit to Moscow he acquired 428 Million assistances from Soviet Union, and in response he was advised to work more closely with Parcham Faction of PDPA and also Support Soviet foreign policy in United Nations Summits. This resulted in filling of high governmental offices by PDPA, and they started targeting all their opponents and religious circle. 7 The university campuses and government offices were changed into a platform for ideological tussles between radical leftists “mostly educated 27 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Reasons, Objectives and Ramifications in the west and Moscow” and radical rightists “mostly educated in Al- Azhar University and Madrassas inside the Country”. 8 Since the government was in hands of leftists, situation for the rightists inside the country were infeasible, especially after a demonstration by women against them, which resulted in their imprisonment by Dawood, and some of them fled to Pakistan in 1975. 9 They were welcomed to Pakistan by premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and were provided sanctuary under Auspices of INTER-Services Intelligence (ISI) in order to use them as pressure against Dawood, and reciprocate it with Dawood’s policy of supporting Pashtun Rebels. Despite meetings and agreements between Dawood and his Pakistani counterpart in 1976 and 1978, the country did not stop supporting and training Afghan Rebellions.10 Dawood was not as flexible in his relations with communists of Afghanistan as they hoped for, and started shunting their military officers into provinces and replaced them with religious and non-Communist people. This way he tried to make his government more inclusive which deteriorated his relations with Soviet Union and reached its zenith in 1977 on a visit to Moscow, where he not only rejected Brezhnev’s demand of expelling UN and NATO workers from Northern Afghanistan, and also working closely with Afghan Communists, but after returning to country announced his visit to USA.11 Soviet Union started looking for alternative of Dawood, and ambiguous murder of Meer Akbar Khyber 12 on 17th April 1978 in Kabul precipitated antagonism of communists against Dawood. PDPA accused Dawood for the murder, and the funeral ceremony of deceased person transformed into anti-government demonstration of 10000-30000 people led by Noor Muhammad Tarakai and Babrak Karmal. On 25th April 1978 Dawood Arrested Communist Leaders including Tarakai and Karmal but Hafizullah Amin remained out of bars. He started conspiracy against government and gathered pro-communist officers in Army, and went for a military coup on 27th April 1978, the military besieged Presidential palace “ARG” with several hundred officers and 50 tanks, Dawood after one-day resistance was killed with 39 “according to Mohammad Hassan Kakar with 18 members” of his family on 28th April 1978 “aka 7 Saur or Saur Revolution”. The coup succeeded and military council took the charge of affairs, both Aslam Watanjar and Abdul Qadir Announced the takeover of government by PDPA on radio, and handed over government to revolutionary council of PDPA on 30th April 1978.13 28 Sahel (2019) Although Soviet involvement in Saur Coup is denied and is regarded as sudden action and reaction by Dawood and PDPA respectively, the fact is that the Soviet Advisers were present in Afghan Military who used to train and advise Afghan officers, also the military officers who went to Soviet Union for military training and were indoctrinated by Marxist ideology, were more loyal to Communism rather than preserving government, and also the Soviet embassy in Afghanistan was in constant contact with Afghan Communists, providing them financial assistance for propagating and spreading communism and also recruiting people into PDPA, which strengthened their lines.14 Dawood Couldn’t protect his government because of ambivalent policies in respect of Right and Left internally, he couldn’t decide about his allies inside the country, first suppressed the rightists and later on started transferring the leftists to provinces too, that’s why in his last days he appointed personal friends into government positions. 15 President Dawood was neither communist nor pro-Soviet Union, he was a progressive nationalist “not ready to compromise on Pashtunistan Issue” and a Fabian socialist16, who believed in bringing reforms gradually, and tried to maintain balanced relations with Both the Super powers “USA and USSR” but United States was reluctant in keeping relations with Afghanistan and refused selling Arms to Afghan government three times in 1948, 1951,1954 respectively, and was not ready to provide military aid to Afghanistan, Soviet on the other hand was ready to provide not only economic assistance but also military and political assistance to Afghanistan in Pashtunistan Issue, hence Dawood turned towards soviet bloc.17 After the Saur Coup, Revolutionary Council of PDPA formed government. Noor Muhammad Tarakai was appointed as head of Politburo “(political bureau) is executive committee for Communist parties in all countries having communist government.” and president. Hafizullah Amin was his deputy Prime Minister and head of AGSA “De Afghanistan de Gato Satelo Idara (Afghan interest protection agency”, the communist Regime “Khalq Faction” started suppressing all their opponents brutally, whether they were teachers, religious scholars, tribal heads, even the government officials of Zahir Shah and Dawood Khan. Not only this, Khalq regime also suppressed their leftist opponents “Parcham Faction”18 and executed most of their workers, and sent their leaders into exile and were appointed as Ambassadors. 29 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Reasons, Objectives and Ramifications Noor Muhammad Tarakai after receiving power signed friendship treaty with Soviet Union on 3rd December 1978, Article iv of the Agreement stated: “the signatories shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries.” 19 The new government brought new socio-economic reforms which were radical and blasphemous in their nature, the reforms included land reforms “Banned Mortgages, High profits, and Re-distribution of land was taken place by government”, government seized the land of all those who owned more than 14 acres of land and was given to landless class, reduced dowry which damaged dignity of women and made them economically dependent, and left out “In the name of Allah” from government documents. These reforms were radical in nature and in contrast not only with the traditional society of Afghanistan but also contended Islamic values and were against human nature too.
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