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What Changes in a Post-Karimov Uzbekistan?

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What Changes in a Post-Karimov Uzbekistan? WHAT CHANGES IN A POST-KARIMOV UZBEKISTAN? CAP Papers 180 December 2016 This event was hosted by the Central Asia Program at the George Washington University’s Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) in partnership with RFE/RL, October 27, 2016. Softer on the Outside but Still Hard at the Core Bruce Pannier (RFE/RL) On September 8, Uzbekistan’s parliament named Mirziyayev to be acting president. This circumvented the constitutional stipulation for the chairman of the Senate to receive that post in the event a serving president was unable to perform the duties of office, or died. Senate Chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev said at the opening of the parliamentary session that Mirziyayev was better suited to assume the responsibility as temporary head of the government, paving the way for Mirziyayev to be confirmed in that position. In his first two months in power, Shavkat Mirziyayev has reached out to all of Uzbekistan’s immediate neighbors, most noticeably to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan’s relations with those two countries ranged from poor to horrible before former President Islam Karimov died at the start of September. Every year several people are killed along Uzbekistan’s borders, usually along the borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. There have been shoot-outs between border guards and use of lethal force against border violators, usually smugglers of some sort. Claims of arbitrary use of force have led to conflicts with local communities and border guards. Mirziyayev quickly moved to ease tensions with Kyrgyzstan. In late August, Uzbek troops had seized a television relay station at Ungar-Too, on the Kyrgyz side of the border, over problems the two countries have long had over border demarcation—in this case concerning a nearby water reservoir both countries claim. On September 9, four Kyrgyz employees of the relay station, who had been held by Uzbek troops, were released. Mirziyayev did not attend a September 16 CIS summit in Bishkek, but he sent Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov who arrived one day early to meet with Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev. On September 18, Uzbek troops vacated the Ungar-Too site and on September 20, Uzbek media reported an Uzbek-Kyrgyz working group had been discussing demarcation of disputed areas along their common border. By mid-November reports said an agreement had been reached on delineation of half of the disputed areas. Uzbekistan also hosted a meeting with Kyrgyz officials in the eastern Fergana Valley city of Andijon at the start of October. Officials from Kyrgyzstan’s Osh, Jalal-Abat, and Batken provinces led by Deputy Prime Minister Adham Ikramov visited Andijon for festivities marking the Uzbek-Kyrgyz friendship. A reciprocal event was held in Osh, Kyrgyzstan at the end of October. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon attended Karimov’s funeral in Samarkand on September 3 and met with Mirziyayev. On September 29, Foreign Minister Komilov visited Dushanbe to meet with Rahmon. The two discussed improving rail connections between the two countries, which were greatly impeded under Karimov, and also a resumption of flights between Tashkent and Dushanbe, which were suspended as early as 1992. Rahmon and Komilov also discussed water use and Tajikistan’s plans to construct the massive Roghun hydropower plant. Karimov had strongly objected to construction of Roghun, at one pointing hinting that if Uzbekistan found itself short of water because of the project that could be grounds for “war.” Tajik media noted with optimism that Komilov had not mentioned Roghun during his speech at the UN General Assembly this year, which is the first time since 2013 Uzbek officials omitted mentioning the hydropower plants in speeches at the UN General Assembly. In mid-October, an unofficial Uzbek business delegation visited Tajikistan’s northern Soghd region to discuss improving business ties. 2 Similarly, on September 26, Uzbek media reported that demarcation talks with Kazakhstan had taken place in Almaty on September 21-26. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan also exchanged visits of deputy prime ministers in late September and early October. Uzbek media reported about Uzbek-Turkmen trade talks in Tashkent at the end of September. And Mirziyayev indicated he was seeking to boost ties with Afghanistan. On October 11, he said representatives of the Foreign Ministry would soon be going to Kabul to sign new cooperation agreements. But while regional relations seem set to improve under Mirziyayev, domestic policies showed no signs of easing. The cotton campaign continued to employ forced labor, with local officials demanding doctors, teachers, students, and others go into the fields to pick cotton. Activists who attempted to document the forced labor continued to be detained and their material continued to be confiscated. From mid-September into October, police and members of the National Security Service (SNB) raided homes in cities in Uzbekistan’s section of the Fergana Valley and Tashkent that belonged to opposition figures, both secular and religious, or their relatives. People were detained and belongings, mainly computers and notes, were confiscated. As a sign of reorganizing the domestic political landscape, Mirziyayev rehabilitated several figures who fell from grace during Karimov’s latter years in power. Abdulla Aripov was chased from his position as deputy prime minister and head of Uzbekistan’s information systems and telecommunications in 2012 when he was linked to international violations that also involved President Karimov’s oldest daughter Gulnara. Aripov returned to those same positions on September 14. The head of GM Uzbekistan, Tahirjon Jalilov, was taken into custody earlier this year when it was discovered automobiles intended for sale in Russia were being stored at a place across the border in Kazakhstan and quietly returned to Uzbekistan for sale. After Mirziyayev came to power, Jalilov was released from custody but ordered kept under house arrest. Gafur Rahimov was known as one of the region’s biggest narcotics traffickers. The U.S. Treasury Department has targeted him with financial sanctions. Rahimov fled Uzbekistan nearly a decade ago and eventually ended up in Dubai. His name was removed from Interpol’s wanted list on September 20 and rumors started soon after that he would be quietly returning to Uzbekistan, though to date there is no information Rahimov has actually done so. But perhaps the most ominous development, and an indication of the kind of leader Mirziyayev will be, came in his first changes as interim president. Mirziyayev started his career in government in 1996 as head of the Mirzo Ulughbek district in Tashkent before being named governor of his native Jizzakh Province, then of Samarkand Province, and eventually in 2003 he was named as Uzbekistan’s prime minister. Mirziyayev’s first dismissals, between September 8 and 18, came in the three places he worked before becoming prime minister, where he sacked governors, mayors, district chiefs, prosecutors, and police officials. While it would be natural for any new leader, especially in Central Asia, to reshuffle cadres and install supporters, Mirziyayev’s hasty action to remove officials in places where he was formerly the boss raise suspicions his motives were somehow revenge or payback. If true, it bodes ill for his country once he is officially elected president, as is expected, on December 4. 3 Uzbek Foreign Policy after Karimov: Change or Continuity? Roger D. Kangas (NESA Center, NDU) The ramifications of Karimov’s death will be felt in the realm of foreign policy. As with the domestic policies of Uzbekistan, foreign policy decisions were made largely at the top–the president and a small coterie of advisors and officials. The current foreign policy in Uzbekistan is explained in the foreign policy concept of August 2012, which emphasizes the importance of “state sovereignty” and respect for the actions of all nations. To assess the future of Uzbek foreign policy will be a bit of guesswork, but one hopes it is “educated guesswork,” no different than when pundits assess the foreign policy directions of candidates in other countries’ campaigns. That said, one can also add an element of so-called “Kremlinology” in our analysis, because that’s what tends to happen when we don’t really know the internal dynamics of a country or the proclivities of the new leader. Two immediate guesses can be made here: (1) that there will be some change in personnel, but will that necessarily involve the foreign ministry? At present, personnel changes are all at the regional and local levels. (2) The more important point is the policy change that could take place. We’ve already seen from the Foreign Policy concept that Uzbekistan highlights a very cautious foreign and security policy and prizes sovereignty over anything else. In the past month, declarations from Uzbek officials, to include those from their Embassy in Washington, DC, endorse a “continuity of policy” of Uzbekistan–an assurance that things won’t become too different than in years past. For now, is it possible to doubt this? To this end, one needs to pay attention to any potential changes in Uzbekistan’s relations with (1) their immediate neighbors (Central Asia); (2) other CIS/Eurasian states; (3) China/Asia; and (4) the US/Europe. In most instances, we will see continuity over change. In terms of the immediate neighbors, within the past month there have been some interesting developments. Visits and calls to leaders in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, as well as lessening of border restrictions with Kyrgyzstan, suggest a potential change. The key challenge will be the non-CIS neighbor–Afghanistan. President Karimov was greatly concerned with the instability and questionable legitimacy of the Karzai government, and somewhat of the Ghani-Abdullah pairing. Will President Mirziyoyev seek to enhance stronger bilateral ties or renew regional development efforts? The latter–which would be a hallmark of a multi-vectored approach– requires improvements in relations within the immediate neighborhood.
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