What Changes in a Post-Karimov Uzbekistan?

WHAT CHANGES IN A POST-KARIMOV UZBEKISTAN?

CAP Papers 180 December 2016

This event was hosted by the Central Asia Program at the George Washington University’s Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) in partnership with RFE/RL, October 27, 2016. Softer on the Outside but Still Hard at the Core

Bruce Pannier (RFE/RL)

On September 8, Uzbekistan’s parliament named Mirziyayev to be acting president. This circumvented the constitutional stipulation for the chairman of the Senate to receive that post in the event a serving president was unable to perform the duties of office, or died. Senate Chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev said at the opening of the parliamentary session that Mirziyayev was better suited to assume the responsibility as temporary head of the government, paving the way for Mirziyayev to be confirmed in that position.

In his first two months in power, Shavkat Mirziyayev has reached out to all of Uzbekistan’s immediate neighbors, most noticeably to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan’s relations with those two countries ranged from poor to horrible before former President Islam Karimov died at the start of September. Every year several people are killed along Uzbekistan’s borders, usually along the borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. There have been shoot-outs between border guards and use of lethal force against border violators, usually smugglers of some sort. Claims of arbitrary use of force have led to conflicts with local communities and border guards.

Mirziyayev quickly moved to ease tensions with Kyrgyzstan. In late August, Uzbek troops had seized a television relay station at Ungar-Too, on the Kyrgyz side of the border, over problems the two countries have long had over border demarcation—in this case concerning a nearby water reservoir both countries claim.

On September 9, four Kyrgyz employees of the relay station, who had been held by Uzbek troops, were released. Mirziyayev did not attend a September 16 CIS summit in Bishkek, but he sent Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov who arrived one day early to meet with Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev. On September 18, Uzbek troops vacated the Ungar-Too site and on September 20, Uzbek media reported an Uzbek-Kyrgyz working group had been discussing demarcation of disputed areas along their common border. By mid-November reports said an agreement had been reached on delineation of half of the disputed areas.

Uzbekistan also hosted a meeting with Kyrgyz officials in the eastern Fergana Valley city of Andijon at the start of October. Officials from Kyrgyzstan’s Osh, Jalal-Abat, and Batken provinces led by Deputy Prime Minister Adham Ikramov visited Andijon for festivities marking the Uzbek-Kyrgyz friendship. A reciprocal event was held in Osh, Kyrgyzstan at the end of October.

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon attended Karimov’s funeral in Samarkand on September 3 and met with Mirziyayev. On September 29, Foreign Minister Komilov visited Dushanbe to meet with Rahmon. The two discussed improving rail connections between the two countries, which were greatly impeded under Karimov, and also a resumption of flights between Tashkent and Dushanbe, which were suspended as early as 1992. Rahmon and Komilov also discussed water use and Tajikistan’s plans to construct the massive Roghun hydropower plant. Karimov had strongly objected to construction of Roghun, at one pointing hinting that if Uzbekistan found itself short of water because of the project that could be grounds for “war.” Tajik media noted with optimism that Komilov had not mentioned Roghun during his speech at the UN General Assembly this year, which is the first time since 2013 Uzbek officials omitted mentioning the hydropower plants in speeches at the UN General Assembly. In mid-October, an unofficial Uzbek business delegation visited Tajikistan’s northern Soghd region to discuss improving business ties.

Similarly, on September 26, Uzbek media reported that demarcation talks with Kazakhstan had taken place in Almaty on September 21-26. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan also exchanged visits of deputy prime ministers in late September and early October. Uzbek media reported about Uzbek-Turkmen trade talks in Tashkent at the end of September. And Mirziyayev indicated he was seeking to boost ties with Afghanistan. On October 11, he said representatives of the Foreign Ministry would soon be going to Kabul to sign new cooperation agreements.

But while regional relations seem set to improve under Mirziyayev, domestic policies showed no signs of easing. The cotton campaign continued to employ forced labor, with local officials demanding doctors, teachers, students, and others go into the fields to pick cotton. Activists who attempted to document the forced labor continued to be detained and their material continued to be confiscated.

From mid-September into October, police and members of the National Security Service (SNB) raided homes in cities in Uzbekistan’s section of the Fergana Valley and Tashkent that belonged to opposition figures, both secular and religious, or their relatives. People were detained and belongings, mainly computers and notes, were confiscated.

As a sign of reorganizing the domestic political landscape, Mirziyayev rehabilitated several figures who fell from grace during Karimov’s latter years in power.

Abdulla Aripov was chased from his position as deputy prime minister and head of Uzbekistan’s information systems and telecommunications in 2012 when he was linked to international violations that also involved President Karimov’s oldest daughter Gulnara. Aripov returned to those same positions on September 14.

The head of GM Uzbekistan, Tahirjon Jalilov, was taken into custody earlier this year when it was discovered automobiles intended for sale in Russia were being stored at a place across the border in Kazakhstan and quietly returned to Uzbekistan for sale. After Mirziyayev came to power, Jalilov was released from custody but ordered kept under house arrest.

Gafur Rahimov was known as one of the region’s biggest narcotics traffickers. The U.S. Treasury Department has targeted him with financial sanctions. Rahimov fled Uzbekistan nearly a decade ago and eventually ended up in Dubai. His name was removed from Interpol’s wanted list on September 20 and rumors started soon after that he would be quietly returning to Uzbekistan, though to date there is no information Rahimov has actually done so.

But perhaps the most ominous development, and an indication of the kind of leader Mirziyayev will be, came in his first changes as interim president. Mirziyayev started his career in government in 1996 as head of the Mirzo Ulughbek district in Tashkent before being named governor of his native Jizzakh Province, then of Samarkand Province, and eventually in 2003 he was named as Uzbekistan’s prime minister. Mirziyayev’s first dismissals, between September 8 and 18, came in the three places he worked before becoming prime minister, where he sacked governors, mayors, district chiefs, prosecutors, and police officials.

While it would be natural for any new leader, especially in Central Asia, to reshuffle cadres and install supporters, Mirziyayev’s hasty action to remove officials in places where he was formerly the boss raise suspicions his motives were somehow revenge or payback. If true, it bodes ill for his country once he is officially elected president, as is expected, on December 4.

Uzbek Foreign Policy after Karimov: Change or Continuity?

Roger D. Kangas (NESA Center, NDU)

The ramifications of Karimov’s death will be felt in the realm of foreign policy. As with the domestic policies of Uzbekistan, foreign policy decisions were made largely at the top–the president and a small coterie of advisors and officials. The current foreign policy in Uzbekistan is explained in the foreign policy concept of August 2012, which emphasizes the importance of “state sovereignty” and respect for the actions of all nations. To assess the future of Uzbek foreign policy will be a bit of guesswork, but one hopes it is “educated guesswork,” no different than when pundits assess the foreign policy directions of candidates in other countries’ campaigns. That said, one can also add an element of so-called “Kremlinology” in our analysis, because that’s what tends to happen when we don’t really know the internal dynamics of a country or the proclivities of the new leader.

Two immediate guesses can be made here: (1) that there will be some change in personnel, but will that necessarily involve the foreign ministry? At present, personnel changes are all at the regional and local levels. (2) The more important point is the policy change that could take place. We’ve already seen from the Foreign Policy concept that Uzbekistan highlights a very cautious foreign and security policy and prizes sovereignty over anything else. In the past month, declarations from Uzbek officials, to include those from their Embassy in Washington, DC, endorse a “continuity of policy” of Uzbekistan–an assurance that things won’t become too different than in years past. For now, is it possible to doubt this? To this end, one needs to pay attention to any potential changes in Uzbekistan’s relations with (1) their immediate neighbors (Central Asia); (2) other CIS/Eurasian states; (3) China/Asia; and (4) the US/Europe. In most instances, we will see continuity over change.

In terms of the immediate neighbors, within the past month there have been some interesting developments. Visits and calls to leaders in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, as well as lessening of border restrictions with Kyrgyzstan, suggest a potential change. The key challenge will be the non-CIS neighbor–Afghanistan. President Karimov was greatly concerned with the instability and questionable legitimacy of the Karzai government, and somewhat of the Ghani-Abdullah pairing. Will President Mirziyoyev seek to enhance stronger bilateral ties or renew regional development efforts? The latter–which would be a hallmark of a multi-vectored approach– requires improvements in relations within the immediate neighborhood.

As for other Eurasian states, continuity will be the case for the short to medium term. Expect to see continued silence and ambivalence on issues such as the Georgia-Russia and Ukraine-Russia relationship. The goal will remain to engage with all parties, express concern about violence and the loss of life, and seek resolutions through bilateral negotiations or acceptable multi-lateral forums, such as the United Nations.

With respect to Russia, it is unlikely that there will be significant change. President Putin expressed his condolences over the death of President Karimov and reiterated his favorable view of Uzbekistan, calling the country one of his “most reliable friends.” Now, whether he believes

this is immaterial–there is a sense that Russia simply wants to see Uzbekistan not moving further away, but remain within the rather tricky orbit of the Eurasian states. The “continued multi-vectored policy” expressed by the current administration in Tashkent is acceptable to Moscow. This is because such a policy was not just a hallmark of Karimov’s personal interest, but more or less ingrained in the broader narrative of the Uzbek foreign policy leadership.

Looking eastward, Uzbekistan’s relations with various Asian countries appear to be moving on a positive trajectory. Within the past month, Interim President Mirziyoyev met with a South Korean delegation, and during the funeral of President Karimov, he met with a number of officials out of courtesy. South Korea remains a key trade partner and there is no reason to believe that the current Uzbek administration would jeopardize that. Likewise, relations with China are key—expect to see this dynamic continue, especially as it is germane to the economic development of Uzbekistan. Chinese President Xi Jinping has noted his support for the peaceful transition of power in Uzbekistan and is repeating the mantra of the importance of “non- interference of states in the internal affairs of others.”

Finally, Uzbekistan’s relations with the West, and the United States in particular, have been difficult at best, and are also unlikely to change. This past month, former Uzbek Ambassador to the US (and former Foreign Minister) Sodyk Safaev paid a visit to the US to emphasize the notion that Uzbekistan’s foreign and security policy will be a continuation of the recent past–to assure friends and allies that there is no radical change afoot. That said, there are areas where relations remain problematic. In terms of human rights, civil society, the registration of NGOs, and religious freedom, the two sides remain apart. Would a new leader in Uzbekistan see these points differently? This is not likely, so expect this to continue as a topic of interest in congressional hearings, State Department offices that focus on human rights, and the very tangible factor of how much financial assistance and trade will be in place.

In terms of the relationship itself, expect the miscommunications, misperceptions, and periodic flare-ups to continue. Communications are formalized, with little opportunity for frank and honest discussion, therefore differences can be exaggerated when they occur. Will a new leader change this? In the short term, it is doubtful. Because these dynamics are systemic, it would take a significant event (like 9/11 or the 2005 events in Andijon) to witness a real change. In the end, the “transactional nature” of Uzbek-US relations will continue with all the fits and starts that typify it today. The US desire to be a “balancer” in the region will be challenged by Uzbekistan, which has the ability to look past this distant country.

In the end, what could change things in the relations with any and all of these countries? Obviously, a serious existential threat would make the Uzbek leadership reconsider the multi- vectored approach that it currently uses. But this has nothing to do with the new leader. Indeed, if many of the key senior officials in place remain, the actions would probably parallel that of the past president. Where we could see change–and change based on the leader himself–is in the immediate neighborhood. While the recent visits and declarations are interesting to witness, they may actually be more than rhetoric. After all, as a leader imbued with the culture of CPSU internal politics, President Karimov did personalize his relations with neighboring states. Interim President Mirziyoyev’s formative years were in the late Soviet period, when change was

already taking place and the CPSU’s authority was being challenged. In some ways, he is positioned to understand the mindset of the older generation, while being able to work with the newer one. As a provincial leader and then Prime Minister, it’s not a stretch to say that domestic affairs will remain his primary focus, but the relations with neighboring Central Asian states could be important for him as he looks abroad. To this end, easing tensions with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as enhancing trade ties with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, make sense. That fifth neighbor–Afghanistan–will be his biggest challenge.

In sum, continuity, reactions to events, and learning on the job will be the focus for the short and medium term. There will always be room for an affirmation of views held, disappointment in bad decisions, or pleasant surprise with any positive turns.

Structural Impediments to Economic Reform in Post-Karimov Uzbekistan

Lawrence P. Markowitz (Rowan University)

Uzbekistan’s autarkic path of economic development was initially pursued as a means of ensuring political stability, which was reinforced by the security imperatives after the September 11 attacks. This economic trajectory, however, has generated its own unintended consequences by concentrating the flow of revenue and rents from many parts of the economy–agriculture, trade, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) development, natural resource extraction, and industry–into the state in three ways.

First, monopolized export-oriented crop production and mineral extraction mostly benefits the few entrenched elites at the top who sign off on exports that are purchased domestically at below-market prices. Second, beyond crop and mineral production, local economies encompass a number of industries that concentrate power under regional officials who exercise considerable command over all three factors of production (land, labor, and capital). Side- payments, rents, bribes and other sources of informal income are stemming from these officials’ control over processes as land distribution, credit allocation, resource distribution, and other forms of local economic activity. Third, local economies remain vulnerable to predatory law enforcement offices (tax inspectors, prosecutors, police, state security, etc.) that have been empowered to monitor many aspects of Uzbekistan's economy. They preserve state controls over the county's largely command economy but at the price of stifling independent economic activity for those without political protection.

In order to succeed, economic reform after Karimov must address these three structural obstacles: vested interests of the ruling elite, extensive controls of regional officials, and predatory law enforcement institutions. While these have served as linchpins of Uzbekistan's autarkic economic trajectory over the past quarter century, they are now the major impediments to the country's economic development. Economic reforms such as land privatization and trade liberalization will have to include some means of mitigating the loss to ruling elites with vested interests over the industries affected. Similarly, implementation of economic reforms of local

factories, farms and other enterprises will need to be comprehensive, including spheres traditionally controlled by regional officials (such as access to credit, technology, transportation infrastructure, construction materials, etc.). Finally, independent farmers, SMEs, other business interests, as well as larger enterprises that may procure foreign direct investment must have long-term assurances that they will not be vulnerable to predatory law enforcement and security offices.

The Uzbek Succession: Is Economic Transformation Possible?

Aziz Khasanov (Eurasia Analytics)

Uzbekistan’s acting president Shavkat Mirziyoyev has offered some important insight into his economic policies. He will likely change some of Karimov’s policies, especially in the economic sphere. Soon after his new appointment, Mirziyoyev outlined six priority areas in dealing with economic challenges: 1. Macroeconomic stability and the need to keep GDP growth figures from declining further 2. Prioritizing local processing of rear and precious metals, as well as food and chemical industries 3. Export-oriented production 4. Support for small- and medium-sized businesses 5. Job creation and the prevention of inequality 6. National transportation infrastructure and information and communication systems Most of these items were repeatedly stated in late president Islam Karimov’s numerous speeches and publications. However, there are a few reasons to believe that Uzbekistan’s new leadership is serious about addressing the apparent pressure points.

Today, Uzbekistan is facing a series of socio-economic challenges due to the decrease in remittances from Russia, low global energy prices and a falling standard of living. GDP growth has been consistently declining since 2010. Officially, the unemployment rate was reported at 5.2% in 2015, which is comparable to the US rate. However, according to some unofficial estimates, between 30-40% of Uzbeks may be unemployed. With 2.5 children per woman, Uzbekistan’s birth rate is among the highest in the world. The country has experienced a 70% increase in the size of the able-bodied population since independence and almost 60% of Uzbekistan’s population is younger than 30.

Unable to find jobs in their own country, many Uzbekistanis turn to Russia and other countries in search of employment opportunities. According to Russia’s Federal Migration Service, there were 1.75 million Uzbek labor migrants in the country at the beginning of this year. However, this number includes mostly legally registered labor migrants or those who managed to obtain special and costly work permits. The actual number of the Uzbek citizens living and working in Russia may be as high as 3 million or even larger, which constitutes roughly 10% of the

population of Uzbekistan and 2% of the population of Russia. This number can significantly increase if the socio-economic conditions in Uzbekistan deteriorate further.

Under macroeconomic stability, as outlined in Mirziyoyev’s list of economic priorities, the government stated its willingness to address national currency stabilization, but no details were given regarding the prospects of the full currency convertibility. At the time this article was written, the black market exchange rate has reached 7,000 Uzbek sum to the dollar, while the official exchange rate was administratively set at 3,084 sum to the dollar. A few privileged companies protected by high-ranking corrupt officials have access to this artificial rate and benefit enormously from this situation. It remains to be seen if Mirziyoyev would be willing to go against such entrenched interests and equalize exchange rates. This would most likely require bold financial steps, including the possibility of a devaluation of the national currency.

Export-oriented production is another important priority area the government of Uzbekistan wants to focus on. In fact, the declared goal is quite a departure from Karimov’s economic isolationism and the promotion of import substitution policies. Prioritizing the export orientation of the economic activity may potentially lead to the transformation of Uzbekistan’s entire economic model of development. Today, more than 20% of all industrial output in Uzbekistan is produced as part of import substitution programs and is protected from global competition.

As far as the support for small- and medium-sized businesses is concerned, the new leadership of Uzbekistan seems to be taking important steps designed to ease restrictions and rid businesses of the massive burden of inspections by the myriad of regulating and controlling entities. All so-called “unscheduled” inspections of private businesses will be outlawed starting on January 1, 2017. The number of scheduled (regular) inspections will be reduced significantly. A special Business Ombudsman’s service will be established to deal with complaints and suggestions on regulating entrepreneurial activity. Uzbekistan’s legal and penal systems will be reportedly revised to ease punishment for business-related offences, especially in relation to first-time offenders.

Uzbekistan desperately needs reforms and they are, to some extent, unavoidable. The new leadership will likely prioritize the economic development over all other pressing issues. And its dealings with the economic and social issues will provide clues for Uzbekistan watchers as to what direction the political transformation is going to move toward, if such transformation will ever take place. In the foreseeable future, the stability of the system in Uzbekistan will largely depend on the consensus of the elites and their ability to manage socio-economic risks.

What Changes are Needed and Expected in the Field of Human Rights and the Legal Sphere?

Dillorom Abdulloeva (Tashabbus)

As the new government consolidates power in Uzbekistan, there are high hopes, expectations and speculations about the country’s future. What are some issues in the legal sphere that need the most urgent reform under the new government?

First, the government should start following the country’s laws, by increasing respect for the rule of law. In the past quarter century, the Constitution was revised eight times. Despite the numerous contradictions and ambiguities in the laws, the Constitutional court reviewed only 38 cases in its entire history since its inception 25 years ago.

What are some changes expected and hoped from the new government in the field of legislature and rule of law?

First, the Constitution should be strengthened with a strong and independent constitutional review.

Second, the judiciary system and the institution of defense lawyers should be independent from the executive power. The interim President Mirziyoyev announced several legal reform initiatives. If implemented properly, they should help strengthen the independence of courts, respect for rights and freedoms of citizens, and fair trials. Yet, there is no mention of meaningful reforms for defense lawyers. Without this institution’s independence and empowerment, respect for rights, freedoms of citizens, fair trials and justice will not be achieved.

Third, corruption must be eradicated and government should be more transparent. Mirziyoyev opened the Prime Minister’s virtual cabinet, where citizens appeal online and via phone. The virtual cabinet is receiving thousands of appeals, and the people’s problems reflect the real situation on the ground. However, the prime minister or the president cannot solve all the problems of the people unless institutional changes are undertaken.