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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei

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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei Order Code RL30341 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei Updated September 7, 2006 Shirley A. Kan Specialist in National Security Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei Summary Despite apparently consistent statements in over three decades, the “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the “one China” policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. vital interests in peace and stability. In Part I, this CRS Report discusses the “one China” policy since the United States began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government. Part II documents the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This report will be updated. U.S. policy on “one China” has evolved to cover three major issue areas: sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue. First, the United States did not explicitly state its own position on the status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques, but “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the strait. President Bush has stated “non-support” for Taiwan independence, but questions have arisen since October 2002 about whether he changed his position to one of “opposition” in closed meetings with the PRC president. Second, successive Administrations have shown opposition to a PRC use of force to resolve the Taiwan question. President Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers near Taiwan in 1996, and President Bush in 2001 initially said he would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.” Third, President Reagan gave “Six Assurances” to Taiwan in 1982, including one that Washington would not pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing. With intermittent talks and military tensions in the 1990s, President Clinton urged cross-strait dialogue. The Bush Administration has re-emphasized the “Six Assurances.” Both Beijing and Taipei have shifted to call for a more active U.S. role in encouraging cross-strait dialogue. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in preventing conflict across the Taiwan Strait have been challenged increasingly by the PRC’s military modernization and moves by Taiwan perceived in Beijing as provocations that would consolidate an independent status. On August 3, 2002, the President of the Republic of China (ROC), commonly called Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), gave a speech on “one country on each side” of the strait, surprising Washington. Leading up to his re-election on March 20, 2004, Chen called for referendums and a new constitution by 2008. PRC Premier Wen Jiabao warned on November 22, 2003, that China would “pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland.” Appearing next to visiting Premier Wen on December 9, 2003, President Bush stated opposition to Chen’s efforts to change the status quo, indicating concerns about a future military crisis. Critics charged that Bush sided with Beijing’s belligerence. The Administration has stated opposition to unilateral changes from Beijing or Taipei to the “status quo.” Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, and the President’s management of the Taiwan Strait situation to advance U.S. strategic interests in democracy, peace and stability, and economic growth. A review of policy toward Taiwan could involve a Congressional role. On U.S. arms sales to and defense relations with Taiwan, see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley Kan. On current legislation, see CRS Report RL33510, Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, by Kerry Dumbaugh. Contents Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China”....................................1 Congressional Concerns.........................................1 Key Statements and Ambiguity...................................5 Has U.S. Policy Changed?.......................................7 Issue Area 1: Sovereignty ...................................7 Issue Area 2: Use of Force..................................18 Issue Area 3: Dialogue.....................................25 Policy Issues.................................................28 Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei ....30 Statements During Nixon Administration..........................30 Kissinger’s Secret Talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai ...........30 Nixon’s “Five Principles” in Secret Talks with Zhou Enlai ........31 Nixon on Withdrawing U.S. Military Forces from Taiwan .........31 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (Shanghai Communique)...........32 Mao on Use of Force......................................33 Statements During Ford Administration ...........................33 President Ford’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress ..........33 Statements During Carter Administration..........................34 U.S. Statement on Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.......................34 PRC Statement on Establishing China-U.S. Diplomatic Relations...34 ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo’s Statement ..................35 PRC’s New Year’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan ...........35 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (Normalization Communique).........36 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8 .......................36 Statements During Reagan Administration.........................39 PRC Leader Ye Jianying’s Nine-Point Proposal .................39 Letter from President Reagan to Deng Xiaoping.................40 Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan.........................40 Message from President Reagan to Taiwan President.............41 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales (1982 Communique) . 41 President Reagan’s Statement on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan ......43 Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communique .........43 PRC’s Statement on the Communique ........................43 Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge and “Six Assurances”.......44 PRC Leader Deng Xiaoping on “One China, Two Systems” .......45 Statements During George H. W. Bush Administration ...............45 Toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing ....................45 Taiwan’s Guidelines for National Unification...................46 Taiwan on the Meaning of “One China”.......................46 President Bush on the Sale of F-16s to Taiwan..................46 Beijing and Taipei Agree to Verbally Disagree on “One China” ....47 Statements During Clinton Administration.........................48 PRC Premier Li Peng Warns Taiwan .........................48 Mainland-Taiwan “Koo-Wang” Talks (Singapore)...............48 Taiwan’s Bid to Gain Parallel Representation at the U.N..........49 PRC’s White Paper on Taiwan ..............................50 Taiwan’s White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations.................50 Washington’s Taiwan Policy Review .........................52 PRC President Jiang Zemin’s “Eight Points” ...................53 Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s “Six Point” Response ...........54 U.S. Visa For Lee Teng-hui’s Private Visit to Cornell University ...55 Clinton’s Secret Letter to Jiang Zemin and “Three Noes” .........56 U.S. Department of State and March 1996 Taiwan Strait Tensions . 56 President Clinton’s Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister ........57 Secretary of State Christopher on Relations with China ...........57 Taiwan’s First Direct Presidential Election and Inaugural Address . 58 Taiwan’s Multi-Party National Development Conference .........59 President Clinton’s Statements at the 1997 Summit (Washington) ...59 1997 Clinton-Jiang Summit and U.S.-China Joint Statement .......60 1997 Summit and the State Department on the “Three Noes” ......61 1998 Clinton-Jiang Summit in Beijing ........................61 1998 Summit and Clinton’s Statement on the “Three Noes” .......62 Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui on “One Divided China”................62 Second “Koo-Wang Talks” (Shanghai) ........................63 U.S. Assistant Secretary Stan Roth on “Interim Agreements” ......63 Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui on “Special State-to-State” Relations ......64 President Clinton on the “Three Pillars” of Policy Toward Taiwan . 65 Taiwan’s Position Paper on “Special State-to-State Relationship”...65 Presidents Clinton and Jiang at APEC Meeting .................66 PRC’s Second Taiwan White Paper and “Three Ifs” ..............67 President Clinton on Resolution with Assent of Taiwan’s People ...68 Taiwan President Chen’s Inauguration Speech and “Five Noes” ....68 PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s New Formulation .............69 Taiwan President Chen on “Integration”.......................69 Statements During George W. Bush Administration..................70 President Bush on “Whatever It Takes” .......................70 PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s Invitation to the DPP...........71 Bush-Jiang Press Conference in Beijing .......................71 Taiwan President Chen on “One Country on Each Side” ..........72 Bush-Jiang Summit in Crawford, Texas .......................73 Bush’s Meeting with PRC President Hu Jintao in France..........74 President Chen Shui-bian on a New Constitution
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