Copyright by Ayesha Ray 2008 The Dissertation Committee for Ayesha Ray certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Political Masters and Sentinels: Commanding the Allegiance of the Soldier in India Committee: _________________________ Robert Harrison Wagner _________________________ Robert Moser _________________________ Ami Pedahzur _________________________ David Prindle _________________________ George Gavrilis _________________________ Kanti Bajpai Political Masters and Sentinels: Commanding the Allegiance of the Soldier in India by Ayesha Ray, B.A.; M.A.; M.Phil. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin August 2008 To my wonderful parents Lolita and Shantanu Ray who helped realize my dream Acknowledgments I take this opportunity to thank some of the most important people who have worked with me throughout the dissertation process. The very first person who I wish to thank is my wonderful mentor and supervisor, Robert Harrison Wagner. His meticulous guidance and constant encouragement always kept me focused on the task at hand. He was a great teacher and always challenged me to think and write better. I could not have asked for a better supervisor and Harrison Wagner will always be an inspiration to me. I also wish to thank the other members of my dissertation committee: Robert Moser, Kanti Bajpai, George Gavrilis, Ami Pedahzur and David Prindle provided valuable feedback for my work and their comments and suggestions helped immensely in crafting the final product. Besides the members of my dissertation committee, I also wish to thank a small group of friends for sticking with me through all the ups and downs of the process and sharing all the important milestones in this journey. Diya Basu Mazumder, Brenna Troncoso, and Julie Lane provided a constant supply of endearing words and encouragement during the most difficult times of the graduate school experience. Not only did they read my work and give me constructive comments but were always available to listen to my academic and non-academic theories! Finally, I wish to thank my family for their unconditional support. My wonderful husband Joel Newell deserves all the applause in the world for his extreme patience during the dissertation writing process. And, my parents Lolita and Shantanu Ray, and brother Dhruv Ray, deserve tremendous praise for their resolute support across a thousand miles. All these individuals believed in me and without them I would have found it extremely difficult to realize this dream. v Political Masters and Sentinels: Commanding the Allegiance of the Soldier in India Publication No. ________________________ Ayesha Ray, Ph.D The University of Texas at Austin, 2008 Supervisor: Robert Harrison Wagner This study is a serious effort to make a significant contribution to the under- examined field of Indian civil-military relations. The objective of the study is to set up a framework that helps explain changes in the division of labor between civilians and the military in India from 1947 to the present day. There are three basic themes in this dissertation that I seek to develop and explain in various chapters. The first theme examines key issues which directly address the divide between civilian and military functions. In discussing the division of labor between civilians and the military and changes affecting India’s structure of civil-military relations, I borrow Samuel Huntington’s general framework outlined in The Soldier and the State. Huntington’s framework provides the starting point for my argument by informing the reader about issues that emerge in the contestation of civilian space by the military. The second theme highlights the very different nature or experience of civil-military relations in India when compared to the United States. The third and final theme of this study seeks to illustrate differences in the nature of the Indian and American political systems. A major conclusion reached in this study is that the advent of nuclear technology in India has reduced the space between civilian and military functions, giving the military a greater role in shaping policy. vi Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………………… 1 I. A General Definition of Civilian Control………………………………………..1 II. Indian Literature on Civil-Military Relations…………………………………... 3 III. Objective and Methodology of the Study…………………………………….. 8 IV. Primary Themes of the Study………………………………………………… 9 1. Military Professionalism and Military Expertise: Core Issues in the Civil-Military Divide……………………………………………………………………………11 2. Contrasts in Indian and American Historical Experiences…...…………………21 3. Differences in Political Structures in India and the United States………………28 V. Organization of the Dissertation…………………………………………….....32 Chapter 2: The Evolution of India’s Higher Defense Organization………………... 33 I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………33 II. Issues in Civil-Military Relations Pre-Independence………………………… 33 III. The General Structure of Higher Defense Organization Post-Independence…40 IV. Stages in the Evolution of India’s Higher Defense Organization……………...44 1. Absence of a Clear Defense Policy (1947-1962)……………………………….. 46 2. Changes in Institutional Structures in the Context of External Wars (1962- 1998)……………………………………………………………………………....50 3. Creation of New Agencies in the Context of Weaponization (1999-2006)…….. 55 V. Distinguishing Features in the Indian Structure of Civil-Military Relations…………………………………………………………………………. 58 Chapter 3: Nuclear Weapons Development in a Strategic Vacuum………………….68 I. Introduction…………………………………………………………………….68 II. The American Military’s Role in the Development of Nuclear Strategy………...68 III. Indian Political Thought and Nuclear Strategy in the 1970s……..…………….74 IV. Indian Military Thought and Nuclear Strategy in the 1980s…………………....82 V. The Significance of Indian Military Expertise on Indian Nuclear Strategy……...90 vii Chapter 4: The Effects of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons on Civil-Military Relations in India……………………………………………………………………………………..99 I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………99 II. Pakistan’s Nuclear Capabilities and Indian Nuclear Strategy in the 1990s….…..99 III. Political Recommendations in Favor of Military Professionalism……………106 IV. The Military’s Critique of Political Objectives in a Conflict with Pakistan……113 V. The Indian Military’s Role in the Development of Strategic Doctrines………..118 Chapter 5: The Indian Military’s Role in Unconventional Operations…………….. 127 I. Introduction………………………………………………………………….. 127 II. The Indian Army in Punjab…………………………………………………..127 III. The Indian Army in Peace Keeping Operations in Sri Lanka………………...131 IV. The Indian Army’s Counter-Insurgency Operations in Kashmir……………..136 V. The Indian Army’s Opposition to Withdrawal in Siachen……………………..139 VI. The Civil-Military Divide and the Critical Issue of Military Professionalism….142 Chapter 6: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………149 I. The War in Iraq and Issues in American Civil-Military Relations………………150 II. Revisiting Huntington’s Framework………………………………………….153 III. Relevance of the American Literature for the Indian Case…………………...156 IV. Observations from the Indian Case………………………………………….159 V. Future Projections and Overall Significance of the Study……………………..162 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………....170 Vita……………………………………………………………………………………...192 viii Charts Chapter 2 1-1: The Structure of Higher Defense Organization in India……………………………66 1-2: The Structure of Higher Defense Organization in America ………………………...67 ix CHAPTER 1 Introduction I. A General Definition of Civilian Control Civilian control of the military is considered a critical necessity for effective democratic governance. It is the principle of civilian control that differentiates democracies from authoritarian states. In authoritarian regimes, the military performs a dual role of fighting wars and making policy. However, democracies pride themselves in a clear demarcation of roles between civilian and military functions.1 In most democracies, the executive, whether the President or the Prime Minister, is responsible for formulating policy while the military is designed to be a war fighting force entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the country’s territorial sovereignty from external and internal attacks. In outlining a general definition of civilian control, three features of civilian control warrant attention. First, civilian control can be understood as a set of functions that the political leadership of a state performs; functions that clearly give the political establishment more power over other institutions in society. These functions are generally associated with decision making over issues such as national security, domestic policy and military strategy. A political leadership’s power over other institutions derives from the primacy of political decisions in the formulation of national security, domestic policy and military strategy. Civilians have the “final say” (whether right or wrong) over a particular policy and by doing 1 Douglas Bland provides a neat description of the division of labor between civilians and the military. According to Bland, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control while military leaders are accountable and responsible for others. Also, the responsibilities for control