The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies

This book explores the ways in which political parties, in contemporary parliamentary democracies, choose their leaders and then subsequently hold them accountable. The authors provide a comprehensive examination of party leadership selection and accountability both through examination of parties and countries in different institutional settings and through a holistic analysis of the role of party leaders and the methods through which they assume, and exit, the office. The collection includes essays on Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Norway and the United Kingdom which have important differences in their party systems, their degree of democratisation, the role assigned to party leaders and their methods of leadership selection. Each country examination provides significant data relating to party rules and norms of leadership selection, leadership tenures and leadership contests. The book concludes with a chapter that merges the country data analyses to provide a truly comparative examination of the theoretical questions underlying the volume. This book will be of strong interest to students and scholars of legislative studies, elections, democracy, political parties, party systems, political elites and comparative politics.

Jean-Benoit Pilet is Lecturer and Director of Cevipol in the Department of Political Science at the Free University of Brussels, Belgium.

William P. Cross is Professor and the Hon. Dick and Ruth Bell Chair for the Study of Canadian Parliamentary Democracy in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, Canada. Routledge research on social and political elites Edited by Keith Dowding Australian National University and Patrick Dumont University of Luxembourg

Who are the elites that run the world? This series of books analyses who the elites are, how they rise and fall, the networks in which they operate and the effects they have on our lives.

1 Coalition Government and Party Mandate How coalition agreements constrain ministerial action Catherine Moury

2 The Selection of Ministers around the World Hiring and firing Edited by Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont

3 Parliamentary Elites in Central and Eastern Europe Recruitment and representation Edited by Michael Semenova, Michael Edinger and Heinrich Best

4 The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies A comparative study Edited by Jean-ÂBenoit Pilet and William P. Cross The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies A comparative study

Edited by Jean-ÂBenoit Pilet and William P. Cross

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2014 Jean-ÂBenoit Pilet and William P. Cross, selection and editorial matter; contributors their contributions. The right of Jean-ÂBenoit Pilet and William P. Cross to be identified as editor of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The selection of political party leaders in contemporary parliamentary democracies : a comparative study / edited by Jean-Benoit Pilet, William Cross. pages cm. – (Routledge research on social and political elites) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Political parties. 2. Political leadership. 3. Cabinet system. I. Pilet, Jean-Benoit. II. Cross, William P. (William Paul), 1962– JF2051.S393 2013 324.2'2–dc23 2013024588

ISBN: 978-0-415-70416-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-85602-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear Contents

List of figures vii List of tables viii Notes on contributors x Series preface xiv Acknowledgements xv List of party names and abbreviations xvi

1 The selection of party leaders in contemporary parliamentary democracies 1 William P. Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet

2 The selection of party leaders in the UK 12 Tim Bale and Paul Webb

3 The selection of party leaders in Belgium 30 Jean-Benoit Pilet and Bram Wauters

4 Unanimous, by acclamation? Party leadership selection in Norway 47 Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Rune Karlsen

5 The selection of party leaders in Austria: channelling ambition effectively 62 Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik and Wolfgang C. Müller

6 Party leader selection in Germany 77 Klaus Detterbeck and Ingo Rohlfing

7 The selection of party leaders in Italy, 1989–2012 93 Giulia Sandri, Antonella Seddone and Fulvio Venturino viâ Contents â 8 The selection of party leaders in Spain 108 Oscar Barberà, Juan Rodríguez-Teruel, Astrid Barrio and Montserrat Baras

â 9 The selection of party leaders in Portugal 124 Marco Lisi and André Freire

10 Let’s not risk too much: the selection of party leaders in Romania 141 Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina

11 Stable leadership in the context of party change: the Hungarian case 156 Gabriella Ilonszki and Réka Várnagy

12 Party leadership in Canada 171 William P. Cross

13 Leadership selection in Australia 189 Anika Gauja

14 Selecting party leaders in Israel 206 Ofer Kenig and Gideon Rahat

15 The selection of party leaders in comparative perspective 222 Jean-ÂBenoit Pilet and William P. Cross

Bibliography 240 Index 254

Online appendix available at: www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415704168/ Figures

2.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in the United Kingdom (1965–2012) 15 3.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Belgium (1965–2012) 34 4.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Norway (1965–2012) 51 5.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Austria (1965–2012) 66 6.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Germany (1965–2012) 81 7.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Italy (1989–2012) 99 8.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Spain (1974–2012) 111 9.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Portugal (1974–2012) 128 10.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Romania (1990–2012) 146 11.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Hungary (1990–2012) 161 12.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Canada (1965–2012) 175 13.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Australia (1965–2012) 192 14.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Israel (1965–2012) 208 Tables

2.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in the UK (2012) 16 2.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in the UK (1965–2012) 19 2.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in the UK (1965–2012) 26 3.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Belgium (2012) 38 3.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Belgium (1965–2012) 39 3.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Belgium (1965–2012) 42 4.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Norway (2012) 53 4.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Norway (1965–2012) 54 4.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Norway (1965–2012) 58 5.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Austria (2012) 67 5.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Austria (1965–2012) 73 5.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Austria (1965–2012) 74 6.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Germany (2012) 82 6.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Germany (1965–2012) 84 6.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Germany (1965–2012) 88 7.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Italy (2012) 100 7.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Italy (1989–2012) 101 7.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Italy (1989–2012) 104 8.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Spain (2012) 115 8.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Spain (1974–2012) 116 8.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Spain (1974–2012) 119 9.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Portugal (2012) 132 9.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Portugal (1974–2012) 135 9.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Portugal (1974–2012) 137 10.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Romania (2012) 147 10.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Romania (1990–2012) 151 10.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Romania (1990–2012) 153 Tables ix 11.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Hungary (2012) 163 11.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Hungary (1990–2012) 165 11.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Hungary (1990–2012) 168 12.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Canada (2012) 178 12.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Canada (1965–2012) 185 12.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Canada (1965–2012) 186 13.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Australia (2012) 193 13.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Australia (1965–2012) 201 13.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Australia (1965–2012) 203 14.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Israel (2012) 213 14.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Israel (1965–2012) 217 14.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Israel (1965–2012) 218 15.1 The selectorate of party leaders (1965–2012) 227 15.2 Parties’ political context when adopting a more inclusive leadership selectorate 229 15.3 Rules organising the elections of party leaders (2012) 230 15.4 Competitiveness of leadership races by type of selectorate 233 15.5 Demographics of party leaders 235 Contributors

Elin Haugsgjerd Allern is Associate Professor of political science at the Uni- versity of Oslo, Norway. Her recent publications include a special issue of Party Politics on party-interest group relationships (with Tim Bale, 2012). Tim Bale is Professor of Politics at Queen Mary, University of London. His most recent books include The Conservatives since 1945: The Drivers of Party Change and European Politics: A Comparative Introduction, now in its third edition. Montserrat Baras is Associate Professor at the Universitat Autònoma de Bar- celona (UAB). Author of several books and articles on Spanish politics, she has been team leader of several Spanish research grants devoted to the study of regionalist parties and decentralisation. Oscar Barberà is Associate Professor at the Universitat de València (UV). Pre- viously he has been a lecturer and visiting fellow at several Spanish and Euro- pean universities. His PhD thesis was published by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Astrid Barrio is an associate at the Universitat de València (Spain). She has a Master’s from Sciences-Po (Paris, 1999) and has been teaching or researching at Barcelona (UOC and UAB), Paris (Sciences-Po), and Montpellier (UM). She was awarded the prize of the Spanish Political Science Association for best thesis. Mihail Chiru is a PhD Candidate in Comparative Politics at the Department of Political Science, Central European University Budapest. He is mainly interested in individual accountability processes as reflected in election campaigns and legislative behaviour. William P. Cross is the Hon. Dick and Ruth Bell Chair for the Study of Cana- dian Parliamentary Democracy in the Department of Political Science at Car- leton University in Ottawa Canada. His work centres around questions of intra-party democracy and party organisation, and his most recent book is The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy (Oxford University Press, with Richard S. Katz). Contributors xi Klaus Detterbeck is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Magdeburg. His main research areas are political parties, federalism and European regions. His publications include Multi-Level Party Politics in Western Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2012). Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik is a researcher at the Austrian National Election Study at the University of Vienna’s Department of Government. His main research interests are political parties, party competition, coalition politics, party patronage, and political appointments. His publications include articles in Governance, European Journal of Political Research, West European Pol- itics, Political Studies and Party Politics. André Freire is Auxiliary Professor with Habitation, Department of Political Science and Public Policies at the Lisbon University Institute in Portugal. His research interests include electoral behavior, political institutions and political representation. He has published widely in these areas. Anika Gauja is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and Inter- national Relations at the University of Sydney. She researches in the area of comparative party organisations and is the author of The Politics of Party Policy (Palgrave, 2013) and Political Parties and Elections (Ashgate, 2010). Sergiu Gherghina is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Political Sci- ence, Goethe University Frankfurt. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Leiden University. His major fields of interest are political parties (party organisations) in new democracies, legislative and voting behaviour, and democratisation. Gabriella Ilonszki is Professor of Political Science at Corvinus University Budapest. Her interest covers political elite developments and parliamentary government in ECE. Her recent publications include Role Stability in the Context of Institutional and Positional Change, in: M. Blomgren and O. Rozenberg (eds) Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures (Routledge European Studies, 2012: 162–83). Rune Karlsen is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, and a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo. His research interests include voting behaviour, political parties, representation, political communication and new media technology. Ofer Kenig is Senior Lecturer at Ashkelon Academic College and Head of the political parties’ research group in the Israel Democracy Institute’s Political Reform Project. His research fields are comparative politics and Israeli politics. His interests include leadership and ministerial selection, party members and constitutional change. Marco Lisi is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Studies, Nova University of Lisbon. He has published two books on Portuguese political parties and several articles on political parties and electoral behaviour in xii Contributors journals such as West European Politics, South European Society and Politics and European Journal of Communication. Wolfgang C. Müller is Professor of Democratic Governance at the University of Vienna and Coordinator of the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES). His main research interests are political parties, government coalitions, political institutions and comparative European and Austrian politics. His publications include several books and many journal articles in these research fields. Jean-Benoit Pilet is Lecturer in Political Science at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium. He is also Director of Cevipol research centre. His research interests include electoral systems, electoral reforms, voters’ behaviour, party politics, elite recruitment, legislative studies and Belgian politics. He has published on these topics in journals such as West European Politics, Comparative European Politics, Representation, Electoral Studies, European Political Science, Regional and Federal Studies, Revue française de science politique and Res Publica (Belgian Journal of Political Science). Gideon Rahat is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Director of the research team on Political Reform at the Israel Democracy Institute. His research fields are comparative politics and Israeli politics. His interests include political parties, electoral reform, the personalisation of politics and candidate selection methods. Juan Rodríguez-Teruel is Lecturer at the University of Valencia. He has been Lecturer at the UAB and Visiting Fellow at the Open University, the LSE and Edinburgh. His PhD thesis was published by the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Ingo Rohlfing is Assistant Professor at the Cologne Graduate School (CGS) of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Cologne. He does research on party politics and social science methods. His publications include Case Studies and Causal Inference and articles in several international journals. Giulia Sandri is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the Université Catholique de Lille, France. She holds a PhD from the Université libre de Bruxelles and her main research interests are party politics, intra-party democracy and party membership, primary elections, and political behaviour. Antonella Seddone is currently Research Fellow at the Department of Culture, Politics and Society of the University of Turin. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the same Department. Her main research interests deal with intra-party democracy. From 2010 to 2012 she was a Fellow at the Department of International Politics and History of the University of Cagliari. Contributors xiii Réka Várnagy is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Corvi- nus University of Budapest. Her main research interests include the dynamics of party development and parliamentary politics. She is currently working on candidate selection patterns of Hungarian parties and the determinants of parliamentary opposition behaviour. Fulvio Venturino is Associate Professor at the University of Cagliari and was previously a Research Fellow at the University of Genoa. He was a member of the Scientific Board of the Italian Society for Electoral Research (SISE) between 2005 and 2010. In 2011 he launched the ‘Candidates and Leader Selection’ Standing Group of the Italian Political Science Association. Bram Wauters is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political and Social Sci- ences of the Ghent University. His research interests include political representation, electoral systems and political parties. He has recently published on these topics in journals such as Party Politics, Political Studies, Politics & Gender, West European Politics, Local Government Studies and Representa- tion. Paul Webb is Professor of Politics at the University of Sussex. He is co-editor of the journal Party Politics, and author or editor of numerous articles and books including The Modern British Party System (Sage 2000), Political Par- ties in Advanced Industrial Societies (Oxford University Press 2002), and Party Politics in New Democracies (Oxford University Press 2007). He is a member of the UK Academy of Social Sciences. Series preface

The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Demo- cracies is an essential addition to the Routledge Research on Social and Political Elites series which so far has provided analyses of parliamentarians in post- authoritarian Central and Eastern Europe and the role of cabinet ministers in coalition governments, and will in the next volume expand the study of ministerial careers to political systems of the five inhabited continents. As rightly argued by the editors of this volume, political parties are essential to the workings of parliamentary democracies. Among their functions is the selection of leaders who will usually embody the choice set from which voters will eventually elect their prime ministers. The methods used for the selection of party leaders may therefore have consequences for who those leaders will be, but also has implications for the identity and background of those who count as the highest political – be it in government or in parliament – elites of a given country. The relevance of this link between intra-party mechanisms for the selection of leaders and the set of political elites who matter most for the conduct of politics in parliamentary democracies becomes quite clear when reading the chapters of this volume. But all contributors to this book also consider the potential intra-party democracy innovations made by smaller and newer parties that are less often key players. In order to assess whether these formal rules have consequences for the identity and longevity of successful contenders, the country specialists (who are all experts in party politics) inspect how these actual processes developed and study their outcomes. Until now, regrettably, we have lacked a comprehensive comparative analysis of the rules set up by parties to select their leaders and their potential consequences. For this volume, data on no fewer than 900 party leadership contests, from the 1960s to the present time across 13 countries, were collected and have been made available in an online appendix. This data collection allows the editors to draw first, exploratory comparative lessons on the implications of a widely assumed uniform move towards greater inclusiveness of party selectorates through time. Their somewhat sobering conclusions open up a route for further exciting research. Revealing the extraordinary potential of the whole enterprise of systematic, dedicated empirical evidence collection within a rigorous comparative framework, together with intensive, context-sensitive analysis by country specialists, this book dovetails perfectly with the goals of the series and makes for a most welcome fourth volume. Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont, August 2013 Acknowledgements

This project began with a conversation several years ago between us at the Cana- dian Political Science Association meetings in Ottawa, Canada. It was then that we agreed upon the need for a systematic, comparative analysis of political party leadership selection. The next step was convening a workshop on the topic at the ECPR Joint Sessions in St. Gallen in which many of the contributors to this volume participated. We are appreciative of the opportunities the meetings of these professional societies provide for international collaboration. Our largest debt is, of course, to our contributors. They have uniformly met all of our expectations (and deadlines!) and have contributed greatly to both the theoretical and empirical components of this volume. They have done so both professionally and with good humour and we have enjoyed working with them all. Much of the data found in this volume are only made available via the cooperation and support of the political parties themselves. Accordingly, we thank them for their openness and willingness to engage with academic enquiry of this sort. At Carleton University, graduate students Matthew Ayling and Scott Pruys- ers provided valuable research assistance. Our work on party leadership continues and we thank the Hon. Dick and Ruth Bell Chair for Parliamentary Democracy at Carleton University, the Belgian Fonds national de la recherche scientifique (FRS-FNRS) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding that allows for the ongoing work of this international group. We also acknowledge and thank our home universities for their support of our research agendas. Finally, as always, we thank our families. We are grateful for their continuing support and understanding of our commitment to this project. Jean-Benoit Pilet William P. Cross Party names and abbreviations

Short name Full name Translation/Note Country

Agalev Anders gaan leven To Start Living Norway Differently Agudat Yisrael – Union of Israel Israel Ahdut Ha’Avoda – Labour Unity Israel ALP Australian Labor Party – Australia AN Alleanza Nazionale National Alliance Italy Ap Det norske Labour Party Norway Arbeiderparti AP Alianza Popular People’s Alliance Spain BE Bloco de Esquerda Left Bloc Portugal Bloc Bloc Québécois – Canada Bündnis 90/Die – Alliance ’90: German Germany Grünen Greens, previously Die Grünen BZÖ Bündnis Zukunft Alliance for the Future Austria Österreich of Austria CCD Centro Cristiano Christian Democratic Italy Democratico Centre CD&V Christen-Democratisch Christian Democratic Belgium en Vlaams and Flemish CDC Convergència Democratic Spain Democràtica de Convergence of Catalunya Catalonia CDH Centre démocrate Humanist Democratic Belgium humaniste Centre –French- speaking Christian Democrats CDS-PP Centro Democrático e Democratic Social Portugal Social-Partido Centre-Popular Party Popular CDU Christlich German Christian Germany Demokratische Democrats Union Deutschlands CiU Convergència i Unió Convergence and Union Spain Conservatives Conservative and – UK Unionist Party Conservatives Conservative Party – Canada Party names and abbreviations xvii

Short name Full name Translation/Note Country CSU Christlich-Soziale Bavarian Christian Germany Union in Bayern Democrats DC Democrazia Cristiana Christian Democracy Italy Degel Hatora – Banner of the Torah Israel Democrats Australian Democrats – Australia Die Linke – German Left, previously Germany PDS and Die Linkspartei Die Linkspartei – Left Party Germany DL Democrazia è Libertà – Democracy is Liberty – Italy la Margherita the Daisy DS Democratici di Sinistra Left Democrats Italy Ecolo Écologistes Confédérés French-speaking Greens Belgium pour l’organisation de luttes originales ERC Esquerra Republicana Republican Left of Spain de Catalunya Catalonia FDF Front démocratique des Front for the Defence of Belgium francophones French-speakers FDP Freie Demokratische German Liberals Germany Partei FDSN Frontul Democrat al Democratic National Romania Salvării Nationale Salvation Front FI Forza Italia ‘Way to go’ Italy Italy Fidesz Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Hungary Párt Union FN Front National French-speaking Belgium Extreme Right party FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Freedom Party of Austria Österreichs Austria FrP Fremskrittspartiet Progress Party Norway FSN Frontul Salvării National Salvation Romania Nationale Front Greens Die Grünen The Green Alternative Austria Greens The Greens – Australia Groen Green Flemish Greens Belgium H Høyre Conservative Party Norway Herut – Freedom Israel IDV Italia dei Valori Italy of Values Italy IU Izquierda Unida United Left Spain Jobbik Jobbik Magyarországért Movement for a Right Hungary Mozgalom Hungary Kadima – Forward Israel KDNP Keresztény Demokrata Christian Democratic Hungary Néppárt People’s Party KrF Kristelig Folkeparti Christian People’s Party Norway Labour Labour Party – Israel, UK LibDems Liberal Democrats – UK Liberal Party – – Australia, Israel Liberals Liberal Party – Canada, UK LIF Liberales Forum Liberal Forum Austria xviii Party names and abbreviations

Short name Full name Translation/Note Country Likud – The Consolidation Israel LMP Lehet Más a Politika Politics Can Be Hungary Different LN Lega Nord Northern League Italy Mapai Mifleget Poalei Eretz Workers’ Party of the Israel Yisrael Land of Israel MDF Magyar Demokrata Hungarian Democratic Hungary Fórum Forum MDP Movimento Portuguese Democratic Portugal Democrático Movement Português Meretz – Energy Israel MR Mouvement French-speaking Belgium Réformateur Liberals MSZP Magyar Szocialista Párt Hungarian Socialist Hungary Party National Party National Party of – Australia Australia NDP New Democratic Party – Canada N-VA former Nieuw-Vlaamse Flemish Regionalist Belgium members of VU Alliantie party, right-wing OpenVLD Open Vlaamse Flemish Liberals Belgium Liberalen en Democraten ÖVP Österreichische Austrian People’s Party Austria Volkspartei PC formerly PUR Partidul Conservator Conservative Party Romania PCE Partido Comunista de Communist Party of Spain España Spain PCP Partido Comunista Portuguese Communist Portugal Português Party PCs Progressive – Canada Conservatives PD Partito Democratico Democratic Party Italy PD Partidul Democrat Democratic Party Romania PDL Popolo delle Libertà People of Freedom Italy PDL formerly FSN, Partidul Democrat- Liberal Democratic Romania PD Liberal Party PDS Partei des Party of Democratic Germany Demokratischen Socialism Sozialismus PDS Partito Democratico Democratic Party of the Italy della Sinistra Left PDSR Partidul Democraţiei Socialist Democratic Romania Sociale in România Party of Romania PEV Partido Ecologista ‘Os Greens Portugal Verdes’ Portugal PNL Partidul Naţional National Liberal Party Romania Liberal PNV Partido Nacionalista Basque National Party Spain Vasco Party names and abbreviations xix

Short name Full name Translation/Note Country PP Partido Popular People’s Party Spain PPI Partito Popolare Italian People’s Party Italy Italiano PRD Partido Renovador Party of Democratic Portugal Democrático Renewal PS Parti Socialiste French-speaking Social Belgium Democrats PS Partido Socialista Portuguese Socialist Portugal Party PSD Partido Social Social Democratic Party Portugal Democrata PSD formerly Partidul Social Social Democratic Party Romania FDSN, PDSR Democrat PSDR Partidul Social Party of Social Romania Democrat Român Democracy in Romania PSOE Partido Socialista Spanish Socialist Spain Obrero Español Workers’ Party PUR Partidul Umanist Romanian Humanist Romania Român Party Rafi Reshimat Poalei Yisrael Israeli Workers List Israel Reform Reform Party – Canada SDP Social Democratic Party – UK Shas Shomrei Sfarad Sfarad’s guards (of the Israel Torah) Sp Senterpartiet Centre Party Norway SP.a Socialistische Partij Socialist Party – Belgium Anders Differently – Flemish Social Democrats SPD Sozialdemokratische German Social Germany Partei Deutschlands Democrats Spirit, later SLP, SLP: Sociaal-Liberale Flemish Regionalist Belgium former members Partij party with a social- of VU liberal profile, now disappeared SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Social Democratic Party Austria Partei Österreichs of Austria SV Sosialistisk Socialist Left Party Norway Venstreparti SZDSZ Szabad Demokraták Alliance of Free Hungary Szövetsége Democrats UCD Unión de Centro Union of the Spain Democrático Democratic Centre UDC Unione dei Union of Christian Italy Democratici Democrats Cristiani UDC Unió Democràtica de Democratic Union of Spain Catalunya Catalonia UDMR Uniunea Democrată Democratic Alliance of Romania Maghiară din Hungarians in România Romania xx Party names and abbreviations

Short name Full name Translation/Note Country UDP União Democrática People’s Democratic Portugal Popular Union UPyD Unión Progreso y Union, Progress and Spain Democracia Democracy V Venstre Liberal Party Norway Vlaams Belang Flemish Interest Flemish Extreme Right Belgium party Volksunie (VU) People’s Union Flemish Regionalist Belgium party, centrist (split up in 2001) WASG WahlalternativeSoziale Labour and Social Germany Gerechtigkeit Justice – The Electoral Alternative: left-wing party in Western Germany, merged with PDS Die Linkspartei in 2007 Yisrael Beitenu – Israel Our Home Israel 1 The selection of party leaders in contemporary parliamentary democracies

William P. Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet

The importance of party leadership On 27 June 2007, Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair as prime minister of the United Kingdom. The succession was not decided by voters, nor by members of the parliamentary majority that was backing the Labour government in West- minster. Rather the choice of the new British prime minister was taken three days earlier, at a special conference of the Labour Party. Exactly three years later, on the other side of the globe, Australia also changed its prime minister with Julia Gillard replacing Kevin Rudd. Here too the choice of the new prime minister was not decided by voters or in parliament, but rather through a closed- door, internal process of the party’s parliamentary caucus. Even if these cases are extreme, in the respect that the selection of the party leader is at the same time the choice of a new prime minister, party leadership selection processes are regularly crucial events in the designation of new governing leaders in contemporary democracies. In fact, in most cases, voters’ options regarding the choice of prime minister or president are limited to those selected as party leaders. For example, with the sole exception of, Helmut Schmidt, every chancellor of post-war Germany has served as leader of his party as has every recent prime minister of Australia, Canada, Israel, Spain and the United Kingdom. These examples illustrate how consequential processes of leadership selection are in modern democracies. They are so important that some countries have even decided to legislate on how party leaders are selected. This is the case, for example, in Germany where the Party Law stipulates that leaders have to be chosen through a vote of delegates at a party conference. This importance of leadership contests within political parties is not particularly surprising considering the central role parties occupy in modern democracies. Schattschneider’s (1942: 1) often repeated observation that ‘political parties created modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties’ has subsequently been confirmed by leading contemporary specialists of political parties (see, among others, Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Parties are the leading actors in elections. They organise the selection of candidates and the recruitment of future legislators (Norris and Lovenduski 1997). They develop the policy pro- grammes that are presented to voters in election campaigns. They convey this 2 W.P. Cross and J.-B. Pilet message through the organisation of the campaign for their candidates (Farrell and Webb 2000). And, most importantly, they are central elements in voters’ determination of who to vote for (Miller and Shanks 1996). However, political parties are not only important during campaigns. They are also key players between elections. Both parliaments and governments are organised along party lines (Docherty 2005; White 2006). In parliament, parties structure the everyday work, from purely organisational matters, such as where legislators sit in the assembly, to the most crucial activities, including legislative votes and the control of the executive. Even in the most personalised systems, widespread party dissent remains rare, at least outside the US (Depauw and Martin 2008). And in government, parties are central in building the ruling coalition, in defining policy priorities and in the balance of power within the executive, whether among parties of a coalition, or between individual ministers. And while political parties have long operated at the centre of democratic politics, the role played by their leaders has expanded in the last 15–20 years, leading some scholars to talk of a presidentialisation of politics (Poguntke and Webb 2005). Their hypothesis is based on four fields in which party leaders have increased their influence. First, party leaders have become more powerful within their party. Decentralised parties, or parties controlled by middle-level elites have lost ground. Although it is still unclear and widely debated among specialists of parties what is the exact new model that is emerging (cartel, stratarchical, modern cadre party?), they all agree that party leaders have been able to accumulate more power in their hands (Webb et al. 2002). Second, in elections, leaders have also gained ground and are today more central in the choice made by voters. They may not have become the single most crucial driver of vote choice, but their influence has been on the rise in most Western democracies (Aarts et al. 2011). This growing importance of party leaders is also apparent in how the media cover politics. Parties are less often described as teams with several prominent candidates, and more and more as electoral organisations dominated by a clear leader (Mughan 2000). And, finally, the party in public office (government or parliament) is also more controlled by its leader (Foley 2000). Dowding (2013) has correctly pointed out that presidentialisation is not the best term for this phenomenon. As he notes, prime ministers have typically been more powerful than have presidents within their political settings. Nonethe- less, he too agrees that prime ministers have increased their relative degree of authority over time. Interestingly, in many parties, the growing role of party leaders has been accompanied by a transformation in the way they are selected. While leaders may once have been chosen by party and parliamentary elites, there is today great diversity in methods of their selection as many parties have broadened the leadership selectorate. As underlined by Katz and Mair (1995) in their cartel party model, party leaders have increased their power by empowering individual rank-and-file members at the expense of the more organised, more easily mobilised and more ideological middle-level elites. One of the crucial reforms in this respect has been to organise the selection of candidates and party leaders by a Party leaders in parliamentary democracies 3 direct vote of the party’s members. The most frequently used illustration of this transformation is the gradual increased weight of the vote of individual members, at the expense of the more organised votes of the parliamentary groups and of trade unions, within the British Labour Party (Russell 2005). But beyond this specific case, according to the first significant comparative work on thetopic (Kenig 2009a), it seems that this trend towards more inclusive selectorates for the choice of party leaders is widespread and often more straightforward than in the case of British Labour. It is, however, not universal as major parties in countries such as Australia, Germany, Spain and New Zealand have resisted this trend. Yet, surprisingly, the central role of party leaders, and their growing influence in recent years, together with the increased diversity in the methods of their selection has not translated into considerably more academic attention to this subject. As demonstrated by Cross and Blais (2012a), the number of publications on the topic is much more limited than in related subfields such as the study of electoral systems, of the organisation of political parties, or even of methods of candidate selection. In fact, most publications on the topic examine only one country, and sometimes only one leadership contest (among others Heppel and Hill 2008; Drucker 1984; Cowley and Bailey 2000). The most extensively studied countries are the United Kingdom and Canada. In the UK case, substantial research interest began in the 1980s and 1990s when the major parties expanded their selectorates beyond their parliamentary group (for example, Quinn 2004; Stark 1996; Punnett 1992; Alderman 1999; Denham and O’Hara 2008; Russell 2005). And in Canada, the topic has attracted scholarly attention with the transfer of selection authority first from the parliamentary caucus to the party conference in the early twentieth century, and more recently to the rank-and-file membership (for example, Courtney 1973, 1995; Carty and Blake 1999; Cross 1996). Beyond these two countries, a few case studies examine leadership selection in individual countries such as Austria (Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991), Belgium (Wauters 2009), Australia (Bynander and ’t Hart 2007), Japan (Sasada 2010) and Ireland (Rafter 2003). Comparative studies of leadership selection remain sparse. A special issue of the European Journal of Political Research that included a collection of six country-specific case studies of the issue was edited in the early 1990s by Marsh (1993). A few years later, Davis (1998) produced a rather superficial comparison of leadership selection in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. More recently, in an article in the journal Party Politics, LeDuc compared selection processes in the UK, Canada and the US (LeDuc 2001). Very recently, more systematic comparisons of more cases have been completed. The most important of these are the study of leadership selection mechanisms in 11 countries published by Kenig in Electoral Studies (2009a) and a book-length study of parties in Westminster democracies by Cross and Blais (2012a). The low number of publications on the topic is even more surprising considering that studies of leadership selection can easily dialogue with many related 4 W.P. Cross and J.-B. Pilet subfields of the study of parties and elections. There are at least seven different sets of literature that the study of party leadership selection can both draw-upon and contribute to. First, it can contribute to the debate on the transformation of party organisations. For more than 20 years now, scholars have been exchanging ideas on how parties’ internal organisations can best be defined. The dominant models of the 1950s and 1960s, and even 1970s, like the mass party, the cadre party and the catch-all party (Duverger 1964; Panebianco 1988) appear to be inadequate for parties at the turn of the new millennium (Katz and Mair 1994). New models have subsequently been proposed, such as the cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995) or the stratarchical party (Carty 2004; Carty and Cross 2006). And, as mentioned above, these models are closely linked to the new distribution of powers within the party, with more strongly empowered leaders and new methods for selecting them. These models are also characterised by the relationship between the different faces of the political party, defined by Katz and Mair (1995) as the party in public office, in central office and on the ground. The relative role of the leader clearly influences the patterns of these relationships which in turn influence the relative role of each party group in the selection of the leader. Another subject that studies of party leaders are naturally connected to is the literature on the transformation of intra-party democracy (Cain et al. 2003; Scarrow 1999a; Cross and Katz 2013). This body of research has been question- ing the way parties conceive of democracy within their organisation, and how this echoes in their vision of democracy outside the party itself, in the broader political system. Gallagher and Marsh (1988: 1) claimed some years ago that ‘the way in which political parties select their candidates may be used as an acid test of how democratically they conduct their internal affairs’. We believe that the same can be said for the way parties select their leader, and how they organise the control of the leader between elections. The methods of leadership selection and accountability, and particularly the relative roles of party elites, external supporters (such as labour unions) and grassroots members, both in selecting the leader and in holding her to account, illuminates much about the distribution of power within political parties. Related to this is a better understanding of why parties engage in organisational reform. Given the movement of some parties to a broader selectorate and the resistance to this by others, this case offers substantial explanatory value relating to the factors that result in this type of organisational change. As discussed more fully below, many scholars have suggested that party organisational reform is best explained through consideration of both a party’s environment and internal circumstances (Harmel 2002; Panebianco 1988; Wilson 1980). Follow- ing this path, in their study of leadership selection change in the Westminster systems, Cross and Blais (2012b) find that parties are most likely to engage in this type of organisational reform when in opposition, after an electoral defeat and when others in their party system have also done so. This is consistent with the hypotheses relating to internal reform offered by Deschouwer (1992), Frant- zich (1989), and Panebianco (1988). Party leaders in parliamentary democracies 5 A fourth field of research that can be linked with the study of party leaders is the study of political participation. The recent changes mentioned above in the way party leaders are selected imply a growing role for rank-and-file members. These reforms clearly influence how activists exercise and conceive of their role within political parties. And, the idea of making the role of members more attractive has often been central in debates about these intra-party reforms (Scarrow 1999b; Young 2013). Parties perceive them as a way to limit, or even to reverse the trends of declining party membership (van Biezen et al. 2012). Their possibility of succeeding at this assumes that party supporters want to participate in leadership selection and that offering them such a role will increase their propensity to join and become active members. Some suggest that this may not be the case and that the apparently growing disinterest in party activism may have less to do with the internal organisation and distribution of power within parties than with broader societal changes making political parties less desirable vehicles for participation by those seeking political and social change (Katz 2013). Dialogue is also possible with specialists of elections. After all, leaders are in most cases selected through some sort of an electoral process – even if the rules defining who is eligible to be an elector may vary significantly (parliamentarians, middle-level elites, party members, all voters). The relationship between campaign dynamics, the voting behaviours of electors, activities engaged in by the candidates, and the influence of electoral rules – such as the electoral system – on issues such as the competitiveness of these contests and the characteristics of leaders emerging from them should be of interest to specialists of legislative and presidential elections. Related to this is the question of public regulation of these contests. There is a growing literature relating to statutory oversight of the activities of parties, and sometimes of their internal organisation through party laws and sometimes constitutional provisions (van Biezen 2004). One of the most consequential things parties do is select leaders from among whom voters essentially select their prime ministers. Thus, understanding whether and how these contests are publicly regulated speaks to a fuller understanding of this phenomenon and to the notion of political parties as public utilities (van Biezen 2004). Finally, a better understanding of how party leaders are selected, and the outcomes of these contests, will provide interesting insights to broader theories of representation. For example, the trend towards more inclusive selectorates of party leaders raises questions relating to who the party leaders are representing and to the possible principal–agent relations that are at play in the leadership selection process. Similarly, consideration of the types of leaders who emerge, in terms of gender, age and political experience, and the relationship between these and the methods of selection, contributes to the literature on descriptive representation. Cumulatively, the chapters that follow make contributions to each of these important questions and we return to some of them in the concluding chapter in which we distil what the individual country studies, taken as a whole, tell us 6 W.P. Cross and J.-B. Pilet about these questions. In many of these areas, we build upon the work of Dowding and Dumont (2009), and their contributors, in their study of ministerial careers. Party leaders serve at the head of the party and in many cases, though not all, are responsible for the hiring and firing of ministers. When serving in government they are the senior minister, and focusing on how they are hired and fired contributes to the existing work in this book series.

What do we know about the selection of party leaders? Though limited in number, existing studies of leadership selection within parties have identified some of the key issues underlying these processes. In particular, the main element of interest has been the movement towards more inclusive selectorates. Several authors have identified a trend to transfer the power to choose the party leader away from the party elite (in most cases, the parliamentary group) to either conferences attended by party delegates or to party members, and in a very few cases, such as the Italian Partito Democratico, to voters generally (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003; Kenig 2009b). The trend has been questioned recently by Cross and Blais (2012a, 2012b) who paid more attention than others to countries such as Australia and New Zealand where parties have resisted the broadening of the selectorate. Moreover, they have pointed to other developments in the rules organising the selection of party leaders in Westmin- ster systems that could moderate the idea of more open procedures for selecting party leaders. In particular, it appears that, with the direct involvement of party members (and in some cases of voters), leadership contests have become more centralised, reducing the role and autonomy of party branches at the local and constituency levels. Moreover, in several parties, though it remains unclear whether this pattern is valid in most countries, requirements for standing as a candidate for party leadership have become stricter. In some parties, such as those in the UK, while the selectorate has been expanded, party elites continue to play a crucial gatekeeping role through control of the nomination process. Beyond identifying a trend towards a particular type of intra-party democratisation, scholarly attention has focused on factors driving the change and on the consequences of the new, more inclusive, methods of leadership selection. Research offering explanations of the democratisation of leadership selection, has been consistent with the analytical model developed by Barnea and Rahat (2007) relating to candidate selection. They explain that the decision to reform the procedures to select candidates (or in our case party leaders) can be explained through an interplay between three levels: the political system, the party system and the intra-party level. At the level of the political system, the central argument is that parties adapt to changes in their environment. In particular, the democratisation of leadership selection should be linked with three transforma- tions of politics and society: the personalisation of politics, the democratisation of society generally and the global decline of party membership. The personal isation of politics (Karvonen 2010) has induced the need for parties to put at the forefront a few individuals (or even one single individual) who can personify the Party leaders in parliamentary democracies 7 party to the public. Parties therefore are seen less as collective organisations and more as entities dominated by a single leader, which obviously can affect notions regarding the legitimacy of processes controlling how the leader is selected and leads to more party members and activists wanting to influence this choice. Second, Western societies have witnessed a deep change in their citizens’ democratic values in recent decades. Access to education has increased, which has induced a shift in citizens’ values and demands (Inglehart 1990). In particular, a significant share of the population is calling for more political participation, for more inclusive democracy and for more transparency in politics. The shift to more inclusive methods of leadership selection is said to be a reaction by parties meant to illustrate that they are responding to these demands. And third, as mentioned above, intra-party democratisation is, for some parties, a reaction to the growing disengagement of citizens towards political parties, and to the decline in party membership (Scarrow 1999b; Dalton 2004; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). By allowing their members a formal voice in the choice of leader, parties hope to increase the value of membership and thus to make it more attractive to their supporters. At the level of the party system, explanations are most commonly linked to the electoral competition between parties. In particular, research has shown that parties are more likely to democratise internally when they are electorally unsuccessful or when other, more democratic parties, are increasingly popular with voters. The first element has been underlined by Cross and Blais (2012b) who have shown that in Britain, Canada and Ireland, almost all reforms towards more inclusive selectorates of the party leader were adopted after a party suffered a poor electoral showing. Parties, by reforming themselves internally, aim at reju- venating their image with the public by appearing more open and democratic (Punnett 1992). Cross and Blais also suggest that the internal balance of power in parties shifts after electoral defeat away from the party elite to the grassroots activists. This then emboldens the membership in their attempt to achieve a formal voice in the choice of leader. The second driver of democratisation at the party system level is the contagion effect. The hypothesis is that once one principal party in a system has democratised its procedures for selecting the leader it becomes more difficult for its competitors to resist similar change, especially when the more inclusive party enjoys electoral success (Scarrow et al. 2001). This explanation has often been linked with the crucial roles of Green parties which were among the first to promote intra-party democracy and who have pressured mainstream parties to follow them in that direction (Poguntke 1989). And third, at the intra-party level, the main motivations for the democratisation of leadership selection identified in the literature are related to the distribution of power within the party. In line with the cartel party model, the hypothesis is that those at the top of the party have empowered rank-and-file members, or even voters, at the expense of middle-level elites. According to May’s law of curvilinear disparity (May 1973), the former are less ideological and easier to control than the latter (Katz 2001). This explanation is somewhat 8 W.P. Cross and J.-B. Pilet controversial given that some scholars suggest that party elites resist this change for as long as possible and in the end only reluctantly give in to reform pressures from their members (Cross and Blais 2012b). Finally, the last angle through which the selection of party leaders, and its democratisation, has been discussed in the literature focuses on the consequences of the different rules and procedures organising leadership contests. In particular the impact of selection methods on three different variables is considered: the characteristics of those who win leadership contests, levels of participation in these elections and their relative degree of competitiveness. First, regarding the profile of party leaders, it is clear that as a group they have never resembled average citizens. In particular, leaders are historically disproportionately male, over age 40 and politically experienced. What has puzzled scholars in recent studies of leadership selection is whether the methods used for choosing party leaders have an influence on the profile of those who are selected. Evidence to date is not very robust due to the lack of large-N comparative studies and the limited information published so far is not particularly encouraging. For example, evidence suggests there are not many more women selected by wider selectorates. In fact, Cross and Blais (2012a) report that in the Westminster parties they study, not a single female candidate has won a national membership vote contest in the UK, Canada or Ireland. And research on candidate selection suggests that wider selectorates are not very favourable for women or newcomers (Rahat et al. 2008). Scholarly attention on the consequences of the democratisation of leadership selection methods has also considered how they influence the level of participation in leadership contests (both in terms of voters and candidates). Obviously, widening the selectorates from parliamentarians to middle-level elites, to members, or to all voters drastically increases the quantity of participants in the leadership election. Yet, one can question whether the focus should just be on the quantity of participants, or also on the quality of participation (Rahat and Hazan 2007). Problems like instant and fraudulent memberships or clientelism have been highlighted in the literature (Courtney 1995; Cross and Rahat 2012). Moreover, in the case of open primaries, party members can become disillusioned and wonder why they should invest so much in a party that, when it comes to a crucial decision like the choice of the leader, does not give them more influence than that afforded to other citizens who have never been involved in the party (Sandri and Pauwels 2011). And third, wider selectorates do not seem to have made competition for party leadership more open. The common assumption is that incumbent leaders would have less difficulty being reselected when the process of leadership selection necessitates the organisation of a true election with many electors. When the choice is left to a limited group of party elite or parliamentarians, a change of leader can happen within hours, such as in Australia in 2010 when Kevin Rudd was replaced by Julia Gillard. Yet, the evidence to date does not seem to confirm this logic. Kenig’s (2009a) analysis of 36 leadership contests shows that incumbents are neither more successful, nor more vulnerable when the choice is left to a wider selectorate. Similarly, Cross and Blais (2012a) find that expansion of the Party leaders in parliamentary democracies 9 leadership selectorate does little to increase competitiveness. While they find a modest increase in the number of candidates in these contests, they do not find that the contests are more competitive. All of the above confirm that there is a growing scholarly interest in the selection of party leaders. Some key questions have been identified but for none of them can we say that we have reached consolidated knowledge. First, the shift towards more inclusive selectorates has attracted much attention but much less emphasis has been focused on cases where such changes have not been apparent (for example Germany, Spain or most of Central and Eastern Europe). More- over, little is known comparatively regarding the other rules, beyond the definition of the selectorate, that organise the selection of the party leader. Only for the five principal Westminster countries covered by Cross and Blais (2012a) do we know much about who is entitled to be a candidate, the electoral formula governing these contests or the rules for deselection. Similarly, outside of a few country- and party-specific studies, there is little known about the nature and dynamics of party leadership campaigns, their degree of competitiveness and how the organisational characteristics may favour some types of politicians over others. There is also little systematic understanding of the causes that have driven the recent changes (or their absence) in the rules organising the selection of party leaders. As we have detailed, Barnea and Rahat (2007) provide a strong theoretical model for such intra-party reforms but their hypotheses have not been broadly tested in relation to the selection of party leaders.

Goals and ambition of this study The previous section has shown that there is still much work to be done on the selection of party leaders. This volume fills many of the gaps in our understanding of leadership selection in much the same way that Gallagher and Marsh’s (1988) edited volume on candidate selection, The Secret Garden of Politics, accomplished this a quarter of a century ago. Their collection offered the first systematic examination of how candidates were selected in different political systems, was able to identify the general patterns of candidate selection across countries and the emerging trends, and to consider who was being selected. And more importantly, this volume was the stepping stone for the definition of a new research agenda on the study of candidate selection. This is an agenda that has since developed in many scientific articles and more recently in comparative books (see, for example, Hazan and Rahat 2010). More precisely, the ambition of this volume goes beyond existing work in at least two respects. First, there is a need for more comparative analysis on the topic. The few attempts published so far have mostly covered countries that are very much alike in terms of institutional setting, party system and the position that party leaders occupy in the system (Cross and Blais 2012a, 2012b). Or they have covered a larger number of countries but concentrated on few aspects of the problem, such as the inclusiveness of the selectorate, and have not provided descriptive details of leadership politics (Kenig 2009a). 10 W.P. Cross and J.-B. Pilet In this volume, we present a study of 13 countries from western and eastern Europe, Oceania and North America (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Norway and the United Kingdom) that differ in their institutional settings (though they are all parliamentary systems), their party system, their degree of democratisation, and the role attributed to party leaders. Within each country the authors consider the case of the principal parties represented in the national parliament and add to this any others that are important to an understanding of the evolution of leadership politics. Our case selection also provides substantial diversity in terms of models of intra-party democracy so that we have significant cases using each of the principal methods of leadership selection (by the parliamentary party, delegated convention and party members). There is also significant variance in terms of the rules and norms of deselection and other regulations governing these contests. This allows us to consider the relationship between these process variables and the nature of leadership politics comparatively. Beyond description of the process and rules, attention is also given in each chapter to important theoretical questions that derive not only directly from the study of leadership selection but also emanating from the bodies of literature discussed above. A second innovation of this volume, compared to existing work on the selection of party leaders, is the comprehensive study of leadership politics in each chapter. All of the country studies cover four broad themes and accordingly are organised into four sections. First, consideration is given to the precise position of party leaders in each country, including examination of their key functions and duties. This discussion illustrates how significantly the role of party leaders varies from country to country, over time within country, among parties within a party system and between those countries governed by coalition and those by a single-party executive. A brief description of each system is also provided allowing readers to situate the parties. Second, the rules organising the selection of party leaders are presented for the 13 countries covering the period from 1965 (or since a country’s first democratic elections if later) to 2012. We generally begin in the mid-1960s as it is in this period that many parties began to codify their leadership selection rules and because it was an era in which norms of participatory democratisation were gaining strength in many countries. Again, this is not a hard-and-fast rule and where it does not make sense, such as in the former Communist countries, a later starting date is used. The rules examined go beyond the selectorate: candidacy requirements, length of term, voting rules, and deselection mechanisms are all detailed. Each chapter includes tables depicting the evolution of the selectorate for each party and the current rules governing the process. Third, the contours of leadership campaigns are studied. This includes consideration of how candidates campaign; and, where applicable how the media cover these elections, the financing of campaigns for leadership, and the degree of participation and competitiveness of these races. Consideration is given to the principal dynamics of these contests. Are they defined by disputes over policy, Party leaders in parliamentary democracies 11 by appeals centred around candidates’ proclaimed electoral strength, the organisational capacity of candidates to mobilise an internal party selectorate, or are they characterised by the personal relationships inherent in small electorates? Each chapter includes tables showing the number of candidates contesting each election and the margins of victory. Where appropriate, these are broken down by type of contest so that inferences can be drawn between these variables and the different selection methods. And, finally, across the 13 countries, we examine who the party leaders are. Consideration is given to gender, age, length in office and previous political experience before becoming party leader. These data are also presented in tabular form allowing for analysis of any relationships between the contests’ rules and the types of leaders chosen and their subsequent longevity in the office. In regards to the latter, we are particularly interested in party rules and norms relating to leadership removal. In each chapter, the same template is followed systematically, covering each of these four broad themes and, in the conclusion, patterns across countries are presented. Perhaps most importantly, we are able to examine these issues for parties in 13 countries over a period of more than 45 years. This time period captures most of the democratisation and adoption of formal rules for leadership selection. Each of the contributing authors has systematically collected and analysed a substantial amount of data relating to the rules of leadership selection and removal for the party system they examine. Data have also been collected for every leadership election conducted during this period. (While these data are presented here in summary form, full details are available on the accompanying website at: www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415704168/.) This comprehensive approach allows us to examine both the impetus for rule changes and the implications of them. By merging all of the country-specific data, in the concluding chapter we consider these questions in the aggregate for the 13 countries and 79 parties included in the earlier chapters. By doing so, we bring significant new insights to the study of party leadership selection in contemporary parliamentary democracies and pave the way for further research on this important topic. 2 The selection of party leaders in the UK

Tim Bale and Paul Webb

Introduction The UK is one of the world’s most stable democracies with a party system struc- tured by a left–right divide and a first-past-the-post electoral system that has long been dominated by just two parties, the Conservatives and Labour, with a third party, now called the Liberal Democrats, trailing some way behind, at least when it comes to parliamentary seats. At the time of writing, the UK parliament also boasts one Green MP, as well as several small parties which operate only in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, none of which have so far governed at national level and are therefore set aside for the purposes of this chapter. The Conservatives can lay claim to being one of the world’s oldest, most successful parties: situated firmly on the centre-right, they combine a commitment to neo- liberal economics with more authoritarian attitudes to crime and immigration and a nationalistic stance on the UK’s relationship with the EU. Labour is a centrist social democratic party, concerned not to destroy capitalism but to make it more dynamic and capable of financing a welfare state that corrects market failures in health and education and promotes equality of opportunity. It also has an essentially positive attitude to the EU – something shared by the Liberal Demo- crats, which, as the product of a merger between a social democratic and a liberal party, is populated by both ‘market’ and ‘social’ liberals (see Webb 2013). All three parties are more or less controlled by their parliamentary caucuses, from whose ranks their leaders are always recruited.1 That said, as Figure 2.1 makes clear, the final say on who becomes leader has over time passed to grassroots members (and in Labour’s case its affiliated organisations). This democratisation of leadership selection has not produced radically different contests. True, over time, candidates have become younger, less experienced but more professional politicians, while the differences between them are arguably less ideological than was once the case. But there is little evidence that these changes have been driven by changes in the way leaders are elected. Nor, although contests have become longer and more expensive affairs, conducted not just by candidates but by organised campaign teams working both privately and publicly through the media, is there much evidence to suggest that they have become any more competitive. Indeed, perhaps the most striking fact of all is that leadership elections Party leaders in the United Kingdom 13 in the UK, despite it electing one of the world’s most iconic female prime ministers, are still dominated by men.

Who is the party leader? Identification of the ‘real’ leaders of the main parties in the UK is a relatively straightforward task: as perhaps befits a country wedded to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, it is widely understood to be the leader of the parliamentary parties. By the time that the Labour Party was born as an externally created body with its roots outside parliament, the pattern set by the Conser- vative and Liberal parties had been established: whoever led the parliamentary sections of these parties was understood to be vying directly for the right to control the apex of the British state and was therefore indisputably the true leader of his party. This notwithstanding, there are other people who count. The Chairman of the Conservative Party is usually a prominent parliamentarian who is responsible for running the party organisation, especially the interface between its parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings. Appointed by and plainly subservient to the party leader, the chairman is an organisational leader, although certainly not the party leader. Labour also has a Chair elected by the National Executive Committee (NEC) for one-year terms, mainly in order to chair NEC meetings and annual conferences. The nearest functional equivalent to the Conservative Chairman is Labour’s General Secretary, but this person is effectively the chief executive of the extra-parliamentary organisation rather than a political leader. Indeed, since 1945 none of the party’s general secretaries have been elected politicians. The Liberal Democrats, however, do have a party president as well as a party leader. Like the leader, the president is directly elected by the membership, and is usually a fairly prominent MP, chairs the party’s federal executive, and is charged with the responsibility of representing the views of the membership in the upper echelons of the party. The post is seen by some – and, indeed, seen by some of its incumbents – as a stepping stone to the leadership and certainly affords the holder, if he or she so wishes, the opportunity to differentiate him- or herself from the leader. However, even though his/her role in party conferences can be politically significant, no observer of politics in the UK would describe the party president as the leader of the Liberal Democrats. As in the cases of Labour and Conservatives, that title falls to the MP who leads the parliamentary party and is considered the party’s candidate for prime minister (Sanderson-Nash 2011).

Rules organising leadership selection

The Conservatives Traditionally, Tory leaders had ‘emerged’ through an opaque process of negotiation and ‘soundings’ involving senior party figures. However, in 1965 a system 14 T. Bale and P. Webb of exhaustive ballots of Conservative MPs was introduced and employed until 1997. It stated that a successful candidate needed to win the support of an overall majority and to achieve a clear margin of at least 15 per cent over any other rival irrespective of whether the first-placed candidate had won an absolute majority on the first ballot2 – an idiosyncratic rule which eventually played a critical part in the most dramatic of recent demises in British politics, the defenestration of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in November 1990. Although MPs were expected to consult in order to gauge the ‘mood’ of their local constituency associations, genuine democratisation did not occur until 1998. From then on, the parliamentary party would only have the right to act as the preliminary selectorate which, through eliminative ballots, would settle on two candidates with the final choice left to the party’s mass membership in aone-member, one-vote postal ballot. The new system also separated the dismissal of a leader from the re-election of his or her successor: previously a challenge to a sitting leader could be triggered by a contestant with the declared support of 10 per cent of the party’s MPs, with other challengers able to sit out the first round and enter in the second if they so desired. Now, if at least 15 per cent of MPs make a confidential request in writing to the Chair of the 1922 Committee (the parliamentary party’s governing body), an unpopular leader faces a vote of no-confidence, the loss of which would oblige his or her resignation – a process which led to the eviction in 2003 of the first leader to be elected under the new procedure in 2001. Under the new system, the leader also became de jure leader of the entire party (including, for instance, Conservative MEPs, Members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, and the hitherto formally autonomous grassroots membership), whereas before she or he was strictly speaking only de facto leader by virtue of his or her election as leader of the parliamentary party.

Labour Before 1980, Labour Party leaders and deputy leaders were elected solely by Labour MPs, and it was against the rules of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) for any challenge to be issued to an incumbent Labour prime minister. However, in the late 1970s a left-wing ‘Campaign for Labour Party Democracy’ (CLPD) forged an alliance with various influential trade union leaderships that were affiliated to the party to press for an electoral college. Introduced in 1981, it was initially divided into three sections, with 40 per cent of the votes going to affiliated societies (trade unions or socialist groups), and 30 per cent eachto local Constituency Labour Party branches (CLPs) and MPs, respectively. Voting was conducted by delegates at a special meeting of the college; delegates from the various affiliated unions, societies and CLPs always cast their votes as mono- lithic ‘blocks’, and were often mandated to vote in a certain way by the bodies they represented. In order to win, a candidate was obliged to win the support of an absolute majority of the college’s weighted votes. Prior to 1994 the rules provided for exhaustive balloting, whereby the candidate faring worst at the first ballot was eliminated and a second round of voting took place for the remaining Party leaders in the United Kingdom 15

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

Conservatives (1998) (1965) Note: votes shared between members and parliamentarians Labour (1981)* (1981) (1965) Note: votes shared between members, parliamentarians and trade unions Liberals (1976) (1965) SDP (1982) LibDems (1988)

Figure 2.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in the United Kingdom (1965–2012). Notes Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate. * In 1981, party rules gave a share of the vote to local party associations. Beginning in 1993 this share has been determined through a ballot of party members. contestants; from 1994, the alternative vote has been used. Nominees required the support of 12.5 per cent of the PLP if they were to contest a vacant leadership position, or 20 per cent of the PLP plus a two-thirds majority of annual conference, if they wished to challenge an incumbent Labour prime minister. Following the general election defeat of April 1992, the new leader, John Smith, decided to seek a revision of the system. In 1993 it was agreed that the balance on the electoral college would be altered so that each section was accorded an equal share of the votes; just as significant, perhaps, was the decision to replace the block or unit voting pattern of delegatory democracy which operated within the affiliated organisation and CLP sections, with a form of one- member-one-vote (OMOV). Instead of each union delegation casting an undivided block vote (weighted according to the number of members for whom they paid an affiliation fee), there would be a direct postal ballot of each union’s members.3 Similarly, the power of CLP delegations to cast block votes on behalf of their local memberships was replaced by a direct postal ballot of the individual members themselves. This idiosyncratic model did not ensure that each vote cast in the electoral procedure carried an equal weight: how could it when there are never more than a few hundred Labour MPs and MEPs,4 but hundreds of Table 2.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in the UK (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

Conservative and Unionist MPs (stage 1) and party No limit Stage 1: elimination ballots; Majority vote of MPs Party members (stage 2) Stage 2: run-off between top two candidates from stage 1 Labour Vote shared equally among No limit One member one vote, Challengers require the support parliamentary section (MPs weighted to one-third of 20% of the parliamentary and MEPs), constituency weight for each section, party if they wish to members, and members of alternative vote used challenge an incumbent affiliated societies Labour leader (primarily trade unions) Liberal Democrat Party members No limit Single Transferable Vote Majority vote of parliamentarians Party leaders in the United Kingdom 17 thousands of CLP and levy-paying union members, with each section obtaining a third of the total electoral college votes? Nevertheless, it undeniably constituted an extension of intra-party democracy by enhancing the real participatory rights of individual CLP and union members.

The Liberal Democrats and their predecessors Liberal Democrat members have from the inception of the party in 1988 enjoyed significant participatory rights in the business of electing leaders. This reflects the willingness of the party’s predecessor organisations to think radically about their internal procedures. In 1976 the old Liberal Party established a special electoral college within which each local constituency association was given a weighted share of the vote: the constituency branches conducted ballots of their own members before casting their college votes in such a manner as to reflect their members’ preferences in a proportional way.5 The Liberal Democrats’ other predecessor organisation was the Social Demo- cratic Party (SDP) – set up in the early 1980s by right-wing Labour defectors and the first significant British political party to elect its leader by anational postal ballot of members. After the Liberals and the SDP merged to form the Liberal Democrats in 1988, the new party adopted the SDP model of leadership election. Indeed, a national postal ballot of members, using the alternative vote, has been used to elect not only the leader of the parliamentary party, but also the party president (effectively the head of the extra-parliamentary organisation). An incumbent leader can be challenged if s/he loses a vote of no-confidence among parliamentary colleagues, or if at least 75 local parties or Specified Associated Organisations (SAOs)6 request an election by writing to the party president. Thus, the Liberal Democrats are still the only major British political party that places the responsibility for electing its leader wholly in the hands of the ordinary members, undiluted by elite influence. Possibly, as a party which had few MPs at the time of its birth and relatively little corporate or state financial backing, its members are its lifeblood and need to be offered participatory incentives to maintain their commitment. Reaction against the Labour Party, with its history of union interference and militant constituency activism, and a desire to be seen to be ‘breaking the mould of British politics’, were also important factors. In broad terms, then, we may say that the procedures for electing British party leaders have gradually become more inclusive since 1960. The motivations for the various reforms vary in their specifics. For instance, the initial decision to hold an election for the leader of the Conservative Party followed controversy about the opaque manner in which a ‘magic circle’ of leading figures selected Sir Alec Douglas-Home as leader following Harold Macmillan’s resignation through ill health in 1963 (Kelly and Lester 2005: 13) – a controversy that might, of course, have died down had Home (as he almost managed to do) held on to Number 10 Downing Street at the general election fought a year later. The party’s decision to open up the process to membership involvement for the first time occurred after the landslide electoral defeat of 1997 exacerbated a feeling 18 T. Bale and P. Webb among activists that they had been ‘betrayed’ by an irresponsible and unruly parliamentary elite – a mood that meant that pressure for greater democratisation coming from the grassroots ‘Charter Movement’ that had previously been easily dismissed became unstoppable. Giving the membership a say in electing the leader was also, it should be said, used as a quid pro quo by a leader (William Hague) for wide-ranging (and centralising) organisational reforms that might otherwise have been rejected at grassroots level. In the case of the Labour Party, the major shift was from election by parliamentary elites to election by electoral college representing the various federated elements of the party organisation. The immediate pressure for such a change was generated by the factional alliance of disaffected left-wing activists and trade union leaderships. For the Liberal Democrats, and their predecessors, internal democracy was all of a piece with their wider enthusiasm for maximising participation and subsidiarity, with their cash-strapped reliance on their membership’s voluntary work and donations, and with their desire to do all they could to differentiate themselves from the two ‘old’ parties. Underlying all of these reforms, however, it is possible to discern an increasingly pervasive sense (a zeitgeist, if you like) that leadership elections should – as with many other processes in contemporary Britain – no longer be the exclusive preserve of elites.

Dynamics of party leadership contests As British leadership contests have become more democratic, they have become longer, more public and probably more expensive. They have, not, however, become that much more competitive. The number of candidates in leadership elections has fluctuated rather than definitively increased (see Table 2.2). And, although there is some prima facie evidence to suggest that margins of victory have diminished, there are – as the following account of the dynamics of leadership contests since 1965 shows – plenty of examples both of tight races occurring before democratisation and easy victories chalked up in its wake. Our account also makes clear that involving the ‘rank and file’ in choosing the party leader has not, contrary to some predictions, made it any more likely that familiar ‘old-hands’ will win out against lesser-known ‘new kids on the block’. If anything, UK parties play it less safe than they used to. When Alec Douglas-Home stepped down as Leader of the Opposition in the spring of 1965, the parliamentary ballot to replace him took little time to arrange and only one round of voting was required after Reggie Maudling and Enoch Powell conceded defeat to Ted Heath. The contest – the first which saw Conser- vative MPs actually elect their leader rather than him ‘emerging’ from an opaque process of consultation – was a relatively good-natured one, fought between former cabinet colleagues. Policy and ideology did not play a big part – rather surprisingly perhaps since Powell was already something of a free-market zealot, whereas Heath and the much-fancied Maudling were far less averse to state intervention. Even though the three were very different characters, personality was not that much of an issue either – partly because, by being middle-class Table 2.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in the UK (1965–2012)

All leadership contests Leadership contests (full membership vote)

Number of candidates Percentage of elections Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 15 1 22 2 31 2 33 3 15 3 11 4 12 4 11 5 or more 27 5 or more 22

Average number 3.2 candidates Average number 2.7 candidates Margin between top two finishers1 25.3 Margin between top two finishers 11.8 N 26 N 11

Note 1 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. 20 T. Bale and P. Webb rather than upper-class, they all provided a contrast with Home and therefore more of a challenge to Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson – a provincial mer- itocrat with a quick wit and the common touch. The contest, since it was both brief and fought more within Westminster than through the media, was inexpensive. Fast forward ten years to Heath’s defeat by Margaret Thatcher, and one is dealing with a very different contest, even though it was fought under almost exactly the same rules. For one thing, the eventual victor, Margaret Thatcher, had a well-organised campaign team that took advantage of the fact that she was not expected to win. They did this by convincing a number of those who simply wanted rid of the incumbent that, unless they voted for her, a complacent Heath would win outright straight away and thus prevent other ‘big beasts’, whose personal loyalty to the former PM put them off challenging him in the first round, from slugging it out in the second. This (plus the fact that, unlike Heath, she did the obvious and went out of her way to talk to wavering MPs) maximised her vote and gave her such momentum that by the time MPs came to vote again she was unstoppable. No matter that she was widely regarded as less voter-friendly and more likely to polarise the Party than the man who finished second, Willie Whitelaw. Thatcher also fought a campaign in the media, relying heavily on the advice of outside professionals. Moreover, it was a campaign based not just on personality but also on ideology (see Thatcher 1975). Extensive academic re- analysis of the parliamentary voting makes it clear that her triumph reflected the fact that the centrist majority of Tory MPs not only wanted a change but were, for the most part, persuaded to throw in their lot with the party’s right – those who saw the failure of the government led by Heath between 1970 and 1974 as merely the latest instalment in a long-term surrender to the corporatist left and the permissive society that now had to be resisted and reversed. By 1979 Labour and the Liberals also had new leaders, Harold Wilson having surprised everybody by stepping down, after more than a dozen years at the top and Jeremy Thorpe bowing to the inevitable by resigning after eight years of Liberal leadership were ended by a scandalous court case. Since Thorpe’s party had decided henceforth to hand the responsibility for electing its leader over to the party in the country, it then staged what at the time was by far the longest contest for leader, with David Steel elected two months after his predecessor’s resignation. The campaign, however, attracted far less interest than had the scramble to succeed Wilson as Labour leader. Since this involved only the parliamentary party, it was a shorter affair, involving three ballots each separated by seven days. For the first time ever, the eventual winner did not top the first ballot, James Callaghan overhauling Michael Foot in round two. As had been the case at all Labour leadership contests in the post-war period, 1976 was ultimately an ideological rather than a personality-based contest, the initial ballot(s) effectively deciding who, come the final round, would represent the right and who would lead for the left. This pattern was repeated in 1980. In the wake of Labour’s general election defeat the previous year, and before the party could complete its move toward Party leaders in the United Kingdom 21 the electoral college system that would give the trade unions and the constituency parties a major role in choosing the next leader, Callaghan outraged activists by resigning so as to leave the decision to MPs only. This time, however, it was the left that emerged victorious, with Michael Foot needing only two rounds to win, although his margin of victory – just ten votes out of 258 – reflected the split in the party that was soon to lead a number of Labour MPs into founding or subsequently joining the new, self-consciously centrist Social Democratic Party. Indeed, some of those who left actually voted for Foot, whose selection came to be widely regarded as electorally disastrous, in order to give their new venture the best start possible, although the main reason for his win was that he was a more conciliatory figure than either Tony Benn to his left or Denis Healey to his right. Not for the first or last time, then, a party prioritised (internal) acceptabil- ity over (external) electability, with only cursory consideration given (often because there is little to choose between candidates in this respect) to their competence and experience (Stark 1996). The SDP eventually resolved that the new party’s leaders would be elected in a ballot (using the alternative vote) of all members – a form of democracy that they believed would ensure that the views of zealous activists would be out- weighed by their more passive, but presumably more moderate, fellow members. The winner of the first leadership contest – one fought mainly on style rather than substance, was Roy Jenkins. When, after forming an electoral alliance with the Liberals for the 1983 elections, the SDP failed to ‘break the mould’ of British politics Jenkins stepped down and David Owen, the man he beat in the first leadership contest, was promptly declared leader unopposed. Owen’s successor, Bob Maclennan, took the leadership in exactly the same way after the Alliance suffered a similar fate at the hands of the electoral system in 1987, and then effectively did himself out of a job by presiding over the merger which created the Liberal Democrats, who employed the SDP’s system to elect the left-leaning Paddy Ashdown as their first leader. Later that same year, in October 1988, Labour made use of its electoral college system for the second time. The first time it had been used, in 1983, the college had delivered victory to Neil Kinnock, whose decisive win in only one round against a lone centrist and two left-wingers owed almost as much to his relative youth, his ebullient personality and his rhetorical skills as it did his ‘soft- left’ political stance. Those qualities and that stance disguised a determination to modernise his party and bring it back into the ideological centre-ground. This caused consternation among left-wingers, whose standard-bearer was Tony Benn, who had been denied a crack at the leadership in 1983 because he lost his seat in the general election earlier that year. Kinnock, however, cruised to crushing majorities in all three sections of the electoral college in 1988, re-energising his leadership and effectively marginalising the ‘hard-left’ for good. When Kinnock stepped down after failing to prevent the Tories winning a fourth consecutive term in 1992, John Smith, who was some way to the right of Kinnock, won over 90 per cent in the electoral college against a rival, Bryan Gould, who was only a little further to the left than he was. 22 T. Bale and P. Webb Labour’s failure to win the 1992 general election owed something (though not of course everything) to the fact that the Conservatives had replaced their iconic but increasingly unpopular leader, Margaret Thatcher, with the more emollient and relatively fresh-faced John Major. Although, once the contest was called, the transfer of power was relatively swift – the whole process took just a few weeks – it was the culmination, though not in any sense the end, of a long drawn out struggle which mixed ideological and personality issues. Thatcher had already been challenged in November 1989 but only by a relatively unknown MP (Anthony Meyer) who was prepared to act as a ‘stalking horse’ in order to demonstrate the level of discontent with Thatcher and maybe even to trigger a second round and the entry of more heavyweight contenders. In the event, one out of six Tory MPs failed to back their leader. Just as importantly, Meyer’s challenge confirmed something that was always implicit in the rules but which nobody was quite sure could or should be done, namely that it was indeed possible to challenge (and in theory replace) a sitting Conservative Prime Minister. A year later, Michael Heseltine, a pro-European pragmatist who had resigned from Thatcher’s cabinet in spectacular fashion a few years previously and had since been conducting what some saw as a slow-burn (and not always very subtle) campaign for the leadership, was practically forced into a challenge by the resignation of Thatcher’s Deputy Prime Minister over EU policy. Heseltine’s loyal supporters conducted an efficient media and parliamentary campaign operation on his behalf, emphasising above all that the party could not now hope to beat Labour at the next election with Thatcher at the helm. Thatcher, like Heath before her, all but declined to campaign, believing her best bet was to be seen to be getting on with the job and performing on the world stage. Even worse, she left her organisation, such as it was, in the hands of people who were incompetent and out of touch with their parliamentary colleagues. As a result, although she managed to beat Heseltine in the first ballot she failed to achieve the necessary 15 per cent margin over him and, after it became clear that she had no chance of winning in the second round, she announced she would not be standing so as to allow others (principally the man who was effectively her anointed successor, John Major) to enter and, as eventually happened, ensure that Heseltine did not take over. Major, it appeared, was the ideal candidate: he represented ‘Thatcherism with a human face’ and his elevation to the leadership wrong-footed Labour, helping the Tories to yet another election win in 1992. But gratitude is a perishable com- modity in politics. Things began to go wrong for the government almost immediately after the election and the keepers of the Thatcherite flame – and Thatcher herself – made it known that they had picked the wrong man. Labour, which opened up a big lead, was perfectly content, however, with its choice, John Smith. Indeed, Smith might well have led them to victory in 1997 had he not become the first major party leader to die in office since 1963. In the event, that task fell to Tony Blair. Blair, an out-and-out centrist ‘moderniser’ had won the leadership in July 1994 against more traditionally left-leaning opponents after a campaign that lasted a couple of months, attracted plenty of media attention, and Party leaders in the United Kingdom 23 saw him, as the clear frontrunner, raise almost £90,000 in donations – three times that of his two opponents put together (see Quinn 2012: 211–13, for a breakdown of donations at all leadership elections since 2001). Like Smith and Kinnock (at least in 1988) Blair had secured majorities in all three sections of the electoral college, each section (PLP, members, unions and affiliated societies) now having a third of the votes and its members being balloted for the first time as individuals (using AV) rather than using votes cast en bloc by union leaders and CLP management committees. This easy win set Blair up for 13 years as Labour leader, the last four of them blighted not only by the Iraq war but also by continual tension with his Finance Minister, Gordon Brown, who believed that Blair had reneged on an agreement back in 1994 that he would hand over to Brown at some point in exchange for Brown agreeing not to stand against him for the leadership. When Blair eventually gave way in 2007, Brown was able to assume the leadership without a contest, having used his position as out-and-out favourite to secure the signatures of so many Labour MPs that none of his putative opponents could meet the nomination requirements. His tenure as prime minister, however, proved disastrous for Labour and he resigned as Labour leader after the 2010 election. There then followed the longest leadership contest in Labour’s history, effectively lasting from May until September 2010. Despite the fact that it was conducted in the press and on the air as well as at party hustings – and despite the fact that, with over £1.1 million donated to candidates, it was the most expensive yet held in the UK – the contest attracted relatively little media and public interest. Indeed, the latter was only piqued right at the end when it was revealed that the younger (and less-fancied) of the two Mili- band brothers, Ed, had snatched victory from former Foreign Secretary, David. Ed’s win was made all the more intriguing by the fact that his older brother got more support than he did from both Labour MPs and MEPs and ordinary party members, making it obvious that he owed his narrow victory entirely to the 9 per cent of those eligible trade unionists who had bothered to vote, most of whom seem to have taken their cue from their unions’ endorsements (see Jobson and Wickham-Jones 2011). Ed may have been the ‘unity candidate’, supposedly able to build bridges between ‘Brownites’ (of which he was one) and ‘Blairites’ (his brother’s camp), but (his detractors argued) only if unity meant keeping union leaders, who were effectively the party’s paymasters, happy. The biggest winners from Labour’s decision to choose Brown and then, as some saw it, ‘the wrong Miliband’ were the Conservatives and their leader David Cameron, who had become prime minister in 2010 following his victory in the Tory leadership contest of 2005. Cameron was the third Conservative leader elected under a system introduced in 1998 which gave ordinary members the right to decide between whichever two candidates came first and second in the exhaustive ballots of Tory MPs. The system had been introduced by William Hague, who had taken over in 1997 after a three-week contest (one fought under the old ‘MPs-only’ rules) which had followed Major’s resignation the day after the general election – a decision which was wholly understandable given that the 24 T. Bale and P. Webb disloyalty displayed by so many of his parliamentary colleagues had continued even after his unprecedented decision to call (and fight and win) a leadership contest in 1995 in order, he hoped, to ‘lance the boil’. The 1997 contest saw Hague emerge (as the youngest candidate and after two initial ballots) as the champion of the Eurosceptic right against the more experienced, electorally more plausible, but ‘Europhile’ (and therefore internally more divisive) Ken Clarke. Clarke tried his luck again in 2001 when Hague resigned in the immediate aftermath of another crushing general election defeat. However, while he managed to occupy one of the top two spots and therefore make it through to the two-month long campaign in the country for the votes of newly enfranchised Tory members, he ultimately lost out to another Eurosceptic right-winger running, in effect, as the ABC (‘Anyone But Clarke’) candidate. Unfortunately for the Conservatives, Clarke’s nemesis was not the charismatic moderniser, Michael Portillo, whose youthful homosexual experiences and social liberalism made him the target of a vicious media campaign, but instead the beneficiary of that campaign, the much less well-known (and, it turned out, much less impressive) Iain Duncan Smith. By 2003, the parliamentary party lost patience with Duncan Smith but, fearing another long, divisive and expensive contest in the country, it contrived, after ditching the incumbent in a no-confidence vote, to nominate only one candidate, thereby handing the leadership on a plate to the nominee, the veteran Thatcherite Michael Howard. After Howard led the party to another defeat in 2005, he signalled that he would resign once the party had had the chance to vote on a reform package that, among other things, would see MPs regain their exclusive right to choose the party leader. The reforms failed to achieve approval but the need to design and then vote on them had the effect of producing what was in effect the longest leadership contest ever held in Britain, lasting from the spring through the autumn (when two parliamentary ballots were held) all the way up to December, when Cameron achieved an easy (two-to-one) victory over his more traditionally right-wing opponent, David Davis. The length of the contest undoubtedly helped Cameron (a relative newcomer but Howard’s favourite) establish himself as a man who could win over the voters and the media, particularly after an impressive performance at the Party’s annual conference. Whether the fact that over half of all the donations made to candidates in the 2005 Tory leadership contest (totalling just over £1 million and making it at that point the most expensive contest yet held) went to Cameron was a factor in, or merely a reflection of, his number-one status is a moot point. What is more certain is that Cameron’s victory unnerved not only Labour but in particular the Lib Dems. Back in 1999, their membership had elected (by a two-to-one margin) Charlie Kennedy, more on the basis of his easy-going, media-friendly personality than his centre-left, social democratic politics. Like many of his predecessors, however, Kennedy had been unable to convert his public popularity into votes and seats at general elections. Even so, he may have been able to survive his failure in 2005 to make the gains that many in his party had expected in the wake of Labour’s decline had it not been for a drinking problem that prompted Party leaders in the United Kingdom 25 colleagues to insist he step down. This triggered a two-month-long contest in the country, the only drama of which revolved around the sexuality of a couple of no-hope candidates. The result was a convincing victory for the interim leader, the respected veteran, Menzies (‘Ming’) Campbell over second-placed Chris Huhne, an ambitious (some thought overly-ambitious) former MEP who had only been elected to Westminster in 2005. Campbell’s victory owed little or nothing to ideology and everything to the need to elect someone who could pull the party together and provide a contrast with the previous incumbent. It quickly became obvious, however, that neither the media nor the public were impressed with a man all-too-easily portrayed (especially when compared with Cameron) as too old for the job. After only 18 months and as soon as it became clear the next general election was a couple of years away, Campbell was persuaded to step down. The ensuing contest between Chris Huhne and Nick Clegg seemed to turn not on policy or philosophical differences (which were minor) but on who would best (and in contrast to Campbell) appeal to voters – one reason perhaps why the campaign turned tetchy as it wore on. Given Clegg’s impressive performance in the televised debates at the 2010 general election, the membership’s decision to hand him a narrow win was the right one – and, in view of the scandal that in 2013 saw Huhne convicted and jailed for perverting the course of justice, a very lucky one, too.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders It used to be that leadership candidates, to have any chance of winning, had to have served for some considerable time in parliament and, ideally, in government; over time, however, this has become less important. The comparison between Cameron, the victor in 2005, and Heath, the winner in 1965, is instruc- tive: the former had been a Tory MP for four years and never served in government (unless one counts a short period as a special advisor in the early 1990s); the latter had been a Conservative MP for 15 years – four of them as Chief Whip and a further four as a fully-fledged cabinet minister. Partly, of course, a relative lack of ministerial experience is to be expected when a party picks its leader after a long (or longish) period in opposition: Tony Blair, after all, had had no opportunity to serve in government when he became Labour leader in 1994. On the other hand, Blair had been an MP for 11 years before his party gave him the nod – a parliamentary apprenticeship nearly three times as long as Cameron’s – and his predecessors as Labour leader had all been in the Commons longer than that when they took over. Since the Liberal Democrats had no experience of office until 2010, time served in government could not be a consideration for Britain’s third party, although time served in the Commons seemed to have some bearing – until, that is, 2007, when both candidates for the Lib Dem leadership were former MEPs who had only entered parliament two years previously. Nick Clegg’s victory not only confirmed the trend begun by David Cameron for service in the Commons not to count for much – a trend further cemented, one can argue, by the election of Ed Miliband to the Labour leadership. The 26 T. Bale and P. Webb Table 2.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in the UK (1965–2012)1

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women 0 33.3 0 0 02 3.8 Average age (in years)3 47 50.3 51.8 43.2 49.7 48.5 Percentage without political 0 0 0 0 0 0 seniority4 Average tenure (in years) 8.7 10.3 4.3 6.4 2.25 6.4 N 5 3 6 5 7 26

Notes 1 All figures calculated from 1965 onwards, including those who led their parties at the start of that year. 2 Margaret Beckett briefly served as Acting Leader of the Labour Party after the death ofJohn Smith in May 1994; she stood unsuccessfully in the ensuing leadership contest in July that year. 3 Average age refers to the average age at which individuals first became party leaders. 4 Seniority means that the leader had national legislative experience at the time of selection. 5 Average tenure of leaders for period since 2000 excludes the present incumbents at time of writing; it is therefore an underestimate of the true position (N = 23). three men also exemplify two additional and related developments. The first is the tendency of leaders and candidates to be younger than they once were (see Table 2.3). The second is the rise to the top of people who have gone straight into politics in research or advisory roles after leaving the elite universities of Oxford and Cambridge and done very little (if anything) else with their lives. This second trend does mean, however, that their relative youth and parliamentary inexperience is in some ways illusory: they were prowling the corridors of power long before the men who became (or tried to become) leaders before them ever had a chance to do so (see Cowley 2012). The word ‘men’, inciden- tally, is used advisedly in this context. Apart from Margaret Thatcher (in 1975 and 1990) and Margaret Beckett (in 1994), only one other woman has stood for the leadership of one of Britain’s three main parties. Even more depressingly, Dianne Abbot, who became Britain’s first ethnic minority leadership candidate when she stood for the Labour leadership in 2010, only succeeded in getting enough nominations because a number of her fellow MPs, although disagreeing with her left-wing politics, were determined to get her on to the ballot – either because they wanted to demonstrate Labour’s commitment to diversity or because they hoped she would steal votes from the rivals of whoever it was that they actually wanted to win.

Conclusion On past precedent at least, Labour’s current leader Ed Miliband, notwithstanding grumbling about poor personal poll ratings, will hang on to his job long enough to fight the next general election. After all, his party is famously culturally much more resistant to formally dismissing its leaders than its Conservative rival, even if it seems no less averse to putting pressure on them to resign. Its current rules Party leaders in the United Kingdom 27 for triggering a leadership contest also make sacking the man in charge harder to do (see Quinn 2012). All this may explain that, while there is only a two-year difference between the average age of the parties’ respective leaders since 1965, Labour leaders tend to stay a year longer in the job (81 months as opposed to 69 months to be exact) than their Tory counterparts. Certainly, it is only Conser- vative leaders (Heath, Thatcher and Iain Duncan Smith) who have been ‘sacked’ from the post. That said, the period since 1945 has witnessed many resignations under pressure. And the vast majority of resignations that are apparently voluntary (the exception is Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s shock departure) are, in fact, cases in which, had the leaders in question not ‘done the decent thing’ and ‘fallen on their sword’ they would sooner or later have been forced out. Invariably, such resignations came after presiding over electoral defeat or – more so in the case of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats than Labour – because they looked like they were heading for one. Indeed, perhaps one of the underlying trends in the UK is that parties – or at least some parties – are less forgiving than they once were. It remains a paradox, however, that after getting rid of their leaders because they were or had become seemingly incapable of winning the next election, they still continue to place as much of a premium on candidates’ ability to unite the party as on their presumed electoral appeal – unless of course the paradox can be solved by pointing to a widespread belief among politicians and pundits that voters cannot abide divided parties. More generally, the UK case provides little if any support for the idea that widening the selectorate – which is the most obvious development in the years under consideration – leads to radically different candidates, contests and results. True, leaders, aspirant and actual, have got younger over time and are increasingly drawn from the ranks of professional politicians who – as many voters see it – have ‘never had a proper job in their lives’. True, too, that the ideological differences between those trying to climb the famously ‘greasy pole’ are arguably less significant than once they were and therefore more accurately encapsul- ated in labels like ‘moderniser’ and ‘traditionalist’ than ‘right’ and ‘left’. However, this seems to us to have much more to do with wider developments in British (and indeed European) politics than with changes to party rules that confirm MPs in their role as gatekeepers even when they are not bypassing those rules (for instance, by nominating just one candidate) in order to eliminate the need for a contest involving the wider membership. It is perfectly possible, of course, if a full contest is triggered, that it may – just may – produce the ‘shock winner’ that broadcast and print media outlets always long for. Often, however, ex post facto analysis suggests that, in fact, the outcome even then should have come as much less of a surprise than it seemed to at the time – a useful reminder, perhaps, that politics is seldom as poetic as it is prosaic. What also stands out is that, over time, there has been some (but by no means complete) convergence in the way in which three main parties in Britain pick their leaders and regulate the process by which they do so. Most obviously, all now involve their ordinary members (albeit after an initial whittling down by MPs of the candidates on offer) either via the nomination process or (in the case 28 T. Bale and P. Webb of the Tories) by actual balloting. Even the electoral systems used by the three parties can be said to have converged, with the Conservatives’ system of exhaustive ballots not a million miles from the one-shot alternative vote systems now used by both the other parties. On the other hand, Labour continues to compli- cate matters by dividing its selectorate into different sections – a practice which, given the power of the unions, could be said (especially in a close race, such as the one that took place in 2010) to deny ordinary members the final say in the process. When it comes to regulation, however, Labour is no different from the other parties: to take just one example, all of them now demand that each candidate publishes the extent and source of donations and spending. This trend towards transparency is part of a wider move in that direction when it comes to party finances, but it is also a function of another development over time, namely the increasing length of contests – or at least those contests that are not deliberately short-circuited by MPs agreeing on a single candidate and therefore denying ordinary members a vote, as the Tories did in 2003 and Labour did four years later. As contests have become longer, and as they have involved more people, they have almost certainly become more expensive, the note of qualification made necessary by the fact that, prior to the move toward greater transparency, we have no way of knowing exactly how much candidates spent or, indeed, where they got their money. Similarly, without conducting a full content analysis of press and broadcast coverage, it is impossible to state with certainty whether contests have become more ‘mediatised’ as they have opened up to more people and got longer. On balance, we suspect that – beyond the advent of multi-channel, 24/7 broadcasting facilitating more public hustings and debates – they have not. The shorter, ‘closed’ contests of yesteryear were intensively reported upon, even if that meant that outsiders had to rely on second-hand information rather than first-hand impressions. Conversely, today’s longer, ‘open’ contests often encounter a degree of media fatigue, especially if the contests in question are seen to mean very little – something which has often applied to those held by the third party and to those held by opposition parties given little chance of winning the next general election: Labour’s 2010 contest, enlivened only by the fact that on that occasion talk of fratricide gave it an extra edge, is only the most recent example. That the winning margin in that particular contest was so small should not be taken as proof positive that, over time, contests have become more competitive. If there is a pattern, it is that the last few contests in the three main parties are about as close as those which took place from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, a few years after which there were some fairly easy wins for the eventual victor. The fact that contests involving ordinary members appear to be closer than those that did not is probably merely a reflection of that pattern rather than an indication that widening the selectorate boosts competitiveness, although we may of course have to revise that opinion if the number of walkovers continues to decline over the next couple of decades. Generally, the number of candidates has fluctuated, too – but not massively so and in no obvious way. Typically, third party contests throw up slightly fewer candidates and they are (certainly if we Party leaders in the United Kingdom 29 use sex as our measure) also less diverse, which suggests that the number and diversity of candidates varies mainly and simply according to the size and composition of parliamentary parties. On present trends, then, we would predict that fields will stay small, that contests will vary when it comes to competitiveness and media interest, and that over time (albeit slowly) more women will not only stand but stand a realistic chance of repeating Margaret Thatcher’s unprecedented and sadly so-far unique achievement.

Notes 1 For detailed coverage of the contests and results in this chapter, see Quinn (2012), Heppell (2007, 2010), Denham and O’Hara (2008) and Bale (2011, 2012). 2 If no candidate surpassed this threshold on the first ballot, then the candidate with the least votes was eliminated and a further ballot conducted. This process continued until someone achieved the necessary margin of victory, though only an absolute majority was required after the first round. Note that candidates would sometimes withdraw from later ballots even if not strictly required to do so under the rules of the contests. However, it was also possible for candidates to enter the contest after the first ballot had taken place (as in 1990, when Douglas Hurd and the eventual victor John Major joined Michael Heseltine in the contest after Margaret Thatcher withdrew). 3 Note that only those affiliated union members who agreed to pay a ‘political levy’ over and above their regular union dues were entitled to vote in the electoral college. 4 A further reform of the electoral college had added the party’s MEPs to its parliamentary party section in 1992. 5 We are grateful to Michael Steed, former President of the Liberal Party and principal designer of the electoral college system used in 1976, for clarifying the way in which it worked. 6 The SAOs are ancillary bodies such as the Liberal Democrat Parliamentary Candidates Association; the Liberal Democrat Agents Association; Liberal Democrat Youth and Students; Liberal Democrat Women; the Association of Liberal Democrat Trade Unionists; the Association of Liberal Democrat Councillors; and the Liberal Democrat Ethnic Minorities Association. 3 The selection of party leaders in Belgium

Jean-Benoit Pilet and Bram Wauters

Introduction Belgium is generally known as a political system in which parties play a dominant role. The country is often considered a textbook example of a so-called ‘partitocracy’ (Deschouwer et al. 1996; De Winter and Dumont 2006). Needless to say then, the leaders of these political parties are crucial and powerful actors. The office of party president is generally recognised as the most important position in the party and as the most powerful one in Belgian politics apart from those of the federal and regional prime ministers. This raises the question of who decides on their selection and deselection. People holding the keys in this selection process are important king-makers, and have a large indirect impact on political decision-making in Belgium. Tradition- ally, congresses with party delegates were in charge in most parties. Most of the time, only one candidate screened by the party elite was presented to these congresses, which almost always approved this candidate with a large majority. This has changed, however, as almost all Belgian parties have adopted direct member votes to select their leader. Belgium has a large number of parties. Between 1968 and 1980, all established nationwide parties split into a Flemish party and a French-speaking party. In 1968, the Christian Democrats split into the Flemish CVP (now CD&V, ‘Christian Democratic & Flemish’) and the French-speaking PSC (now CDH, ‘Humanist Democratic Centre’). In 1971, the Belgian liberals became the Flemish PVV (now OpenVLD, ‘Flemish Liberals and Democrats’) and the French-speaking PRL (now MR, ‘Reform Movement’). Finally, the socialists split in 1978 into the Flemish SP (now SP.a, ‘Socialist Party – Dif- ferently’) and the French-speaking PS (‘Socialist Party’). From a three-party system Belgium became a six-party system. At the same time, new regionalist parties were created: Volksunie (VU) (‘People’s Union’, now N-VA, ‘New Flemish Alliance’) in Flanders, RW (‘Walloon Rally’) in Wallonia and FDF (‘Front for the defence of French-speakers’) in Brussels. Later on, in the 1980s, the Ecologists (Ecolo and Agalev) entered the political scene, followed by the Flemish extreme right (Vlaams Blok, now Vlaams Belang, ‘Flemish Interest’) and by a small francophone extreme right (FN). The emergence of Party leaders in Belgium 31 new parties was made even easier by the use of proportional representation for all elections in Belgium. In this chapter, we focus on the following ten parties: CD&V, CDH, PS, SP.a, OpenVLD, MR, Ecolo, Groen, N-VA, Vlaams Belang. These parties held, in 2012, a minimum of five seats (out of 150) in the federal lower chamber (House of Representatives).

Who is the party leader? Identifying the real leader of the party in Belgium was for most of the post-war era a very easy task. The real leader was simply the one formally empowered as such by party statutes, namely the party president or party chairman. All party statutes clearly mention this position as the leading position in the party. And, as previous analyses have confirmed on several occasions, the position of the party chairman is genuinely important in Belgium, and the power he exerts is considerable (Deschouwer 1994; Fiers 1998; Deschouwer 2009). He is the leader of the party in central office. He manages the everyday life of the party and organises the contact with party members, party delegates and elected officials of the party at all levels (local, provincial, regional, national/federal and European). He is also, in most cases, the electoral leader of the party between elections, and, most importantly, during the electoral campaign. He is the person in charge of con- veying the message of the party in the media. He has discretionary power to select the ministers of the party. He also supervises the selection of candidates for elections as well as the selection of the leaders of the parliamentary groups in the various federal and regional assemblies. Finally, in a country often depicted as one of the most perfect examples of ‘partitocracy’ (Dewachter 1987; Deschouwer et al. 1996; De Winter and Dumont 2006), the party presidents play a central role in the negotiations to form coalition governments after the elections. On top of that, party presidents are also often involved in major reforms decided by the government during its term. For instance, the various state reforms that have gradually transformed Belgium into a federal state have been negotiated directly by party presidents and not by members of the government, except the prime minister who is always involved. Unlike in Westminster countries, the function of party leader does not coincide with that of leader of the parliamentary party (or parliamentary parties as there are several assemblies in the federal state). This does not impact, however, on the party chairman’s authority as the main decision-maker on the policy stances and voting behaviour of his party’s parliamentarians. The leader of the parliamentary party acts rather as an intermediary between the top party elite (including the party president) and the parliamentary party: he communicates decisions taken by the party elite to the backbenchers and enforces party discipline (if necessary), and, when required, warns the party elite of (possible) discontent among backbenchers (De Winter 1998). The only role that was not taken over by the party president is that of leader of the party in government. And the explanation is straightforward: Belgian 32 J.-B. Pilet and B. Wauters parties apply an incompatibility rule between the position of party president and member of a government. Therefore, in Belgian parties, the party president is not and cannot be the leader of the party in government. When party leaders become a member of an executive, they have to resign from their position as party president. This rule has had a direct implication for the party that is deliv- ering the prime minister. For most of the period under study (1965–2012), the same party, i.e. the Flemish Christian Democratic party (CD&V, formerly CVP), has delivered the prime minister. The only exceptions were between 1999 and 2008 (Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, OpenVLD) and from 2011 onwards (Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo, PS). When a party delivers the prime minister, this person is the true leader of the party. The only task of the party leader then is the management of the party organisation. And in most cases, the party president had to receive the informal endorsement of the prime minister to be (s)elected as party chairman. It has happened a few times in Belgian political history that very ambitious party leaders, frustrated by their subordinate role vis- à-vis the prime minister of the same party, have clashed openly with their prime minister (De Gucht versus Verhofstadt in OpenVLD; Tindemans versus Martens in CD&V). This has mostly resulted in an outcome to the detriment of the party chairman. Yet, the leadership of party presidents – except for the party of the prime minister – has become less obvious in recent years. In particular, in the last 15 years, it is less easy to determine who the real leader is in many parties. The reason is that leaders of the party in government have become more important. At the federal level, first, all parties of the coalition have a deputy prime minister. This deputy prime minister is the leader of the party in government, and participates in what is called the kern, that is a meeting of the core ministers of the ruling coalition. As the role of the ‘kern’ has grown in recent years, the leader of the party in government has become more important. The francophone liberal party (MR, formerly PRL) even included in its statutes in 2000 an official role for the leader of the party in government. This evolution is also visible at regional level. The minister-presidents of the main two regions, Flanders and Wallonia, are prominent political figures. And in some cases they can even compete with the party president and the leader of the party in federal government for the leadership of the party. This also has to do with the fact that there are no national parties anymore in Belgium: all parties are organised on the regional level, which could explain the powerful position in the party of regional government ministers. This is, for example, the case of the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) in recent years. In 2004, the party president, Yves Leterme, became minister-president of Flanders. He then abandoned the position of party president but remained in reality the true leader of his party. His successor in 2007 as minister-president of Flanders, Kris Peeters, is today as important, if not more so, than the actual party president, Wouter Beke. The growing importance of leaders of the party in government has had one significant consequence in several parties: the rule of incompatibility between the position of party president and of member of an executive has not always Party leaders in Belgium 33 been applied. This was the case for example for Didier Reynders who was at the same time president of the francophone liberal party (MR) and deputy prime minister and minister of finance between 2004 and 2011, but also for Joëlle Milquet who was president of the francophone Christian Democrats (CDH, formerly PSC) and deputy prime minister and minister of employment between 2008 and 2011. This evolution shows the growing importance of members of executive in Belgium and the reduced prestige and power of party presidents. All of this makes it more and more difficult to set a priori a rule for identifying the party leader within Belgian political parties. Yet, taking into account the historical importance of party presidents, the fact that this position is the one that has been most clearly defined in party statutes of all parties, and that it has been the target of efforts for a more direct role for party members in its election, we focus on this position. One last element has to be added. Some parties function or have functioned with more than one party president. This is the case for the francophone green party, Ecolo. The party has functioned since its creation in 1980 with a team of secretaries-general. The size of this team has been gradually reduced from up to eight in the mid-1980s to three in the 1990s, and finally to two co-presidents since 2007. The statutes of Ecolo provide that the team of presidents should consist of one male and one female, and of one president from Brussels and the other from Wallonia. Another party, the francophone liberal party (PRL at the time, MR now) has also experienced a dual presidency, in 1990, though it was not explicitly provided for in the party’s statutes.

Rules organising leadership selection In this section, the rules organising the selection of party presidents in Belgium, and their evolution since 1965, are described. And without any doubt, the most crucial evolution has been the gradual widening of the selectorate. Most Belgian parties have evolved from a representative system, in which party delegates selected the party president, to a direct election system, in which all members are eligible to vote for the party presidency. In 1965, the party landscape was dominated by three nationwide parties: the Christian Democratic party (CVP-PSC), the Belgian socialist party (PSB-BSP) and the liberal party (PVV-PLP). The presidents of these three parties were selected by party congresses, which were composed of delegates of the constituency parties. These delegates were middle-level party elites appointed by the members at the constituency level. The procedure was somewhere between the selection by an oligarchy of party elites and by a members’ vote. This system very much conformed to the consociational model by allowing the party elite to control leadership selection while at the same time incorporating members in the process through delegation. Moreover, the role of party delegates was not as important in practice as it was in theory. As explained above, when a party president became a member of an executive, they had to resign from party 34â J.-B. Pilet and B. Wauters presidency. This situation arose rather frequently. Interim leaders were then appointed, usually by the party executive or the party council and not by the Congress. Such interim leaders were afterwards easily affirmed by the Congress in ‘contests’ with often only one candidate (Maes 1990: 43; Fiers 1998). In these cases, the Congress delegates, in theory holding the power to select the party leader, saw their prerogative hijacked by the party executive or the council. Between 1968 and 1980, all nationwide parties split. In more or less the same era, new parties were created and started to gain support. For the selection of party leaders, as said above, the most striking evolution is the gradual shift to full member votes in almost all Belgian parties (Fiers 1998; Biondi et al. 2000; Maes 1990). The French-Âspeaking Christian Democrats (CDH, formerly PSC) were the first to adopt the measure in June 1970, and in 1975 the francophone regionalist party, FDF, that was founded ten years earlier, followed by giving their grassroots members the right to select the leader at a party conference. In 1980, two newcomers, the green parties, Ecolo and Groen (formerly Agalev) had grassroots participation at the very heart of their message. In line with this ideological

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

CD&V (1993) (1969) CDH (1970) (1969) SP.A (1995) (1978) PS (1997) (1978) OpenVLD (1993) (1965) MR (1989) (1971) Groen (1995) (1981) Ecolo (1981) N-VA (1999) (1965) Vlaams Belang (2010) (1978)

Figure 3.1âInclusiveness of the selectorate in Belgium (1965–2012) (source: party constitutions). Note Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate. Party leaders in Belgium 35 positioning, Ecolo and Groen adopted democratic intra-party rules for leadership and candidate selection (at all levels, national, constituency and local). The French-speaking Greens (Ecolo) adopted a direct members’ vote system for the selection of their leaders, though this election was organised during a party congress, and not through a postal ballot or voting at local party offices. This initiative put pressure on other French-speaking parties, and not surprisingly, the French-speaking Liberals opened up their leadership selection process in January 1990. The Flemish Greens were more modest by selecting their leader in a party council (in which nevertheless representatives of the grassroots – without any formal political position – were present). The next wave of internal democratisation took place at the beginning of the 1990s, mainly in Flanders: the radically transformed liberal party OpenVLD was the first in Flanders to introduce real internal elections (with polling booths in every local section) for party leadership in June 1993 (De Winter 2000). The radical party transformation, of which the leadership primaries were an important element, attracted a lot of media attention and the party also topped the opinion polls. The Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V, formerly CVP) promptly followed the example of OpenVLD in December 1993. The Dutch-speaking Social- ists (SP.a, formerly SP), the French-speaking Socialists (PS) and the Dutch-speaking regionalists (Volksunie) followed a bit later. The two parties which emerged from the splitting of the VU (N-VA and Spirit) also adopted this technique. The situation in 2012 is that only one party, the extreme right Vlaams Belang, does not organise the election of its party president through a full member vote. The party only had two presidents until 2010: its founding leader, Karel Dillen, and its successor, Frank Van Hecke who was directly chosen by Dillen. In 2010, the system was reformed for the selection of Bruno Valkeniers, who was succeeded recently by Gerolf Annemans. It is now the party council that holds a vote and the preferred candidate is subsequently acclaimed by a party conference. In general, parties change their internal rules (including those about the selection of the party leader) when finding themselves in an awkward position, i.e. after a (huge) electoral defeat, when being kicked out of government, when suf- fering decline in membership figures, etc. (Cross and Blais 2012b; Scarrow 1999b). For most Belgian parties, the national elections of 1991 with the breakthrough of the extreme-right Vlaams Belang and the (enormous) decline in vote shares of all established parties (‘Black Sunday’), provided a shock inviting them to consider internal change. However, the relationship between electoral defeat and the introduction of direct member votes is less straightforward than in other (Westminster) countries (Wauters 2013). Owing to internal resistance by powerful middle-level elites (either representatives of regional branches or social organisations), it took some time after the disastrous election results of 1991 to eventually introduce a direct member vote. The resistance of the middle-level elites was so fierce because they feared losing a large part of their power. Only when the party crisis was further exacerbated (by party scandals, by bad scores 36 J.-B. Pilet and B. Wauters in opinion polls or by bad publicity in the press), was the demand for reform so strong that resistance could be overcome. This was the case for CD&V and PS. Another scenario suggests that party elites have to be in a strong position in order to overcome middle-level resistance. This was most typical in SP.a where it was only after an unexpected victory in the 1995 elections that the party leader was in such a strong position that he finally could implement leadership primaries against the wishes of the regional branches in the party. The process to introduce leadership primaries in Belgium differs from that in Westminster countries mainly because the starting position is different. In West- minster countries, most of the time the parliamentary party is in charge of selecting the leader. When the party suffers an electoral defeat, this automatically also implies a weakening of the position of the parliamentary party, which facilitates taking away power from them. This is not the case in Belgium, where middle- level elites (typically through delegates at party conferences) were responsible for selecting the party leaders (Wauters 2013). Finally, we briefly discuss three other elements of the selection procedure for the party president in Belgium: the electoral formula, the length of term and the deselection procedure. The most frequent electoral formula used for the election of party presidents is the run-off system with a second round organised between the two candidates having obtained most votes on the first ballot with neither of them having obtained an absolute majority. The system is currently used by seven parties (see Table 3.1). It should be noted, however, that a second round is seldom used as most of the time one candidate obtains already the required majority in the first round (see below). Interestingly, the run-off system became the most common voting system after the shift to full member vote. Before that, when party leaders were selected by delegates at party conferences, plurality was the norm. Now- adays a plurality rule is only used for the election of the leaders of CDH and N-VA. One last party uses a different voting system.1 The Flemish Greens (Groen) elect their leader through elimination ballots with majority requirements, and that is why their members have to come to a party congress to vote. Such a system cannot easily be used if elections of the party leader are organised in voting stations around the country. The last element to highlight is that all parties but one who require the winning candidate to reach a threshold apply a requirement of 50 per cent + 1 of valid votes. The only exception was the Volksunie that required its leader to be supported by two-thirds of the delegates casting a vote. As for the length of term, this typically coincides with the length of a parliamentary term on the federal level, i.e. four years.2 In almost all Belgian parties, the number of terms is limited to two, meaning that party presidents can in principle remain in office for up to eight years. In contrast to selection rules, the deselection procedures are not extensively described in the party statutes. In some parties, they are not described at all. In those parties which define the procedure to deselect the party president, it appears that in general the deselectorates tend to be more exclusive than the selectorates. While party leaders are in general selected by all members, they Party leaders in Belgium 37 are, according to the party statutes, deselected by party councils or party executives (‘party bureau’). A last important element regarding the rules organising the selection of party presidents in Belgium are the regulations in the party statutes relating to who is eligible to be a candidate for party presidency, and how candidateship has to be formally filed. In most Belgian parties in the 1970s,3 candidates to become party leader had to be nominated by regional branches, called arrondissemental federations. These regional federations were organised on the level of an arrondissement, which coincided with the electoral multi-member districts at that time situated between local municipalities and provinces. In the CVP one had to be nominated by the national executive committee. In other parties (PS and VU), there was no nomination procedure, but one already had to be a member of a party committee at the national level. In the 2000s, the arrondissement level has disappeared in the nomination procedures, but also as a separate level in the party as a whole. An electoral reform enlarging the electoral districts in Belgium to the level of the provinces has made the arrondissement level superfluous in party organisation and, consequently, almost all parties have abolished this level of party organisation. The powerful position in the certification procedure, however, is not simply transferred from the arrondissement to the provincial level. Provincial sections are in some parties still able to nominate candidates, but nowadays candidates can also be put forward by (a number of ) local sections (and even by a number of individual members in OpenVLD). The general trend is an upgrading of the role of local sections and of unorganised members in the certification process. It is striking that while in the past the support of one federation was sufficient, nowadays a number of party sections at the same level have to express their support (for instance at least ten local sections from at least two provinces, who together count at least 5,000 members in SP.a). A novelty in comparison with the 1970s is seniority as a condition to be a candidate. Whereas in the 1970s this was not mentioned in any of the party statutes, now most parties expect candidates for party presidency to have been members for some time (ranging from six months in Ecolo to five years in the PS). All in all, it appears that in Belgian parties the conditions to become a candidate for the party leadership have been tightened over the years. It seems that because of the increase in inclusiveness of the selectorate (see Figure 3.1), this filtering function, which is now spread over a number of party actors, has become more important. In order to summarise the elements of this section dedicated to the formal rules organising the selection of party leaders/presidents within Belgian political parties, Table 3.1 provides an overview of the situation as for 2012.

Dynamics of party leadership contests In this section, we discuss the competitiveness of elections for party presidency in Belgium, with a specific look at the results of these elections as well as at the 38 J.-B. Pilet and B. Wauters Table 3.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Belgium (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

CD&V Party members 4 Run-off No procedure in party statutes CDH Party members 4 (max. 2 terms) Plurality Party bureau1 SP.a Party members 4 Run-off Party council2 PS Party members 4 Run-off Party council OpenVLD Party members 4 Run-off Party council MR Party members 4 (max. 2 terms) Run-off No procedure in party statutes Groen Party members 4 Elimination Party council ballot with majority requirements Ecolo Party members 4 (max. 2 terms) Run-off Party council N-VA Party members 3 Plurality No procedure in party statutes Vlaams Belang Party council 4 Run-off Party council with a two- third majority

Notes 1 Party bureau is a party organ composed in most cases of the parliamentary party, members of executives, delegates of party federations, and the party president and vice-presidents. 2 Party council means party delegates gathering in a party convention. dynamics of these campaigns. As shown in previous sections, almost all Belgian parties have experienced two systems of leadership selection: election by party delegates on the occasion of a party congress, and election by direct member vote. Therefore, this section is divided in two, with a general analysis followed by specific consideration of contests decided by full member votes. The advantage is twofold. On the one hand, it avoids confusion in understanding the dynamics of leadership selection in different systems. On the other hand, it allows identifying how changes in procedures organising the selection of party presidents may affect the dynamics of competition and the campaign for party presidency. The analysis of competitiveness of elections is based on two indicators: (1) the number of candidates running, and (2) the margin of victory for the winning candidate. Regarding the number of candidates, the average for all elections of party leadership contests is 2.1 candidates (see Table 3.2).4 Yet, the distribution is skewed. Almost 60 per cent of these contests saw only one candidate running. For the remaining cases, 19 per cent included two candidates, and 11 per cent were very competitive with five candidates or more. Now, if we separate out contests with a more open selectorate, when party leaders have been directly chosen by party members, we can observe that the situation is slightly more open. On average, there are 2.7 candidates and elections with only one candidate are a bit less frequent, representing just less than Table 3.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Belgium (1965–2012)

All leadership contests Full member votes and open primaries only

Number of candidates1 Percentage of elections Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 59.1 1 48.7 2 19.7 2 21.1 3 7.9 3 7.9 4 2.4 4 3.9 5 or more 11.0 5 or more 18.4

Average number 2.1 candidates Average number 2.7 candidates N 127 N 76 Margin between top two finishers2 28.9 Margin between top two finishers 30.5 N 42 N 29

Notes 1 Since the late 1990s, Ecolo organises elections between teams of candidates for the positions of secretaries-general/co-presidents. We counted each team as one candidate. 2 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. 40 J.-B. Pilet and B. Wauters 50 per cent of the cases (48.7 per cent). Yet, it remains that leadership contests are not very open and that, in many cases, grassroots members can only approve or disapprove the candidate put forward by the party elite. This becomes even more obvious considering that elections with many candidates predominantly happened in Ecolo in the early years of the party (1980s). At that time, the party was run by several secretaries-generals (between five and eight), and they were chosen by full member votes for each member of the team, meaning many candidates were running. In other words, the dominant pattern is an election with only one or two candidates. For example, both CD&V and SP.a have only experienced one election with more than one candidate. This overall impression of elections with low competitiveness is confirmed by the second indicator, which is the margin between the top two finishers on the first ballot. When at least two candidates are running, the gap between the first ballot leader and his most serious challenger ranges around one-third of valid votes (31.7 per cent). And there is no striking difference for contests organised as full member votes (33.0 per cent). Most of the time there is a candidate preferred by the party establishment who only has to struggle with a minor, often not well-known contender who obtains only a limited share of votes. The frontrunner is also often the incumbent president, or a new candidate who often had the chance to be interim president for a few months before the actual election by party members, giving him more notoriety and legitimacy. Actually, in only three elections under full member votes (FMV) was the margin of victory below 10 per cent. The most competitive contest was the election of Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb for the presidency of the PSC (now CDH) in 1996 when he won with 47.9 per cent compared to 47.8 for his opponent, Joëlle Milquet. The two other fairly competitive elections were the election of Geert Bourgeois who defeated Patrik Vankrunkelsven in the 2000 VU leadership contest with a difference of 7.8 per cent, and the recent election of Alexander De Croo who defeated Marino Keulen for the presidency of the Flemish liberal party (OpenVLD) in 2010 with a margin of victory of 9.9 per cent in the second round, after having finishing second in the first round less than one percentage point behind Keulen. OpenVLD and CDH are actually the only two parties with a record of several really competitive elections. These two parties were perhaps not accidently also the two parties that were first in their region to introduce a direct member vote to select their party leader. The lack of competitiveness in election for party presidency is also obvious when one looks at the dynamics of the pre-election campaign. Elections for the party presidency have attracted more media attention with the shift to full member vote. Candidates are interviewed a few times by national newspapers, radio and television to present their programme for the party. The ambiance of the intra-party campaign is covered by one or two articles during the campaign. Press coverage tends to increase when the competitiveness of the contest increases. In OpenVLD, for instance, both in 1997 and 2010, when the race was very close and the outcome of the contest uncertain, even opinion polls among OpenVLD party members were organised and published by a newspaper. Party leaders in Belgium 41 Yet, most of the campaign remains within the party. Candidates meet members in debates organised in most cities and regions. They also receive the list of members with their home addresses in order to send them their programme and a few letters stating the core principles and goals of their candidacy. Yet, further than that, the campaign is not very intense. And no party has so far felt the need to regulate the campaign very much, or more particularly to limit campaign expenses. Finally, in terms of content, in most cases, the campaign is about the personality of the candidates, and their ability to win elections and to lead the party into the next governing coalition. The main reason for this is that often there are no major ideological or programmatic differences between candidates. The exceptions are parties that are more divided internally, be it between institutionalised factions, or between less formal ideological tendencies. This is, for example, the case for the francophone Christian Democrats (CDH, formerly PSC), a party that has been historically composed of a more centre-left and a more centre-right faction, or for the Flemish Liberals (OpenVLD) where campaigns for the party presidency have often been contested by a candidate pushing the party to the right, and another towards the centre. A last example of intra- party divisions reflected by elections for the leadership of the party is Ecolo. The party has historically been divided on the issue of governmental participation, between pragmatists and ‘fundamentalists’ (Delwit and De Waele 1996). And when the party first entered government in 1999, its members elected afew months later a team of secretaries-general representing the tendency that was most critical of government participation.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders The objective of this section is twofold. First of all, it aims to portray party leaders in Belgium and to discuss in greater detail who they are in terms of gender, age and political seniority. But more importantly, the intention is also to identify how the characteristics of party leaders differ over time, across parties, between Flanders and French-speaking Belgium, but also across methods of leadership selection. In particular, one of the goals of this section is understanding whether, as claimed by Rahat and Hazan (2006) for methods of candidate selection, and also by Kenig (2009a) for party leaders, the empowerment of rank-and-file members does not favour the election of newcomers, but rather tends to lead to the re-election of incumbents, of male leaders and of leaders who have been involved in politics for a long time. For the analysis here, we selected only those leadership contests between 1965 and 20125 in which a party leader was selected for the first time. Contests which simply prolonged one’s stay in leadership office (re-election as incumbent) are not included. A party leader entering party leadership for a second time, but with an interruption in between, is, however, included. This was the case, for example, with Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb who became party leader in 1972 and in 1996. We also exclude the French-speaking green party Ecolo from our analysis since they have a collective leadership. It is not easy to compare the 42 J.-B. Pilet and B. Wauters representational quality of these collective leaders with cases of only one leader. Four characteristics of party leaders are discussed here: gender, age, whether the leader had held a position of MP or of minister at the national level before becoming party leader (seniority) and the length in office as party leader (see Table 3.3). In terms of gender, only seven women have been elected president of a Belgian party since 1965 (8 per cent of all party leaders, without counting Ecolo that functions with at least one woman among its secretaries-general). Moreover, their presence is a rather recent phenomenon. Six of these seven women party leaders have been elected since 1999. Only Annemie Neyts was a female party leader before that, when in 1985 she became president of the Flemish liberal party (PVV, now OpenVLD). Another element to note is that Annemie Neyts is also the only woman who became party leader under a method other than the full member vote. The six others were directly elected by party members. It should be noted that of the seven female party leaders, two have been president of the Flemish greens (Groen), two of the Flemish liberals (OpenVLD), one of the French-speaking Christian Democrats (CDH), one of the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V), and one of the Flemish socialists (SP.a). In other words, several parties have never (as of 2012) had a female party leader. This is the case for the French-speaking liberals (MR), the French-speaking socialists (PS), the Flemish regionalists (VU and N-VA) and the Flemish extreme right (Vlaams Belang). There clearly appears to be a left–right divide: parties from the (centre) left have had more female party leaders than have rightist parties. Finally, a last element worth mentioning is that, with the exception of Joëlle Milquet who was the leader of the francophone Christian Democrats (CDH) between 1999 and 2010, the six other female party leaders all led Flemish parties. The second characteristic of party leaders discussed in this volume is their age. In Belgium, the stereotypical party leader is in his forties. The average age of party leaders when they are elected is 46.5 years. Interestingly, this average has not changed much over time. Until the end of the 1960s, leaders were older,

Table 3.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Belgium (1965–2012)

1960s1 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women 0.0 0.0 7.7 4.3 20.0 8.0 Average age (in years)2 53.8 47.4 41.5 46.9 45.4 46.5 Percentage without political 0.0 15.8 30.8 13.0 8.0 14.8 seniority2,3 Average tenure (in years) 7.1 4.8 6.1 4.5 2.6 4.8 N 8 19 13 23 25 88

Notes 1 Leaders in office between 1965 and 1969, including leaders selected before 1965. 2 Average age and political seniority at time of first election as party leader. 3 Seniority means that the leader has national legislative or executive experience at the time of selection. Party leaders in Belgium 43 in their fifties. But since 1970, they are on average younger – in their forties. The youngest generation of party leaders was active in the 1980s. During this decade, there was a generational change. New leaders emerged and stayed at the top of their party for a long period, until the early 2000s. This was the case for Gérard Deprez (CDH), Guy Verhofstadt (OpenVLD), Herman Van Rompuy (CD&V), Jaak Gabriels (Volksunie), Louis Michel (MR) and Guy Spitaels (PS). Several of them were elected party president before entering parliament or government (see below). The next generational change occurred in the 2000s with the arrival of leaders in their early forties or even thirties like Alexander De Croo (OpenVLD), Caroline Gennez and Bruno Tobback (SP.a), Bart De Wever (N- VA), Wouter Beke (CD&V), Wouter van Besien (Groen), Benoît Lutgen (CDH), Charles Michel (MR), Jean-Michel Javaux, Sarah Turine and Emily Hoyos (Ecolo) and Bruno Tobback (SP.a). It is remarkable to note that in 2010, when Belgian parties negotiated for more than 500 days to form a new coalition government, except for the subsequent Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo (PS) and the extreme right party leader Bruno Valkeniers – who did not participate in these negotiations – all party leaders were in their thirties and forties. Across parties, party presidents of the two socialist parties (PS and SP.a) tend to be on average the oldest (average = 48.3), while the youngest average age is found in the Flemish greens (average = 44.4). But here again, there are no big differences to be observed. The third element of party leaders’ profile considered in this section is their political seniority. The goal is to determine whether being a member of the national parliament or of the national government is a precondition for becoming party president in Belgium. And what appears is that there is a significant minority (14.8 per cent) of party presidents who became leader of their party before being a member of any assembly or executive (see Table 3.3). The main difference to be noticed for this criterion is that there have been some changes over time, though the trend has not been linear. Having a party leader without seniority was more common in the 1980s, when an important generational renewal occurred (see above). Interestingly, the shift to full member votes has had no dramatic effect on the chances of becoming party president without any previous political record. It only slightly reduces the chances for a newcomer to be elected by rank-and-file members as party leader (only 12.8 per centof leaders elected under FMV had never served before in an executive or an assembly). We should note, however, that half of these inexperienced party leaders, directly elected by the rank and file, are found in the Flemish Green Party. Finally, an interesting element of reflection is the duration of party leaders in Belgium. On average Belgian party leaders remain in office a bit more than four years (see Table 3.3). A cursory look at individual party presidents shows that their length in office varies a lot. Some like Léo Collard (PS), Frans van der Elst (VU), Karel van Miert (SP.a), Karel Dillen (Vlaams Belang), Guy Spitaels (PS), Gérard Deprez (CDH), Frank Van Hecke (Vlaams Belang), Joëlle Milquet (CDH) and Elio Di Rupo (PS) have led their party for more than ten years. While others, like Frans Grootjans (OpenVLD), Yves Leterme (CD&V), 44 J.-B. Pilet and B. Wauters Antoine Duquesne (MR) or Etienne Schouppe (CD&V), have only been party president for a single year. There are also strong differences across parties. Some parties, like the Greens, and even more so the French-speaking Greens (Ecolo), have kept their leaders for very short periods. Ecolo has included a provision in its statutes requiring its team of secretaries-general/co-presidents to stand for re-election every two years. Turnover has also been high within Christian Democratic parties, on the French-speaking side until the mid-1980s, and on the Flemish side since the 1990s. On the contrary, other parties like Vlaams Belang, N-VA/VU or PS, have had a few long-lasting leaders. Another element to be underlined is the link between time spent in office and how leaders are (s)elected. Party presidents elected under FMV have on average remained a bit longer than three years in office. As has been shown, this is not because party leadership contests are more competitive since the empowerment of rank-and-file members (see Table 3.2). Nevertheless it seems that with the introduction of FMV, parties have been stricter in organising elections following the term of party presidency defined in their statutes. When presidents were chosen by party delegates, elections for party presidency were held less frequently. Yet, other explanations for the recent trend towards more short-lived party leaders in Belgium could also be provided. In particular, the mediatisation of politics seems to have shortened the life of party president. They have become more exposed as the main spokesperson of their party in the media (Poguntke and Webb 2005). And their role as electoral leaders seems to be more difficult in recent years. While until the early 1980s, 68.75 per cent of leaders facing an electoral defeat were able to remain in office, this was the case for only 44.11 per cent of them since 1981.6 Moreover, the fed- eralisation of Belgium has multiplied the number of executive positions. And since most Belgian parties apply a rule of incompatibility between the role of party presidents and any executive position, it has become more frequent for a party leader to resign early to enter government. The most illustrative example was Yves Leterme who became president of CD&V in 2003 and resigned one year later to become minister-president of Flanders. These explanations for the shorter period in office of Belgian party leaders could be linked to the reasons why they left office. It appears that the most frequent cause is forced resignation, especially after an electoral defeat. In such circumstances, leaders often prefer to resign before being formally removed by the party organs, or before being seriously challenged in a leadership election. Actu- ally, it is extremely rare that a party leader is defeated at the polls in an intra- party election. It has happened only three times in the last 20 years. The other frequent cause for the end of term as party leader is voluntary resignation. The explanation for this is the incompatibility rule imposed by most parties. There- fore, many party leaders resign to become a member of a government, especially when they were chairing an opposition party and have succeeded in bringing the party back to power. Party leaders in Belgium 45 Conclusion In this chapter, we have described the selection process of the party president in Belgium. We have shown that in the course of the 1990s almost all Belgian parties have opened up their leadership process to include party members. Belgium is, in that sense, a rather unique case from a cross-country perspective, as the introduction of closed party primaries has taken place in nearly all parties and earlier in comparison with other countries. This does not mean, however, that party members in Belgium are very powerful actors. In practice, the party elite have built-in control mechanisms allowing them to push the selection process in their preferred direction. First of all, parallel with the adoption of more open selectorates for the party leadership, the conditions to become a candidate have been tightened over the years. Support by party organs and seniority within the party provide a higher barrier than before. Second, the party elite often manages to limit the number of effective candidates. In almost half of the direct member votes, there is only one candidate. In these internal elections (which are effectively organised even when there is only one candidate) grassroots members can only approve or disapprove the candidate put forward by the party elite. And even when there are more candidates, there is often no real contest, as most of the time there is a candidate preferred by the party establishment who only has to struggle with a minor, often not well-known contender. Finally, party members can only seldom make a real programmatic or ideological choice as the campaign is often about the personality of the candidates or their ability to win the next elections or to enter government. In sum, party members are in practice not really empowered by the introduction of direct member votes. Some authors (Rahat and Hazan 2006; Kenig 2009a) even state that direct member votes increase the power of the party establishment. We have analysed a number of indicators to see whether this applies to Belgian parties. Our analysis confirms the thesis that it is more difficult to reach party leadership: this results from the fact that leaders elected by party members are on average older and tend to have more parliamentary experience. The effect is only marginal, however. Two other indicators appear to contradict the argument of a more powerful party elite. Female party leaders are more frequently elected in direct member votes compared to other selection methods, although their numbers remain limited. Second, party presidents tend to remain in office for shorter periods since the shift to full member votes. All in all, the Belgian case only offers limited support to the idea that empowering party members actually makes leadership selection more open.

Notes 1 Until the early 1990s, Ecolo used the single non-transferable vote to elect its secretaries-general (between five and eight). 2 The parliamentary term on the regional level is five years. 3 The comparison is much easier between the 1970s and nowadays because it is after the 46 J.-B. Pilet and B. Wauters split of nationwide parties and the creation of linguistically based parties, as the situation stands today. 4 Since the late 1990s, Ecolo organises elections between teams of candidates for the positions of secretaries-general/co-presidents. We counted each team as one candidate. 5 Party presidents in 1965 who were selected before that year are also included. 6 We have verified whether party presidents in office during an electoral defeat were able to remain leader of their party the year of the election and the year after. We excluded those cases when the party president resigned to become minister or prime minister. 4 Unanimous, by acclamation? Party leadership selection in Norway

Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Rune Karlsen

Introduction1 Norway has never been a prime example of the ‘party government’ model, but the position of political parties in society and public office had grown strong by the 1960s. All major parties eventually developed national headquarters and similar, nationwide membership organisations, with the (bi)annual congress of delegates, elected at the regional level, as the superior body (Svåsand 1994: 327; Allern 2010a: 20ff ). The parties have traditionally divided their leadership tasks between two or three main offices, if not between different people: the party chair, the parliamentary chair, and the possible prime minister. Historically, the power of these positions has differed between parties, but in the 1990s, Strøm (1993: 322) concluded that the party chair was considered the effective party leader in most parties. Since the 1960s, at least, these leaders have come to power through a semi- inclusive formal procedure across parties: he or she has been elected by the delegates at the national party congress (Svåsand 1992).2 But despite notable exceptions, contested leadership elections have been rare in Norway, at least officially (Strøm 1993; Heidar 1997). Mirroring an egalitarian political culture, party leaders have traditionally not risen ‘to power because of birth right or social position nor on the basis of (overt) political campaigns’; they have rather relied on party organisational experience and support (Heidar 1997: 129). The British norm of looking at strong party leadership as a quality in itself has been alien to Norwegian party politics (ibid: 130).3 However, in recent decades, comparative literature on party organisations – including the introduction to this book – suggests that we are witnessing a trend towards empowerment of the parliamentary party leader and more inclusive leadership selection in old democracies. Moreover, increased electoral competition for votes, decline of party membership figures, and media developments like the rise of television and the Internet have put new pressure on party leaders and significantly changed the external constraints on leadership selection – both in Norway and elsewhere.4 A stronger focus on candidates and politicians as individuals may have strengthened the party leader vis-à-vis the organisation, but can also have made leaders less autonomous, as their tenure is, perhaps, less 48 E.H. Allern and R. Karlsen secure than before. By the early 1990s, Strøm (1993: 344–5) concluded that leadership succession had at least become more openly contested in Norway than it used to be, due to increased mass media scrutiny of – and public debate on – party leadership positions. In this chapter, we analyse the development of the nature of party leadership and of the process of leadership selection and deselection in Norway from 1965 to 2012. We also look at the outcome of the various leadership elections in terms of the leaders’ social and political backgrounds and the length of party leadership. We concentrate on the seven parties persistently represented in the Norwe- gian Parliament (the Storting), from the left to the right: the Socialist Left (originally SF; from the 1975 Socialist Left Party, SV), the Labour Party (Ap), the Centre Party (originally the Farmers Party, Bp, from 1959, the Centre Party, Sp),5 the Christian People’s Party (KrF ), the Liberals (V), the Conservatives (H), and the Progress Party (FrP, Anders Lange’s Party, ALP, until 1977).6 Only the Socialist Left and the Progress Party were formed after 1960. The analysis is based on extensive, original data generated from a wide range of both written sources and interviews with key informants.7 On the whole, we find that the amount of organisational change regarding party leadership selection is small or modest in Norway. The findings do not provide much support for the hypothesis predicting empowerment of public party leadership offices at the expense of the extra-parliamentary party chair, nor have we seen a move towards more direct democracy in Norwegian party leadership elections. The formal selectorate of party leaders have formally been congress delegates in all parties during the entire period examined, but the actual choice between candidates seems to be made during the nomination process, which is headed by a national election committee. We conclude that the leadership selection is still closer to the semi-inclusive than the exclusive pole. At the same time, the dynamics and outcome of party leadership seem to have changed to some extent. Our findings confirm and strengthen Strøm’s conclusion from the 1990s that leadership succession has in general become more openly contested in Norway. But despite more media pressure on the selection process and political leaders, we also find that leadership durability has in fact increased considerably since the 1960s. The most striking change is women’s access to the top-leadership of parties: today, four of the seven parties in parliament have female leaders in Norway.

Who is the party leader? The collective national party leadership – between party congresses – consists of a national council (landsstyre) and a national executive committee (sentralstyre) in Norwegian parties. Each party’s extra-parliamentary organisation has a chair (leder), and often two deputy chairs (nestleder).8 Deputy chairs are quite often just honorific offices meant to balance the ticket symbolically in terms of ideological factions or gender (cf. Strøm 1993: 323), yet sometimes, the deputy leaders are in fact seen as future party chair candidates. In addition, there are Party leaders in Norway 49 secretaries-general, but only the Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party has an elected secretary: a ‘party secretary’ (partisekretær), who is considered a part of the national leadership. The second main leadership office is therefore the parliamentary leader (parlamentarisk leder), the chair of the given party’s parliamentary group in the Storting (stortingsgruppe). This is the party’s main spokesperson and prime negotiator in the parliamentary sphere. In general the party statutes say little about the party chair’s jurisdictions and responsibilities. The secretaries-general and party secretaries manage the central office and keep in touch with the party organisation day-to-day, but the chair is in charge of the extra-parliamentary party. The question is whether the party chair is to be considered the actual effective organisational leader for the party as a whole as well. At first glance, it seems difficult to decide which leadership office ismost important. First, the organisational power basis of the different offices is open to debate. The extra-parliamentary organisation (EPO) has traditionally dominated the parliamentary group (PPG) in the leftist parties, whereas the oldest centre- right parties have been closer to the pole of PPG dominance by means of rules of representation and monitoring. The difference seems to have decreased somewhat over time, due to a general convergence towards Labour’s (mass) party leadership model after the Second World War (Strøm 1993: 323; Heidar 1997; Svåsand 1994: 309). However, as mentioned above, the parliamentary ‘face’ of the party has been hypothesised to be empowered at the expense of the party organisation in recent years across the board, due to, for example, the relative size of resources allocated to the PPGs compared to the EPOs. Second, concurrent tenure – the situation where a single person holds multiple positions simultaneously – has occurred in all major parties over time and is often used to mediate between the different wings of the party. The only constitutionally impossible combination is being prime minister and parliamentary leader con- currently, as MPs who are appointed cabinet members have to resign their parliamentary seat temporarily.9 Third, no statutory rules regulate the exceptions of ‘divided leadership’ between offices. However, this is not to say that it is impossible to tell who is perceived to be the actual party leader by party activists and external observers. In the traditionally EPO-dominated Labour Party, the party chair has long been considered the real party leader (Strøm 1993: 322),10 whereas up to the 1980s, the leader of the parliamentary group used to be considered the effective party leader of the Conservatives (Heidar 1997: 133), mirroring the historical importance of the parliamentary party face. For example, Sjur Lindbrække was party chair for eight years in the 1960s, but was never considered the Conservative’s leader by its members (Strøm 1993: 323). But 20 years later, when Kaci Kullman Five was elected party chair in 1991, she became the effective leader of the party, not the parliamentary leader Anders Talleraas (ibid.: 326). The fact that the party chair is usually the electoral leader of the party – and the one participating in the so-called ‘party leadership debates’ on television before elections – is a highly visible indication of this development. 50â E.H. Allern and R. Karlsen That said, it is not given that the party chair is the effective party leader of the party at the present. For example, Gro Harlem Brundtland stepped down as party leader in 1992, but continued on as prime minister until 1996. Kjell Magne Bondevik headed two coalition governments, from 1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2005, but resigned as party chair of the Christian People’s Party in 1995. In 2000 Jens Stoltenberg became Labour’s candidate for prime minister, while former Prime Minister Thorbjørn Jagland was still Labour Party leader (and became minister of foreign affairs in Stoltenberg’s short-Âlived new cabinet). Who was, or is, the actual party leader in all these cases is open to debate: the prime ministers appeared not to be subordinate to the party chairs. Generally speaking, party chairs are powerful, but perhaps not when the former party chair continues as prime minister or prime-Âministerial candidate. The effective power of the various office-Âholders might, of course, also vary with their personal leadership qualities and intra-Âparty network. Hence, we might conclude that the party chair is not always and entirely the effective party leader, but is in most cases the most prominent position within Norwegian parties, even in the cases of divided leadership. A general empowerment of the parliamentary party leader does not seem to have taken place in recent years. Therefore, it is the party chair position that we concentrate on in the remainder of this chapter.

Rules organising leadership selection In the following section, we map different aspects of the leadership selection methods. We begin by discussing to what extent there has been a development towards a more inclusive selectorate of party leaders within Norwegian parties. A party selectorate can range from one single leader to the entire electorate (Kenig 2009b: 435; Cross and Blais 2012b). In between these extremes, we find a small party elite group, like the national executive/council, the parliamentary group, the party congress, and all party members. Writing in the mid-Â1990s, Heidar (1997) concluded that party leaders in Norway are elected at the biannual national congress, the highest authority within Norwegian parties. According to Svåsand (1992), this has been the formal rule since at least the 1960s. In 2012, party leaders and deputy leaders are still elected by the delegates at the national congress. Direct intra-Âparty democracy has been discussed (Heidar and Saglie 2003), but is hardly used to date in Norway in any area.11 Thus, there is no evidence of formally more inclusive procedures for party leadership elections; they are still semi-Âinclusive according to party statutes. Figure 4.1 illustrates the lack of change in the formal selectorate since the 1960s. That said, Figure 4.1 hardly represents the whole story. In all parties, a small election committee screens potential candidates in advance, and it usually nomi- nates a single nominee for this office before the congress starts.12 According to party statutes, the election committee is appointed by the National Council in the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party, and the Centre Party, and by the previous annual congress in the Progress Party, the Conservative Party, the Christian Party leaders in Norway 51

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council/ leader convention executive

Labour Party (1965) Conservative Party (1965) Central Party (1965) Christian People’s Party (1965) Liberal Party (1965) Progress Party (1974) Socialist Left Party (1965)

Figure 4.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Norway (1965–2012) (source: the various parties’ statutes, 1965–2012).

People’s Party, and the Liberal Party.13 The question is whether this committee makes the leadership elections more or less inclusive in practice. A closer look at how they work, based on interviews with former secretaries or members/ leaders of these bodies, paints a complex picture.14 On the one hand, the meetings take place behind closed doors, and the committees tend to keep their deliberations secret. On the other hand, the committees base their decisions on consultation with outsiders. According to all key party informants, the aim is to find a candidate who can be elected unanimously or at least by a great majority, at the party congress, to avoid conflict over the issue of leadership election at the congress. The biannual convention is supposed to be an arena for rallying around the new leader, not debating over different candidacies. Therefore, all parties have more or less formalised procedures for consult- ing the party organisation before making a choice, in addition to informal contacts with different party circles. The election committee usually invites the regional branches to suggest candidates, and the regional branches sometimes involve the local branches in this process as well. In the Liberal Party, the election committee even invites individual members to contribute suggestions.15 52 E.H. Allern and R. Karlsen Hence, at first glance the election committee seems to make the leadership election more oligarchic by limiting the number of persons actually influencing the choice between candidates. But we see that the nomination process is semi- inclusive at an early stage, and that the election committee’s final decision is also based on consultation with at least regional party branches. In other words, the organisational units that the formal selectorate represents do get the chance to influence the committee’s choice of a single nominee. Table 4.1 describes the electoral rules, the term length, and the deselection rules in Norwegian parties as of 2012 (in addition to the formal selectorate). As far as candidacy is concerned, the party statutes have not explicitly stated who is eligible to be the party leader. But in Labour and Progress a weak general requirement exists since only paying members who have affiliated for a specific period of time can stand for election as a party official tillitsvalgt( ) (one or three months respectively).16 The Christian People’s Party is the only party to include an additional rule: a person must believe in the Christian faith to be eligible.17 Hence, the threshold for becoming a party leader is formally low in Norway, but as will become clear in the next section, the election committees tend to nominate candidates who have previously been MPs and/or cabinet members. All the parties use voting rules which can be labelled elimination ballots with majority requirements (EBMR), and have apparently used these for the whole period covered. If no candidate receives a majority in the first ballot, the candidate with the least votes is excluded, and voting is continued until a candidate obtains a majority of the votes. A second ballot has been necessary only once. The Progress Party applies elimination ballots with majority requirements, with the caveat that when there are only two candidates left, a majority is not required. That said, it should be noted that data from several previous elections are incomplete or virtually missing as voting rules are not always specified by party statutes or made explicit by congress records.18 On the whole, then, there seems to have been few, if any, changes in the voting rules in Norwegian parties since the 1960s. None of the party statutes has ever included a description of what it takes to deselect a party chair.19 Leaders are elected for a fixed, short (two-year) term. There is no formal leadership review or no-confidence vote. Deselection typically takes place quietly, and often behind closed doors. If a party leader faces a challenger, he or she may know that his/her time is up and prefer a graceful exit (Strøm 1993: 337). In the case of external shocks (like electoral defeats) and in situations of strong internal turbulence, all parties allow for an extraordinary party congress to be summoned for the purpose of electing a new leader.20 For example, the Socialist Left held an extraordinary national congress in March 2012 to elect a new party chair after Kristin Halvorsen announced in September 2011 that she would step down. Apparently, the timing of this announcement (at the end of the polling day) was chosen to avoid endless media speculation about her intra-party position and support; her long-term plan was to resign before the next general election anyway.21 Table 4.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Norway (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

Ap Delegates with voting rights in the 2 Elimination ballots with majority By national congress or National Congress requirements extraordinary national congress FrP1 Delegates with voting rights in the 2 Elimination ballots with majority By national congress or National Congress requirements1 extraordinary national congress H Delegates with voting rights in the 2 Elimination ballots with majority By national congress or National Congress requirements extraordinary national congress KrF Delegates with voting rights in the 2 Elimination ballots with majority By national congress or National Congress requirements extraordinary national congress Sp Delegates with voting rights in the 2 Elimination ballots with majority By national congress or National Congress requirements extraordinary national congress SV Delegates with voting rights in the 2 Elimination ballots with majority By national congress or National Congress requirements extraordinary national congress V Delegates with voting rights in the 2 Elimination ballots with majority By national congress or National Congress requirements extraordinary national congress

Source: The party statutes and various other party documents (see endnote 6). Note 1 FrP have elimination ballots if no candidate obtains a majority; however, when only two candidates are left there are, explicitly, no majority requirements (due to inclusion of abstentions). 54 E.H. Allern and R. Karlsen Dynamics of party leadership contests The dynamics of leadership selection concern both the degree of competitiveness among candidates and the openness of the selection process. Based on formal records, leadership selection in Norway seems to be a quiet affair. There is no official campaign period, party culture apparently ‘dictates’ that candidates should not initiate or promote their candidacy themselves, but should accept the offer/request of the party’s election committee. Official competition for party chairmanship is therefore still rare and overt challenges to an incumbent leader even rarer. The candidate nominated by the committee to the congress is usually elected – without an opponent, unanimously, and by acclamation. In more than 70 per cent of the elections since the 1960s there has been only one candidate, and the average margin of victory in elections with more than one candidate is 65 per cent (see Table 4.2). Formally, then, the competitiveness of Norwegian leadership elections does not appear to have increased since 1965. While the average number of candidates for the whole period is 1.31, the average number of candidates since 1980 is 1.07. That said, leadership elections in Norwegian parties do not completely lack drama and actual competition. For example, outspoken dissatisfaction with party leaders, demand for more balanced group representation, and the expression of personal ambitions are indeed a part of the game in practice – more or less behind the scenes. Most importantly, multiple candidates have been considered for the party leadership (chair and deputy chairs), both by the election committee and by the party at large, on several occasions throughout the twentieth century. The history of Labour and the Conservatives provides us with some illustrative and well-known examples. The Labour Party leadership was uncontested for decades after the Second World War, but instability set in when Einar Gerhardsen prepared to step down

Table 4.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Norway (1965–2012)1

All leadership contests

Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 76 2 18 3 6 4 or more 0

Average number 1.31 candidates Margin between top two finishers2 65 N 49

Notes 1 The table is based on elections of new party leaders only, and elections with missing values are excluded. 2 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. Party leaders in Norway 55 and tried to prevent Trygve Bratteli from becoming the next leader (e.g. Strøm 1993). When Bratteli resigned in 1975, the contest for the leadership was even more open. The inner circles of the party were divided between two candidates: Oddvar Nordli and Reiulf Steen. The solution was to make Nordli prime minister, Steen party chair, and Bratteli parliamentary leader (Strøm 1993). When Nordli resigned as prime minister in 1981, due to health problems, the party leadership wanted Rolf Hansen, then minister of the environment, to take over. However, the majority of the national council (i.e. regional party leaders) favoured deputy chair Gro Harlem Brundtland instead (Strøm 1993). According to Skjeie (1999: 59–60), Hansen also declined the ‘offer’ from the leadership and suggested Gro Harlem Brundtland himself. The latter was, in the end, made prime minister and was soon able to obtain all important party posts – chair and parliamentary leader/PM – in her hands (Strøm 1993; Skjeie 1999). Leadership disagreement erupted in the Labour Party again when Brundtland suddenly announced that she would step down as party leader for family reasons at the 1992 national party congress. The deputy leader at the time, Gunnar Berge, declined the party leadership, and the party then divided between party secretary Thorbjørn Jagland and the rising party star Jens Stoltenberg. A lot of political manoeuvring took place behind the scenes at the congress, and Stoltenberg did not stand for election. Jagland was elected chair, unanimously, by acclamation. However, although not salient during the most of the 1990s, the struggle between Jagland and Stoltenberg for the leadership of the Labour Party continued into the new millennium. After a disastrous local election for Labour in 1999, the leadership debate opened up again. The two represented different party circles, but the conflict was seen more as a matter of personal qualities than ideology (Allern 2001: 175). After a few weeks of enormous pressure, not least from the media, Jagland stepped down as parliamentary leader and prime-ministerial candidate. Although Jagland retained his position as chair of the party, Stolten- berg was now the outward ‘face’ of the party. In 2002, Stoltenberg also replaced Jagland as party chair. Similar incidents have occurred within the Conservative Party. In 1970, Kåre Willoch defeated Erling Norvik and Lars T. Platou in the contest for the Conser- vative party leadership. Willoch was the effective leader of the party until he retired in 1986, but was chair for only a short period in the early 1970s (Strøm 1993: 335). In the 1980s and early 1990s both Rolf Presthus and Jan P. Syse resigned as party leaders under considerable pressure. The pressure on Presthus was due to failure at the polls, and the pressure on Syse was partly due to a small tax row (ibid.). When Kaci Kullman Five stepped down as leader of the Conser- vatives in 1994, no candidates stood out, and several names were debated in the newspapers. The election committee decided on the 47-year-old MP Jan Petersen. Hence, it could be argued that the competition for the leadership is stronger in Norway than the formal records suggest, but that the election committees make the process a relatively closed one and thus the competition that actually exists is less visible to outsiders (cf. Strøm 1993: 333ff; Heidar 1997).22 Yet, the question 56 E.H. Allern and R. Karlsen also arises as to whether the leadership elections are more open today than they used to be. A definite answer would require a number of case studies, but there is at least no doubt that media developments have significantly changed the external framework of party leadership elections in Norway in recent decades. The end of the formal partisan press, the increase in the number of news desks and rise of television has increased the total media pressure on parties (e.g. Østbye and Aalberg 2008) and, consequently, made party leadership issues more difficult to handle quietly at the elite level. Contested leadership elections are considered good news stories and are generally widely covered. In addition, new media technologies have made it easier for journalists themselves to map different factions and opinions within parties during the selection process.23 For example, the problems in the Labour Party when Brundtland became prime minister in 1981 were extensively reported in the papers. This was also the case with Jagland from the late 1990s onwards; indeed, his resignation has been described as strongly media-driven by Allern (2001), among others. Mass media was widely viewed as taking part in a ‘campaign’ against Conservative leader Rolf Presthus in the 1980s (see, for example, Notaker 2008). The Conser- vative leader Jan Petersen was destabilised in 2002 when the media reported that several in the party wanted Petersen to step down as leader, and his leadership was much discussed in the media until he resigned in 2004. Similarly, in 2002, news stories began to appear stating that many in the party wanted the leader of the Christian People’s Party, Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, to step down.24 After a few months of speculation, Haugland withdrew her candidacy for re-election. Two candidates had emerged in the media, Dagfinn Høybråten and Jon Lilletun. Lilletun decided not to stand for election, and Høybråten was elected leader.25 To what extent the media themselves destabilise party leadership is open to debate, but the so-called ‘mediatisation of politics’ certainly seems to have made it more difficult for party elites to negotiate behind closed doors and easier for party factions and activists to communicate dissatisfaction and leadership preferences outside party channels. As a result, the selection process seems more open and informal conflicts and competition more visible, to a large audience today than was the case in the 1960s.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders What are the results of the selection methods and selection processes described above? In this section, we scrutinise the development of the demography and durability of Norwegian party leaders. As far as gender is concerned, it is first worth noting that – despite a lack of formal changes in selection methods – gender quotas have been applied in Nor- wegian parties since the 1970s (Socialist Left and Liberals), 1980s (Labour and Centre), and 1990s (Christian People’s Party), but never in the Conservatives and the Progress Party (Heidar and Saglie 2002: 129; party statutes 2012). None of the former parties require a gender-balanced party leadership group according to their statutes, but both the socialist and the centrist parties do state that party Party leaders in Norway 57 offices in general should, ideally, be gender balanced; and the Labour Party even requires 50 per cent of men and women in all party bodies. The question is whether an increase in female party leaders has followed. The average share of female party leaders for the whole period covered is 19 per cent, but as Table 4.3 indicates, the percentage of women leaders has increased substantially since 1965. In the 1960s, there were no female party leaders. About 8 per cent (i.e. two party leaders) were female during the 1970s, and 6 per cent (i.e. one) of the party leaders were women during the 1980s. In the 1990s there was a steep increase to 35 per cent, and since the turn of the century about half of the party leaders have been female. Four out of seven parties have a female leader at the time of writing. Hence, the gender quotas implemented in the 1970s have perhaps indirectly paved the way for female party leaders by increasing the pool of politically experienced, and thus eligible, women (see below). The proportion of female leaders has been highest in the Centre Party since the 1980s: three of four leaders elected have been women during this period. However, there is no difference between parties with and without gender quotas in general: since the 1980s, 33 per cent of the party chairs have been female in both groups. Moreover, the findings do not fit the conventional idea that left-wing parties are more likely to be open to having women as party leaders. The proportion of female party leaders has not been greater in these parties than in other parties: since the 1980s, two of seven party leaders (29 per cent) have been women in Labour and Socialist Left, compared to eight of a total of 22 female leaders (36 per cent) in the centrist and right-of-centre parties. As regards political experience, all present party leaders were elected MPs at the time of their election. Six of them were current deputy leaders and the leader of the Christian People’s Party, Knut Arild Hareide, had been deputy leader earlier in his political career (from 2003–2007). The average share of leaders without political seniority has decreased over the decades and reached zero in the 2000s. However, this does not imply that Norwegian party leaders are particularly old; quite the contrary. The average age of the party leaders at the time of election for the whole period is 46, and has steadily decreased over time. In the 1960s, party leaders were on average 50 years old when elected; in the 2000s, they were just 41 (see Table 4.3). The average age of the present leaders at the time of election was 42. Three of the party leaders are at present (2012) 51 to 54 years old; three of them are 40 to 43 years old; and the newly elected leader of the Socialist Left Party, Audun Lysbakken, was only 35 years old when elected. Finally, we see that the average tenure of party leaders for the whole period is six years. As Table 4.3 shows, the durability of Norwegian party leadership has not become shorter since the 1960s – despite increased media pressure and the more open competition for the leadership offices described above. Indeed, the average tenure for candidates elected in the 1970s was significantly lower than for candidates elected in the 1990s. Several of the incumbent leaders have been in office for long periods: Labour’s Jens Stoltenberg had served ten years as party leader as of 2012, the 58 E.H. Allern and R. Karlsen Table 4.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Norway (1965–2012)

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women1 0 8 6 31 50 19 Average age (in years)2 50 49 45 43 41 46 Percentage without political 22 20 30 20 0 19 seniority2 Average tenure (in years)3 6.7 4.9 5.7 7.9 N/A 6.0 N4 7–9 20–26 10–17 10–16 9–16 50–58

Notes 1 The percentage women is calculated based on all who were party leaders that decade, regardless of which year they were selected. Hence, the N in the first table row is generally larger than in the other rows. 2 The entries refer to average age and political seniority at time of first election as party leader. Party chairs elected in the 1950s who were still leaders in 1965 are included in the 1960s group. Seniority means the leader has national legislative experience at the time of selection. 3 Average tenure is calculated based on the decade during which the leader was elected. Party chairs elected in the 1950s who were still leaders in the 1960s are excluded from this analysis for the sake of comparability. The period 2000–11 is excluded because several leaders have not stepped down and the average is not comparable to the earlier decades. 4 The N varies somewhat across variables, mainly due to the calculation of female leaders (see note 1).

Conservatives’ Erna Solberg had served eight, and Kristin Halvorsen stepped down after 15 years as leader of the Socialist Left Party in 2011.26 There are also a few differences between the parties that should be noted. As Carl I. Hagen was the leader of the Progress Party for almost 30 years – from 1978 to 2006 – the average is of course great for this party. But if we exclude Progress, the party leaders from Labour are on average the longest-serving with 9.3 years, and the Liberals have the shortest average leadership period with 4.6 years.

Conclusion In this chapter we have mapped the development of the nature of party leadership and of the process of leadership selection and deselection in Norway from 1965 to 2012. We have also investigated possible changes in terms of the demography and tenure of party leadership in the wake of such organisational developments. The frequency of concurrent tenure makes it hard to decide who the party leader actually is in Norway, but since the 1990s, the party chair has usually been seen as the effective party leader in all parties, including the Conservatives (cf. Strøm 1993; Heidar 1997). In cases of divided EPO and PPG leadership, the party chair is normally superior, and the party chair usually becomes prime minister or parliamentary leader – even though this is not a given and is dependent on personal qualities and intra-party networks. In sum, the findings do not provide much support for the hypothesis predicting empowerment of the party leadership in public office. Regarding selection methods, the selectorate of party leaders has formally been delegates at the national party congress in all parties during the entire Party leaders in Norway 59 period examined. Their power is, however, limited by the existence of an election committee nominating single candidates for chair and deputy chair(s) – who are usually elected unanimously, without motion from the floor. As a result, the selection process seems, at first glance, less inclusive than the statutes suggest. But for the very same reason – the goal of a widely supported single candidate – the committee’s screening of candidates and the final choice of nominee is based on consultation with, at least, regional party branches in all parties. We can therefore conclude that the leadership selection is, overall, closer to the semi- inclusive than the exclusive pole. Most importantly, we have not seen a move towards more direct democracy in any Norwegian party’s leadership elections. Party unity is emphasised more than legitimacy through popular involvement in the selection process. Or, put differently, Norwegian parties have not chosen to bypass the activist level and strengthen the party leader’s position vis-à-vis the organisation based on a more personalised leadership mandate (Pogunkte and Webb 2005: 9). As far as the dynamics – the degree of competitiveness and openness – of the selection is concerned, leadership elections in Norway seem to be far from a ‘horse race’ on the surface. There is no official campaign period and official competition for party chairmanship is still rare. However, this does not mean that Norwegian party leaders are always effectively elected ‘unanimously by acclamation’: conflicts concerning alternative candidates do indeed occur, at least behind the scenes. Moreover, critical media coverage of party leadership seems to have increased in the wake of general media developments like the end of the party press. In this sense, our findings confirm and strengthen Strøm’s (1993: 344–5) conclusion from the 1990s that leadership succession has in general become more openly contested. The election committee cannot deliberate and negotiate as peacefully behind closed doors as before. The question even arises as to whether such developments will eventually also affect the selection methods and formal dynamics of party leadership selection. The recent party chair selection in the Socialist Left Party suggests that such a development is not entirely unlikely. Soon after the long-time leader, Kristin Halvorsen, announced her resignation in September 2011, three candidates emerged: Audun Lysbakken, Heikki Holmås and Bård Vegard Solhjell. Sol- hjell retracted his candidacy early on, but Lysbakken and Holmås embarked on a formal campaign, including intra-party debates between candidates. The campaign lasted until the election committee non-unanimously nominated Lys- bakken. Soon after, Holmås withdrew his candidacy as he realised that a majority vote was out of reach.27 That said, mediatisation of politics and strengthened competition for votes have not lead to shorter terms of length of office: actually, Norwegian party leaders stayed longer in office during the 1990s and 2000s than they did in the 1970s and 1980s. Even if the party leadership position appears to be more risky than it used to be, our evidence does not suggest that it is more difficult for party leaders to survive today than previously. As far as the demography of leadership elections is concerned the most radical change is the increase in gender parity; 60 E.H. Allern and R. Karlsen i.e. women’s access to the top-leadership of parties. However, this development cannot clearly be traced back to changes in selection methods and dynamics. The introduction of gender quotas in general might have increased the number of eligible women. Then again, there are no differences in general shares of female leaders between parties with and without quotas since the 1980s. To conclude, the amount of organisational change regarding party leadership selection is small or modest. This is a pattern we recognise from previous studies of manifesto-making and candidate selection in Norway (Heidar and Saglie 2003; Valen et al. 2002). Why Norwegian parties are – despite significant external challenges – so resistant to reform is difficult to discern and beyond the scope of this chapter. We know that the chain of delegation and accountability – and emphasis on external party unity – associated with the mass-party model still enjoys high levels of normative legitimacy among Norwegian party members, activists, and leaders (Heidar and Saglie 2002). A question for future research is why party elites at different levels continue to find this old party structure quite useful for power-seeking purposes as well.

Notes 1 We wish to thank Eirik Ågotnes Hildal for excellent research assistance and the Research Council of Norway for financial support (FRISAM, project no. 185436). Thanks are also due to the seven parties studied here for granting us access to party archives, and to the key informants interviewed about the election committees for their openness and time. The chapter has also benefited from constructive comments by participants in a research seminar at the Department of Political Science, Univer- sity of Oslo, in 2012. 2 Thus, the party leader came to be elected by the same body adopting the party programme (Svåsand 1994). In contrast, candidate selection is decentralised to the regional level in Norway (Valen et al. 2002). 3 For an account of how party leaders were previously elected in Norway’s prime example of the mass-party model, Labour, see Skjeie (1999: 51–4). 4 See Narud and Strøm (2011) and Allern (2010b) for a detailed description of the general developments of Norwegian political parties and their environment. 5 Over time, the Centre Party has moved from the right to the left side of the political spectrum; see Narud and Valen (2007: 148). 6 For the translation of Norwegian party names, we apply the terms used in Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose’s The International Almanac of Electoral History (1991) and in the Yearbook of the European Journal of Political Research. However, it should be noted that Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF ) uses ‘the Christian Democratic Party’ in English, not the literal translation ‘Christian People’s Party’; see, for example, www.stortinget.no/en/In-English/Members-of-the-Storting/. 7 The material includes party statutes, other party rules/guidelines, annual reports, books of minutes and other congress documents, political biographies, the web page of the parliament and the government (www.stortinget.no, www.regjeringen.no) and the encyclopaedia www.snl.no, electronic communication with party headquarters, and interviews with key informants about organisational routines in connection with party leadership elections. A specified list of sources can be obtained by contacting the authors. 8 The exception is the Labour Party, which has one deputy leader. 9 Consequently, it is not possible for one person to hold all three positions at the same time. Party leaders in Norway 61 10 Although both pre-war Labour prime ministers were not party chairs and came from the parliamentary group, they were controlled by the party organisation (Heidar 1997: 133). 11 Only a few local (county) parties have employed some sort of ballots in candidate selection, and one (county) party did vote over alternative candidates as a preparation to the nomination of a new Socialist leader in 2012. 12 See details of all leadership contests during this period, including number of candidates, in the online appendix to this volume available at www.routledge.com/books/ details/9780415704168/. 13 In the Centre Party, the congress decides what counties should be represented, but the National Council appoints members based on nominations from these regional party branches. In the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party the national congress appoints the election committee based on a proposition from the National Executive Committee (H) and the National Council (V). In Labour, the Chair of the Confedera- tion of Trade Unions (LO) has traditionally headed the party congress’s election committee, but this practice was dropped when the controversial LO Chair Gerd-Liv Valla had to resign as the post after a long-term conflict with an employee in LO’s headquarters in 2007. 14 Interviews with Svein Kiran, SV (22 August 2012); Inger Betsy Torp, Sp (23 August 2012), Knut Are Hole, KrF (3 September 2012); Morten A. Hagen, V (10 August 2012); Lars Arne Ryssdal, H (4 July 2012); and Petter N. Myhre (24 July 2012). The Labour Party answered our questions through mail correspondence with Odd Erik Stende (23 October 2012). 15 Interview with Morten A. Hagen, V (10 August 2012). 16 See party statutes §3 Medlemskap, stemmerett, valgbarhet (FrP) and §13 Alminnelige bestemmelser (Labour). 17 See KrF Party Statutes, §2 Tillitsverv. 18 See the online appendix to this volume, available at www.routledge.com/books/ details/9780415704168/, for details on the levels of certainty. 19 Only rules for the suspension or exclusion of party officials (in general) are included in the party statutes, with the exceptions of KrF and the Liberals. 20 For example, in the Labour Party, an extraordinary party congress will be held if a provincial party organisation that represents two-fifths of the members demands it (§7). In the Progress Party, an extraordinary party congress can be called by either the national council, a two-thirds majority in the central executive committee, at least seven of the provincial party organisations, or by two-thirds of the MPs. 21 http://snl.no/Kristin_Halvorsen. 22 Interviews with party representatives (see above). 23 But it should be noted that journalists were, of course, not only loyal reporters for the party leadership during the golden era of the party press. For example, the main Labour newspaper and its editor Arvid Jacobsen are widely believed to have conducted a campaign to remove Nordli as prime minister and Steen as Labour chair. The claim is supported by new evidence in the form of Jacobsen’s correspondence (Dag og Tid 13 January 2012). 24 E.g. Adresseavisen 14 January 2003. 25 In addition to these examples, the recent party leadership of Lars Sponheim (Liberals) and Dagfinn Høybråten (Christian People’s Party), and the current leadership of Erna Solberg (Conservatives), have all received significant negative media attention for longer or shorter periods of time. 26 The average tenure for the leaders who were elected from 1990 onwards and have since resigned is 6.9 years. 27 Dagsavisen 18 February 2012. 5 The selection of party leaders in Austria Channelling ambition effectively

Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik and Wolfgang C. Müller

Introduction Institutional design makes Austria a classical party democracy, as the proper functioning of the institutions – from the electoral system to government at various levels of territorial organisation – requires cohesive political parties (Müller 2003). The parties, in particular the two that have dominated post-war politics – the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the People’s Party (ÖVP) – have lived up to their role in running political institutions. Politics in Austria is indeed party politics. Yet the two traditional major parties have considerably expanded their role beyond that, penetrating the state (below the political level), the economy and civil society (Luther 1999), and they have built vast organisations enrolling and socialising large shares of citizens (Müller 1994). While the heyday of party influence outside what is the political realm in the narrow sense was in the first half of our period of observation, it is still a very relevant phenomenon. This omnipresence of the two major parties has evoked the criticism of their competitors, which, however, have eagerly adopted a similar approach to power whenever the occasion occurred. Given the relevance of party politics in Austria who leads these organisations is crucial. Studying party leadership selection therefore seems particularly relevant with regard to the Austrian case. Different selection processes in terms of rules and behaviour, in turn, may lead to different types of leaders (Heclo 1973). Despite the important differences in ideology and organisation between the parties, their formal leadership selection processes are very similar throughout the observation period. There are more differences in terms of actual behaviour, but the similarities are still overwhelming. Probably the parties respond to functional needs resulting from their competitive environment. Given the relevance of the office of party leader, both in terms of substantive policymaking and as a key to high public office, we might expect it to be the object of desire of any ambitious politician and consequently for leadership selection processes to be fiercely competitive. This chapter shows that this is not the case. In only a few cases is ambition pitted against ambition in the formal leadership processes. We argue here that we need to go beyond these processes if we want to understand the real conduct of leadership selection. Party leaders in Austria 63 In this chapter we consider the experience of all parties represented in the popularly elected chamber of the Austrian parliament, the Nationalrat, since the mid- 1960s. In addition to the already mentioned SPÖ and ÖVP these are the Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Liberal Forum (LIF ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) – two parties that were founded internally as break-away parties from the FPÖ – and the Greens. While the SPÖ, ÖVP and FPÖ were present over the entire period of observation the LIF (1993–1999), BZÖ (since 2005) and the Greens (since 1986) have shorter histories as parliamentary parties. Our findings illustrate remarkable similarity with regard to formal selection rules between the parties and stability over time, with the party congress electing the party leader. The only change in this respect occurred early in our observation period, with the SPÖ adopting this model. Our survey of actual leadership processes shows that most leadership selections unfold in predictable ways, presenting a united front to the public with all the ‘real action’ occurring in the run-up to party congresses. The few exceptions to these rules are scattered across time and parties but typically fall in crisis periods of the respective party.

Who is the party leader? While the term ‘party leader’ may refer to several different political positions (head of the extra-parliamentary party, the party in government, the party in parliament or the party’s top candidate in elections), in Austria it clearly denotes the individual heading the extra-parliamentary party organisation. Typically, the majority of the other functions have also been performed simultaneously by the party leaders, but only as a consequence of them heading the party organisation. The supremacy of the party organisation dictates that the most important public office available to the party at the national level is reserved for the party leader. For government parties, this would be the office of chancellor or vice chancellor (i.e. prime minister and deputy prime minister), whereas opposition party leaders typically assume the leadership position of the party’s parliamentary group (PPG). There have been some exceptions to this rule: first, younger parties used this division of labour more frequently (e.g. the FPÖ during its first two decades in parliament, or the Greens in the early tomid-1990s). Second, opposition party leaders have been less prone to accumulate offices. And third, there have been periods of non-overlap during transitions from one party leader to the next. Yet, these latter instances especially highlight the supremacy of the party: particularly during the early post-war decades, the ÖVP would first select a party leader and only one or two years later award to this person the office of chancellor.1 A permanent separation of the party leader position and the most important public office is extremely rare in contemporary Aus- trian politics. In addition to heading the party organisation and the party in public office, party leaders usually run as top candidates on their party list in parliamentary elections.2 Exceptions from this rule are rare (e.g. the Freedom Party in 1999) and do not usually undermine the authority of the party leader. 64 L. Ennser-Jedenastik and W.C. Müller It is obvious that this accumulation of offices calls for the delegation of certain tasks to other leading party figures: deputy party leaders, general secret aries, PPG leaders, or individual ministers who serve as ‘coalition coordinators’ within the cabinet. Yet while these persons can exercise considerable influence, they remain clearly subordinate to the party leader (Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991: 40–1). Before delving further into the subject, it should be noted that not all parties have always accepted the necessity of having a party leader. The Austrian Greens, for instance, created the post of party leader no earlier than 1992 – a full four years after they had gained parliamentary representation. In the years before 1992, the party’s scepticism of personality politics also led it to run the party organisation by collective leadership and to present a team of top candidates in parliamentary elections (Lauber 1997: 190). While party leaders are typically very powerful figures within their party, there have been instances when the most influential individual within a party did not formally occupy the post of party leader. Most notably, Jörg Haider’s role as a ‘spiritual leader’ during much of the time when the FPÖ and its later split-off, the BZÖ, were in government represented a permanent threat to the authority of the parties’ formal leaders (Luther 2011: 460–4). This constellation greatly fostered intra-party conflict and significantly contributed to the conflictual termina- tion of the first coalition between the FPÖ and the ÖVP in late 2002. The position of leader in the different parties is endowed with different formal and informal intra-party powers. Party leaders in the BZÖ, for instance, have the right to single-handedly draft the candidate lists for parliamentary elections and can even veto lists for sub-national elections. By contrast, attempts by Green Party leaders to place their favoured candidates on safe list positions have repeatedly been thwarted by the party congress. In between these two extremes are the FPÖ and the two major parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP. ÖVP party leaders are severely constrained by a decentralised organisational structure that vests much of the power in a number of factional leaders and sub-national party elites (Müller and Steininger 1994). As a consequence, party leader turnover is much higher in the ÖVP than in the SPÖ (Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991). In terms of biography, most Austrian party leaders have had a long career within their party before assuming the leadership position (see the section on seniority below). Real outsiders hardly ever attain a leading position in a party, although the recent decades have seen a few examples of party leaders who were outsiders in terms of the parties’ time-honoured career paths (e.g. the SPÖ’s Franz Vranitzky or the Greens’ Alexander Van der Bellen).

Rules organising leadership selection All party leaders in Austria are selected by their party congress for a fixed term (that, however, may be cut short by an early party congress) and that is infinitely renewable (although the ÖVP requires a two-thirds majority in a secret ballot after 12 years in office). Parties have granted their leaders terms varying between Party leaders in Austria 65 one and four years, with the general trend being to increase the term lengths (see below). Party congresses are typically made up of several hundred delegates from the regional party branches and other sub-national units plus a number of ex officio delegates and representatives of associated organisations. The following paragraphs present a more detailed description of the party leader selectorates (as at 2012). The bulk of the roughly 600 SPÖ conference delegates represent local and regional party branches. In addition, a substantial number of seats are reserved for members of the party executive, MPs, trade union representatives and the women’s organisation. In addition, the party statute lists 20-odd associated organisations (e.g. youth, pensioners, business and professionals) that are awarded between one and seven delegates each. The ÖVP awards conference delegates on the basis of national votes (one per 10,000) to its regional party branches and on the basis of members (one per 10,000) to its six sub-party organisations (representing farmers; business people; and workers and employees (including many civil servants) – the three so-called leagues – plus organisations for women, youth and seniors). Also, all members of the party executive, Land ministers, MPs, MEPs, regional party leaders and general secretaries function as delegates. A small number of seats are also reserved for delegates from associated organisations (representing, inter alia, students, professionals and trade unionists), bringing the delegate total to about 600. The FPÖ and the BZÖ award delegates to their Land party branches (one delegate per 100 party members in the FPÖ and 50 in the BZÖ, respectively). The Freedom Party also incorporates the party executive among its delegates. At the Green Party conference, Land parties are represented according to their population size (with a quota for ethnic minorities), with party elites (e.g. the party executive, MPs, MEPs and Land MPs) also represented. Despite various changes in the exact composition of party conferences, the only significant change in the selection mechanism across parties was the enfran- chisement of the SPÖ party conference in the late 1960s (see Figure 5.1). Before 1967, the Social Democrats had their leader exclusively selected by the party executive or the party delegation (a larger executive body) from amongst their members. Since then, this decision has to be ratified by the party conference – and it usually is with an overwhelming majority (Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991: 41–3). All other parties have been choosing party leaders by party conference votes for the entire post-war period. While there have been some trends in all parties towards ‘technical’ democratisation (e.g. taking measures to guarantee delegates a secret ballot such as using election papers and voting booths) (Müller et al. 1992), there is little ambition to open up the process of leadership selection. The trend towards more inclusive selectorates that has recently become apparent in other parliamentary democracies (Carty and Blake 1999; Kenig 2009a, 2009b; Cross and Blais 2012a, 2012b) has thus far not materialised in Austria. At the sub-national level, there have been some attempts to involve party members and even the general 66 L. Ennser-Jedenastik and W.C. Müller

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

(1967) SPÖ (1965) ÖVP (1965) FPÖ (1965) Greens (1992) LIF (1993) BZÖ (2005)

Figure 5.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Austria (1965–2012) (source: party constitutions). Note Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate. population in the selection of candidates, especially for local and regional elections (Stirnemann 1988: 608–13). Yet, the most ambitious attempts at holding primary elections for parliamentary elections of 1994 (Nick 1995) have never been repeated. These reform attempts were not loved by the party functionaries (who saw them as causing additional work and potentially undermining the established internal incentive systems) nor considered helpful to improving the party’s image. Within that background it is not surprising that there is to date no sign of leadership selection processes for party office opening up. Quite to the contrary, some indicators even point to growing oligarchic tendencies within the higher echelons of the parties. For instance, the statutory term of party leaders has increased in almost all parties during the post-war period. The SPÖ and FPÖ went from one to two years, the ÖVP from two to four years, the Greens from two to three years, while the recently founded BZÖ (a creation of the late Jörg Haider) grants its party leader four years in office before having to face re-election (see also Müller et al. 1992: 122). Also, some parties have considerably increased the share of ex officio delegates at their party conference (see e.g. Müller 1996: 249). The actual voting rules for the position of party leader are typically specified in the official party statutes or in the by-laws for the party conferences. All parties require an absolute majority of the vote. If no candidate reaches this threshold in the first round of voting, the ballot is repeated. In the second round, some parties require lower thresholds to be met (ÖVP), others just repeat the ballot and then have run-offs between the top two candidates in the third round (FPÖ, BZÖ). The Greens have a more complicated quota that candidates need to reach to proceed to the next round of voting,3 whereas the SPÖ Table 5.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Austria (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

SPÖ Delegates to a party convention 2 If no absolute majority in first round, new Unspecified ballot is proposed ÖVP Delegates to a party convention 4 If no absolute majority in first round, Party executive (in case of relative majority in second ballot, in misconduct) case of a tie decision by lot FPÖ Delegates to a party convention 2 If no absolute majority in first round, vote Unspecified again in a second round. If no absolute majority in second round, then a run-off between the top two candidates Greens Delegates to a party convention 3 Elimination ballot with majority Delegates to a party requirements convention BZÖ Delegates to a party convention 4 If no absolute majority in first round, vote Unspecified again in a second round. If no absolute majority in second round, then a run-off between the top two candidates 68 L. Ennser-Jedenastik and W.C. Müller leaves the scenario of not having a winner with an absolute majority entirely unspecified. This may reflect the fact that there has not been a single instance of a party leader falling short of 50 per cent of the vote at a party conference since 1945. Only Christoph Chorherr who was elected Green party leader with 51 per cent in 1996 had to be confirmed in a second round of voting (with no opponent left on the ballot), because the number of invalid votes cast in the first round did not rule out the possibility that he was not supported by an absolute majority of all delegates present at the conference. Interestingly, the party statutes at the time did not specify the voting rules in detail, so five slightly different proposals for the ballot procedure were put forward by groups of delegates before the vote was taken. In a move typical for Green Party conferences, the delegates rejected the procedural proposal that was put forward by the party executive. In general, the voting rules that the parties have adopted for the position of party leader have to date been largely inconsequential. This lack of open contests for the leadership at party conferences, however, should not be mistaken for a shortage of competition in general. The majority of intra-party battles for the leadership never reaches the party conference stage, but is carried out (and settled) among party elites behind closed doors (see next section). With office terms of varying length in place for all party leaders, the default method of deselecting a leader is simply to install a new one. To that end it may be necessary to call an extraordinary party conference, which can usually be done by the party executive, a fixed number of regional party branches, or some quota of conference delegates. Since any unwanted leader can thus be removed by crowning a new one, the party statutes are almost silent on the exact deselection mechanism. Besides the Greens, who allow for removal by two-thirds of party conference delegates in a vote of no-confidence, only the ÖVP party executive has the explicit power to remove the party leader by a two-thirds majority in case of misconduct. The ÖVP also requires long-serving party leaders (at the time of writing: 12 years) to be confirmed by a two-thirds majority for any further term. While most ÖVP leaders do not survive long enough in office to be affected by this rule, it was used at least once to persuade a sitting party leader (Alois Mock) not to stand for re-election at the next party conference.

Dynamics of party leadership contests Table 5.2 reports on the formal processes of party leadership election. Most obvious is the absence of contests from the vast majority of selection processes of individual leaders. Only eight (of 37) leaders ever experienced open contestation for party leadership and only one went through such a contest twice (Norbert Steger, FPÖ). And only in eight (out of 92) elections in the observation period did more than one candidate run – once in the SPÖ, three times in the ÖVP, and twice each in the FPÖ and the Greens. All but one of these contests occurred when the office of leader was vacant because the incumbent had resigned or Party leaders in Austria 69 declared that he would not run again. Note, however, that the departure of most leaders from party leadership resulted from their being pushed rather than jumping (Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller forthcoming). The absence of contests in selecting new leaders is not accidental but rather results from the parties’ attempts to keep their ranks closed and present a united front to the public watch- ing the party congress. The image of ‘a good start’ of the new leader is nomination by unanimous vote in the party executive to be followed by an uncontested party congress election with support in the high 90 per cent range. According to Table 5.2 the latter target is met in the vast majority (65 out of 92) of party congress votes (including re-elections) when considering all leaders of the parties represented in parliament since 1965. There are clear differences between the parties. While 85 per cent of the votes in the SPÖ were above the 90 per cent support level, the respective figures are 76 per cent for the ÖVP, 58 per cent for the FPÖ and a mere 27 per cent for the Greens. Taking into account only the uncontested votes, naturally these shares are somewhat higher (SPÖ 88 per cent, ÖVP 84 per cent, FPÖ 62 per cent, Greens 33 per cent). Clearly, these differences reflect party cultural differences as much as differences in the popularity of individual leaders. Con- sequently, the performance of leaders in such votes typically is measured against the standards prevailing in the individual parties. Take the re-election of SPÖ leader Werner Faymann who won ‘only’ 83.4 per cent of the valid party congress votes in 2012: this result caused panic in the SPÖ headquarters; desperate attempts to sell a politically favourable explanation to the public; and undesired media headlines. Votes ‘on target’ with ‘90 per cent plus’ results and ‘accidental’ ones of uncontested incumbents missing that mark can clearly be related to their performance in office and help in predicting their remaining duration as leader (Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller forthcoming). Such relation to performance is most obvious for the FPÖ, that has traditionally displayed a lower level of voting discipline at party congresses. The two leaders, Jörg Haider and H.C. Strache, who greatly improved upon the electoral performance of their party, clearly stand out. With regard to the Greens, we can interpret steadily increasing support levels as both a result of the leaders Alexander Van der Bellen and Eva Glawischnig doing a fine job, and as a sign of ‘normalisation’ of what has started out as a more fundamental alternative to the other parties. The intended signal from uncontested elections and almost universal support from the floor of the party congress is that the party is firmly united behind the new leader. The party congresses are carefully designed to serve that purpose and present the new leader in the best light. Indeed, a new party leader tends to be introduced as a kind of new ‘messiah’ who has all the answers to the party’s and the country’s problems. Yet, in reality, it is not always clear from the beginning of the selection process who ought to be the new ‘messiah’. At times, more covert competitive processes have occurred before the party congress. Indeed, often more than one of the party’s inner circle (or even an outsider) has felt able and willing to lead 70 L. Ennser-Jedenastik and W.C. Müller the party. Nor does the selectorate spontaneously settle on a single candidate. Rather, aspirant leaders and their entourages always try to bring specific names into the play. Note, however, that too-obvious ambition for office is against the norms prevailing in Austria. Rather than actively declaring their candidacy, those who desire high office aim to be asked or even nominated by relevant intra-party groups or units. The typical phrase in statements declaring a candidacy for leadership then is ‘my party friends have asked me to run’. The members of the party elite, in turn, are engaged in processes of discussing the relative strengths and weaknesses of potential contenders, sounding out how various names resonate with intra-party groups, building alliances, calculating the potential intra-party support of alternative contenders, making promises in return for support of a specific candidate, or deterring unwanted contenders. Much of this occurs behind closed doors. Clearly, this makes these processes more difficult to research than the overt part of leadership selection. However, gaining insights is not impossible if one is willing to resort to a more traditional approach of collecting qualitative evidence (from newspaper reports, memories, archival sources and personal interviews with the actors) and subjecting this to systematic scrutiny. As is clear from the above discussion, the dominant pattern of the real leadership selection is oligarchic sounding-out among the respective party’s heavyweights and bringing this process to a conclusion with a unanimous vote in the relevant party executive body. This vote makes the designated candidate the party executive’s official nominee. Such nomination makes clear that other candidates are neither encouraged nor expected – and, as we already have seen, no others run in the vast majority of party congress elections. Yet personal and group ambition exists and plays out in the informal selection processes. For the sake of simplicity, we can distinguish three types of such processes: those uncontested unofficially and officially, those contested in the informal part but not thereafter, and those contested before and at the party congress. The vast majority of re-elections of incumbent party leaders fall in the uncontested-uncontested category. Predictably, here we also find the elections in new parties that were the creation of a single political entrepreneur (Heide Schmidt of the LIF and Haider of the BZÖ). And there are a few occasions where the outgoing party leader was strong enough to de facto select his successor. This applies to three successive SPÖ leaders (and chancellors) – Bruno Kreisky, Fred Sinowatz and Franz Vranitzky. It also applies to ÖVP leader (and chancellor) Wolfgang Schüssel, who handed over his party and government offices to his long-term lieutenant Wilhelm Molterer. Clearly, all these successions had either been planned long ahead of time or were at least well prepared for by appointing the respective successor to high government or party offices before the succession issue came up. Accordingly, Kreisky had made Sinowatz deputy party leader and vice chancellor. Vranitzky held the office of minister of finance (but no high elected party office), from where Vranitzky even moved up to the office of federal chancellor (still without taking elected party office) and Molterer was deputy party leader and leader of the parliamentary party. Most of Party leaders in Austria 71 these choices of party leader thus were already predictable before they occurred and none was viewed as odd or controversial. (If anything, making Vranitzky federal chancellor rather than party chairman was rather controversial in the SPÖ.) The outgoing party leader also played an important (though not dominant) role in several other selection processes, even contested ones. The contested-uncontested category is more heterogeneous. It consists both of party leaders returned to office and of new ones. In the case of a sitting party leader discomfort may be articulated, but ambitious would-be candidates know that open challenge is a double-edged sword, as it may undermine the chances of both the incumbent and the challenger. So the best tactic is to let others do the undermining and then come forward as a willing candidate only once the departure of the current leader has been decided. In other instances, incumbents have pre-empted such painful processes of gradual undermining and eventual replacement by early resignation when their party’s performance was disappointing. Take the most recent leadership selection processes in the ÖVP in 2011. Then Josef Pröll resigned from the party leadership for health reasons but in a situation where his attempt at revitalising the party had suffered a serious setback. The party heavyweights considered three candidates – all of similar age, cabinet rank and untried as electoral leaders: Maria Fekter, Reinhold Mitterlehner and Michael Spindelegger. These names had been put forward internally in the sounding-out process. All of them were ready to accept the challenge of leading the party. The party executive process of seeking consensus eventually gravi- tated to the least polarising candidate (Spindelegger) and a team of deputy party leaders including Fekter and Mitterlehner. Spindelegger was elected with more than 95 per cent of the party conference votes despite widespread concerns that he may lack appeal as an electoral leader and candidate for the chancellor’s office. A similar episode occurred in the SPÖ when party leader Klima resigned in 2000 after his party’s electoral defeat and after being outmanoeuvred in government formation. Then, two members of the SPÖ’s inner circle – Caspar Einem and Karl Schlögl – representing the party’s left and right wings, respectively – had the ambition to succeed him in the leadership position. Both were party executive members and held positions in the outgoing cabinet. Yet their inner circle peers – the members of the party presidium – were determined to avoid a showdown and considered both of them too divisive for the party. They convinced both would-be candidates not to run and selected one of the party’s up- and-coming (but still backbench) MPs, Alfred Gusenbauer, as the official candidate for the leadership position. The party congress did as it was told and provided 96.5 per cent support. Once in office, Gusenbauer did much to renew his party. Although he led the SPÖ to narrow electoral victory in 2006 and returned the party to government, he did not survive as party leader much beyond this as he became an electoral liability and had few remaining friends in the party. Perhaps the most spectacular recent case of severe contestation at the pre- party congress stage of leadership selection followed by harmony at the party 72 L. Ennser-Jedenastik and W.C. Müller congress was the selection of ÖVP leader Wolfgang Schüssel in 1995. Then, the party heavyweights largely agreed that the sitting leader, Erhard Busek, was to be replaced after the 1994 electoral disaster. Those most committed to leadership change despised not just Busek but his entire liberal following, amongst which Schüssel, then a cabinet minister, was counted. Therefore, most observers saw him already on his way out of politics. In his memoirs Schüssel reported having himself shared this opinion (Schüssel 2009: 7). Yet Busek still commanded some intra-party support and was willing to play it off in his end game. Resorting to a clause in the party statutes that allows any candidate to run for the office of leader with the support of 50 party congress delegates he made the credible threat to do so. Making the party congress a battlefield was likely to cause more negative reporting, deepen the party’s crisis, and make the start of a new leader’s term even more difficult. Consequently, none of the party’s heavyweights was willing to run nor could they agree on an outsider (as suggested, with desperate courage, by some of Busek’s adversaries). The solution then was a candidate from the party’s inner circle who would appeal enough to Busek to make him abstain from running: Schüssel. As the only candidate he was elected with 95.5 per cent of the party congress votes. Once designated, Schüssel turned out to be effective at overcoming intra-party differences and – backed by his success in outmanoeuvring other parties and one stunning electoral victory – remained in office for 12 years. Party elites thus always seem keen to avoid open contestation. At times they have gone to great lengths to avoid a showdown at the party congress even when such attempts eventually failed. Take the ÖVP leadership selection of 1971 when the party chair was vacant after Hermann Withalm’s resignation. The ÖVP was confronted with two competing tickets (of party leader plus general secretary); and as a party that had suffered major electoral defeats and loss of government office recently, it was desperate to avoid a divisive election. To that end, the party executive established an election committee that was given the task of presenting a single choice to the party congress. That attempt was paralleled by exercising pressure on one of the candidates for general secretary to withdraw and hence split the ticket. This trick worked and confronted with one complete and one incomplete ticket, the committee endorsed Karl Schleinzer who still had a running mate. Although angry conference delegates then nominated Stefan Koren and forced a contested election on the party, official endorsement of Sch- leinzer coupled with Koren’s lack of a running mate helped Schleinzer to achieve a victory of the desired magnitude (Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991). As these episodes illustrate, the two major parties are really concerned that they not appear divided. Although the FPÖ and the Greens have been slightly more relaxed about this in their early years, the patterns of sorting out internal dissent informally before the party congress has become universal more recently. Sizable dissent or open contestation always causes negative publicity (‘a leader who cannot even convince the followers of his own party’) and, according to widespread belief, undermines the parties’ ability to achieve their electoral and office goals. Such reasoning is generally accepted in the political realm despite Party leaders in Austria 73 Table 5.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Austria (1965–2012)

All leadership contests

Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 91.4 2 8.6 3 or more 0.0

Average number 1.09 candidates Margin between top two finishers1 24.4 N 93

Note 1 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. some of the most successful leaders such as Klaus, Kreisky and Haider having emerged from open contestation. Nevertheless, on these and on a few other occasions parties were too divided and candidates too determined to run to allow the processes of sounding-out and consensus building to be successful. Then, typically, career ambitions, ideology and conflict between modernisers and tradition- alists reinforced each other (Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991: 46–55).

Demographics and tenure of party leaders The typical Austrian party leader is a middle-aged man who has spent most of his professional life in the political sphere and has held high party or public offices (usually ministerial or parliamentary) prior to his appointment tothe leadership. Indeed, most party leaders in Austria have been political animals throughout their life, typically owing much of their career to their party – a time- honoured pattern in Austrian politics (Dachs et al. 1995). In fact, there has not been a single party leader who entered this position from outside politics. Table 5.3 shows that only three out of 37 leaders (Peter, Götz and Strache – all FPÖ) between 1965 and 2012 had no parliamentary or ministerial background at the national level. All three, however, were leaders of regional party branches at the time of selection. This reflects the fact that, in the absence of a strong parliamentary representation (let alone government participation), the Freedom Party was forced to draw on sub-national party elites as a personnel resource. Only five of the 37 Austrian party leaders since 1965 have been women,4 all of whom entered the leadership position after 1990. Two served in the 1990s and three in the 2000s. Currently, the Greens are headed by a female leader. Strikingly, no female politician has ever made it to the top of one of the major parties (SPÖ and ÖVP). Also, at an average of only 2.7 years, women have had considerably shorter stints than men (at the time of writing, the only current female party leader had just entered her fourth year in office). This rather dismal record is somewhat in contrast to the substantial advances that women have made within the governmental, parliamentary and party arenas in the past decades (Steininger 2001, 2006). 74 L. Ennser-Jedenastik and W.C. Müller Table 5.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Austria (1965–2012)

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women 0 0 0 22.2 18.8 13.5 Average age (in years)1 51.5 50.4 47.4 44.2 47.3 47.1 Percentage without political 25.0 14.3 0 0 6.3 8.1 seniority1,2 Average tenure (in years) 13.3 6.2 8.9 6.1 3.0 5.4 N 4 9 7 11 20 373

Notes 1 Average age and political seniority at time of first selection; all party leaders without seniority held important regional party offices at selection. Average duration excludes incumbent party leaders. The calculations by decade are based on all party leaders active at any point during the respective period. Therefore, some party leaders are counted in more than one decade. 2 Seniority means that the leader had national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection. 3 N for tenure is 32.

In terms of age, party leaders are quite uniformly distributed across the range of 35 to 60 years, with younger leaders somewhat more prevalent in more recent decades. Also, FPÖ and Green party leaders tend to be several years younger than their counterparts, possibly suggesting that the career path that leads to the very top can be covered in a shorter amount of time in smaller (and typically opposition) parties. For most politicians, the stint at the top of their parties – combined with whichever is the most important public office available to the party – represents the apex of their career. Curiously, many of them do not leave politics, even after being painfully removed from the party leadership and, in some cases, having suffered public humiliation. Of the 37 leaders in our sample,5 no less than 19 continued their political career, or at least attempted to do so. Some stayed on as MPs or ministers, others went into Land or local politics. Of the nine individuals who left politics after losing their leadership position, six had occupied the post of chancellor. The only ex-chancellor to remain in a political position at the national level was Wolfgang Schüssel who served as parliamentary party group leader for two years and as an ordinary MP thereafter. It may come as little surprise that party leaders find it hard to completely abandon the political stage, not least since most of them have spent most of the career in public or party offices. In several cases this may less reflect their addic- tion to politics than their dependence on deriving a decent income from this source. Note that the continuing hanging around of an ex-party leader in politics is not always to the benefit of the party (and especially the respective successor).

Conclusion In this chapter we have briefly mapped the Austrian experience with party leadership selection since the 1960s. Austria is an easy case in identifying party Party leaders in Austria 75 leaders. Party organisations are the mainspring of political power and leading the organisation normally is indicative of being the person at the helm. With a few temporary exceptions all other desired political positions have come as a consequence of leading the party organisation. We have noted remarkable similarity with regard to formal selection rules between the parties and stability over time, with the party congress electing the party leader. The only change in this respect occurred early in our observation period, with the SPÖ adopting this model. The party executive bodies play a key role in the pre-congress stage. Typically, the party congress is confronted with a single candidate who has the official endorsement of the party executive, mostly by unanimous vote. The normative ideal prevailing within the parties then is overwhelming support – 90 per cent plus – at the party congress. The vast majority of party leader elections indeed conform to this ideal. Disappointing support levels or even more so contested elections are rare. With a single exception the latter have occurred only when the leadership position was vacant. This chapter has shown that there is more ambition and competition for the leader’s office than meets the eye when focusing at the ‘official story’. Indeed, party elites at times have gone to great lengths to maintain a united front in leadership selection and thereby to allow a new leader ‘a good start’. Channel- ling ambition of potential contenders and sorting out differences between intra- party groups about who should lead the party informally at the pre-congress stage is much more important in terms of outcome than the formal conclusion of the process at the party congress. Shielding these processes from the public – to the best of their ability – clearly responds to functional requirements resulting from the parties’ competitive environment. Publicly debating the weaknesses of the future leader is considered unhelpful, as is dividing the party into winners and losers of a contest. And the normative ideal of ‘a good start’ for a new leader appears particularly relevant when the competing parties are able to provide that. This is also internalised by potential candidates for leadership office who frequently make themselves available only on the condition of a smooth and uncontested selection process. While these functional needs are real, it seems that sometimes parties have prioritised a smooth leadership selection process over the goal of selecting the most effective leader.

Notes 1 A notable deviation from this pattern is the transition from Fred Sinowatz to Franz Vranitzky in the late 1980s. Vranitzky took over the chancellorship in 1986 but only became party leader of the SPÖ in 1988. Although this was not made public at the time of government leadership change, identical change in the party leadership was planned from the very beginning. 2 Austrian electoral law provides for national ‘top candidates’ of parties as one individual was allowed to lead as many constituency and regional party lists as the party decided until 1992. Since 1992 individuals are confined to one slot at each tier of the electoral system that now also comprises a national tier. Typically, the parties nominate their leaders as first-ranked candidates in the national tier. In addition to filling such a formal role as derived from the electoral law, party leaders function as their parties’ top 76 L. Ennser-Jedenastik and W.C. Müller candidates in that they focus their propaganda activities on them and communicate to the electorate that the party leader is the party’s nominee for the top jobs in government or parliament to be filled after the election. 3 The quota for reaching the next voting round is specified as the number of valid votes divided by the number of candidates. The resulting figure is rounded to the next higher integer. 4 Nor was any party headed by a female leader before 1965. 5 Five of whom are still active, two died in office, and two more left due to ill health. 6 Party leader selection in Germany

Klaus Detterbeck and Ingo Rohlfing

Introduction Party leaders in Germany are important political figures who preside over complex, multi-layered organisations. Parties are crucial players in running elections, organising parliaments and recruiting government personnel; their central role in the democratic process is constitutionally recognised in the German Basic Law. Yet, parties are also decisive in making cooperative federalism work. The German federal system is characterised by a strong degree of interlocking between the territorial levels. The German parties mirror this institutional setting through strong vertical integration inside their organisations. Elite negotiations within and across party lines are routine business in the second federal chamber and other intergovernmental arenas (Lehmbruch 2000; Renzsch 2000). In this context of an interlocked federal party democracy, the relative power of national party leaders strongly depends on vertical power balances within the party and his/her talent for political bargaining. Given this political context, it may come as less of a surprise to learn that the selection of party leaders in Germany has been and still is an elite affair which is most often determined behind closed doors. In this chapter, we focus on party leaders of the following German parties: the Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen), the Christian Democrats (CDU and her Bavarian sister party, the CSU), the Liberals (FDP), the Social Democrats (SPD) and the post-Socialists Die Linke, a merger of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism)/Die Linke with the WASG. We choose these parties because they have achieved, with minor breaks for the Greens and the PDS, continuous representation in the German national parliament during our period of analysis. While the German party law stipulates that party conferences must elect the party leader and the bulk of the members of the party executives, competitive leadership contests have been rather rare. There are strong efforts within German parties to reach a consensus on a single candidate prior to the formal election; he/she is then presented to the conference delegates and usually ‘coronated’ by very large margins. As we demonstrate, the German parties do evidence some minor differences and there are occasional, more substantial exceptions to this rule. Moreover, the Green party is, in many respects, unique among the parties. 78 K. Detterbeck and I. Rohlfing By and large, however, there has been no effort to ‘democratise’ leadership selection at the national level so far.

Who is the party leader? The party law and statutes leave little doubt that the elected party chairman (Parteivorsitzende/-r) is the leader of the party, the head of the party in central office. The nomination of the general secretary (which is an elected position in all parties except for the CSU) and other important party functionaries in the party headquarters are among the privileges of the party chairman. In presiding over the national executive and the smaller leadership body, the national executive committee, party chairmen have a strong voice in shaping the competitive strategies and policy positions of their party. Yet, German party leaders are not absolute monarchs. While employing very different leadership styles, all German chairmen have had to make sense of complex organisational structures with many important stakeholders inside their party. To bring together the leading politicians of the federal and the Land (state) level, German party executives must find common ground with the federal -parlia mentary party, Land premiers or other important party representatives (see Detterbeck 2011; Herzog 1997). The chairman is part of any important formal and informal negotiation forums, whether concerning the formation or the maintenance of government coalitions, sensitive policy decisions at governmental level or intergovernmental bargaining in the federal sphere. For the party members and the public at large, the party chairman is the official face of the party; his/her presence in the media, in election campaigns at the federal and Land level and at party conferences, is an important yardstick of his/her popularity both within and outside the party. National party chairmen have relatively little impact on the selection of parliamentary candidates, which is the domain of regional and local party bodies (see Poguntke 1994: 188–9). Party leaders thus have only limited control over the composition of ‘their’ parliamentary party. Generally speaking, German party leaders are also seasoned members of their party in public office, where seasoned is defined as having served as a national MP or member of the federal cabinet before the party leadership is assumed. In the more traditional German parties, which have made up the famous ‘two-and- a-half party system’ until the 1980s (CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD), party chairmen have been and still are either members of the federal government, leaders of the parliamentary opposition or Land premiers. Most federal chancellors have either been party leaders when they assumed office (Adenauer, Brandt, Kohl and Merkel) or assumed that position during their chancellorship (Erhard, Kiesinger, Schröder). Thus, Helmut Schmidt is actually the only federal chancellor who never became party chairman. Traditionally, the party leaders of both major parties, CDU and SPD, have the right to nominate the electoral leader for the federal election, meaning that they possess the prerogative to nominate themselves for the chancellorship. However, there have been several instances where Party leaders in Germany 79 the party executives decided to have someone else head the party list, mainly for reasons of electoral appeal. Looking at the top political positions in parliament and government, the general patterns of the ‘old’ parties are quite obvious. Usually, the party chairman of the biggest party in the Bundestag is federal chancellor and the leader of the smaller coalition partner (presuming two-party cabinets) is federal vice chancellor. Vice chancellor is not an official position, but this title designates the importance of the party leader in the cabinet.1 The party leaders of the Bundestag opposition often head their parliamentary parties (Fraktionsvorsitzende/-r). In some cases, however, the party leader builds upon a strong position in the Länder. The SPD, for example, has had several party leaders over the last two decades who simultaneously served as Land premiers. In the case of the CSU, party leaders have typically been Bavarian premiers or senior members of the federal cabinet. The picture of a strong overlap between parliamentary and extra- parliamentary party elites is somewhat different for the two ‘new’ parties, which have entered federal parliament since the 1980s. This is particularly true for the Green Party, formed in 1980. The Greens had three co-speakers between 1980 and 1990 and two co-speakers (at least one of them being a woman) since then. The party had a strict policy of incompatibility between public office and membership in the party executive committee (Bundesvorstand) until 2003. Follow- ing a successful party plebiscite, one-third of the (currently six) executive committee members are now allowed to hold a parliamentary mandate. As originally intended in the Green concept of grassroots democracy, the separation of party office and public mandate has made access to party leadership in the Green Party relatively open and non-hierarchical. However, it has also allowed for the emergence of informal leadership structures. In addition to the two party chairmen, the two leaders of the parliamentary party are obvious candidates for public attention. In addition, personal charisma and distinct public offices have made individual Green politicians such as Joschka Fischer and Renate Künast the ‘public faces’ of the party even without holding an elected party office proper. In 2005, for example, the popular foreign minister Fischer became the frontrunner for the Greens despite his party’s general dislike for personalised election campaigns. Informal and fragmented leadership structures as well as the separation between party and parliamentary leadership have long been perceived as problematic by Green Party elites but are still valued as expressions of grassroots democracy among many party activists and members (see Raschke 1993; van Hüllen 1990).2 The Left Party is also chaired by two chairmen (at least one of them a woman) since the party arose from the merger between the post-socialist PDS and the splinter party WASG (Wahlalternative Soziale Gerechtigkeit) in 2007.3 At the federal level, nearly all party chairmen have simultaneously held a public mandate at the national or regional level. Some party chairs, like Oskar Lafon- taine (who left the SPD and joined the WASG in 2005) and Lothar Bisky, were also senior figures in the parliamentary party. This overlap between party faces 80 K. Detterbeck and I. Rohlfing was already present in the PDS (established in 1990 as successor party to the state regime party SED in the German Democratic Republic). At the Land level, there is a stronger yet unsystematic divide between the Left organisational leaders and the sub-state parliamentary parties (see Koß and Hough 2006). To recap, party chairs are usually the central figures in Germany, but the degree to which this holds true depends on personality and political context. Powerful and charismatic informal leaders have sometimes challenged the position of the incumbent party chair. Notwithstanding these particular instances, however, it generally holds that the party chairmanship and the factual party leadership coincide.

Rules organising leadership selection The institutional characteristics of party leadership selection are remarkably stable in Germany. Moreover, differences between the parties are rather small. Most importantly, the selectorate for all German parties is the same. As stipulated in the German party law of 1967, delegates to party conventions are to choose the party leader in a secret vote (Article 9, 4 Party Law). The state regulation of leadership selection forms part of the democratic principles which German parties must respect in their internal proceedings. The German Basic Law (1949) has constitutionally recognised the importance of parties in the political process but requires them to be organised democratically in order to enjoy the privileges of this constitutional status, including public funding. While there have been many changes to the legislation on party finances since 1967, state regulation on internal party democracy has remained intact, without any major revisions (Poguntke 1994: 189–94). As a result, party conferences are the arenas of leadership selection in all German parties. It is only at the Land level that leadership primaries have recently gained some prominence.4 Given the legal restrictions, membership ballots can have only consultative effect. In fact, there has only been a single exception to the traditional modus of conference voting at the national level. In 1993, the SPD hastily arranged a non- statutory membership ballot for choosing the new party leader. The former party chair, Björn Engholm, resigned over his involvement in a Land election campaign scandal in his native Schleswig-Holstein. Three contenders emerged, each representing different factions within the SPD. Because of the high degree of contestation of the leadership selection and the proximity to the next federal election, the SPD elites chose to let the party members decide. Rudolf Scharping won the ballot against Gerhard Schröder and the left-wing Heidemarie Wiezcorek-Zeul, and was subsequently coronated by a party conference (for a detailed analysis, see Leif and Raschke 1994). However, despite this direct mandate from the party members, Scharping’s leadership position remained fragile and lasted for only two years (see below). While the membership ballot was perceived as a success with respect to internal mobilisation and public reac- tions, the Social Democrats afterwards returned to the more restrictive selectorate of party conventions. The overall stability of leadership selection procedures Party leaders in Germanyâ 81

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

CDU (1965)

CSU (1965)

FDP (1965)

Greens (1980)

The Left (1990)

(1993) SPD (1965) (1994)

Figure 6.1âInclusiveness of the selectorate in Germany (1965–2012) (source: party statutes). Note Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate. in Germany thus contrasts with the more general finding by Cross and Blais (2012b) that selection has become more inclusive in Westminster democracies. For the 2013 federal elections, the SPD has engaged in a discussion of whether a party primary should be the instrument for choosing the top candidate. The situation mirrored 1993 to the extent that three politicians – Sigmar Gabriel, Peer Steinbrück and Frank Steinmeier – positioned themselves as candidates. In addition, it was expected that primaries would make the SPD, which has suffered an intense membership drain over the past decades, more attractive as a party. While the SPD finally decided to nominate Steinbrück without holding a primary, the Greens stepped forward in September 2012. They became the first German party to hold a party primary for the electoral leadership (actually a team of two top candidates, at least one of them being female) in the 2013 federal elections. As with leadership primaries at the Land level, expected electoral benefits and elite conflict are behind some modest progress towards a more inclusive modus of leadership selection at the federal party level. Similar methods in organising leadership selections can also be found when looking at other procedural aspects (see Table 6.1).5 In all parties, chairs are elected for a term of two years and then have to stand for re-Âelection at the next party conference. Again, in this respect, the parties are simply following the pre- scriptions of the German party law. The Left is the only party that puts an upper limit on the maximum number of terms that a party chair can serve. With respect to the electoral system, all parties require the absolute majority of votes in the Table 6.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Germany (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

CDU Delegates to a party convention 2 Run-off between the top two Resignation, no further procedure in candidates party statutes CSU Delegates to a party convention 2 Run-off between the top two Resignation, no further procedure in candidates party statutes FDP Delegates to a party convention 2 Run-off No procedures in party statutes Greens Delegates to a party convention 2 Run-off with more than two Resignation, deselection by party candidates (plurality voting in convention second round) The Left Delegates to a party convention 2 (max. 4 terms) Absolute majority Resignation, deselection by party convention SPD Delegates to a party convention 2 Run-off Resignation, deselection by party convention

Source: party statutes. Party leaders in Germany 83 first round. When an absolute majority is not reached, parties either have a run- off between the two leading aspirants, as in the cases of the two Christian Demo- cratic parties, or organise a second round of elections on plurality rules in which more than two candidates can stand. In this latter model, which is used by the Green Party, new candidates are allowed to enter the race at this stage. The majority requirements are relaxed, so that the candidate who has gathered the most votes is elected (see Table 6.1). However, as we will see later, most German party leaders are elected in the first round. With respect to candidacy, the party statutes of the different parties show some nuances. While all parties expect their leaders to be members, some have more specific nomination rules. In the SPD, candidates traditionally needed a nomination vote by the incumbent executive committee or 30 delegates at the party convention (until 1970, these had to come from four different regional branches). It was only in the late 2000s that the possibility of nomination by a single delegate was allowed. The FDP is unique to the extent that a series of party actors are explicitly granted the right to propose a candidate, including actors such as the Land branches, the executive committee of the youth organisation (Junge Liberale) and the executive committee of the association of liberal women. However, the procedure is not fully democratic because the support of 25 delegates was and still is necessary to be nominated. In the other parties, candidates can come forward by proposing themselves or by being proposed by a single delegate. Incompatibility rules exist for the CSU and the Greens. The CSU prescribes that no member shall have more than one chair position at the different levels of the party. In particular, the CSU party leader cannot simultaneously chair a constituency (Kreis) and a district (Bezirk) branch. Full-time employees of the CSU headquarters are also ineligible for the chair position (§50 CSU Party Statutes). As mentioned above, until 2003, the Green Party prevented members of parliament or government at regional, national or supranational levels from being elected to a national or regional party executive. While the rule is now relaxed and does allow the two Green co-chairs to sit in parliament, incompatibility is still upheld for members of government at any political level, as well as for members of the party’s central office (§15 Green Party Statutes). Except for the Greens, Die Linke and the SPD, the German parties do not have explicit rules concerning the deselection of party leaders. Unless the incumbent leader resigns, he/she can only be replaced if a challenger beats the incumbent party leader in an election at the party convention. By contrast, the Greens and The Left have given their delegates the right to vote individual chairs, or the executive committee as a whole, out of office (by absolute majority). The SPD maintains basically the same procedure for the selection and deselection of party leaders. For the Greens, this procedure was evoked twice during the turbulent early years of the party in the 1980s.6 84 K. Detterbeck and I. Rohlfing Dynamics of party leadership contests Leadership elections and their dynamics usually receive considerable attention from the media and the public. The level of attention is particularly high when elections are contested; when the incumbent leader is under pressure and criticised from within the party, it becomes even greater. This intense scrutiny contrasts with the unambiguous and unspectacular empirical picture of the dynamics of leadership selection in Germany. More than 88 per cent of all leadership elections were uncontested at the party convention (see Table 6.2). This of course does not imply that leadership elections were free of conflict before the convention. However, there is a widespread practice, at least among the more traditional parties (CDU, CSU, FDP and SPD), not to carry these conflicts into the convention and force run-offs between two or more candidates. Intra-party unity is strongly valued by party leaders and members as well as party supporters and the public. Although conflicts in the run-up to party conventions highlight a lack of unity as well, these are often less transparent and there is a considerable degree of reluctance to hold a Kampfabstimmung between multiple candidates at the convention. The numerous elections with a single candidate further indicate that incumbent party leaders correctly read the signals when under internal pressure. When the incumbent is confronted by a challenger, the former most often refrains from taking his chances and initiating a dispute at the party convention. One of the more prominent recent examples concerns foreign minister Guido Westerwelle who was head of the FDP until early 2011. Westerwelle chaired the FDP from 1998 and, after some ups and downs, achieved the party’s best federal election result ever in 2009 (14.8 per cent of the vote). The main, not to say single, campaign message was lower taxes and a simpler tax system. After the FDP formed a coalition with the CDU and CSU, it failed to fulfil its promise because the German budget did not allow for significant tax cuts. Nevertheless,

Table 6.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Germany (1965–2012)

All leadership contests

Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 88.43 2 5.09 3 3.24 4 0.93 5 or more 2.31 N 215

Average number 1.31 candidates Margin between top two finishers1 24.98 N 25

Note 1 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. Party leaders in Germany 85 the FDP was in permanent conflict with its coalition partners in order to achieve at least a few tax cuts. This conflict and a series of severe losses at Land-level elections raised voices suggesting that Westerwelle should pave the way for a successor. Moreover, since the late 2000s, a group of three young men – Bahr, Lindner, Rösler – positioned themselves in the centre of the FDP and demanded a programmatic reorientation of the party. Although Westerwelle still had some support from within the party, he decided to resign and not to face a run-off election with Philipp Rösler, who eventually became his successor. One of the rare examples in which the leader of an established party lost an election involves the SPD in 1995. In 1993, Rudolf Scharping had won the only primaries the SPD had ever held since the Second World War (see above). In 1994, he unexpectedly lost the federal election to Helmut Kohl. The loss of the federal election was complemented with several disappointing election results in the German Länder. Another dominant figure in the SPD at the time was Oskar Lafontaine, then prime minister of the Saarland. At the party convention in 1995 for which Scharping was scheduled for re-election, Lafontaine first gave a speech that was enthusiastically received by the delegates. Lafontaine was then nominated as party leader candidate on short notice and eventually won the run- off election against Scharping the following day. Although this incident is frequently alluded to in Germany when a party leader comes under attack, in particular a leader of the SPD, it is an exception to the rule of uncontested leadership elections. Most of the few elections involving two or more candidates were held by the Green Party. This is particularly true for the first decade of their existence, the 1980s. Compared to the other parties, the Greens have a particularly strong commitment to intra-party democracy. Somewhat surprisingly, this has not manifested itself in leadership elections via primaries (at least until recently) even though this would be the most inclusive method of selection. Leaving this aside and given that party leaders are elected at conventions, the nomination of more than one candidate is seen as a manifestation of grassroots democracy because this gives the delegates a choice. The average margin of victory for those elections that were contested (25 in total) is about 25 per cent (see Table 6.2). This seems to indicate that leadership elections with multiple candidates are not competitive because, on average, the elected leader wins by a wide margin. However, the picture looks different once one looks behind the aggregate figure. In the past, the FDP witnessed four contested leadership elections. The first two were close. In 1982, Genscher, the incumbent leader, won against Ronneburger with 55.78 per cent to 42.46 per cent. The race was even closer in 1988 when Lambsdorff and Adam-Schwaetzer competed for the leadership. Lambsdorff won with a margin of only 6 per cent, gathering 52.75 per cent of vote as opposed to 46.75 per cent for Adam-Schwaetzer. The other two contested elections involved Wolfgang Gerhard, who had to defeat two challengers at successive conventions. In 1995, Gerhard was running to succeed Kinkel and had to compete with Möllemann and Schönherr. Gerhard received 56.73 per cent of all votes, but nevertheless won by a considerable margin because 86 K. Detterbeck and I. Rohlfing Möllemann could only garner 33.49 per cent (Schönherr trailed with 5.5 per cent). At the next convention in 1997, Gerhard was challenged by Kappel, but soundly beat him by a margin of 86.36 per cent to 9.92 per cent. The only contested election in the CDU took place in 1971. After the CDU lost power at the federal level in 1969, Rainer Barzel and Helmut Kohl both ran for the leadership. Barzel won – 65.3 per cent to 33.5 per cent. In 2007, the CSU experienced the only competitive election in its history. Three candidates were running for the leadership position after the Bavarian prime minister and CSU party leader Edmund Stoiber was forced to resign. Günther Beckstein won the election with a margin of 19.1 per cent (58.2 per cent to 39.1 per cent for Horst Seehofer and 2.5 per cent for Gabriele Pauli). The PDS/Die Linke had two contested elections in its history, the first taking place in 2010 between Klaus Ernst and Heinz-Josef Weich. Ernst won with a clear margin by gathering 74.9 per cent of all votes, with Weich at only 13.9 per cent. In 2012, both leadership positions were contested. Katja Kipping was elected co-party leader over Dora Heyenn with 67.1 per cent of the vote compared to 29.3 per cent. The election was close for the second position, reflecting the fierce debate in advance of the convention: Bernd Riexinger received 53.5 per cent, while Dietmar Bartsch polled 45.23 per cent. The contested elections of the Greens are too numerous to be discussed in detail here. A look at trends over time shows that the Greens are becoming more and more typical on two counts. First, the number of candidates involved in contested leaderships has dropped significantly since the 1990s. In fact, the majority of leadership elections held since the 1991 party reform have seen just one candidate for each of the two chair positions. The Greens have traditionally been characterised by conflicts between Realos (moderate faction) and Fundis (leftist faction). The relatively large number of contested elections in the early days of the Greens is attributable to this intra-party division that became decreasingly salient over time. Moreover, the declining number of candidates running for the leadership position further speaks to the professionalisation of both factions as both now manage to nominate only one candidate (if they figure centrally in the nomination process at all). Second, if contested, the margin of victory in their recent elections is large. For instance, Cem Özdemir won with a margin of 78 per cent over Lars Willen in 2008. The margin of victory is partly a function of the number of candidates, but, as the previous discussion indicates, a small number of candidates is neither necessary nor sufficient for a large margin of victory. Instead, large margins are more accurately seen as a sign of a maturing Green Party. Just as the other parties normally do, they agree on a single candidate prior to the convention and settle all disputes beforehand. As mentioned before, some members of the Greens do consider it undemocratic if only one person is nominated for the leadership position. This may explain why, occasionally, completely unknown members nominate themselves for the leadership. These members are not serious candidates, which accounts for their small share of the vote and the large margin of victory in formally contested elections. Party leaders in Germany 87 With regard to the substance of contested leadership elections, we find variance both across parties and over time within the same party. Arguably, the most important difference again concerns the Green Party and the PDS/Die Linke on the one hand, and the more traditional parties on the other. The role of ideological factions in the Green Party was quite important for leadership contests in its founding decade. It only lost importance more recently. Since the mid-2000s, after their first involvement in federal government (1998–2005), one can witness a normalisation of the Greens, meaning that potential leaders are increasingly evaluated with regard to their potential to bring the party back into government. Moreover, there are periodic discussions about whether the Greens should expand their options and be prepared to form a coalition with the CDU on the federal level. Some members of the party elite are decidedly against this, while others are open to the idea. Considering that a coalition with the conservative mainstream party is still a contested issue, candidates for the leadership position are now screened with regard to their position towards such a coalition. The situation is similar for the PDS/Die Linke. The members of this party and parts of the elite had a strong ideological commitment combined with an aver- sion against participation in government. However, over time, the PDS became more office-orientated in the Länder in East Germany where it had a strong electoral basis, eventually forming coalitions with the SPD. The formation of Die Linke in 2007 through a merger of the PDS (then called Die Linkspartei) and the West German WASG reopened the debate about the balance between office versus policy orientation. Now, the party Die Linke has two leaders, one with roots in the WASG and one with roots in the PDS. Given the different perspectives of the WASG and PDS on the benefits of a radical opposition strategy (Fundamentalopposition) and more responsible, office-orientated behaviour, party leader elections and contests have a particular emphasis on this dimension and the question of how the party should operate in the national arena. The other German parties are, of course, also characterised by factionalism following ideological and regional cleavages and disputes about the relationship between policy- and office-seeking goals. However, in comparison with the Greens and the Left, it seems fair to argue that these issues play a lesser role. In the more traditional parties, party leaders are basically selected with regard to their electoral prospects and chances to gain public office. The degree to which a party leader promotes the pursuit of vote- and office-seeking goals is not equally salient for the FDP, CDU, CSU and SPD, and for each party over time. For instance, it was more important for the SPD to consolidate its ideological and policy profile after it returned to the opposition benches after the election of 2005 and seven years in government that strained the party. In general, though, leadership contests and elections in FDP, CDU, CSU and SPD take place with an eye toward the candidate’s potential to achieve their respective vote- and office-seeking goals. 88 K. Detterbeck and I. Rohlfing Demographics and tenure of party leaders The discussion of party leader characteristics draws on leadership contests between 1965 and 2012 in which a party leader was selected for the first time.7 Contests which simply prolonged one’s stay in leadership office (re-election as incumbent) are not included. A party leader entering party leadership for a second time, but with an interruption in between, is included. In this spirit, this section covers four characteristics of party leaders: gender; age; whether the leader had held a position of MP or of minister at the national level before becoming party leader; and the length in office as party leader. On an aggregate level, the proportion of women among the party leaders is relatively high at 30 per cent. However, the picture starts looking different when we take into account that the Greens and the Left maintain a gender quota for party leadership positions. Consideration of female party leadership by party shows that the CSU, FDP and SPD have never had a woman as party leader. The CDU has a share of 16.7 per cent, representing the leadership of Angela Merkel as at the time of writing. The PDS/Die Linke and the Greens stand out with a share of female leaders of about 22 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively. Cur- rently, it seems that the other three parties – CSU, FDP and SPD – appear to be far from selecting a woman as party leader. These three parties have few women in top-level positions and nearly all of those who are perceived as potential leaders are male.8 In contrast to the western parties, the PDS/Die Linke has been and still is somewhat more open to female party leaders. In 2000, Gabi Zimmer became the first female leader of the PDS. In 2008, Gesine Lötzsch became the second female leader, now of the party Die Linke. In 2012, Katja Kipping became the third woman at the head of Die Linke. For the Green Party, gender policy has been a constitutive issue from its very beginning. The Greens want to overcome gender discrimination and therefore follow a gender quota for the party leadership. This means that at least one leadership position has to be filled with a female candidate. Since the 2000s, however, it has been the informal rule that one position was held by a woman and one by a man.

Table 6.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Germany (1965–2012)

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women 0.00 0.00 36.84 35.00 32.00 29.73 Average age (in years) 54 46 43 47 51 48 Percentage without political 0.00 33.33 68.42 55.00 32.00 44.59 seniority1 Average tenure (in years) 14.61 12.75 2.71 3.13 3.11 4.49 N 7 3 19 20 25 74

Note 1 Seniority means that the leader has had national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection. Party leaders in Germany 89 The average age of party leaders at the time of their first election is about 50 years. This is relatively young, for example, in comparison with the age of politicians who were ministers at the federal level during the past decade. A breakdown of age by party gives a more nuanced picture. The Greens have the youngest leaders at 43 years. The low age is easy to explain with the youth of the Green Party and its foundation in 1980 by people mostly in their twenties and low thirties. FDP leaders, on average, have been 49 years old and thus approximate the overall mean. The leaders of the CDU, CSU and PDS/Die Linke are about 53 years old (on average) at the time of their election. SPD leaders are the oldest with an average age of slightly more than 55 years. Again, it becomes apparent the aggregate figure for all parties is misleading because it is strongly driven by the Green Party, which has so far recruited many young leaders due to a certain degree of leadership instability and rules concerning the election of a minimum of two leaders. Half of all newly elected party leaders are not politically seasoned, meaning that they have not previously occupied a public position at the federal level. This high figure might suggest that the leadership of a party is a vehicle for inexperienced politicians seeking to bolster their power position for the pursuit of political and personal objectives. However, this interpretation would be wrong because the high share of such leaders is fully driven by the Green Party. If we look at the figures for the Greens and the remaining parties separately, we see that the leaders of all non-Green parties held public office at either the federal or Land level when assuming their leadership position. This finding underscores that these parties require a certain level of political experience from their party leaders. A look at the recruitment patterns of the parties points to differences as regards the nature of political experience. The prime ministers of the German Länder traditionally hold a strong position within the CDU (Schmid 1990), but most party leaders (except for Helmut Kohl) have been recruited from the federal level. This is different for the SPD, a difference which is arguably attributable to the fact that the SPD has been in opposition for long periods of time since 1965 (1965–9, 1982–98, 2009–13). When the SPD is in opposition, it recruits its leaders from among the Länder prime ministers. This practice continued during its time in office between 1998 and 2009, but was complemented with recruitment from the federal level. In a time of high leadership turnover between 1991 and 2009, the SPD had five new party leaders from the federal level and four leaders recruited from among the Länder prime ministers.9 The FDP and PDS/Die Linke generally recruit their leaders from the federal level. This is attributable to the fact that federal ministers and leading members of the caucus in the national parliament are likely to be central figures in the party and better known to the public. The PDS/Die Linke and, even more so, the FDP have been members of the government in multiple German Länder. However, the Länder ministers are not usually known beyond their respective Land, thus putting them at a disadvantage relative to members of the federal government and the faction in the Bundestag. 90 K. Detterbeck and I. Rohlfing Of all Green party leaders during our period of analysis, more than 70 per cent were not politically seasoned at the time of their election to the leadership position.10 The high share of inexperienced leaders can be explained by the provision that a leader of the Green Party is not allowed to hold a political position at the same time (e.g. member of a cabinet or, until 2003, member of parliament). This does not preclude the Greens from electing a person into the leadership who already has some political experience provided that they resign from their political position in order to become leader. In fact, about one-quarter of all Green leaders had such prior political experience. However, this is the exception to the rule. The large share of inexperienced leaders is explained by two possible reasons. First, potential candidates for the leadership who hold a public mandate are not prepared to step down and thus are not available. Second, people with seniority status do run for the leadership position, but fail to win against their non-experienced counterparts. Members of the Green Party traditionally held anti-authoritarian and anti-hierarchical attitudes, which are attributable to their leftist ideology and the fact that many founding members challenged public authority at demonstrations, for example against nuclear power plants (Kleinert 1992). These attitudes might account for a low share of support for experienced candidates and, as a consequence, a high number of leaders without political experience. For the other parties, the share of politically inexperienced party leaders is zero or at negligible levels, indicating that experience in elective office seems a vital factor for becoming a party leader. The final variable to be discussed is leadership durability. The average tenure of leaders is 4.49 years. This figure is relatively low, but can be explained on two different grounds. First, leadership durability is short for the Greens and the PDS/Die Linke, at 2.3 years and 3.3 years, respectively. With regard to the Green Party, the short average durability reflects intra-party factionalism (Realos vs Fundis, see above) and a cleavage separating the party leadership from party members holding an anti-hierarchical attitude (Kleinert 1992). These conditions are not conducive to leadership stability and account for the high turnover rate in the Greens. The PDS was relatively stable since its foundation, but experienced more instability after its merger with the West German WASG and its renaming to Die Linke in 2007. The western wing of Die Linke pursues a clear-cut opposition policy (Fundamentalop- position), while the eastern wing is more pragmatic and prepared to take over government responsibility in the Länder (which they already do in some eastern Länder) and at the federal level. This dispute has created considerable turmoil since the merger in 2007 and contributed to frequent recent leadership turnover. For the SPD, durability is also low at about 4.5 years on average. This figure is driven by the high turnover rate since the resignation of Willy Brandt in 1987. In the last 25 years, the SPD has had nine different leaders, accounting for an average tenure of less than three years.11 The FDP has an above-average durability of 6.2 years. This figure is due to periods of relative stability and one period of instability. The FPD had nine leaders between 1960 and 2011, with four of them having been elected between 1985 and 1995 and five leaders covering the remaining 31 years. A similar picture emerges for the CDU, which has an Party leaders in Germany 91 average tenure of 8.8 years. The CDU was governed by Helmut Kohl between 1973 and 1998, and Angela Merkel from 2000 until the present. In the periods from 1966 to 1973 and 1998–2000, on the other hand, the CDU witnessed four different leaders. The most stable party is, not very surprisingly, the CSU with an average tenure of 13.7 years and only three leaders between 1961 and 2007. High leadership durability of the CSU is a reflection of the party’s homogeneity because it is not as factionalised as the other German parties. It was only in the late 2000s that the CSU displayed signs of instability due to the unfortunate hand- ling of Stoiber’s resignation in 2007 and the loss of the absolute majority in the Bavarian elections of 2008. On the aggregate level, the decline in length of leadership tenure over time indicates that the conditions for party leaders have become increasingly hostile. According to one line of reasoning, this could be due to an increasing pressure on party leaders to achieve electoral success (Andrews and Jackman 2008). However, this is not the main reason behind this decline in Germany. Most importantly, the SPD experienced numerous changes in party leadership in the 1990s and 2000s, only one of which is directly related to a poor performance by the party leader.12 In addition, two new parties that are more open to leadership change, the Greens and the Left, have entered the German party system. In total, the durability figures for Germany thus lend little credence to the claim that the fate of party leaders is closely linked to their electoral performance.

Conclusion The German parties show a relatively high degree of homogeneity when it comes to party leadership selection. For most parties during the period under investiga- tion here, the formal party leader has been the factual leader of the party as well. The institutional design of leadership selection is very similar across parties. The legally entrenched rule is election by delegates at a national party convention. It is somewhat surprising that the Greens, with their strong emphasis on participation and democratic practices, follow this procedure as it is possible to hold a party primary and have the result confirmed by congress delegates (as the SPD did in 1993). The Greens have now decided to elect the top candidates for the next federal election via primaries. However, similar proposals are not under consideration for the election of the party leader. Another aspect of homogeneity concerns the dynamics of leadership selection. With the exception of the Green Party in its early years, it is the rule that conflicts about the leadership position are settled prior to the convention and that only one candidate is nominated at the convention. The largest differences can be witnessed with regard to the characteristics of party leaders. The Greens are unique on all variables that we considered here due to their special roots and goals. To a lesser degree, the PDS/Die Linke is also different from the established western parties. But even if we leave these two parties aside, the other parties show differences as well on the selected variables. In most instances, the particularities such as a low average tenure for SPD leaders can be explained by party-specific characteristics and developments. As regards the short 92 K. Detterbeck and I. Rohlfing and medium run, one can expect that party leadership selection and the dynamics and characteristics of party leaders will follow the same patterns as in the past.

Notes 1 The president of the second chamber takes over responsibility when the chancellor cannot fulfil his duties because of ill health or resignation. 2 The most important Green Party reform in 1991 which signalled the predominance of the more pragmatic (Realos) party wing vis-à-vis the more radical faction (Fundis) sought to solve this problem by establishing a new party council, the Länderrat. It was made responsible for coordinating the national and regional party levels and their respective parliamentary groupings. In the party council, there is explicit representation of the party executives and the parliamentary parties (see Poguntke 1993). This is also true for a new executive body, the Parteirat (16 members), established in 1998. However, it took several unsuccessful attempts by the party executive before the members finally accepted moves to integrate public office-holders in the Green Party executive committee, the Bundesvorstand (six members) in 2003. 3 The WASG (Wahlalternative Soziale Gerechtigkeit) was founded in the western part of Germany in reaction to the Agenda 2010 of the SPD in 2003, which marked a shift away from the left side of the political spectrum. In contrast to the PDS and WASG, Die Linke is governed by two party leaders. 4 At the Land level, the major German parties (CDU, SPD) started to experiment with leadership primaries in the 1990s. While party conventions with one single candidate are still the norm, party members have occasionally been asked to choose between two or more aspirants in membership ballots. Most often, the position in question has been the electoral leadership of the party in an upcoming Land election. Considering these cases, electoral motives, the desire to promote the popular standing of the successful candidate, and the failure of elites to agree on a single candidate can be seen as the strongest motives for Land party primaries. For an analysis of this development at the sub-national level, see Detterbeck 2013. 5 While the party law defines the selectorate (party conferences), demands secret voting and requires the party executive to be re-elected at least every second year (with no restriction on reselection of party leaders), it says nothing about other aspects of leadership selection, such as the electoral system and candidacy requirements. 6 Deselection failed in 1985, when the controversial party leader Jutta Ditfurth was not voted out of office by the party convention. In 1988, however, the entire party executive committee had to step down after the party convention declared a vote of non- confidence due to the mishandling of party finances. 7 Party presidents in 1965 who were selected before that year are also included. 8 Despite its massive gender gap at the top, the CSU seems prepared to accept the former federal minister Ilse Aigner as potential successor of Horst Seehofer within the next few years. 9 Lafontaine, Schröder, Müntefering (twice), and Gabriel held positions at the federal level. Engholm, Scharping, Platzeck and Beck were Länder prime ministers when they became party leader. Moreover, Lafontaine, Gabriel and Schröder all served as Land prime ministers before they moved to federal politics. 10 The Green Party dominates the aggregate seniority figure covering all parties (about 68 per cent) because the Green Party has a relatively high leadership turnover rate and always has at least two leaders. 11 Müntefering is not counted twice here. He resigned in 2006 and returned to the leadership position in 2008. 12 This concerns Scharping’s removal as party leader in 1995. 7 The selection of party leaders in Italy, 1989–2012

Giulia Sandri, Antonella Seddone and Fulvio Venturino

Introduction The Italian party system has long been characterised by high levels of political fragmentation and instability (La Palombara 1989). This period of great instability reached its peak and came to an end in the early 1990s, when the old power system of the parties collapsed following a series of nationwide corruption scandals and judicial investigations (Bardi and Morlino 1994; Bardi 2002). During the rest of the 1990s, Italian politics experienced a systemic change. A new electoral law, the creation of new political actors and the strategic use of political communication began to sweep aside the old party system and to create a new basis for the internal organisation of political parties, much more centred around the leaders than the parties’ traditional bureaucratic structure. The emergence of new organisational structures also produced the inevitable changes in terms of internal relations within political parties, of the role played by leaders and consequently of the formal procedures for their selection. One immediate upshot was that scholars and political commentators generally acknowledged the distinction between the First and the Second Italian Repub- lics. The First Republic (1946–93) featured a proportional electoral system, large and heavily bureaucratised mass parties, a polarised and multi-party system, extremely low electoral volatility and lack of alternation in government. In contrast, the Second Republic – inaugurated with the 1994 parliamentary election – has been characterised by two separate and mixed electoral systems, personalised parties united in pre-electoral coalitions, exceptionally high electoral volatility, and government alternation in all six elections held between 1994 and 2013. Taking into account the huge differences in these two political and electoral scenarios, in this chapter we focus on the parties of the Second Republic. However, the scope of our analysis is limited by two traits of the Italian parties that have emerged in recent years: a general lack of consolidation in party organisation and the persistent fragmentation of the party system. Thus, we have chosen to select the most prominent cases from a large number of parties under- going a continuous and sometimes chaotic process of merging and splitting. To do so, we focus on the 2008–13 legislature, when only five parties entered parliament.1 The winning coalition was formed by the rightist Popolo delle Libertà 94 G. Sandri et al. (PDL) and Lega Nord (LN); the main opposition parties were the leftist Demo- cratic Party (PD) and Italia dei Valori (IDV); finally, a separate parliamentary opposition is represented by the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani (UDC), a tiny centrist party composed of former Christian Democrat politicians. One more cautionary remark is necessary here: only LN and IDV have been consistent in maintaining their ‘brand’ names, while other parties have evolved through different organisations, sometimes preserving rules and party oligarchy but occasionally reshaping their names and often modifying their ideological and cultural roots (i.e. Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and Forza Italia (FI), merged into a new party in 2008). To take account of these major changes, we also examine seven predecessors of the five current parties. The time period under scrutiny begins in 1989, and ends immediately before the 2013 parliamentary elections. Ostensibly, the party leadership selections held in this period manifested two different trends. The main leftist parties – except for the IDV – evolved first from the traditional congress of delegates inherited from their predecessors, to closed primaries, and then to open primaries. In this transition, the opening up of the parties was initially put into practice through informal and ill-defined practices. But recently, the PD has approved statutes and rules in which the democratisation of the leadership selection process is clearly stated.2 The story of the rightist parties is entirely different, since any regulations continue to be extremely loose, the selection of leaders is still decidedly informal, and the coronation of ‘founding fathers’ is a recurrent theme. However, the forthcoming ter- mination of the political careers of leaders such as Silvio Berlusconi and Umberto Bossi is going to dramatically change what have been their personal parties, though it is not easy to say what is going to happen thereafter. Several rightist politicians are pointing to primary elections as the new tool to be adopted for the renewal of their parties. If this change does come about, a ‘contagion from the left’ will pave the way for a new era in Italian politics.3

Who is the party leader? During the entire period of the so-called First Republic (1946–92) leadership roles were shared among different personalities within most Italian parties. In particular, there was a basic division of labour between the leader of the extra- parliamentary party – the party secretary – and the leader of the party in parliament and/or in government. For instance, the secretary of the DC (Christian Democracy) was prohibited from being appointed as chief executive. This was a particularly significant rule, because as the largest party, all the prime ministers during all the First Republic were from the DC, except for a four-year period in the 1980s. In most cases the party secretary was in effect more powerful than the chief executive for two reasons. First, the First Republic governments were invariably short-lived, so the secretary enjoyed a more stable position. Second, he led the party in negotiations to form a coalition government as well as in discussion on major policy agreements. Party leaders in Italy 95 From 1993–4 onwards, the advent of the Second Republic entailed dramatic innovations for the political system as a whole, as well as for the party leadership. Until the transition, almost all ‘First Republic’ Italian parties assigned full power to party secretaries as organisational leaders of the party. But in the last 20 years there has been a trend towards the concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of the leader of the party in parliament and/or in government. This has been particularly noticeable among right-wing parties (Ignazi 2006; Venturino 2010). Thus, when Gianfranco Fini took part in the rightist governments led by Silvio Berlusconi, he was repeatedly assigned roles as minister, deputy chief executive and speaker of the Lower House. During his tenure as party secretary of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi kept a tight rein on all ministers for federal reform. Silvio Berlusconi is the longest-lasting prime minister of the Italian political system since its re-foundation after the Second World War. He created Forza Italia in 1994 using his own financial and organisational resources (Calise 2010; Poli 2001; Paolucci 2007), and his leadership as party president persisted after its conversion to the PDL in 2008. The only significant innovation occurred in 2011 when Angelino Alfano was appointed as party secretary by Berlusconi himself.4 This unusual double leadership has not in reality limited Berlusconi’s power, but is rather to be considered as an initial step towards the ending of the political career of the 77-year-old entrepreneur, who is still acknowledged as leader, even though sentenced for tax fraud. These three rightist parties and their leaders have several features in common. In order to highlight how organisational changes differ from those of the traditional parties, Berlusconi and Fini deliberately chose the name of ‘president’, while Bossi favoured the term ‘federal secretary’ in order to call attention to the political goals of his party. Also, these parties have for decades kept their ‘founding fathers’ as party leaders.5 The centrality of the rightist leaders can be discerned in several aspects of their parties’ internal life. In line with traditional patterns of Italian politics, they are not the parliamentary leaders of their respective parties. Regardless of this limitation, they all enjoy unconditional media dominance, they are seen to be the main asset in personally gathering electoral support, they wield tight control on the extremely centralised process of candidate selection and, finally, they counter potential factionalism by forcing out any opponents. All things considered, they have renewed the Italian political landscape by creating strictly controlled parties whose main goal is the promotion of their own public and personal careers. All this has been accomplished with admirable adroitness and dexterity. There is another party still dominated by its ‘founding father’: Italia dei Valori (IDV). It is a leftist party created in 1998 by the former judge Antonio Di Pietro. The IDV was formed more as a cultural association than a party and Di Pietro was designated as the ‘owner’ of the organisation, with no limits placed on his power or tenure as leader. Despite repeated changes to the IDV’s statutes, it remains an organisation completely dependent on its leader for media attention, candidate selection and electoral activities. Further distinguishing features are its unrelenting populist discourse against corrupt politics and a complete 96 G. Sandri et al. absence of any internal opposition within. In short, IDV is a leftist party with a personalised organisational structure similar to that of its counterparts on the right. The situation in other Italian parties is somewhat different. They do not have clearly identified ‘founding fathers’, they have often maintained the organisational roots of their predecessors from the First Republic, and are therefore less personalised in terms of leadership style. Yet, in these parties too, there has recently been a trend towards ‘presidentialisation’ and a more unified leadership. In 1994, it was the former DC that split, into a number of minor parties which later formed electoral alliances with other leftist and rightist parties, or positioned themselves in a solitary centrist position. The leftist Italian People’s Party (PPI) – formed in 1994 – maintained a party secretary until it merged with the newly-founded ‘Margherita’ in 2001–2. The man in charge for the entire period from 2002 to 2007, Francesco Rutelli, then discarded the name ‘secretary’ to take on the preferred title of ‘federal president’. He never filled the role of parliamentary leader, but led the leftist coalition in the 2001 parliamentary elections as candidate for prime minister. When the former Communists and Christian Democrats merged in 2007 to form the Democratic Party, the new party adopted inclusive methods to select its leader. Besides this innovation regarding leadership selection, the PD maintained greater continuity with regard to the role of the leader: the label ‘secretary’ was maintained, with the president in a clearly subordinate role. The secretary’s role was quite separate from that of the coordinators of the parliamentary group, and the secretary serves as the party’s electoral leader. As criticism of the presidentialisation of parties gained momentum in the 1990s, several former Christian Democrat parties opted instead to preserve a traditional organisational form led by a party secretary (Pizzimenti 2007). But these eventually morphed into political machines sustaining the careers of some distin- guished politicians. This is particularly evident in the case of Pierferdinando Casini and his associated parties, the CCD and the UDC (Baccetti 2007). Casini was selected as party secretary of the CCD in 1995 and operated as a traditional party secretary until 2001, when his party found itself in opposition. After the 2001 formation of the second Berlusconi government, Casini was appointed as speaker of the Lower Chamber. He had thus forsaken his partisan role, and Marco Follini was selected as new party secretary. This solution kept the usual distinction between partisan and institutional roles. In 2002 the CCD evolved into the UDC; Follini continued to lead the new party until 2005, with the party maintaining the traditional split between a secretary leader and a subordinate president. Casini, though, filled neither of these roles. Instead, he was assigned the singular role of coordinator of the parliamentary caucus from 2008 to 2012. Nevertheless, it was clear that, despite not having any formal role within the party, he continued to be the party’s most prominent politician. This was made evident by his pre-eminence in official party communications, and above all by the overt presence of his name on the party symbol during the 2008 and 2013 elections. In sum, the UDC in effect has an innovative triumvirate leadership: a Party leaders in Italy 97 party secretary, a party president and above all an institutional and electoral leader, the latter being an unofficial but dominant role. Therefore, for most of the parties included in this analysis, it is possible to clearly identify the leading figure of the party, either the ‘secretary’ or the ‘party president’, often acting also as party leader in government. The only exception is indeed the UDC, whose actual leading figure has not always been the officially appointed party ‘secretary’. Given that we are focusing on formally selected party leaders, the remaining part of the chapter is dedicated to the position of UDC party ‘secretary’, even though the position has not always been that of informal leader of the party.

Rules organising party leadership selection During the First Republic all the Italian parties adopted similar methods for selecting their leaders. The first step was the election by the members of a congress, composed on average of 1,000–2,000 delegates. The assembly was entrusted with the selection of the secretary or alternatively it appointed a party council which then had the task of choosing the leader. None of the parties ever adopted more inclusive procedures. But during the Second Republic those rules changed dramatically. Here, they are explored with regard to four factors: candidacy requirements, inclusiveness of the selectorate, election and deselection rules. In terms of requisites for candidacy, differences can be observed in the rules across time as well as among parties. Seniority, as a condition of eligibility as a leadership candidate, has never been incorporated into Italian parties’ internal rules. The PD and the LN require that prospective candidates should be party members, while the PDL, UDC and IDV statutes do not stipulate any specific requirement. Similar rules were adopted by their predecessors. No Italian party has ever set an age limit for its leader, and the same goes for gender alternation. A similar pattern emerges when looking at the variation, either across time or across parties, of the rules governing candidacy. Very few parties require that their prospective candidates possess some kind of formal endorsement in order to participate in the leadership race. The prospective candidates for PD leadership have to be supported by 10 per cent of the delegates to the National Assem- bly or by a number of members that ranges from 1,500 to 2,000 nationwide. The PDL does not require official endorsements for its prospective candidates, nor do any of the other parties. It would seem then, that the rules on candidacy in Italy have been tightened only within those parties that have at least marginally increased the inclusiveness of the selectorate. In terms of inclusiveness of the selectorate, we can see from both Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 that there is a key difference between the PD, the IDV and all other parties. The PDL, LN and UDC have adopted a representative system, in which party delegates select the party leader, the PD use an open primary system and the IDV have adopted selection by a party council. The size of selectorate bodies can vary widely, ranging from around three million voters participating in 98 G. Sandri et al. the PD’s primary elections, to the few thousand members of the LN, UDC and PDL, to the 150 members of the IDV party council. In terms of changes across time, the PD (and its predecessors PDS-DS) has undergone three significant waves of internal democratisation, while most other parties (IDV, UDC, LN, PDL and their predecessors) have not changed their selectorates in the past decade. From the year 2000, the PDS-DS began to evolve from a representative system (with a party secretary selected by delegates in the congress) to a direct election system, in which all eligible members were entitled to select the leader. When it was founded in 2007, the PD was one of the first parties in Western Europe to adopt open direct primaries for selecting its leader. Therefore, the selectorate is composed of the entire electorate of the party. Indeed, both Italian and European citizens can participate, as can minors (over 16) and legal immigrants (Bordandini and Di Virgilio 2008; Venturino 2010; Seddone and Ven- turino 2013). Since 2009, the selectorate has been further extended to include Italians living abroad, although they are obliged to register as party supporters in order to vote in one of the 10,000 or so polling stations set up around the country. This particular model of primary election is modelled along the lines of the ‘open primary with public declaration’ used in American presidential primaries (Ranney 1972; Ware 2002; Valbruzzi 2005; Cohen et al. 2008). Besides the PDS-DS-PD, the only other party to broaden its selectorate was FI. In 1995, FI adopted a formal procedure for selecting the leader based on a vote by the party council rather than its earlier practice of having the leader chosen informally by the party elite. By 1997, FI had instituted a leadership selection procedure whereby leaders were to be chosen by delegates at the party congress. However, the fact that there has been no change in leadership since 1994 shows that the adoption of this new, apparently more inclusive, selection procedure was mainly a public image and communication strategy rather than real organisational change. Moreover, in most parties such rules are today loosely defined and have been even more flexibly implemented: during the last 20 years, an evident lack of formality has continued to prevail over official rules and party statutes. In short, if rules for selecting new leaders are formally enshrined in parties’ constitutions, they are not always strictly followed. The overall picture to emerge from viewing this political party panorama is that there has been a generalised hesitancy on the part of Italian parties to actually democratise leadership selection methods, with the exception of the PDS-DS. With regard to their election rules, Table 7.1 shows that the PD and UDC currently employ the run-off system. While their leadership selection procedures are based on two very different selectorates, all other parties use a plurality rule. Further, election rules have evolved little since the end of the First Republic and, with the exception of the leader of the PD (maximum mandate of two terms), there are no term limits for the leaders of most current and extinct Italian parties. Length of mandates ranges from between two (UDC) and four years (PD), with the notable exception of the PDL, whose statutes, unsurprisingly, provide no formal indication of the maximum length of a leader’s mandate. Party leaders in Italyâ 99

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party party group council leader convention

Partito Partito Democratico Democratico, Democratici della Sinistra, PD di Sinistra DS PDS (2007) (2001) (1998) (1991) Partito Popolare Italiano, PPI (1994)

Margherita (2002) Italia dei Valori, IDV (1998) Centro Christiano Democratico, CCD (1994)

Unione dei Democratici Cristiani, UDC (2002)

Alleanza Nazionale, AN (1994) Forza Italia, FI (1997) (1994) Popolo delle Libertà PDL (2009)

Figure 7.1âInclusiveness of the selectorate in Italy (1989–2012). Note Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate.

As for deselection rules, no removal procedure is provided for by the party statutes of the UDC, IDV, LN or PDL. The same goes for their predecessors. Among the PD’s predecessors, Margherita’s constitution assigned the party council power to vote on the removal of the secretary, while the Democratici di Sinistra’s statute has given the same right to the party congress since 1998. Currently, the PD statutes stipulate that the National Assembly (which is an internal permanent body similar to the party congress in that it is composed of about 1,000 delegates chosen by party members and voters at the regional level) can vote a motion of no-Âconfidence against the party leader if it is supported by an absolute majority of the delegates. 100 G. Sandri et al. Table 7.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Italy (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

PD All voters 4 Run-off Party congress IDV Party council 3 Plurality No removal procedure UDC Delegates to party 2 Run-off No removal convention procedure LN Delegates to party 3 Plurality No removal convention procedure PDL Delegates to party No term specified Plurality No removal convention procedure

It is often the case that parties change their organisational structure, and in particular their leadership selection rules, after a significant electoral defeat or when affected by an external shock (Cross and Blais 2012b; Scarrow 1999a). In the case of the PD and before it the DS, it was the impact of internal dynamics that seems to have influenced the choice to open up the leadership selectorate. The changes adopted in 1998 and in 2007 coincided with the momentum generated by the creation of a new party, the DS and the PD respectively, while the changes adopted in 2000 by the DS probably came about in response to legitimacy claims by voters and members (the party was then in power but in a highly unstable coalition of various left and centre-left parties), or may have been due to internal wrangles within the dominant coalition. The organisational changes introduced by FI, on the other hand, appear to be more clearly linked to the 1996 electoral defeat as well as to the need to improve the party’s image and to stabilise its organisational structure (Paolucci 2007).

Dynamics of party leadership contests So far we have discussed the formal rules regulating the selection of the leaders in Italian parties. We now focus on a description of the leadership races that have occurred in the period under examination. We begin with the figures detailed in Table 7.2. Looking at thehand left- columns, the first significant data are the large number of coronations. Out of 35 leadership selections, 24 (68.6 per cent) were ‘contested’ by a single candidate (mostly involving rightist parties) with no competitors at all.6 In fact, right-wing parties held 17 leader selections, and only in one case did two contestants run. In the majority of cases these parties used the traditional method of selection by a convention of delegates to crown a founding father whose position was never seriously questioned. Whenever party merging and splitting led to political turmoil that made such an electoral charade unfeasible, then completely informal procedures were resorted to in order to ensure the continued status of incumbent leaders. Seldom have leaders of leftist parties been ‘selected’ as a result of a coronation, though this did happen in the case of the IDV and the Margherita, namely Table 7.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Italy (1989–2012)

All leadership contests Full membership vote and open primaries

Number of candidates Percentage of elections Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 68.6 1 0.0 2 17.1 2 0.0 3 8.6 3 50.0 4 2.9 4 25.0 5 or more 2.9 5 or more 25.0

Average number 1.5 candidates Average number 3.8 candidates Margin between top two finishers1 38.4 Margin between top two finishers 43.5 N 35 N 4

Note 1 The margin between the top two finishers indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested elections only. 102 G. Sandri et al. two new parties unconstrained by the political traditions of the First Republic. In the first case, Antonio Di Pietro was selected in 1998 at the time of the party’s formation, and his leadership has never since been challenged. Francesco Rutelli was affirmed as the Margherita’s party leader in four party congresses, until the party disbanded in 2007. The story is wholly different in the case of the parties that rose from the ashes of the traditional ones. To begin with, from 1991 to 1998 the former Commu- nists (PDS-DS) ran only three leadership selections with single nominees and these candidates never earned the support of the whole selectorate, as in the cases discussed above. This was by no means due to competitiveness in the leadership contest, but was rather caused by dissent against reformers from orthodox Communists, which was a prelude to further fragmentation and splitting to form new, short-lived parties. Multi-candidate elections numbered 11 in total, representing 31.4 per cent of all selections, and were contested by a minimum of two candidates (six times) and a maximum of five (on only one occasion). Ten of them were run by leftist parties. The only exception was the two-candidate run-off held by the UDC in its 2007 delegate convention, which concluded with the runaway success of the front runner in the first round. We focus on the multi-candidate selections organised by the leftist parties. The PPI – a predecessor of the ‘Margherita’ active in the 1990s – continued to use the convention of delegates it had inherited from the Christian Democrats. In the first half of the 2000s, the post-Communist parties showed greater creativity; the DS, for example, abandoned the traditional congress of delegates and in two further instances, leaders were chosen by a full membership vote. The year 2007 represented a true turning point, when Christian Democrats and former Commu- nists merged to create the Democratic Party (PD). The new party then launched open primaries – held twice so far in 2007 and 2009 – that were contested by five and three candidates respectively. The above discussion of the multi-candidate races of the leftist parties brings our attention now to the open contests reported in the right-hand columns of Table 7.2. Here, we are examining only four cases: two full membership vote selections in the DS in 2001 and 2005, and two open primaries in the PD in 2007 and 2009. While dealing with only four cases limits the scope of our discussion to some extent, one point to note is that larger selectorates and multi-candidate contests appear to go hand in hand, and that the open primary election held by PD in 2007, featuring five candidates, was the most crowded selection inour sample. Of course, it is not possible to verify whether or not these multi- candidate electoral competitions are a consequence of the opening up of leader selection procedures, or are instead determined by the ideological leanings of these parties. An examination of the average number of candidates is a useful indicator in examining the pattern of competition predominating in the inclusive selections of the leftist parties. As shown again in Table 7.2, when all contests are taken into account the average is about 1.5 candidates. Yet when only the four races Party leaders in Italy 103 with large selectorates are considered, it peaks to at 3.8. The pattern that emerges if we focus on these measures is one of a direct relationship: the larger the selectorate, the more competitive the leader selection is. Regardless of the small number of cases, it is worth noting that the number of candidates alone is a very rough proxy for competitiveness. To avoid misinterpretation, changing levels of competitiveness can be assessed using an alternative measure. It is fairly evident, for example, that competition is higher when a tiny margin of votes separates the front runner from his main competitor, while it is lower when that margin is greater. Since this measure obviously cannot be used in cases of uncontested selection with a single candidate, the average margin between the two top finishers is calculated only using the results of the 11 races featuring at least two candidates. The resulting 38.4 per cent average margin indicates a rather low level of competitiveness. But given that the average margin calculated for the four open contests is still higher (43.5 per cent), this means that, despite the higher selectorate inclusiveness and the greater number of candidates, when compared to the whole sample these contests turn out to be less competitive on this measure. Our small sample of only four open contests poses the further dilemma that one single outlier might sway the results. In effect, the sample is split between two selections where the margin is quite low (DS 2001 and PD 2009), and the other two with sizeable margins well beyond 60 per cent. Although the overall picture remains unclear, we can at least say that the levels of competitiveness are not significantly affected by the different kinds of open selections, since full member voting and open primaries alternatively produce low and high scores. The simple hypothesis that competitiveness is fostered by a greater number of candidates is to be rejected: the 2007 PD primary election contested by five candidates was won by Walter Veltroni with a margin of 62.9 per cent, while the subsequent 2009 primary – with only three candidates was won by a margin of 18.9 per cent.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders Over the last 20 years, the overriding feature of the Italian party system has been an instability that has led to a series of significant consequences and has also considerably impacted on the career patterns of Italian party leaders. For example, some leaders have switched parties moving from left to right, and vice versa.7 And when a new party arose its first leader was invariably chosen by an ad hoc elite group through an obscure process involving a few veteran politicians. On occasion, leaders selected in the starting phase of a party’s life were in charge for only for a short period, followed by a more stable leadership. There are no obvious explanations to account for these chaotic changes. In order to eschew any gross inaccuracies, we will proceed as follows. First, in the case of a politician who has spent most of his career on the right, but who temporarily led a leftist party,8 we consider the ideological standing of the party as prevailing, and hence the leader as a leftist. Second, when a politician has survived more than one selection and has thus led his party for several mandates we refer exclusively to his first mandate. 104 G. Sandri et al. But – and this is our third caveat – if the same politician was selected as a leader of two different parties we consider the two cases as separate.9 Fourth, we disregard leaders temporarily selected to lead new parties for a short period, focusing instead on the following leader enjoying a more stable mandate. Once these criteria have been applied to our full dataset, the number of cases to consider falls to 23. Table 7.3 provides a description of some characteristics of this subset, split into the two decades comprising the Second Republic. Here we can observe at least some general trends, even though the whole period under examination is relatively short. The first variable reported in Table 7.3 is gender. It speaks for itself: in recent Italian history no mainstream party has ever been led by a woman. Moreover, only one woman, Rosy Bindi, has contested a party leadership since 1989. She was runner-up in the PD primary election won by Walter Veltroni in 2007. Thus the only leader selection featuring a female candidate was also a highly inclusive competition, in theory involving the whole of the Italian electorate, although turnout amounted to 3,500,000 voters. Of course, this is not sufficient evidence to establish a causal link between inclusiveness and the breaking down of the gender gap, although we can safely affirm that exclusive leader selections are not female-friendly. In this regard, however, organisation and ideology seem to be more important than the kind of leader selection process adopted. The only cases of parties led by a woman – not reported here – may be found among the ‘new’ parties founded during the 1970s, such as the Greens and the extreme left. The second characteristic of party leaders presented in Table 7.3 refers to average age. The typical Italian party leader over the past 20 years has been a man in his fifties, though notable variations exist between the two extremes. On the one hand, Pierferdinando Casini and Gianfranco Fini were about 40 years old when they became presidents of their parties for the first time in 1995; on the other hand, Silvio Berlusconi was confirmed as president of the PDL in 2009 at the age of 73. Additionally, the age of Italian party leaders has slightly increased over time, moving from an average of 51 in the 1990s to 54 in the 2000s. Finally, those leaders directly elected by a full membership vote or by all voters through open primary elections tended to be somewhat older than those selected by party delegates.

Table 7.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Italy, 1989–2012

1989–99 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women 0 0 0 Average age (in years) 51 54 52 Percentage without political seniority1 7.7 10.0 8.7 Average tenure (in years) 7.0 3.4 5.4 N 13 10 23

Note 1 Seniority means that the leader had national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection. Party leaders in Italy 105 Table 7.3 also reports that, in order to be selected as a party leader, an earlier career in some representative role appears to be necessary. In effect, about 90 per cent of the party leaders of the Second Republic had previously served as, or were incumbent, MPs when selected. The apparent increase from 7.7 to 10 per cent of the leaders without such a track record could, therefore, be misleading. In both decades, only one leader was a complete newcomer: Lorenzo Cesa, chosen as UDC leader in 2005, but even more prominent was Silvio Berlusconi’s entrance onto the playing field when he founded Forza Italia in 1994. Moreover, it should be noted that the definition of seniority, as reported in Table 7.3, simply refers to the existence of a previous career at national level though, more realistically, most Italian politicians start their careers at local level. As a member of the EU, Italy also offers its political class the opportunity to access political mandates at the European level. In any case, when the various career paths of politicians are examined, the general picture to emerge is fairly uniform. This is because only very few leaders lack previous experience at local or European level, and the figures largely overlap with their presence in national institutions. Once more, Silvio Berlusconi is the most notable exception, being the only Italian politician who on his appointment as party leader in 1994, lacked any experience at local, national and European levels. Length of tenure is the fourth element of party leadership considered here. On average, Italian leaders remain in office for slightly over five years, but with a sharp decrease in the 2000s as compared to the previous decade. What mainly contributed to this average decrease was the short leadership tenures of two PD leaders, who had been selected through open primaries; their average stay in office was only 27 months. Nevertheless, since no clear relationship seemsto exist between the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the length of tenure, it can reasonably be argued that the mode of selection is not relevant to predicting the durability of the leadership, and that the most interesting variations across parties can be observed by comparing their ideological standing and the circumstances of resignations. The right-wing parties have usually maintained the same leaders – however selected – right from their origins, and cases of a party disbanding have been exclusively due to party merging, financial scandals or a voluntary resignation.10 In four out of 13 cases of resignation, the reason for stepping down was simply the end of the term imposed by the party statute, and so it was a kind of resignation that had never previously occurred for the leaders of the right- wing parties. The respective fixed terms for the PPI and DS are 24 and36 months, and it is apparent that the varying period of tenure among leftist and rightist leaders has been brought about by their opposite modes of leadership ter- mination, even though there is no maximum number of terms to be respected among any leftist party. In conclusion, it should be emphasised that no leader has ever been formally removed by the organs of his party. This is hardly surprising, because as reported above in Table 7.1, most statutes are silent about rules concerning a possible recall. And when a leader has been involved in a scandal – a recurrent affair in Italian politics – his party has always preferred to support him, and eventually to move him into another role rather than bring him down definitively. 106 G. Sandri et al. Conclusion The comparative literature shows that, in most countries, parties began to implement a democratisation of their leadership selection procedures from the 1960s. This study has revealed that Italian parties followed an entirely different pattern. Wholesale continuity predominated until the 1990s, when the whole party system entered a period of dramatic turbulence. Paradoxically, while the parties were shaken by this shattering ‘earthquake’ – an overused metaphor to describe Italian politics in the last 20 years – their methods of leader selection remained quite unchanged. Indeed all parties continued to use a congress of delegates chosen by party members to select elderly male leaders with political experience and seniority. Lack of formality continued to prevail over official rules and party statutes, especially during the frequent transitions from one party label to another. The only exceptions were the small post-materialist parties – not considered here – where female and younger leaders have been periodically selected. It was not until the 2000s that major changes came about among leftist parties. In 2001, the DS did away with the pre-existing congress of delegates and opted for closed primary elections. But a real revolution only came about in 2007 with the formation of the PD. For the first time in Western Europe, an inclusive selectorate encompassing all Italian citizens elected Walter Veltroni as PD leader. Although open primaries did not prove effective in averting the endemic leadership weaknesses of the major leftist parties, they were resorted to for the second time in 2009 and currently enjoy such support among the rank-and-file members (Sandri 2011) that they can now be considered a stable feature of the party. While the methods of selection changed dramatically, the party in public office underwent only minor changes, given that the leftist leaders continued to refuse governmental roles. The pattern is totally reversed for the rightist parties, in which all party leaders have also filled important governmental and parliamentary roles. The extreme case is evidently that of Silvio Berlusconi, who has been the chief- executive candidate six times between 1994 and 2013, and prime minister in four long-lived governments. Changes among the right have been largely nominal and token with regard to the party in central office. The predominance of the founding fathers has encouraged personal parties with repeated uncontested coronations of single candidates, loose enforcement of fundamentally informal procedures and finally an absolute refusal to open up leader selection procedures. In conclusion, two main elements have emerged regarding the organisation of leadership selection in Italy. On the one hand, there is a significant and persistent gap between formal rules and their actual implementation. On the other hand, the main point is the recent trend towards more inclusiveness of leadership selection procedures on the left, but not on the right side of the political spectrum. Although the selectorate remains exclusive in most parties, the formal development since the end of the 1990s has nonetheless been noteworthy. Internal elections have been formally adopted by all parties, although the manipulation of candidacy Party leaders in Italy 107 rules, the exclusiveness of the selectorates, the abundance of coronations and the lack of actual leadership contests show that intra-party democracy within Italian centre-right ‘personal’ parties remains limited. The leadership selectorate within Italian parties remains on average quite exclusive, despite some signs of opening up during the last decade. The current twilight of the leaderships among the rightist parties paves the way for important changes. According to the existing theories concerning the democratisation of parties’ internal life, the new trends seem to have arisen as a result of a ‘contagion effect’. Thus, the open primaries inaugurated by the leftist parties are seen to be the likely solution to be adopted by the rightist parties as well. If so, internal party change will once again signal a decisive renovation in Italian politics.

Notes 1 However, during the 2008–13 legislature, party splitting and floor crossing have substantially modified the parliamentary party system. Moreover, the Berlusconi government, formed after the 2008 election, was subsequently replaced in November 2011 by a ‘non-political’ government led by Mario Monti. 2 Nevertheless, mainly due to the recent implementation of such restrictive rules, the PD has often redefined them in order to better adapt its strategy to any emerging political contingencies. 3 In this regard, it should be pointed out that there have been some recent local cases of inclusive procedures promoted by rightist parties in selecting candidates for municipal level elections. Furthermore, in autumn 2012, during the leadership crisis of the rightist coalition, such inclusive methods were considered the most effective strategy to choose a new leader. But it was ultimately the personalised matrix of parties and coalitions that prevailed, quite dependent on the figure of Berlusconi. 4 Alfano was appointed directly by Berlusconi as president of the party without any consultation with the party organs (namely the party convention) responsible for the selection of the leader (nor with any other internal party body). Therefore, the informal appointment of Alfano was not coupled with any major change of internal decision-making procedures or with any change in the distribution of internal power. This is why the selection of Alfano is not included in the present analysis. 5 After being expelled from the PDL in 2010, Fini gathered a number of experienced parliamentarians to become the president of a new party named Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia (FLI). This party failed to enter the parliament at the 2013 election. 6 We consider a ticket of two candidates as an uncontested race. This is because we deal here with 35 contests, but with 36 party leaders in the next section. 7 This is especially the case with former Christian Democrats. They occasionally led parties allied with leftist coalitions, more often guided rightist parties supporting Ber- lusconi’s leadership, and sometimes created autonomous parties located in the centre. 8 This is the case of Rocco Buttiglione, who temporarily led the leftist PPI in 1994 during the transition from First to Second Republic. 9 For instance, Silvio Berlusconi figures twice in our dataset: the first time as leader of Forza Italia selected in 1994, the second as leader of the Popolo delle Libertà selected in 2009. 10 As already noted, the only analogous case on the left is Antonio Di Pietro, who founded IDV in 1998 and until the ruinous 2013 parliamentary election maintained an unchallenged leadership. 8 The selection of party leaders in Spain1

Oscar Barberà, Juan Rodríguez-Teruel, Astrid Barrio and Montserrat Baras

Introduction After 40 years of authoritarian regime, Spain’s transition towards democracy started in the mid-Â1970s. By 1977, the first democratic elections since the Civil War (1936–9) were called and a new multi-Âparty system emerged. It was made up of two big statewide parties, the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE); two medium statewide parties, the Partido Comunista de España (PCE) and the Alianza Popular (AP); and several non-Âstatewide parties notably the Catalan Convergència i Unió (CiU2), and the Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). These six parties reached a consensus on most of Spain’s new institutional setting and the main economic and welfare policies. However, this party system came to an end at the 1982 general elections. After a short interlude, the present national party system emerged by the end of the 1980s. This was composed of two big statewide parties: the PSOE and the Partido Popular (PP), the latter being the result of a merger of the AP with some splits from the former UCD; a medium statewide alliance, Izquierda Unida (IU) which included the PCE and other leftist parties and social movements; and several non-Âstatewide parties among whom the CiU and the PNV were still the most relevant players. Although new statewide parties such as Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD) have emerged in the last decade, the party system and the party competition dynamics remain very much the same as in the early 1990s (Oñate 2008). That is why the five major Spanish political parties analysed in this chapter are the PSOE, PP, IU, CDC and the PNV. The data included cover the period from 1974 to 2012. As this chapter illustrates, the selection of party leaders in Spain has not changed substantially since it was first implemented with the restoration of democracy. Formally, leadership selection is essentially made through delegates in party congresses. None of the analysed parties has ever held (open or closed) primaries to select the party leader. Unlike other countries this has not prompted intra-Âparty competition: generally speaking, the incumbent party leaders are rarely challenged, and party contests are still atypical even when the incumbent resigns (Méndez et al. 2004). Furthermore, these procedures have not favoured the promotion of women as party leaders. Party primaries, intra-Âparty contests Party leaders in Spain 109 and women’s promotion can be found in Spain, but they have mainly occurred in minor or regionalist parties (like UPyD, ERC or ICV), at the regional level, and mostly for the selection of the party’s top candidate.

Who is the party leader? There is no so-called formal position of party leader in the Spanish parties. However, it is a common and accepted convention that the leader is the party chairman; either called the party president (PP,3 CDC,4 PNV), the general secretary (PSOE) or general coordinator (IU). Although there are some problems that are discussed below, in this chapter we consider as party leader the party chairman of all Spanish parties. There are several reasons for sticking to this criterion: on the one hand, the party chairman is the highest individual executive position of both the party board and the central office. On the other hand, the selection of the party chairman is always well defined in the party statutes and, generally speaking, is the politically most relevant position. It is even more important than the selection of the national top candidate. This is because the main Spanish parties, since the early 1970s, have adopted an organisational model close to that of the catch-all parties – characterised by the predominance of the party’s central office over the other faces of the party (van Biezen 2003; Gunther et al. 2004). At the national level, this prevalence make it is easy for the party chairman to become the top candidate in the general elections: if the former decides to stand for the top position in a national election he is hardly ever challenged or questioned.5 This means that, in general terms, the party chairman is also in charge of the parliamentary party; and, if the party eventually wins the national elections, he becomes the prime minister. Concentrating all these roles in a single position makes Spanish party leaders the most powerful players in Spanish politics. They are probably more powerful than many of their colleagues from other countries, especially in those where the prime minister or the leader of the parliamentary party group does not control the extra- parliamentary party. Yet, in a few Spanish parties, it is more difficult to ascertain who the party leader is. On the one hand, this is the case for parties such as the Basque PNV, where the party chairman is not allowed to be the party’s top candidate. This means that although the central office controls the candidate selection process, the party chairman is not directly in charge of the parliamentary group. When the PNV has been in regional government (from 1980 to 2009), this has led to a dual leadership composed of both the party chairman and the regional prime minister. For practical reasons, in this chapter the PNV party chairman will be considered as the party leader. Another problem lies in defining the party leader in alliances such as IU or CiU. In IU, from the very beginning the parties defined a common organisation and, thus, a procedure to select the party chairman (Ramiro 2004), who used to be the leader of the PCE, the major party of the federation. In the case of CiU, the institutionalisation of a common board has been more complex and undefined. 110 O. Barberà et al. From 1979 to 2001, CDC and UDC did not agree on having a common party board or chairman for CiU. Through the CDC-UDC pre-electoral agreements, CDC’s leader was routinely designed CiU’s regional top candidate. This changed in 2001 when CiU approved its first party statutes in which the party chairman and the top regional candidates were elected. However, in practice, the positions of CiU’s party chairman and top candidate still fall to the CDC’s party chairman. From 1980 to 2003, and since 2010 CDC’s leader has also been the regional prime minister of Catalonia. This is why in this chapter we focus on the selection of CDC’s party chairman. Furthermore, CiU, like the PNV, is also peculiar in the sense that it is a non-statewide actor. This has a further implication for the definition of CiU’s leader because, as we have already pointed out, he becomes the top candidate for the Catalan regional elections, not for the national ones. Finally, identifying the party leader is always difficult in interim periods (i.e. periods between when a party chairman announces his will to step down, and a new one is elected).6 In those situations, some parties have defined a sort of informal procedure: once the party leader announces his will to step down, the would-be party chairman is selected as the new top candidate for the general elections. If the electoral results are considered good enough (as has been the case so far), then the candidate is elected as party chairman, and the interim period finishes.7 Something a little different happened in CDC. After more than 20 years in the regional government, in 2000 CDC’s party leader announced his desire to retire. Then, the party congress elected a new general secretary (the second post in the party’s hierarchy) who, in turn, was appointed deputy prime minister in the regional government, and then selected as the candidate for the next regional election (Barrio 2008: 429).

Rules organising leadership selection This section describes the main formal rules organising the selection of the party leader and discusses whether they have evolved over time. It focuses on the selectorate, the electoral system, the candidacy requirements, the formal term length and the procedures involved in the deselection of the party leader (see Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1). The most relevant dimension concerning the selection of the party leaders is the inclusiveness of the selectorate. In the following paragraphs we analyse it along with the voting procedures. Generally speaking, the Spanish political parties choose their leaders through representative selectorates. Some parties have done it from their founding, while others have evolved from oligarchic selectorates to representative ones (Rodríguez-Teruel et al. 2010). Generally speaking, party congresses are the usual agencies in charge of the party leader’s election. This implies that party leaders must stand for re-election at the end of each term. As we will see, on many occasions this is a mere formality as party leaders are rarely challenged. None of the parties analysed in this study has adopted more inclusive mechanisms such as direct election through (open or closed) primaries to select their leaders (see Figure 8.1).8 The voting procedures Party leaders in Spain 111

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

PSOE (1974)a

(1979) PP (1977) IU (1989)b CDC (1974)

(1985) PNV (1977)

Figure 8.1 Inclusiveness of selectorate in Spain (1974–2012). Notes Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate. a Carried out in Suresnes (France). The first PSOE’s public party congress held in Spain was in 1976. b Two-step process. First step in the party assembly. Second step in the national council. show some differences depending on whether there are separate ballots for the leader and for the party board. Since 1976, the PSOE has always chosen the party leader through party congresses with delegates. Therefore, it has always used a representative system. However, one of the most striking features of the PSOE party congresses from 1979 to 1990 was the vote by territorial delegations, not by party delegates. This left the leadership selection process in the hands of a group of regional and provincial leaders (Colomé and López Nieto 1989). This rule changed in 1994, when the party leader (González) promoted a reform that allowed the delegates to directly elect the party board. This move towards more inclusiveness of the selectorate was meant to erode the power of the deputy leader (Guerra) and the party middle-level elites that supported him (Juliá 1997; Méndez 2000). Although it did not change the representative nature of the selection process, it does support the view that moves toward more inclusiveness are meant to erode the party on the ground (Mair 1994; Katz and Mair 1995). Between 1977 and 2000, the process of leadership selection was based on a unique ballot with closed lists of candidates using the plurality formula. The lists contained the names for the general secretary and the other members of the party board. This changed in 2000 when a process with two different ballots was put in place. The first ballot elects the general secretary. The day after, a second ballot elects the party board (including the general secretary). The PP has evolved from an oligarchic system towards a representative one. The first AP party statutes stated that the party leadership had to be chosen by the party board (Junta Directiva Nacional). During the first party congress in 1977, the whole party board was elected by acclamation by the delegates (López 112 O. Barberà et al. Nieto 1988: 32). In 1979, some changes were introduced: the president (and not the secretary-general) became the party leader, and he had to be elected by the party congress. With these changes, the PP introduced a significant change towards a more inclusive selectorate. Since then, the PP party leader has always been chosen in party congresses. The candidacy of the party leader also includes the rest of the board in the same list, and is elected through individual and secret vote with a plurality formula. The only exception is the above-mentioned 1977 congress. IU is one of the Spanish parties where the formal participation of the party membership in the leadership selection process has always been more restricted. Since its formation in 1989, IU party leaders have been selected through a two- step process. First, the party delegates of the party assembly (Asamblea Federal) select the members of the National Council (Consejo Político Federal). Then, the elected members of the National Council select the party leader and the party board. The elected National Council members are not bound by the results of the party assembly, so they can freely negotiate their support. In addition, since 2004 the National Council includes co-opted members from the party on the ground. Hence, although the first step of the process is made by a representative party agency, strictly speaking IU’s party leader is elected by an oligarchic selectorate. So far, IU has not changed the selectorate. However, compared to the leadership selection of the PCE – the major partner of IU – during the 1980s there is a step towards greater inclusiveness. In the PCE, a representative body (namely, the Federal Assembly) elected the party board who, along with other co-opted members, elect the party leader afterwards. Finally, in IU the election of the party leader is disconnected from the rest of the party board and made through individual and typically secret vote, with a plurality formula (Ramiro 2004). Since 1977, CDC has selected its party leader through delegates at a party congress. The names of the post and the functions of the party leader have changed over time, but not the way he is selected. Hence, CDC’s selectorate has always stayed representative. Since 1981, CDC’s party leader has been elected by direct and secret vote in a separate ballot from the rest of the board with a plurality formula. However, in 1977 and 1978 the party leader was proclaimed (not voted on) in the congress. The PNV is the Spanish party that has experienced the most important trans- formations in the inclusiveness of the selectorate. The very model of organisation defined in the 1930s was also adopted in the late 1970s. Those procedures were characterised by a strong weight given to the regional (provincial) organisations in the power structure of the party (Pérez Nievas 2004). By then, the party board elected the president from amongst its 12 members, making the leadership selection process remarkably oligarchic. From 1987 on, the mechanism has substantially changed. The party leader is elected through delegates during the party assembly (Asamblea General). However, only the members of the National Council (Asamblea Nacional) elected by the territorial organisations are able to participate in the ballot. The process is a direct vote employing Party leaders in Spain 113 a plurality formula. This has turned a very oligarchic selectorate into a representative one. The candidacy requirements for being a party leader have been somewhat restrictive in most Spanish parties. Some general provisions such as being a party member, keeping fees updated and meeting a seniority rule (i.e. having an uninterrupted period of membership before the nomination) are common to all of them. However, there are other additional requirements that can restrict access to the leadership ballot that are unique to each party (Rodríguez-Teruel et al. 2010). The PSOE has tightened its candidacy terms in the past years. From 1977 to 2004 it only required a period of at least 24 months of continuous membership. However, in 2004 the requisite seniority was changed by the support of 20 per cent of the congress delegates, which clearly hindered the access to the party leadership. The same can be said in the PP. From 1979 to 2004, would-be candidates only needed the support of 50 out of approximately 1,000 party delegates (Chadel 2000). This changed in 2004 when the support of 20 per cent of congress delegates was required, although this was soon relaxed, because since 2008 a candidate only needs the endorsement of 100 party members. The candidacy requirements have not changed substantially in IU, but they are remarkably lower than they were in the PCE. Since 1994, when the leadership in Izquierda Unida is contested, each candidacy has required the support of 10 per cent of those delegates attending the party assembly. The CDC has also tightened its candidacy requirements over time. Its 1977 party statutes provided that any member could be eligible for the highest post of the party, the secretary-general. The nomination had to be endorsed by ten members (25 by 1978), while any member could support as many candidates as desired. Some years later, in the 1985 party statues, a seniority requirement was introduced and, by 2004, party statutes added the requirement of an endorsement of 5 per cent of party congress delegates. Finally, the PNV has also moved towards a progressive tightening of the eligibility requirements. The two traditional requirements to become president were both being a member of the party and already holding a position on the party board. The 1987 party statutes removed the last clause and added the requirement to belong to the party for at least two years. In 2000, candidates were required to be able to speak Basque. The overall trend in the candidacy requirements shows a considerable tightening in the 2000s. This may have to do with the fact that leadership renewals occurred in most parties during that period. In some cases, more restrictive requirements surely have prevented would-be candidates from challenging new or weak party leaders. This is certainly the case of the PP in 2008. On the other hand, that has not stopped occasional leadership contests in the PSOE, PNV or IU. The term length of the Spanish party leaders is the same as the frequency of the congresses in which they are elected. Generally speaking, the span between party congresses has widened since the late 1970s and now follows the length of 114 O. Barberà et al. the parliamentary legislatures, every three or four years (Verge 2007: 322). In addition, most of the Spanish parties do not have a stated term limit for their leaders. On the other hand, none of the parties included in this chapter have explicit deselection rules in their party statutes. The only implicit rule available is then to call for an extraordinary party congress and to select a new party leader. But as the requirements to do so are extraordinarily high in all parties this is a highly improbable event. The PSOE originally held party congresses every two years. In 1981 the term changed from two to three years and in 1990 from three to a maximum of four. Since 2000 the party has called its congresses every four years. Furthermore, it should be noted that there are no limits to the number of mandates or to the time that someone can hold the post of party leader, and that there is not any incompatibility rule between the position of secretary-general and the exercise of public office. On the other hand, there are no explicit deselection rules. Unless the party leader resigns (or dies), the only way to remove him from the post between two congresses is to call for an extraordinary congress. To do so requires, according to the 2008 party statutes, the agreement of the party board, the national council or more than the 50 per cent of the party members. Similar rules apply to the PP. In 1982 the time between party congresses changed from one to two years. In 1986 this changed again to three years. In practice, the PP called for party congresses every year or every other year till the 1990s. Since 2004, the span has widened to every four years. To call for an extraordinary congress in the PP, the 2008 party statutes require an agreement of two-thirds of the National Council. Unlike the PP and PSOE, in IU it has been the case since 1994 that there is a two-term limit for holding the party leadership. Exceptionally, the mandate may be extended if 60 per cent of the Federal Political Council agrees. IU has also enlarged the time between two party assemblies from two to up to four years. To hold an extraordinary assembly in IU, according to the 2008 party statutes, a majority of three-fifths of the National Council or the agreement of several regional councils representing more than 50 per cent of IU membership is required. The CDC party statutes have never set any limits on the duration or incompatibility of the party leaders. The top term length between two congresses was started at one year, in 1981 was updated to two and from the early 1990s increased to four years. In practice, CDC has called for a party congress soon after each regional election. The 1977 party statutes state that calling for an extraordinary party congress requires an agreement of the National Council or of 3 per cent of the local branches. From 2000 on, 25 per cent of the party membership can also call for it. Unlike the rest of the Spanish parties analysed in this chapter, the party leader of the PNV, and other internal posts, are affected by a scrupulous system of incompatibilities, which in turn has been tightened over recent years. According to this principle, the highest individual executive post of the organisation (as well as virtually all the other internal ones) cannot be held by officials or employees of the public administration, and holding such officeis Party leaders in Spain 115 incompatible with the exercise of public office, as is being the leader of other unions or business organisations. Some ad hoc exceptions were set in the early 1980s, but these were soon removed. The 2000 party statutes included a two-term limit for each executive position within the party, although it is provided that some exceptions can be made. Between 1984 and 1988 several crises forced the party to call for an assembly every year. Since 1988, the maximum period between one assembly and the next has been four years. In the early 1980s the peculiar organisation of the PNV provided for an easy deselection mechanism: if the party leader was not elected first by his own regional branch he had to resign his post. That actually happened in 1985 to Roman Sudupe. Since 1992, it is stated that each internal party nomination can be revoked by its selectorate. Although leadership selection methods have remained substantially stable in Spain, two contradictory trends can be observed. On the one hand, during the transition to democracy most parties adopted representative procedures to select their party leaders. On the other hand, in the last decade most parties have tightened their candidacy requirements and increased the leader’s term length. Overall, these changes have made the system more closed and, as we highlight in the next section, severely restricted intra-party competition.

Dynamics of party leadership contests Generally speaking, contested ballots to select party leaders are rare in the main Spanish parties. Party elites’ control over party congresses has led to few contests and lots of coronations (see Table 8.2). Out of the 65 processes included in this analysis, 81.5 per cent of them had just one contestant. In addition, there

Table 8.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Spain (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

PSOE Delegates 3–4 Plurality Implicit rule: extraordinary congress (delegates) PP Delegates 3 Plurality Implicit rule: extraordinary congress (delegates) IU Delegates 4 Plurality Implicit rule: (1st stage) extraordinary congress Party Council and re-start the process (2nd stage) CDC Delegates 4 Plurality Implicit rule: extraordinary congress (delegates) PNV Delegates 4 Plurality Explicit rule: extraordinary congress (delegates) 116 O. Barberà et al. Table 8.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Spain (1974–20121)

All leadership contests

Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 81.5 2 7.7 3 7.7 4 1.5 5 or more 1.5

Average number 1.31 candidates Margin between top two finishers2 31.69 N 65

Notes 1 Includes the new party leader of the PNV elected in early January 2013. 2 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. have been only a few leadership contests with two (7.7 per cent) or more candidates (10.8 per cent). The limited inclusiveness of this kind of selectorate has led to landslide victories. The average margin of victory in Spain’s party congresses is 75 per cent, although this share dramatically decreases to 31.7 per cent when excluding contests with only one candidate. However, as stated above, contested party congresses represent less than 20 per cent of the leadership selection pro cesses held in Spain since 1977. Another implication of having party congresses as a leadership selection method is the limited amount of information available on the way these contests have been conducted. Hence, only a broad assessment is possible on this dimension. So far, leadership selection contests have been mainly driven by personality or by organisational issues such as the party model or the internal distribution of power. This is especially true in the IU where factions are well organised, and in the PNV, where the party chairman is never the top electoral candidate. Concern regarding the electoral strength of the candidates also played an important role in the González (PSOE, 1979), Zapatero (PSOE, 2000) and Llamazares (IU, 2000, 2003, 2004) elections, but was less important in those of Hernández-Mancha (AP, 1987), Anguita (IU, 1992, 1997) and Rubalcaba (PSOE, 2012). In all cases the candidates launched their official campaigns when the party congress was called and they lasted for a few weeks. However, on some occasions the campaign actually started before the congress was called and lasted for months. Most of what happens in these internal processes (such as their cost) is widely unknown. The media only pay limited attention to them and mostly frame them following the horse-race approach. However, most of the key exchanges and agreements are rarely revealed. Unlike party primaries, the rules organising the party congresses are mainly limited to what happens when the congress is in session, not in the events leading up to them. This leaves these contests largely unregulated and, so far, there is no state regulation of these contests in Spain. Party leaders in Spain 117 Despite the low number of contested ballots, some real contests have happened during these years. Three out of 12 PSOE’s party congresses had contested ballots in recent history. Felipe González successfully challenged the incumbent general secretary at a party congress that took place in Suresnes (near Paris) in 1974. Years later, in 1979, González saw his leadership challenged by a faction who disagreed with his proposal of eliminating Marxism from the party platform. However the challenger did not succeed and González ended up con- solidating his leadership within the party. From his victory in the 1982 general election to the late 1990s his leadership was unchallenged. González’s successor was chosen in 1997 by an elite arrangement. The new leader, Joaquín Almunia, was not able to secure his position and resigned shortly after the PSOE’s poor performance in the 2000 general elections. The next two party leaders, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Alfredo Rubalcaba were selected through contested ballots. In 2000, Zapatero won unexpectedly over three other candidates (two of them women) in a very tight election. In 2012, Rubalcaba won against a female candidate (Carme Chacón). Coronations have been the rule in the PP. Until 2012 only one of 17 party congresses has been contested. In addition, the incumbent party leader has never been challenged. The one contested ballot took place after the resignation of Manuel Fraga in 1986. The winner was Antonio Hernández Mancha who became the new party leader with 71.5 per cent of the vote. Despite the landslide victory, the new leader was soon questioned after the poor performance of AP in the 1987 local and regional elections. The internal division led to the comeback of Fraga, who presented his candidacy for the party leadership shortly before the 1989 party congress. Fraga’s candidacy forced the resignation of Hernández Mancha. Since then, leadership successions have been widely controlled by the party elite (Chadel 2000). In 2003, after eight years as prime minister, Aznar pledged not to stand for a third term and he appointed Mariano Rajoy (then deputy prime minister) as national top candidate and party leader just a few months before the general election (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006). Although the PP lost the 2004 general election, the close results and the strong polarisation over the 11-M attacks in Madrid favoured Rajoy’s continued leadership. Unlike the PP, IU’s evolution has been characterised by frequent contests and challenges to the party leader. So far, six out of 11 party assemblies have been contested with two or more candidates. After being elected party leader in 1989, Julio Anguita never lost an intra-party election. However, some years later, health problems and a poor performance in the 1999 regional elections forced Anguita’s resignation as top national candidate just months before the 2000 general election, in which the party suffered a great electoral loss (Ramiro 2004). This situation led, some months later, to a contested ballot in order to select a new party leader. At the 2000 party assembly, an unknown candidate, Gaspar Llamazares, challenged the PCE’s party leader and top candidate, Francisco Frutos. Llamazares’ list won the first-step vote by a narrow margin (42.6 per cent of the vote) and became the first IU leader not to serve simultaneously as the PCE’s party leader. Eight years later, Llamazares’ succession took place in a 118 O. Barberà et al. stormy assembly where five candidates contested for the party leadership. The winner, Cayo Lara, was not the PCE’s party leader, but had the explicit support of its party elite. CDC is the only main Spanish party not to have had a contested leadership ballot. From the very beginning, its founding leader, Jordi Pujol, remained unchallenged (Barrio 2008). Pujol was also the regional prime minister of Cata- lonia from 1980 to 2003. He personally decided and controlled the whole process of succession, appointing Artur Mas as the new leader in 2000 (through a formal process of congress election). Since then, Mas’ leadership has followed the same undisputed and stable path of his predecessor. Unlike other parties, a high level of instability in the party leadership characterised the first years of the PNV during the post-Francoist regime. Between 1977 and 1987, the PNV had four different party leaders. A deep division pitted the party central office against the regional prime minister, Carlos Garaicoetxea, and part of the parliamentary group. As the confrontation grew, the regional prime minister and his supporters eventually left the PNV and formed a new party. In 1987, after the separation, the PNV reformed the party statutes and introduced important changes to the leadership selection process. The new election procedure provided more stability and enhanced the figure of the president. That enabled Xavier Arzalluz to be re-elected as president for more than 15 years. Two candidates ran to replace him at the 2004 party assembly. Josu Jon Imaz defeated Arzalluz’s preferred candidate by a narrow margin. Imaz’s leadership was full of disagreements with the PNV’s regional prime minister, Juan José Ibarretxe. That led to a new crisis just before the 2008 party assembly. Eventually, Imaz’s resignation enabled a consensus on a new party leader, Íñigo Urkullu. In 2012, the PNV’s return to the Basque regional government led to a new change in the party leadership. Urkullu was elected as regional prime minister and Andoni Ortuzar was elected as the new party leader in early 2013.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders The stability in the leadership selection processes might suggest continuity in the profile of the Spanish party leaders. This section examines whether there have been relevant changes over time. Our analysis is based on the individual profiles of the 20 party leaders elected in the five main Spanish parties for the democratic period (Table 8.3).9 One of the main traits of continuity is gender. The top leaders of the main political parties in Spain have always been men. The lack of party chairwomen deviates from the increasing proportion of women in the parliament and the cabinet (Oñate 2011; Rodríguez-Teruel 2011). Furthermore, very few women have contested for the leadership in these parties. In fact, no woman has ever been a candidate in the formal process of party leader selection in the PP, CDC and PNV. In the left parties (PSOE and IU), things have not been so different. In the PSOE, two female candidates stood for the leadership in the 2000 contest – neither of whom had any chance of success – and one in 2012. During the 2012 Party leaders in Spain 119 contest, gender was often mentioned as one of the features of Chacon’s message of party renewal, but also was subtly employed against her. Similarly, female candidates only appeared in IU in 2000 and 2008, and with little chance of becoming party leader either time. Party chairmen are usually appointed in their mid-forties. The average age of Spanish party leaders at the time of their appointment is 46.6 years. Of course, some cases divert from the mean age. The oldest leader was Jesús Insausti (73), although his appointment was considered interim in a situation of strong internal division in the PNV. At the opposite extreme, González became the chairman of the PSOE when he was very young (32), and his appointment gave way to the arrival of a new generation that replaced the old socialist leaders. This generational change was part of the transformation of the old political parties to the new coming democracy. Yet the change of political regime did not necessarily mean that other parties also chose young leaders. In some cases, some political figures of the Francoist regime or the opposition remained at the top of the political parties. This was the case of Fraga in AP and Carrillo in the PCE. Generally speaking, there has been a gradual increase in the age of party leaders in recent decades. As Table 8.3 shows, it is not a perfect linear evolution, moving from 43 years in the 1970s and 1990s to 48 years of the 1980s and the 2000s. In recent years leaders elected under the age of 40 have disappeared and have been replaced by older ones, challenging the notion of youth as a political requirement for new leaders. Some of the still-active party leaders have succeeded much younger colleagues. In the PSOE, the 61-year-old Rubalcaba replaced Zapatero, who was appointed at age 40. And the 49-year-old Rajoy replaced Aznar, who became leader of the PP at age 37. In the same way, Llamazares was appointed party leader of IU at age 43, but his successor Lara replaced him at age 56. This increase of political maturity does not seem to be linked to any change in the leadership selection rules or mechanisms, but reflects a more general trend of the Spanish political elite and society.

Table 8.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Spain (1974–20121)

1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women 0 0 0 0 0 Average age (in years)2 42.8 48.2 43.0 48.2 46.6 Percentage without political 75.0 60.0 0 60.0 50.0 seniority2,3 Average tenure (in years) 15.4 7.3 8.8 6.94 9.0 N 4 5 2 9 20

Notes 1 Includes the new party leader of the PNV elected in early January 2013. 2 Average age and political seniority at time of first election as party leader. 3 Seniority means that the leader has national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection. 4 Active political leaders’ tenure is calculated as of 31 December 2012. The new PNV party leader is not included. 120 O. Barberà et al. Behind the increasing age of the party leaders lies the importance of political seniority as a condition of leadership. The figures presented in Table 8.3 show that more than half of Spanish party leaders had no previous experience in national parliament or government (53 per cent). However, this aggregate figure is influenced by the arrival of a new political elite during the transition to democracy. The evolution over time shows a steady decrease of new party leaders without political seniority since the 1970s. In addition, the time series of Table 8.3 have to be counterbalanced by the fact that the leaders of the PP and PSOE (the two main parties) have generally been national MPs for more than ten years and have often been members of the national cabinet. All of them used this cabinet experience as a key argument for their election as party leader. González is one exception but he was elected party leader just at the end of the Francoist regime. Another exception was the election of Hernández Mancha as the AP party leader in 1986. As the leader of the main opposition party he was not a member of the low chamber, but of the Senate, so he could not directly challenge the prime minister at question time. His leadership did not last more than a year. Despite serving for 14 years as an MP, Zapatero did not have executive background when he was elected party leader. Another element to bear in mind is that Spain is a multi-level party system, and therefore political experience can also be acquired at the regional level. This is especially the case for leaders of non-statewide parties like CDC and PNV. Although national political background might help, non-statewide party leaders like Mas have built seniority in the regional parliaments or even in a strong cabinet career. Even in the case of the PNV, the system of incompatibilities does not prevent new party leaders from having careers at both the parliamentary and the executive level, like Arzalluz, Imaz and Urkullu. Finally, IU has tended to recruit party leaders with either parliamentary or, sometimes only, local, experience. This was the case for Anguita and Lara, both mayors for more than ten years before becoming party leaders. Neither of them were an MP at the time of their election. Similarly, Llamazares had been a regional representative for some years and was elected as a national MP only some months before becoming party chairman. Although political seniority has been always a relevant consideration in elections for party leadership, it appears to be less important in contested elections than in coronations. Zapatero, Hernández Mancha, Llamazares and Imaz were not front-running candidates at the beginning of their contests as they had less substantial political backgrounds than their opponents – yet they were all elected. These examples seem to counter the argument of Leonard Stark who contends that the main criteria for the selection of new leaders are maintaining party unity, enhancing electoral appeal and providing perceived competence in government (Stark 1996). In all four cases these candidates challenged the party establishment as they sought to replace the incumbent generation. In contests that are ‘coronations’, that is when the party elite succeeds in presenting only one candidate, the aspirant chosen is typically someone with government experience, party seniority and perceived electability. Party leaders in Spain 121 Finally, the length of tenure of party chairmen differs markedly. For those who have already left the post, duration varies between the nine months of Roman Sudupe (PNV) to the almost 25 years of Pujol (CDC). The average duration of party leaders is around nine years, but again this figure varies over time. Durability seems to have been steadily decreasing from an average of 15 years in the 1970s to seven years in the 2000s. This is because the length of term of Spanish party leaders is still influenced by the recent return of democracy. Thus, leaders who have remained longer in office are those who were elected during the transition to, or in the early years of, democracy. Pujol, Arzalluz, González and Fraga became charismatic chairmen, whose leadership lasted for most of two decades. The long survival of some of these party leaders made the subsequent transition a difficult task. Long tenures of party leaders were followed by selection of unstable successors (Almunia, Hernández Mancha and Imaz), who ruled their party for only four years or less. During the 2000s, a new generation of party leaders (Zapatero, Llamazares, Rajoy and Mas) successfully retained the leadership for several years. Hence, more than looking at time series, cases must be divided between those party leaders staying four years or less and those staying more than four years. In the second group we find those leaders who really left a mark in the history of the party. Some of them became prime ministers at the national (González, Aznar, Zapatero and Rajoy) or the regional level (Pujol and Mas). The reduced historical perspective of Spanish democracy does not allow for identifying the main factors explaining leadership stability. One of them might be political performance in the medium term. Electoral defeats do not lead necessarily to the end of the party leadership. All those leaders who became national or regional prime ministers were defeated at least once or twice in elections before entering the cabinet. Zapatero was a major exception. Of course, coming into power increases the durability of leaders compared to those who fail in this objective (Barrio and Barberà 2010). However, González became prime minister eight years after his election, Rajoy did it in seven years and Aznar in six. From this point of view, political success seems a relevant condition for survival as much as a consequence of stable leaderships. In fact, most of the short tenures belong to leaders who resigned as a result of internal divisions rather than a bad electoral result.

Conclusion As we have shown in this chapter, Spanish party leaders are usually the party chairmen, regardless of whether they are the top candidates in the general election. In most cases, these individuals fill several roles (leaders of the party central office, the parliamentary group and eventually the party in government). However, in some situations, the position of party leader might move from one post to another depending on the political condition of intra-party life. The party leaders, no matter what they are called in the statutes, are the most powerful actors in Spanish party politics, which has fostered the phenomenon of presidentialisation 122 O. Barberà et al. within the party and also in the electoral and the executive arenas (van Biezen and Hopkin 2005). This is why the process to elect party leaders is usually very clearly defined in the party statutes. Of course, these processes are a combination of formal rules and informal practices, and the political culture of each party heavily influences the way this combination works in practice. The formal rules organising leadership selection processes have remained notably stable for more than 30 years. Above all, this process has been in the hands of hundreds of delegates attending the party congresses. During the last decade candidacy requirements have been tightened in all parties, especially in the PP and PSOE. The generalised use of party congresses to select leaders has not resulted in a higher level of competition; this is in contrast to previous research findings (Rahat et al. 2008: 673). Only 20 per cent of the contests were actually contested ballots. Most of the party leader elections were coronations of the incumbent leader or of a successor personally designated by the previous party chairman. As for contested ballots, in only a few of them were there at least two candidates with real chances of being elected. The fact that most of these real contests have taken place in the last decade might suggest an evolution towards higher levels of competition within Spanish parties. Yet this change would come in the absence of any relevant change in leadership selection methods. Medium levels of competition do not seem to foster political representation either. No woman has been elected to the top of a party organisation in more than 35 years of party leadership contests. In fact, only one female (Carme Chacón) has ever had a real chance of winning such an election, in the 2012 contest for the PSOE’s leadership. Finally, the trend towards older party leaders does not seem to be related to the selection rules but rather to generational dynamics in the replacement of party elites. On the contrary, contested ballots have favoured less politically experienced candidates while they have also led to some of the shortest tenures of party chairmen. Almost half of the party leaders during the democratic period have remained in power for more than 11 years. This is probably the best indicator of their strength and, in broader terms, of the party elites’ stability in Spain. This might also explain the ability of Spanish parties to prevent an evolution towards more inclusive leadership selection processes.

Notes 1 This chapter is part of the project MICINN CSO2009-14381-C03-02 (2009–12) funded by the Spanish government and the project SGR 2009-1290 (2009–13) funded by the Catalan regional government. 2 CiU is an alliance between two parties: Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC). CDC is by far CiU’s major partner (Barrio and Barberà 2011). 3 From 1977 to 1989 the party was called Alianza Popular (AP). At the third congress (1979), the AP’s party leader changed from the secretary-general to the president, and has remained unchanged ever since. Party leaders in Spain 123 4 At the eighth congress (1989), the CDC’s party leader changed from the secretary- general to the president. In 2000 (during an interim period) it moved back to the secretary-general. In 2012 it changed once more from the secretary-general to the president. 5 There are a few examples, though. In 2000, the PSOE leader decided to call for closed primaries in which he was challenged and lost (Hopkin 2001). In 2007 the IU leader called and won a closed party primary. This rule does not fit so well at the regional level, where the top candidate is not always the party chairman. 6 Interim situations have occurred: between 1987–9 and in 2004 in the PP; between 1997–2000, and in 2011 in the PSOE; between 1999–2000 in IU, and between 2000–4 in CDC. 7 This has been the case for the PP in 1989 and 2004; the PSOE in 2011; and IU in 2000. This does not apply to the PNV because the party chairman is not the top candidate. 8 Direct democratic procedures to select the party leader have been introduced by Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), and Inici- ativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV). Other parties like the PP in the Balearic Islands or the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) have elected the party leader in rather inclusive procedures such as party congresses opened to all party members. 9 We start with the following congresses or assemblies: PSOE (1974), CDC (1976), PP (1977), PNV (1977), IU (1989). 9 The selection of party leaders in Portugal

Marco Lisi and André Freire

Introduction With the ‘Carnation Revolution’ of 25 April 1974, Portugal initiated the so- called ‘third wave’ of worldwide democratisation. A stable party system quickly emerged, and by 1976 four parties represented almost 90 per cent of the electorate. Apart from a brief period during the mid-1980s when the centre-left Party of Democratic Renewal (PRD) emerged and disappeared, the party system has remained relatively stable. The general tendency (1987–2005) was for the vote to concentrate on the two centrist ‘catch-all’ parties: the centre-left Socialist Party (PS, Partido Socialista), and the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD, Partido Social Democrata).1 Alongside the PS and the PSD, the Commu- nist Party (PCP, Partido Comunista Português) and the conservative (although with significant Christian Democratic influences) Democratic Social Centre (CDS, Centro Democrático e Social) have become the system’s main parties.2 Some smaller parties have also obtained seats in parliament during the democratic period, especially the Left Bloc (BE, Bloco de Esquerda).3 With the exception of the non-party cabinets appointed by president Ramalho Eanes during the late 1970s, the PS and PSD have always controlled the government alone or in coalition with the CDS-PP (Freire 2005; Jalali 2007). Since the 1987 ‘realignment elections’ there has been an increasing concentration of the vote in two major parties. The change from ‘consensual’ to ‘majoritarian’ democracy has several features: movement from a fragmented to a kind of bipartisan party system; from coalition (or minority) and unstable governments to single party majorities (most of the time) and rather stable governments; and from a strong parliament (and president) to a strong government (and prime minister) (Freire 2005; Bruneau et al. 2001). The economic and financial crisis that has hit Portugal since 2008 put an end to government stability and single-party majority governments. The socialist government elected in 2009 proved to be quite short (September 2009–June 2011), given the worsening economic conditions and the difficulty in negotiating austerity packages with the main opposition party. This situation led Prime Min- ister Sócrates to resign in March 2011. The 2011 early elections gave a clear victory to the PSD which formed a coalition with the CDS-PP. Party leaders in Portugal 125 In this chapter we focus on the parties that have achieved parliamentary representation over a relatively long period of time.4 Although the five parties presented above differ in terms of leadership selection methods, there has been an overall trend towards a democratisation of the selectorate. Yet there are significant differences among parties. While the main governing parties have tended to give a greater say to party members, the method of leadership selection for opposition parties of the radical left has remained unchanged.

Who is the party leader? Portuguese political parties have traditionally been characterised by a high level of centralisation, and leaders have displayed significant powers. To a large extent this is the consequence of being internally created parties with important organisational resources concentrated in the hands of the main leaders (van Biezen 2003; Lopes 2004). They have occupied government positions immediately after the emergence of the democratic regime, benefiting from both public subsidies and media visibility. Moreover, they usually control the extra-parliamentary party – which is the most important face of party organisations – as the party in central office overshadows the legislative party. Party leaders also benefit from the fact that, with a few exceptions, prime ministers have always been the effective leaders of their respective parties. In the Portuguese case the identification of the party leader is relatively easy. The formal position of party leaders is clearly defined by party statutes and varies according to the type of organisational model adopted. In the PS, which adopted a traditional social-democratic structure based on vertical links, the party leader is the secretary-general who controls the main executive party body (the secretariat). In the PSD, the chairman corresponds to the party president who presides over the political commission, that is, the executive organ. The small right-wing party, CDS-PP, has adopted a similar structure, with the president as the leading figure of the main party bodies (political and executive commission). Unlike the main governing parties, the PCP displays the conventional structure of communist parties – based on ‘democratic centralism’ – with no formal roles for the party leader. The main figure of the party is just one among the members of the Central Committee (CC). A different case is the BE, a radical left party that has adopted a more collegial leadership style. Like other ‘movement parties’ (Kitschelt 2006), the BE decided to implement a configuration centred on horizontal links between members and higher echelons and on participatory and decentralised mechanisms of decision- making. Therefore, the BE has a network organisation with a strong emphasis on grassroots participation. However, the most striking feature is the lack of a clear leadership, with the adoption of a ‘poliarchic’ executive. This choice was functional to maintaining a substantial degree of autonomy for the several founding parties, while representing the pluralism of the new political force. After the success obtained in the 2005 legislative election, the BE created an executive organ (political committee) and Francisco Louçã started to play the 126 M. Lisi and A. Freire role of coordinator, that is, the de facto leader (Lisi 2011: 130–1). However, it is worth noting that this was an informal change, as party statutes still do not recognise the figure of party leader. Following Louçã’s voluntary resignation in 2012, the main party bodies selected two speakers, one man and one woman, both members of the secretariat (the main executive organ). This solution was decided upon by the party’s inner core and was highly criticised by party members. Despite this important change, the party statutes completely omit leadership selection rules. This shows the weak institutionalisation of this new party and the party leadership’s great freedom to manoeuvre. Party leaders’ views usually coincide with those of the electoral leader who competes for the prime-ministerial office. Therefore, the Portuguese case follows the majority of European countries where party leaders are also the main candidates for prime minister (LeDuc 2001; Kittilson and Scarrow 2003). For smaller parties included in coalition government (in this case the CDS-PP), the party leader is the natural candidate to assume the second top position within the executive. In general, party organisations are responsible for defining the rules to select the electoral leader, and there are no laws regulating the selection of prime- ministerial candidates. In the PCP the secretary-general has always been the official prime-ministerial candidate. This is also true for the main governing parties. However, there have been a few exceptions to this rule. In both main parties (PS and PSD), party leaders have stepped down to support other candidates for the electoral contest when they held executive positions. This happened in 1985, when Soares, the PS historical leader (1974–85), decided to propose his candidacy for the presidency of the Republic, supporting Almeida Santos as the main party candidate at legislative elections. A similar situation occurred in 1995, after the long governmental period experienced under Cavaco Silva (1985–95). The PSD prime minister decided to support Fernando Nogueira as the new leader. In both cases, incumbents retained their de facto control over their respective party organisations, whereas the electoral candidates had difficulty in imposing themselves as the effective party leaders. Another exception to this rule happens in the case of pre-election coalitions. In these situations parties have to select only one leader for the electoral contest. There have been very few pre-election alliances in Portugal, but as a rule the leader of the main party within the coalition has always been the candidate for prime minister. The PCP has traditionally formed pre-electoral coalitions with the MDP (Movimento Democrático Português) and, after 1983, with the PEV (Greens).5 In this case the communist party leader has always been the main candidate. The PS formed a pre-election coalition only in 1980, while the PSD and the CDS-PP formed a formal alliance (Democratic Alliance, AD) in 1979 and 1980. In both cases the leader of the main party within the coalition ran as a candidate for prime minister. As previous studies have shown (Lobo 2003; van Biezen 2003; Teixeira 2009), the party in central office is the most important face of Portuguese party organisations, controlling the parliamentary party. This is mostly the result of Party leaders in Portugal 127 the high centralisation level of the candidate selection process. In fact, the party leader, through the main party bodies, usually has the final say on MP choice. The chairman is also directly responsible for choosing the parliamentary leader, who mainly plays the function of intermediation between the parliamentary group and the main party bodies. Party discipline is usually very high, strengthening leaders’ control over their parliamentary group. This does not mean that there have not been conflicts between the party leader and the parliamentary leader. For example, the PS had huge conflicts in the 1970s that ultimately led to internal splits (Lisi 2009: 156–73). The PSD had similar problems until 1985, as did the CDS-PP during the Ribeiro e Castro leadership (2005–7). Despite this, the secretary-general and the party chair have usually been able to control the party. As a result, party leaders not only significantly influence strategic decisions – related, for example, to governmental alliances or ideological changes – but they also exert great power on the nomination of ministers and other public officials. In order to better understand the role of the party leader, we also need to examine the organisational characteristics, namely in terms of the ‘original model’. Both the PS and CDS-PP followed a top-down process of penetration, leading to a very centralised structure. On the other hand, local party structures were extremely important in the formation of the PSD, with notables also playing a significant role at the national level (Jalali 2007: 146–7). This founda- tional phenomenon has important implications for the party leader position internally. While the leading role of the party chair within the PS and CDS-PP is evident, within the PSD party leaders have essentially been more managers rather than uncontested decision-makers. This means that when in opposition, the party assumes a more ‘stratarchical’ structure and party leaders have more difficulty in asserting their power over local bosses (Jalali 2006: 368–70). Con- sequently, the effective role of the party leader can vary according to institutional position and electoral performance.

Rules organising leadership selection This section describes the rules organising party leader selection and their evolution over time. It contains a description of rules regarding candidacy, campaign support and regulation, the selectorate, the electoral system, term length and the rules for deselecting the party leader. Overall, two main features have characterised the experience of leadership selection in Portuguese parties. The first is the frequent and sudden rule changes regulating the leadership selection process. As we will show, the proposals to reform party leadership selection have been central to the conflict among distinct factions and/or party leaders. The second is the main parties’ trend towards an increasing openness of leadership selection methods. Given the wide prerogatives attributed to party leaders, it is not surprising that the procedures of leadership selection have been at the centre of organisational reforms and are one of the most divisive issues among party elites. In fact, there 128 M. Lisi and A. Freire have been frequent and significant organisational changes regarding leadership selection methods. Traditionally the main party bodies have been responsible for party leadership choice. In the democratic regime’s early years, party congresses selected party leaders. However, there have been frequent selectorate changes in the two main parties since (see Figure 9.1). Overall, the rationale behind these reforms was twofold. On the one hand, it was an attempt to consolidate leaders’ power and to reduce internal party conflicts. On the other, it was a strategy put forth by challengers to gain supporters and to increase the odds of incumbent defeat. The PS experienced three important leadership selection method changes before introducing the direct election. The first PS statutes established that the congress was responsible for the election of the secretary-general. Party delegates, elected at the district level (federation), had the right to choose the party leader. As for the PSD, each federation’s vote was weighted according to its membership. Candidacy to party leadership required the presentation of a motion with the main programmatic orientations. Therefore, the candidate with more votes among party delegates was elected as the party leader. This method of selection changed after Soares’ resignation in 1986. In order to reduce the PS leaders’ power and to make party leaders more responsible to the main party bodies, the responsibility to select the party leader was attributed to the secretariat, while the political commission elected the party president.6 Finally, the method of leadership selection changed again with the 1992 major organisational reform (van Biezen 2003: 71–3, Lisi 2009: 117–25). This reform abolished the congress and entitled party members to directly elect the political commission, which then elected the secretary-general through a simple plurality. Like the PS, early PSD statutes allowed the congress to select party leaders from a pool that consisted of secretariat members. In 1976 party statutes introduced the figure of the party president as the party leader, whereas the political

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

PCP (1974) (1998) PS (1974) (1986) (2006) PSD (1974) (1981) (1986) CDS-PP (2005) (1974) (2011)

Figure 9.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Portugal (1974–2012) (source: party constitutions). Note Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate. Party leaders in Portugal 129 commission replaced the secretariat as the main executive body. It was only with the new statutes adopted in 1978 that the role of the party leader was defined. Sá Carneiro (PSD leader from 1974 to 1980) aimed to strengthen his authority by granting the party leader more powers and making him responsible to the party congress, rather than to the political commission (Stock 1989). Therefore, between 1978 and 1981 the party chairman was distinct from the president of the political commission, a position clearly subordinated to the former. When Balsemão replaced the historic leader (1981), a more collegial leadership was adopted and the figure of president was eliminated. As a consequence the new statutes adopted in 1981 reintroduced the figures of vice presidents and established the party leader as the president of the main executive body. Statu- tory changes occurred again in 1986 by reintroducing the direct election of party leaders by party delegates. With this new change, the party chairman became the head of the list for the executive body election (political commission) and this remained unchanged until 2006. As for the CDS-PP, the first party constitution stipulated that the party’s national congress, which meets biannually, had responsibility for leadership selection. During the first decade of the democratic regime, Freitas do Amaral was able to be re-elected easily as party leader. After his resignation in 1982, three different leaders occupied this position: Francisco Lucas Pires, Adriano Moreira and Manuel Monteiro. It was also after Freitas do Amaral’s withdrawal that the debate regarding leadership selection methods opened up with some leaders defending a more collective leadership (Robinson 1996: 963). However, these proposals were to fail, and the method of leadership selection remained unchanged, while organisational reforms were relegated to a marginal place. As mentioned above, one of the most important organisational transforma- tions taken by Portuguese political parties during the last decade was the adoption of party leader elections by party members. All the main governing parties adopted one-member-one-vote (OMOV) procedures between 1998 and 2006. The PS was the first to introduce democratisation reforms in the late 1990s, while the two parties of the right adopted direct leadership selection more recently, between 2005 and 2006. Before analysing this change, it should be noted that according to the new party law approved in 2003, the selectorate of official party bodies is formally limited to party members. This means thatin some cases – as in the PSD, where the leader is officially considered a party organ – these rules exclude the possibility of opening leadership selection to sympathisers, voters or independents. Yet during the campaign to elect the new socialist leader after Sócrates’ resignation (2011), one of the two candidates (Francisco Assis) defended the need to introduce open primaries for selecting the prime minister and mayoral candidates. This was mainly a strategic move aiming to increase supporters by deepening party democratisation. However, this reform was not able to mobilise socialist members and did not increase Assis’ support. Although the debate over the introduction of direct leadership selection dates back to the beginning of the 1990s (Lisi 2011: 219–21), it was only in 1998 that 130 M. Lisi and A. Freire the PS decided to introduce direct election through a majority run-off system. This means that if no candidate meets the absolute majority, a run-off is held between the top two contenders. As illustrated in the following section, this situation has never occurred. On the other hand, both right-wing parties introduced direct leadership elections following the 2005 electoral defeat and their return to opposition. Both parties adopted a plurality system, but in 2012 the PSD decided to change to a majority run-off system. In general, party elites have always given little consideration to organisational matters within the party, as the main parties have been mainly concerned with the institutional arena, rather than with members’ participation and inclusion in decision-making processes (Jalali 2007; Lisi 2011). With the partial exception of the PS, which adopted OMOV following a major organisational restructuring, the move towards more democratic methods of leadership selection was mainly based on strategic considerations. Therefore, the raison d’être for the introduction of direct leadership selection has been twofold. On the one hand, this change followed electoral defeats, with the aim of demonstrating party renewal in order to appeal to voters and party members. On the other hand, democratising reforms have been used as a tool in challenging incumbent leaders. Opposition leaders have often defended the deepening of intra-party democracy to challenge the incumbents, whereas weak leaders (such as Marques Mendes or Ribeiro e Castro) have tried to strengthen their position through the use of OMOV. The fact that the same leaders have often (and suddenly) changed their opinion on leadership selection procedures depending on their circumstances confirms the strategic use of democratisation reforms. Internal divergences regarding direct leadership selection are alive in all parties, undermining the institutionalisation of this procedure. In particular, strong criticism has emerged within the CDS-PP, leading party delegates to reintroduce in 2011 the election of the party leader by the congress through plurality vote. The OMOV method for leadership selection is more consolidated within the PS, while in the PSD there are still strong divergences of opinion.7 Contrary to the significant changes experienced by the main governing parties, for the PCP the method for party leadership selection has remained the same over the years. The communist party presents very high levels of party leadership stability, with only three different leaders in almost 40 years. Cunhal remained the undisputed leader until 1992 when Carlos Carvalhas replaced him. Formally, the central committee (CC) is responsible for the selection of the party leader. The process is based on two steps. First, party delegates choose the members of the new CC. Second, the newly elected CC elects the secretariat and, from among its members, its secretary-general. The election of the party leader is virtually unanimous, with no open opposition. According to party statutes, the method of leadership selection presents a low level of inclusiveness. In practice the procedure is even more oligarchic. This is because historic party leaders have always played an important role in the choice of the new leaders. If Cunhal was crucial for the choice of Carvalhas, Domingos Abrantes decisively influenced the selection of the new leader, Jerónimo de Party leaders in Portugal 131 Sousa, elected in the XVII congress (2004). However, on that occasion some mid-level party cadres complained of the lack of debate and freedom in choosing the new leader.8 In practice, the selection of the secretary-general is carried out by the most important group within the leadership’s inner core. This means that the procedure has been very restricted and exclusive, with no open debate. Besides the method of selection, the second aspect of leadership selection that we need to address is who is entitled to be selected as party leader. Overall, party statutes do not set strict candidacy requirements, at least formally. Party constitutions usually stipulate only general eligibility criteria for party offices, while additional requirements can be established by internal – and more flexible – rules. Apart from seniority rule and support from a certain amount of party members, the statutes contain very few formal requirements. There may be two types of requirements in order to run for party leadership. The first candidacy requirement is simply related to eligibility criteria. As a rule, party statutes establish that, as for any party office, candidates should be members for a minimum period of time. Seniority criteria vary from three months, in the case of the CDS-PP, to 18 months for the PS. Therefore, even if only senior party members are de facto selected as party leaders, eligibility criteria are fairly loose. The second requirement has to do with the presentation of signatures of a minimum number of supporters. When party leaders were selected by the party congress, eligibility for candidacy to party leadership required a number of signatures of delegates (20 or more). With the introduction of direct leadership selection, party statutes establish that a candidacy must be supported by a certain number of party members. This requirement has varied across parties and over time. The most important change took place in the PSD, which requires the submission of 1,500 signatures of party members, whilst this barrier is much lower for the other two parties.9 It should also be noted that the requirement of a membership period in order to participate in leadership selection has been a problematic issue, especially in the two main parties. This is due to the fact that local notables have frequently manipulated enrolment files. As a consequence, membership data are highly unreliable. The introduction of the OMOV method for leadership selection has worsened this problem because of attempts to use membership requirements to influence the final outcome. Usually incumbents use the rules to make it more difficult for non-members to join and participate in the leadership contest, while challengers favour the possibility of registering new members until a few days before the election. Overall, we can say that formal nomination requirements have become more restrictive with the expansion of the selectorate. However, in practice candidacy requirements have always been very loose, while the main party bodies still play an important gatekeeping role in informally controlling access to leadership ballots. Party leaders have always been selected from the members of party executive bodies. This rule is mandatory when party leaders are the head of the list of the main executive party body. For example, the leader of the PCP always 132 M. Lisi and A. Freire belongs to the secretariat. This is also what happens in the main governing parties. This means that there have been limits to the openness of this position to members outside the parties’ inner core. Outsiders hardly ever attempt to conquer party leadership. Party leaders are usually experienced politicians with a strong partisan background and always belong to the main party organs. This confirms the prevalence of the party in central office vis-à-vis the parliamentary party and the highly centralised structure of Portuguese parties. Two other aspects need to be addressed. The first concerns the leader’s term length. In all parties the duration of party leaders’ mandate coincides with the term limit for the main party bodies, which varies from two to four years (see Table 9.1). Therefore, the renewal of party mandates usually takes place when a new congress and new party organs are elected. The second aspect deals with deselection procedures. Only right-wing parties have established regulations for deselecting the party leader. In the PSD, for example, old statutes stipulated that the congress was responsible for leadership review. This means that delegates had the chance to evaluate the party leader and to force his retirement. The only case of deselection in Portuguese parties took place in 1985. In that year the PSD national commission approved a motion of censure against the party leader, Mota Pinto, leading to his resignation. However, this rule was abolished in the 1986 statutory revision. The CDS-PP introduced the possibility of the national council voting a motion of confidence against the main executive body in 1996. The motion had to be approved with two-thirds majority in order to force the retirement of party leadership. Therefore, the party leader was not directly accountable to the main deliberative bodies, rather there was a collegial responsibility. In the remaining parties, statutes completely omit this procedure, meaning that de facto deselection only takes place on a voluntary basis, when the party leader decides to step down. This is what has happened in the Portuguese experience. Party leaders

Table 9.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Portugal (2012)1

Party name Selectorate Term Voting rule Deselection (in years)

PCP Central committee 4 Unanimity No procedure in party statutes PS Party members 2 Run-off No procedure in party statutes PSD Party members 2 Plurality2 No procedure in party statutes CDS-PP Party delegates 2 Plurality No procedure in party statutes

Notes 1 The BE is not included in the table since party statutes do not officially recognise the figure of party leader. 2 In 2012 the party congress approved the adoption of a run-off majority system but the statutory change and the specific electoral rule for leadership selection have not been formulated yet. Party leaders in Portugal 133 have withdrawn before the end of their term usually after an electoral defeat, a scandal or internal conflicts. Voluntary early deselection has been the rule for left parties (with the exception of Jorge Sampaio), while right party leaders have more often been forced to resign through electoral contests, especially when in opposition.

Dynamics of party leadership contests This section aims to characterise two important aspects of leadership selection. The first is related to the characteristics of the campaign for the selection of party leaders over the democratic period. The second aspect deals with the competitiveness of leadership contests. With respect to the campaign, there are no specific rules that regulate leadership contests. When delegates were responsible for the selection of the party leader, the campaign took place with the election of party delegates to the national congress. This means that elections for party leadership were basically internal contests with a very low salience within the public opinion and with very low organisational or financial resources required. The campaigns aimed mainly to mobilise supporters among the grassroots and to receive support from local notables and office-holders. It should also be noted that during this phase the number of ‘contested’ elections was very low and that the main historic leaders (Cunhal, Soares, Sá Carneiro, Freitas do Amaral) were chosen by unanimity or with very high rates of approval. As a consequence, there was little need to campaign. Although the personalisation of leadership contests had been relatively high since the early years of the democratic regime, in many cases ideological or strategic divergences were also important, especially within the PS and the PSD. In both parties, during the first decade of the democratic regime, two issues played a crucial role. The first was the party leaders’ stances toward the role ofthe military in the new democratic regime. Until at least 1982, when a major constitutional revision led the military to withdraw from the political sphere, the main parties were particularly divided with respect to the ‘civilianisation’ of the presidency of the Republic.10 On the other hand, another important division was based on socio-economic issues, specifically the intervention of the state into the economy. More radical factions aimed to preserve the legacy of the democratic transition by supporting state ownership of the main companies, whereas more moderate and liberal sectors defended the need of the state to withdraw from the economy. All in all, party leadership contests were relatively politicised and ideological differences played an important role. Campaigns for party leadership have undergone significant changes since the 1990s. They have lost their programmatic and ideological character and have increasingly focused on leaders’ personality or organisational matters. This change has to do with the overall process of personalisation of politics experienced by Portuguese parties (Lobo 2005). The emergence of private communication channels in the mass media, the growing importance of leaders in electoral 134 M. Lisi and A. Freire competition and the increasing centralisation of power in the prime minister’s hands are all important factors that fostered media attention on leadership contests. This change culminated with the introduction of direct leadership selection procedures. It is difficult to consider the change in the way political campaigns are conducted as a consequence of democratising reforms. The strengthening of candidate-centred politics has usually been considered one of the main consequences of the adoption of direct leadership selection methods (Seyd 1999; Young and Cross 2002b). True, campaigns for the selection of the party leader have become increasingly professionalised and mediatised. Since the 2004 election of the PS leader, internal party campaigns have attracted widespread attention from the mass media and have been organised as electoral campaigns with a campaign staff and external consultants, raising the costs normally associated with internal elections.11 Yet, as we mentioned above, leadership personalisation was relatively high even during the first decade of the democratic regime. Moving to an analysis of competitiveness, it is worth emphasising the low number of contested elections. More than half of leadership elections have had only one candidate, while there have been 26 contests with two candidates (35.6 per cent, see Table 9.2). Therefore, party leaders in Portugal are rarely selected through a competitive contest. When we consider the number of candidates there is a trend towards an increase in the competitiveness as we move to more inclusive methods of selection, especially after the introduction of OMOV. This finding confirms previous comparative results (Kenig 2009a: 245). We can also see that the overall rate of approval is very high (79 per cent on average). Although formally selected by (and accountable to) party congresses, party leaders have had a significant degree of autonomy in terms of internal powers, while cases of competition for party leadership have been rare, especially when parties hold government positions. In the PS, Mário Soares, Guterres and Sócrates dominated internal party life during their respective leaderships. The same happened in the case of the CDS-PP under the leadership of Freitas do Amaral (1974–82; 1988–91) and Paulo Portas (party leader from 1998 onwards, except a brief interval between 2005 and 2007). What is the effect of the introduction of party leadership selection on the number of candidates? Several authors have argued that this organisational reform should decrease internal party cohesion (Rahat et al. 2008). This is also what we found when we compared the average number of candidates before and after the introduction of direct election. Overall, the number of candidates increased from 1.8 to 2 with more inclusive procedures (Table 9.2). However, if we disaggregate this trend by party, the Portuguese experience shows that there is not a general trend. On the one hand, democratising reforms are associated with a significant decrease in the number of candidates in the case of the PS; on the other, it seems that it can foster more centrifugal forces, especially in the case of the PSD. The short experience of the CDS-PP does not display any clear pattern, with the alternation of both highly competitive elections and party leaders’ coronations. Table 9.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Portugal (1974–2012)1

All leadership contests Leadership contests (full member votes only)

Number of candidates Percentage of elections Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 54.8 1 44.4 2 35.6 2 33.3 3 7.1 3 11.1 4 2.9 4 11.1 5 or more 0 5 or more 0

Average number 1.79 candidates Average number 2.0 candidates Margin between top two finishers2 31 Margin between top two finishers 50 N 73 N 18

Notes 1 The table excludes the PCP, for which no election took place for the selection of the party leader. 2 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. 136 M. Lisi and A. Freire How can we explain this different pattern? Overall, we believe that the degree of party cohesion is attributable, to a large extent, to the institutional position and specific circumstances. On the one hand, the long period that the PS spent in power was certainly one important factor for the decrease in intra-party conflicts. On the other, as the PSD experience shows, the level of competitiveness has not followed a linear trend, but it depends mostly on contextual and short-term factors, such as leaders’ popularity or electoral challenges (at national or local level). In this case, given the long period spent in opposition since the mid- 1990s, the number of candidates has increased. The trend achieved a peak in the 2008 contest when four main candidates competed for party leadership and Manuela Ferreira Leite was elected with a small plurality (37.8 per cent against 31.1 obtained by Passos Coelho). As for the CDS-PP, party leaders seem less vulnerable than those of the PSD, showing greater capacity to insulate themselves from electoral pressures. It is also worth noting that during the first decade of the democratic regime the same trend emerged, with no competition when the party was in power and more centrifugal tendencies when it was in opposition. If we look at the degree of competitiveness – measured by the margin between the two top contenders for contested elections, we find a great variation between the main governing parties. The PS shows the lower level of competitiveness with an average of 70 percentage points for the entire period (1974–2012). On the other hand, the PSD presents the highest level with an average difference between the top two finishers of just 11 percentage points, while the CDS-PP displays an intermediate position with a value of 31 percentage points. Despite the overall increase in the number of candidates, leadership contests have not become more competitive with the introduction of OMOV. In many cases the election of party leaders has just become the ‘coronation’ of party leaders, while traditional party meetings have lost to a large extent their drama and importance in terms of deliberative gatherings. In fact, if we observe the margin of victory there is a slight increase from 31 to 50 per cent (Table 9.2). This means that after the introduction of OMOV the level of competitiveness is lower than before, and it is easier for leaders to be re-elected. Overall, we found a common trend for the main governing parties in terms of competitiveness. While in government, the leadership contest has assumed the character of plebiscitary elections, with no real competition and relatively low levels of participation. This means that the institutional position of the party has significantly influenced leadership competitiveness. Incumbency is always associated with very low levels of competitiveness, while the shift to opposition fosters more competitive contests. Another important finding is that there are differences among parties, with right-wing parties displaying higher levels of competitiveness than the main centre-left party. This difference is even higher if we consider that anti-system parties (PCP and BE) have shown a remarkable stability of party leaders with no competition at all. Therefore, ideology also seems to be an important factor, as right-wing parties are generally more fragmented than those on the left. Party leaders in Portugal 137 Demographics and tenure of party leaders This section provides some biographical data of party leaders. In particular, we examine some demographic characteristics (gender and age) and leaders’ prior political background (particularly any service in elected positions at the national level). Overall, we can see that some of the social and political characteristics of the party leaders are related with the age of the democratic regime and its institutionalisation. First, the average age of the party leaders has increased, reflecting the institutionalisation of the political regime. In the 1970s the average age was 41.2 years, while in the 1980s the average increases to 50.1 (Table 9.3). In the 1990s a process of leadership turnover led younger politicians to replace the first generation of party leaders. As a consequence, the average age diminished to 42.4 years old and then increased to 51.6 years in the period 2000–12. Second, virtually all party leaders have some political background. The only party leaders that seem to have no ‘formal political background’ are Mário Soares (PS) and Álvaro Cunhal (PCP). However, this is because their political activity prior to the democratic regime took place under dictatorship. Even if they have had a long international political experience – namely in the socialist and communist international movement, respectively, they did not hold any institutional office prior to the establishment of the democratic regime. Alterna- tively, several right-wing leaders who emerged during the first decade of the new regime were either members of the allowed ‘liberal opposition’ in the dictatorship’s parliament, or participated as technocratic members in the dictatorship’s last governments (as the CDS-PP leader Freitas do Amaral). Yet with the passage of time and democratic consolidation, this (apparent) difference between left and right parties has vanished. In terms of the longevity of party leaders two important aspects are worth highlighting. On the one hand, there is a trend toward a decrease in the average durability of party leadership. While the first generation of leaders displayed a great stability (more than nine years on average), in the period 2000–12 the

Table 9.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Portugal (1974–2012)

1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–2012 Entire period

Percentage women 0 0 0 17 6 Average age (in years)1 41.2 50.1 42.4 51.6 47.5 Percentage without political 40 0 0 0 6 seniority1,2 Average tenure (in years) 9.3 2.8 5.1 2.1 4.8 N 5 9 8 12 34

Notes 1 Average age and political seniority at time of first election as party leader. 2 Seniority means that the leader had national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection. 138 M. Lisi and A. Freire average durability was only 2.1 years. In the 1990s the relatively high value of leadership stability mirrors the capacity of the second generation of party leaders (Guterres, Durão Barroso, Portas, Carvalhas) to secure their position and their internal power. On the other, we can observe a significant variation between the main parties. While the leaders of radical left parties (PCP and BE) stay in office much longer than those of right-wing parties (PSD and CDS-PP), the PS stands as an intermediate case. The greater stability of left-wing parties is related not only to organisational characteristics (the ‘democratic centralism’ in the case of the PCP, the ‘poliarchic’ leadership for the BE), but also to the lack of electoral pressures, given their anti-systemic character and their opposition role. Finally, it should be noted that Portuguese party leaders are male, with the only exception being the election of Manuela Ferreira Leite (PSD) in 2008. Overall, we can say that the average profile of the leaders in the Portuguese parties is a man, aged around 47 and with parliamentary and governmental experience (the latter not in the case of radical left parties). Despite the increase in age and political background, this picture has not substantially changed over the democratic period.

Conclusion The experience of Portuguese parties has shown that leadership contests have been driven to a great extent by electoral constraints. With the exception of the two radical left-wing parties where leadership tenure has been extremely high, leaders have been selected according to their prospects of success in the electoral arena. In addition, the evolution of the electoral competition has put new pressures on party leaders, especially if we consider the loss of party members, decreasing rates of turnout and lower levels of trust in political parties. From this viewpoint, democratisation reforms seem a timid attempt to react to the challenging environment that the main governing parties have to face. This is also confirmed when we observe the profile of political leaders. Overall, little has changed over the democratic period in terms of social or political background, even after the introduction of direct leadership selection. One of the findings of this study points to an increasing openness of leadership selection procedures, although limited to the main governing parties. What is the origin of leadership election reforms? The decision to adopt every-member voting was a contentious issue in all parties. The introduction of more inclusive methods of leadership election depended mainly on strategic considerations. As Panebianco (1988) emphasised, democratising reforms can often be interpreted as an instrument for challengers to stand against the dominant coalition and gain internal power. This is mainly what happened in the centre-right parties. However, ideology is an important factor for explaining the acceptance of this procedure. In the parties of the right this is still a controversial matter, while there are few disgruntled socialists with this choice. From this point of view, one important aspect of leadership selection in Por- tuguese parties is its low level of institutionalisation. First, the rules regulating Party leaders in Portugal 139 leadership selection are not well defined, especially with regard to candidacy requirement and deselection procedures. Second, eligibility criteria have often been manipulated by strategic calculations. Finally, there has often been a mis- match between formal rules and the practice followed by party actors. The low level of competitiveness of leadership contests reflects the powerful position of party leaders in Portuguese parties. More often than not, the party elites find a consensual candidate who presents himself as the best option in order to win the electoral contest. As a consequence, party leaders have often been elected by a near unanimous majority or by acclamation. The rationale behind this is that party elites fear the negative impact that an open competition may have in terms of intra-party divisions and public opinion’s perception, with potential dangerous effects at the electoral level. This fact suggests that the direct election of party leaders aims essentially at improving party image through media coverage. The increase in the importance of the party leader both in electoral terms and within the executive has led to an increase in media attention to the leadership selection process. This phenomenon also has an important impact on the functions played by party organisations and local structures. As the link between party leaders and members is increasingly mediatised – rather than mediated by party structures – leaders may establish direct ties with their supporters, ‘hollowing-out’ the traditional functions developed through party organisation even further.

Notes 1 The PSD is not, as its name suggests, a social democratic party, but rather a liberal party. 2 Following its defeat in the 1991 legislative elections, the CDS changed its leadership, its ideological profile and its name, becoming the Democratic Social Centre-Popular Party (CDS-PP). In the text we use the present acronym (CDS-PP). 3 This left-libertarian organisation was originally a coalition (two parties and one political movement) that emerged in the 1999 elections, but over the years it has evolved into a single political party. 4 Therefore, we exclude both the PRD, which elected MPs between 1985 and 1987, and the UDP, an extreme left party which achieved parliamentary representation (one MP) between 1975 and 1980. This party was one of the founders of the BE in 1999. The PSN (Party of National Solidarity) also elected one MP in the 1991 legislative elections. 5 Between 1978 and 1987 the PCP formed the APU (Aliança Povo Unido) which included the PCP, the MDP and the Greens (since 1983). The CDU alliance (Coli- gação Democrática Unitária) has been formed since 1987 and includes the PCP and the Greens. 6 This figure exerts ceremonial powers and is clearly subordinated to the secretary- general. 7 According to a recent survey of socialist party delegates (2011), 68 per cent of PS’ activists support the selection of the leader by party members, while 20 per cent would prefer an open ballot for sympathisers and voters (less than 10 per cent support the previous procedure based on party delegates). There are no similar data for the PSD, but in both the 2010 and 2012 congresses an intense debate took place about the opportunity to return to the election of leaders by party delegates. 140 M. Lisi and A. Freire 8 Joaquim Miranda, ex-MEP, publicly defended the election of the secretary-general by party delegates through the Party National Congress or members’ ballots (see Público 26 November 2004). 9 Unlike what happens in parties in some other countries, in none of the Portuguese parties is a voting fee required in order to participate. 10 This was the main dividing issue that led to Mota Pinto’s deselection. 11 All main Portuguese newspapers have started to conduct opinion polls since the first competitive contest in 2004. In general, the higher the competitiveness, the higher is the visibility and the coverage of leadership elections in the media. The candidates of the two main parties usually form ad hoc teams for the organisation of internal campaigns. Unfortunately, no data or estimates are available for the funding of leadership contests and internal campaigns. 10 Let’s not risk too much The selection of party leaders in Romania

Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina

Introduction In most of Central and Eastern Europe, the beginning of transition to democracy was marked by negotiations among political elites grouped within proto-parties or loose political movements (e.g. umbrella organisations). This top-down process was combined with the fact that most of it occurred before the real institutionalisation of the new democratic regimes consecrated the central role of political parties in the political life of these countries. As a result, post- communist politics soon became party politics (Enyedi and Toka 2007). Empiri- cally, this claim is corroborated by the very few instances in which independent politicians managed to secure seats in the legislatures. Thus, the vast majority of decision-making processes has been the result of intra- and inter-party competition and negotiations. Romania follows this pattern: its political system is dominated by parties and their leaders – especially when the latter become heads of state or government. Unlike some of its neighbours, the Romanian party system and the patterns of inter-party competition have been quite stable in the last two decades. Since 1992, no new party has gained seats in the legislature; there were only exits with no entries. Therefore, the dominant pattern has been the gradual reduction of the number of significant parties in Romania. In the 2008 elections, only five parties secured seats in Parliament: two major, one mid-size, and two minor actors (out of which one formed a pre-electoral alliance with the largest party). Three of them – the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) – have had uninterrupted presence in the legislature since the regime change.1 The PSD (formerly PDSR) is the largest Romanian party: it won five out of six national elections, was the dominant party of the government coalition three times, once supported a minority government (based on a ‘silent agreement’2), and took part for a year in the most recent government coalition (as a second party although it won the popular vote). Its president won the presidential elections three times and since 2000 the party has enjoyed relatively constant electoral support of approximately 35 per cent of the vote (very low levels of electoral volatility). In 2001, it absorbed the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR) and it 142 M. Chiru and S. Gherghina formed electoral alliances with the PC (formerly known as PUR – the Romanian Humanist Party) for the 2000, 2004 and 2008 national legislative elections. The PDL (formerly PD) is the second largest party in post-communist Romania. It formed together with PSD the umbrella organisation winning the first elections after regime change (the National Salvation Front, FSN). It emerged in 1992 when the separation from PSD marked the official formation of both parties. Although it did not win any elections outright, it was part of four government coalitions – twice as minor partner (1996–2000 and 2004–8) and twice as the major party (2008–9 and 2009–12). It subsequently left all the governments in which it did not act as the major party. The PNL is the third largest party. It was part of the electoral alliance winning the 1996 elections and was twice part of a coalition government (1996–2000 and 2004–8). In its most recent governmental experience it led a minority government for two years (supported by the PSD on the basis of a ‘silent agreement’). The UDMR is the fourth party with relatively low but constant electoral support. The party represents the interests of the ethnic Hungarians and has played a pivotal role in many instances. Accordingly, it has been part of the government since 1996 (including a ‘silent agreement’ with the PSD between 2000 and 2004). The PC (formerly PUR) has been a parliamentary party since 2000, but has never competed on its own. Having always run in an electoral alliance with PSD this party had, nevertheless, for most of the period its own parliamentary party group. The party was twice in government (2000–3 and 2004–6), not always being loyal to the PSD (e.g. in 2004 it supported other parties in government although it got into parliament due to its pre-electoral coalition with the PSD). In organisational terms, the function of party president has been always considered as the most important and powerful position in the party. This importance was also reflected in the visibility and electoral advantages provided to their parties. The party presidents did not limit themselves to their position within the party, but also targeted high state offices. For example, the first president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) also became the head of state for two successive terms between 1990 and 1996. By running in presidential elections, organised simultaneously with the legislative ones until 2004, popular party presidents often had a coat-tail effect on the legislative results of their party (e.g. Traian Băsescu with the Liberal Democratic Party – PDL). Similarly, party leaders on a descending slope of popularity dramatically reduce the opportunities for their parties to make a comeback on the political scene after electoral defeat (e.g. Marian Milut as the president of the Christian Democratic National Peasants Party). Given this high profile status of the party presidents, it is particularly relevant to know who selects and deselects them. Who has the power to vest one person with extensive prerogatives and indirectly decide the fate of the party? Con- gresses bringing together party delegates are in charge of the process virtually everywhere, the only differences appearing in the number of delegates. There are variations in terms of electoral rules (majority vs run-off system); provisions Party leaders in Romania 143 governing eligibility; and competitiveness (in slightly more than half of the situations, only a single candidate contested the leadership election). This chapter describes and analyses the similarities and differences between the selection methods of the five Romanian parties relevant for the post-communist period. In doing so, we emphasise the main features of these methods, sketch the profile of the leaders selected, and explain how the selection methods can influence the trajectory of the party.

Who is the party leader? In Romania, the party leader is the president of the party. This is formally acknowledged by all the parties’ statutes: they explicitly indicate that this is the leading position within the party. The president’s functions and powers are considerable, and relate both to the internal and external life of the party. He is the leader of the party in central office, manages the daily activities of the party (between the meetings of the national executive or of the executive committee), ensures the organisational continuity and functioning, and maintains the connection with the territorial branches of the party. He ensures the visibility of the party, being its main speaker in the media and plays a relevant role during the electoral campaigns for local, national and European elections. He also leads the discussions for government formation. In the last decade, the presidents of the parties receiving highest electoral support have been appointed as prime minister: Adrian Năstase in 2000, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu in 2004, Emil Boc in 2008 and Victor Ponta in 2012. Along these lines, compared to the first post-communist decade, there is an increasing tendency for party presidents to take over the role of leader of the party in government. Between 1990 and 2000, none of the appointed prime ministers was a party president. During this period, the highest position of a party president – apart from that of the head of state held by Iliescu between 1990 and 1992 – belonged to Oliviu Gherman, from the PSD, who was speaker of the Senate. According to the Romanian Constitution, this is the second highest position in the state: when the country’s president is impeached or cannot make full exercise of his functions, the Senate speaker acts as president. Most of the time, party leaders became ministers in the cabinets in which their parties were participating. Following 2000, all the designated prime ministers were party presidents.3 Such a practice has clearly influenced the stability of the prime ministers in office. In the 1990s, a change in government usually coincided with the resignation of the prime minister. As soon as the party presidents took charge of government formation, the change of government was limited to a modification of the cabinet composition. For example, the president of the National Liberal Party (PNL), Popescu-Tăriceanu, remained in office as prime minister for a full term after changing the composition of government three times. Similarly, the PDL president, Emil Boc, changed the composition of his government five times until he eventually resigned at the beginning of 2012 following a vote of no- confidence in parliament (the second in his term after one in 2009). Thelast 144 M. Chiru and S. Gherghina example is the term of Năstase (the president of the PSD) who was prime minister between 2000 and 2004. He has been the sole prime minister to remain in office for a full term, without any major changes in portfolios within his cabinet. In general, the party president is the party leader both at election time and in central office. There is an exception to this rule – the case in which the party president becomes the president of the country. The Romanian Constitution pro- hibits the president of the country from remaining affiliated with a political party. The head of state is formally considered an impartial mediator between state institutions – and implicitly among political parties – and between these institutions and society (Art. 80). Following this provision, all the country’s presidents have resigned from their parties once elected as head of state. But de facto, all of them have maintained ties with their parties after their election as Romanian president. Actually, in such situations, the head of state often remains the true, though informal, leader of the party. Two good examples are Iliescu and Băsescu who were elected Romanian presidents when they were the leaders of their parties, then officially resigned. A new party leader was appointed, who sometimes even became prime minister, but the true leaders of the parties remained Iliescu and Băsescu. They have both enjoyed more influence than the formally elected party leaders, Oliviu Gherman for the PSD (1992–6) and Emil Boc for the PDL (2004–12). As long as the political leaders who become head of state enjoy greater popularity than their party, their power within the party organisation is very high. They remain unchallenged even if they unilaterally decide to engage the party in pre-electoral alliances (e.g. Băsescu with the PDL) or not to participate in government coalitions. But when the popularity of the Romanian president is in decline, this concentration of power may become a topic of criticism from his opponents. For instance, the strong connections maintained by the country’s president and his active involvement in the internal affairs of his former party lead to the first impeachment of Băsescu in 2007. The leadership of party presidents has become more obvious in the last decade. In particular, starting from 2000 it is easier to determine who the leader is. This is mainly driven by their increased visibility in positions such as head of state or of the executive. Following this trend, even the party leaders of the major opposition parties benefit from appointment in high public offices. For example, Mircea Geoană, the president of PSD (2005–10), was the Senate speaker between 2008 and 2011 although his party was in opposition since 2009. When parties with lower electoral support such as the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) or the Conservative Party (PC) are in government, their presidents often agree to become ministers. This is a common strategy adopted throughout the entire post-communist period to increase the visibility of the party and to convey messages to voters. The PC is a particular case that had to use a different strategy in recent times. The founder of the party and its president for more than 15 years was Dan Voiculescu. His public image was badly damaged following the official confirmation of allegations of collabor ation with the Communist Political Police, Securitate. He resigned from his position as party president and continued since 2008 as honorific president. Party leaders in Romania 145 Voiculescu is the real leader of the party for two main reasons: (1) the ownership of a media trust (visual and print) makes him and his party a desirable ally for other political parties; and (2) all subsequent party presidents had closely followed his views on all the political and party related issues. Although he is no longer officially the party president, it is quite clear that he continues to be the PC’s leader. Overall, while there are exceptions, the general rule holds that in Romania the party president is the effective leader and thus the remainder of our analysis refers to these individuals.

Rules organising leadership contests In this second section, we turn our attention to the rules organising the selection and deselection of Romanian party leaders. Little longitudinal and cross-party variation can be observed with respect to the different dimensions of leadership selection. Unlike other countries (Rahat and Hazan 2001; Kenig 2009a; Cross and Pilet, this volume); in Romania there is no clear shift towards more inclusive selection procedures (Chiru and Gherghina 2012). The parties rely on territorial delegates with representation quotas decided by the central leadership usually on the basis of the territorial branches’ electoral success. A similar picture emerges when analysing the other provisions organising leadership selection. The major variation occurs with respect to the number of terms in office occupied by one president. During the first post-communist decade, party leaders were able to remain in place for relatively long periods of time,4 even when their party suffered severe electoral defeats. In recent years, presidency has become much more risky. Electoral defeats have almost immediately triggered changes in leadership in the largest parties: PSD (in 2004), the PNL (in 2008) and the PDL (in 2012). To better understand the stakes for each political party and its leaders, a brief description of the Romanian political landscape is necessary. In spite of their differences in size and presence in government, the inclusiveness of the selectorates is similar across the five major Romanian parties. Throughout the entire period since the regime change, the party leaders have been elected in national conventions by delegates of the local branches. The most salient exception to this rule is represented by the Conservative Party during its first decade of existence. Until 2000, there were no elections for president in this party – Dan Voiculescu serving as Founding President. The party statute was then changed to ensure the election of the president by the Party Council.5 In 2003, the Conservatives converted to the mainstream model of president elected by the party congress. The Social Democrats have formally made their selectorate more inclusive in 2010 by adopting closed primaries, giving each party member one vote. This decision followed a change in leadership at the beginning of the same year, after the president of the party had lost his bid to become the country’s president. However, since then no leadership contest has been organised, and one can wonder whether this regulation will remain just a dead letter as was the case with the closed primaries adopted by the same party for legislative candidate 146 M. Chiru and S. Gherghina

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

(2010) PSD (1992) PDL PNL UDMR (2003) (2000) PC (1991)

Figure 10.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Romania (1990–2012). Note Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate. selection in 2004 (Gherghina 2013). With this partial exception, there is practically no reform of leadership selection for any of the Romanian parties. The adoption of more inclusive leadership selection could provide a few advantages. One of them is increased legitimacy and, consequently, higher like- lihood for increased voter confidence in political parties (Cross 1996). In Romania, this would be extremely desirable, particularly since the average level of trust in parties does not exceed 15 per cent. Similarly, inclusive leadership selection methods could be used to boost parties’ brand image in voters’ eyes (Gauja 2009; Cross and Blais 2012a). However, none of these incentives triggered a change in the selection of leadership. Based on the provisions of the statutes, all Romanian parties choose their leaders at national conventions that include local delegates and the central leadership. The decision is taken at the same layer – the party conventions – involving local and territorial (regional) delegates. In three out of five parties – the exceptions are the PNL and the UDMR – the central office can manipulate the number of delegates; this possibility occurs due to the loose character of the criteria employed to decide the algorithm of representation. Consequently, the only observable differences between the selectorates reflect slight numerical changes in the composition of the parties’ electoral congresses. There is a trend to include more representatives at the national convention over time. This is most visible for the PSD (628 at the 2nd Congress in 1997 and 1,657 at the 7th Congress held in 2010), the PNL (615 delegates at the 3rd Congress in 1997 and 1,431 at the 6th Congress held in 2009), and the UDMR (from 252 delegates at the 2nd Congress to 555 at the 8th Congress) (Chiru and Gherghina 2012). The increased size of national conventions reflects a tendency of the parties to capitalise on the increasing media coverage of these events; this is particularly the case with the emergence of private channels specialising in news.6 With these occasions the party leadership conveys messages of strength to the electorate. In doing so, the conventions are Party leaders in Romania 147 Table 10.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Romania (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term Voting rule Deselection (in years)

PSD Eligible party 4 Run-off Eligible party members members PDL Delegates to 4 Run-off No procedure in party national statutes convention PNL Delegates to 4 No procedure in Party Congress national party statutes convention UDMR Delegates to 4 Run-off Party Congress national convention PC Delegates to 4 Plurality No procedure in party national statutes convention

Source: party statutes. organised in large conference halls that, of course, need to be filled with delegates. Table 10.1 illustrates the similarities across parties in the regulation of leadership selection. All the parties allow for four-year mandates, whereas in three out of five cases leaders are elected through a majority run-off formula. Two of the parties, the Democratic Liberals (PDL) and the Conservatives (PC) do not mention in their statutes any rule concerning the removal of their presidents. This is not surprising given the very little amount of leadership change for both: they had only three leaders for the entire period analysed. For the other three parties the selection and deselection are functions of the same body: the national congress (PNL and UDMR) and the party membership in its entirety (PSD). Although the general provisions are similar, a few differences occur with respect to eligibility criteria; voting process; procedures to establish the convention delegations; and their size. In the PSD, there is a requirement of three years of membership to be able to run for a national party office. The president is elected through secret ballot by the National Convention (Congress) of the party taking place every four years. The participants are delegates elected through secret ballot by the county conventions according to an algorithm of representation established by the party’s National Executive Committee. The algorithm is decided based on ‘the number of party members, the political activity and the electoral results of each party organisation’ (Art. 48). Two-thirds of the delegates with voting rights have to be present in order for the National Convention to take place (Art. 48). An Extraordinary Convention can be called under certain conditions (Art. 49). The president is elected for a four-year mandate through a majority run-off system (Art. 53). The previous statute, adopted in May 2005, stipulated only one round of voting, which meant that the candidate who got the 148 M. Chiru and S. Gherghina plurality of votes was automatically declared the winner (Art. 77). The PSD Extraordinary Congress held on 16 October 2010 (more than 4,500 delegates) modified the party statute in the direction of allowing all party members to vote for the president of the party starting with the following ordinary Congress scheduled in 2014. The same Congress announced open primaries for the nomination of the party’s candidate for the country’s presidential elections. The norms for the implementation of these reforms are still to be drafted by the General Secretariat of the party. Since its beginning, the PDL used a list election of its leader, based on a competition of motions (party strategies) and leadership teams that support each of them. The first politician to sign the winning proposal becomes the new president of the party in a majority run-off contest (Art. 79). The next four signers become vice presidents while the fifth is the new secretary-general. All the 30 members of the group promoting the motion become members of the National Council of Coordination (Art. 79). This leadership selection process takes place at the National Convention, which is supposed to be organised every four years. The centre (The National Coordination Council) decides on the number of delegates, which cannot be lower than 1,000 (Art. 63.3). The delegates at the National Convention are elected by the county organisations, with the exception of ‘ex officio delegates’, i.e. members of the national leadership of the party (Art. 64). The delegates are elected by the political bureaus of every county branch. The number of delegates each organisation is entitled to corresponds to an algorithm of representation, decided by the centre mainly on the basis of electoral results (Art. 65). Currently, a proposal/‘motion’ can be debated at the National Convention only if its promoters gather the support of at least ten county organisations (Art. 74). In the first decade of the party’s existence a motion needed the support of one-third of the MPs or one-fifth of the delegates at the Convention or one-third of the members of the national executive; these provisions have limited competition at the National Convention. The National Congress of the PNL, scheduled every four years, is in charge of the selection of the party leader. At the Congress those with a right to participate are the members of the National Permanent Delegation (NPD) and the delegates elected by the territorial organisations (Art. 55), according to the representation algorithm decided by the Permanent Delegation (the Executive Committee) (Art. 57). This algorithm is established by taking into account the number of party members of each organisation (one-quarter weight) and its results at the local, national and European elections (three-quarters weight) (Art. 57). Any candidate running for a national party office has to have at least two years of membership (Art. 87). The Congress can sanction or sack the president at the proposal of the Permanent Delegation (Art. 61). The UDMR’s Congress elects the party’s president every four years. The leadership of the Union (the Executive Presidium, the Council of the Represent- atives of the Alliance, ministers and state secretaries/under-secretaries) has the right to participate at the Congress in an ex officio capacity (UDMR Statute, Art. 44). 15 per cent of the delegate mandates are reserved for members of the youth Party leaders in Romania 149 organisations of UDMR (Art. 44). The rest of delegates are nominated by territorial and corporate organisations inside the Alliance (Art. 44). The president is elected through a majority run-off contest (Art. 60) for a four-year mandate. In order to be able to run for the office a candidate needs either the support of two organisations represented in the Council of the Representatives of the Alliance or the signatures of 1,000 party members (Art. 60). The National Convention can decide to sack the president if requested to do so by the Alli- ance’s Council of Representatives (Art. 45). The PC statute does not offer many details concerning leadership selection. The only pieces of information are that the party’s president is elected through secret ballot (plurality) by the National Congress, which is organised every four years; the participants are delegates elected by the county conventions according to an algorithm of representation established by the party’s Executive Commit- tee (Art. 56).

Dynamics of party leadership contests This section analyses the dynamics of leadership selection with a special focus on the campaigns and competitiveness of elections for party presidency. While the story regarding campaigning in Romania is short and straightforward, analysis of competitiveness of leadership contests allows a thorough discussion of two indicators: (1) the number of candidates running and (2) the margin of victory of the winning candidate. The absence of real competition is visible both with respect to the number of candidates (slightly more than half of all contests are coronations) and when calculating the difference between the first and second place competitors (an average margin of 34.3 per cent). The electoral campaigns for the highest office in the party are, at best, under- developed. In general they are relatively short, being confined to the one or two days of the national convention. Things are slightly different in the parties that require the candidates to gather the support of a number of party branches in order to be able to run (the PDL and the UDMR). In these cases, campaigns are somewhat longer, with the main candidates touring the territorial organisations in search for support. These are the only instances in which candidates meet members in debates organised in the local organisations, mostly in the cities, very rarely in villages. However, even these campaigns are not very intense and this is the reason why neither of these two political parties has strict regulations regarding the campaign (particularly relating to campaign expenditures). One reason for the absence of heated debates between the candidates for the position of party president is the absence of major ideological or programmatic differences. In line with the main characteristics of the party system which is highly personalised, polarised on symbolic issues, and lacking substantive programmatic linkages with voters (Popescu 2003; Muntean et al. 2010; Gherghina and Miscoiu 2010) – policy issues rarely make it into the centre of the leadership selection debates. A telling example is the coronation of Emil Boc as the president of PDL in 2005, a moment which also marked the party’s move away from 150 M. Chiru and S. Gherghina a social-democratic to a right-popular label (followed by the change of the corre- sponding European party families). Although in policy terms this implied a dramatic shift of positions, and thus it could have spurred an intense debate, no counter-candidate emerged, nor did any of the party delegates express concerns about it. Instead, the ability of the contenders to attract electoral support at election time and their personal affinities with circles of power within the parties seem to be the main elements over which delegates make their voting decision. Summing up, the campaigns are about the personality of the candidates and their ability to win elections or to secure the party’s participation in the next governing coalition. Two partial exceptions to this rule are the most recent leadership selections in the PNL in 2009 and 2010. Apart from personality and charismatic differences, the two candidates running for the position of party president also displayed different policy priorities and preferences. In 2009, the incumbent party president and former Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu supported a presence in the government coalition next to the PDL, the winner of the 2008 elections. The challenger, Crin Antonescu argued in favour of opposition status and emphasised the necessity to restore the public image of the party, damaged after four years in government. This strategy dispute occurred a few months prior to the campaign and Antonescu won the contest by a large margin. One year later, Antonescu ran again to maintain the presidency of the party after failing to become head of state at the end of 2009. His electoral promise was to bring to the PNL a vote share as high as 30 per cent in the next legislative elections – that would allow the party to win the elections. In doing so, an electoral alliance with the PSD was intensely advertised (it eventually emerged a few months after). At the same time, Antonescu was a supporter of list candidacy for the selection of the party leadership. The challenger, Ludovic Orban was clearly against both these stances: he actively voiced opposition to the alliance with the PSD (also after the 2010 Con- gress) and explicitly mentioned that the lists candidacies for party positions should be changed. There are no state regulations of these contests, the only rules that apply are internal ones. Although party discipline is highly valued by all five parties, and some of them (e.g. the PDL and the PSD) have even occasionally forbidden dec- larations different from the official party line, at national conventions speakers can and do criticise openly (and sometimes fiercely) the state of the party and the leadership’s performance. However, there are only isolated instances in which the results of leadership selection processes lead to splits in the party. One of the few examples is the PNL in the early 1990s when the incumbent Radu Câm- peanu left the party after losing the presidency to Mircea Ionescu-Quintus; a splinter emerged: PNL-Câmpeanu. One possible reason for the low incidence of splits following these elections is the limited ideological conflict between the candidates. The average number of candidates in the elections for party leader is 1.76. The distribution is skewed with more than half of contests being coronations. At the same time, almost one-quarter of these elections included only two Party leaders in Romania 151 candidates (see Table 10.2). For the remaining cases, only around one-fifth included three candidates and less than 3 per cent had four candidates. There are no elections with five or more candidates. Such a situation means that not many candidates run for the position of party president. At the same time, there is a limited number of fringe candidates. Quite often, such candidates withdraw prior to elections, observing the low support they can mobilise. Even the contests for leadership with more than one participant were relatively uncompetitive: an average margin of victory larger than 34 per cent. The most competitive elections ever held in Romania took place in the smallest parties that have gained parliamentary representation, UDMR and PC. First, in late May 1991, at the second National Congress of the UDMR Géza Domokos’s presidency was challenged by the secretary-general of the party, Szőcs Géza. Domokos retained the party’s leadership after winning six more votes than Szőcs: 129 to 123. Szőcs became vice-president of UDMR. In 2008 PC held its first non-coronation presidential contest, which pitted Daniela Popa against Florian Anghel. In the end, the former won by a margin of 1.07 per cent and became the first woman to lead a Romanian political party. Overall the Liberals and the ethnic party have had the fewest coronations – three. In the two elections that were not coronations, the Conservatives had the smallest average margin of victory: 21.5 per cent. Since 2005, when they gave up on coronations, PSD also registered relatively competitive elections – an average margin of 25.1 per cent. The Social Democrats are followed by the PDL with 29.8 per cent (only two non-coronations), PNL with a mean difference between the winner and the runner-up of 40.9 per cent, and the UDMR, with 41.4 per cent. The longitudinal analysis of party leadership contests provides nuanced information regarding the selection process for Romanian political parties. Running for party offices (including the presidency) is limited to registered

Table 10.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Romania (1990–2012)

All leadership contests

Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 51.35 2 24.33 3 21.62 4 2.70 5 or more 0

Average number 1.76 candidates Margin between top two finishers1 34.29 N 37

Note 1 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. 152 M. Chiru and S. Gherghina members in all parties. Such common features are in line with the observations from Table 10.1 where we took into account the most recent statutes. However, as the previous descriptions have mentioned, there are a few relevant longitudinal and cross-party differences. For example, since 2005, the PSD has introduced a seniority requirement: only members that have been in the party for at least three years can run for office. Only the PDL and the UDMR statutes explicitly mention the endorsement requirements for candidacy. These were quite restrictive throughout the period for the Democratic Liberals, with a peak in the early 2000s when would-be candidates needed the support of half of the party branches or of one-third of the members of the national executive. By contrast, every UDMR politician obtaining the support of two branches or of 1,000 members could run for leadership. Generally, it seems that, over time, Romanian parties have become more competitive – with the exception of the PDL, where President Băsescu’s uninterrupted domination since 2001 has made any internal competition futile. Corona- tions are much less common than in the first post-communist decade, while the margins of victory tend to be smaller, particularly for those conventions held after general or presidential elections.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders The previous sections have explored the more technical or formal issues relating to the party presidency: who the real leader is, how he is selected and how the selection process has evolved over time and across parties. Now we turn to the leaders themselves and explore a few of their general features: who are they in terms of gender, age and political seniority? Apart from answering these questions, we also seek to distinguish how these features are distributed across time and parties. The average leadership tenure is 5.7 years, significantly longer than the electoral cycle (four years). This situation is exclusively determined by the extreme longevity of some of the founding leaders, elected in the 1990s (e.g. Petre Roman for the PDL, Mircea Ionescu-Quintus for the PNL, Marko Bela for the UDMR and Dan Voiculescu for the PC). On average, the politicians who started their presidency in the first post-communist decade, survived in office for almost 7.5 years. On the other hand, after 2000 the life of a party leader became much shorter: the average tenure for the second decade is half as long: 3.7 years. The average age of the party leaders is also quite high, slightly above 50 years. This is also skewed with younger party presidents emerging in the second decade (an average of 47 years). The general tendency to select younger presidents is reflected at the level of each party and not triggered by particular political contexts. Daniel Constantin (PC) is the youngest party president in Romania, having been only 31 years old at the time of his election. He is followed by Victor Ponta (PSD) and Emil Boc (PDL) who were 37 and 38 years old when elected. In the 1990s the youngest presidents were Marko Bela (UDMR), 41 years, and Petre Roman (PDL), 44 years. During the first decade there were a Party leaders in Romania 153 Table 10.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Romania (1990–2012)

1990s 2000–2012 Entire period

Percentage women 0 7.7 4.5 Average age (in years)1 56.9 46.8 50.6 Percentage without political seniority1,2 37.5 7.7 19 Average tenure (in years) 7.4 3.7 5.7 N 9 13 22

Notes 1 Average age and political seniority at time of first election as party leader. 2 Seniority means that the leader had national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection. few leaders who were older than 60 years when selected as presidents of their parties (e.g. Iliescu and Gherman for the PSD, Câmpeanu and Ionescu-Quintus for the PNL, or Domkos Geza for the UDMR). This can be explained by the domination of Romanian politics in the first post-communist decade by second- rank party apparatchiks who had started their careers in the late 1960s, and to a lesser extent by politicians who have been active in the youth organisations of the inter-war democratic parties. After 2000, most presidents were below the age of 50, with only Stolojan and Popescu-Tăriceanu (PNL), and Popa being older. Also, during the second decade, the first female president was selected; this is in line with the general under-representation of women in Romanian politics. Daniela Popa occupied this position for two years (2008–10) in the PC, the smallest parliamentary party in Romania. Seniority also plays a crucial role in the profile of a political leader. Only four presidents (Voiculescu and Constantin for the PC, Câmpeanu7 for the PNL and Ionescu-Quintus in his first term for the same party) did not occupy positions in the national parliament or national government when becoming presidents of their parties. Except for Constantin, all these cases occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, if variation appears in terms of length in office and age, having a party leader with seniority seems to be a constant in Romanian politics. Thus, seniority has become a precondition for being selected as party president. In a nutshell, party leadership appears to be almost exclusively an affair of senior male politicians. No less than 11 of the 17 leaders replaced in the 1990–2012 period had resigned voluntarily. In the vast majority of these cases, their hand-picked successor was elected by the party. Of those leaders standing for re-election, only four lost their bid: two of them in the PNL, Câmpeanu and Tăriceanu; the founding leader of the PDL, Roman; and Geoană from the PSD. In recent years it has become increasingly difficult for leaders to survive electoral defeats. In the first post-communist decade only one leader, Radu Câm- peanu, was removed – in a case of extreme defeat. This happened when his party (the PNL) failed to gain parliamentary representation. After 2000, four party leaders were removed or had to resign following electoral defeats. Two of them 154 M. Chiru and S. Gherghina were leaders of PSD, Adrian Năstase and Mircea Geoană, who both lost the chance to become the country’s president (in 2004 and 2009) despite being seen as the favourites. Petre Roman – the founding leader of the Democratic (Liberal) Party was removed in 2001, after gathering only 3 per cent of the vote at the 2000 presidential elections. Finally, Emil Boc, the PDL president had to resign in June 2012, after his party registered a humiliating defeat in local elections.

Conclusion Throughout this chapter, we have analysed the process of party leadership selection in Romania. We have observed that all Romanian parties maintain their leadership contests at the level of the national conventions where party delegates (from territorial organisations) make the choice. There is no longitudinal or cross-party variation with respect to the inclusiveness of the selectorate. The only difference occurs in terms of the size of convention and the extent to which the central office can intervene in influencing who participates (more precisely, the number of delegates). This similarity and absence of inclusiveness regarding the procedures of party leader selection in Romania is a further indicator of the previous observations that party members are not very powerful in Eastern Europe (Szczerbiak 2001; van Biezen 2003; Kopecký 2006; Spirova 2007). Without the direct and strong involvement of members, it is not surprising that only a few aspects of the selection process have been modified. Low competitiveness continues to characterise Romanian intra-party politics. Slightly more than half of the leadership elections were coronations and in one-quarter of them there were only two candidates; there was no contest with more than four candidates. Whenever there is more than one candidate, the average difference between the first two competitors is relatively high. The choice between candidates is seldom programmatic or ideological. Campaigns are almost always about the candidates’ personalities and charisma and their potential to gather territorial support. Most of the time, all promises evolve around the same items: a better result (or low electoral volatility in the case of the UDMR) in the following legislative elections and the ability to enter the governmental coalition. In the process of leadership selection seniority and gender are constant bar- riers. Seniority is a feature of all but four presidents (almost all in the aftermath of regime change); a quick look at the unsuccessful candidates (not directly analysed in this chapter) indicates that seniority is also part of their profile. With a single women being elected as party leader, Romania is among the European countries with the highest percentage of male party presidents. Two more components of the selection process that lack variation are the requirements for candidacy and the voting system. The eligibility criteria are rarely modified, but when this happens, as in the case of the PDL, it is generally in the direction of lowering the threshold (e.g. endorsement by a smaller number of branches). Sim- ilarly, with the exception of the PDL, none of the Romanian parties has altered the majority vote requirement to become party president. Party leaders in Romania 155 With so many constants at play, it may appear somewhat surprising that the duration of the term in office has decreased over time for most political parties. This happens mainly because of the ever-growing expectations of mid-level party elites vis-à-vis success in elections and, consequently, participation in governmental structures and access to patronage appointments – which have become extremely far-reaching in recent years. As political competition becomes more and more personalised, electoral success is highly dependent on a charismatic leader, and as a result party organisations are more willing to replace leaders who seem to under-perform electorally. Members play virtually no role in this story, and change (in the direction of their real empowerment) will most probably not happen very soon.

Notes 1 The relatively small number of parties with continuous presence in the legislature determined a particular coalition government setting. In the last decade, each political party took part in at least one coalition with each of the other parties. 2 The PSD neither held any position in government nor had any alliance with the governing party, but backed most cabinet proposals in parliament. 3 In 2004, there was a seven days (21–28 December) caretaker government led by Eugen Bejinariu from the PSD. This was only a transition period between the Năstase and Tăriceanu governments, the latter taking over after the 2004 legislative elections. Accordingly, the Bejinariu cabinet is not considered a government per se. 4 With the exception of the PNL presidents. 5 This is the national executive body of the party elected by the Congress. 6 During the first post-communist decade the party congresses were much smaller events and significantly fewer accounts of them appeared in the media. 7 At the time of the first PNL Congress Câmpeanu was the vice-president of the Provi- sory Council for National Unity (CPUN), the unelected body that functioned as a provisory legislature before the first parliamentary elections held in June 1990. 11 Stable leadership in the context of party change The Hungarian case

Gabriella Ilonszki and Réka Várnagy1

Introduction In the context of new democracies, party leaders are often their parties’ founding fathers who guide their organisation through the process of formation and institutionalisation and lead them to success – or failure. This is the context that provides the background for party leadership elections in Hungary. Party change and party system change characterise even the relatively stable cases, like Hungary. More recently, as the result of the 2010 elections, the Hungarian party arena has undergone substantial changes: parties dating back to the period of democratic transition disappeared, new parties emerged and the formerly dominant left party suffered a serious electoral loss. In our analysis we focus on the parties that are represented in the parliament in 2010 while the large parties of systemic change like the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) or the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF ) that actually disappeared in 2010 are only sporadically mentioned when they are relevant for comparative or analytical reasons. The post-2010 parliament offers a particular picture about the Hungarian political landscape: two ‘old’ parties date back to the time of regime change and two new ones entered the legislative arena for the first time in 2010. The strongest governing party, the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) is a right-wing conservative party that is currently running a coalition government with its ally, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP). Fidesz is led by a strong leader, Viktor Orbán who has occupied this post since 1993 with only a short interruption. This party then offers an example of leadership continuity since the party’s birth. Its junior coalition partner, the KDNP plays an inferior role to Fidesz. Some even claim that KDNP cannot be regarded as an independent party: in the last two elections the party ran on joint party lists with Fidesz, its critical decisions (including leadership selection) is influenced strongly by Fidesz, and dual party membership is allowed. For this reason the party is only marginally covered in our analysis. The other ‘old’ party, the Hungarian Social- ist Party (MSZP) was founded in 1989 as the successor to the former communist party. Its heritage included a well-established institutional base. Indeed, MSZP was the only party with clear-cut organisation, administrative and bureaucratic Party leaders in Hungary 157 skills and local resources during and after systemic change. In contrast to Fidesz, in the Socialist Party competing groups of politicians have always been visible, with rivalry between groups emerging from the socialist era and those representing the new reformist generation presenting MSZP as a case of party renewal along with leadership renewal. These two parties, Fidesz and MSZP have become the pillars of the Hungarian party system that by the middle of the 1990s was regarded as consolidated, stable and even frozen (Ágh 1995; Márkus 1997). Still, the original cartel of the parties triggered by the context of the negotiated transition (Ilonszki and Várnagy 2012), was shaken at the 2010 elections when the two largest parties of systemic change, the liberal SZDSZ and the conservative MDF disappeared. At the same time two genuinely new parties entered the parliament: the extreme right-wing Movement for a Right Hungary (Jobbik) and the left-of- centre Politics Can Be Different (LMP). They represent a new party type, the ‘movement party’, with Jobbik a post-industrial extreme right party and LMP a left-libertarian party (Gunther and Diamond 2003). While the highly centralised Jobbik followed the single leader path by electing one president, the LMP struggles to maintain a collective leadership in a highly personalised and leader- focused political context. The distinction between the old and new parties is relevant not only chrono- logically but in the analytical sense as well. Just as political regimes have gone through different thresholds of democratisation (Rokkan 1968), Fidesz and MSZP have gone through the thresholds of institutionalisation: party formation, when the party is born; parliamentarisation when the party enters the legislative arena; and governmentalisation when the party occupies a governing position either alone or as a partner in a coalition. Fidesz and MSZP were formed as extra-parliamentary parties then entered parliament and formed strong parliamentary groups (PPGs) that played a decisive role in leadership contests. Along with the PPG, holding government post(s) also elevated the position of the leader(s), thus potential challengers were disadvantaged and low level of competition for leadership prevailed. Concerning the formal procedures of selection, despite their different ideological, structural and historical characteristics, these parties display a surprising similarity. Although the selection process has become more sophisticated over time, the low level of competition along with centralised decision-making structures highlights the insignificance of formal rules. These findings also imply the importance of background negotiations between elite actors. In contrast, the two new parties, Jobbik and LMP are at the beginning of this road, that is in the phase of parliamentarisation and face the challenge of establishing themselves as relevant political actors. Both parties struggle to keep a balance between the parliamentary group and the party on the ground, the latter of which includes radical paramilitary groups like the Hungarian Guard in the case of Jobbik and loosely formed grassroot organisations in case of LMP. While Jobbik lacks transparency, and thus its internal conflicts are only occasionally visible for the public, the LMP’s internal conflicts led to party split early in 158 G. Ilonszki and R. Várnagy 2013, highlighting the difficulties emerging from collective leadership amongst the conditions of parliamentary politics.

Who is the party leader? A striking feature of party leadership is that initially most Hungarian parties opted for collective leadership (Punnett and Ilonszki 1994). The reason behind this was symbolic as well as political pragmatism. The symbolic message served to warn the power-holders of the communist era and attract a wide pool of potential followers at the same time: we are together and united. From a more political-pragmatic perspective, to launch a leadership contest – and the complementary conflict – is not something that parties can easily handle at that formation stage. As of now most parties operate under the lead of a single party president. The trend towards centralised leadership is evident and the explanation seems to lie in the logic of parliamentary work. By the end of the first parliamentary cycle in 1994 all parties had one president who was elected from among the members of the parliamentary caucus. Only a few parties resisted this concentration of powers in the hands of the leader of the parliamentary party and maintained separate leaders: one for the party in central office and one for the PPG (Ilonszki 2000). However, it has been proved in several instances that this duality of party leadership is not a viable option in Hungarian politics as it often results in internal conflict between the PPG and the party in central office led by the party president. The question of who emerges as the true leader, the PPG head or the party president depends greatly on the party context and the president himself. In the MSZP the party in central office has traditionally been a strong entity. In the Fidesz the opposite is true as the party president who emerges from the PPG dominates over the central office. Today, the party presidents hold a parliamentary mandate and in the case of most opposition parties the post of party president and that of PPG leader are held by the same person. The only current exception is the LMP which adopted a collective leadership model and decided to nominate one of its most well-known politicians as the leader of its PPG. The crisis the party faces in its first parliamentary cycle proves again that collective leadership does not help to solve the conflicts between the party in central office and the PPG: while the PPG leader was strengthened by a vote of confidence in the Congress, the members of the PPG still decided to oppose the leader’s political strategy which first resulted in the resignation of the PPG leader then escalated into the schism of the party at the beginning of 2013. Collective leadership as well as the dualisation of the leader posts holds another threat which affects party communication. Due to the personalisation and presidentialisation of politics, party presidents have become the principal brands of their parties and voters tend to regard the political game as a contest of leaders (Körösényi 2005). While bigger parties have the opportunity to introduce more than one politician as ‘the face’ of the party, smaller parties’ chances are limited in this respect. The practice of nominating the party president as the leader of different electoral lists (including for example the European Parliamentary electoral Party leaders in Hungary 159 list) without the intention of occupying the given mandate is a good example of this branding. While dependence on one single person to represent the party is risky, as the failure of the president can easily jeopardise the party itself, having more than one leading politician opens the door for competition to emerge. The struggle to control the political elite is thus a recurring challenge for the party presidents. Regarding the party presidents’ role they are not only the most well-known ‘faces’ of their parties but also their true leaders. While party statutes do not offer a detailed description of the party presidents’ rights and duties, both the Fidesz and the MSZP statutes attribute important competencies to the president such as the coordination of the work of the party executive, implementation of the parties’ goals and ‘representation of the party’, whatever this might mean. In practice the presidents’ roles go beyond their formal competencies and they can be regarded as veto-players in their parties’ decision-making processes, moreover in some cases such as candidate selection they are the single most important decision-makers (Várnagy 2010). Formally, the party congresses and the participating party member delegates have control over the leaders but the true and real power structure is elite-centred. In Fidesz, the party president, in power for almost 20 years, is a crucial figure whose decisions rule the party, if any conflicts exist they are invisible in the eyes of the public. His central role within the party is further strengthened by the support of party members and party supporters who in Weberian terms do not only attribute rational legal legitimacy to him but also charismatic and, as the founding father of the party, traditional legitimacy as well. The formal and informal support enables him to dominate party decision-making and in certain instances even to overcome the interests of party elites. In MSZP the party leader also plays a crucial role although his decisions can be challenged by diverse platforms and party elite groups. The interdependence of elite groups and the president becomes evident in times of disagreement between the two actors. This was the case in 2007 when Ferenc Gyurcsány, the socialist prime minister and president of the MSZP tried to introduce policy reforms that were opposed by the party elites. The reforms eventually failed but the resulting internal conflict significantly eroded the party and even led toa government crisis. Interestingly, both the MSZP and Fidesz have experimented with separating the post of the party president and the prime minister but they both failed in this regard: the parties had to be controlled by a firm hand. Small parties have never acquired the responsibility of the prime-ministerial position thus their organisation of party leadership followed a different logic in the pre-2010 period. These parties often maintained a unified leadership within and outside government. Yet, we often tend to forget that government positions might be a challenge for small (coalition) parties’ leaders who are constrained by two needs: to cooperate with the major coalition partner and to guard their party’s independence at the same time. In the Hungarian case government posts have proved detrimental for small parties’ leaders who either lost their identity and were regarded as subordinates or chose to quit governments due to diverse 160 G. Ilonszki and R. Várnagy political conflicts and constraints. The only exception seems to be the SZDSZ which successfully managed to guard its independence in two socialist–liberal coalition governments (1994–8, 2002–6) although in their last governmental cycle (2006–9) the party chose to quit the coalition, and eventually fell out of national parliamentary politics in 2010. Our analysis of party leadership in Hungary at three different phases of party institutionalisation (formation, parliamentarisation and governmentalisation) confirms that Hungarian parties have deeply reorganised themselves in their short history. While in the formation phase the presence of several leaders could serve the parties well, soon all of them recognised the need to establish a leader who can be easily identified. In the phase of parliamentarisation, the extra- parliamentary party versus the parliamentary party group have been the two potential actors in the leadership selection process. But in most cases, like in other new democracies (van Biezen 2003: 214–18), party leadership was gradually concentrated in the hands of a single leader. In most parties, the PPG was the decisive actor in this process. Yet, the socialists are a notable exception in this respect. The party in central office has become the dominant actor in selecting the leader, and in imposing its choice on the PPG. Obviously, the party’s organisational roots and its well-established – inherited – party organisation explain this difference. In any case, we can conclude that an influential and strong party presidential post has emerged in most Hungarian parties. This became a norm as well as a necessity because the biggest threat party leaders faced was that they could not dominate the different political arenas of the party.

Rules organising leadership selection As already mentioned in the introduction, there is no variation among the parties in the party leader selection process – moreover, there has not been any substantial change in the party statutes in this respect since systemic change. We argue that this ‘no action–no change’ scenario is not unexpected: rather, it responds to political rationality. Academic literature contends that widening of the selectorate serves to increase the legitimacy of the leader, to close the gap between leaders and members and to respond to leadership failure (LeDuc 2001; Hazan 2002) thus it appears to be as an intra-party democracy issue (van Biezen 2003; Kenig 2009a). These ‘requirements’ (or demands) appear vaguely in the Hun- garian case. Indeed, the most important among them – the potential challenge of the members – has hardly ever occurred in the Hungarian parties. The rank-and- file is weak not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of activity. Members do not challenge leaders: rather, if dissatisfied, they vote with their feet. The possible extension of the selectorate was put on the agenda only once, after the landslide failure of the Socialists at the 2010 elections. The party became divided over the ex-Prime Minister and ex-party president, Gyurcsány’s initiative to reform the MSZP according to his views. In order to circumvent the upper ranks of the party he suggested the democratisation of the leadership selection process hoping to reach out directly to the rank-and-file. The Socialist Party leaders in Hungary 161 Party resisted the proposed organisational change, which resulted in a party schism: the ex-prime minister and party leader left the party and the PPG with his followers in 2011 to found a new party, the Democratic Coalition. This case confirms that parties tend to flirt with new leadership selection methods after electoral setback and when in opposition (Cross and Blais 2012b: 134) although a further explanation should also be added: a broadening of the selectorate could serve a leader who assumes that his/her supporters are in the lower echelons of the party or even among the non-party member sympathisers but certainly not among the party elites. In this case of the Socialist Party the democratisation process could have enabled the leader to bypass the party’s elite and middle ranks and gain legitimisation directly from the rank-and-file members. The inherent trap, however, is that the democratisation process implies a change of the party statute, which requires the support of the party hierarchy. The party leadership will submit only if there is strong pressure from below. A relatively inactive membership cannot exert enough influence to ‘make things happen’. It should be noted that Hungarian parties began the party leadership selection process relatively ‘open’: they did not go through the stage that many parties in old democracies did, starting from closed party councils or the PPG making the choice. Initially, some idealism towards democracy understood as less centralisation prevailed – as we have seen in the ideal of collective leadership. In addition – and somewhat paradoxically – this was the procedure that parties learned from the former pre-democratic tradition when the single party (the Communist Party) elected the party leader by delegates in party convention – or as it was then called, party congress. Interestingly, in 2010, two decades after systemic change the two new parties did not start anything new in this respect: although the green, left, libertarian LMP follows the ‘tradition’ of collective leadership, both this party and the extreme right Jobbik select their leader by party convention. Figure 11.1 shows the straightforward pattern. The analysis of the parties’ statutes dating back to the transition era strikingly shows that leadership selection is very loosely defined. In recent years, party statutes have become more specific in defining leadership selection rules. Still, most statutes only state that the leader is selected by the congress, as the highest decision-making forum, through secret ballot. Further than that they occasionally

Voters Party Delegates PPG Party Single members to a party council Leader convention

Fidesz (1993) MSZP (1989) Jobbik (2003) LMP (2008)

Figure 11.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Hungary (1990–2012). 162 G. Ilonszki and R. Várnagy specify the voting system to be used, but the nomination process is not explicitly stated (see Table 11.1). The most elaborate formal rules can be found in the Socialist Party which issued an appendix to its statutes specifying the rules of decision-making and selection including the criteria for the nomination process. According to these rules either one-third of the electors need to support a candidate or s/he must be nominated by a special nomination committee to become an official nominee. As the delegates to the congress can express their support by open voting at the congress, the nomination can easily become just an official phase of the selection process and cannot be regarded as a real, political obstacle for contestants. The appendix also specifies that a majority of votes is necessary in order to win a mandate. If, in the event of their being several contestants, nobody receives 50 per cent plus one of the vote in the first round, a second round is held in which only the two strongest candidates run. The same two-round election is included in the Fidesz statute although it has never been applied in leadership contests. We should not leave the relatively short time span of the election cycle unnoticed – which can often be regarded as an ‘excuse’ for stability or lack of change (Cross and Blais 2012b: 142). All Hungarian parties apply two-year terms as a maximum for party leaders. Even more interestingly, no party specifies the rules for deselection. The rationale behind this is partly the short electoral cycle as well as the assumption that leadership crises should be handled by less transparent political means, like resignation. The fact that formal rules do not tell us much about leadership selection leads us to informalities to answer the question: who is to decide upon the party leader? With strong leaders we tend to forget about the king-makers, those more or less visible politicians who decide on the fate of contestants. What are the informal rules of selection, and who are the veto-players in this process? This question is rather hard to answer as negotiations usually take place behind closed doors and deals are never made public. Still, there are some actors we can identify. As elsewhere, in the party elite a core group exists, influential members who have a say in leadership selection (Marsh 1993). The two big parties represent distinct patterns in this respect. In Fidesz, members of the party elite have either taken an active part in the party’s foundation or have been office-holders within the party or in government. This homogeneity is not necessarily an advantage: it might impede renewal, and stability might last only as long as the current party leader is in place. If, on the other hand, the elite is heterogeneous, as in the Socialist Party, choosing the party leader is the product of a lengthy bargaining process and can result in the selection of an ‘outsider’. This is what happened in 2002 when the Socialist list leader and prime- ministerial candidate was not even a party member or in 2004 when an unfore- seen candidate, Ferenc Gyurcsány was nominated to be the prime minister and later was elected to be the party president by the Socialist Party. Intra-party challengers can be detected in some other parties as well. They are openly visible in the centralised, extreme right Jobbik. Paradoxically, it might be the degree of centralisation together with a surprisingly visible and well-organised Table 11.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Hungary (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

Fidesz Party delegates 2 Run-off between the top two candidates (in Not specified three rounds if necessary: in the first round absolute majority is required; if not the top three candidates go for a second round, if no one gets absolute majority a third round is organised) Jobbik Party delegates 2 Simple majority Missing (party statute unavailable) LMP Party delegates 1 Run-off between the top two candidates Through disciplinary protocol, exclusion from the party voted by two-thirds of the delegating committee by secret ballot MSZP Party delegates 2 Elimination ballot with majority requirement Not specified 164 G. Ilonszki and R. Várnagy rank-and-file that explains this context. This party has strong regional support in north-east Hungary where social and economic deprivation provides the basis for extremism and the ‘locals’ often make their voice heard against the Budapest- based – not to mention Brussels-based – party hierarchy. Still, this challenge could not destabilise the leadership and critical members again voted with their feet, leaving the party. Internal potential king-makers are less visible in the other new party, the green-left LMP – particularly because they still have a collective leadership. According to the party’s statute the main decision-making body is the congress. The political guidelines of the party are defined by the National Council that includes 13 members elected by the congress. The idea of collegial leadership resonates with the party’s postmodern values and organisational form that builds strongly on grassroots activism, but as indicated before seems less viable within the Hungarian political context. The lack of a single leader reflects, and in a sense strengthens, the co-existence of various political alternatives within the party and makes it hard to build and follow a common vision and strategy. In the case of LMP the willingness to cooperate with the left-wing opposition parties provoked such a deep divide that it led to a party schism early in 2013. This case also highlights the relatively low profile of the congress: the party’s PPG leadership decided to oppose the decision of the congress concerning the party’s electoral strategy, which resulted in the party schism. The low profile of the congress can also be documented in the case of Fidesz where a very small elite group presides over important decisions such as leadership selection. The striking discrepancy between the formal and informal rules is evident: while the party’s statute defines rather elaborate rules of leadership selection designed to deal with potentially competitive election, in reality the leadership of Viktor Orbán has never been openly contested. The fact that he was among the founding members of the party and was also the first leader emerging from the party ranks also suggests the weak institutionalisation of the leadership process. While there is no variation in the inclusiveness of leadership election, the next section considers whether there is variation in terms of competitiveness. In addition, a broader picture of the function of leadership dynamics in party development is also presented.

Dynamics of party leadership contests In this section, we argue that the dynamics of leadership selection can be understood in terms of party change and stability. First, we map out the competitiveness of leadership selection as an indicator of stability. Second, we look in more detail to the cases of leadership change. Our thesis is that leadership change is largely related to how the given parties go through different stages of party development and institutionalisation. Third, expecting a rather high stability in party leadership we aim to assess the ability of prevailing leaders to guide parties through the development process, to see whether leader stability is an asset in itself. Party leaders in Hungary 165 Regarding the competitiveness of leadership selection, Table 11.2 clearly shows that in the majority of elections only one candidate stood for the position of the leader. Generally low levels of competitiveness prevail. Out of 30 leadership elections in the current parliamentary parties only five were contested and each of these had only two candidates. This overall picture presented in Table 11.2, however, conceals important differences between parties: in the Fidesz, between 1990–2011, there was one contested leadership election, moreover it occurred very early in the party development cycle, that is in 1994, while the Socialist Party had three contested elections out of 13 and the radical right-wing Jobbik also had one contested election out of four. It is important to note that elections with two candidates are not symbolic coronations. The fact that contests occur only in a few instances suggests that second candidates only run when they truly intend to put up a fight. While the average margin of victory (43 per cent) does not reflect close contests it indicates that in the given parties there was tangible support for these second candidates (see Table 11.2). The low levels of competition and the lack of symbolic candidates point out that the opportunity to choose is not considered to be a value in itself by parties, that is they do not press candidates to stand and presumably lose at these elections. The only exception was the liberal party, SZDSZ which is not included in our tables because it lost its parliamentary representation at the 2010 general elections. The SZDSZ had a tradition of contested leadership dating back to the early 1990s, and in the 1990–2011 period ten out of 14 leadership elections were contested. The SZDSZ had always been torn by two, sometimes contradicting objectives: to cooperate with the left in order to impede the rise of a right-wing government and to establish a separate liberal pole in Hungarian politics. Com- petitors for party leadership often represented either of these two goals. Other small parties not included in Table 11.2 also had a record of more contested leadership contests. Out of the 14 leadership elections, four were contested in the Conservative MDF but three of them resulted in a party schism with the failed

Table 11.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Hungary (1990–2012)

All leadership contests

Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 83 2 17 3 or more 0

Average number 1.16 candidates Margin between the top two finishers1 43.5 N 30

Note 1 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested elections only. The one contested Jobbik election is not included due to lack of available data. 166 G. Ilonszki and R. Várnagy candidate leaving the party in order to form a new organisation. In another small party, the Smallholders, out of the five elections the only one contested signalled the end of the long-reigning leader and the end of the party itself. The Christian Democratic Party also had two contested elections out of eight but both occurred before the party actually ceased to operate for five consecutive years only to revitalise later as a satellite of Fidesz. While the above-mentioned examples demonstrate the critical role of contests, they also show that getting challenged is a sign of weakness. Not only the small number of contested elections but also the high percentage of votes cast for the single standing candidates confirms this assumption. The Fidesz leader, Viktor Orbán, always obtained more than 90 per cent of the valid votes and the socialist leaders do not lag behind with at least 85 per cent of votes received when standing alone. In this context of desired stability the change in leadership deserves a more detailed analysis. Harmel and Svåsand (1993) connected leadership change and party institutionalisation. They claim that party development can be described in three phases: party identification, organisation and stabilisation (Harmel and Svåsand 1993: 75). Initially, a clear message has to be sent out about the party concerning its position and political orientation; then the party must develop organisationally including consensus building among competing intra-party groups; finally a fully blown and complex stabilisation should take place. How were the leaders able to respond to these party developmental challenges and how can leader stability or lack of it be connected to these periods? If we analyse leadership change in the context of the challenges of the different phases of party development, we can see that timing is a critical factor. Out of the four parties in our analysis, only Fidesz seems to have successfully reached the period of stability. In the case of Fidesz, leadership change was administered in proper time: the transformation from collective leadership to personal and strong leadership occurred in parallel with the transformation of the party’s profile from the liberal to the conservative platform. Party leadership change happened harmoniously with the task of party identification. Moreover, the party was still small, that is the transformation did not challenge large groups in the existing organisation, rather it opened the window for new members and voters. As the emerging party leader was the initiator of this successful process, the enduring success of the leader’s authority was unquestioned. Initially, due to its high level of systemness (Panebianco 1988), the MSZP did not have to face the challenges of party development as described by Harmel and Svåsand. By building on their existing identity, organisation and stability, the Socialists could recruit what Enyedi calls ‘party careerist leaders’ that is leaders from their own ranks (Enyedi 2006). The top hierarchy of the communist period was replaced by those in the second row. This is well illustrated by the fact that the first Socialist prime minister of the democratic era (1994–8) was a well-established politician before regime change. While the strong organisation allowed for a clear hierarchy it did not result in a homogenous party and the party’s internal unity was eroded. Coupled with a growing external pressure for Party leaders in Hungary 167 party renewal, an ‘external careerist’ leader was elected in 2002 as mentioned above. The list leader and prospective prime minister was not even a party member and the conflict between ‘independent’ governance and the central party office concluded not only in a governmental but in a party crisis as well. The need for renewal presented itself as an identity challenge which the new leader aimed to overcome through a dominant leadership style which did not suit the heterogeneous nature of the Socialist Party’s organisation. In this sense, the leader failed to overcome the challenges of organisation and stabilisation in the party. In the other smaller parties, the phases and tasks of party institutionalisation were more blurred and problematic. The Christian Democrats’ competing (potential) leaders failed to provide clear identity and conflicts about policy orientation, and more importantly about coalitions strategies, intensified. The party fell apart and returned to parliamentary politics as a satellite of Fidesz. In the case of MDF, the leader’s strategy to distance the party from the ex-coalition partner Fidesz and to move towards the centre of the political spectrum provoked conflicts within the party and tensions soon eroded the party’s membership and support base. The reasons behind these parties’ failures were similar. Their leaders could not take the necessary steps of party institutionalisation; they fell short of providing identification and/or of organisational stabilisation to these parties. Generally speaking, the collapse of the pre-2010 Hungarian parties became manifest in leadership issues: the inability of the leader to lead the party through the next developmental stage, be it identity formation, achieving leadership cohesion or stable connection with followers and coalition partners. It should also be noted that electoral defeat, that is performance theory in its narrow sense (Bille 1997: 389) did not play a conclusive role in leadership change. Rather, leadership failures signalled party developmental failure while final electoral blows only followed.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders A quick look at Table 11.3 confirms that party leaders resemble the average member of the Hungarian political elite: male, middle-aged and experienced in politics. Yet, at a second glance we can observe a trend of renewal among political leaders. Comparing the demographic data collected for the 1990s and the last decade we can see that leaders are getting younger, new faces (without seniority) are entering the picture and they also seem to stay in office for shorter periods allowing for greater variance in the position. The only feature that does not show any significant change is the percentage of women in party leadership positions. It is important to note that the table covers the two old parties, Fidesz and MSZP along with the extremist Jobbik. Having a collective leadership the table does not include data about the LMP leaders. Leaders are only covered at their first election so incumbents’ data are included repeatedly only if they were re-elected after an absence of one or more cycles. 168 G. Ilonszki and R. Várnagy Table 11.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Hungary (1990–2012)

1990s 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women 0 10 8 Average age (in years) 49 40.3 45.8 Percentage without political seniority1 0 20 15 Average tenure (in years) 6.7 1.7 2.7

Note 1 Seniority means that the elected leader has national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection.

The under-representation of women illustrated in Table 11.3 (only one female party leader) is a general phenomenon in every sphere of Hungarian politics (Várnagy and Ilonszki 2012). Even the single woman featured here cannot be considered as a true party leader as she served as a temporary manager-leader in the MSZP. The only female party leader who served as a real leader for a considerable period of time (1999–2010) was the president of the conservative MDF. She was a popular politician who was partly successful in building an independent image for her party after governing in coalition with Fidesz (1998–2002) but failed in reaching consensus with the party’s political elite and rank-and-file concerning the party’s ideological and strategic orientation, and eventually could not stop the disintegration of the MDF. It is revealing that as a female politician she never cooperated with, nominated or appointed any females in her party and was an embodiment of the ‘queen bee’ syndrome. Although the extreme right Jobbik does not have female leaders, it is worth mentioning that the first widely known politician of the party was a woman who, after contributing substantially to the party’s success in the national arena, was elected to the European Parliament. The other new party, LMP which is not observed here did introduce a 30 per cent candidate quota to promote women’s access to politics and includes women in its leading Council (20 per cent) although so far only males occupied the party’s most visible party position, which is the PPG leader. The rise of younger politicians can be attributed to the MSZP and Jobbik while the data hide the actual ageing of the Fidesz leaders which went in parallel with the ageing of the party that called itself ‘Young Democrats’ at its birth. In contrast, an attempted renewal of the Socialist Party can be observed in the declining age of its leaders. The fact that the post-2010 MSZP party leader was still in primary school before systemic change reflects their attempt to break with the party’s communist heritage in terms of leadership as well. Thus far, the extreme right Jobbik has produced the youngest leaders. The young age of its leaders is also consistent with the party’s support base where youth dominate. It seems that anti-establishment slogans as well as the movement-like foundation of the party attract young age cohorts. This explanation is further supported by the LMP which is dominated by young politicians and attracts a young voter base. Party leaders in Hungary 169 The data regarding political seniority are in accordance with our demographic findings: currently it is only the Jobbik leaders who did not have political seniority before their election. Again, the LMP case would further support this trend as we can find many new politicians even in the top of the party’s hierarchy. This is not surprising for a new party. The tenure of the party leaders has diminished considerably during the second decade of Hungarian democracy. This trend can be explained by three factors. First, the tenure of socialist leaders decreased over time; more particularly, the first Socialist Party president was in office for more than eight years, the current party leader has been in office for 2.5 years (as at 31 December 2012). Second, the leadership of Viktor Orbán was interrupted for two years by two consecutive leaders during his time as prime minister; and third, the first leader of Jobbik was replaced after three years Yet, the data hide the fact that before this intermezzo Orbán was in office for almost six years and since his re-election in 2003 he has been party president for nine years and that the current president of Jobbik has been in office for more than six years.

Conclusion Parties’ developmental life span – from origin to institutional stability – is said to last for 15–20 years (Harmel and Svåsand 1993: 70). So it seems: at least the two main parties reached fully blown systemness in Hungary and leadership developments can be considered in this context. The success of party institutionalisation depends on the ability of the leader to pursue the different steps of party development. Though Hungarian parties have been deeply transformed internally as they have been institutionalised in the last 20 years, these intra-party changes have not materialised in reforms of the procedures for selecting party leaders. First of all, the personalisation or leader effect was very strong. Also, there was no membership demand to transform the method of electing leaders. In addition, the tasks and difficulties inherent in party institutionalisation inhibit these types of reforms because they are built on and require decentralisation. All in all, party leadership has been stable in Hungary. If we look at the dynamics of leadership selection, the dominant pattern is that of stability. Most leadership races are uncontested. Real competition for party leadership only happened when the respective party took or attempted to take major developmental steps. In Fidesz, there were two short lived attempts at leadership change since the election of Viktor Orbán in 1993. The Socialists have experienced more leadership change, primarily when the party has tried to redefine itself. Somewhat paradoxically, we assume that behind this apparent stability, most contemporary Hungarian parties will face serious challenges related to leadership selection in the near future. The socialists are already in the middle of this process as they try to create and establish a leader who is able to integrate this multi-polar party as well as to respond to the challenge of the charismatic Fidesz 170 G. Ilonszki and R. Várnagy leader. At the same time they have to regain their shaken image, indeed establish it anew – not on the basis of the communist legacy but on democratic party grounds. Although the Fidesz leadership has been in an uncontested position for two decades we claim that the party might well have to go through a leadership change to reach full institutional stabilisation. As it is often argued, charismatic leadership contrasts with democratic party institutionalisation (Panebianco 1988: 145). The two new parties are not exempt from leadership problems either. For the extreme right a strong party leader is a must as that type of leader could embrace the leadership principle which corresponds to the idea of an unquestion- able paramount leader (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 188–9). Still, as we have seen this is not yet the case with Jobbik, because time and again its grassroots troops give the party elite cause for concern. For the LMP, the big question is whether their organisational form is compatible with the institutional context. Further than these specific questions for each of the Hungarian parties, this chapter has shown that the issue of leadership selection has a slightly different connotation in a new democracy than in more established democracies. Atten- tion towards party leadership issues is often justified in terms of their implication for general election results (Garzia 2011: 703). In the case of a new democracy a complementary question is whether the leaders are able to stabilise, or if necessary transform, their party. While we have not found much procedural variation in terms of leadership selection, leadership issues will continue to enjoy a high profile in Hungarian politics in the context of the parties’ further development.

Note 1 We would like to thank OTKA K106220 research support scheme for making this research possible. Gabriella Ilonszki would like to express her gratitude for the wel- coming academic atmosphere that she could enjoy while working on the chapter in 2012 at the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University, Stockholm. 12 Party leadership in Canada

William P. Cross

Introduction The Canadian party system has experienced significant flux in recent years. In the 1993 federal election, the governing Progressive Conservatives (PCs) were reduced to just two seats in the House of Commons. This led to a decade of contestation on the right between the PCs and the upstart Reform Party. At the same time, a new force, the Bloc Québécois, emerged within the province of Quebec and succeeded in winning most of the province’s federal seats in six successive elections (from 1993 to 2008). With the Bloc dominating Quebec, Reform winning most seats in Western Canada and the Liberals sweeping Ontario, there was a strong regional cast to party politics in this era (Cross 2002). With their vote shares spread inefficiently across the country, the PCs and the left-of-centre New Democratic Party (NDP) suffered significant loss of seats and found themselves struggling for survival (Carty et al. 2000). By dominating the country’s largest province, and thanks to the machinations of the single member plurality electoral system, the Liberals managed to form majority governments from 1993 to 2004 (though never approaching a majority of the popular vote). This situation began to change in 2004 with the merger of the two right-of-centre parties. The new Conservative Party held the Liberals to a minority victory in 2004, came to power themselves in 2006 and won again in 2008 and 2011. Removed to the opposition benches after more than a decade in power, the Liberals found themselves deeply divided along factional lines representing rival leadership aspirants. The party suffered its worst-ever electoral drubbing in 2011 as it slipped to a distant third place behind a resurgent NDP benefiting from the widespread popularity of its leader Jack Layton. Illustrating the perceived importance of effective leadership to electoral success, the Liberals’ response to their defeats has been to replace the leader after every recent election. Liberals are now on their fifth leader since the 2003 retirement of their last successful one, Jean Chrétien (subsequent leaders have been Martin, Dion, Ignatieff, Rae and Trudeau). The 2011 election also brought a significant setback for the Bloc as Quebec voters moved en masse to the NDP. Given the significant upheaval in support 172 W.P. Cross level for the parties in recent elections it is foolhardy to predict the future. One thing is certain, though: all of the parties view strong leadership as key to electoral success and have shown a willingness to remove those not seen to be meeting this standard. Party leaders in Canada are chosen for an unlimited tenure, meaning there is no set term to their time in office. They lead their party both during parliamentary sessions and election campaigns. The Canadian situation is similar to that in many countries in that leaders are seen to be accumulating greater power as the parties are increasingly viewed through the prism of their leaders and election campaigns are seen as contests among party leaders (Poguntke and Webb 2005). Two important contextual factors that facilitate strong leaders are a relatively high degree of party discipline in parliament and the leaders’ veto power over candidate selection. Party discipline in the Canadian House of Commons is extremely strong and significantly greater than that found in legislatures in many other Western democracies such as the United States and Great Britain. One result is that leaders are able to exert great control over their party’s policy and parliamentary agendas. In addition, election laws provide that party leaders must approve of their party’s candidate in each of the country’s single member electoral districts. While this authority is used to varying degrees it has regularly been exercised by leaders refusing to endorse locally selected candidates that the leader, for whatever reason, does not approve of (Cross 2004, 2006). The result is that members of parliament and would-be MPs know they must remain in the good favour of their leader in order to be sure of a chance to contest the next election. With some exceptions, as discussed below, leaders can be formally removed from their position but this happens very rarely. Instead they serve until they choose to retire or until mounting opposition makes their staying in office untenable. Poor election returns often result in leaders leaving their post. There are no laws governing how parties select their leaders. The decision is left to each party to make for itself. The result is that there has been significant experimentation with different methods and change over time reflecting the parties’ shifting democratic ethos and electoral imperatives. There has often been strong debate within parties over the appropriate way to select leaders and these debates have often been coloured by the leadership ambitions of potential candidates and how they perceive they would fare under different regulatory regimes. Parties typically establish a leadership rules committee just prior to the outset of each contest and these committees often engage in vigorous debate before deciding on the rules for the upcoming election. Leadership campaign operatives suggest that influencing the decisions of these committees, to ensure a regulatory framework favourable to their candidate, is a key part of any successful campaign (see Flanagan 2007). This chapter focuses on leadership selection in the four principal political parties at the federal level. These are the governing Conservatives, the New Demo- crats, the Liberals and the Bloc Québécois. Only the Liberals and Conservatives Party leaders in Canada 173 have ever governed and thus only their leaders have served as prime minister. The New Democrats have traditionally been a third- or fourth-place party, though in the 2011 election they had a significant breakthrough and finished a strong second. The Bloc runs candidates only in the largely francophone province of Quebec and thus has no aspirations to governing. The data in this chapter focus on the period from 1965 to 2012. During this time frame the current Conservative party was split into two competing groups between 1987 and 2003 – the Progressive Conservat- ives (PCs) and the Reform/Canadian Alliance. References to the Conservative Party relate to the PCs for that time period.

Who is the party leader? In terms of leadership, Canada’s political parties fit firmly within the Westmin- ster model. There is a single leader of each party who is the effective head of both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organisation. Each party’s membership elects a president and other executive members but the formal influence of these office-holders is limited to the party organisation outside of parliament and they are clearly secondary in authority to the party leader. Once chosen, the leader remains in his position until either being removed or retiring. Thus, the same person leads the party both between and during elections. The leader is thus the principal spokesperson for the party at all times. She heads the parliamentary group, has oversight over the extra-parliamentary organisation, oversees electoral preparation and is the party’s lead campaigner during elections. When a party forms government, its leader becomes prime minister while maintaining the position of party leader. By tradition, party leaders are members of the lower parliamentary branch – the House of Commons. As discussed below, at times non-parliamentarians are chosen as party leader but the expectation is that they will seek a seat in parliament at the first opportunity and usually an MP from their party will resign to create such opportunity. Given how influential the party leader is, there are many who aspire to the position and, thus, there are often intra-party rivals to leaders. There are, however, no party positions that rival that of leader in terms of power both within the political party and in the broader Canadian democratic context.

Rules organising party leadership selection Consistent with the Westminster tradition, Canada’s party leaders were initially selected by, and from among, their parliamentary group. This was the method used for the first five decades after Confederation in 1867. The Canadian parties have subsequently been at the forefront in terms of broadening the leadership selectorate and experimenting with different forms of selection. As early as 1919 the Canadian Liberals expanded the selectorate, formally bringing the extra-parliamentary organisation into the process. The Liberals were in opposition at the time, having been reduced to a relatively small parliamentary group disproportionately made up of MPs from the province of Quebec. The party’s 174 W.P. Cross leadership believed that it needed to increase its appeal to English Canadians in order to have a viable chance of returning to government. Given this strategic imperative, the small number of Liberal MPs from anglophone Canada made the parliamentary party something less than an ideal body to select the new leader (Courtney 1973). At this same time there was a growing populist movement in parts of the country. This was evidenced by the expansion of the franchise in 1918 and the electoral success of farmers and progressive parties at both the provincial and federal levels. In expanding their leadership selectorate, Liberals were responding to the challenge from these parties by presenting themselves both as organisational innovators and as more inclusive than their opponents. The method adopted by the Liberals, and quickly copied by the other parties in the system, was selection through a delegated convention. These early ‘leadership conventions’ were comprised of two groups of delegates. One set was made up of local party activists chosen from each of the country’s electoral districts. The second group consisted of party elites, known as ex officio delegates, who came to their delegate status by virtue of holding a high party office. These leadership contests have been described as ‘semi-open, moderately competitive’ (Cross 2004: 79). The proportion of ex officio delegates was relatively high and the constituency-based delegates were themselves often local elites. While parties continued to select their leaders through delegated conventions for several more decades, the nature of leadership elections changed dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s. During this era, the balance of power within conventions began to shift away from party elites to rank-and-file constituency party members. Conventions became significantly larger and the additional delegates primarily were in the group of those chosen to represent local party members. Conservative and Liberal leadership conventions of 1967 and 1968 respectively were nearly twice the size of prior ones and the number of candidates and competitiveness of the contests increased significantly. The 1967 Conservative contest featured nine serious candidates and eight contested for the Liberal leadership a year later. The competitiveness of these elections is evidenced by the fact that the Conservative contest went five ballots and the Liberals’ four before a candidate emerged with the required majority support. Not surprisingly, candidates in subsequent contests responded strategically to this changed environment and began in the 1970s and 1980s to shift the focus of their campaign efforts away from the convention itself to influencing the selection of convention delegates. Up to this point, candidates and their supporters focused on attempting to win over those delegates selected to attend the convention. During this new period, campaigns began to attempt to influence who was selected with an aim of having those already committed to supporting their candidate elected as delegates. This resulted in considerably longer, more expensive and more complicated campaigns as candidates were required to organise in each of the country’s then almost 300 electoral districts – each of which inde- pendently elected convention delegates. These efforts resulted in candidates engaging in tactics such as branch stacking in order to ensure they controlled the Party leaders in Canadaâ 175 delegate selection meeting. Carty (1988) refers to this era of leadership selection as ‘trench warfare’. Largely in response to criticism of these contests, and particularly abuses relating to the delegate selection process, some parties at the provincial level began experimenting with every-Âmember-vote contests in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1985, the Parti Québécois was the first major Canadian party to abandon the leadership convention in favour of a direct vote of its entire membership. Many provincial parties, from all regions of the country and different political persua- sions, followed suit and by the mid-Â1990s selection through membership votes appeared to be the norm (Cross 1996). As illustrated in Figure 12.1, the federal parties were slower to move away from the delegated convention. Delegates to a Liberal Party convention in 1990 were the first to vote in favour of the idea and established a working group to develop detailed rules for a membership vote for future contests. Subsequently, however, party leadership got cold feet over the idea and instead orchestrated a compromise in which all party members voted for their preferred leadership candidate and these votes determined who would serve as convention delegates. Three innovations were involved: first, rank-Âand-file members cast a ballot in favour of their preferred party leader; second, convention delegates were chosen on a proportional basis reflecting each leadership candidates’ local vote share; and, third, delegates were bound to reflect local preferences on the convention’s first ballot.

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

Bloc Québécois (1996) (1991) (1996) Conservatives (1995) (1965) (2003)aa a (2002) Liberals (1990) (1965) (2012) (2009) (1992) New Democrats (2003) (1965) Reform/ Canadian Alliance (1991) (1987)

Figure 12.1âInclusiveness of the selectorate in Canada (1965–2012). Note Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new selectorate. 176 W.P. Cross In 1997, the Bloc Québécois became the first federal-level party to select a leader through a direct vote of its members. They were quickly followed in this by the Conservative Party just a year later, the Reform/Canadian Alliance in 2000 and the New Democrats in 2003. The Liberals amended their rules in 2011 adopting a vote of members and ‘supporters’ for the 2013 selection of their current leader. While some provincial-level parties still use the delegated convention method, all four of the principal federal parties have now abandoned it in favour of a direct, full membership vote. While membership votes are now the norm, there are two additional issues relating to the definition of the selectorate that require consideration. The first concerns the New Democrats, a social democratic party with strong traditional ties to organised labour. When the NDP first selected its leader through a membership vote it adopted something akin to the electoral college method used by the Labour party in the United Kingdom (see Bale and Webb this volume). The NDP divided up vote shares between its grassroots members and organised labour – with members allocated three-quarters of the vote and labour unions one-quarter. In the run-up to its 2012 leadership election, the party’s rules committee reconsidered this allocation. This was a contentious issue within the party both among those generally concerned about the relationship with the trade union movement and with supporters of various candidates who saw electoral advantage with a particular outcome to this debate. In the end, the committee eliminated the labour unions’ vote share, adopting a pure membership vote process. The result is that none of the Canadian parties now allocates a vote share to any external, affiliated groups. Given that all of the parties now grant leadership votes to their ‘members’ it is important to consider who is a party member. All of the parties are membership organisations and typically one joins by completing a membership form and paying a modest fee of about $20. Membership usually requires renewal on an annual basis. Parties throughout Western democracies take very different approaches in defining members for purposes of including them in the selection of their candidates and leaders. These differences largely reflect varying objectives embedded in the decision to include members in the selectorate. Some parties have highly restrictive definitions requiring that members belong for a year or more before being granted a vote (the Irish Labour Party) and others require that members actively participate in party affairs (for example by attending a set number of party meetings) before being eligible to vote. This approach limits participation to those with an ongoing commitment to the party and reflects a desire to give meaning to long-term membership and activism by restricting this privilege to those who meet these requirements. It also suggests a desire for the leader to be chosen by those with a long-term commitment to the party reflecting a belief that these individuals know the party’s needs best and are thus best suited to make the leadership choice. The alternative approach is to have a wide-open membership and essentially let any interested voter participate in the contest. This approach reflects a view that the leadership campaign provides an important opportunity for the party to Party leaders in Canada 177 attract new recruits that it might later convert to ongoing supporters and perhaps activists. This is the approach adopted by the Canadian parties. One of the defining characteristics of Canadian leadership contests is that the electorate is extremely fluid and not set at the outset of the contest. Membership deadlines in the federal parties range in length but always fall after the start of the campaign. For example, in the March 2012 NDP contest that began in earnest in September 2011, eligibility rules required only that would-be voters join 30 days prior to the vote. Some parties at the provincial level have completely done away with any membership deadline allowing voters to join on the day of the contest at the same time they cast their membership ballot (Stewart 1997). In these cases membership has little meaning and can be seen as little more than an attempt by the party to raise funds (in the form of membership fees) and build a list of party supporters for future solicitations (for votes, money and volunteer work). One result of these rules is that the first imperative for any serious candidate for party leadership is to recruit large numbers of new members. As described in the next section, the outcome of many leadership contests is determined by the organisational capacity of the competing campaigns to recruit supporters to party membership. The franchise for leadership selection in membership votes is broader than for general elections. While voting in general elections is reserved for Canadian citizens over the age of 18, all of the major parties allow those younger than 18 to vote and none of them require citizenship as a prerequisite for membership. The minimum age varies but is generally around 14. Some, but not all parties require residency in Canada. In accordance with new rules adopted for the party’s 2013 leadership contest, the Liberals expanded the selectorate to include what they call ‘supporters’. This is a new designation consisting of those who certify that they support the party’s goals, do not belong to another political party and do not wish to join the Liberal Party. These supporters, who, unlike members, must be 18 years of age, are per- mitted to vote in leadership contests without joining the party or paying any fee. Given that participating in leadership votes is one of the most significant induce- ments to membership in the Canadian parties (Young and Cross 2002a) it will be interesting to see how this rule change affects the party’s efforts to attract new members. The Canadian parties are unique among their Westminster counterparts in providing absolutely no privileged role in leadership selection to their parliamentarians (Cross and Blais 2012a). In the current membership vote processes the preference of each MP counts for no more than does that of any other party member. This can be contrasted with the UK case in which Labour allocates one-third of the leadership vote to parliamentarians and the Conservatives task MPs with narrowing the field to two finalists from between whom the rank-and- file members choose a leader. Similarly, there is no threshold support of parliamentarians required for candidacy for leadership. In many other Westminster parties where the selectorate has been expanded to include regular members, MPs maintain a gatekeeping role through the nomination process. For example, 178 W.P. Cross when Gordon Brown was acclaimed as leader of UK Labour in 2007, there were other prospective candidates who wanted to contest for the leadership but were prevented from doing so because they did not have the support of the more than 40 MPs required to stand. In the Canadian parties there have been many leadership candidates, some ultimately successful, who have enjoyed very little support among parliamentarians. The Canadian parties take this to the extreme in that they do not even require that leadership candidates be MPs themselves. Many recent party leaders were not parliamentarians when they sought the leadership. In these cases, new leaders typically run in a by-election shortly after ascending to the leadership. Often vacancies are created by encouraging a colleague in a safe party seat to resign making room for the new leader. While MPs are elected through a plurality electoral system, as illustrated in Table 12.1, all parties select their leader using a majority rule. Parties have used both run-offs and preferential voting for this purpose. When leaders were chosen at delegated conventions, multiple ballots were held, with the last place candidate eliminated in each round until a majority result was achieved. Accord- ingly, it was common for contests to be decided on third, fourth and fifth ballots. This was easily accomplished as all voters were physically in one room and sequential ballots could be held with minimal delay. As discussed in the following section, elections with run-offs as opposed to preferential balloting can result in very different campaign dynamics. When the move to membership voting was first adopted, some parties (for example, the Conservatives and the now defunct Canadian Alliance) maintained the tradition of sequential balloting. This is obviously a more onerous process for membership votes than delegate conventions as the electorate is much larger and more diffuse. Typically parties adopting this approach have prescribed that if no candidate receives majority support on the first ballot a second round of voting, limited to either the top two or three candidates, will be held a week or

Table 12.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Canada (as of 2012)

Selectorate Term Voting rule Deselection (years)

Bloc Québécois Party members None Majority/ Party conference preferential vote Conservatives Party members None Majority/ Party conference preferential (when in opposition vote only) Liberals Party members None Majority/ Party members (when and supporters preferential in opposition only) vote New Democrats Party members None Majority/ Party conference preferential vote Party leaders in Canada 179 two later. If more than two candidates are allowed on the second ballot, preferential voting has been used at this stage to ensure that more than two rounds of voting are not required. Other parties have used preferential voting in the first round to avoid the cost and administrative burden of organising a second ballot. Parties have experimented with different forms of membership voting. At the provincial level, several parties have used in-person voting. The form has ranged from inviting members to vote in their local electoral district in a manner similar to general elections (for example, the Alberta Conservatives), to organising a few regional sites to which members must travel to vote (the New Brunswick Conservatives), to hosting a single convention to which all party members are invited to attend and vote (Prince Edward Island Conservatives). Probably reflecting the geographic size of the country, none of the federal parties using a direct member vote have yet attempted in-person voting. Telephone, mail, fax and Internet voting have all been tried. The New Democrats in 2012 used a mixture of methods. Members had the option of filling in a preferential ballot by mail or voting by Internet on the day of the vote counting. Those voting electronically did not use a preferential ballot but rather voted in four separate rounds after the results of the earlier counts were announced. The result was that some members had far greater information in making their second, third and fourth round voting decisions than did others. Those who voted in advance, which included the majority of those who participated, indicated their subsequent preferences without knowledge of how the candidates fared on the first ballot. Those voting electronically had full knowledge of early ballot results before deciding who to support in subsequent rounds. What is interesting here is the wide diversity of voting methods adopted by the parties. It is not difficult to see how different rules might favour different candidates. The well-organised candidate might be confident of his campaign’s ability to mobilise and turn out supporters in person for multiple voting rounds while a candidate with fewer resources might prefer postal balloting which requires less of a commitment from her supporters. The experience thus far indicates that candidates and their supporters will try and influence rule-making to their advantage and indeed important details of the rules are regularly argued over and changed in the lead up to every leadership contest (see Cross and Blais 2012a). While membership votes are now the norm at the federal level, the parties have taken different approaches to how votes are counted. Traditionally, Cana- da’s political parties have been described using the brokerage model (Carty et al. 2000). The governing Conservatives and Liberals have been characterised as big tent parties that attempt to bridge the country’s principal political cleavages within their own organisations. Historically, the central cleavages have been language and region (Siegfried 1904 [1966]). This form of party organisation has had implications for leadership selection. Recall that the initial impetus for expanding the leadership selectorate beyond the Liberals’ parliamentary caucus was the under-representation of anglophone Canada in that group. There has long been a concern for regional and linguistic balance in Canada’s political 180 W.P. Cross institutions and this has influenced the rules governing leadership selection. When parties chose leaders through conventions the Liberals and Conservatives allocated an equal number of delegates to each electoral constituency across the country. This ensured that all regions were represented in the choice. This differs from the process used in some parties, including Canada’s New Democrats, that allocated delegate numbers on the basis of the size of a local party’s membership. In these parties regions with more members were granted more delegates and thus a greater say in the selection of leaders. This principle is more difficult to operationalise in every-member-vote processes. One of the driving arguments in support of membership votes is the populist notion of including all members equally in the leadership choice. Given the significant regionalisation of party support in Canada it is impossible to square the principle of equality of individual votes with equitable regional representation in leadership elections. For example, a local Conservative Party in Alberta, where the party is electorally dominant, may have 5,000 members participating in a leadership election contrasted with 25 in a Quebec constituency where the party is all but moribund in much of the province. In this example, if all votes are counted equally, Albertans will have far greater influence over the outcome than will Quebecers even though there are approximately twice as many Que- becers as Albertans. To deal with this concern, the Liberals and Conservatives have maintained the principle of equitable regional representation by converting membership vote totals to percentages in each electoral district and determining the winner by adding together these percentages. In effect this means that each district has 100 votes in the contest regardless of how many members actually cast a ballot. While this ensures regional equity it comes at the expense of equality of the individual vote. Stewart and Carty (2002) illustrate this through an example from the Conservative’s 1998 contest. In the Ontario constituency of Kingston and the Islands 1,300 party members cast ballots compared with eight in the Quebec district of Bellechasse-Etchemins-Montmagny L’Islet. Because both districts were granted 100 votes in the contest, each Kingston ballot was converted to 0.13 of a vote contrasted with a value of 12.5 for each voter in the Quebec constituency. Thus, some votes counted 96 times more than others. The New Democrats have never shared the brokerage impulse to the same extent as the Liberals and Conservatives and thus have never required equity among regions in their selection of leaders. All votes cast by their members count equally. The same is true for the Bloc Québécois which has no concern for balancing inter-provincial representation within its organisational structure. Because Canadian party leaders are chosen for indeterminate terms, the norms and procedures surrounding leadership removal are important to consider. When the New Democrats selected their leaders at party conventions, they formally were chosen for two-year terms. Thus each biennial conference included the possibility of a leadership election. Incumbent leaders had to renominate, if they desired to stay in the job, and any other individual could challenge them. While there occasionally were challengers to sitting leaders, these never amounted to serious threats to the incumbent. Since the NDP moved to membership votes in Party leaders in Canada 181 2003 none of the parties have fixed terms for their leaders. Once chosen, a leader remains in the job until she decides to resign or is formally removed. Removal rules vary by party, but essentially require either a majority vote of biennial convention delegates (Conservatives, New Democrats) or of local party members (Liberals) to launch a leadership contest. Only one party leader has been formally removed from the position and that was in 1967 when the Conservatives replaced John Diefenbaker as leader.1 While no other leader has been formally removed, these rules have resulted in leaders resigning in two ways. First, leaders have resigned after surpassing the 50 per cent threshold in a review vote but not winning sufficient support to silence their critics. A prime example of this was the resignation of Conservative leader and former Prime Minister Joe Clark. After receiving the support of two- thirds of delegates to the party’s 1981 convention he announced he would resign if he did no better in the next leadership review vote. When his total at the 1983 conference was virtually identical he resigned the leadership.2 Second, the mere threat of an impending leadership review challenge has encouraged some to leave their party’s top job. Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was long under internal pressure from supporters of leadership rival Paul Martin to retire. Chrét- ien resisted for several years and only announced his intention to leave once it became apparent that he would face a very difficult task in winning an upcoming leadership review vote. Thus, these rules, though rarely used to remove a leader, have on several occasions had the effect of encouraging a leader to resign. There is an important exception to the norm that leaders can be removed. Both the Conservatives and Liberals have within the last decade adopted rules providing that when their leader is serving as prime minister he is not subject to a review vote. This means that prime ministers from these parties serve for as long as they wish with no formal mechanism in place for a party to remove them.

Dynamics of party leadership contests The character of leadership campaigns in Canada’s political parties is largely defined by the large, defined ill- and geographically dispersed selectorate. The first characteristic of leadership campaigns is that they are relatively lengthy and open affairs, particularly when compared to those in other parliamentary systems. When the leadership franchise is restricted to parliamentarians, elections are often defined as secretive and quick. Challengers to a leader often sur- reptitiously organise and launch a surprise attack resulting in a vote within days of the challenge becoming public (Cross and Blais 2012a). Even when transitions are managed, such as in the event of the incumbent’s voluntary retirement, parties selecting their leader in the party room typically choose the successor in a short time frame, with a campaign often lasting no longer than a week or two. The broader selectorate in the Canadian case, coupled with its ill-defined and fluid nature, makes this impossible. The formal period for leadership campaigns typically runs between six and ten months while the campaign often begins much earlier. 182 W.P. Cross Leadership elections in the Canadian parties regularly include electorates approaching or exceeding 100,000 voters (numbers participating in Canadian leadership campaigns can be found in Cross and Crysler 2009). This poses a significant administrative challenge to the political party as, in the absence of state regulation, it is responsible for the organisation, funding and operation of the contest itself. It obviously takes some time for the party to put in place the apparatus necessary to conduct such a large-scale election. The objective of using the leadership election to expand the party’s membership also leads to a longer campaign. Candidates often spend six months or longer on this part of the campaign. The necessity for candidates to communicate with, and attempt to win the support of, voters living thousands of miles apart and spanning six time zones also affects the nature of the campaign. First, it is impossible to put together the organisation to run such a campaign in a hurry. Leadership candidates often spend years in advance of the contest cultivating support at the grassroots level, identifying key supporters in each constituency who will chair their local efforts, meeting with fundraisers who will help bankroll their campaign and putting together a team of campaign professionals. There are many cases of parliamentarians and other would-be candidates who begin to test the leadership waters near the official start of a campaign only to discover that better-organised colleagues have already recruited and locked-up the support of all the key organisers and thus they never officially enter the contest. The need to communicate with tens of thousands of dispersed party members also means that these are public campaigns. While leadership candidates can privately meet and talk with their parliamentary colleagues this is not possible when the electorate includes all party members. Candidates spend months travel- ling the country meeting with groups of party members. They also mail campaign literature to members and seek out as much publicity as possible in the broadcast media. All of this makes leadership campaigns in Canadian parties costly affairs. In a comprehensive examination of this issue, Cross and Crysler (2011) show that candidates in the major parties routinely spend millions of dollars on their leadership campaigns. It is suggested that Liberal Paul Martin spent close to nine million dollars on his efforts to secure the leadership in the run-up to the party’s 2003 contest. Prior to 2004 there was no regulation of spending in these contests other than that imposed by the parties themselves. This meant that different parties took different approaches and that the same party sometimes imposed different rules from one contest to the next. Some required disclosure of amounts spent as well as the identity of contributors while others did not. Some parties set a cap on expenditures but Cross and Crysler (2009) suggest that these limits were often surpassed with no repercussions for the violating campaigns. The key point here is that any rules that were set were enforced (or not) by the parties themselves and parties had very limited enforcement capacity and perhaps even less desire to publically penalise their own leadership candidates. Disclosure of rules violations typically occurred after the leadership vote and any party would Party leaders in Canada 183 be hard-pressed at this stage to reprimand their new leader or one of his main opponents who may now be serving in another position of leadership in the party. Criticism of this essential free-for-all in leadership campaign spending resulted in public regulation of the financing of these contests enacted for the first time in 2004. The new legislation requires disclosure of contributions and allows only modest contributions from voters (not unions or corporations) (see Cross and Crysler 2011 for a detailed discussion of the financing of leadership campaigns). The legislation does not prescribe a limit on campaign expenditures, but experience thus far suggests that the strict contribution rules significantly limit candidates’ ability to raise the amounts spent in earlier contests. Candidates in the 2006 Liberal election spent considerably less than major candidates in earlier contests (particularly when adjusted for inflation) and complained that the new rules made fundraising much more difficult. Among the key campaign events are candidate debates organised by the party. Every party organises a series of debates, typically held in different parts of the country and televised nationally, that allow party members (and all voters) to view and hear from the candidates. In many ways, these campaigns are now similar to those run by parties in general elections only they last considerably longer. One result of this is that candidates put together campaign ‘entourages’ for their leadership election including policy specialists, organisers, fundraisers, media specialists, image consultants and more. This group of political professionals and party activists often form a core group around the candidate and accompany a new leader to senior positions in the party’s electoral and organisational apparatus (Noel 2007). One result of this is a personalisation of the party around the leader as these individuals come to their positions because of their relationship with the leader, owe their primary loyalty to him and often leave when his tenure ends. In terms of considering what drives voter behaviour in these contests it is unfortunate that we do not have survey data of voters in these elections at the federal level. We do, however, know several things. First, many of the participants are recruited to the party for the sole purpose of voting in the leadership contest. These new members are recruited by particular candidates and it can be assumed that many are largely immune to what subsequently happens in the campaign and will vote for the candidate who recruited them. This is supported by the fact that the candidate who manages to recruit the largest number of voters typically wins these contests. It also appears that policy positions of the candidates matter to voters but only in a general sense. In the Liberal party, for example, there often has been a cleavage between candidates seen as representing the centre-right and those from the centre-left. Thus when John Turner defeated Jean Chrétien in 1984, Turner was believed to have been supported by those on the pro-business side of the party. When Chrétien defeated Paul Martin for the leadership six years later, this was a victory for those more in the centre and centre-left of the party. As these are intra-party contests, these cleavages are very general in nature and it is rare for a leadership contest to be defined by con- crete policy differences among the candidates. 184 W.P. Cross An example of this is provided by the 2012 NDP leadership vote. The issue that defined the contest was whether the party should in some way undergo internal reform (and ideological moderation) to present itself to voters as a potential governing party or continue to operate as an opposition party committed to its social democratic roots. While this issue divided the candidates it did not take the form of specific policy debates but rather remained at the more notional level relating to party strategy rather than focusing on specific areas of policy differentiation among the candidates. In the place of policy differences, much attention is given to the electoral strengths of the leadership candidates. As leaders have become the central players in general election campaigns, for many party members the campaign strengths of the candidates are key considerations in leadership selection. Can- didates emphasise what they perceive to be their strengths in leading the party into the next general election. This sometimes manifests itself in consideration of a would-be leader’s ability to win votes in the country’s many different regions. Thus, an ability to campaign effectively in both French and English is now a must for leaders of the three parties that run candidates nationally. There are many examples of candidates (and would-be candidates) who have seen their leadership campaigns fizzle because of an inability to communicate effectively in both official languages (see Cross 2004: 100). Leadership elections in Canada are typically competitive events. When we eliminate those automatic New Democratic contests that resulted in acclamations, we are left with 29 leadership selections in the major parties. In these 29 elections, the average number of candidates was 4.8 and only four of them resulted in acclamations (and two of these were the selection of the initial leaders of the Reform/Canadian Alliance and the Bloc Québécois parties). For the 25 contested elections the mean number of candidates is 5.4. As illustrated in Table 12.2, in two-thirds of the contested elections, there were five or more candidates.3 We find no difference between selection at delegate conventions and selection through member votes in terms of the number of candidates. While some have hypothesised that the movement to member votes might discourage some would-be candidates because of the need for more campaign funds and larger campaign organisation, we find, as shown in Table 12.2, that so far they have on average attracted the same number of candidates as did earlier contests. Table 12.2 shows that the vote spread between the top two candidates on the first ballot is significantly smaller in membership votes than for all contested elections. This too suggests that these contests are no less competitive than were selections at party conferences. The competitiveness of these contests is also illustrated by the fact that in two-thirds of contested elections, no candidate received majority support on the first ballot, necessitating a second round of voting (or counting in preferential contests). Many leaders have won on the fourth or fifth ballot including Liberals Trudeau and Dion, Conservatives Stanfield, Clark and Mulroney, and New Democrats Broadbent, McLaughlin and Mulcair. This is a list that spans parties and covers the complete timeframe from 1965 to 2012. One result of this is that Table 12.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Canada (1965–2012)

All leadership contests Full member vote contests only

Number of candidates Percentage of elections Number of elections Number of candidates Percentage of elections Number of elections

1 13.8 4 1 0 0 2 13.8 4 2 0 0 3 10.3 3 3 28.6 2 4 3.4 1 4 14.3 1 5 or more 58.6 17 5 or more 57.1 5

Average number 4.8 candidates Average number 5.0 candidates N 29 N 8 Margin between top 22.9 Margin between top 11.8 two finishers1 two finishers1 N 25 N 8

Note 1 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested constests only. 186 W.P. Cross dark-horse candidates who trail on first ballots are occasionally able to receive majority support and win several ballots later. Stéphane Dion and Joe Clark are both examples of candidates finishing third on the first ballot who ultimately won on a fourth ballot.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders Canada has had only one female prime minister, Conservative Kim Campbell. This is directly related to the low number of female party leaders as prime minsters need first win a party leadership. The Conservatives have chosen only one female leader, the Liberals and Bloc none and the New Democrats two. Overall, as illustrated in Table 12.3, this represents less than 12 per cent of party leaders chosen since 1965. It is also worth noting that all three female leaders were chosen at party conventions at which rules were in place to ensure a set number of delegate positions were allocated to women. There are no such rules relating to gender representation in every-member votes and not a single female candidate has been successful in any of the membership votes held to date at the federal level. The pool of potential leaders is not restricted to parliamentarians. Of the 27 leaders included in this analysis, ten were not MPs at the time of their selection. Four of these leaders were former MPs but had been out of parliament for some years before being chosen as leader. Six others had never served in parliament (Conservatives Stanfield and Mulroney, New Democrats McDonough and Layton and Reform/Canadian Alliance leaders Manning and Day). To some extent this may reflect career patterns in a federal state. Half of the leaders who had not previously served in parliament were senior elected officials in their provincial legislatures. However, the fact that ten of the 27 were not MPs when chosen probably also results from having a broader selectorate. When party members and convention delegates make the choice it is likely that they are more willing to look beyond the narrow confines of the parliamentary group to find a preferred leader than when MPs make the choice themselves.

Table 12.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Canada (1965–2012)

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Entire period

Percentage women 0 0 25 25 0 11.1 Average age (in years) 51 46 49 50 53 50.3 Percentage without political 50 0 50 13 20 22.2 seniority1 Average tenure (in years) 12.4 8.7 8.8 6.3 2.72 6.25 N 2 3 4 8 10 27

Notes 1 Seniority means that the leader has national legislative or executive experience at the time of selection. 2 Leaders who remain in office as of post-2012 are excluded. Three leaders had their term end when their parties’ merged, when they are excluded this number increases to 3.3 years. Party leaders in Canada 187 The length of a leader’s tenure in office varies dramatically. While the mean tenure is just over six years, as shown in Table 12.3, this ranges from Pierre Tru- deau’s more than 16 years as leader to Kim Campbell’s seven months. To a large extent this is correlated with a leader’s electoral record. For example, Campbell led the Conservatives to their worst-ever defeat while the Liberals won four of five elections fought under Trudeau’s leadership. Measuring electoral success is not always easy as it can have different meanings for different parties at different times. For example, NDP leader Ed Broadbent was able to remain in the top job for 174 months despite not achieving an electoral breakthrough for his party. His best showing was in the 1988 campaign when his party won its highest-ever number of parliamentary seats. Yet, this was seen as a disappointing result for the party and Broadbent was subject to internal criticism as the NDP entered the campaign with the strong possibility of finishing in second place and winning twice as many seats as it ultimately did. One thing that is clear is that most leaders resign the leadership under pressure to do so (Cross and Blais 2011). There are 24 leaders selected after 1965 whose leadership tenure ended by 2012. Of these, four lost their leadership due to a force majeure (Layton died and Manning, McKay and Harper all had their parties merge or otherwise transform in a manner requiring a new leadership contest). Of the remaining 20 leaders, no more than one-third can be said to have truly retired from the leadership of their own accord. It is difficult to classify whether or not resignations are voluntary as most leaders are constantly under some pressure from those in the party who prefer someone else in the position. Nonetheless, our coding is generous towards the voluntary classification. Many of those who resigned under pressure did so in the immediate aftermath of a very disappointing election result. They may have been able to stay on for a short while, but opposition in their party was sure to grow should they have tried to do so (examples being Martin, Ignatieff and Duceppe). The best form of job security for a party leader is to win elections.

Conclusion Party leaders are perhaps the most important figures in Canadian politics. They form the very small pool from among whom voters choose a prime minister and leader of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition. Both of these individuals are central figures in Canadian democracy. The lack of public regulation of leadership elections has resulted in parties experimenting with many different forms of selection. Canada’s parties were pioneers among their Westminster counterparts in expanding the leadership selectorate to include activists from outside the parliamentary party. First through delegated conventions and now through membership votes, the parties have taken an inclusive approach to participation in these contests. As the parties have increasingly made participation in these contests easier, requiring no real commitment to the party and essentially allowing almost anyone who wishes to do so to vote, it is worth asking what it means to call 188 W.P. Cross these ‘party’ affairs. They are organised by the parties with almost no state regulation, but participation, and thus potentially control over outcomes, is open to many from outside the party. In recent contests long-term party members have seen their influence overwhelmed by the tens of thousands of new members recruited for the sole purpose of voting in one of these contests. As one former party leader charged, these contests are often hijacked by ‘tourists’ to the party. In many ways, Canadian leadership contests have come to resemble US-style primaries. This is not necessarily a bad thing as it opens participation in a key democratic decision to virtually everyone wanting to participate. It does, however, raise issues relating to the integrity of the political party and of the meaning and value of party membership. It also raises the real possibility of the selection of leaders who have little experience in the party and sparse support among their party’s parliamentary group. This runs counter to the Westminster tradition of leaders being selected by and from among a party’s parliamentarians. The newer methods may appear more democratic but they certainly raise new and challenging issues relating to the practice of parliamentary democracy and to the political party as a meaningful institution.

Notes 1 This occurred before any of the party’s had formal ‘review’ processes and resulted from a protracted struggle between Diefenbaker and party president Dalton Camp. The organisational party ultimately launched a leadership contest which Diefenbaker contested as the incumbent. He was badly defeated finishing a distant fifth place on the convention’s first ballot. 2 Clark contested the ensuing leadership election, losing in a close contest to Brian Mulroney. 3 Details for all of these contests can be found in the online appendix to this book at: www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415704168/. 13 Leadership selection in Australia

Anika Gauja

Introduction This chapter presents an analysis of how leaders are selected (both appointed and removed) in Australian political parties. The four political parties that won the largest respective first preference vote shares in the 2010 federal election are included in the analysis: the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the Liberal Party, the National Party and the Australian Greens. However, in order to fully evaluate leadership selection in Australia, the chapter also includes the Australian Demo- crats – a political party that existed from 1977 to 2008 with representation in the federal Senate. Although the party has now ceased to exist as a significant political force, as the chapter will illustrate, the Democrats’ leadership selection processes were unique amongst Australian parties and played an important role in shaping the leadership selection rules of the other parties in the Australian system. Australian party leadership contests have been described as operating on ‘a Darwinian scale unmatched elsewhere in the Western parliamentary democracies’ (Davis 1998: 172) and criticised for producing an elitist and unstable system, in which ‘the relentless focus on personal and factional politics and the ugly succession struggles it generates do little to enhance the parties’ waning ties with their partisans’ (Bynander and ’t Hart 2007: 70). While some of these criti- cisms may be overstated, Australia does present an interesting case for comparative analysis in the frequency and ease with which party leaders are appointed and removed. Furthermore, in contrast to the trend apparent in many established democracies, leadership selection processes in Australian political parties have remained remarkably constant over time. Since 1965, there has been no push to grant selection rights to party members and/or supporters, and the selection of the party leader remains firmly in the hands of the parliamentary party group. The chapter explores some of the reasons for this stasis and the ways in which this rule stability is inextricably linked to the dynamics of the Australian leadership contest. 190 A. Gauja Who is the party leader? The task of identifying the leader in most Australian political parties is relatively straightforward – it is largely taken for granted that the leader of the party is the person who is the leader of the parliamentary party group. He or she is the public face of the party on an everyday basis; has control over its parliamentary business and personnel; is largely responsible for the development and legislative adoption of party policy; and is the authoritative voice of the party during election campaigns. From a functional perspective, therefore, there is a unity between the parliamentary and organisational party leaderships (see Cross and Blais 2012a: 5–6, 2012b: 134). However, an examination of the formal rules and constitutions of Australian parties reveals a more complex picture. Consistent with the archetypal mass- party model, Australian party constitutions typically separate the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary arms of the party organisation, and in doing so create two leadership positions: the parliamentary leader and the organisational leader (termed, for example, the national president in the ALP and the Demo- crats, and the federal president in the Liberal Party and Nationals). Writing in the late 1970s, Starr et al. argued that these positions were distinct, and that the relationship between them ultimately reflected the character of the individuals who occupied them, and the ‘relative strengths and weaknesses of the two incumbents’ (1978: 39). Nonetheless, despite the potential for conflict between the president and leader to occur, Starr et al. noted that the pattern of dominance tended to rest with the parliamentary leader (1978: 40). Beyond the personalities of the leaders themselves, a number of institutional factors serve to reinforce the dominance of the parliamentary party (and its leader) today. Well documented as a consequence of the evolution of party organisational structures, these pressures include the superior (monetary and staffing) resources that flow to the party in public office and, in particular, the leaders’ office, from the state and the focus on the parliamentary leader as the key figurehead in a national campaigning strategy (see for example Katz and Mair 2002: 122–6). The practical dominance of the parliamentary party is also reinforced by the lack of detail in party rules and constitutions as to the respective roles and functions that the president and parliamentary leader are expected to fulfil. For example, the National Constitution of the ALP stipulates little more than administrative functions for the president – such as chairing Conference and meetings of the National Executive, and carrying out any other duties referred to him or her by the national executive of the party (Article 9c). The constitution is completely silent on the role of the leader of the federal parliamentary party. Within the Liberal Party the leadership positions within both the federal party organisation and the parliamentary party are kept organisationally distinct, but close cooperation is expected between these two arms: ‘It shall be the duty of the Parliamentary Party and of the Organisation to keep one another informed on all political matters and to co-operate closely’, with regular meetings between the leader of the Federal Parliamentary Party and the federal president (Article 53). Party leaders in Australia 191 However, as the ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the determination and revision of party policy is vested in the parliamentary party (Article 57), the position of the organisational leader is reduced to secondary importance. Hence while we may observe a formal constitutional separation of leadership positions within Austral- ian political parties, the everyday practice of politics points to a fusion of these roles (see Heidar and Koole 2000: 258) and to the parliamentary party leader as the ‘leader’ of the party. Finally, it is worth noting the case of the Australian Greens. Consistent with the early organisational ethos of many green parties in Western Europe, the Aus- tralian Greens began their life without a constitutionally articulated leadership position – a conscious omission designed to mitigate against centralising and elitist tendencies within the party (Miragliotta 2006: 589). However, at the 2005 National Conference, the party passed a motion allowing the parliamentary party the freedom to elect its own leader. Shortly thereafter, the parliamentary party elected Senator Bob Brown as it leader. Although the power of the position was heavily qualified with respect to the extra-parliamentary party organisation – while the leader could speak for the party publicly, he or she had no other rights or authority within it (Jackson 2011: 125) – Brown’s position was widely interpreted as being that of the ‘de facto leader of the Greens’ and simply formalised what was perceived to be existing practice (Jackson 2011: 189–92, Miragliotta 2006: 592). The Greens’ adoption of a formal leadership position in 2005 further reflects what is consistent practice amongst Australian political parties. As such, in the analysis that follows, the position of federal parliamentary party leader is equated with the position of ‘party leader’.

Rules organising leadership selection With the exception of the Australian Democrats, political parties in Australia have been overwhelmingly consistent (both amongst themselves and over time) in how the party leader is selected and removed. Figure 13.1 and Table 13.1 illustrate the range of rules used by the five main Australian parties, which for the Labor, Liberal, National and Green parties are formulated by the parliamentary party and can typically only be found in the party-room rules. These are not public documents. Since 1965 there has been no change in any of the formal leadership selection rules used by the Australian political parties, although as Cross and Blais (2012a: 65) report, there is some flexibility in the process by virtue of the fact that the parliamentary party group retains the prerogative over rule-making: ‘leadership politics are governed by the norms and traditions of the party room as they exist at any point in time’. The leadership selection and removal rules as of 2012 are as follows. In the Liberal, Labor, National and Green parties, the party leader is selected exclusively by the parliamentary party group, which comprises parliamentarians from both houses of the federal parliament (the House of Representatives and the Senate). Compared with the overall size of the party membership, in absolute terms this is a very small selectorate: as of 2012, the size of the Labor parliamentary party was 192 A. Gauja

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

ALP (1965) Liberal Party (1965) National Party (1965) Greens (2005) Democrats (1977–2008)

Figure 13.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate in Australia (1965–2012).

103, the Liberals 89, the Nationals 16 and the Greens 10. Candidacy for leadership contests is restricted to members of the parliamentary party, who self- nominate for the position.1 The mechanism that triggers any leadership election in these parties is called the ‘spill motion’ (a motion to declare any or all of the leadership positions vacant). A spill motion can be moved at any time in a meeting of the parliamentary party and no particular challengers need to be named. A successful motion needs to be moved, seconded and supported by a majority of the parliamentary party. Therefore as readily as the parliamentary party group can select a leader, it can also remove him or her. As the following section illustrates, Australian party leaders are particularly vulnerable to removal attempts. Apart from a spill motion, a federal election will automatically trigger a leadership contest, with the party rooms meeting as soon as practicable after an election result is known to formally re-endorse the incumbent, or select a new leader. As a consequence, the term of leadership in all Australian parties (including the Democrats) is tied to the length of the electoral cycle, which effectively creates a limit of three years, although there is no limit on the number of terms a leader can serve. Australian parliamentary party groups use one of two electoral systems to select their leaders: the alternative vote and elimination ballots. The former system, in which voters rank candidates in order of preference and these are distributed in a single ballot, is used in the Australian Labor Party. It is also used by the Greens in the event that a decision by consensus cannot be reached. If a ballot to select the Labor leader is tied, convention dictates that the name of the winner will be drawn from a hat. In the case of the Greens, the party room keeps voting until the deadlock is resolved with 24 hour breaks in between votes (Party Room Rule 6). Sequential elimination ballots, in which the lowest ranked Table 13.1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Australia (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years)1 Voting rule Deselection

Australian Labor Party Parliamentary caucus 3 Alternative Vote Parliamentary caucus Liberal Party Parliamentary caucus 3 Elimination ballot Parliamentary caucus National Party Parliamentary caucus 3 Elimination ballot Parliamentary caucus Greens Parliamentary caucus 3 Consensus; if this cannot be Parliamentary caucus achieved then an alternative vote Democrats2 Party members 3 Alternative Vote Parliamentary caucus; or party organ (National Executive); or 100 members

Notes 1 The leader’s term is tied to the electoral cycle in Australia, which is three years. 2 The party lost parliamentary representation in 2008, information for illustrative purposes only. 194 A. Gauja candidates are progressively eliminated before new ballots take place, are used by the National and Liberal party groupings. However, as the next section of the chapter will illustrate, second rounds are used only rarely as in the bulk of contests the main contender is elected unopposed, or obtains a majority in the first round. It is important to note that in Australia, the administration of leadership ballots is an internal party affair rather than a public event. With the exception of the Democrats, who articulate their selection rules in the party’s national constitution, the procedures for leadership selection and removal can only be found in party-room rules, which are not publicly distributed. Contests are not regulated by the state, or by the extra-parliamentary party organisation, and no campaign support is provided to candidates. Accurate records of party-room votes are usually not kept, nor officially reported. Rather, ballots are ‘traditionally destroyed immediately after the count and memories, many years later, have faded on such detail’ (Davey 2010: 270). Hence, while every effort has been made to accurately report the processes and results of these contests, some information is inevitably missing and the data that have been assembled relies, in part, on the subjective accounts of the participants involved. Beyond the formal party rules, informal influences come to bear upon the selection process from a variety of different party stakeholders, including activists, factions, affiliated organisations and the media. For example, on the eve of the challenge to Howard’s deputy leadership of the Liberal Party in 1985 and his consequent election to leader, Howard received a phone call from Australian media mogul Kerry Packer, who reportedly asked: ‘Sport, is there anything I can do for you?’ (Howard 2010: 151). More recently, Labor frontbencher Anthony Albanese consulted with his local party in choosing to back Kevin Rudd in the February 2012 challenge to Julia Gillard’s leadership (Albanese 2012). As Laing and ’t Hart (2011: 111) note, when adopting leadership selection and removal rules, political parties need to balance considerations of stability with the flexibility to remove unpopular or unsuitable leaders, and give thought to the degree of inclusiveness in who should make these decisions. The formal rules of the Labor, Liberal, National and Green parties indicate that Australian parties favour flexibility over stability in leadership, and restrict decision-making in this arena to a comparatively exclusive selectorate. In turn, these decisions and rules have important consequences for the dynamics of leadership contests, and who is selected (see next two sections). One of the most interesting questions, from a comparative perspective, is why these rules have not changed over time. While many democracies are experien cing a general trend towards more inclusive leadership selection processes over time (Cross and Blais 2012b: 133; Kenig 2009a), this is not reflected at all in these four parties, which have not altered their selection mechanisms in any significant manner since 1965. While some of the catalysts that have precipitated reform in comparable systems have been present in Australian parties, for example, electoral defeats and sustained periods of opposition, these have generally been addressed by Australian parties by the removal of the leader rather than reform of the selection processes used to appoint him or her. Party leaders in Australia 195 Cross and Blais (2012a: 55–7, 2011: 152) have suggested a number of reasons for this institutional stasis. The first reason given to these authors by Australian party elites in interviews is the length of the electoral cycle, which does not allow time for a protracted contest. Yet, as Cross and Blais (2012a: 56) argue, it is not an entirely convincing explanation for the fact that the average electoral cycle is not that much shorter in Australia than in other Westminster systems. If avoiding uncertainty is the underlying rationale, then there is little to suggest that the current method of leadership selection in these parties, which can encourage high turnover and ample speculation in the weeks before a formal challenge, fares much better in achieving this aim. Another source of stability could come from the nature of the Australian electoral system, which provides an element of continuous regional representation in the party caucus, even in the aftermath of a significant electoral setback. Missing from the Australian context, this was one of the key catalysts for reform in other Westminster systems: ‘reformers argued that the parliamentary party was too narrow and geographically unrepresentative to be charged exclusively with leadership selection’ (Cross and Blais 2011: 152). Perhaps the main reason has been the absence of a positive model of leadership selection reform that has acted to prompt other Australian parties to adopt those methods. The experience of the Australian Democrats, which acted as a negative rather than a positive exemplar, is highly relevant here. In contrast to the selection processes described above, all members of the Australian Democrats had the right to choose the party’s parliamentary leaders – a practice that was seen as a ‘fundamental part of the party’s participatory democracy ethos’ and reflecting the organisational principles of the ‘new politics’ movement (Australian Democrats 2003: 51). As a new political party (established in 1977), the Democrats used inclusive leadership selection procedures to distinguish themselves from their political rivals. Individual party members elected the party leader by a postal ballot, which was held both in the event of a leadership spill (see below) and as soon as practicable after each federal election. The method of election was by alternative vote. Democrats’ Senators nominated themselves as candidates, and in the event that only one nomination was received, a ratification ballot was held to endorse the candidate. In terms of removing the party leader, the Democrats’ processes also differed considerably from their counterparts. A spill of the Democrats’ leadership could be occasioned in one of three ways: either by an absolute majority vote of the parliamentary party group; by an absolute majority vote of the National Execu- tive (the extra-parliamentary party’s governing group); or by a petition of 100 members. Leadership spills were initiated by membership petition in two instances: in 1991 to successfully remove Janet Powell and again in 2000 in attempt to remove Meg Lees, who survived with 81 per cent support from those who voted in the ballot (see Gauja 2005: 77). Both these challenges caused serious acrimony within the party and within a year of each challenge both Powell and Lees had resigned from the party to sit as Independents in the Senate. 196 A. Gauja An internal review into the Democrats’ party organisation commissioned in 2003 noted the potentially destabilising effect of these provisions. One submission to the review commented that ‘it is staggering that for an expenditure of just $5,000 in terms of signing up 100 new members, any lobby could force a vacancy on the party leadership’ (Australian Democrats 2003: 51). A second source of instability and animosity was created when the popularly elected parliamentary leader did not enjoy the support of the party room. This occurred in 2002 when Natasha Stott Despoja (who was elected by the membership over Meg Lees with 70 per cent of the vote) was forced to resign as leader in the culmination of three years of party-room infighting concerning the treatment of her opponent. The review noted support for switching to a vote of the parliamentary party, but also noted that participation in leadership ballots was the most popular amongst members (when compared to constitutional and policy ballots). It recommended raising the threshold for a membership spill from 100 members to 10–20 per cent of the membership: ‘the threshold needs to be such that genuine and widespread dissatisfaction by the members can be acted on, while at the same time the Leaders are spared from small groups of dissenting members undermining their leadership’ (Australian Democrats 2003: 51). It also recommended that endorsements from fellow parliamentarians be included on candidates’ supporting statements to signal to the membership more clearly that the candidate enjoyed the support of the parliamentary party. Ultimately what the Democrats’ procedure attempted to balance, but could not ultimately resolve, was the dual function of the party leader as a manager of the party room and as a representative of the party. The potentially differing selectorates for the election and removal of the leader posed difficulties for the focus of responsiveness and accountability, and the election mechanisms attracted criticism from some parliamentarians as simply being unworkable:

Party members as a group can never be as informed as a party room will be about a leader or potential leader’s all round capabilities and judgement . . . if a leader is imposed on a party room against that party room’s judgement that will obviously produce problems, whatever the merits of the new leader. (Murray 2002)

Even some members of the Democrats were not entirely sure of the value of the leadership selection procedures. In an internal party ballot of members conducted in 1992, members were asked ‘how strongly’ they felt about their right to have secret ballots of parliamentary leadership positions. 53 per cent of respond- ents felt that the leadership selection ballot ‘must stay’, 24 per cent felt that it ‘should stay’, 8 per cent were ‘not fussy’, 10 per cent felt that it ‘should change’, and 3 per cent felt that it ‘must change’ (Australian Democrats 1992: 12). Although the ballot revealed majority support for the procedures, the proportion in agreement with the conduct of leadership ballots (77 per cent) was on average Party leaders in Australia 197 10 per cent lower than for membership ballots on party policy (87 per cent), office bearers (88 per cent) and candidate selection (87 per cent). Whether well-founded or not, throughout their history the Democrats were subjected to labels such as ‘fairies at the bottom of the garden’, and the experience of the party’s internal mechanisms was perceived by the others as creating chaos and instability, to the extent that ‘the more inclusive selection rules were widely portrayed by leaders in other parties as partially responsible for organisational chaos and ultimately the electoral demise of the party’ (Cross and Blais 2012a: 57). One final factor that may explain the pattern of continuity in leadership selection methods is the role of factions in the process. This is a dynamic that is not revealed (or acknowledged) in the rules of the party room, nonetheless, other sources of data which reveal something of a party’s internal workings (party histories, memoirs, media reports etc.) suggest that factions do play a central role. For example, convention in the ALP has dictated that leadership positions are allocated according to factional strength, with the dominant faction in the parliamentary party claiming the leadership position for one of its own. By the same token, as the forced resignation of Kevin Rudd as leader of the Labor Party in June 2010 illustrated, a loss of factional support could also bring about the downfall of a leader. Factional politics, particularly in the Labor Party is so inti- mately tied to leadership and cabinet selection that for factions to lose the ability to distribute positions in this manner would be a significant blow to their organisational dominance. It seems highly unlikely that factional groupings would support moves to more inclusive leadership selectorates, particularly where this requires constitutional change.

Dynamics of party leadership contests Leadership campaigns in Australia are conducted very quickly, by virtue of the fact that the selectorate (the parliamentary party) is relatively small and that methods for election and removal are fluid and relatively easy to achieve. In the Australian context, it is therefore both more intuitive and illustrative to speak of leadership removal and selection as part of the same event, particularly where there is a spontaneous contest (that is, one not brought about by a predetermined post-election spill). Often a vote will occur within days, or even hours, of a challenge being announced. However, this tight timeframe often obscures the many weeks of behind the scenes planning and manoeuvring that occurs as challengers ‘gather the numbers’ – privately campaigning amongst their party-room colleagues. The degree of secrecy varies: in some cases, incumbents may not even know of the existence of a challenge until moments before the actual contest. As John Howard recalled of the challenge mounted by Andrew Peacock for the Liberal Party leadership:

The coup against me had been well planned to take place at a routine party meeting. I did not know about it until confronted by Andrew Peacock, Fred 198 A. Gauja Chaney and Austin Lewis (leader and deputy Senate leader respectively) in my office the night before, and was therefore denied any chance to organise in my own defence. Peacock won convincingly by a vote of 44 to 27. (Howard 2010: 180)

On the same day (9 May 1989) a simultaneous coup was mounted in the Nation- als’ party room, which saw Charles Blunt take over the leadership from Ian Sin- clair in a meeting that lasted for two hours. As Davey (2010: 269) notes, ‘not everyone was aware of the impending spill as they gathered in the party room’. One parliamentarian, Ian Cameron, who only found out moments before the meeting ‘got up and told them they were a pack of bastards – this was not the way we worked’ (cited in Davey 2010: 269). In other instances, the candidate who is ultimately selected as the party leader might not be responsible for coordinating or orchestrating the challenge. For example when Mark Latham was elected leader of the ALP in November 2003, it was a group of factional powerbrokers including John Faulkner and Martin Ferguson who gave deposed leader, Simon Crean, the ‘tap on the shoulder’ (see Latham 2005: 245–54). These examples of the secrecy, speed and often indirect ways by which leadership challenges and campaigns are conducted also highlight the ways in which they are used as strategic rather than simply instrumental tools to gain political influence. As Weller (1994: 141) argues, leadership challenges do not necessarily have to be victorious in order to be effective. When Paul Keating challenged Hawke for the Labor leadership in June 1991 he lost (40 per cent of the vote to Hawke’s 60 per cent). However, Keating came close enough to challenge again six months later, and in the meantime his supporters worked within the parliamentary party to destabilise Hawke’s leadership both inside and outside cabinet (Weller 1994: 141). As previously noted, leadership campaigns in the Labor, Liberal, National and Green parties are internal party-room affairs, and as such they are not regulated by the state nor is there any specific regulation of the campaign in party- room rules beyond a specification of the selection mechanism. There isno financial cost involved as the type of canvassing undertaken usually consists of personal meetings and phone calls to members of the party room. While these machinations have traditionally taken place behind closed doors, in recent years parliamentarians appear to be more open to declaring their allegiance to a particular candidate in the public arena through press statements, interviews and most recently, social media such as Twitter. In the lead up to the February 2012 Labor leadership vote, the majority of Labor’s 103 parliamentarians had publicly declared their support for their preferred candidate in one of these ways (The Sun Herald, Sydney, 4 March 2012: 4). The relationship between media coverage and leadership campaigns in Australia is quite complex and often symbiotic, with actors using media leaks to begin leadership challenges, for example, the campaign against Labor leader Simon Crean only became known to the public and the majority of the Labor caucus after it was reported on a television news Party leaders in Australia 199 bulletin (Latham 2005: 246). Media coverage, particularly where allegiances and preferences are publicly reported can actively frame a contest, working to install favourites. Again, the exception to the typical party-room campaign is the Australian Democrats. The individual member ballot takes longer than the caucus method used by the other parties, usually lasting around six to eight weeks as nominations must be declared, ballots and candidate materials sent to members, returned (within a month), and the result tallied. This process has attracted criticism from media commentators and academics (for example, Economou and Ghazarian 2008; Sugita 1995) for being ‘overly cumbersome’, for exacerbating divisiveness and effectively leaving the party leaderless (Warhurst and Tate 1998: 5–6). While this may have been one of the factors prompting other parties not to copy the Democrats’ example, Warhurst and Tate (1998: 6) argue that during this period an acting leader is appointed, and there is nothing to suggest that the process itself would cause a level of acrimony that would not have otherwise existed. In all Australian parties, both electoral popularity and policy issues play into leadership selections, but which of these is emphasised more (if at all) depends upon the individual contest. For example, the rivalry between Andrew Peacock and John Howard during the 1980s in the Liberal Party, by Howard’s account, was borne of differences in policy emphasis and direction. Howard was ‘determined that the Coalition should take a more consistent pro-market approach’ (Howard 2010: 141). Similarly, after the party’s defeat at the 2007 federal election, the ensuing Liberal leadership contest between Brendan Nelson and Malcolm Turnbull (which Nelson won by just three votes) was depicted as a division in the party room between ‘those still loyal to policy lines identified with Howard, and those arguing for fresh beginnings’ (Brett 2010: 243). By contrast, the removal of Kevin Rudd as Labor leader in 2010 was orchestrated after the former leader’s popularity sank in public opinion polls. A similar fate awaited Democrats’ Senator John Coulter, under whose leadership the party polled only 3.8 per cent in the 1993 election, its lowest figure since 1977 (Bean 1997: 83–4). Interacting with policy and personality issues in Australian leadership campaigns are two other important factors: factional support and parliamentary party management. Although the election of the leader by the federal parliamentary party simply requires majority support, scholars analysing the Labor Party agree that how this support is gained revolves strongly around the system of factional politics that is in place within the party (Miragliotta et al. 2010: 220; Economou 2010: 22; Lucy 1985: 133–5). The factions are instrumental in distributing leadership positions with the party – including the leader – and the Keating– Hawke leadership spill and the selection of Kim Beazley rather than Kevin Rudd following the resignation of Mark Latham in January 2005 have been attributed to factional influences (see for example, Weller 1994: 137). Conversely, the elections of Latham and later Rudd to the party leadership are cited as examples where factional influence was suppressed (see for example, Economou 2010: 200 A. Gauja 223). While the salience of factions in shaping the dynamics of the leadership contest and the distribution of positions is more prevalent in Labor, it is also present in Liberal contests, although factional allegiances tend to revolve more around transient policy issues and personalities, rather than institutionalised cleavages. In 2009, the victory of challenger Tony Abbott over incumbent Malcolm Turnbull was in part a contest over climate change policy, but it also signalled the dominance of the ‘neo-liberal conservative’ wing of the party. A final consideration that is brought into the play by the nature of the selectorate is a leader’s popularity within the parliamentary party, and his or her leadership style and managerial competence. These were key considerations in the 2010 coup against Kevin Rudd, whose leadership style was alleged to be ‘abrasive and apparently autocratic’,2 and a dominant reason he was again defeated in a challenge to return to the party’s leadership in February 2012. As the Democrats’ experience illustrates (particularly the downfalls of former leaders Powell and Stott Despoja) this management capacity becomes even more important where a leader’s authority may not derive from the same individuals that he/she has to lead on an everyday basis – if the leader is wholly selected by the party’s members but must work with and maintain the continuing confidence of the parliamentary party. It is also made all the more difficult by the fact that Australian party leaders must deal with their predecessors and cabinet members who have previously worked against them, and who may continue to reside in the parliamentary party for years, for example Menzies, Fraser and Peacock. As Bynander and ’t Hart (2007: 70) argue, these ‘unholy alliances are imposed on incumbents by political necessities’ – Labor’s factionalism and the Liberals’ per- sonalistic groupings. Turning to the level of competition in party leadership contests, Table 13.2 depicts the average number and distribution of candidates in Australian party leadership contests. For all contests between 1965 and 2012, the average number of candidates in each contest was 1.6. The majority of ballots (58 per cent) were conducted with a single, unopposed candidate. By contrast, just over a quarter of leadership elections (28 per cent) were contested by two candidates. Contests with three or more challenges have been rare in Australian party leadership elections: if we remove the Australian Democrats from the analysis, such events have only occurred in the Liberal Party. These contests took place in the years that Whitlam and the Labor Party were a dominant opposition with John Gorton and Billy McMahon vying for the leadership amongst other contenders (1968, 1969 and 1972), and again in 2009 when Joe Hockey stood as a moderate candidate in the challenge that saw Tony Abbott elected as Liberal leader. Since 1965, no contests with more than two candidates have taken place in the Labor Party, the Nationals and the Greens. At face value, these figures suggest that in terms of the number of candidates, leadership elections in Australia are not particularly competitive. There are several factors that might explain this. The first is the large number of ballots held to ratify the leadership of an incumbent, particularly when automatic leadership spills are triggered as the result of a federal election. The second is the Table 13.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Australia (1965–2012)

All leadership contests Full member votes and open primaries only

Number of candidates Percentage of elections Number of candidates Percentage of elections

1 58 1 22 2 28 2 22 3 9 3 44 4 1 4 0 5 or more 3 5 or more 11

Average number 1.6 candidates Average number 2.7 candidates N 96 N 9 Margin between top two finishers1 23 Margin between top two finishers1 33 N 34 N 5

Note 1 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. Excludes contests where reliable vote counts are not available 202 A. Gauja quick timeframe of the selections and the often secretive nature of the challenge, which may catch potential competitors off-guard. Third, the relatively small size of the parliamentary party group as the selectorate enables potential candidates to canvass their numbers before deciding to officially nominate. Hence it is not uncommon for aspirants to declare an interest in running, but to withdraw their candidacy before the official ballot to avoid a potentially embarrassing defeat if support is insufficient. This occurred in 2007 when Tony Abbott withdrew from the Liberal leadership race after realising he ‘didn’t have the numbers to mount a credible challenge’.3 Subsequently, Abbott contested the leadership against Malcolm Turnbull just 13 months later and won. Looking at the limited number of cases of full member voting that were held by the Australian Democrats between 1978 and 2004, it appears that this process of leadership is indeed more competitive, based on the average number of candidates participating (2.7). In terms of the number of voters, the Democrats reported that between 1990 and 2002, an average of 46 per cent of members participated in leadership ballots (Australian Democrats 2003: 21). However, the higher number of candidates in Democrats’ leadership contests needs to be interpreted with some caution. The absolute number may be inflated to an extent that belies the open choice of the membership in two ways. During the early days of the party it was common practice for all senators to put themselves forward for nomination in order to allow the party membership to make a full decision without any vetting from within the parliamentary party. For example, in 1981 five Senators contested the ballot, and in 1985 this figure increased to six as the party increased its parliamentary representation. However, these early ‘competitive’ ballots were a form of ratification more than anything else, with Chipp elected with more than 90 per cent of the votes in 1981 and by an ‘overwhelming’ majority again in 1983 and 1985 (Warhurst and Tate 1998: 4). In latter years the public endorsements provided by senators also worked to influence the choice exercised by the membership, shaping the contest with an authority and influence sufficient to give it, and not the rank-and-file membership, real ‘ownership’ of the party’ (Ward 1997: 127–8, see also Warhurst and Tate 1998: 6). Given that we cannot separate the mechanics of the leadership selection contest from the culture and practices in the party, it is therefore difficult to conclude that in the Australian Democrats’ case a more inclusive selectorate produces a more competitive contest. Indeed, if the margin of victory is considered, the Democrats’ full member vote produced less competitive outcomes with a margin of 33.4 per cent between the top two candidates. This stands in contrast to the average of all Australian party contests, which is 23 per cent. The battles most closely fought have been shared between the Liberal and Labor parties, with just a handful of votes separating Keating and Hawke in 1991 (56–51) and between Latham and Beazley in 2003 (47–45). The closest Liberal contests in recent years have both involved Malcolm Turnbull: defeating Brendan Nelson for the leadership in 2008 by four votes, but then losing it to Tony Abbott in 2009 by just one vote in the second ballot. Party leaders in Australia 203 Demographics and tenure of party leaders Table 13.3 details some of the characteristics of the party leaders. The average profile of an Australian party leader since 1965 iseducated, awell- white, middle-aged male. The average age of leaders at the time of their appointment is 49, with only slight variations by party and over time since the 1970s: Liberal and Labor leaders are generally three years older than their National Party and Democrat counterparts. By virtue of the fact that candidates nominate from amongst the ranks of the parliamentary party, all Australian party leaders have some experience in elected office. The gender bias amongst the leaders of the major parties in Australia reflects what has historically been a much more pervasive under-representation of women in the parliament. Whereas in recent years this situation has improved with increased awareness and the introduction of gender quotas by some parties, such affirmative action has not fully filtered through to the appointment of female leaders. Of all the individuals who have led their party since 1965, only 16 per cent have been women. If the Australian Democrats are removed from the analysis, Australian politics has only ever seen two female party leaders: Julia Gillard, who led the ALP from 2010 to 2013, and Christine Milne, who currently leads the Greens. Since 2001, however, there has been a trend toward parties electing female deputy leaders: Jenny Macklin and Julia Gillard in the ALP, Julie Bishop in the Liberal Party and Christine Milne in the Greens. In terms of leadership demographics, the Democrats again constitute an interesting exception in the Australian case. Women have regularly held key positions within the party, and of the ten leaders that the party has had throughout its history – a majority (six) have been women. Janine Haines, who became leader of the party in 1986, was the first woman to lead a political party in Australia. At 31, Natasha Stott Despoja was the youngest person ever to lead a political party in Australia. Senator Aden Ridgeway, deputy leader from 2001–2002 was only the second indigenous Australian to enter parliament. Prominent gay rights activist Brian Greig acted as interim party leader in 2002. However, whether or not the more diverse leaders selected by the Democrats are a product of the party’s leadership selection processes, or are reflective of a

Table 13.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Australia (1965–2012)

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–12 Entire period

Percentage women 0 0 14 25 22 16 Average age (in years) 57 49 47 48 49 49 Percentage without political 0 0 0 0 0 0 seniority1 Average tenure (in years) 9.5 6.4 3.8 4.5 2.4 4.7

Note 1 Seniority means that the leader has had national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection. 204 A. Gauja broader progressive political culture within the party, is debatable. From the limited number of instances of the full member vote in Australian political parties (practised only by the Democrats) and the lack of variation amongst the other parties’ selection mechanisms, it is impossible to evaluate whether broader selectorates and full member votes favour the election of a leader with a particular demographic profile (see Kenig 2009a). Similarly, only tentative conclusions can be made from the Australian experience about the impact of leadership selection methods of party leaders on the longevity of the leader. Across all parties, the average length of a leader’s tenure is 4.7 years. The National Party changes its leader least often – every 6.8 years – and the Liberals and Labor average a change every 4.5 years. By contrast, the average length of a Democrat leader’s term is only 2.9 years. While the context surrounding the churning of leaders in the Democrats has already been explored and is certainly linked to the party’s unusual leadership selection rules and the attempt to balance the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary arms in this process, there is no apparent variation in the mechanics of leadership selection between the Nationals and the other political parties that could explain the increased longevity of Nationals’ leaders. Rather, the explanation may lie in the fact that as a comparatively smaller parliamentary party, there is less choice of viable challengers, and as the junior partner in coalition with the Liberal Party, the leader of the Nationals is partially quarantined from the fallout of negative electoral performance. What can be observed clearly across all political parties, however, is that the average tenure of the party leader has decreased markedly over time – falling from an average of 9.5 years in the 1960s to 2.4 years in the 2000s. Absent any change in selection methods used by the Australian political parties, one might speculate that a greater turnover over time might reflect broader changes in the overall character of Australian politics, including the onset of the semi- permanent electoral campaign, elements of the personalisation of politics and a greater media focus on the party leader, as well as declining levels of partisan attachment.

Conclusion From a comparative perspective, there are several characteristics of leadership selection rules and contests that make for an interesting analysis. Unlike other established democracies there has been no change in the leadership selection processes of any of the Australian parties since 1965 and the four main parties still in existence today (Labor, Liberals, Nationals and the Greens) both select and remove their parliamentary leaders with relative ease by a ballot of the parliamentary caucus. Leadership contests and their campaigns happen often (on average every two years), are conducted quickly and usually behind closed doors, though the machinations of challengers and agitators may take place over a number of weeks or months before a spill motion is put to the caucus. The media is used as a strategic tool to launch challenges, declare allegiances and Party leaders in Australia 205 influence outcomes. The typical party leader elected is white, middle-aged and male with previous parliamentary and (shadow) ministerial experience. The system of leadership selection in Australia has been described as Darwin- ian yet no attempt has been made to reform the process even though the legitimacy of some selections has been called into question – particularly when an incumbent prime minister has been deposed. However, reform in the near future seems unlikely given the negative perceptions of the Democrats’ experience with a membership vote for the selection of the party leaders, the dominance of factions in the Australian Labor Party and the control that they exercise over leadership selection, ministerial selection and constitutional changes, and finally the absence of certain catalysts for reform (for example, the lack of regional representation in the party room after electoral defeats) that have been influential in driving change in other democracies.4

Note 1 By convention, candidates for the leaders of the Labor, Liberal and National parties are members of the lower house of parliament (House of Representatives). In the Demo- crats and Greens, who have a history of predominantly upper house (Senate) representation, and who have not participated in government, candidates for party leader are drawn from this chamber. 2 ‘Labor pains: Australia looks on aghast as vicious leadership struggle erupts’, The Guardian (UK), 24 February 2012, available at: www.theguardian.com/ world/2012/ feb/24/labor-australia-leadership-julia-gillard- kevin-rudd. 3 ‘Tony Abbott talks frankly about leadership and loss’, ABC Lateline, 28 February 2007, transcript available at: www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/ s2104447.htm. 4 Subsequent to the writing of this chapter, in 2013 several significant events occurred within the ALP that transformed the process of leadership selection in this party. In June, Kevin Rudd successfully challenged Prime Minister Julia Gillard for the party leadership under the existing rules. Upon becoming the new leader, Rudd proposed reforms to the selection process that would include both a vote of parliamentarians and party members. These changes were accepted by the parliamentary caucus, but were not put to conference. Following the party’s defeat in the September 2013 federal election, the National Executive decided to implement the new rules to select the party leader by a vote of all party members registered at the time of the election (approximately 40,000) and the parliamentary party (both weighted at 50 per cent). Two candidates, Anthony Albanese and Bill Shorten, stood for the leadership. Shorten was elected leader with 64 per cent of the parliamentary party vote and 40 per cent of the membership vote. 14 Selecting party leaders in Israel

Ofer Kenig and Gideon Rahat

Introduction Israel is a parliamentary democracy that has been ruled, since its establishment in 1948, by multi-party coalition governments. Party leaders – prominent among them David Ben-Gurion, leader of the Mapai Party, who is seen as the founding father of the state of Israel – were central actors in Zionist and Israeli politics from the pre-state period. Party leaders were, and still are, almost always automatically regarded as the parties’ candidates for the highest executive positions: the prime ministership for the leaders of the largest parties and senior ministerial positions for the smaller ones. Six of Israel’s 12 prime ministers took office immediately following an intra-party procedure, with no general election held between the party’s decision and their inauguration (Kenig 2009c: 63). This emphasises the importance of leadership selection as a practice that has political consequences beyond the intra-party arena. While party leaders these days may not be perceived as the ‘giant’ leaders of earlier periods, their role in Israeli politics is nevertheless central, especially due to the processes of presidentialisation (Hazan 2005) and centralised personalisation (Balmas et al. 2012). In this chapter we examine the five largest parties in the Israeli Knesset (parliament), as at 2012. These include the centre-left Labour and the centre-right Likud, veteran parties whose origins can be easily traced back to the pre-state period. The Labour Party was established in 1968 as a unification of three socialist parties. Labour (and its predecessor, Mapai) was the dominant party in the pre-state period and also led all coalition governments between 1949 and 1977. Later, the party took part in three unity governments (1984–90) and recaptured the leading position in the governments of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres (1992–6) and Ehud Barak (1999–2001). In the last decade, it has served as a junior coalition partner in several cabinets. Despite its decline it is still regarded as a main government contender. Labour’s traditional arch-rival was Likud (and its predecessor, Herut). Herut – the main component of Likud – was established on the basis of the Irgun (Etzel) pre-state militia. It later established an alliance with the Liberal Party (1965) and was a junior partner in the national unity governments of 1967–70. In 1973 these two parties formed the Likud parties’ alliance with additional parties Party leaders in Israelâ 207 and in 1988 they finally unified into a single party. Likud first won an election in 1977 and since then has been in power more often than any other party. As of 2012, it is the ruling party in a coalition with smaller religious and right-Âwing ultra-Ânationalistic parties. The other three parties are much younger. Kadima is the only one, other than Labour and Likud, which ever led the coalition. Former Likud leader and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon broke away from the party he led to establish this party in late 2005 – as a result of disagreements concerning his plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip – and it quickly attracted MKs (members of the Knesset) from Likud and other parties, including Labour. Despite its youth, Kadima led the government for three years (2006–9) and enjoyed the largest electoral support in two general elections (2006, 2009). The ultra-Âorthodox Shas was established in 1984 in reaction to the discrimination of Oriental Jews (Jews who immigrated from Asia and Africa) within Israel in general and the ultra-Âorthodox community in particular. The extreme (or radical) right party, Yisrael Beitenu, was established in 1999 as a party of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, but has since tried to break through to other electorates. This chapter identifies a process of democratisation in three of the parties (Likud, Kadima and Labour) and the absence of signs for any change in the other two, rather authoritarian, parties (Shas and Yisrael Beitenu). The selection of a leader in the democratised parties, through party primaries, is more participatory, transparent and open, but also much more costly and prone to manipulation. Leadership primaries in Israel attract more candidates in comparison to selection events that use more exclusive selectorates, but the contest is slightly less competitive. Most of the candidates and leaders are middle-Âaged men with prior legislative experience. The average tenure of the Israeli party leaders is six years, though there are significant differences in this aspect among the parties.

Who is the party leader? In several countries (including some covered in this volume) leadership positions in the party are divided among several individuals. The party’s electoral leader may differ from the party’s organisational leader and its leader in parliament. In Israel we do not find such a division. Party leaders blend these functions. They are the undisputed ‘number one’s in the party: they top the list of candidates for the Knesset elections;1 they are the recognised candidates for the prime minister – or the top ministerial position the party may hold as a junior partner in a governing coalition; and they usually have the authority to pick the politicians who will represent their party in the cabinet (Kenig and Barnea 2009). Israeli party leaders are often simply called ‘leaders’ although the formal title in most parties is chairman (yoshev rosh). The other leadership-Âlike positions (organisational or parliamentarian) within parties should not be mistaken for that of the party leader. In the Labour Party, the secretary-generalÂ (mazkal) may be regarded as the organisational leader but he is clearly subordinate to the party chairman. The importance of this position has dwin- dled over the years – and in 2009–12 it was not even held by an MK – reflecting 208â O. Kenig and G. Rahat theÂmove away from a model of ‘mass party’ to an electoral party. In the other parties, the organisational leaders were and remain weaker, never having enjoyed anything resembling the status Labour once offered. This is possibly because they come from the extra-Âparliamentary arena, and this is reflected in the position’s title: in Likud and Kadima they are referred to as the party’s director-Âgeneral or CEO (mankal). In the legislative arena (the Knesset), we find the chairman of the parliamentary party group (yoshev rosh hasi’ah). This position usually is occupied by backbenchers (at least in the large parties) and is not regarded as a senior role. Finally, we must add the distinction between a spiritual and a political leader. In Shas, all authority and power rests with a ‘spiritual leader’ – Rabbi Ovadia Yosef.2 He appoints and can remove the party’s political leader and members of the council of sages, which is formally the supreme decision-Âmaking body of the party. Under the heading ‘basic principles’ in Shas’ party regulations (1993, Article 2D), it states that: ‘The party sees the council of sages under the leadership of .â.â. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef .â.â. as the superior religious, biblical, ideological and political authority in the Land of Israel.’

Rules organising leadership selection Figure 14.1 maps the selectorates that choose the party leaders in the five parties under discussion. As is evident, over time, the three large parties – whose leader is a candidate for the prime ministership – adopted more inclusive selectorates. In contrast, Shas and Yisrael Beitenu have consistently used highly exclusive selectorates. Below we consider these developments in more detail.

Voters Party Delegates Parliamentary Party Single members to a party group council leader convention

Labour (1991) (1965) Likud (1992) (1965) Kadima (2008) (2006) (2005) Yisrael Beitenu* (1999) Shas (1984)

Figure 14.1âInclusiveness of the selectorate in Israel (1965–2012). Note Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate starting date and the date of adoption of new selectorate. *âFormally, the party central committee is the selectorate, but in practice it is a case of a self- acclaimed leader who was never subject to selection. Party leaders in Israel 209 In the Labour Party, leadership selection rules have gone through a gradual process of both opening up and formalisation. We can point to four distinct phases in this evolution process (Kenig 2009c): the ‘natural leader’ phase (up to 1963); the transitional phase (1963–74); the period of contests in party agencies (1974–90); and the primaries era (since 1991). Until 1963 there were no formal rules regulating leadership selection. David Ben-Gurion, the founding father of the party and its leader since the early 1930s, was perceived as its natural and undisputed leader. His candidacy for the office of prime minister was taken for granted (Medding 1972: 170). Even when he temporarily retired from politics in 1954 – and was replaced by Moshe Sharett as prime minister – he was still regarded as the (real) party leader. His final resignation in 1963 marked the end of more than 30 years of leadership and the beginning of the transitional period. The main attribute of the transitional period (1963–74) was the informal though tight control of the party’s ‘old guard’ over leadership succession. When Ben- Gurion retired, Mapai’s notables held informal consultations resulting in the recommendation to appoint Levi Eshkol to the leadership. This decision was not surprising since Eshkol had long before established himself as the number two and was regarded as the natural heir (Yanai 1981: 46). His selection was ratified at the party’s central committee. This was the last instance in which leadership succession was determined with no formal rules. Soon after Eshkol seized the leadership, the party constitution was amended to say that the party’s parliamentary party group and the central committee would henceforth jointly select the party’s leader (Medding 1972: 171).3 Other aspects of selection rules – such as candidacy requirements or a required majority – remained vague and undefined. In June 1965, a few months prior to the general elections, the central committee convened to select the leader. Both Eshkol and Ben-Gurion stepped forward as candidates, and for the first time ever the party saw a formal leadership contest.4 Eshkol remained the party leader until his death in 1969. He had no obvious successor and the old guard – which still had effective control over the process – recommended Golda Meir as the new leader and prime minister. This recommendation was ratified in the central committee soon afterwards. Meir stayed in office until early 1974, when she was forced to retire following mounting public criticism concerning her responsibility for the failures relating to the 1973 war. The 1974 leadership succession marked the beginning of a third period – open contest for the votes of delegates. Yitzhak Rabin was selected as party leader by a majority of the 600 delegates of the party’s central committee. The Old Guard still had some control over the process, but not as tight as before. Despite Rabin being supported by the old guard, his rival, Shimon Peres, gathered considerable support. Two more leadership contests between Rabin and Peres were held in 1977 and 1980. The party constitution was not changed, but based on ad hoc decisions, in both cases the selectorate was the party’s convention, a body of 3,000 delegates. This marked a further widening of the selectorate, although it still remained within the realm of selection by party delegates. 210 O. Kenig and G. Rahat Peres – who became party leader before the 1977 elections, following Rabin’s resignation – dominated the party convention through the 1980s, preventing additional challenges to his position. However, following Labour’s defeat in the 1988 elections, the internal discontent towards his leadership grew. At the same time, various forces in the party called for internal democratisation that would revitalise its old and stagnated public image. The opening up of candidate and leadership selection (introducing party primaries) was seen as a means of bypassing the party machine and as an expression of democratisation (Barnea and Rahat 2007). New rules were finalised in 1991. The decision to give the right of vote to every party member sparked a genuine participatory revolution. The size of the selectorate surged from 3,000 (delegates) to about 150,000 (party members). In order to be selected, a candidate needed to secure at least 40 per cent of the votes; otherwise, a second ballot took place, in which only the two top candidates competed. Candidates had to be party members for at least six months prior to the contest and had to submit signatures of 1,000 party members who supported their candidacy. The first primaries took place in February 1992. It was the fourth time Peres and Rabin had competed against each other. This time, however, two additional candidates joined the contest, producing the first ever multi-candidate contest in Labour. Rabin managed to win on the first ballot, by a very small margin. Labour’s victory in the 1992 general elections facilitated the entrenchment of these selection rules. Since 1992, in all but two instances party members selected Labour’s leaders in closed (or ‘party’) primaries.5 According to the party constitution, the right to participate in intra-party selection is earned six months after becoming a party member. Yet the constitution allows adopting specific rules concerning the waiting period for each contest. These rules thus change from one contest to the next, and waiting periods have ranged from 1.5–10 months. Labour Party leaders have no formal fixed term. Rather, terms are correlated with the Knesset terms (typically three to four years). Since the 1990s, the party’s statute distinguishes between two political situations. If the party leader is prime minister, the leadership contest may be held only in proximity to the next general elections. This protects the leader from possible challenges during most of the legislative term. However, in case the party does not succeed in forming a government, the leader may be challenged soon after the general elections. Under such circumstances, when the party is in opposition (or is a junior coalition partner), the leader is much less secure in office. Such leaders may actually be challenged twice during a legislative term. That is, incumbent party leaders may be deselected by losing a contest – or deciding to refrain from competing in it – in which all party members participate (primaries). Several Labour leaders stepped down while others lost the contest following electoral defeat; thus in no instance did the same leader face two challenges in a single legislative term. Likud also experienced a gradual process of opening the selection procedure. The period up to 1983 may be termed the ‘natural leader’ phase. Until the Party leaders in Israel 211 resignation of Menachem Begin that year, there was never any real doubt concerning the leadership. Begin was the head of the Irgun – the pre-state militia that the party was mainly based on – from 1943 and had served as leader since the foundation of the party in 1948. His position was almost undisputed and the few attempts to challenge him failed miserably. Although the party’s statute called for the selection of the leader every two years (at the party’s biennial convention), the reselection of Begin was taken for granted every time. There were several occasions of discontent but these never took the form of a formal challenge (Weitz 2002). In August 1983 Begin resigned from the positions of prime minister and leader of the Likud. His successor, Yitzhak Shamir, was selected in a two-man contest in the party’s central committee, a body of several hundred delegates (Togrovnik 1990). Shamir’s position was not as solid as Begin’s and he was challenged twice more, both times in the party’s central committee. The selectorate grew substantially from the first two selection events of 1983 and 1984 to that of 1992. In the first two events it involved less than 800 delegates, the members of Herut’s central committee. In 1992 it involved more than 3,000, resulting from the fact that Herut’s convention decided in 1986 to select all of its members to the central committee, and thus made these two entities identical; in addition, delegates from the Liberal Party and an additional smaller party were added in the process of the unification of Likud. Likud’s defeat in the 1992 general elections led to calls for party renewal, specifically demands to follow the democratisation introduced in Labour a year earlier, and to the adoption of party primaries. In November 1992 the party decided to hold leadership selection within four months and to open the process to the entire membership. The rules were almost identical to those introduced in Labour. Since the first leadership contest (1993), six more contests have been held and primaries have been entrenched as the method for selecting the party leader. Candidacy requirements are slightly stricter than those in Labour. In 1993, candidates had to have been party members for at least nine months prior to the cut-off date for members to join and thus be eligible to vote in the contest. This period was extended to three years in 2005. Since 1992, a run-off between the two leading candidates is supposed to take place should no candidate win at least 40 per cent of the votes. Leaders have no fixed tenure and their term is correlated with the legislative term. They may be challenged several months prior to the general election, regardless of the party’s political position (heading the government or not). Leadership selection rules in Kadima changed dramatically in a period of less than three years, mainly due to the circumstances of the party’s establishment and the events that occurred in the first months of its existence. Kadima was- estab lished in November 2005 when Prime Minister Sharon decided to leave the Likud and establish a new party. As the architect and founding father of the new party, he was self-acclaimed as Kadima’s first leader. In January 2006, less than two months after Kadima’s establishment, Sharon suffered a serious stroke from which he never recovered. The urgency of appointing a prime minister – especially with 212 O. Kenig and G. Rahat general elections already set for March – led the fledgling party to turn by default to Ehud Olmert, Sharon’s deputy. Olmert’s appointment as the new leader was adopted ad hoc by the party’s parliamentary group. Sharon and Olmert both assumed the party leadership in precarious circumstances. However, as the party became institutionalised, it followed Labour and Likud, adopting an almost identical leadership selection method. In the subsequent two leadership contests (2008, 2012) the selectorate was composed of the party members; a 40 per cent majority was required to win the first round, otherwise a second round was supposed to take place between the two leading candidates. Eligibility to vote and get selected in the 2008 and 2012 primaries was allotted only to those who had been party members for 13 months, but this rule was suspended for the 2008 primaries, allowing members who had just joined the party to participate. With regard to term length of the party leader, Kadima has a similar arrangement to Likud’s: the party’s rules states that leadership selection will take place 60 to 90 days prior to the general elections.6 For the 2012 primaries, candidates needed to pay a NIS10,000 (approx. €2,000 at the time of writing) registration fee and submit signatures of 300 members who support their candidacy. Shas provides us with the case of a single-man selectorate. Its spiritual leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, was directly responsible for the selection of Yitzhak Peretz (1984–90), Arye Deri (1990–9) and Eli Yishai (since 1999) as the three political leaders of the party since its foundation in 1984. Yosef is sometimes advised in his decision by a sort of ‘magic circle’ made up of several rabbis, but the final say is in his hands. That being the case, there is no need for candidacy requirements and the term length is unlimited: Shas’ political leader can stay in office until Yosef decides to remove him. While Yosef has the power of deselection as well, the actual circumstances of deselection have been external: Peretz left the party because he did not agree with the spiritual leader’s instructions concerning the party’s political moves while Deri was forced to leave after being tried and convicted for taking bribes. Yisrael Beitenu is a case of a party that was established by a leader who still holds power. Avigdor Lieberman founded the party in 1999 and has remained its leader ever since. Since 2002 the party’s constitution has included rules for leadership selection. The chairman is to be selected by a plurality of the delegates of the central committee, and the party central committee decides the timing of leadership selection, which should take place more than six months prior to general elections. Except for the case of the incumbent chairman, candidacy requires the submission of 500 party members’ signatures that support the challenger’s candidacy. A candidate should be a member of the party; a waiting period is not required. In practice, however, it is clearly an autocratic party, and no one has challenged Lieberman’s leadership. The rules will be tested only in the post-Lieberman era, provided the party survives without his charismatic leadership. Table 14.1 illustrates the current similarities between the selection methods of the three large parties. The two veteran parties (Labour and Likud) both have Table 14.1â Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Israel (2012)

Party name Selectorate Term (in years) Voting rule Deselection

Likud Eligible party members 4–52 Run-off between the top two candidates in case no Eligible party members3 candidate wins 40% of votes in the first round Kadima Eligible party members 4–52 Run-off between the top two candidates in case no Eligible party members3 candidate wins 40% of votes in the first round Yisrael Beitenu1 Leader (delegates to a n.a. (4–52) n.a. (Plurality) n.a. (Delegates to a party’s party’s central central committee) committee) Labour Party Eligible party members 4–52 Run-off between the top two candidates in case no Eligible party members3 candidate wins 40% of votes in the first round Shas (Spiritual) leader n.a. n.a. Spiritual leader

Notes 1 Information in parentheses indicates formal procedures that were never used. 2 There is no formal fixed term. Terms are correlated to the legislative term, formally four to five years but typically (due to early elections) three to four years. In Labour, incumbent leaders may be challenged twice during the legislative term if the party is not forming government. 3 Party leaders may be removed if they lose the leadership contest to a challenger. 214 O. Kenig and G. Rahat undergone a gradual process of democratisation that culminated in the adoption of party primaries in the early 1990s. Kadima, after a period of institutionalisation under difficult circumstances, followed suit and adopted primaries as well. In Shas a single spiritual leader is de facto and de jure the selectorate while Yisrael Beitenu has leadership selection rules that have yet to be implemented. We can thus identify a democratisation of the leadership selection methods in the three large parties. Labour and Likud were the first to adopt inclusive selectorates for selecting their leaders. A combination of factors at different levels – the political system level, the party system level and the intra-party level – explains this development (Barnea and Rahat 2007). First, it was an adaptation to the zeitgeist, and more precisely to overall trends of democratisation, Americanisation and personalisation of Israeli politics and society. These, combined with the decline of parties and the overall trust in them and in politics in general, created fertile ground for the promotion of reform. Next are changes in the inter-party arena, especially the replacement of the dominant party system with the competitive bipolar party system in 1977. In the context of the close electoral competition between Labour and Likud, democratisation was perceived as a tool for achieving an electoral leverage. Indeed, as could be expected (Cross and Blais 2012b), both Labour and Likud adopted party primaries after experiencing electoral defeat. Finally, intra-party calculations also contributed to the opening of the selection method. In the Labour Party, the challengers to the incumbent leader were convinced that the adoption of an inclusive selectorate – instead of the central committee – would serve their goal. This was because the incumbent (Shimon Peres) had a strong power base in the party apparatus while the main challenger (Yitzhak Rabin) was much more popular among the wider public. By the time Kadima entered the scene in late 2005, leadership primaries were established as the acceptable method for selecting the leaders of the large governing parties. It was thus only natural that it would follow the example of Labour and Likud. It is worth noting, though, that other parties, that have not adopted inclusive leadership rules, did not face any public pressures or criticism. This is probably because these parties do not have any real chance of occupying the prime ministership and also because their electorates do not place much importance on democratic values such as intra-party competition or leadership accountability.

Dynamics of leadership contests To date, most leadership contests in Israel have not been about ideology, issues or policy. Rather, they have been highly personalised. This is not surprising because in an intra-party contest the ideological distance between candidates is usually not that big. Yet, from time to time, candidates were identified with specific ideological colours, such as doves and hawks within Labour (e.g. hawkish Rabin versus dovish Peres in 1992) or moderate and extreme right within Likud (Netanyahu versus Feiglin since 2005). The need of the candidates to recruit the support of tens of thousands of dispersed and largely passive members clearly Party leaders in Israel 215 makes the campaign more public and the use of the mass media much more useful and central for those running. Providers of expertise (campaign professionals) and resources (donors) also become more important with the dramatic increase in the size of the selectorate. In his study of leadership contests in Britain, Stark (1996) argues that selectors of party leaders take into account a mixture of considerations (see also Cross and Blais 2012a). They look for competence, but also for a leader who is likely to be accepted by all segments of the party and, of course for one who is electa- ble. Taking this framework as a guideline, we may argue that at least since the adoption of primaries, the dominant consideration is which of the candidates can ‘deliver the goods’. In other words, party members look for a figure who is popular and can lead the party to electoral success. The bluntest expression of the primacy of the electability consideration in a primary campaign is the extensive reliance on public opinion polls. During leadership primaries, the daily newspapers and major TV networks regularly conduct polls examining how well the party would fare under different leaders. Often, the dynamics of the campaign are influenced by these polls. In this sense, primaries are rather different from leadership contests held in more exclusive selectorates. While contests in central committees or conventions were not affected as much by public opinion polls, they were also highly personalised. Leadership campaigns do not have a typical length. Rather, this is dictated by the specific circumstances of each contest. In Israel, the Party Law definesa ‘campaign period’ for the purpose of monitoring and oversight of candidates’ donations and expenses. According to the law (clause 28/a), the contest period begins on the day the party sets the date for the selection. This makes the length of campaigns very flexible. For instance, in the case of the 2011 Labour leadership contest, the ‘official’ campaign began about six months before the day of selection. In contrast, in the case of the 2012 Likud leadership contest the ‘official’ campaign began only 46 days before the day of selection. Short and extensive campaigns are more likely to occur under a small exclusive selectorate, where voting procedures may be organised quickly.7 But as the two examples above demonstrate, the time frame for primaries campaigns is broad and is dependent on different circumstances, among them the influence of the incumbent leader on the timing of the selection. Campaigns in the primaries era can be characterised as having four phases. The first is the pre-campaign period. Here, prospective challengers try to pressure the party to set a date for the primaries. Many leadership contests in the last two decades started as a struggle around the timing of the primaries. In some cases, this is also the time for extensive recruitment efforts that aim to enrol supporters as party members just before the deadline to do so expires.8 The second period starts with the announcement of the formal selection day and ends with the deadline for registration as a candidate, usually three to four weeks before the selection day. Here potential candidates test the waters and build their campaign machine. In the third phase the candidates are officially recognised, although there have been cases in which candidates withdrew just days before 216 O. Kenig and G. Rahat selection. Only now does each candidate formally launch his or her selection campaign. Candidates travel the country, trying to persuade members to support them, but the main efforts are invested in the mass media. Candidate debates are a rare sight in Israeli leadership contests. The final phase starts about two days before selection day and ends with the closing of the voting stations on the eve of selection day. The candidates’ headquarters put considerable effort into contacting potential supporters (by telephone) and urging them to come out and vote. Efforts are also invested in mobilising party members to the ballot stations, even organising transportation to take them to vote. While postal ballots or email voting have yet to arrive in Israel, party members do not have to drive very far to cast their ballot as voting stations are placed countrywide.9 In terms of costs, leadership campaigns in the primaries era are quite expensive. In order to mobilise tens of thousands of eligible selectors, candidates need considerable resources. In order to regulate selection and create fairer and cleaner contests, the Party Law – that was adopted in parallel with the adoption of primaries and has been amended many times since – dedicates an exclusive and ever-growing chapter to the regulation of intra-party campaign finance. Israeli intra-party campaign finance is highly regulated in comparison to other democracies with mixed and PR electoral systems (Hofnung 2008). The law mainly limits and regulates donations for candidates and sets an expense limit. Limits are in proportion to the size of the selectorate. Candidates in the Labour 2011 leadership contest were allowed to raise and spend a maximum of NIS1,295,372 (about €260,000), reflecting a selectorate of about 66,000 members. Candidates in the Likud 2012 leadership contest were allowed to raise and spend up to NIS1,999,032 (about €400,000), reflecting a selectorate of about 125,000 members. The limits set on donations and expenses were often violated (Hofnung 2005). As long as the parties themselves were charged with the authority of overseeing these limitations, little was done. Parties had little motivation for revealing scandals and affairs that would stain their good name. In 2005, however, the Party Law was amended and the State Comptroller was authorised to monitor the accounts of primary candidates. The law specifies sanctions in the form of fines for candidates and parties that violate the regulations. The law also authorises the party’s legal institution to disqualify a candidate who fails to meet these regulations (clause 28(25)). The adoption of leadership primaries in the early 1990s by Labour and Likud, and by Kadima in 2008, may be regarded as true democratisation from the perspective of participation. Indeed, the number of selectors rose meteorically from a few hundred or several thousand delegates (not to mention the fewer participants in the informal selections) to tens of thousands of members. For example, in 1965 only 282 delegates (members of the central committee) took part in the selection of Labour’s leader. A dozen years later, 2,865 delegates (of the party conference) participated in Labour’s leadership selection contest while 15 years later, more than 100,000 party members participated in Labour’s first leadership primary. However, this increase went hand in hand with negative side-effects Table 14.2 Competitiveness of leadership contests in Israel (1965–2012)

All leadership contests Full membership votes only

Number of candidates1 Percentage of elections Number of candidates Percentage of elections

12 14.8 12 5.9 2 33.3 2 23.5 3 25.9 3 29.4 4 22.2 4 35.3 5 or more 3.7 5 or more 5.9

Average number 2.7 candidates Average number 3.1 candidates Margin between the top two 19.8 Margin between the top two 20.6 finishers3 finishers3 N 27 N 17

Notes 1 Contests in Labour, Likud and Kadima only. In Shas and Yisrael Beitenu there were no contests. 2 In the cases that only one candidate contested we left out all cases in which the incumbent leader was re-selected unopposed (Shamir in 1988, Peres in 1984) and included only cases of leadership change. Accordingly, we have four cases of single-candidate ‘contests’: Golda Meir (1969), Shimon Peres (1977, 1996) and Ehud Olmert (2006). Peres’s 1996 selection is included as a full membership vote despite the fact that no formal vote was held, because these were the rules at the time. 3 Indicates the average margin on the first ballot for contested contests only. 218 O. Kenig and G. Rahat that cast a shadow over the quality of participation (Rahat and Hazan 2007). For example, the recruitment campaigns supplied an opportunity for ‘vote brokers’ – people who recruit party members by the hundreds, especially in weaker social groups that can be easily mobilised – to gain power and influence. This created a selectorate with a significant proportion of instant and insincere members. That is, many of these recruited members had questionable affiliation with the party and many did not even intend to vote for it in the general elections (Kenig et al. 2013). Here we use two simple measures to evaluate the level of competitiveness. We look at the number of candidates in a contest and then at the average margin of victory between the top two candidates (Table 14.2). In regard to the number of candidates we can see that contests with inclusive selectorates have, on average, 3.1 candidates, while contests with more exclusive selectorates have, on average, 1.9 candidates. That is, in terms of the number of competitors, primaries are indeed more competitive than selection by delegates. With regard to how close contests are, the average margin of victory is slightly higher in primaries than in more exclusive selectorates (20.6 and 17.8, respectively). That is, primaries are less competitive in this sense than selection by party delegates, but in no way is it a highly significant difference. Both of these findings are in line with Kenig’s (2009a) findings in a cross-national analysis.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders Table 14.3 presents a summary of statistics for the gender, age, seniority and durability in office of the party leaders of the five parties since the 1960s. Below

Table 14.3 Demographics and tenure of party leaders in Israel (1965–2012)

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–12 Entire period1

Percentage women 50 0 0 0 20 15 Average age (in years) 69.5 53.0 57.0 52.5 59.8 53.7 Percentage without 0 0 50 12.5 10 15 political seniority2 Average tenure(in years)3 5.4 8.5 7.4 5.0 1.9 6.0 N 2 2 2 8 10 20

Notes 1 The calculations for the ‘entire period’ column is only for first selection of a party leader. The calculations for other columns take into account leaders’ second selection to office as well. Hence the differences between the total number of cases (N = 20) and the sum of cases in each decade (N = 24). The very small N for the three early decades makes it almost impossible to draw any substantial conclusions regarding changes in demography and tenure of party leaders through time. 2 Seniority means that the leader has had national legislative or governmental experience at the time of selection. 3 For the calculation of tenure, the five incumbent leaders were excluded. As a result, the very short average duration for the latest period is somewhat misleading. Three out of the five incumbent leaders have actually enjoyed long spells in office: Yishai and Lieberman were selected in 1999, while Netanyahu was selected (to his second term as Likud’s leader) in 2005. Party leaders in Israel 219 we make a more detailed analysis of these four characteristics, including references to unsuccessful candidates. Three out of the 20 party leaders (15 per cent) were women. Golda Meir was appointed by Labour as its leader in 1969, Tzipi Livni was selected as leader of Kadima in 2008 and Shelly Yachimovich as Labour’s leader in 2011. Besides these three, only one more woman has stood as a candidate since 1965.10 Demo- cratisation of leadership selection does not seem to enhance the chances of women to become party leaders. On average, party leaders are first selected at the age of 53.7. Yet, there is great variance in this regard. Arye Deri (Shas) was appointed as leader at the age of 31. Others, such as Ariel Sharon (Likud) and Golda Meir (Labour) were above the age of 70 when they first became leaders. All but three Israeli party leaders had legislative experience before their selection. Yitzhak Peretz (Shas 1984) and Avigdor Lieberman (Yisrael Beitenu 1999) lacked legislative experience because they became leaders before their parties gained legislative seats. Amram Mitzna (Labour) was the only successful candidate with no prior parliamentary experience who won a party primary. He did, however, have other public credentials, including two consecutive terms as the Mayor of Haifa, Israel’s third largest city.11 Even when looking at the full list of candidates who have contested the party leadership through the years we can find very few who lacked legislative experience, and those few did not have a real chance to get selected. It may be argued, however, that the recurring challenge that Moshe Feiglin – a right-winger in Likud with no parliamentary experience – posed to Netanyahu did influence politics within Likud. His demonstration of power, his ability to recruit the support of a significant minority of party members (more than 20 per cent in the 2007 and 2012 primaries), made him an important actor in leadership selection. As for the durability in office, six years is the average. The differences between Labour and Likud are striking. For the same period of time, Labour had ten leaders (plus two comebacks) and Likud only four (plus one comeback). Note that all Labour leaders except one – Shimon Peres, who was the party leader for 15 years, in 1977–1992 – and all Kadima leaders had tenures which were less than the average while all leaders of the other parties had tenure above the average. This seems to reflect the changing fortune of Labour and Likud, the first in decline, the second holding on to the leading position it won in 1977. If leadership durability is a sign of strength, then Kadima has reason to worry, while the autocrats of Yisrael Beitenu and Shas can stay calm. Very few of the party leaders have voluntarily decided to resign. In fact only Rabin (in 1977) and Begin (in 1983) left office of their own will. To these cases we may add the two cases of incumbent party leaders who ended their term by surprisingly leaving their party to establish a new party under their leadership (Sharon in 2005 and Barak in 2011). In five cases, leaders resigned shortly after their party lost in general elections. These cases may be regarded as voluntary resignations. However, these leaders preferred to move away, anticipating that they would have to face mounting pressures to resign. Apart from these nine 220 O. Kenig and G. Rahat cases – and an additional three cases of force majeure: death, assassination and serious illness – eight party leaders have involuntarily left office. This happened either as a result of a defeat in a formal challenge against them (four cases), a decision of the spiritual leader to make changes in the leadership position (two cases) or as a result of pressures directly mounted at them (two cases). Interestingly for Israel, leaving the office of party leader often does not mark the end of one’s political career. Former leaders often come back for a second term in office, or at least try to. Leaving aside the three cases of force majeure, in 12 out of the 17 remaining cases the outgoing leader became a leader once again, or competed in a leadership race and lost. Thus Israel is described as a [political] ‘comeback nation’ where leaders never vanish but merely exit for a while, only to return (Barnea 2011: 147).

Conclusion The identity of the party leader in Israel is clear and is vested in one political leader for each party, except in the case of Shas. In this religious party, the real leader is the spiritual head while the political leader is clearly subordinate to his authority. The main parties in Israel – parties that regard themselves and are perceived by the public as contenders for government – have changed their leadership selection rules from fairly exclusive methods to highly inclusive ones. They also use quite similar rules concerning eligibility to vote, candidacy and the rules concerning the required majority to get selected. Yet, not all parties took the democratisation path. In the remaining two parties, leaders are either self- acclaimed (Yisrael Beitenu) or appointed by a religious leader (Shas). This leaves the middle range of the selectorate continuum – the party delegates – empty. There are smaller parties in which party delegates select the leaders, but this has become rare, for candidate selection too (Rahat 2011). This may point to the occurrence of a process of institutional personalisation of Israeli politics (Balmas et al. 2012). Primaries have taken root as the almost default method for leadership selection in the parties contending for government. Leadership selection by party members is more participatory, more transparent and direct and attracts more candidates. But it also bears a price: it is much more costly; it is prone to irregu- larities; and it creates a playing field for vote brokers and encourages the recruitment of insincere and instant members. Turnout and competition in primaries – in comparison to selection by delegates – are far from impressive. Contests are usually not about ideas, policies and positions but rather about the candidates’ image and their electability. Since the adoption of primaries in the early 1990s, there has been growing intervention of the state in the party’s internal affairs. This extensive regulation reflects the pathologies of primaries but also acknow- ledges the importance of intra-party leadership contests for national politics. Most selected party leaders in Israel are middle-aged men with prior parliamentary experience. There are no apparent differences between the leaders who were selected through primaries and those selected by more exclusive methods Party leaders in Israel 221 in terms of age, gender and political background. The rhythm of leaders’ turnover – with the clear exception of Menachem Begin (Likud) – seems to be linked to the success of the party in general elections, and in getting governmental posts, more than to the method of selection. That is, being selected in primaries does not supply leaders with a stable base of legitimacy.

Notes 1 Israeli elections are organised under a PR list system, with one single nationwide constituency, and therefore one single list per party. 2 In other ultra-orthodox parties in Israel (Degel Hatora, Agudat Yisrael) authority rests with a spiritual leader or leaders too. 3 This is a de facto selection by the central committee as in any case most members of the party’s parliamentary group were also members of the central committee and composed a minority within it. 4 The leadership contest was one event in the ongoing clash between Ben-Gurion and the party’s ‘Young Turks’ on one side and Eshkol and the old guard on the other. Eshkol won the contest and Ben-Gurion and his followers left the party and formed a new one, Rafi. In 1968 Rafi joined Mapai and another socialist party (Ahdut Ha’Avoda) to establish the Labour Party. 5 The exceptions were: first, the case of the selection of Peres in 1995 that occurred after the assassination of Prime Minister and Labour chairman Rabin; the party blocked the possibility of a contest and enthroned Peres. Second, the selection of Peres by the central committee in 2003 as an interim party chairman; Peres held this post until 2005. He lost his bid for chairmanship in the 2005 primaries to Amir Peretz, left the party and joined Kadima. 6 Until 2009 another clause allowed the party’s council to proclaim that the leadership contest will be postponed. Thus, Ehud Olmert (who controlled the council) could not really be challenged and had an unlimited term in office. His decision to resign as leader and prime minister resulted from allegations regarding corruption scandals he was involved in and subsequent pressure from his coalition partners for his resignation. 7 The campaign for Labour’s 1974 leadership selection in the central committee lasted 11 days, from the day Golda Meir resigned to the selection of Yitzhak Rabin in that forum. Likud’s 1983 leadership selection campaign lasted even fewer days, following the resignation of Prime Minister Begin. 8 These recruitment campaigns are among the most serious pathologies (Rahat and Hazan 2007; Cross and Rahat 2012) of Israeli primaries. They became less problematic following the introduction of longer waiting periods for party members before they are eligible to participate in primaries. 9 Likud used 502 voting stations in 154 locations in its 2012 leadership primaries while Kadima used 197 voting stations in 104 locations in its 2012 leadership primaries. 10 There were two women party leaders in Meretz, a minor party that is not covered in this chapter. 11 Note, however, that Mitzna had the shortest duration as a party leader, which may point to the importance of legislative experience. 15 The selection of party leaders in comparative perspective

Jean-Benoit Pilet and William P. Cross

As set out in the introduction to this volume, our goal has been to shed a new light on a major element of contemporary democratic practice: the selection of political party leaders. Who the leaders are, how they are chosen and how they are held to account are key questions in understanding the distribution of political power both within parties and in the broader democratic setting. Party leaders in most political systems are key actors in the functioning of their democracies: they lead their parties both between elections and during electoral campaigns. In doing so, they supervise, and sometimes directly control, the selection of candidates who represent their party in legislative elections; they often lead their party’s legislative caucus; they play a key role in drafting party manifestos; and, when in government, they are central in the selection of party ministers and in negotiations among parties when coalitions are formed. Moreover, in most political systems, the leaders of major parties are the main contenders for the position of prime minister. Given these key functions, it is not surprising that several scholars have recently observed that the position of party leader has become more powerful over the past 20 years. The observation is that leaders have become more influential in both intra-party and governmental decision- making, and more central in the minds of voters when deciding who to vote for (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Aarts et al. 2011; Dowding 2013). Yet, surprisingly enough, the role of party leaders has not been the source of much academic attention. Compared to research on ministers, on members of parliament, or even on candidates, the literature on party leaders remains limited in both quantity and scope (Cross and Blais 2012a). Most studies are of individual cases, or are limited comparative studies of two or three cases. Publica- tions covering more countries are the exception (see Marsh 1993; Davis 1998; Cross and Blais 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, many tend to concentrate on single aspects of party leadership, either on the personal history of one leader, or on one case of leadership selection that has attracted considerable political attention or is thought to have significant consequences. In this volume, our aim has been to advance the study of party leadership by presenting an ambitious examination of leadership selection in 13 countries from western and eastern Europe, Oceania and North America covering the period between 1965 and 2012. The 13 countries are all parliamentary democracies. We A comparative perspective 223 exclude presidential systems as the role of party leader is not as clear and certainly differs from that found in parliamentary democracies. In presidential systems, the crucial moment is not so much the selection of a party leader, but rather the selection of the candidate for the next presidential election – and these two positions are often distinct. This is evident in the example of France in 2012, when neither of the two leading presidential candidates François Hollande nor Nicolas Sarkozy was the formal leader of their party. Similarly, Mitt Romney cannot be said to lead the US Republican Party in 2013 even though he was its most recent presidential candidate. This can be contrasted with, for example, Tony Abbott’s continued leadership of the Australian Labor Party after his 2010 electoral defeat. Because of these very different dynamics relating to party leadership, we have limited our analysis to parliamentary systems. Within this group, the cases selected differ on several important variables. First, we have both majoritarian and proportional systems. And, among the ten cases where elections are held under proportional representation, we include some where the party system is clearly bipolarised (such as Spain, Portugal, Hungary and to some extent Germany, Norway and Romania), and others where the party system is more fragmented and where coalitions are flexible (such as Belgium, Austria and Israel). In addition, our study includes countries with different democratic histories. Some are older democracies like Britain, Canada, Australia, Belgium and Norway; others are post-Second World War democracies such as Germany, Austria and Italy; while others experienced democratic transitions more recently – Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and Romania and Hungary in the 1990s. For the older democracies, our study generally begins in 1965, and for the newer ones we start in the year of their first democratic elections. Finally, we have centralised political systems as well as multi-level systems, a characteristic that may have direct consequences on the career paths of politicians, including party leaders (Borchert and Stolz 2011; Detterbeck 2012). These differences among our cases have implications for the study of party leadership, as is made evident in the chapters in this volume. In this concluding chapter, we present a comparative analysis of political party leadership in these 13 countries. Within these countries, we have a total of 71 political parties included in our study as of 2012 – and this does not include older parties that may have disappeared but are also covered in the earlier analysis (such as the Canadian Reform Party, the British SDP and the several Italian parties of the First Repub- lic). For most countries, the five most relevant parties are studied – usually meaning the largest ones. Following Sartori’s definition of relevant parties (Sartori 1976), those that have some blackmail potential in the making of governing coalitions are also included. For some countries, like Belgium, Norway, Italy and Spain, five parties are not enough and a few more are added. In addition, in a few chapters, authors have added parties that were neither large, nor relevant for the making of government but that were innovative when it comes to the selection of party leaders. This was the case, for example, of the Austral- ian Democrats who were the sole Australian party to have used membership 224 J.-B. Pilet and W.P. Cross voting for the selection of their leaders. For similar reasons, the Hungarian LMP (Politics Can Be Different) is also included. Overall, with 13 countries and over 70 political parties, we have more data on party leadership than any previous study. To provide some sense of the quantity of data collected, we note that this volume surveys close to 900 leadership contests and more than 400 party leaders. This vast amount of data is used in this concluding chapter for a first comprehensive, comparative exploration of party leadership in parliamentary democracies. The analysis follows the same structure as the country chapters. We start with a discussion regarding the identification of who the leaders are in the different political parties. We then discuss the rules that are used to select party leaders, with an emphasis on the selectorate and on the trend towards its becoming more inclusive. In the third section, we study the dynamics of leadership races, focusing on their degree of competitiveness. And, finally, in a fourth section, we detail the demographic characteristics of party leaders in terms of gender, age, political experience and length of tenure, and we examine how these evolve over time and vary according to the rules used for selecting leaders.

Who is the party leader? The first point of discussion in any study of party leadership should be the identification of the party leader. This question may sound somewhat trite for readers most familiar with Westminster systems where the party leader is easily identifi- able and is at once the leader of the party in public office (parliament and/or government), in central office, and in election campaigns. While an incumbent leader may have rivals for the position of party leader, there is no rival position to that of leader. This concentration of power in the hands of a single individual is the norm in most of those countries covered by the existing literature on party leadership (countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland and Aus- tralia). We find a similar concentration of power in parties in other countries such as Israel, Portugal, Spain and, for most of the period, in Germany. But in still other countries, including many of those covered in this volume, the situation is not as straightforward. In Norway for example, one may identify different leaders of the extra-parliamentary party, of the party in parliament, and in government. The same configuration can also be found in Hungary and in Italy. In Belgium, the tradition is that the same person cannot be party president and a member of government. Moreover, since the Constitutional Reform of 1993, members of government cannot, at the same time, be members of parliament – requiring different ‘leaders’ for different spheres of party life. In these cases, the question that arises is: who is the real leader? And here again, there is not a single answer. In some cases, the real leader of the party is the leader of the parliamentary group (such as in the case of the Norwegian Conservatives, most of the Hungarian parties, and the Italian parties since the Second Republic). However, in Austria and Belgium, the most powerful position is typically that of leader of the extra-parliamentary party. A comparative perspective 225 Another complication arises when the party is in power. Under these circumstances, it may be that the real party leadership lies in the hands of the prime minister, or of the most senior minister of the party in a coalition government. It is clear for example in Belgium that the prime minister is the real leader of his party even if a party president is formally appointed to manage the extra- parliamentary organisation. But when the party is sent to the opposition benches, the real leadership of the party reverts back to the leader of the extra- parliamentary group. Norway also provides examples of blurred leadership when the party chair – that is the leader of the extra-parliamentary party – co-exists with a prime minister of the same party. In these cases it is not always obvious who the real party leader is. A further complication is the system of collective leadership. The most well- known examples here are the Green parties. In their founding years, these parties were very critical of traditional party politics and the personalisation of politics that they saw as centralising power in the hands of a few leaders (Müller-Rom- mel and Poguntke 2002). As a consequence, most of these parties opted for systems of collective leadership rather than for the selection of one single leader for their newly born party organisations. In Belgium, Ecolo opted for a system with five to eight leaders before gradually reducing it to two. The Austrian and German Greens also adopted collective leadership. But this system does not limit itself to one single party family. The German Die Linke opted for dual leadership in 2007. Most Hungarian parties also chose this organisational form in their early years, and one Hungarian party, LMP, still uses it. Moreover, several other parties have occasionally worked with several co-leaders, most often to solve an intra-party conflict. For example, this was the case of the Italian Lega Nord in 2012, of the Belgian francophone liberals (MR) in 1990–1, and the Austrian FPÖ in 2002–3. There is also the peculiar situation of Shas. This ultra-orthodox Israeli party has both a spiritual leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, and a political leader who is subordinate to the spiritual leader. Notwithstanding all of these complications, there is a common observation made in the chapters in this volume that there is sufficient concentration of power to point to one single leader in almost every party. Formally, several positions of leader may be maintained but most parties see the emergence of a single dominant position. The main factors that seem to have led to this evolution are, first, the public financing of parties and, second, the way the media cover politics. A system of public financing has been implemented in most contemporary democracies (van Biezen 2010) and these new resources have, depending on the country, been allocated by state authorities either to the extra-parliamentary or to the parliamentary party empowering one face of the party at the expense of the others. Media coverage of politics has evolved significantly in recent decades. Two relevant trends are the personalisation and the presidentialisation (or prime ministerialisation, see Dowding 2013) of politics in the media. Party leaders in general, and even more so party leaders in government, have benefited from these developments that have reinforced their position. And most parties have adapted. Even those, like Green parties in Belgium, Austria and Germany, that 226 J.-B. Pilet and W.P. Cross were working with a system of collective leadership, have adapted and today have fewer leaders, and an established hierarchy among them. All of this has allowed for the identification of the principal leader of each of the parties studied in this volume. And it is on this basis, that we are be able to discuss, in a meaningful comparative fashion, how party leaders are selected, the dynamics of competition in leadership races and the characteristics of those who are eventually chosen as party leaders.

How are party leaders selected? For those identified as the principal leader of their party, the first question we can address is how they are selected. And the first observation is that there is a variety of selection methods particularly in terms of the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate. At the two extremes, we can identify the Italian Partito Demo- cratico that selects its leaders through open primaries for which all voters are eligible to participate and the Israeli Shas in which the (spiritual) leader of the party apparently is selected by God. And in between, we find a variety of methods that range from the more inclusive (selection by all party members or by party delegates at a conference) to the more exclusive (selection by a limited group of party elite, or even by the incumbent leader alone). This observation of the variety of bodies empowered to select party leaders is not new (see Kenig 2009a; Cross and Blais 2012b). Yet, what our analysis provides is an overview of how common these various methods are for about 70 parties in countries that in many cases were not covered by previous studies. Moreover, the time lapse of almost 50 years allows us to verify whether previous studies were correct in identifying a significant, though not universal, trend towards more inclusive selection methods, and towards a more systematic participation of party members. And what the data show is that both observations can be confirmed, yet with some refinements necessary (see Table 15.1). First, it is true that we observe a trend over time towards more inclusive selectorates. In 1965, the most frequent method was the selection of party leaders by a convention of party delegates (most of whom were selected by regional branches of the party, but also representing functional groups within the party like the parliamentary group (PPG), affiliated trade unions, youth organisations and sometimes ideological factions). Selection by the PPG was second most common but was exclusively used in Westminster parties. Then, over time, more inclusive methods of leadership selection were introduced. Selection by a direct vote of all party members in particular spread sufficiently to become the second most frequently used method by 2012. And it has been introduced in very different contexts: Belgium, Canada, Israel, Britain, Portugal and Italy. And at the same time, selection by the parliamentary caucus remains the norm only in Australia, and even here change is afoot. When we consider all episodes of reform of selectorates over five decades, the trend is clear. We have a total of 31 parties that have changed the body responsible for selecting the party leader. And 30 of them have opted for a more inclusive selectorate.1 Moreover, it seems that once parties have democratised, Table 15.1 The selectorate of party leaders (1965–2012)

Selectorate 1965 1980 1995 2012

N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage

Open primaries 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 2.8 Full membership votes 0 0.0 4 9.3 12 18.5 19 26.8 Party delegates 18 72.0 30 69.8 37 56.9 36 50.7 Party council 1 4.0 3 7.0 8 12.3 6 8.5 Others (i.e. single leader) 0 0.0 1 2.3 2 3.1 2 2.8 Mixed 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 3.1 2 2.8 Parliamentary party group 6 24.0 5 11.6 4 6.2 4 5.6 N 25 100.0 43 100.0 65 100.0 71 100.0

Note Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding. 228â J.-B. Pilet and W.P. Cross there is no turning back. There are a few cases of parties that have during a short period of time gone back and forth between full member votes (FMV) and more exclusive methods, but the final decision has almost always been to give each member one vote (e.g. Portuguese PS and CDS). Yet, this trend towards more inclusive selectorates should not be overstated, and that is another major finding of this research. It is true that when parties change their mechanisms to select leaders, they opt for more inclusive methods. However, the image of a universal and irresistible evolution towards full member votes or even towards open primaries is far from reality. First, the most frequently used system to select party leaders remains election by a convention of party delegates. It involves party members but not on a one-Âmember, one-Âvote basis. The picture that we observe in 2012 is therefore the co-Âexistence of two dominant selectorates: party members and party conventions. We also find that the trend towards more inclusiveness can be resisted. In Spain, Germany,2 Austria, Hungary and Norway parties have not modified the way their leaders are selected over the entire period we study. And, even in countries where these changes have been happening, not all parties have followed suit. Italy is probably the best illustration of this. On the left, the social democrats (PDS, PD) gradually shifted to full member votes and then to open primaries. But on the right, their main opponents (Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazion- ale, Lega Nord) have not opted for more inclusive selection methods. The same dualisation of how party leaders are chosen may be observed in Portugal and in Israel. Only Canada and Belgium, and to some extent the UK, can be described as cases where adoption of the FMV method has been an irresistible change for all national parties. These differences across countries and between parties directly link with existing scholarly work on the determinants of intra-Âparty democratisation of which the adoption of more inclusive selectorates is a key component. Cross and Blais (2012b) have pointed at various conditions under which such reforms are more likely to happen. First, parties seem to be more likely to democratise after an electoral defeat as well as when they are in opposition. Second, intra-Âparty democratisation is more frequent among newer and smaller parties, and slightly more common among left-Âwing parties. And, third, there seems to be a contagion effect within national political systems. On this last element, we have already seen that contagion might explain the adoption of full member votes by all parties in Belgium and Canada, as well as the partial democratisation of the British parties. Yet, it cannot account for cases like Italy, Portugal or Israel where only some parties have opted for FMV while others have maintained less inclusive selectorates. But while the idea of a contagion effect seems to be limited to a few countries, the effects of electoral defeat and of being in opposition are strongly confirmed (see Table 15.2). Close to 80 per cent of the parties that have adopted more inclusive selectorates did so while they were out of power, and about two-Â thirds of them did so after an electoral defeat. The same figures are found when shifts to FMV are considered alone. These findings confirm those of Cross and A comparative perspective 229 Table 15.2 Parties’ political context when adopting a more inclusive leadership selectorate

All shifts towards more Only shift towards full inclusiveness1 (percentage) membership votes or open primaries (percentage)

Defeat in last election 65.5 68.8 In opposition 77.4 77.8 Left-wing 41.9 44.4 New parties (<10 years) 18.7 22.2 Small parties (<10%) 19.4 22.2 N 31 18

Note 1 All changes towards more inclusiveness are counted, even when a party shifts more than once. We exclude parties (like Forza Italia, Lega Nord and Kadima) that adopted more inclusive selectorates in the immediate period after their foundation. The shift towards more inclusive selectorate is for them just a shift from a self-appointed founding leader to the normal functioning of a political party.

Blais (2012b) about Westminster democracies. They also show that Wauters’ analysis of the Belgian case (Wauters 2013), where some parties did opt for a more inclusive selectorate while in government and/or after an electoral victory, appears exceptional. As Wauters himself suggests, this could be a peculiarity of consensus democracies. For the other hypotheses tested by Cross and Blais, we find, like they did, mixed evidence. The adoption of FMV or the shift towards any kind of more inclusive selectorate does not seem to occur significantly more frequently among left-wing parties, nor among newer and smaller parties. Only a minority of those parties that have democratised leadership selection were founded less than ten years before or received fewer than 10 per cent of the vote in the preceding elections. And, more importantly, their proportion among democratising parties is close to their share of our overall population of parties. Overall, if we try to sum up the contribution of this volume to the understanding of the democratisation of leadership selection within political parties, it appears that the main factors are country and system-level effects (see Barnea and Rahat 2007). We see a lot of change in some countries and no change in others; and system-level effects, such as electoral defeats and periods in opposition, appear strongly related to the propensity to adopt these reforms. Though the selectorate is central in understanding how party leaders are chosen, it is not the only rule that is of interest in understanding the dynamics of leadership selection within political parties. In this volume, we also discuss other rules and mechanisms such as the electoral formula, candidacy requirements, endorsement thresholds, term lengths and deselection rules. Table 15.3 illustrates the status of these rules as of 2012. The first finding is that the most frequent electoral formula is the two-round run-off system used in more than 40 per cent of the parties. Then comes first- past-the-post and elimination ballots. This distribution resembles what is Table 15.3 Rules organising the elections of party leaders (2012)

Electoral formula (%) Candidacy requirements (%) Endorsement (%) Term length (%) Deselection rules1 (%)

Plurality 25.0 Being a member 53.3 No endorsement 48.5 One year 1.4 No deselection rule 47.9 required in party statutes Elimination 22.1 Being an MP 7.0 Two years 28.2 ballot Endorsement by 15.0 Removal by party 8.5 Being member of 15.5 Three years 15.5 party members members AV 7.4 party council Four years and more 31.0 Endorsement by 33.3 Removal by party 23.9 Run-off 44.1 No requirement 23.9 regional/local No term length 23.9 delegates

Other 1.5 branches Max number of terms 14.7 Removal by party 11.3 Endorsement by 3.2 council

MPs Removal by 5.6 parliamentary party

group

Other 2.8 N2 68 N 71 N 33 N 71 N 71

Notes 1 Reflects formal rule as established in party statutes or rules. 2 Ns vary because information may be missing for some parties on some of the variables. A comparative perspective 231 observed for presidential elections in democracies around the world for which the most frequent system is also run-off followed by plurality voting (Bormann and Golder 2013). We can thus confirm that for election to one single position, the most common systems guarantee that the winner has the support of at least 50 per cent of the voters. Interestingly, the electoral formula used by political parties does not copy the one in use for national legislative elections. Leadership elections under plurality are not found in Canada and Britain. In these countries, the most frequent formulae are elimination ballots and the alternative vote. Plu- rality elections are more common in Italy, Spain and Portugal. Run-off elections are the most frequent formula in Belgium, Austria, Germany, Israel and Hungary. The second set of rules for which we can provide information relates to the conditions imposed for standing as a candidate in leadership races. One question is whether political parties try to compensate for the democratisation of the selectorate by finding ways to control access to the ballot. Our data show that this does not seem to be the case. Candidacy requirements remain low. In more than half of the parties, being a member is the only eligibility requirement. Moreover, in many cases, there is no endorsement mechanism requiring candidates to seek support among members, middle-level elites of the party or MPs. And when such endorsements are required, it is typically through a decentralised procedure allowing groups of party members or decentralised branches of the party to endorse candidates. Neither the parliamentary party nor the central party elite have strict control over ballot access. An exception here is the UK case where Conservative parliamentarians alone choose the two candidates to contests a subsequent membership ballot and access to the Labour party’s electoral college ballot requires significant support from the party’s MPs. Finally, we are also able to detail how political parties organise the end of their leaders’ tenure. And the most striking finding is that they do not provide for these circumstances in their party statutes. The vast majority of them (85 per cent) do not specify any maximum number of terms and half of the parties studied do not have any specification in their statutes regarding how leaders may be deselected. And one in four of them do not specify any term length. For those that do, it is often the length of an electoral cycle of four or five years. The exceptions are the German parties that are obliged by their Federal Party Law to organise leadership elections every two years. The same rather short-term length is also common in Austria and Norway, as well as among green and left- libertarian parties. Some of these started with terms of one year, like the young LMP in Hungary and the Belgian Ecolo in the 1980s. We consider below whether the common absence of regulation regarding the end of party leaders’ terms has consequences for their average duration in office.

The dynamics of party leadership contests Having considered the rules organising leadership selection, the next question is whether these have an impact on the nature of races for party leadership. 232 J.-B. Pilet and W.P. Cross Consistent with the country chapters, this question is addressed from two perspectives. First, we consider whether the dynamics of leadership contests vary depending upon the selectorate and, second, whether the leaders chosen through different methods have different demographic and political profiles. Regarding the nature of leadership contests, we are interested in the relative rates of competitiveness and participation. One of the arguments advanced by promoters of more inclusive methods for selecting leaders is that these are less susceptible to elite domination and manipulation. As a consequence, these races should have more candidates running. Several scholars have already contested this argument. Katz and Mair (1995) have explained that party elite may prefer to leave leadership selection to grassroots party members who they may find easier to control than middle-level party activists such as convention delegates. And Cross (this volume) suggests that the financial costs of FMV campaigns may limit the number of candidates. Empirically as well, the evidence is not straightforward in supporting the proposition that more inclusive selectorates result in more open and competitive races. In an earlier analysis of party leadership elections in 11 countries over 30 years, Kenig (2009a) has shown that though more inclusive selectorates tend to attract more candidates, the distribution of votes is more concentrated in FMV systems than in those with less inclusive selectorates. In other words, there are more candidates but the contests are rarely close. The data from the 13 countries confirm for the most part Kenig’s observations (see Table 15.4). First, coronations with one single candidate are much less frequent in full member votes. While coronations represent about three-quarters of the total number of leadership contests, they only occur in about four in ten races held under FMV and open primaries. The other system frequently attracting more than one candidate is selection by the parliamentary party group (PPG). However, when there is more than one candidate in these contests, the most frequent number of candidates is two. Under FMV it is not unusual to have more names on the ballot. Races with at least three candidates represent 40 per cent of leadership contests with these most inclusive selectorates. By contrast, when the choice is left to delegates in a party convention, or to a smaller party agency like a party council, coronations are the norm. This does not result from a lack of competition for party leadership but rather because these conflicts happen behind closed doors. Intra-party groups and factions try to reach a consensus in order to come up with a single candidate to be confirmed by the party convention or the party council. Thus, the real contest often occurs among party elites prior to the convention. When we consider the actual competition between candidates running, the differences between selectorates are less sharp. The measure we use is the margin between the top two finishers on the first ballot. Taking all contests into account, it is clear that selection through FMV, as well as the PPG, produces more competitive races. However, this is mostly due to the fact that there are fewer coronations. When only races with at least two candidates are taken into consideration, the differences remain but are less striking. The smallest margin Table 15.4 Competitiveness of leadership races by type of selectorate1

Selectorate Full membership vote Party delegates in Party council Parliamentary party All contests and open primaries conference group Number of candidates

1 39.8 80.5 77.6 55.9 71.7 2 20.3 12.0 10.2 28.0 14.7 3 16.3 4.6 10.2 7.5 6.8 4 11.4 0.8 0.0 3.2 2.7 5 or more 12.2 2.1 2.0 5.4 4.0

Average number of candidates 2.6 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.6 N 123 609 49 93 892 Margin between top two finishers (all cases) 54.2 83.9 82.5 66.6 77.8 N = 859 Margin between top two finishers (min. two 30.7 38.5 34.5 22.0 33.3 candidates) N = 244 Proportion of tight races (margin <10% with 18.3 22.6 9.1 34.1 22.2 minimum of two candidates) N = 244

Note 1 Parties selecting leaders with mixed selectorates (members, delegates, parliamentary party group), like the British Conservative and Labour parties, are not counted in any of the first four columns; but, they are counted in the category ‘all contests’. Thus, the N for ‘all contests’ is larger than the sum of the Ns for the four types of selectorates. 234 J.-B. Pilet and W.P. Cross between the top two finishers is found in races within the PPG. The most famous example of these probably is the 1990 race for the leadership of the British Conservative Party that led to Margaret Thatcher’s dismissal. But there are many examples of other close contests when the parliamentary caucus selects the leader. There have been many of these in both the Australian Labor and Liberal parties. This probably results from the knowledge candidates have regarding their support level among such a small and intimate selectorate. Would-be candidates with limited support tend to withdraw before the balloting begins, meaning most of those remaining are likely to have significant support among their parliamentary colleagues. Thus, contested elections are often close. Races for party leadership held under FMV have the second smallest average margin between the top two finishers. There are examples of very tight FMV races such as the 1996 contest in the Belgian francophone Christian Democratic party (CDH) won with a margin of 0.1 per cent. However, this is not the norm. The most likely configuration is to have two or three candidates running but with one candidate clearly ahead and ultimately winning by a large margin. In that sense, the competitiveness of elections by party members is not very different from those when party delegates vote or when the choice is left to a party council or other party agency. Another indicator that illustrates this point is the proportion of contested races in which the margin on the first ballot is ten percentage points or less. While this occurs in about one-third of the races organised within the parliamentary caucus, it is only found in 18 per cent of those held under FMV. This is slightly less than when the party leader is selected by delegates gathered during a party convention (23 per cent), and about twice as frequent as when a party council decides (9.1 per cent). Overall, these findings tend to confirm Kenig’s conclusions. More inclusive selectorates attract more candidates, but do not necessarily produce more competitive races. On this variable, FMV contests are not significantly different from those held among convention delegates. And it is when the parliamentary caucus decides that races tend to be closest. Our data also shed light on the conditions under which more competitive contests are most likely to occur regardless of the selectorate. Two factors stand out here. First, races are less competitive when a party is in government. For instance, one-third of the races held when a party sits on the opposition benches involve more than one candidate, compared with one-quarter of contests for parties in power. Moreover, the average margin between the top two finishers is a little smaller when the party is in opposition compared to parties in government. This difference probably results from a greater desire by governing parties to manage the transition internally and not risk potential divisiveness resulting from a contested, intra-party struggle. The second finding worth noting is that races are clearly more competitive after an election loss than after electoral victory. Half of the races held after an electoral defeat involve more than one candidate compared to one in four of those following an election in which the party gained votes. There is also a A comparative perspective 235 difference in the margin between the top two candidates on this variable. In other words, and perhaps not surprisingly, party leadership contests are more competitive when parties find themselves in difficult times. This is probably linked with the observation made in several of the country chapters that, in recent decades, party leaders are facing more difficulties in surviving an electoral defeat or a long period in opposition than they did in the 1960s and 1970s. Consistent with the personalisation of politics noted earlier, party leaders have to be successful electoral performers if they want to remain in their position. They are evaluated on their results, and these results are mostly about winning elections and entering government. Those who succeed typically enjoy easy re-election while leaders who fail on these counts are likely to face challengers in their efforts to remain in the top job.

Demographics and tenure of party leaders We consider here the age, gender and political experience of those chosen to lead their party. In doing so we examine whether there has been change over time and whether the rules governing leadership selection influence the profile of leaders chosen. Finally, we consider the relationship between the length of leaders’ tenure and the type of rules they were selected under. The dataset assembled for this volume includes information on 443 party leaders (see Table 15.5). Our first observation is that we can confirm a strong under-representation of women. In total, they represent only 12.4 per cent of all

Table 15.5 Demographics of party leaders

Women Age Political Average N2 (percentage) (in years) seniority length of (percentage tenure (in with) months)1

All 12.4 49.4 83.3 61.4 443 Full membership vote 14.4 50.2 85.6 44.2 104 Party delegates 13.5 48.4 84.3 64.1 252 Party council 0.0 50.7 43.7 102.5 23 Parliamentary party 4.7 51.8 97.5 69.1 43 group 1960s 3.8 57.8 96.2 94.8 26 1970s 4.5 47.9 81.2 76.0 66 1980s 9.9 50.1 75.7 63.7 71 1990s 12.8 48.3 83.8 70.4 117 2000s 15.4 49.0 85.8 40.2 162

Notes 1 Leaders selected before 2012 but still in office are counted with duration in office until 31 December 2012. Leaders selected more than once but with an interruption between leadership terms are counted more than once. 2 Ns for duration in office are slightly smaller due to missing information for some leaders and because leaders who are part of a collective leadership are not counted. 236 J.-B. Pilet and W.P. Cross leaders (55 of 443) and some of these are cases where there are two leaders with one position reserved for a female. On the positive side, we do observe an increase in their number over time. While female leaders were almost non- existent in the 1960s and 1970s, they gradually increase in number and approach 16 per cent in recent years. These female leaders are not equally spread across our 13 countries. There have been several in Norway, Belgium and Canada while in other countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Romania and Britain there have been none or very few. We find little variation in terms of leaders’ age when they assume the position. The average age at the time of becoming a party leader has consistently remained around 50 years. There are brief periods of generational change in several countries when a new group of younger leaders emerges and temporarily lowers the average age. But these are fleeting transitions and do not last as in almost every case the average age increases again as time goes on. The findings here are strikingly consistent across countries and over time. What seems to be more of a trend is the decline in political seniority of party leaders. In the 1960s, almost all leaders had served in the national parliament or government before becoming leader. While this remains the case for a strong majority of leaders there is a slight decrease in frequency in recent years. Post- 1970 about one-fifth of leaders have not been a national MP or minister before becoming leader. There are two main explanations for this change, and neither seems to point at a growing tendency of parties to give political rookies a chance at the leadership. First, the significant number of leaders without political seniority in the 1970s and 1980s is in large measure due to the addition of Spain and Portugal. Many leaders in these two countries had no political seniority because they did not hold any national office during the dictatorship of Franco and Salazar. The same is true for the leaders of Romanian parties in the early 1990s, but interestingly not in Hungary. The second explanation is the growing number of party leaders who come from sub-national politics in multi-level countries. In Belgium and Spain especially, but also in Canada, Germany and Austria, this type of career trajectory has become somewhat more frequent in recent years. We are also interested in how these demographic and political characteristics are related to the rules organising leadership selection. In a study of the use of more inclusive selectorates for choosing legislative candidates, Rahat and colleagues (2008) have shown that wider selectorates do not necessarily lead to the more frequent selection of women and that they also tend to favour incumbents at the expense of newcomers. Our findings for party leaders show slightly different patterns. There are significant differences between, on the one hand, selection by FMV or party delegates and, on the other hand, by a smaller party agency like a party council or the parliamentary caucus. First, female leaders are significantly more likely to emerge victorious from FMV contests or a convention of delegates. On the other hand, smaller party agencies like party councils more frequently select leaders without previous experience in national parliament and/ or government. In that sense, the data confirm that established politicians are favoured by wider selectorates, but also that more inclusive selectorates do not A comparative perspective 237 appear to disadvantage female candidates as may be the case for the selection of those running for the legislature. The type of selectorate does not make any significant difference for age of leaders. The demographic and political characteristics of party leaders are not the only elements of their biography that can be analysed with our data. We also consider the length of leaders’ tenure in office. What we observe here is a decline over time in the length of party leaders’ stay in office. More precisely, we note a sharp decline between the 1960s and the 1980s and then a stabilisation in the 1990s. (Figures for the 2000s – until 2012 – are hard to interpret because they include leaders still in office, and therefore artificially lower the average.) We do find that there is some relationship between the rules of the game and leaders’ duration in office. The first observation is that leaders elected under FMV tend to leave (or be forced to leave) office earlier. Their average duration as party leader is less than four years (44 months) while leaders selected by PPGs and party convention stay a considerably longer 69 and 64 months, and leaders selected by party councils last the longest at 102 months. The shorter tenure for leaders directly selected by party members is not explained by the arti- ficial effect of including leaders still in office. Without them, the average tenure for leaders selected through FMV remains the same. The other rules that could be expected to have an effect are how the party organises the deselection of its leader, and how long the leader’s term is before having to stand for re-election. For the first set of rules, there are two interesting findings. First, whether or not there are deselection procedures included in the party statutes makes little difference. Leaders selected by parties with no such provisions have an average length in office that is very close to the overall mean (61 months). The second finding is that deselection mechanisms do not appear to have any effect on the duration of leaders’ tenure in office. We observe no significant difference in the length in office of party leaders across the different groups that have the formal power to deselect the leader. Whether this authority is held centrally or dispersed to all party members does not seem to significantly affect leaders’ longevity in office. Finally, it appears that rules regarding term length also make very little difference. Leaders of parties that have no term length specified in their statutes stay in office for about two months less on average than those leading parties that require their leaders to be periodically renewed. In other words, it does not seem that stricter rules regarding how a party leader’s term may end significantly affect how long leaders last.

Intra-party democracy and leadership selection The overview of party leadership provided in this volume is extremely rich. It covers more countries, more political parties, more leadership races and more party leaders than any previous study on the subject. Therefore, extracting the main findings of this study is a complicated task. And this concluding chapter only begins to open avenues for further reflection and research. Readers are 238 J.-B. Pilet and W.P. Cross reminded of the rich online appendix to this book that includes comprehensive details of all of the leadership races and party leaders included in our dataset (www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415704168/). Beyond the empirical findings, this study connects with other subfields of research in political science and can usefully dialogue with them. First and fore- most, this book contributes to the discussion on democracy within political parties. Much has been written on the decline of parties as membership and participatory organisations (Mair and van Biezen 2001; Cain et al. 2004; Scarrow 1999a; Cross and Katz 2013). Public opinion polls in many democracies find a growing number of voters dissatisfied with the performance of their parties and distrustful of them as democratic organisations. At the same time, the traditional parties have been challenged by new entrants, such as the greens, radical right populists and pirate parties, who are often critical of the old-line parties as being out of touch and elite dominated. Many parties have responded to these pressures by attempting to reframe their internal organisational structures to become more participatory and in doing so provide more authority to their rank-and-file members (Young and Cross 2002b). In terms of party leadership selection, this increasingly has taken the form of involving members directly in the choice of the head of the party. The large majority of parties now provide their members with a say in the leadership choice either directly through FMV or indirectly through delegated conventions. While the role of party leader varies by party and country, the person holding this office exercises considerable political authority both within and often beyond the party. Thus, it is not surprising that reformers have often set their sights on the method of selection of the party leader in their attempts to democratise party organisation. While there is an observable trend towards FMV, it is neither universal nor irresistible. The details in the country chapters of this volume make clear that the method of leadership selection has important implications. Contests are different when conducted in the parliamentary caucus, or among a small party elite, than when they take place at a party congress or through a ballot of all party members. Con- tests with wider selectorates tend to be more transparent and to involve and inform many more voters. These contests, with more inclusive selectorates, also have significantly more candidates running, and coronations of a sole candidate selected by a few, typically behind closed doors, are less common. Yet, this does not mean that these leadership races are necessarily more competitive as one candidate typically dominates the field. Wider selectorates also seem to lead to slightly more representative leaders. While still dramatically under-represented, we find more female party leaders when members do the selecting than when small groups within the party do so. But at the same time, members may also be conservative in electing established politicians who perhaps come better prepared to these lengthier, more costly and more complicated party contests. Finally, there are some signs that party leaders are slightly more accountable when they are elected by wider selectorates. On average, they stay in office for shorter periods of time, and are more likely to be challenged when they do not deliver electoral success to the party. A comparative perspective 239 Several decades ago, the selection of legislative candidates was aptly referred to as the ‘secret garden’ of politics (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Today, this phrase might well apply to the selection of party leaders. Our hope is that this volume begins to shed an illuminating light on this most important aspect of intra-party politics. How parties organise the selection of their leaders, typically in the absence of state regulation, tells us a great deal regarding how they view themselves as democratic organisations. Parties decide who the appropriate ‘demos’ is for purposes of leadership selection, they set the thresholds would-be candidates must meet in order to seek office, they decide how long leaders stay in their post and how easy or not it is to remove a leader. But these are not positions of influence limited to the political party. As we have noted, these party leaders most often are also the principal candidates for prime minister and regularly take up key posts in the legislature and government. Concern regarding the methods of their selection transcends intra-party politics as these elections are increasingly a crucial element of the overall democratic process within parliamentary democracies.

Notes 1 Each party is counted only once, meaning that if a party has reformed several times, we only compare the initial and the current situation. 2 Germany is an interesting case as its federal law requires parties to select their leaders by a party convention. Yet, some have argued for full member votes to precede the formal selection at convention. This system has been used in several Länder for the selection of the Land party leaders. Bibliography

Aarts, K., Blais, A. and Schmitt, H. (2011) Political Leaders and Democratic Elections, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ágh, A. (1995) ‘The “early freezing” of the East Central European parties: the case of the Hungarian Socialist Party’, Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition, no. 129, Buda- pest: Hungarian Center for Democratic Studies Foundation. Albanese, A. (2012) ‘Transcript of Press Conference – Sydney – Issue: Labor Leader- ship’, 25 February, available at: http://anthonyalbanese.com.au/transcript-of-press- conference. Alderman, K. (1999) ‘Revision of leadership election procedures in the Conservative Party’, Parliamentary Affairs, 52(2): 260–74. Allern, E.H. (2010a) Political Parties and Interest Groups in Norway, Colchester: ECPR Press. Allern, E.H. (2010b) ‘Parties as vehicles of democracy in Norway: still working after all these years?’ in K. Lawson (ed.) Political Parties and Democracy: Europe, vol. 2. Westport, CN: Praeger. Allern, S. (2001) Flokkdyr på Løvebakken, Oslo: Pax. Andrews, J.T. and Jackman, R.W. (2008) ‘If winning isn’t everything, why do they keep score? Consequences of electoral performance for party leaders’, British Journal of Political Science, 38(4): 657–75. Astudillo, J. and García-Guereta, E. (2006) ‘If it isn’t broken, don’t fix it: the Spanish Popular Party in power’, South European Society and Politics, 11(3/4): 399–417. Australian Democrats (1992) National Journal, April, Lower Plenty, Victoria: Australian Democrats. Australian Democrats (2003) Freedom, Fairness and the Future, Kingston: Australian Democrats. Baccetti, C. (2007) I postdemocristiani, Bologna: Il Mulino. Bale, T. (2011) The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron, Cambridge: Polity. Bale, T. (2012) The Conservatives Since 1945: The Drivers of Party Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Balmas, M., Rahat, G., Sheafer, T. and Shenhav, S. (2012) ‘Two routes to personalized politics: centralized and decentralized personalization’, Party Politics, DOI: 10.1177/1354068811436037 (ahead of print). Bardi, L. (2002) ‘Italian parties: change and functionality’, in Webb, P., Farrell, D. and Holliday, I. (eds) Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bardi, L. and Morlino, L. (1994) ‘Italy: tracing the roots of the great transformation’, in Bibliography 241 Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (eds) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London: Sage. Barnea, S. (2011) ‘Chronicles of the comeback that was and the one that almost was’, in Arian, A. and Shamir, M. (eds) The Elections in Israel – 2009, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Barnea, S. and Rahat, G. (2007) ‘Reforming candidate selection methods: a three-level approach’, Party Politics, 13(3): 375–94. Barrio, A. (2008) ‘Les aliances entre partits. El cas de CiU 1978–2004’, PhD thesis, Bel- laterra: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Barrio, A. and Barberà, O. (2010) ‘La stabilité des dirigeants de parti en Espagne (1977–2008)’, Pôle Sud, 33: 159–87. Barrio, A. and Barberà, O. (2011) ‘Convergència i Unió’, in Elias, A. and Tronconni, F. (eds) From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the Challenges of Representa- tion, Hongria: Braumüller. Bean, C. (1997) ‘Australian Democrats: electoral performance and voting support’, in Warhurst, J. (ed.) Keeping the Bastards Honest: The Australian Democrats’ First Twenty Years, Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Biezen, I. van (2003) Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Biezen, I. van (2004) ‘Political parties as public utilities’, Party Politics, 10(6): 701–22. Biezen, I. van (2010) ‘Campaign and party finance’, in LeDuc, L., Niemi, R.G. and Norris, P. (eds) Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, London: Sage. Biezen, I. van and Hopkin, J. (2005) ‘The presidentialization of Spanish Democracy: sources of prime ministerial power in post-Franco Spain’, in Poguntke, T. and Webb, P. (eds) The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Demo- cracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Biezen, I. van, Mair, P. and Poguntke, T. (2012) ‘Going, going, . . . gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 51(1): 24–56. Bille, L. (1997) ‘Leadership change and party change: the case of the Danish Social Democratic Party 1960–95’, Party Politics, 3(3): 379–90. Biondi, P., Dewachter, W., Fiers, S. and Wauters, B. (2000) ‘Political Belgium 1980–2000: a concise statistical overview’, Res Publica, 42(1): 119–63. Borchert, J. and Stolz, K. (2011) ‘Introduction: political careers in multi-level systems’, Regional and Federal Studies, 21(2): 107–15. Bordandini, P. and Di Virgilio, A. (2008) ‘The birth of a party: the case of the Italian Partito Democratico’, South European Society and Politics, 13(3): 303–24. Bormann, N.-C. and Golder, M. (2013) ‘Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946–2011’, Electoral Studies, 32(2): 360–9. Brett, J. (2010) ‘The Liberal Party’, in Woodward, D., Parki, A. and Summers, J. (eds) Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia, 9th edition, Sydney: Pearson. Bruneau, T.C., Diamondouros, P.N., Gunther, R., Lijphart, A., Morlino, L. and Brooks, R.A. (2001) ‘Democracy, Southern European style’, in Diamandouros, P.N. and Gunther, R. (eds) Parties, Politics, and Democracy in New Southern Europe, Balti- more, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Bynander, F. and ’t Hart, P. (2007) ‘The politics of party leader survival and succession: Australia in comparative perspective’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 42(1): 47–72. 242 Bibliography Cain, B., Dalton, R. and Scarrow, S. (2003) (eds) Democracy Transformed? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Calise, M. (2010) Il partito personale. I due corpi del leader, Bari: Laterza. Carty, R.K. (1988) ‘Campaigning in the trenches: the transformation of constituency politics’ in Perlin, G. (ed.) Party Democracy in Canada: The Politics of National Party Conventions, Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada. Carty, R.K. (2004) ‘Parties as franchise systems: the stratarchical organizational imperative’, Party Politics, 10(1): 5–24. Carty, R.K. and Blake, D.E. (1999) ‘The adoption of membership votes for choosing party leaders – the experience of Canadian parties’, Party Politics, 5(2): 211–24. Carty, R.K. and Cross, W. (2006) ‘Can stratarchically organized parties be democratic? The Canadian case’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 16(2): 93–114. Carty, R.K., Cross, W. and Young, L. (2000) Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics, Van- couver, BC: UBC Press. Chadel, F. (2000) Étude comparative du leadership au sein des partis politiques. Le RPR et le PP, PhD thesis, Aix-en-Provence: Institut d’Études Politiques. Chiru, M. and Gherghina, S. (2012) ‘Keeping the doors closed: leadership selection in post-communist Romania’, East European Politics and Societies, 26(3): 510–37. Cohen, M., Karol, D. and Noel, H. (2008) The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Colomé, G. and López Nieto, L. (1989) Leadership Selection in the Spanish Parties, Working Paper No. 6, Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials. Courtney, J.C. (1973) The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada, Toronto, ON: Macmillan. Courtney, J.C. (1995) Do Conventions Matter? Choosing National Party Leaders in Canada, Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Cowley, P. (2012) ‘Arise, novice leader! The continuing rise of the career politician in Britain’, Politics, 32(1): 31–8. Cowley, P. and Bailey, M. (2000) ‘Peasants’ uprising or religious war? Re-examining the 1975 Conservative leadership contest’, British Journal of Political Science, 30(4): 599–629. Cross, W. (1996) ‘Direct election of provincial party leaders in Canada, 1985–1995: the end of the leadership convention?’ Canadian Journal of Political Science, 29(2): 295–315. Cross, W. (2002) ‘The increasing importance of region to Canadian election campaigns’, in Young, L. and Archer, K. (eds) Regionalism and Party Politics in Canada, Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Cross, W. (2004) Political Parties, Vancouver, BC: UBC Press. Cross, W. (2006) ‘Candidate nomination in Canada’s political parties’, presented at the IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka Japan. available at: http://paperroom.ipsa.org/ papers/ paper_5470.pdf. Cross, W. and Blais, A. (2011) ‘Holding party leaders to account: the Westminster cases’, in ’t Hart, P. and Uhr, J. (eds) How Power Changes Hands, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 133–56. Cross, W. and Blais, A. (2012a) Politics at the Centre: The Selection and Removal of Party Leaders in the Anglo Parliamentary Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cross, W. and Blais, A. (2012b) ‘Who selects the party leader?’ Party Politics, 18(2): 127–50. Bibliography 243 Cross, W. and Crysler, J. (2009) ‘Grassroots participation and party leadership selection: examining the British and Canadian cases’ in DeBardeleben, J. and Pammett, J. (eds) Activating the Citizen: Dilemmas of Participation in Europe and Canada, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cross, W. and Crysler, J. (2011) ‘Financing party leadership campaigns’ in Young, L. and Jansen, H. (eds) Money, Politics and Democracy: Canada’s Party Finance Reforms, Vancouver, BC: UBC Press. Cross, W. and Katz, R.S. (eds) (2013) The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cross, W. and Rahat, G. (2012) ‘The pathologies of party primaries and their possible solutions’, presented at the workshop on ‘Party Primaries in Europe: Consequences and Challenges’, European Consortium for Political Research’s Joint Sessions of Work- shops, University of Antwerp, Belgium, 11–15 April. Dachs, H., Gerlich, P. and Müller, W.C. (eds) (1995) Die Politiker, Vienna: Manz. Dalton, R.J. (2004) Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Polit- ical Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R.J. and Wattenberg, M. (eds) (2000) Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davey, P. (2010) Ninety Not Out: The Nationals 1920–2010, Sydney: UNSW Press. Davis, J. (1998) Leadership Selection in Six Western Democracies, London: Fitzroy Dearborn. De Winter, L. (1998) ‘Parliament and government in Belgium: prisoners of partitocracy’, in Norton, P. (ed.) Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe, London: Frank Cass. De Winter, L. (2000) ‘Liberal parties in Belgium: from freemasons to free citizens’, in De Winter, L. (ed.) Liberalism and Liberal Parties in the European Union, Barcelona: ICPS. De Winter, L. and Dumont, P. (2006) ‘Delegation and accountability under partitocratic rule’, in Ström, K., Müller, W.C. and Bergmann, T. (eds) Delegation and Account- ability in Parliamentary Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Delwit, P. and De Waele, J.-M. (1996) Ecolo: Les verts en politique, Brussels: De Boeck, collection Politique et Histoire. Denham, A. and O’Hara, K. (2008) Democratising Conservative Leadership Selection: From Grey Suits to Grass Roots, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Depauw, S. and Martin, S. (2008) ‘Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective’, in Benoit, K. and Gianetti, D. (eds) Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments, Abingdon: Routledge. Deschouwer, K. (1992) ‘Survival of the fittest: measuring and explaining adaptation and change in political parties’, paper presented at the Joint Sessions of the ECPR, Limer- ick, Ireland. Deschouwer, K. (1994) ‘The decline of consociationalism and the reluctant moderniza- tion of the Belgian mass parties’, in R. Katz and P. Mair (eds) How Parties Organize: Adaptation and Change in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London: Sage, pp. 80–108. Deschouwer, K. (2009) The Politics of Belgium: Governing a Divided Society, London: Palgrave. Deschouwer, K., Dewinter, L. and Della Porta, D. (1996) ‘Partitocracies between crises and reforms: the cases of Belgium and Italy’, Res Publica, 38(2): 215–494. Detterbeck, K. (2011) ‘Party careers in federal systems: vertical linkages within Austrian, 244 Bibliography German, Canadian and Australian parties’, Regional and Federal Studies, 21(2): 245–70. Detterbeck, K. (2012) Multi-Level Party Politics in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmil- lan. Detterbeck, K. (2013) ‘The rare event of choice: party primaries in German Land parties’, German Politics, DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2013.794451 (ahead of print). Dewachter, W. (1987) ‘Changes in particracy: the Belgian party system from 1944 to 1986’, in Daalder, H. (ed.) Party Systems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, the Neth- erlands and Belgium, London: Pinter. Docherty, D. (2005) Legislatures, Vancouver, BC: UBC Press. Dowding, K. (2013) ‘The prime ministerialisation of the British prime minister’, Parlia- mentary Affairs, 66(3): 317–35. Dowding, K. and Dumont, P. (2009) The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing, Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Drucker, H. (1984) ‘Intra-party democracy in action: the election of leader and deputy leader by the Labour Party in 1983’, Parliamentary Affairs, 37(1): 283–300. Duverger, M. (1964) Political Parties, London: Methuen. Economou, N. (2010) ‘The Labor Party’, in Woodward, D., Parki, A. and Summers, J. (eds) Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia, 9th edition, Sydney: Pearson. Economou, N. and Ghazarian, Z. (2008) ‘Vale the Australian Democrats: organisational failure and electoral decline’, paper presented at the Australian Political Studies Asso- ciation Conference, Brisbane, available at: www.uq.edu.au/polsis/apsa2008/ Refereed- papers/Economou.pdf‎. Ennser-Jedenastik, L. and Müller, W.C. (forthcoming) ‘Intra-party democracy, political performance, and the survival of party leaders: Austria, 1945–2012’, Party Politics. Enyedi, Z. (2006) ‘A befagyott felszín és ami alatt van. A 2006-os választás és a magyar pártrendszer’, in Karácsony, G. (ed.) Parlamenti választás 2006. Elemzések és adatok, Budapest: DKMKA BCE. Enyedi, Z. and Toka, G. (2007) ‘The only game in town: party politics in Hungary’, in Webb, P. and White. S. (eds) Party Politics in New Democracies, Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press. Farrell, D. and Webb, P. (2000) ‘Political parties as campaign organizations’, in Dalton, R.J. and Wattenberg, M. (eds) Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fiers, S. (1998) Partijvoorzitters in België of ‘Le parti, c’est moi, Leuven: Acco. Flanagan, T. (2007) Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power, Montreal, QC/Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Foley, M. (2000) The British Presidency, Manchester, Manchester University Press. Frantzich, S.E. (1989) Political Parties in the Technological Age, New York: Longman. Freire, A. (2005) ‘Party system change in Portugal, 1974–2005: the role of social, political and ideological factors’, Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 4(2): 21–40. Gallagher, M. and Marsh, M. (1988) (eds) Candidate Selection in Comparative Per- spective: The Secret Garden of Politics, London: Sage. García-Guereta, E. (2001) ‘Factores externos e internos en la transformación de los partidos políticos: el caso de AP-PP’, PhD thesis, Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estu- dios e Investigaciones. Garzia, D. (2011) ‘The personalization of politics in Western democracies: causes and consequences on leader–follower relationships’, The Leadership Quarterly, 22(4): 697–709. Bibliography 245 Gauja, A. (2005) ‘The pitfalls of participatory democracy: a study of the Australian Dem- ocrat’s GST’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 40(1): 71–85. Gauja, A. (2009) ‘Internal party democracy and policy formulation: rationales, trends and relevance’, paper presented at the European Consortium on Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops in Lisbon, Portugal. Gherghina, S. (2013) ‘One-shot party primaries: the case of the Romanian Social Demo- crats’, Politics, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9256 (ahead of print). Gherghina, S. and Miscoiu, S. (2010) Partide si lideri populisti in Romania postcomuni- sta [Populist Political Parties and Leaders in Post-Communist Romania], Iasi: Editura Institutului European. Gunther, R. and Diamond, L. (2003) ‘Species of political parties: a new typology’, Party Politics, 9(2): 167–99. Gunther, R., Montero, J.R. and Botella, J. (2004) Democracy in Modern Spain, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Harmel, R. (2002) ‘Party organizational change: competing explanations’, in Luther, R. and Muller-Rommel, F. (eds) Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and Ana- lytical Challenges, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harmel, R. and Svåsand, L. (1993) ‘Party leadership and party institutionalization: three phases of development’, West European Politics, 16(2): 67–88. Hazan, R. (2002) ‘Candidate selection’, in LeDuc, L., Niemi, R. and Norris, P. (eds) Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Hazan, R. (2005) ‘The failure of presidential parliamentarism: constitutional versus structural presidentialization in Israel’s parliamentary democracy’, in Webb, P. and Poguntke, T. (eds) The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hazan, R. and Rahat, G. (2010) Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heclo, H. (1973) ‘Presidential and prime ministerial selection’, in Matthews, J.R. (ed.) Perspectives on Presidential Selection, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Heidar, K. (1997) ‘A new party leadership?’ in Strøm, K. and Svåsand, L. (eds) Chal- lenges to Political Parties: The Case of Norway, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. Heidar, K. and Koole, R. (2000) ‘Parliamentary party groups compared’, in Heidar, K. and Koole, R. (eds) Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies: Political Parties Behind Closed Doors, London: Routledge. Heidar, K. and Saglie, J. (2002) Hva skjer med partiene? Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. Heidar, K. and Saglie, J. (2003) ‘Predestined parties? Organizational change in Norwe- gian political parties’, Party Politics, 9(2): 219–39. Heppell, T. (2007) Choosing the Tory Leader: Conservative Party Leadership Elections from Heath to Cameron, London: IB Tauris. Heppell, T. (2010) Choosing the Labour Leader: Labour Party Leadership Elections from Wilson to Brown, London: IB Tauris. Heppell, T. and Hill, M. (2008) ‘The Conservative Party leadership election of 1997: An analysis of the voting motivations of Conservative parliamentarians’, British Politics, 3(1): 63–91. Herzog, W. (1997) ‘Die Führungsgremien von Parteien. Funktionswandel und Strukturen- twicklungen’, in Gabriel, O., Niedermayer, O. and Stöss, R. (eds) Parteiendemokratie in deutschland, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 246 Bibliography Hofnung, M. (2005) ‘Fat parties – lean candidates: funding Israeli internal party contests’, in Arian, A. and Shamir, M. (eds) The Elections in Israel – 2003, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, pp. 63–83. Hofnung, M. (2008) ‘Unaccounted competition: the finance of intra-party elections’, Party Politics, 14(6): 726–44. Hopkin, J. (2001) ‘Bringing the members back in? Democratizing candidate selection in Britain and Spain’, Party Politics, 7(3): 343–61. Howard, J. (2010) Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography, Sydney: Harper Collins. Hüllen, R. van (1990) Ideologie und Machtkampf bei den Grünen. Untersuchungen zur programmatischen und innerorganisatorischen Entwicklung einer deutschen ‘Bewe- gungspartei, Bonn: Bouvier. Ignazi, P. (2006) Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ilonszki, G. (2000) ‘Parties and parliamentary parties in the making: Hungary, 1989–1997’ in Heidar, K. and Koole, R. (eds) Behind Closed Doors: Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies, London: Routledge. Ilonszki, G. and Várnagy, R. (2012) ‘The diminishing importance of party regulation in Hungary? When and how do institutions matter?’ paper presented at the CES, Nine- teenth International Conference of Europeanists, Boston, MA, March. Inglehart, R. (1990) Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jackson, S. (2011) ‘The Australian Greens: between movement and electoral professional party’, unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Sydney. Jalali, C. (2006) ‘The woes of being in opposition: the PSD since 1995’, South European Society and Politics, 11(3/4): 359–79. Jalali, C. (2007) Partidos e democracia em Portugal 1974–2005, Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Jobson, R. and Wickham-Jones, M. (2011) ‘Reinventing the block vote? Trade unions and the 2010 Labour party leadership election’, British Politics, 6(3): 317–44. Juliá, S. (1997) Los socialistas en la política española, 1879–1982, Madrid: Taurus. Karvonen, L. (2010) The Personalization of Politics: A Study of Parliamentary Demo- cracies, London: ECPR monographs, ECPR Press. Katz, R.S. (2001) ‘The problem of candidate selection and models of party democracy’, Party Politics, 7(3): 277–96. Katz, R.S. (2013) ‘Should we believe that improved intra-party democracy would arrest party decline?’ in Cross, W. and Katz, R.S. (eds) The Challenges of Intra-Party Demo- cracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (1994) (eds) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London: Sage. Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (1995) ‘Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party’, Party Politics, 1(1): 5–28. Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (2002) ‘The ascendancy of the party in public office: party organizational change in twentieth-century democracies’, in Gunther, R., Ramon-Montero, J. and Linz, J. (eds) Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Kelly, R. and Lester, P. (2005) Leadership Elections: Conservative Party, London: House of Commons Briefing Note SN/PC/1366. Kenig, O. (2009a) ‘Democratization of party leadership selection: do wider selectorates produce more competitive contests?’ Electoral Studies, 28(2): 240–7. Bibliography 247 Kenig, O. (2009b) ‘Classifying party leadership selection methods in parliamentary democracies’, Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties, 19(4): 433–47. Kenig, O. (2009c) ‘Democratizing party leadership selection in Israel: a balance sheet’, Israel Studies Forum, 24(1): 62–81. Kenig, O. and Barnea, S. (2009) ‘The selection of ministers in Israel: is the prime minister “a master of his domain”?’ Israel Affairs, 15(3): 261–78. Kenig, O., Philippov, M. and Rahat, G. (2013) ‘Party membership in Israel: an overview’, Israel Studies Forum, 28(1): 8–32. Kitschelt, H. (2006) ‘Movement parties’, in Katz, R.S. and Crotty, W.J. (eds) Handbook of Party Politics, London: Sage. Kittilson, M.C. and Scarrow, S. (2003) ‘Political parties and the rhetoric and realities of democratization’, in Cain, B.E., Dalton, R.J. and Scarrow, S. (eds) Democracy Trans- formed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kleinert, H. (1992) Vom Protest zur Regierungspartei: Die Geschichte der Grünen, Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn. Kopecký, P. (2006) ‘The rise of the power monopoly: political parties in the Czech Republic’ in Jungerstam-Mulders, S. (ed.) Post-Communist EU Member States Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate. Körösényi, A. (2005) ‘Political representation in leader democracy’, Government and Opposition, 40(3): 358–78. Koß, M. and Hough, D. (2006) ‘Landesparteien in Vergleichender Perspektive: Die Link- spartei. PDS zwischen Regierungsverantwortung und Opposition’, Zeitschrift für Par- lamentsfragen, 37(2): 312–34. La Palombara, J. (1989) Democracy Italian Style, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Laing, M. and ’t Hart, P. (2011) ‘Seeking and keeping the hot seat: a comparative analysis of party leader successions’, in ’t Hart, P. and Uhr, J. (eds) How Power Changes Hands, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Latham, M. (2005) The Latham Diaries, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Lauber, V. (1997) ‘The mixed fortunes of the Austrian Greens in the mid-1990s’, Environmental Politics, 6(1): 185–92. LeDuc, L. (2001) ‘Democratizing party leadership selection’, Party Politics, 7(3): 323–42. Lehmbruch, G. (2000) Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. Leif, T. and Raschke, J. (1994) Rudolf Scharping, die SPD und die Macht, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rororo Aktuell. Lisi, M. (2009) A arte de ser indispensável: Líder e organização no Partido Socialista Português, Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Lisi, M. (2011) Os Partidos Políticos em Portugal: Continuidade e Transformação, Coimbra: Almedina. Lobo, M.C. (2003) ‘A elite partidária em Portugal, 1976–2002’, in Pinto, A.C. and Freire, A. (eds) Elites, sociedade e mudança política, Lisbon: Celta. Lobo, M.C. (2005) ‘The presidentialization of Portuguese democracy?’ in Poguntke, T. and Webb, P. (eds) The Presidentialization of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lopes, F.F. (2004) Os Partidos Políticos, Oeiras: Celta. López Nieto, L. (1988) Alianza Popular: Estructura y evolución electoral de un partido conservador (1976–1982), Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. 248 Bibliography Lucy, R. (1985) The Australian Form of Government, Melbourne: Macmillan. Luther, K.R. (1999) ‘Must what goes up always come down? Of pillars and arches in Austria’s political architecture’, in Luther, K.R. and Deschouwer, K. (eds) Party Elites in Divided Societies, London: Routledge. Luther, K.R. (2011) ‘Of goals and own goals: a case study of right-wing populist party strategy for and during incumbency’, Party Politics, 17(4): 453–70. Maes, M. (1990) ‘De formele aanstelling van de partijvoorzitters in België, 1944–1990’, Res Publica, 32(1): 3–62. Mair, P. (1994) ‘Party organizations: from civil society to the state’, in Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (eds) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London: Sage. Mair, P. and Biezen, I. van (2001) ‘Party membership in 20 European democracies 1980–2000’, Party Politics, 7(1): 5–21. Márkus, G.G. (1997) ‘Az anomáliák normalitása – befagyott pártrendszer-cseppfolyós pártok’, in Kurtán, S., Sándor, P. and Vass, L. (eds) Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve 1996-ról, Budapest: DKMKA. Marsh, M. (1993) ‘Introduction: selecting the party leader’, European Journal of Political Research, 24(3): 229–31. May, J.D. (1973) ‘Opinion structure of political parties: the special law of curvilinear disparity’, Political Studies, 21(2): 135–51. Medding, P.Y. (1972) Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Méndez, M. (2000) La estrategia organizativa del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (1975–1996), Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Méndez, M., Ramiro, L. and Morales, L. (2004) ‘Los miembros y su papel en los partidos políticos españoles’, Zona Abierta, 108/109: 153–207. Miller, W.E. and Shanks, J.M. (1996) The New American Voter, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press. Miragliotta, N. (2006) ‘One party, two traditions: radicalism and pragmatism in the Aus- tralian Greens’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 41(4): 585–96. Miragliotta, N., Errington, W. and Barry, N. (2010) The Australian Political System in Action, Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Mughan, A. (2000) Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections, Bas- ingstoke: Palgrave. Müller, W.C. (1994) ‘The development of Austrian party organizations in the post-war period’, in Katz, R.S. and Mair, R. (eds) How Parties Organize: Change and Adapta- tion in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London: Sage. Müller, W.C. (1996) ‘Die Organisation der SPÖ, 1945–1995’, in Maderthaner, W. and Müller, W.C. (eds) Die Organisation der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie 1889–1995, Vienna: Löcker Verlag. Müller, W.C. (2003) ‘Austria: imperfect parliamentarism but fully-fledged party democracy’, in Strøm, K., Müller, W.C. and Bergman, T. (eds) Delegation and Account- ability in Parliamentary Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Müller, W.C. and Meth-Cohn, D. (1991) ‘The selection of party chairmen in Austria: a study of intra-party decision-making’, European Journal of Political Research, 20(1): 39–65. Müller, W.C. and Steininger, B. (1994) ‘Party organization and party competitiveness: the case of the Austrian People’s Party, 1945–1992’, European Journal of Political Research, 26(1): 1–29. Bibliography 249 Müller, W.C., Philipp, W. and Steininger, B. (1992) ‘Wie oligarchisch sind Österreichs Parteien? Eine empirische Analyse, 1945–1992’, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Poli- tikwissenschaft, 21(2): 117–46. Müller-Rommel, F. and Poguntke, T. (2002) (eds) Green Parties in National Govern- ments, London: Frank Cass. Muntean, A., Pop-Eleches, G. and Popescu, M. (2010) ‘The 2009 Romanian presidential elections’, Electoral Studies, 29(4): 753–57. Murray, A. (2002) ‘Submission to the Australian Democrats strategic review’, September, internal party document held by the chapter author. Narud, H.M. and Strøm, K. (2011) ‘Norway: from Hønsvaldian parliamentarism back to Madisonian roots’, in Bergmann, T. and Strøm, K. (eds) The Madisonian Turn: Polit- ical Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Nordic Europe, Ann Arbor, MI: Univer- sity of Michigan Press. Narud, H.M. and Valen, H. (2007) Demokrati og ansvar. Politisk representasjon i et fler- partisystem, Oslo: Damm & Søn. Nick, R. (1995) ‘Die Wahl vor der Wahl: Kandidatennominierung und Vorwahlen’, in Müller, W.C., Plasser, F. and Ulram, P.A. (eds) Wählerverhalten und Parteienwettbew- erb. Analysen zur Nationalratswahl 1994, Vienna: Signum. Noel, S.J.R. (2007) ‘Leaders’ entourages, parties and patronage’, in Gagnon, A.G. and Tanguay, A.B. (eds) Canadian Parties in Transition, 3rd edition, Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (1997) Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Notaker, H. (2008) ‘Coming across: the Norwegian Conservative Party and the import of overseas campaign events for the media 1986–1989’, PhD thesis, University of Oslo. Oñate, P. (2008) ‘Los partidos políticos en la España democrática’, in Jiménez de Parga, M. and Vallespín, F. (eds) La Política, Madrid: Fundación Sistema. Oñate, P. (2011) ‘The members of the Spanish autonomic parliaments: some features of a regional professionalized elite’, Pôle Sud, 33: 27–46. Østbye, H. and Aalberg, T. (2008) ‘Media and politics in Norway’, in Strömbäck, J., Ørsten, M. and Aalberg, T. (eds) Communicating Politics: Political Communication in the Nordic Countries, Gothenburg: Nordicom. Panebianco, A. (1988) Political Parties: Organisation and Power, Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press. Paolucci, C. (2007) ‘Forza Italia’, in Bardi, L., Ignazi, P. and Massari, O. (eds) I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti, Milan: Egea. Pérez-Nievas, S. (2004) ‘Modelo de partido y cambio político: El Partido Nacionalista Vasco en el proceso de transición y consolidación democrática en el País Vasco’, PhD thesis, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales. Pizzimenti, E. (2007) ‘La galassia postdemocristiana’, in Bardi, L., Ignazi, P. and Massari, O. (eds) I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti, Milan: Egea. Poguntke, T. (1989) ‘The ‘new politics’ dimensions in European Green parties’ in Muller- Rommel, F. and Poguntke, T. (eds) New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Poguntke, T. (1993) Alternative Politics: The German Green Party, Edinburgh: Edin- burgh University Press. Poguntke, T. (1994) ‘Parties in a legalistic culture: the case of Germany’, in Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (eds) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organiza- tions in Western Democracies, London: Sage Publications. 250 Bibliography Poguntke, T. and Webb, P. (2005) (eds) The Presidentialization of Politics: A Com- parative Study of Modern Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Poli, E. (2001) Forza Italia. Strutture, leadership e radicamento territoriale, Bologna: Il Mulino. Popescu, M. (2003) ‘The parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania, November 2000’, Electoral Studies, 22(2): 325–35. Punnett, M. and Ilonszki, G. (1994) ‘Leading democracy: the emergence of party leaders and their roles in the Hungarian parties’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 10(3): 101–19. Punnett, R.M. (1992) Selecting the Party Leader: Britain in Comparative Perspective, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Quinn, T. (2004) ‘Electing the leader: the British Labour Party’s electoral college’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6(3): 333–52. Quinn, T. (2012) Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Rafter, K. (2003) ‘Leadership changes in Fine Gael and the Labour Party, 2002’, Irish Political Studies, 18(1): 108–19. Rahat, G. (2011) ‘The political consequences of candidate selection to the 18th Knesset’, in Arian, A. and Shamir, M. (eds) The Elections in Israel 2009, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Rahat, G. and Hazan, R. (2001) ‘Candidate selection methods: an analytical framework’, Party Politics, 7(3): 297–322. Rahat, G. and Hazan, R. (2006) ‘Candidate selection methods: methods and consequences’, in Katz, R.S. and Crotty, W. (eds) Handbook of Party Politics, London: Sage. Rahat, G. and Hazan, R. (2007) ‘Participation in party primaries: increase in quantity, decrease in quality’, in Zittel, T. and Fuchs, D. (eds) Participatory Democracy and Political Participation: Can Participatory Engineering Bring Citizens Back In? Abing- don: Routledge. Rahat, G., Hazan, R. and Katz, R.S. (2008) ‘Democracy and political parties: on the uneasy relationships between participation, competition and representation’, Party Pol- itics, 14(6): 663–83. Ramiro, L. (2004) Cambio y adaptación en la izquierda. La evolución del Partido Comu- nista de España y de Izquierda Unida (1986–2000), Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Ranney, A. (1972) ‘Turnout and representation in presidential primary elections’, Amer- ican Political Science Review, 66(1): 21–37. Raschke, J. (1993) Die Frünen. Wie sie wurden, was sie sind, Cologne: Bund-Verlag. Renzsch, W. (2000) ‘Bundesstaat oder Parteienstaat. Überlegungen zu Entscheidungspro- zessen im Spannungsfeld von Föderaler Konsensbildung und Parlamentarischem Wett- bewerb’, in Volezkow, H. and Holtmann, E. (eds) Zwischen Wettbewerbs- und Verhandlungsdemokratie. Analysen zum Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deut- schland, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. Robinson, R.A.H. (1996) ‘Do CDS ao CDS-PP: o Partido do Centro Democrático Social e o seu papel na política portuguesa’, Análise Social, XXXI(138): 951–73. Rodríguez-Teruel, J. (2011) Los ministros de la España democrática. Reclutamiento político y carrera ministerial de Suárez a Zapatero, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políti- cos y Constitucionales. Rodríguez-Teruel, J., Barberà, O., Barrio, A. and Baras, M. (2010) ‘¿Se han hecho más Bibliography 251 democráticos los partidos? La evolución de la selección de líder en España (1977–2008)’, Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Política, 208: 159–187. Rokkan, S. (1968) ‘The structuring of mass politics in the smaller European democracies: a developmental typology’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10(2): 173–210. Romanian Constitution, available at: www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339 (accessed 5 May 2012). Russell, M. (2005) Building New Labour: The Politics of Party Organization, Basing- stoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sanderson-Nash, E. (2011) ‘Obeying the iron law? Changes to the intra-party balance of power in the British Liberal Democrats since 1988’, unpublished PhD thesis, Univer- sity of Sussex. Sandri, G. (2011) ‘Leadership selection methods in Italy and their consequences on membership mobilization’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, St. Gallen, Switzer- land, April 12–17, 2011. Sandri, G. and Pauwels, T. (2011) ‘The role of party members in Belgian and Italian parties: a cross-national analysis’, in van Haute, E. (ed.) Party Membership in Europe: Exploration into the Anthills of Party Politics, Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sasada, H. (2010) ‘The electoral origin of Japan’s nationalistic leadership: primaries in the LDP presidential election and the pull effect’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 10(1): 1–30. Scarrow, S. (1999a) ‘Democracy within – and without – parties’, Party Politics, 5(2): 275–82. Scarrow, S. (1999b) ‘Parties and the expansion of direct democracy: who benefits?’ Party Politics, 5(3): 341–62. Scarrow, S., Webb, P. and Farrell, D. (2001) ‘From social integration to electoral contestation: the changing distribution of power within political parties’, Dalton, R. and Wat- tenberg, M. (eds) Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schattschneider, E.E. (1942) Party Government: American Government in Action, New York: Farrar and Rinehart. Schmid, J. (1990) Die CDU: Organisationsstrukturen, Politiken und Funktionsweisen einer Partei im Föderalismus, Opladen: Leske+Budrich. Schüssel, W. (2009) Offengelegt, recorded by Alexander Purger, Salzburg: Ecowin. Seddone, A. and Venturino, F. (2013) ‘Bringing voters back in leader selection. the open primaries of the Italian Democratic Party’, Modern Italy, 18(3): 303–18. Seyd, P. (1999) ‘New parties/new politics’, Party Politics, 5(3): 383–405. Siegfried, A. (1904 [1966]) The Race Question in Canada, revised edition, Frank Under- hill (ed.), Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart. Skjeie, H. (1999) Vanens makt. Styringstradisjoner i Arbeiderpartiet, Oslo: Gyldendal. Spirova, M. (2007) Political Parties in Post-Communist Societies. Formation, Persist- ence, and Change, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Stark, L.P. (1996) Choosing A Leader: Party Leadership Contests in Britain from Mac- millan to Blair, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Starr, G., Richmond, K. and Maddox, G (1978) Political Parties in Australia, Richmond: Heinemann. 252 Bibliography Steininger, B. (2001) ‘Representation of women in the Austrian political system 1945–1998. from a token female politician towards an equal ratio?’ Women & Politics, 21(2): 81–106. Steininger, B. (2006) ‘Frauen im Regierungssystem’, in Dachs, H., Gerlich, P., Gottweis, H., Kramer, H., Lauber, V., Müller, W.C. and Tálos, E. (eds) Politik in Österreich. Das Handbuch, Vienna: Manz. Stewart, D.K. (1997) ‘The changing electorate: an examination of participants in the 1992 Alberta Conservative leadership election’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 30(1): 107–28. Stewart, D.K. and Carty, R.K. (2002) ‘Leadership politics as party building: the Conser- vatives in 1998’, in Cross, W. (ed.) Political Parties, Representation and Electoral Democracy in Canada, Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press. Stirnemann, A. (1988) ‘Rekrutierung und Rekrutierungsstrategien’, in Pelinka, A. and Plasser, F. (eds) Das österreichische Parteiensystem, Vienna: Böhlau. Stock, M.J. (1989) ‘Elites, Facções e Conflito Intra-partidário. O PPD/PSD e o processo político português de 1974 a 1985’, PhD thesis, University of Évora. Strøm, K. (1993) ‘Competition ruins the good life: party leadership in Norway’, Euro- pean Journal of Political Research, 24(3): 317–47. Sugita, H. (1995) ‘Challenging “twopartism”: the contribution of the Australian Demo- crats to the Australian party system”, unpublished PhD thesis, Flinders University, South Australia. Svåsand, L. (1992) ‘Norway’, in Mair, P. and Katz, R.S. (eds) Party Organizations: A Data Handbook, London: Sage. Svåsand, L. (1994) ‘Change and adaptation in Norwegian party organisations’, in Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (eds) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London: Sage. Szczerbiak, A. (2001) Poles Together? Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Post-Communist Poland, Budapest: CEU Press. Teixeira, M. da Conceição Pequito (2009) O Povo Semi-Soberano. Partidos políticos e recrutamento parlamentar, Coimbra: Almedina. Thatcher, M. (1975) ‘My kind of Tory party’, Daily Telegraph, 30 January, available at: www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=102600 (accessed 5 May 2012). Togrovnik, E. (1990) ‘An incumbent’s electoral politics under adverse conditions’, in Elazar, D.J. and Sandler, S. (eds) Israel’s Odd Couple: The 1984 Knesset Elections and the National Unity Government, Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. Valbruzzi, M. (2005) Primarie. Partecipazione e leadership, Bologna: Bononia Univer- sity Press. Valen, H., Narud, H.M. and Skare, A. (2002) ‘Norway: party dominance and decentralized decision making’, in Narud, H.M., Pedersen, M.N. and Valen, H. (eds) Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control: Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway, Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark. Várnagy, R. (2010) ‘Jelöltállítás a 2009-es európai parlamenti választásokon’, Politikatu- dományi Szemle, 2010/4: 9–24. Várnagy, R. and Ilonszki, G. (2012) ‘Üvegplafonok. Pártok fent és lent’, Politikatu- dományi Szemle, 2012/4: 7–25. Venturino, F. (2010) ‘Italy: from partitocracy to personal parties’, in Blondel, J. and Thiébault, J.L. (eds) Political Leadership, Parties and Citizens: The Personalization of Leadership, Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Bibliography 253 Verge, T. (2007) Partidos y representación política: las dimensiones del cambio en los partidos políticos españoles (1976–2006), Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Soci- ológicas. Ward, I. (1997) ‘Party organisation and membership participation’, in Warhurst, J. (ed.) Keeping the Bastards Honest: The Australian Democrats’ First Twenty Years, Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Ware, A. (2002) The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and Trans- formation in the North, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Warhurst, J. and Tate, A. (1998) ‘Direct democracy in the Australian political parties: the Australia Party and the Australian Democrats’, paper prepared for the Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Dunedin. Wauters, B. (2009) ‘Explaining participation in intra-party elections: evidence from Belgian political parties’, Party Politics, 16(2): 237–259. Wauters, B. (2013) ‘Democratizing party leadership selection in Belgium: motivations and decision-makers’, Political Studies, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12002 (ahead of print). Webb, P. (2013) The Modern British Party System, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Webb, P., Farrell, D. and Holliday, I. (2002) (eds) Political Parties in Advanced Indus- trial Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weitz, Y. (2002) From Underground Movement to Political Party: The Foundation of Herut, Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press. Weller, P. (1994) ‘Party rules and the dismissal of prime ministers: comparative perspectives from Britain, Canada and Australia’, Parliamentary Affairs, 47(1): 133–43. White, G. (2006) Cabinets and First Ministers, Vancouver, BC: UBC Press. Wilson, F. (1980) ‘Sources of party transformation: the case of France’, in Merkl, P.H. (ed.) Western European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects, New York: Free Press. Yanai, N. (1981) Party Leadership in Israel: Maintenance and Change, Ramat Gan: Tur- tledove Publishing. Young, L. (2013) ‘Party members and intra-party democracy’, in Cross, W. and Katz, R.S. (eds) The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Young, L. and Cross, W. (2002a) ‘Incentives to membership in Canadian political parties’, Political Research Quarterly, 55(3): 547–69. Young, L. and Cross, W. (2002b) ‘The rise of plebiscitary democracy in Canadian political parties’, Party Politics, 8(6): 673–99. Index

Page numbers in italics denote tables, those in bold denote figures.

Note: Political parties are mostly entered using their abbreviations followed by the full party name. A list of all political parties can be found on pages xvi–xx in the front of the book

Abbot, Dianne 26 Australia 189–205; leaders’ demographics Abbott, Tony 200, 202, 223 203–4, 205; leader defined 190–1; Abrantes, Domingos 130 leadership contests 8, 189, 194, Adam-Schwaetzer, Irmgard 85 197–202, 201, 204–5; party names and Adenauer, Konrad 78 abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 197; Agudat YIsrael Party (Israel) 221n2 selection rules 191–7, 192, 193, 194, Ahdut Ha’Avoda Party (Israel) 221n4 197, 202, 204, 205n4, 226–8; tenure Aigner, Ilse 92n8 192, 193, 203, 204; women 1, 203 Albanese, Anthony 194 Australian Democrats 189, 190, 195, 197, Alberta Conservative Party (Canada) 179, 203–4; leadership contests 199, 200, 180 202; selection rules 191–4, 192, 193, Alfano, Angelino 95, 107n4 195–7, 202, 205n1 Allen, Elin Haugsgjerd 47–61, 56 Australian Greens 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, Almunia, Joaquín 117, 121 198, 200, 203, 205n1 ALP (Australian Labor Party) 1, 8, 189, Austria 62–76; leaders’ demographics 64, 190; leaders’ demographics/tenure 203, 68, 73–4, 76n4–5, 236; leader defined 204; leadership contests 194, 198, 63–4, 224; leadership contests 68–73, 199–200, 202; selection rules 191, 192, 75, 75n1, 76n3; party names and 193, 194, 197, 205, 205n1, n4, 234 abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 71; AN (Alleanza Nazionale) (Italy) 94, 99, selection rules 64–8, 66, 67, 72, 75, 228 75n2, 76n3, 228, 231; tenure 64–5, 67, Anders Lange’s Party (Norway) 48 68, 74, 76n5; women 48, 58, 59–60, 65, Anghel, Florian 151 73, 74, 76n4 Anguita, Julio 116, 117, 120 Aznar, José María 117, 119, 121 Annemans, Gerolf 35 Antonescu, Crin 150 Bahr, Daniel 85 AP (Alianza Popular) (Spain) 108, 111, Bale, Tim 12–29 117, 119, 120, 122n3 Barak, Ehud 206, 219 APU (Aliança Povo Unido) (Portugal) Baras, Montserrat 108–23 139n5 Barberà, Oscar 108–23 Arzalluz, Xavier 118, 120, 121 Barnea, S. 6, 9 Ashdown, Paddy 21 Barrio, Astrid 108–23 Assis, Francisco 129 Bartsch, Dietmar 86 Indexâ 255 Barzel, Rainer 86 Callaghan, James 20–1 Bãsescu, Traian 142, 144, 152 Cameron, David 23–4, 25 Basque language 113 Cameron, Ian 198 BE (Left Bloc) (Portugal) 124, 125–6, 136, Camp, Dalton 188n1 138, 139n3–4 campaigns: financing 10, 182–3, 216, 225, Beazley, Kim 199, 202 232; professional 215; recruitment Beck, Kurt 92n9 campaigns 176–7, 183, 188, 215, 218, Beckett, Margaret 26 220, 221n8; single candidate 28, 59, 70, Beckstein, Günther 86 75, 77, 84, 86, 92n4, 100, 103, 106, 143, Begin, Menachem 211, 219, 221, 221n7 232; see also leadership contests Bejinariu, Eugen 155n3 Campbell, Kim 186, 187 Beke, Wouter 32, 43 Campbell, Menzies (‘Ming’) 25 Belgium 30–46; leaders’ demographics 36, Câmpeanu, Radu 150, 153, 155n7 37, 38, 41–4, 42, 45, 236; leader defined Canada 171–88; leaders’ demographics 8, 31–3, 224–5; leadership contests 35, 36, 178, 186–7, 236; leader defined 173; 37–41, 39, 45, 234; party names and leadership contests 174, 175, 177, abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 44; 181–6, 184, 185, 188; party names and selection rules 33–7, 34, 38, 226, 228, abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 178, 229, 231; tenure 36, 38, 42, 43–4, 45n2, 181, 187; selection rules 7, 172, 173–81, 46n6 175, 178, 182–3, 186, 188, 228, 231; Ben-Gurion, David 206, 209, 221n4 tenure 172, 178, 180–1, 186–7; women Benn, Tony 21 186 Berge, Gunnar 55 candidate numbers and requirements: Berlusconi, Silvio 94, 95, 104, 105, 106, Australia 200–2, 201; Austria 73, 74; 107n3, 107n9 Belgium 37, 38–9, 45; Canada 174, 178, Bindi, Rosy 104 184, 185; Germany 77, 83, 84, 86, 89, Bishop, Julie 203 92n4, n5; Hungary 165, 166; Israel 209, Bisky, Lothar 79 210, 211, 212, 217; Italy 97, 100, 101, Black Sunday 35 106; Norway 50–2, 54, 55, 59; Portugal Blair, Tony 1, 22–3, 25 126, 131, 132, 133, 135, 139; Romania Blais, André 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 81, 191, 195, 143, 147, 151, 152, 154, 155; Spain 113, 222, 228–9 115, 116, 117, 120, 122; UK 19 Bloc Québécois (Canada) 171–2, 173, 175, Carnation Revolution 124 176, 178, 180, 184, 186 Carrillo, Santiago 119 Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) Carty, R. Kenneth 175, 180 (Spain) 123n8 Carvalhas, Carlos 130, 138 Blunt, Charles 198 Casini, Pierferdinando 96, 104 Boc, Emil 143, 144, 149, 152, 154 Catalonia 110, 118 Bondevik, Kjell Magne 50 CCD (Christian Democratic Centre) (Italy) Bossi, Umberto 94, 95 96, 99, 102, 107n7 Bourgeois, Geert 40 CD&V (Christian Democratic and BP/SP (Centre Party) (Norway) 48, 50, 51, Flemish) (Belgium) 32, 34, 35, 36, 40, 56, 57, 60n5, 61n13 42, 44 Brandt, Willy 78, 90 CDC (Democratic Convergence of Bratteli, Trygve 55 Catalonia) (Spain) 109, 110, 111, 112, Broadbent, Ed 184, 187 113, 114, 115, 118, 120, 121, 122n2, Brown, Bob 191 123n4, n6 Brown, Gordon 1, 23 CDH (Christian Democrats) (Belgium) 33, Brundtland, Gro Harlem 50, 55, 56 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 234 Busek, Erhard 72 CDS (Democratic Social Centre) Buttiglione, Rocco 107n8 (Portugal) 124, 139n2 Bynander, F. 200 CDS-PP (Democratic Social Centre- BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria) Popular Party) (Portugal) 124, 137–8, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 178–9 139n2; leader defined 125, 126, 127; 256â Index CDS-PP continued Cross, William P. 1–11, 81, 171–88, 191, leadership contests 134, 136; selection 195, 222–39 rules 128, 129, 130, 131, 132–3 CSU (Bavarian Christian Democrats) CDU (Christian Democrats) (Germany) (Germany) 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 78, 81, 82, 83–91, 92n4, 139n5 88–9, 91, 92n8 centralisation/decentralisation 125, 127, Cunhal, Álvaro 130, 133, 137 134, 161, 162–3, 169 CVP: (Christian People’s Party) (Belgium) Cesa, Lorenzo 105 37; see also CD&V (Christian Chacón, Carme 117, 119, 122 Democratic and Flemish) (Belgium) Chaney, Fred 198 Charter Movement 18 Davey, P. 198 Chipp, Don 202 Davis, David 24 Chiru, Mihail 141–55 Davis, J. 3 Chorherr, Christoph 68 Day, Stockwell 186 Chrétien, Jean 171, 181, 183 DC (Christian Democracy) (Italy) 94, 96 Christian Democratic National Peasants De Croo, Alexander 40, 43 Party (Romania) 142 De Wever, Bart 43 Christian Democratic party (CVP-PSC) Debates (leaders) 183 (Belgium) 33 Degel Hatora Party (Israel) 221n2 Christian Democratic Party (Hungary) Democratic Alliance (AD) (Portugal) 126 166, 167 Democratic Coalition (Hungary) 161 Christian People’s Party (KrF; Norway) democratisation 6–7, 8, 228, 229, 238; 48, 50, 51, 52, 56, 57, 61n19 Hungary 157, 161; Israel 211, 214, 216, CiU (Convergence and Union) (Spain) 219; Italy 106, 107; Portugal 124, 125, 108, 109–10, 122n2 129–30, 133, 134, 138; Spain 123n8 Clark, Joe 181, 184, 186, 188n2 demographics (leaders’) 8, 235–7, 238; Clarke, Ken 24 Australia 192, 193, 203–4, 205; Austria Clegg, Nick 25 64, 65–6, 68, 73–4, 76n4–5, 231, 236; clientelism 8 Belgium 37, 41–4, 42, 45, 236; Canada coalition formation 2, 64, 87, 94, 154, 8, 178, 186–7, 236; Germany 78, 79, 155n1, 156, 159–60, 204, 206–7, 210, 88–91, 92, 92n9–10, 236; Hungary 223 167–9, 168, 236; Israel 207, 218–21, Coelho, Passos 136 221n10; Italy 97, 103–5, 104, 106, 236; Collard, Léo 43 Norway 48, 56–8, 59–60, 61n26, 231, collective leadership 41–2, 64, 129, 157, 236; Portugal 131, 132, 137–8, 236; 158–9, 161, 164, 166, 225–6 Romania 147, 152–4, 153, 236; Spain Conservative Party (Canada) 171, 172–3; 108–9, 118–21, 119, 122, 236; UK 8, leaders’ demographics 186; leadership 25–6, 27, 236; see also tenure contests 174, 184, 188n1–2; selection Deprez, Gérard 43 rules 174, 175, 176, 178–9, 180 Deri, Arye 212, 219 Conservative Party (H) (Norway) 48, 49, Deschouwer, Kris 4 50, 51, 55, 56, 61n13 deselection: central committee 213; Conservative Party (UK) 12; leadership disciplinary protocol 163; forced contests 20, 22, 23–4, 25, 234; selection resignation 44, 117, 133, 155; implicit rules 13–14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, 231 rule 114, 115; majority vote of MPs 16; consociational model 33 national congress 53, 99; no procedure/ Constantin, Daniel 152, 153 unspecified 38, 52, 67–8, 82–3, 99, 100, Constituency Labour Party branches 105, 132, 147, 162, 163, 230–1; (CLPs) (UK) 14–17, 23 parliamentary caucus 192, 193, 195, coronations 94, 100–2, 106–7, 115–17, 230; party bureau 37, 38; party 122, 134, 136, 149–52, 154, 165, 232, conference 178; party congress 100, 238 114, 147; party convention 67, 82, 92n6, Coulter, John 199 181, 230; party council 37, 38, 99, 230; Crean, Simon 198 party executive 67, 193; party members Indexâ 257 147, 178, 181, 193, 213, 230; spiritual Westminster countries 35, 36; see also leader 212, 213 direct member votes; full membership Detterbeck, Klaus 77–92 votes (FMV); primary election; voting Di Pietro, Antonio 95, 102, 107n10 rules Di Rupo, Elio 32, 43 elites 2, 4, 6, 7–8, 167; influence 35–6, 45, Die Linke (Germany) 77, 83, 87, 88, 90, 60, 81, 87, 120, 122, 155, 159, 162, 164, 92n3, 225 168, 238; leadership contests 115, 139, Diefenbaker, John 181, 188n1 174, 231–2, 238; leadership selection Dillen, Karel 35 33, 36, 40, 50, 68, 75, 87, 103, 224, 226; Dion, Stéphane 171, 184, 186 role of 30–1, 56, 64–5, 70, 72–3, 77, 79, direct member votes 3; leaders’ 98, 117–18, 130, 161–2, 170; selection demographics 42, 45, 104, 237; impact rules 17–18, 35, 80, 92n4, 111, 127–9 on leadership contests 6, 134, 220; endorsements 23, 32, 230, 231; official 72, leadership legitimacy 160–1; party 75, 97, 196, 202, 230; by party members renewal 130, 139; popularity of 226, 113, 210, 212, 214–15, 230; regional/ 227, 238; see also full membership local branches 152, 154, 230 votes Engholm, Björn 80, 92n9 direct member votes by country: Australia Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz 62–76 192, 202, 204, 205, 205n4; Belgium 30, Enyedi, Zs. 166 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45; ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) Canada 175–6, 179, 180, 184, 185, 187; (Spain) 123n8 Germany 146; Hungary 160–1; Israel Erhard, Ludwig 78 208, 210, 211, 220; Italy 98, 99, 104; Ernst, Klaus 86 Portugal 128, 129–30, 131, 132, 134, Eshkol, Levi 209, 221n4 138, 139; Romania 148, 155; Spain 110, European Journal of Political Research 3 112–13, 123n8; UK 13, 15, 17 extra-parliamentary organisation 157, 194, Ditfurth, Jutta 92n6 225; influence 13, 17, 48, 49, 125, Domokos, Géza 151 190–1, 208, 224–5; leader defined 63, Douglas-Home, Alec 17–18 79, 94, 109, 173; leadership selection Dowding, Keith 2, 6 160, 173, 195, 204 DS (Left Democrats) (Italy) 99, 100, 102, 105, 106 factions/factional support 194, 197, 198, Duceppe, Gilles 187 199–200, 205, 232 Dumont, Patrick 6 Faulkner, John 198 Duncan Smith, Iain 24, 27 Faymann, Werner 69 Duquesne, Antoine 44 FDF (Front for the Defence of French- Durão Barroso, José Manuel 138 speakers) (Belgium) 34 FDP (Liberal Party) (Germany) 78, 81, 82, Eanes, Ramalho 124 83–90 Ecolo (French-Speaking Greens) Feiglin, Moshe 214, 219 (Belgium) 33, 34–5, 37, 40, 41, 44, Fekter, Maria 71 45n1, 46n4, 225, 231 Ferguson, Martin 198 Einem, Caspar 71 Ferreira Leite, Manuela 136, 138 electoral college systems 14, 15, 17, 18, FI (Forza Italia) (Italy) 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 21, 23, 29n3–4 105, 107n3–4, n9, 228 electoral defeats 4, 7, 234–5 Fidesz (Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union) electoral systems 229–31, 230; confidence/ (Hungary) 156–9, 161, 162, 163, 164, no-confidence votes 99, 132; electronic 165, 166, 167, 168, 169–70 voting 179, 216; fees 140n9; multi-stage Fini, Gianfranco 95, 104, 107n5 selection 16, 67, 115, 163, 213; multiple First Republic (Italy) 93–4, 97, 98, 102 ballots 14–15, 29n2; open contests 28; Fischer, Joschka 79 postal balloting 179, 195, 216; PR list Five, Kaci Kullman 49, 55 system 221n1; secret vote 64–5, 80, fixed terms 64–5, 105, 181, 210;see also 92n5, 112, 147, 149, 161, 163, 196; tenure 258â Index FLI (Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia) 107 Geza, Domkos 153 Follini, Marco 96 Géza, Szõcs 151 Foot, Michael 20, 21 Gherghina, Sergiu 141–55, 153 founding leaders: Hungary 156, 159, 164; Gherman, Oliviu 143, 144 Israel 209, 211, 212; Italy 94, 95, 96, Gillard, Julia 1, 8, 194, 203, 205n4 100, 106; Spain 118 Glawischnig, Eva 69 FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) (Austria) González, Felipe 111, 116, 117, 119, 120, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 72, 73, 74 121 Fraga, Manuel 117, 119, 121 Gorton, John 200 France 223 Götz, Alexander 73 Frantzich, S.E. 4 Gould, Bryan 21 Fraser, Malcolm 200 governing parties 155n2; leader defined Freire, André 124–40 63, 125, 132, 156; leadership contests Freitas do Amaral, Diogo 129, 133, 134, 137 126, 136, 138, 184, 234; reforms 125, Frutos, Francisco 117 138; selection rules 129, 130, 214 FSN (National Salvation Front) (Romania) grassroots democracy: expanding role of 4, 142 7, 12, 34–5, 125, 176, 232; leadership full membership votes (FMV) 234; costs contests 133, 182; party membership 14, 232; leaders’ demographics/tenure 104, 40, 45, 157, 170; party reforms 18, 79, 235, 236, 237; impact on selectorate 85, 164 composition 228–9, 238; number of Green Parties (Belgium) see Ecolo candidates 232, 233; see also direct (French-Speaking Greens); Groen member votes; primary elections (Flemish Greens Conservative Party) full membership votes (FMV) by country: (Belgium) Belgium 34–5, 36, 38–40, 43, 44; Green Party (Austria) 63, 64, 68; leaders’ Canada 175, 185; Italy 101, 102, 103; demographics 66, 73, 74; leadership Portugal 135, 138, 139n7; Spain 123n8; contests 69, 72; selection rules 65–6, 67, UK 19; see also direct member votes 68, 81, 89, 90 Green Party (Germany): leaders’ Gabriels, Jaak 43 demographics 79, 88–9, 90, 91, 92n10; Gallagher, Michael 4, 9 leader defined 77–8; leadership contests Garaicoetxea, Carlos 118 79, 85, 86–7; selection rules 80–3, 81, Gauja, Anika 189–205 82, 91, 92n2, n6 gender parity 56–7, 59–60, 118–19 Green Party (Italy) 104 gender quotas 56, 57, 60, 88, 168, 186, 203 Green Party (Portugal) 139n5 Gennez, Caroline 43 Greig, Brian 203 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 85 Groen (Flemish Greens Conservative Geoanã, Mircea 144, 153, 154 Party) (Belgium) 34–5, 36, 42, 43 Gerd-Liv Valla, Gerd-Liv Grootjans, Franz 43 Gerhard, Wolfgang 85–6 Guerra, Juan 111 Gerhardsen, Einar 54 Gusenbauer, Alfred 71 German Basic Law 77, 78, 80, 92n5, 231, Guterres, António 134, 138 239n2 Gyurcsány, Ferenc 159, 160, 162 German Democratic Republic 80 Germany 77–92; leaders’ demographics Hagen, Carl I. 58 78, 79, 88–92, 92n9–10, 236; Federal Hague, William 18, 23–4 Party Law 1, 231, 239n2; leader defined Haider, Jörg 64, 66, 69, 70, 73 78–80, 90, 91, 92n1; leadership contests Haines, Janine 203 77, 84–7, 84, 86; party names and Halvorsen, Kristin 52, 58, 59 abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 80, Hansen, Rolf 55 82, 85, 90, 91; selection rules 77, 80–3, Hareide, Knut Arild 57 81, 82, 91, 92n4–5, 228, 231, 239n2; Harmel, Robert 166 tenure 78–80, 82, 88, 89–90, 91; women Harper, Stephen 187 83, 88 ’t Hart, Paul 194, 200 Indexâ 259 Haugland, Valgerd Svarstad 56 internet 179 Hawke, Bob 198, 199, 202 Ionescu-Quintus, Mircea 150, 152, 153 Hazan, Reuven 8, 41 Ireland 7, 8, 176 Healey, Denis 21 Israel 206–21; leaders’ demographics 207, Heath, Ted 18, 20, 25, 27 218–21, 221n10; founding leaders 209, Heidar, Knut 50 211, 212; leader defined 207–8, 220; Hernández-Mancha, Antonio 116 leadership contests 214–18, 217, 220; Herut (Freedom Party) (Israel) 206, 211 Party Law 215, 216; party names and Heseltine, Michael 22, 29n2 abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 209, Heyenn, Dora 86 210, 211, 219–20, 221n6–7; selection Hockey, Joe 200 rules 208–14, 213, 215, 216, 218, 220, Hollande, François 223 221n1, n3; n9, 226, 228, 231; tenure Holmås, Heikki 59 207, 210, 211, 212, 213, 218, 219, 220, Howard, John 194, 197, 199 221n11; women 218, 219, 220, 221n10 Howard, Michael 24 Italy 93–107; leaders’ demographics 97, Høybråten, Dagfinn 56, 61n25 103–5, 104, 105, 106, 236; founding Hoyos, Emily 43 leaders 94, 95, 96, 100, 106; leader Huhne, Chris 25 defined 94–7; leadership contests 100–3, Hungarian Guard 157 101, 104, 106, 107, 107n6; party names Hungary 156–70; leaders’ demographics and abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 167–9, 168, 236; founding leaders 156, 105; selection rules 97–100, 99, 100, 159, 164; leader defined 158–60, 225; 103, 106, 226, 228, 231; tenure 98, 100, leadership contests 157, 164–7, 165, 104, 105; women 104 166, 169; party names and abbreviations IU (Izquierda Unida) (United Left; Spain) xvi–xx; resignations 158, 162; selection 108, 119, 120; leader defined 109, rules 160–4, 161, 162, 163, 228, 231; 123n6–7; leadership contests 116, tenure 163, 168, 169; women 167–8 117–18; selection rules 111, 112, 113, Hurd, Douglas 29n2 114, 115, 123n5

Ibarretxe, Juan José 118 Jacobsen, Arvid 61n23 IDV (Italia dei Valori) (Italy) 94–9, 100, Jagland, Thorbjørn 50, 55, 56 102, 107n10 Javaux, Jean-Michel 43 Ignatieff, Michael 171, 187 Jenkins, Roy 21 Ignazi, Piero 95 Jobbik (Movement for a Right Hungary) Iliescu, Ion 143, 144, 153 (Hungary) 157, 161, 162–4, 163, 165, Ilonszki, Gabriella 156–70 167, 168, 169, 170 Imaz, Josu Jon 118, 120, 121 incompatibility rule 32, 44, 79, 83, 90, Kadima Party (Israel) 207, 208, 211–14, 109, 114–15, 120, 144 213, 216, 219, 221n9 incumbents: challenges to 54, 84, 108, Kappel, Heiner 86 117, 120, 128, 210; demographics 57, Karlsen, Rune 47–61 205, 236; deselection 24, 68–9, 83, Katz, R.S. 2, 4, 8, 232 188n1; influence of selectorate KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s composition 8–9, 41, 54, 214, 226, 236; Party) (Hungary) 156 leader defined 13, 80, 126, 190, 224; Keating, Paul 198, 199, 202 leadership contests 20, 25, 40, 70–1, 84, Kenig, Ofer 3, 41, 206–21, 232, 234 100, 122, 136, 150, 197, 200, 214–15; Kennedy, Charlie 24 performance in office 69, 200; Keulen, Marino 40 resignations 153, 219; selection rules Kiesinger, Kurt Georg 78 14–15, 16, 17, 130, 131, 180, 181, 192, Kinkel, Klaus 85 212 Kinnock, Neil 21, 23 Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV) Kipping, Katja 86, 88 (Spain) 123n8 Klaus, Josef 73 Insausti, Jesús 119 Klima, Viktor 70, 71 260â Index Kohl, Helmut 78, 85, 86, 89, 91 Liberal Party (Australia) 189, 190–1, 203, Koren, Stefan 72 204; leadership contests 194, 197–8, Kreisky, Bruno 70, 73 199, 200, 202; selection rules 191–4, Künast, Renate 79 192, 193, 205n1, 234 Liberal Party (Canada) 171, 172–3, 181, Labor Party (Australia) see ALP 186; leadership contests 182, 183, 184, Labour Party (Ireland) 176 187; selection rules 173–4, 175, 176, Labour Party (Israel) 206, 207–8, 209, 177, 178, 179, 180 210, 219, 221n4; leadership contests Liberal Party (Israel) 206–7 209, 210, 214, 215, 216, 218, 221n5–6; Liberal Party (Norway) 48, 51, 56, 61n13, selection rules 208, 209–10, 212–14, 61n19 213, 216, 218 Liberal Party (UK) 20–1 Labour Party (Norway) 49–52, 51, 54–5, Lieberman, Avigdor 212, 219 56, 57, 60n8, 61n10, n20, n13, n23 LIF (Liberal Forum) (Austria) 63, 66, 70 Labour Party (UK) 3, 12, 13, 25; Likud Party (Israel) 206–7, 208, 210–14, leadership contests 20–1, 22–3, 26–7; 213, 215, 216–17, 219, 221, 221n6–7, n9 selection rules 14–17, 15, 18, 28, 177–8, Lilletun, Jon 56 231 Lindbrække, Sjur 49 Lafontaine, Oskar 79, 85, 92n9 Lindner, Christian 85 Laing, M. 194 Lisi, Marco 124–40 Lambsdorff, Alexander Graf 85 Livni, Tzipi 219 language 179–80, 184 Llamazares, Gaspar 116, 117, 119, 120, Lara, Cayo 118, 119, 120 121 Latham, Mark 198, 199, 202 LMP (Politics Can Be Different) Layton, Jack 171, 186, 187 (Hungary) 156–7, 158, 161, 163, 164, leader defined 1, 222, 224–6, 238; 168, 169, 170, 225, 231 Australia 1, 190–1; Austria 63–4, 224; LN (Lega Nord) (Italy) 94, 95, 97–9, 228 Belgium 31–3, 224–5; Canada 173; Lötzsch, Gesine 88 Germany 78–80, 90, 91, 92n1; Hungary Louçã, Francisco 125–6 158–60, 225; Israel 207–8, 220; Norway Lutgen, Benoît 43 48–50, 60n2, 224, 225; Portugal 125–7; Lysbakken, Audun 57, 59 Romania 142, 143–5; Spain 109–10, 121; UK 1, 13 Macklin, Jenny 203 leadership contests 5–10, 231–5, 238; Maclennan, Bob 21 Australia 8, 189, 194, 197–202, 201, Macmillan, Harold 17 204–5; Austria 68–73, 73, 75, 75n1; Maddox, G. 190 Belgium 35, 36, 37–41, 39, 45, 234; magic circle 17, 212 Canada 177, 181–6, 185, 188–9; Mair, Peter 2, 4, 232 Germany 77, 84–7; Hungary 157, 164–7, Major, John 22, 29n2 165, 169; Israel 214–18, 217, 220; Italy Mancha, Antonio Hernández 117, 120, 121 100–3, 101, 104, 106, 107, 107n6; Manning, Preston 186, 187 Norway 48–50, 54, 59; Portugal 133–6, Mapai Party (Israel) 206, 209, 221n4; see 135, 138, 139, 140n11; Romania 143, also Labour Party (Israel) 149–52, 151, 154; Spain 115–18, 116, Margherita Party (Italy) 96, 99, 100, 102 122; UK 18–25, 19; see also campaigns Marko, Bela 152 LeDuc, Larry 3 Marsh, M. 3, 4, 9 Lees, Meg 195, 196 Martin, Paul 171, 181, 182, 183, 187 Left Party, The (Germany) 79–80, 81, 82, Marxism 117 88, 91 Mas, Artur 118, 120, 121 left-wing parties 229 mass media: impact on tenure 57, 59; Leterme, Yves 32, 42, 44 influence of 12, 24, 25, 35, 40–1, 47, Lewis, Austin 198 55–6, 139, 194, 199, 225; leaders Liberal Democrats (UK) 12, 13, 15, 17–18, defined 78, 95, 125, 143, 145; leadership 21, 24–5, 27 contests 20, 22–3, 27–8, 48, 52, 56, 116, Indexâ 261 133–4, 182–3, 198–9; mediatisation of Nãstase, Adrian 143, 144, 154, 155n3 politics 44, 56, 59, 134, 139, 146–7, National Party (Australia) 189, 190, 155n6; negative coverage 61n25, 69; 191–4, 192, 193, 198, 200, 203, 204, opinion polls 140n11; party press 59, 205n1 61n23; personalisation of party leaders NDP (New Democratic Party) (Canada) 2, 6–7, 24, 29, 61n25, 133–4, 169, 204, 171, 173, 180–1, 186, 187; leadership 206, 214, 220, 225, 235; as political tool contests 177, 184; selection rules 175, 204–5, 215–16; social media 198 176, 178, 179, 180 mass-party model 60 Nelson, Brendan 199, 202 Maudling, Reggie 18, 20, 29n2 Netanyahu, Benjamin 214, 219 May, J.D. 7–8 New Brunswick Conservative Party McDonough, Alexa 186 (Canada) 179 McKay, Peter Gordon 187 Neyts, Annemie 42 McLaughlin, Audrey 184 no-confidence votes 14, 68, 99, 143;see McMahon, Billy 200 also spill motion MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) Nogueira, Fernando 126 (Hungary) 156, 157, 165–6, 167, 168 Nordli, Oddvar 55, 61n23 MDP (Portuguese Democratic Movement) Norvik, Erling 55 (Portugal) 126, 139n5 Norway 47–61; leaders’ demographics 48, Meir, Golda 209, 219, 221n7 56–7, 58, 59–60, 61n26, 231, 236; direct Mendes, Marques 130 democracy 48, 50, 59; leader defined Menzies, Robert 200 48–50, 60n2, 224, 225; leadership Meretz Party (Israel) 221n10 contests 48–50, 54, 59, 60; party names Merkel, Angela 78, 88, 91 and abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations Meyer, Anthony 22 49, 55, 56; selection rules 50–3, 51, 53, Michel, Charles 43 59, 60, 60n2, 61n11, n13, n19–20, 228; Michel, Louis 43 tenure 47–8, 49, 52, 53, 58, 61n26; Miliband, David 23 women 48, 57, 58, 60 Miliband, Ed 23, 25, 26 Nothomb, Charles-Ferdinand 40, 41 Milne, Christine 203 Milquet, Joëlle 33, 40, 42, 43 oligarchic selection process 33, 52, 66, 70, Milut, Marian 142 94, 110, 111–13, 130–1 Miranda, Joaquim 140n8 Olmert, Ehud 212, 221n6 Mitterlehner, Reinhold 71 OpenVLD (Flemish Liberals) (Belgium) Mitzna, Amram 219, 221n11 34, 35, 37, 40–1, 42 Mock, Alois 68 opinion polls 140n11 Möllemann, Jürgen 85–6 opposition parties 127, 144; leaders’ Molterer, Wilhelm 70–1 demographics 25, 44, 74, 90, 119, 137, Monteiro, Manuel 129 138, 187; deselection 133, 178, 194, Monti, Mario 107n1 210; leader defined 18, 63, 78–9, 89, 96, Moreira, Adriano 129 120, 144, 158, 225; leadership contests MR (French-speaking Liberals) (Belgium) 28, 87, 130, 136, 171, 184, 200, 234; 32, 33, 34, 42 organisational reforms 4, 127, 150, 161, MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) 228–9; selection rules 130, 164, 173, (Hungarian) 156–7, 158, 159, 160–1, 229 162, 163, 165, 166–70 Orbán, Viktor 150, 156, 164, 166, 169 Mulcair, Thomas 184 Ortuzar, Andoni 118 Müller, Wolfgang C. 62–76 Ovadia, Rabbi Josef 208, 212, 225 Mulroney, Brian 184, 186, 188n2 ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) (Austria) Müntefering, Franz 92n9, 92n11 62–5, 66, 67, 68–72, 74 Murray, A. 196 Özdemir, Cem 86

N-VA/VU (Flemish Regionalist Party) Packer, Kerry 194 (Belgium) 34, 36, 37, 42, 44 Panebianco, Angelo 4, 138 262â Index Pankrunkelsven, Patrik 40 party councils: leaders’ demographics 235, parliamentary caucuses: deselection 192, 236; deselection 37, 38, 99, 230; 193, 195, 204, 205n4, 230; leadership leadership contests 232, 234; selection candidates 12, 89, 96, 158; leadership rules 34, 66, 99, 111, 128, 146, 175, selection 1, 193, 204 227, 233, 235 parliamentary party (PPG) by country party press 59, 61n23 224–5, 226, 227, 231, 232–4, 233; patronage appointments 155 Australia 189–92, 193, 196, 197, 199, Pauli, Gabriele 86 200, 202, 204, 205n4; Austria 63, 74; PC (Conservative Party) (Romania) 142, Belgium 31, 34, 36; Canada 173–4, 175, 144–5, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 153, 177–8, 188; Germany 78, 79, 92n2; 155n5, 174 Hungary 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 168; PCE (Communist Party of Spain) (Spain) Israel 208, 209, 212, 221n3; Italy 94, 95, 108, 112, 113, 117–18, 119 107n1; Norway 49, 58, 61n10; Portugal PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) 126–7, 128; Romania 153; Spain 109, (Portugal) 124, 125, 126, 128, 130–2, 111, 118; UK 12, 13, 15, 20–1, 29 136, 137, 138, 139n5 parliamentary party (PPG) selectorates 10, PCs (Progressive Conservatives) (Canada) 15, 16, 34, 111, 175, 192, 208, 227, 233, 171, 173 235 PD (Democratic Party) (Italy) 96, 102, Parti Québécois (Canada) 175 104, 105; leadership contests 102, 103, partitocracy 30, 31 104; selection rules 6, 94, 97–9, 99, 100, party caucuses 179, 195, 236 106, 107, 107n2, 226, 228 party congress: biannual 47, 50–1, 129; PD (Democratic Party Romania) leadership selection 48, 50–1, 59, 64, (Romania) 142 72, 75, 122, 131, 148; deselection 53, PDL (Democratic Liberal Party) 99, 100, 114, 115, 147; extraordinary (Romania) 141, 142, 143, 144, 152, 153; congress 52, 53, 61n20, 114, 115, leadership contests 149–50, 151; 147–8; frequency 113–14, 148, 149; selection rules 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, leadership contests 34, 38, 54–5, 69–72, 154; tenure 145, 152, 153 75, 102, 106, 108, 115–18, 122, 151, PDL (Popolo delle Libertà) (Liberal Party) 238; national congress 47, 50, 52, 53, (Italy) 93–4, 95, 97–9, 104 61n13, 133, 140n8, 147, 149; selection PDS/Die Linke (Germany) 86, 87, 88–9, rules 33, 63–5, 97–9, 106, 110–14, 116, 90, 91; see also Die Linke (Germany) 129, 132, 144–6, 148, 150, 161–2, 164; PDS-DS (Democratic Party of the Left) voting rules 35–6, 52, 53, 75, 130, (Italy) 98, 102, 228 139n7; see also direct member votes; PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) full membership votes (FMV); primary (Germany) 77, 79, 87, 88, 90, 99 elections; party conventions PDSR (Socialist Democratic Party in party conventions 40, 15, 234; coronations Romania) (Romania) 141–2 94, 100–2, 106–7, 115–17, 122, 134, Peacock, Andrew 197–8, 199, 200 136, 149–52, 154, 165, 232, 238; Peeters, Kris 32 demographics/tenure 186, 235, 236, Peres, Shimon 206, 209–10, 214, 219, 221n5 237; deselection 67, 82, 92n6, 181, 230; Peretz, Amir 221n5 popularity of 227, 228; requirement for Peretz, Yitzhak 212, 219 239n2; see also party congress personalisation 2, 6–7, 24, 29, 61n25, party conventions by country: Austria 66, 133–4, 169, 204, 206, 214, 220, 225, 235 67; Belgium 30, 34, 38; Canada 174, Peter, Friedrich 73 175, 178, 180, 186, 187; Germany 77, Petersen, Jan 55, 56 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 91, 92n4–5; Hungary PEV (Green Party) (Portugal) 126 159, 161, 164; Israel 208, 210; Italy 97, Pilet, Jean-Benoit 1–11, 30–46, 222–39 98, 99, 100, 107n4; Norway 51, 61n20; Pinto Balsemão, Francisco 129 Portugal 128–9, 131, 134, 140n8; Pinto, Mota 132, 140n10 Romania 142, 146, 154n6; Spain 111, Pires, Francisco Lucas 129 123n8; UK 15 Platou, Lars T. 55 Indexâ 263 Platzeck, Matthias 92n9 PPG see parliamentary party (PPG) PNL (National Liberal Party) (Romania) PPI (Italian People’s Party) (Italy) 96, 99, 142, 143, 153, 155n7; leadership 102, 105 contests 150, 151; selection rules 146, PRD (Party of Democratic Renewal) 147, 148; tenure 145, 152, 153, 155n4 (Portugal) 124, 139n4 PNV (Basque National Party) (Spain) presidentialisation 2, 96, 121, 128, 158–9, 108–9, 111–14, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 206, 223, 225 121, 123n6 Presthus, Rolf 55, 56 poliarchic executive 125 primary elections: closed primaries 94, political levy 29n3 106, 108, 110, 123n5, 145–6; open political party organisation 5, 7, 18, 32, 37, primaries 8, 39, 94, 97–8, 101–7, 129, 40, 48–9; bipolar system 214, 223; 148, 201, 217, 226–8, 227, 229, 232–3 brokerage model 179; cadre 4; cartels 2, primary elections by country: Belgium 36, 4, 7; catch-all parties 4, 109, 124; 39; Canada 188; Germany 80, 81, 85, clientelism/fraudulent membership 8; 91, 92n4; Israel 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, decline in membership 5, 6, 7, 35, 47, 214, 215–16, 220, 221, 221n8–9; Italy 238; financial transparency 28; gender 94, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, parity 56–7, 59–60, 118–19; German 107; Portugal 129, 145; Romania 148; Basic Law 77, 78, 80; mass-party model Spain 108, 110, 123n5 4, 190; membership rules 176–7, 183, prime ministers: authority 2, 30, 31, 50, 188; movement parties 157, 168; multi- 61n10, 94, 118, 134, 159; challenges to level systems 16, 77, 115, 120, 223, 14–15, 22, 205n4; demographics 13, 23, 236; party names and abbreviations by 89, 92n9, 95, 106, 117, 121, 143–4, 169, country xvi–xx; reforms 4, 238; 185, 186, 203; deputy prime ministers stratarchical 4, 127; top-down structure 32–3, 63, 110; deselection 14, 27, 127, 141; see also parliamentary party 61n23, 181, 205; leader defined 13–14, (PPG); rank and file membership 47, 49–50, 55, 63, 109–10, 125, 159, Ponta, Victor 143, 152 173, 207–8, 225; leadership contests 20, Popa, Daniela 151, 153 85–6, 118, 162, 166–7, 209, 221n7; Popescu-Tãriceanu, Cãlin 143, 150, 153, resignations 27, 55, 56, 124, 143, 181, 155n3 211, 221n6; selection of 1, 5, 55, 58, Popolo delle Libertà (PDL) (Italy) 94, 99, 117, 126, 143, 187, 206, 209, 211–12, 107n9 221n5, 222; selection rules 23, 32, 124, populism 95–6, 174, 180, 238 126, 129, 160–1, 181, 210, 214; see also Portas, Paulo 134, 138 party leaders; party presidents Portillo, Michael 24 Progress Party (Norway) 48, 50, 51, 52, Portugal 124–40; leaders’ demographics 56, 58, 61n20 131, 132, 137–8, 236; deselection Pröll, Josef 71 132–3, 139, 140n10; leader defined Provisory Council for National Unity 125–7; leadership contests 133–6, 135, (CPUN) (Romania) 155n7 138, 139, 140n11; party names and PS (French-speaking Social Democrats) abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 126, (Belgium) 34, 35, 36, 37, 42, 44 129, 132, 133; selection rules 126, PS (Portuguese Socialist Party) (Portugal) 127–33, 128, 129, 130–1, 132, 134, 124, 137, 138; leader defined 125, 127, 138–9, 140n9, 228, 231; tenure 132, 139n6; leadership contests 133, 134, 137, 138; women 137 136; selection rules 126, 128, 129–30, post-Communist politics 141, 143, 144, 131, 132, 139n7 145, 152, 153, 155n6 PSB-BSP (Socialist Party) (Belgium) 33 Powell, Enoch 18, 20 PSC see CDH (Christian Democrats) Powell, Janet 195, 200 (Belgium) PP (People’s Party) (Spain) 108, 109, 118, PSD (Social Democratic Party) (Portugal) 119, 120, 123n6–7; leadership contests 124, 125, 127, 138, 139n1; leadership 117, 122; selection rules 111, 112, 113, contests 133, 134, 136; selection rules 114, 115 126, 128–9, 130, 131, 132, 139n7 264â Index PSD (Social Democratic Party) (Romania) Romania 141–55; leaders’ demographics 141–2, 143, 144, 155n2–3; leaders’ 147, 152–4, 153, 236; leader defined demographics 145, 152, 153, 154; 142, 143–5; leadership contests 143, leadership contests 151; selection rules 149–52, 151, 154; party names and 145–7, 146, 148, 152 abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 144, PSN (Party of National Solidarity) 153–4; selection rules 142–3, 145–9, (Portugal) 139n4 146, 147, 150, 154; tenure 145, 147, PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party; 152, 153, 155; women 151, 153, 154 Partido Socialista Obrero Español) Romanian Constitution 143, 144 (Spain) 108, 114; leaders’ demographics Romney, Mitt 223 118, 119, 120, 122; leader defined 109, Ronneburger, Uwe 85 123n6–7; leadership contests 117, 122; Rösler, Philipp 85 selection rules 111, 113, 114, 115, Rubalcaba, Alfredo 116, 117, 119 123n5 Rudd, Kevin 1, 8, 194, 197, 199, 200, public opinion polls 215, 238 205n4 Pujol, Jordi 118, 121 run-off elections 16, 36, 38, 66–7, 82–5, PUR (Romanian Humanist Party) 100, 130, 132, 147–9, 163, 178, 210–13, (Romania) 142 229–31, 230 PVV see OpenVLD (Flemish Liberals) Rutelli, Francesco 96, 102 (Belgium) PVV-PLP (Liberal Party) (Belgium) 33 Sá Carneiro, Francisco de 129, 133 Sampaio, Jorge 133 queen bee syndrome 168 Sandri, Giulia 93–107 Santos, Almeida 126 Rabin, Yitzhak 206, 209–10, 214, 219, Sarkozy, Nicolas 223 221n5, 221n7 Sartori, Giovani 223 Rae, Bob 171 Scharping, Rudolf 80, 85, 92n9, 92n12 Rafi Party (Israel) 221n4 Schattschneider, E.E. 1 Rahat, G. 6, 9, 41, 236 Schleinzer, Karl 72 Rahat, Gideon 206–21 Schlögl, Karl 71 Rajoy, Mariano 117, 119, 121 Schmidt, Heide 70 rank and file membership: empowerment Schmidt, Helmut 1, 78 2–5, 7, 23, 27, 41, 174–5, 177, 238; Schouppe, Etienne 44 influence on party 44, 155, 168, 202; Schröder, Gerhard 78, 80, 92n9 leadership contests 17–18, 43, 44, 106, Schüssel, Wolfgang 70, 72, 74 177; selection rules 160–1, 164; SDP (Social Democratic Party) (UK) 15, selectorate composition 3, 9, 15, 16, 34, 17, 21 99, 128, 146, 175, 192, 208, 226, 233 Second Republic (Italy) 93, 94, 97, 105 Reform/Canadian Alliance (Canada) 173, Secret Garden of Politics, The (Gallagher 175, 176, 184, 186; see also Reform and Marsh) 9 Party (Canada) Seddone, Antonella 93–107 Reform Party (Canada) 171, 223; see also Seehofer, Host 86, 92n8 Reform/Canadian Alliance (Canada) selection rules 226–31; Australia 191–7, Republican Party (US) 223 192, 193, 194, 197, 202, 204, 205n4, resignations: forced 44, 117, 133, 155; see 226–8; Austria 64–8, 66, 67, 72, 75, also deselection 75n2, 76n3, 228, 231; Belgium 33–7, Reynders, Didier 33 34, 38, 226, 228, 229, 231; Canada 7, Ribeiro e Castro, José 127, 130 172, 173–81, 175, 178, 182–3, 186, 188, Richmond, K. 190 228, 231; Germany 77, 80–3, 81, 82, 91, Ridgeway, Aden 203 92n4–5, 228, 231, 239n2; Hungary Riexinger, Bernd 86 160–4, 161, 162, 163, 228, 231; Israel Rodriguez-Teruel, Juan 108–23 208–14, 213, 215, 216, 218, 220, 221n1, Rohlfing, Ingo 77–92 n3, 226, 228, 231; Italy 97–100, 99, Roman, Petre 152, 154 100, 103, 106, 226, 228, 231; Norway Indexâ 265 50–3, 51, 53, 59, 60, 60n2, 61n11, n13, Steed, Michael 29n5 n19–20, 228; Portugal 126, 127–33, Steel, David 20 128, 129, 130–1, 132, 134, 138–9, Steen, Reiulf 55, 61n23 140n9, 228, 231; Romania 142–3, 145, Steinmeier, Frank-Walter 92n9 145–9, 146, 147, 150, 154; Spain Stewart, David K. 180 110–15, 111, 122, 228, 231; UK 6, 7, Stoiber, Edmund 86, 91 13–18, 15, 16, 27, 28, 226, 228, 231 Stolojanv, Theodor 153 Shamir, Yitzhak 211 Stoltenberg, Jens 50, 55, 57–8 Sharett, Moshe 209 Stott Despoja, Natasha 196, 200, 203 Sharon, Ariel 207, 211, 219 Strache, H.C. 69, 73 Shas Party (Israel) 207, 208, 212, 213, Strøm, Kaare 47, 48, 59 214, 219, 220, 225, 226 Sudupe, Roman 115, 121 Silva, Cavaco 126 SV see Socialist Left Party (SV) (Norway) Sinclair, Ian 198 Svåsand, L. 50, 166 Sinowatz, Fred 70, 75n1 Syse, Jan P. 55 Skjeie, H. 55 SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) Smallholders Party (Hungary) 166 (Hungary) 156, 157, 160, 165 Smith, John 15, 21, 22, 23 Soares, Mário 126, 128, 133, 137 Talleraas, Anders 49 Socialist Left Party (SV) (Norway) 48–52, Tate, A. 199 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61n11 technology 56 Sócrates, José 124, 129, 134 tenure (of leaders) 229, 230, 231, 235, Solberg, Erna 58, 61n25 237; Australia 192, 193, 203, 204; Solhjell, Bård Vegard 59 Austria 64–5, 67, 68, 74, 76n5; Belgium Sousa, Jerónimo de 130–1 36, 38, 42, 43–4, 45n2, 46n6; Canada SP.a (Flemish Social Democrats) 172, 178, 180–1, 186–7; Germany (Belgium) 34, 35, 36, 40, 42 78–80, 82, 88, 89–90, 91; Hungary 163, Spain 108–23; leaders’ demographics 168, 169; Israel 207, 210, 211, 212, 213, 108–9, 118–21, 119, 122, 236; 218, 219, 220, 221n11; Italy 98, 100, founding leaders 118; leader defined 104, 105; Norway 47–8, 49, 52, 53, 58, 109–10, 121; leadership contests 61n26; Portugal 132, 137, 138; Romania 115–18, 116, 122; party names and 145, 147, 152, 153, 155; Spain 113–14, abbreviations xvi–xx; selection rules 115, 119, 121, 122; UK 16, 23, 26; see 110–15, 111, 116, 122, 228, 231; also demographics tenure 113–14, 115, 119, 121, 122; term limits 98, 114–15, 132 women 108–9, 117, 118–19, 122 Thatcher, Margaret 14, 20, 22, 26, 27, 29, SPD (Social Democratic Party) (UK) 15, 234 17, 21 Thorpe, Jeremy 20 SPD (Social Democrats) (Germany) 78, Tobback, Bruno 43 79; leaders’ demographics 88–9, 90, 91; Tory Party see Conservative Party (UK) leadership contests 84, 85, 87; selection trade unions 3, 4, 14, 16, 21, 28, 29n3, rules 80–1, 82, 83, 91, 92n4 61n13, 176, 226 Specified Associated Organisations Trudeau, Pierre 171, 184, 187 (SAOs) 17, 29n6 Turine, Sarah 43 spill motion 192, 195, 197, 198, 200; see Turnbull, Malcolm 199, 200, 202 also no-confidence votes Turner, John 183 Spindelegger, Michael 71 Twitter 198 Spitaels, Guy 43 SPÖ (Social Democratic Party) (Austria) UCD (Union of the Democratic Center; 62, 64, 65, 66–8, 69, 70–1, 74, 75, 75n1 Unión de Centro Democrático) (Spain) Sponheim, Lars 61n25 108 Stanfield, Robert 184, 186 UDC (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya) Stark, Leonard 120, 215 (Spain) 110, 122n2; see also CiU Starr, G. 190 (Convergence and Union) (Spain) 266â Index UDC (Union of Christian Democrats; 130, 131, 134, 136, 145, 228; plurality Unione dei Democratici Cristiani) 38, 98, 100, 112, 113, 115, 128, 130, (Italy) 94, 96, 97–9, 102, 105 132, 147, 149, 213, 230, 231; UDMR (Democratic Alliance of preferential voting 178, 179, 184, 192; Hungarians in Romania) 141, 142, 144, proportional representation 31, 223; 152, 153; leadership contests 149, 151, regional representation 180, 195, 205; 154; selection rules 146, 147, 148–9, run-off elections 16, 36, 38, 66–7, 82–5, 152 100, 130, 132, 147–9, 163, 178, 210–13, UDP (People’s Democratic Union) 229–31, 230; single non-transferable (Portugal) 139n4 vote 45n1; single transferable vote 16; United Kingdom (UK) 6, 12–29; leaders’ weighted voting 14–15, 16, 17, 128, demographics 8, 25, 26, 27, 236; leader 148, 205n4 defined 1, 13; leadership contests 18–25, Vranitzky, Franz 64, 70, 71, 75n1 19, 28–9; no-confidence votes 14; party VU see N-VA/VU; Volksunie names and abbreviations xvi–xx; resignations 27; selection rules 6, 7, Warhurst, John 199 13–18, 15, 16, 27, 28, 226, 228, 231; WASG (Labour and Social Justice) trade unions 3, 14, 16, 21, 28, 29n3; (Germany) 77, 79, 87, 90, 92n3; see women party leaders 26 also Die Linke (Germany) UPyD (Union, Progress and Democracy; Wauters, Bram 30–46, 229 Unión Progreso y Democracia) (Spain) Webb, Paul 12–29 108, 123n8 Weich, Heinz-Josef 86 Urkullu, Íñigo 118, 120 Weller, Patrick 198 Westerwelle, Guido 84–5 Valkeniers, Bruno 35, 43 Westminster-style democracies 3, 4, 6, 8, Valla, Gerd-Liv 61n13 9, 35, 36, 224, 226, 229 van Besien, Wouter 43 Whitelaw, Willie 20 Van der Bellen, Alexander 64, 69 Whitlam, Gough 200 van der Elst, Franz 43 Wiezcorek-Zeul, Heidemarie 80 Van Hecke, Frank 35, 43 Willen, Lars 86 van Miert, Karel 43 Willoch, Kåre 55 Van Rompuy, Herman 43 Wilson, Harold 20, 27 Várnagy, Réka 156–70 Withalm, Hermann 72 Veltroni, Walter 103, 104, 106 women party leaders 8, 235, 236; Australia Venturino, Fulvio 93–107 1, 203; Austria 48, 58, 59–60, 65, 73, Verhofstadt, Guy 32, 43 74, 76n4; Belgium 42; Canada 186; Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) Germany 83, 88; Hungary 167–8; Israel (Belgium) 34, 35, 42, 44 218, 219, 220, 221n10; Italy 104; Voiculescu, Dan 144–5, 152, 153 Norway 48, 57, 58, 60; Portugal 137; Volksunie (People’s Union) (Belgium) 35, Romania 151, 153, 154; Spain 108–9, 36, 40 117, 118–19, 122; UK 26, 29; see also vote brokers 218, 220 Campbell, Kim; demographics; Gillard, voting rules 10, 66–8, 132; absolute Julia; Meir, Golda; Thatcher, Margaret majority 67, 82; acclamation 54, 59, 111, 139, 184; alternative vote (AV) 16, Yachimovich, Shelly 219 21, 23, 27, 192, 193, 230, 231; Yishai, Eli 212 consensus 193; elimination ballot 16, YIsrael Beitenu Party (Israel) 207, 208, 38, 193, 230; elimination ballot with 212, 213, 214, 219, 220 majority requirements (EBMR) 52, 53, 67, 162, 163, 178–9, 192–4, 193, 229, Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez 116, 117, 230; majority rule 66–8, 81–2, 83, 89, 119, 120, 121 142, 154, 162, 163, 178, 220; one- Zimmer, Gabi 88 member-one-vote (OMOV) 16, 129, Taylor & Francis F R sf^ Y°UR eBooks ; s; s 'S 'S FOR liBRARIES Over 23,000 eBook titles in the Humanities, Social Sciences, STM and Law from some of the world's leading imprints. Choose from a range of subject packages or create your own!

~ Free MARC records ~ COUNTER-compliant usage statistics i i l ~ Flexible purchase and pricing options

~ Off-site, anytime access via Athens or referring URL

Benefits ~ Print or copy pages or chapters for your user ~ Full content search ~ Bookmark, highlight and annotate text ~ Access to thousands of pages of quality research at the click of a button

For more information, pricing enquiries or to order a free trial, contact your local online sales team. UK and Rest of World: [email protected] US, Canada and Latin America: [email protected] www.ebooksubscriptions.com

A ALPSP Award for BEST eBOOK / % PUBLISHER Taylor & Francis 0:515133 2009 Finalist Taylor & Francis Group

A flexible and dynamic resource for teaching, learning and research.