Noncognitivism in Ethics

Bibliography

Items are organized topically rather than alphabetically for ease of use as a resource. Some entries are duplicated, as a result. Within each group, entries are in chronological order of publication.

General works in metaethics Moore, G.E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harman, Gilbert (1977). The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mackie, J.L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin, especially chapters 1 and 2. Smith, Michael (1994a). The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds. (1997). Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miller, Alexander (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity. Copp, David, ed. (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fisher, Andrew, and Simon Kirchin, eds. (2006). Arguing about Metaethics. New York: Routledge. 236 bibliography

Shafer-Landau, Russ, and Terence Cuneo, eds. (2007). Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Empirical work on moral judgment and philosophical discussions of its connection to metaethics de Waal, Frans (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Primates and Other Animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greene, J.D., R.B. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J.M. Darley, and J.D. Cohen (2001). ‘An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment.’ Science 293: 2105–8. Haidt, Jonathan (2001). ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.’ Psychological Review 108: 814–34. Greene, J.D., and J. Haidt (2002). ‘How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?’ Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 517–23. Nichols, Shaun (2004). Sentimental Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Joyce, Richard (2006). The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Historical noncognitivism Ogden, C.K., and I.A. Richards (1923). The Meaning of Meaning. New York: Harcourt Brace. Barnes, W.H.F. (1933). ‘A Suggestion about Value.’ Analysis 1: 45–6. Broad, C.D. (1933). ‘Is “Goodness” the Name of a Simple Non-Natural Quality?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 34: 249–68. Carnap, Rudolf (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Ayer, A.J. (1936). Language, Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover. Stevenson, C.L. (1937). ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.’ Reprinted in Stevenson (1963), Facts and Values. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Moore, G.E. (1942). ‘A Reply to My Critics.’ In Paul Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1942). ‘Moore’s Arguments against Certain Forms of Ethical Naturalism.’ In Paul Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1944). Ethics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hägerström, Axel (1953). Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals. Edited by Karl Olivecrona and translated by C.D. Broad. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. bibliography 237

Edwards, Paul (1955). The Logic of Moral Discourse. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Hare, R.M. (1963). Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1963). Facts and Values. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Urmson, J.O. (1968). The Emotive Theory of Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Hare, R.M. (1972). Practical Inferences. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hare, R.M. (1981). Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smart, J.J.C. (1984). Ethics, Persuasion, and Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Satris, Stephen (1987). Ethical Emotivism. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Truth-conditional semantics Larson, Richard, and Gabriel Segal (1995). Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heim, Irene, and Angelica Kratzer (1998). Semantics in Generative Grammar. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Speaker subjectivism and related theories Moore, G.E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Perry, R.B. (1926). General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1937). ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.’ Reprinted in Stevenson (1963), Facts and Values. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Dreier, James (1990). ‘Internalism and Speaker Relativism.’ Ethics 101(1): 6–25. Timmons, Mark (1999). Morality without Foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Finlay, Stephen (2004). ‘The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgment.’ Journal of Ethics 8: 205–23.

Expressivism Blackburn, Simon (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gibbard, Allan (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 238 bibliography

Blackburn, Simon (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, Simon (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons (2000). ‘Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.’ Philosophical Papers 29: 121–53. Gibbard, Allan (2003). Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons (2006). ‘Cognitivist Expressivism.’ In Horgan and Timmons, eds., Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The nature of the expression relation Jackson, Frank, and Philip Pettit (1998). ‘A Problem for Expressivism.’ Analysis 58(4): 239–51. Barker, Stephen (2000). ‘Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?’ Analysis 60(3): 268–79. Copp, David (2001). ‘Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.’ Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 1–43. Joyce, Richard (2002). ‘Expressivism and Motivation Internalism.’ Analysis 62(4): 336–44. Jackson, Frank, and Philip Pettit (2003). ‘Locke, Expressivism, and Conditionals.’ Analysis 63(1): 86–92. Smith, Michael, and Daniel Stoljar (2003). ‘Is There a Lockean Argument against Expressivism?’ Analysis 63(1): 76–86. Dreier, James (2004). ‘Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions.’ Analysis 64(1): 84–91. Finlay, Stephen (2005). ‘Value and Implicature.’ Philosophers’ Imprint 5(4), available online at www.philosophersimprint.org/005004/. Boisvert, Daniel (2008). ‘Expressive-Assertivism.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 169–203. Schroeder, Mark (2008a). ‘Expression for Expressivists.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 86–116.

Cognitivism about instrumental reason Harman, Gilbert (1976). ‘Practical Reasoning.’ Reprinted in Harman (1999), Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davis, Wayne (1984). ‘A Causal Theory of Intending.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 21: 43–54. bibliography 239

Bratman, Michael (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Setiya, Kieran (2007). ‘Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason.’ Ethics 117(4): 649–73. Bratman, Michael (2009). ‘Intention, Belief, Theoretical, Practical.’ Forthcoming in Simon Robertson, ed., Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ross, Jacob (2008). ‘How to Be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason.’ Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics.

The Frege–Geach problem

Before Geach and Searle Acton, H.B. (1936). ‘The Expletive Theory of Morals.’ Analysis 4: 42–5. Ross, W.D. (1939). Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, chapter 2. Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, especially chapter 2.

The classical problem Geach, Peter (1958). ‘Imperative and Deontic Logic.’ Analysis 18: 49–56. Geach, Peter (1960). ‘Ascriptivism.’ Philosophical Review 69: 221–5. Searle, John (1962). ‘Meaning and Speech Acts.’ Philosophical Review 71: 423–32. Geach, Peter (1965). ‘Assertion.’ Philosophical Review 74: 449–65. Searle, John (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hare, R.M. (1970). ‘Meaning and Speech Acts.’ Philosophical Review 79(1): 3–24.

Early approaches and responses Blackburn, Simon (1973). ‘Moral Realism.’ Reprinted in Blackburn (1993), Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zimmerman, David (1980). ‘Force and Sense.’ Mind 89: 214–33. Blackburn, Simon (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schueler, G.F. (1988). ‘Modus Ponens and Moral Realism.’ Ethics 98(3): 492–500. 240 bibliography

Zangwill, Nick (1992). ‘Moral Modus Ponens.’ Ratio (NS) 5(2): 177–93. Hale, Bob (1993). ‘Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?’ In John Haldane and Crispin Wright, eds., Reality, Representation, and Projection. New York: Oxford University Press. van Roojen, Mark (1996). ‘Expressivism and Irrationality.’ Philosophical Review 105(3): 311–35. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2000). ‘Expressivism and Embedding.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(3): 677–93. Kölbel, Max (2002). Truth without Objectivity. New York: Routledge.

Deflationist responses Horwich, Paul (1993). ‘Gibbard’s Theory of Norms.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 22: 67–78. Stoljar, Daniel (1993). ‘Emotivism and Truth Conditions.’ Philosophical Studies 70: 81–101. Price, Huw (1994). ‘Semantic Deflationism and the Frege Point.’ In S.L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. London: Routledge. Dreier, James (1996). ‘Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.’ Philosophical Studies 83(1): 29–51.

Inferential-commitment strategies Blackburn, Simon (1988). ‘Attitudes and Contents.’ Ethics 98(3): 501–17. Gibbard, Allan (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dreier, James (1999). ‘Transforming Expressivism.’ Noûs 33(4): 558–72. Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons (2000). ‘Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.’ Philosophical Papers 29: 121–53. Björnsson, Gunnar (2001). ‘Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency.’ Philosophical Studies 104(1): 81–108. Gibbard, Allan (2003). Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons (2006). ‘Cognitivist Expressivism.’ In Horgan and Timmons, eds., Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schroeder, Mark (2008c). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. bibliography 241

The negation problem Unwin, Nicholas (1999). ‘Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege–Geach Problem.’ Philosophical Quarterly 49(196): 337–52. Unwin, Nicholas (2001). ‘Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard’s Logic.’ Philosophical Quarterly 51(202): 60–75. Gibbard, Allan (2003). Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, chapter 4. Dreier, James (2006). ‘Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for Their Solution.’ In Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schroeder, Mark (2008c). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schroeder, Mark (2008d). ‘How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.’ Noûs 42(4): 573–99

Noncognitivism and truth Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Horwich, Paul (1990). Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wright, Crispin (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Divers, John, and Alexander Miller (1994). ‘Why Expressivists about Value Should not Love Minimalism about Truth.’ Analysis 54(1): 12–19. Horwich, Paul (1994). ‘The Essence of Expressivism.’ Analysis 54(1): 19–20. Jackson, Frank, Graham Oppy, and Michael Smith (1994). ‘Minimalism and Truth-Aptness.’ Mind 103: 287–302. Smith, Michael (1994b). ‘Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth.’ Analysis 54(1): 1–12. Smith, Michael (1994c). ‘Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude, and Belief.’ Analysis 54(1): 21–6. Schroeder, Mark (forthcoming a). ‘How to Be an Expressivist about Truth.’ Forthcoming in Nikolaj Jang Pedersen and Cory Wright, eds., New Waves in Truth.

The wishful thinking problem Dorr, Cian (2002). ‘Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking.’ Noûs 36(1): 97–103. Enoch, David (2003). ‘How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking.’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 41: 527–45. 242 bibliography

Lenman, James (2003). ‘Noncognitivism and Wishfulness.’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6: 265–74. Ridge, Michael (2007a). ‘Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds.’ In Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Budolfson, Mark (unpublished). ‘Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.’ Unpublished paper.

Other epistemological issues for noncognitivism Gibbard, Allan (2003). Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, especially chapter 11. Chrisman, Matthew (2007). ‘From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism.’ Philosophical Studies 135(2): 225–54. Lenman, James (2007). ‘What s Moral Inquiry?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 81: 63–81. Ridge, Michael (2007b). ‘Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 81: 83–108.

Hybrid theories Stevenson, C.L. (1944). Ethics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1963). Facts and Values. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Alm, David (2000). ‘Moral Conditionals, Noncognitivism, and Meaning.’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 38(3): 355–77. Barker, Stephen (2000). ‘Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?’ Analysis 60(3): 268–79. Copp, David (2001). ‘Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.’ Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 1–43. Finlay, Stephen (2004). ‘The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgment.’ Journal of Ethics 8: 205–23. Finlay, Stephen (2005). ‘Value and Implicature.’ Philosophers’ Imprint 5(4), available online at www.philosophersimprint.org/005004/. van Roojen, Mark (2005). ‘Expressivism, Supervenience, and Logic.’ Ratio 18(2): 190–205. Ridge, Michael (2006). ‘Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege.’ Ethics 116(2): 302–36. Alm, David (2007). ‘Noncognitivism and Validity.’ Theoria 73(2): 121–47. Ridge, Michael (2007a). ‘Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds.’ In Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. bibliography 243

Ridge, Michael (2007b). ‘Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 81: 83–108. Boisvert, Daniel (2008). ‘Expressive-Assertivism.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 169–203. Bar-On, Dorit, and Matthew Chrisman (2009). ‘Ethical Neo-Expressivism.’ In Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ridge, Michael (2009). ‘Truth for Ecumenical Expressivists.’ In David Sobel and Stephen Wall, eds., Reasons for Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schroeder, Mark (2009). ‘Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.’ Ethics 119(2): 257–309. Finlay, Stephen (2009). ‘Oughts and Ends.’ In Philosophical Studies 143: 315–40. Copp, David (unpublished). ‘In Defense of Realist Expressivism and Conventional Simplicature.’ Unpublished draft of December 2007.

Pejoratives and related linguistic issues Dummett, Michael (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth. Hornsby, Jennifer (2001). ‘Meaning and Uselessness: How to Think about Derogatory Words.’ In Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Figurative Language (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XXV). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Boghossian, Paul (2003). ‘Blind Reasoning.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 77: 225–48. Williamson, Timothy (2003). ‘Blind Reasoning.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 77, 249–93. Barker, Stephen (2004). Renewing Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Potts, Christopher (2005). The Logic of Conventional Implicature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Potts, Christopher (2007). ‘The Expressive Dimension.’ Theoretical Linguistics 33(2): 165–97. Richard, Mark (2008). When Truth Gives Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 1. Hom, Christopher (2008). ‘The Semantics of Racial Epithets.’ In Journal of Philosophy 105: 416–40. Kaplan, David (unpublished). ‘Meaning as Use.’ Unpublished manuscript. 244 bibliography

Mood, imperatives, and imperative logic Ross, Alf (1941). ‘Imperatives and Logic.’ Theoria 7: 53–71. Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 2. Rescher, Nicholas (1966). The Logic of Commands. New York: Dover. Stenius, Erik (1967). ‘Mood and Language-Game.’ Synthese 17(1): 254–74. Hare, R.M. (1971). ‘Wanting: Some Pitfalls.’ Reprinted in Hare (1972), Practical Inferences. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hare, R.M. (1972). Practical Inferences. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Karttunen, Lauri (1977). ‘Syntax and Semantics of Questions.’ Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 3–44. Huntley, Martin (1984). ‘The Semantics of English Imperatives.’ Linguistics and Philosophy 7(2): 103–33. Smart, J.J.C. (1984). Ethics, Persuasion, and Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sadock, Jerrold and Arnold Zwicky (1985). ‘Speech Act Distinctions in Syntax.’ In Timothy Shopen, ed., Language Typology and Syntactic Description, vol. I, Clause Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Searle, John, and Daniel Vanderveken (1985). Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harnish, Robert (1994). ‘Mood, Meaning, and Speech Acts.’ In S. L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. London: Routledge. Hare, R.M. (1999). ‘Imperatives, Prescriptions, and Their Logic.’ In Hare, Objective Prescriptions and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boisvert, Daniel, and Kirk Ludwig (2006). ‘Semantics for Nondeclaratives.’ In B. Smith and E. Lepore, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Epistemic modals, conditionals, and truth

Epistemic modals Egan, Andy, John Hawthorne, and Brian Weatherson (2003). ‘Epistemic Modals in Context.’ In Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, eds., Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 131–68. MacFarlane, John (forthcoming). ‘Epistemic Modals are Assessment-Sensitive.’ Forthcoming in a volume on epistemic modals edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. bibliography 245

Ross, Jacob, and Mark Schroeder (unpublished). ‘Reflection, Disagreement, and Invariance.’ Unpublished draft manuscript, available online at www-rcf. usc.edu/~maschroe/research/Reflections_on_Epistemic_Modals.pdf

Conditionals Adams, Ernest (1975). The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel. Gibbard Allan (1981). ‘Two Recent Theories of Conditionals.’ In William Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce, eds., Ifs. Dordrecht: Reidel. McGee, Vann (1985). ‘A Counterexample to Modus Ponens.’ Journal of Philosophy 82(9): 462–71. Edgington, Dorothy (1986). ‘Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions?’ Critica 18: 3–39. Edgington, Dorothy (1995). ‘On Conditionals.’ Mind 104: 235–329. DeRose, Keith, and Richard Grandy (1999). ‘Conditional Assertions and Biscuit Conditionals.’ Noûs 33(3): 405–20. Lycan, William (2001). Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bennett, Jonathan (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dreier, James (2009). ‘Practical Conditionals.’ In David Sobel and Stephen Wall, eds., Reasons for Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kolodny, Niko, and John MacFarlane (unpublished). ‘Ifs and Oughts.’ Unpublished manuscript.

Truth Strawson, P.F. (1949). ‘Truth.’ Analysis 9: 83–97. Horwich, Paul (1990). Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Soames, Scott (1999). Understanding Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Field, Hartry (2008). Saving Truth from Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Other work on noncognitivism by the author Schroeder, Mark (2008a). ‘Expression for Expressivists.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 86–116. Schroeder, Mark (2008b). ‘What Is the Frege–Geach Problem?’ Philosophy Compass 3/4: 703–20. Schroeder, Mark (2008c). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of 246 bibliography

Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schroeder, Mark (2008d). ‘How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.’ Noûs 42(4): 573–99. Schroeder, Mark (2009). ‘Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.’ Ethics 119(2): 257–309. Schroeder, Mark (forthcoming a). ‘How to be an Expressivist about Truth.’ Forthcoming in Nikolaj Jang Pedersen and Cory Wright, eds., New Waves in Truth. Schroeder, Mark (forthcoming b). ‘How Not to Avoid Wishful Thinking.’ Forthcoming in Michael Brady, ed., New Waves in Metaethics. Schroeder, Mark (forthcoming c). ‘The Moral Truth.’ Forthcoming in Michael Glanzburg, ed., The Oxford Handbook to Truth. Ross, Jacob, and Mark Schroeder (unpublished). ‘Reflections on Epistemic Modals.’ Unpublished draft manuscript, available online at www-rcf.usc. edu/~maschroe/research/Reflections_on_Epistemic_Modals.pdf