BIBLIOGRAPHY Items are organized topically rather than alphabetically for ease of use as a resource. Some entries are duplicated, as a result. Within each group, entries are in chronological order of publication. General works in metaethics Moore, G.E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harman, Gilbert (1977). The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mackie, J.L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin, espe- cially chapters 1 and 2. Smith, Michael (1994a). The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds. (1997). Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miller, Alexander (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity. Copp, David, ed. (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fisher, Andrew, and Simon Kirchin, eds. (2006). Arguing about Metaethics. New York: Routledge. 236 BIBLIOGRAPHY Shafer-Landau, Russ, and Terence Cuneo, eds. (2007). Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Empirical work on moral judgment and philosophical discussions of its connection to metaethics de Waal, Frans (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Primates and Other Animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greene, J.D., R.B. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J.M. Darley, and J.D. Cohen (2001). ‘An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment.’ Science 293: 2105–8. Haidt, Jonathan (2001). ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.’ Psychological Review 108: 814–34. Greene, J.D., and J. Haidt (2002). ‘How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?’ Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 517–23. Nichols, Shaun (2004). Sentimental Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Joyce, Richard (2006). The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Historical noncognitivism Ogden, C.K., and I.A. Richards (1923). The Meaning of Meaning. New York: Harcourt Brace. Barnes, W.H.F. (1933). ‘A Suggestion about Value.’ Analysis 1: 45–6. Broad, C.D. (1933). ‘Is “Goodness” the Name of a Simple Non-Natural Quality?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 34: 249–68. Carnap, Rudolf (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Ayer, A.J. (1936). Language, Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover. Stevenson, C.L. (1937). ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.’ Reprinted in Stevenson (1963), Facts and Values. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Moore, G.E. (1942). ‘A Reply to My Critics.’ In Paul Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1942). ‘Moore’s Arguments against Certain Forms of Ethical Naturalism.’ In Paul Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1944). Ethics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hägerström, Axel (1953). Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals. Edited by Karl Olivecrona and translated by C.D. Broad. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. BIBLIOGRAPHY 237 Edwards, Paul (1955). The Logic of Moral Discourse. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Hare, R.M. (1963). Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1963). Facts and Values. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Urmson, J.O. (1968). The Emotive Theory of Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Hare, R.M. (1972). Practical Inferences. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hare, R.M. (1981). Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smart, J.J.C. (1984). Ethics, Persuasion, and Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Satris, Stephen (1987). Ethical Emotivism. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Truth-conditional semantics Larson, Richard, and Gabriel Segal (1995). Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heim, Irene, and Angelica Kratzer (1998). Semantics in Generative Grammar. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Speaker subjectivism and related theories Moore, G.E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Perry, R.B. (1926). General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Stevenson, C.L. (1937). ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.’ Reprinted in Stevenson (1963), Facts and Values. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Dreier, James (1990). ‘Internalism and Speaker Relativism.’ Ethics 101(1): 6–25. Timmons, Mark (1999). Morality without Foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Finlay, Stephen (2004). ‘The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgment.’ Journal of Ethics 8: 205–23. Expressivism Blackburn, Simon (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gibbard, Allan (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 238 BIBLIOGRAPHY Blackburn, Simon (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, Simon (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons (2000). ‘Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.’ Philosophical Papers 29: 121–53. Gibbard, Allan (2003). Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons (2006). ‘Cognitivist Expressivism.’ In Horgan and Timmons, eds., Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The nature of the expression relation Jackson, Frank, and Philip Pettit (1998). ‘A Problem for Expressivism.’ Analysis 58(4): 239–51. Barker, Stephen (2000). ‘Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?’ Analysis 60(3): 268–79. Copp, David (2001). ‘Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.’ Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 1–43. Joyce, Richard (2002). ‘Expressivism and Motivation Internalism.’ Analysis 62(4): 336–44. Jackson, Frank, and Philip Pettit (2003). ‘Locke, Expressivism, and Conditionals.’ Analysis 63(1): 86–92. Smith, Michael, and Daniel Stoljar (2003). ‘Is There a Lockean Argument against Expressivism?’ Analysis 63(1): 76–86. Dreier, James (2004). ‘Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions.’ Analysis 64(1): 84–91. Finlay, Stephen (2005). ‘Value and Implicature.’ Philosophers’ Imprint 5(4), avail- able online at www.philosophersimprint.org/005004/. Boisvert, Daniel (2008). ‘Expressive-Assertivism.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 169–203. Schroeder, Mark (2008a). ‘Expression for Expressivists.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 86–116. Cognitivism about instrumental reason Harman, Gilbert (1976). ‘Practical Reasoning.’ Reprinted in Harman (1999), Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davis, Wayne (1984). ‘A Causal Theory of Intending.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 21: 43–54. BIBLIOGRAPHY 239 Bratman, Michael (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Setiya, Kieran (2007). ‘Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason.’ Ethics 117(4): 649–73. Bratman, Michael (2009). ‘Intention, Belief, Theoretical, Practical.’ Forthcoming in Simon Robertson, ed., Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ross, Jacob (2008). ‘How to Be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason.’ Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics. The Frege–Geach problem Before Geach and Searle Acton, H.B. (1936). ‘The Expletive Theory of Morals.’ Analysis 4: 42–5. Ross, W.D. (1939). Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, chapter 2. Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, especially chapter 2. The classical problem Geach, Peter (1958). ‘Imperative and Deontic Logic.’ Analysis 18: 49–56. Geach, Peter (1960). ‘Ascriptivism.’ Philosophical Review 69: 221–5. Searle, John (1962). ‘Meaning and Speech Acts.’ Philosophical Review 71: 423–32. Geach, Peter (1965). ‘Assertion.’ Philosophical Review 74: 449–65. Searle, John (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hare, R.M. (1970). ‘Meaning and Speech Acts.’ Philosophical Review 79(1): 3–24. Early approaches and responses Blackburn, Simon (1973). ‘Moral Realism.’ Reprinted in Blackburn (1993), Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zimmerman, David (1980). ‘Force and Sense.’ Mind 89: 214–33. Blackburn, Simon (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schueler, G.F. (1988). ‘Modus Ponens and Moral Realism.’ Ethics 98(3): 492–500. 240 BIBLIOGRAPHY Zangwill, Nick (1992). ‘Moral Modus Ponens.’ Ratio (NS) 5(2): 177–93. Hale, Bob (1993). ‘Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?’ In John Haldane and Crispin Wright, eds., Reality, Representation, and Projection. New York: Oxford University Press. van Roojen, Mark (1996). ‘Expressivism and Irrationality.’ Philosophical Review 105(3): 311–35. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2000). ‘Expressivism and Embedding.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(3): 677–93. Kölbel, Max (2002). Truth without Objectivity. New York: Routledge. Deflationist responses Horwich, Paul (1993). ‘Gibbard’s Theory of Norms.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 22: 67–78. Stoljar, Daniel (1993). ‘Emotivism and Truth Conditions.’ Philosophical Studies 70: 81–101. Price, Huw (1994). ‘Semantic Deflationism and the Frege Point.’ In S. L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. London: Routledge. Dreier,