MODERN IN THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES Edited by: Ildikó Barna and Anikó Félix

First published 2017 By the Tom Lantos Institute 1016 , Bérc utca 13-15.

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2017 Tom Lantos Institute

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The text does not necessarily represent in every detail the collective view of the Tom Lantos Institute. CONTENTS

01 02 Ildikó Barna and Anikó Félix CONTRIBUTORS 6 INTRODUCTION 9

03 Veronika Šternová 04 Ildikó Barna THE CZECH REPUBLIC 19 47 I. BACKGROUND 20 I. BACKGROUND 48 II. ANTISEMITISM: II. ANTISEMITISM: ACTORS AND MANIFESTATIONS 27 ACTORS AND MANIFESTATIONS 57 III. CONCLUSIONS 43 III. CONCLUSIONS 74

05 Rafal Pankowski 06 Grigorij Mesežnikov 79 105 I. BACKGROUND 80 I. BACKGROUND 106 II. ANTISEMITISM: II. ANTISEMITISM: ACTORS AND MANIFESTATIONS 88 ACTORS AND MANIFESTATIONS 111 III. CONCLUSIONS 102 III. CONCLUSIONS 126 The Tom Lantos Institute (TLI) is its transmission to younger gener- an independent human and minori- ations. Working with local commu- ty rights organization with a par- nities to explore and educate Jewish ticular focus on Jewish and Roma histories contributes to countering communities, Hungarian minori- antisemitism. The research of con- ties, and other ethnic or national, temporary forms of antisemitism is linguistic and religious minori- a flagship project of the Institute. ties. It operates internationally in terms of staff, partners, scope, This publication summarizes our re- and funds. As a research and search on modern antisemitism in education platform, TLI aims to the Visegrád region conducted by bridge the gaps between research a team of researchers in all four and policy, norms and practice. countries.

TLI locates itself at the intersec- tion of and identi- ty politics. While appreciating the importance of legal perspectives and remedies to violations, it in- vestigates through multidisciplinary approaches the problem-solving capacity of existing national and international norms. TLI’s principal strategic goal is the socialization of human and minority rights through research, education, public debates, publishing, and memorialization. TLI’s Jewish Life and Antisemitism Programme focuses on the past, present and future of the Hungar- ian and European Jewry. It active- ly promotes this extremely diverse heritage and identity, supporting 01 CONTRIBUTORS Ildikó Barna is a sociologist and an University’s Faculty of Social Scienc- Associate Professor in the Depart- es, where she is currently pursuing ment of Social Research Methodol- a PhD in Sociology. Her research ogy at ELTE University’s Faculty of focuses on right-wing extremism Social Sciences in Budapest. She also from a perspective. She is serves as the Chair of the Depart- a member of the MTA-ELTE Peri- ment. Barna wrote her habilitation pato Comparative Social Dynamics thesis on the identity of Hungarian Research Group. In this framework, Jewry and has participated in many she has participated in various re- research projects on search projects, published articles and post-Holocaust period, Jewish and presented her findings at inter- identity and antisemitism, publish- national conferences and in media ing articles and books and present- interviews.1. ing her research at international conferences. In 2015, she was a Vis- iting Fellow at the Mandel Center for Grigorij Mesežnikov is a politi- Advanced at the cal scientist and President of the Holocaust Memorial Institute for Public Affairs (IVO) in Museum (USHMM), where she start- Bratislava. He has published expert ed a research project on Hungarian studies on the development of par- Jewish displaced persons. In 2013- ty systems and the political aspects 2016, she monitored antisemitic of transformation in post-Commu- hate crimes and incidents in Hun- nist societies, including the rise of gary on a monthly basis. radical and right-wing extremism, in various monographs, edited volumes and scholarly jour- Anikó Félix is a sociologist and nals in Slovakia and other countries. Programme Manager for Jewish Life He regularly comments on Slovaki- and Antisemitism at the Tom Lantos an politics in domestic and foreign Institute in Budapest. She holds an media. MA in Minority Politics from ELTE

1 https://tatk.academia.edu/Anik%C3%B3F%C3%A9lix (accessed June 19, 2017).

7 Rafal Pankowski is an Associ- ate Professor at Collegium Civitas in Warsaw and heads the War- saw-based anti-racist East Monitoring Centre2, which was es- tablished by the “Nigdy Wiecej” (“Never Again”) association. He has also served as deputy editor of the “Nigdy Wiecej” magazine since 1996. Pankowski holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Warsaw and a PhD and Habilita- tion in Sociology of Culture from the University of Warsaw’s Institute of Applied Social Sciences.

Veroniká Šternová studied Jew- ish Studies and Hussite Theology at Charles University in Prague. During her studies, she focused on the top- ic of antisemitism. She subsequently went to work as an analyst for the Jewish Community of Prague and the Federation of Jewish Commu- nities in the Czech Republic (FZO), where she was responsible for the compilation of annual reports on antisemitism in the Czech Republic.

2 http://www.rafalpankowski.pl/ (accessed June 19, 2017).

8 02 INTRODUCTION lldikó Barna and Anikó Félix

9 The present report analyzes the cur- Unlike in the West, from Germa- rent state of modern antisemitism, ny to the United States, where new and especially , in antisemitism is generally associated the Visegrád countries: the Czech Re- with left-wing, pro-Palestinian ac- public, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. tivists, the identity of those engag- Each of the four country reports in ing in it in the Visegrád countries is this volume examines the three main more diffuse. A further difference is manifestations of this phenomenon, that this phenomenon plays a much namely secondary, conspiratorial and smaller role in the public and aca- new antisemitism, with a particular demic discourse of these four coun- emphasis on the latter. Secondary an- tries. Although the intensity of new tisemitism pertains to the denial, rel- antisemitism is undeniably much ativization and/or trivialization of the weaker in this region, it is also not Shoah, while conspiratorial antisemi- entirely absent. In fact, the region tism covers conspiracy theories about has a strong history of anti- the . In order to distinguish legit- due to its Communist past. The aim imate criticism of from new an- of this report is to identify the actors tisemitism, we have applied the “3D” that engage in modern antisemitism test proposed by Natan Sharansky. in the Visegrád countries, with a par- The first “D” stands for the demoni- ticular emphasis on new antisemi- zation, which refers to cases in which tism, in order to identify and evaluate the Jewish state is portrayed as inher- their commonalities and differences. ently wicked or evil. The second “D” To this end, the authors of the coun- stands for double standards, which try reports map the main discourses, come into play when criticism of Israel topics and actors that feature in the is applied in an imbalanced or selec- modern antisemitic discourse in each tive manner. The third “D” stands for country. In the process, they also dis- delegitimization, which applies when cuss the historical, legislative and at- such criticism turns into a denial of titudinal background that has given Israel’s fundamental .3 rise to this phenomenon.4

3 Natan Sharansky, “3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization,” Jewish Political Studies Review 16, nos. 3-4 (2004). 4 We would like to take this opportunity to extend our thanks to the authors of this volume for their contributions, to Grigorij Mesežnikov in particular, whose thoughts informed this summary report.

10 The main research questions Analytical framework addressed by the four country For the purposes of this project, we reports are as follows: have employed the working definition (i) Is new antisemitism present in of antisemitism adopted by the In- the country in question? If so, ternational Holocaust Remembrance what forms does it take? Alliance (IHRA).5 As regards the defi- (ii) What is the connection between nition of modern antisemitism, we new and other forms of an- have distinguished three subtypes, tisemitism? namely secondary, conspiratorial and new antisemitism. Regarding the (iii) What are its historical, legisla- third subtype of modern antisem- tive and political aspects? itism, new antisemitism, we are (iv) What are its main topics aware that criticism of Israel does and discourses? not necessarily equate to antisemi- tism or anti-Zionism6 and that there (v) Who are the main actors that is sometimes a fine line separating are responsible for producing them. One of the main dangers of these discourses and determin- new antisemitism is that it is often ing these topics? regarded as part of legitimate or ac- (vi) What events have triggered ceptable discourse,7 thus preventing these topics and discourses the international community from during the past six years? seeing the Jewish-Arab conflict in all its complexity. This distorts the debate on the human and minority rights issues that have emerged on both sides, ultimately undermining efforts to resolve the conflict. In -or der to distinguish legitimate criticism

5 For more information on the working definition of antisemitism adopted by the IHRA Plenary in Budapest in May 2016, see https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/sites/default/files/press_release_ document_antisemitism.pdf (accessed January 25, 2017). 6 David Matas, Aftershock: Anti-Zionism & Anti-Semitism (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2005). 7 This problem was discussed in detail at a conference held at Indiana University in April 2016, entitled “Anti-Zionism, Antisemitism, and the Dynamics of Delegitimization.” See http://www.indiana. edu/~iscaweb/isc_video.shtml (accessed December 15, 2016).

11 of Israel from antisemitism, we have movements, associations and per- therefore applied Natan Sharansky’s sons, while the second category en- “3D” test. compasses the media.8 Manifesta- tions of modern antisemitism also fall into several categories, includ- Outline and methods ing events (e.g. demonstrations and Since the main purpose of this re- boycotts), incidents (e.g. physical or port is to analyze and compare the verbal attacks) and other acts (e.g. prevalence of modern antisemitism speeches, publications and so forth). in the Visegrád countries, all four Most of these manifestations were country reports follow the same attributable to the aforementioned structure. The first section of each actors, but others were selected by report, presents a brief history of the the authors on the grounds of their Jewish population and community in pertinence to the topic. The final sec- the country concerned, followed by tion of each report summarizes the an analysis of the historical context authors’ findings and presents their of modern antisemitism, a review conclusions. of recent opinion polls on the sub- ject of antisemitism, an overview of The historical the legislative background, and an context of modern antisemitism examination of official governmen- tal relations with Israel. The next The history of the Jewish popula- section of each report identifies the tion has broadly followed the same main actors and manifestations in trajectory in all four countries. For the field of modern antisemitism in centuries, a large Jewish population the period under review (2010-2016). contributed to the country’s social, The actors, defined as those who ap- economic and cultural development. pear to have a significant voice and However, even periods of peaceful impact at national level, have been coexistence between Jews and non- divided into two categories. The first Jews were accompanied by growing category comprises parties, groups, anti-Jewish sentiment. Antisemitism

8 The method of selection is briefly summarized at the beginning of the relevant section in each country report.

12 later seeped into national politics, disappeared, antisemitism continues culminating in the Shoah and the an- to exist at the attitudinal and polit- nihilation of most of the Jewish pop- ical level in all four countries. The ulation of all four countries. Although results of the opinion polls presented the post-war regimes appeared to in the country reports corroborate offer the surviving communities the the well-known fact that there is no possibility of assimilation, in practice direct correlation between the size of antisemitism was resurrected by the the Jewish population and the lev- Communist parties of the region. As el of antisemitism. Antisemitism is far as the intensity and brutality of present in all the Visegrád countries, this new incarnation of antisemitism regardless of the size of the local is concerned, the activities of the Jewish community. Although a direct Communist regimes cannot be com- comparison of the data gathered in pared to the Nazis’ campaign of vilifi- the different countries is impossible cation and dehumanization, but they due to the different methodological were nonetheless sufficient to sow approaches, certain conclusions can the seeds of persistent antisemitic nevertheless be drawn. According to sentiment in the local population. the opinion polls, Jews are not re- The establishment of Israel created garded as “public enemy no. 1” in a further focus for anti-Jewish feel- any of the countries under review, ing. In all four countries, anti-Zionist especially not in the Czech Republic, campaigns of varying intensity were where they are seen in a neutral light waged on various grounds, from op- or even viewed sympathetically. Nev- position to Jewish nationalism and ertheless, all three types of modern self-determination to accusations of antisemitism are in evidence in the disloyalty and treason. Visegrád countries, albeit to different degrees of intensity.

A comparative view Actors and manifestations Although all four countries re-es- tablished diplomatic relations with The authors of the country reports Israel after a period of transition and identify two kinds of actors. The first state-fuelled anti-Zionism has all but kind are those who combine all three

13 types of modern antisemitism, while parties to adopt a more anti-Islamic the second are those who “only” hold agenda and reframe their antisemi- anti-Israel views. The two most con- tism. As all four country reports in- spicuous differences between Eastern dicate, the refugee crisis has given and Western Europe in this regard rise to new conspiracy theories. As include the anti-Zionist position ad- Veronika Šternová puts it in her re- opted by far-right parties in Eastern port on the Czech Republic, the idea Europe and the fact that there are that “my enemy’s enemy is my en- fewer leftist, pro-Palestinian actors emy” has started to influence the operating there. antisemitic rhetoric of some of these In Western Europe, far-right parties parties, as in the case of Hungary’s 10 are mostly characterized by a strong . anti-Islamic agenda, which means Although we have no concrete evi- that they are less antisemitic and in dence that the antisemitism of these some cases even pro-Israel.9 This is far-right parties is built on the foun- not the case in the Visegrád coun- dations of Communist anti-Zionism, tries, where most of the actors are we assume that it persists to some far-right parties, movements and extent in their rhetoric, even at a persons that engage in all forms of subconscious level. The preservation modern antisemitism. These actors of this heritage is most apparent in include parties like National Democ- the Communist parties of the Czech racy in the Czech Republic, Jobbik in Republic and Slovakia, but it is less Hungary, the People’s Party Our Slo- evident in the other two Visegrád vakia and nationalist elements linked countries. The lower number of Com- to the Kukiz’15 movement in Poland. munist anti-Zionist actors in the re- The situation has changed somewhat gion is partly explained by bad mem- as a result of Europe’s migration cri- ories of Communism, while the lower sis, which has pushed some of these number of purely anti-Zionist actors

9 Hans-Georg Betz, “Mosques, Minarets, Burqas and Other Essentials: The Populist Right’s Campaign against Islam in Western Europe,” in Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, ed. R. Wo- dak, M. Khosravnik and B. Mral (: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 71-88. 10 Jobbik has recently toned down its antisemitic rhetoric. During the period under review, however, the party exhibited strong antisemitic sentiments, which is why Ildikó Barna identified Jobbik as a significant actor in her country report on Hungary.

14 is probably related to the absence living, which remains low compared of a significant Muslim population in to Western countries. the region. Nevertheless, some ac- tors have adopted an exclusively an- In all four Visegrád countries, far- ti-Israel position, without any trace right actors are the main exponents of the other types of antisemitism. of secondary and conspiratorial an- Examples of such actors include the tisemitism. New conspiracy theories bloggers Kamil Kandalaft and Bar- have recently emerged in the region, bora Weberová, who are discussed such as the alleged Jewish contribu- in the Slovak country report, and tion to the European refugee crisis, as the International Solidarity Move- discussed in all country reports. Con- ment (ISM), which is discussed in the spiracy theories concerning George country report on the Czech Repub- Soros, the multimillionaire entrepre- lic. Apart from the ISM, there is no neur of Jewish-Hungarian origin, are significant movement in the region another common element in three of similar to the Boycott, Divestment the four countries (the Czech Repub- and Sanctions (BDS) movement in lic being the exception).12 In all four Western countries, which focuses countries, manifestations of new an- on promoting a cultural, academic tisemitism were mostly linked to far- and economic boycott against Isra- right actors, which also engaged in 11 el. Our assumption, which warrants other types of antisemitism. In the further investigation, is that this is case of the Czech Republic and Slo- partly due to low levels of social- vakia, however, some acts that can ly conscious consumerism. In other be categorized exclusively as new words, consumers in the Visegrád antisemitism were carried out by countries base their choices less on left-wing actors. Aside from these moral values and more on econom- cases, it is difficult to place manifes- ic imperatives. This behaviour likely tations of antisemitism in just one has historical roots and may also be category, since they mostly combine related to the regional standard of

11 See https://bdsmovement.net (accessed January 23, 2017). 12 Péter Krekó et al., “‘Migrant Invasion’ as a Trojan Horseshoe,” in Trust within Europe, ed. Péter Krekó et al. (Budapest: Political Capital, 2015), 63-72, available at http://www.politicalcapital.hu/ wp-content/uploads/PC_OSIFE_Trust_Within_Europe_web.pdf (accessed January 15, 2016).

15 at least two of the three subtypes ined. This has inevitably resulted in a of modern antisemitism. A case in degree of subjectivity. Furthermore, point appears in the Polish country we cannot empirically substantiate report, which discusses the burning the link between the historical heri- at a demonstration of a Hassidic effi- tage of Communist anti-Zionism and gy depicting George Soros as the au- the current antisemitic discourse, nor thor of a secret plan to bring Muslim the correlation between the lack of refugees to Europe. BDS activity and the low level of so- Physical attacks against Jews as cially conscious consumerism in the manifestations of antisemitism are Visegrád countries. Further research much less prevalent in the Viseg- is therefore needed on these issues. rád countries than in many Western In addition, a detailed analysis of European countries, with most inci- the manifestations of the various dents occurring online or in the form subtypes of modern antisemitism is of verbal attacks. However, the num- required in order to understand the ber of violent incidents in the Czech relationships between them. A net- Republic rose during the period un- work analysis of inter-country and der review. intra-country relations is also neces- sary. In countries where the extreme Left plays a role in the antisemitic Limitations and further research discourse, as in Slovakia and the The present report seeks to provide an Czech Republic, relations between the overview of modern antisemitism in extreme Left and the extreme Right the Visegrád countries, while taking should also be investigated. Last but account of the region’s special his- not least, a regional survey of an- torical and political context. However, tisemitism in the Visegrád countries we are aware of the limitations of should be carried out on the basis this study. First, since not all actors, of the special historical and political manifestations and platforms could characteristics of the region outlined be covered, only those selected after in this report. The Tom Lantos Insti- careful consideration by the authors tute and the editors of this volume of the country reports were exam- aim to achieve these objectives in the near future.

16 References • Betz, Hans-Georg. “Mosques, Minarets, Burqas and Other Essentials: The Populist Right’s Campaign against Islam in Western Europe.” In Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, edited by R. Wodak, M. Khosravnik and B. Mral, 71-88. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. • Matas, David. Aftershock: Anti-Zionism & Anti-Semitism. Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2005. • Krekó, Péter, Csaba Molnár, Anikó Félix, Ildikó Barna and Mira Boneva. “‘Migrant Invasion’ as a Trojan Horseshoe.” In Trust within Europe, edited by Péter Krekó, Csaba Molnár, Anikó Félix, Ildikó Barna and Mira Boneva, 63-72. Budapest: Political Capital, 2015. • Sharansky, Natan. “3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization.” Jewish Political Studies Review 16, nos. 3-4 (2004).

17 18 03 THE CZECH REPUBLIC Veronika Šternová

19 I. BACKGROUND 1781, the Edict of Tolerance im- proved conditions for Jews in the Czech lands by revoking many dis- Jewish population criminatory laws. It heralded a pro- and community cess of Jewish Emancipation, which The Jewish presence in the territory was centred around Prague, where now known as the Czech Republic many social reform clubs were has a history stretching back over founded. The resulting assimilation a thousand years. The first account and Germanization marked a signif- of Jewish people in Prague can be icant turning point for Czech Jewry. found in a letter from the tenth As in other European countries, the century written by the Jewish mer- Holocaust subsequently decimated chant Ibrahim ibn Jacob. Since then, the Jewish population. Only about the country has been home to a sig- thirty thousand Jews survived. Post- nificant Jewish population, including war events in Central and Eastern several religious authorities. In the Europe also proved very challeng- Middle Ages, the Jewish population ing when it came to restoring Jew- enjoyed the protection of the king of ish life in . The rise the Czech lands. Jews were obliged of the Czechoslovakian Communist to pay a special tax for this protec- Party under the aegis of the Soviet tion and were therefore an import- Union prompted the emigration of ant source of revenue. At the same Jewish , most- time, however, they were excluded ly to Israel and the United States. from pursuing most crafts and were Those who remained faced anoth- not allowed to own land. As a result, er period of antisemitic repression, most of the Jewish population was which lasted almost until the end concentrated in the cities in ghettos. of Communist rule in Czechoslova- Jews were also subjected to various kia. The Velvet Revolution of 1989 other restrictive measures and were brought freedom and democracy often the target of violent physi- to Czechoslovakia and marked the cal attacks known as .1 In beginning of the economic and so-

1 The worst in the Czech lands took place in the Prague ghetto during Easter 1389. Over 3,000 Jews were killed during the pogrom.

20 cial transformation of Czech society, bers of a Jewish community and which opened the door to Western only 345 people describe themselves diversity and liberalism. Under these as Jewish believers,3 although the circumstances, the Czech Jewish FJC’s website claims that there are community was finally able to re- an additional 10,000-15,000 people store itself, develop its activities and of Jewish origin living in the Czech become an integral part of modern Republic who are not registered Czech society. with any official organization.4 There Today, the Czech Jewish commu- is no official data on the main so- nity is officially represented by the cio-demographic characteristics of Federation of Jewish Communities the Jewish population in the coun- in the Czech Republic (FJC), which try, but it can be assumed that a serves as the umbrella organization majority of the members of the of ten official Jewish communities in Jewish communities are over fifty Bohemia and Moravia and several years old. The activities of the com- other “secular” Jewish organiza- munities are therefore targeted at tions, including youth organizations, this age range and hold little appeal conservative and reform organiza- for younger generations, which are tions, and sports clubs. Official -es largely unaffiliated. timates of the Jewish population in the Czech Republic are very low. The Historical context official Jewish communities currently of modern antisemitism have about 3,000 registered mem- bers, almost half of whom reside in The in the Prague.2 Other Jewish organizations Czech lands is as long as the his- have roughly 4,000 members. How- tory of Jewish habitation there. In ever, the latest census shows that this respect, it does not differ all only 1,132 people claim to be mem- that much from neighbouring coun-

2 Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic (FZO), “About Us,” https://www.fzo.cz/en/ about-us/organization (accessed January 2, 2017). 3 Czech Statistical Office, Obyvatelstvo podle náboženské víry v krajích, https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/ faces/cs/index.jsf?page=vystup-objekt-vyhledavani&vyhltext=n%C3%A1bo%C5%BEenstv%C3%AD&b- kvt=bsOhYm_FvmVuc3R2w60.&katalog=all&pvo=SLD9100PU-KR (accessed January 2, 2017). 4 FZO, “About Us.”

21 tries such as Germany or Austria. been able to fully restore itself. For centuries, the Jewish population The Czech form of modern antisem- faced various kinds of restrictions itism has its roots in the nineteenth imposed by the Church, which tend- century, when specific antisemitic ed to benefit from these measures ideas emerged in the Czech lands. in some way. Jews were often ob- These ideas differed slightly from jects of hatred and were subjected those circulating in Germany or to numerous pogroms. They were France, originating as they did from not allowed to own land, and as a a different set of experiences. The result most of the Jewish population Jewish population in the region was lived in towns in closed ghettos. In highly assimilated and consisted the eighteenth century, in 1726 so- mainly of Reform Jews who had called bureaucratic antisemitism adopted a modern way of life not became official government policy unlike that of their Czech neigh- with the adoption of two laws des- bours and were fully integrated in ignating the permitted number and society. As a result, the Czechs did living areas of Jews in the Czech not harbour racist notions of an in- 5 lands, namely the Familiant Law ferior Jewish race. Instead, modern 6 and the Translocational Rescript. Czech antisemitism of the nineteenth These restrictions remained in force and early twentieth centuries was until 1848, when Jews became cit- motivated by purely economic and izens with partially equal rights. By nationalistic reasons. Racial factors 1867, they had gained full equali- were not part of the rhetoric. In- ty. During this time, however, new stead, hatred of the German minority forms of antisemitism were emerg- had extended towards the Jews, who ing, ultimately culminating in the were accused of collaborating with atrocities of the Holocaust. Due to the Germans against the Czechs. the persistence of various restric- These accusations were inspired by tions throughout most of the twen- the fact that most Czech Jews spoke tieth century, the Jewish population German and had German names at in the Czech Republic has still not this time, which was more of a his-

5 Designed to regulate the number of Jewish families and control Jewish population growth. 6 Designed to regulate locations inhabited by the Jewish population.

22 torical coincidence than a demon- there were approximately 180,000 stration of affinity for the German Jews living in Czechoslovakia. While nation. As a result, conspiracy theo- 26,000 of them were able to em- ries and disputes about loyalty were igrate before 1941, over 80,000 the among the main preoccupations Czech Jews were murdered. of Czech antisemites in those days, After World War II, Czechoslovakia as they still are today. became a part of the Eastern Bloc, Another specific episode in the his- and a new wave of antisemitism tory of modern antisemitism in the flourished in the countries that fell Czech lands involves the famous under the influence of the Soviet politician Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Union. Jews were regarded as the who took it upon himself to speak enemy and referred to as “cosmo- out against the antisemitic senti- politans” due to their connections ments and stereotypes that surfaced with Jews in other countries. Like- during the so-called Hilsner affair of wise, anti-Jewish conspiracy theo- 1899.7 After he became president of ries once again began to proliferate Czechoslovakia, Masaryk continued under Communist rule. As in the to speak out against antisemitism, , Jews were accused of together with other politicians. For plotting against Socialism, and poli- this reason, any expression of an- ticians of Jewish origin were put on tisemitism at the political level re- trial, the most notorious example mains unacceptable in the Czech being the so-called Slansky trial.8 Republic today, and any manifes- Antisemitism was officially reject- tation will result in the end of the ed, but unofficially persisted in the offender’s career in mainstream form of anti-Zionism, which covered politics. not only hatred of the “imperialistic” Unfortunately, the Holocaust devas- State of Israel but also resistance tated the Czech Jewish population. to “Jewish bourgeois nationalism” 9 Before the start of World War II, and Judaism. Agents of the secret

7 See http://www.jewishmuseum.cz/en/program-and-education/exhibits/archive-exhibits/363. 8 See http://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/u4/bps_/publications_/2009-08-Blumenthal.pdf. 9 Pavlát, Leo. “Antisemitismus – nejsetrvalejší zášť v dějinách lidstva.” In Židé – dějiny a kultura. Edited by Leo Pavlát. Prague: Jewish Museum in Prague, 2005, 105.

23 police paid special attention to cit- towards each minority on a scale of izens of Jewish origin, going so far one to five (one being very sympa- as to compile a list of them in the thetic, five being very unsympathet- framework of a secret operation ic). The latest survey, published in called “Pavouk” (Spider). The official March 2016, shows that respons- Jewish communities were also mon- es concerning Jews ranged for the itored by the secret police. most part from neutral to rather Today, Communist anti-Zionist rhet- sympathetic, with an average rating 10 oric is still in evidence in some of 2.91. peripheral Communist media and Similar results appeared in the an- is advanced by members of ex- nual survey conducted in March treme-left movements as well as 2015 by the non-profit agency pro-Palestinian activists. In the po- STEM, which measures the social litical mainstream, however, anti-Zi- distance of respondents to minori- onism or new antisemitism of any ties by asking them whether they description remains unacceptable. would accept a neighbour of a dif- ferent nationality or ethnicity. In this survey, roughly two-thirds (65%) of Opinion polls on antisemitism respondents stated that they would The Public Opinion Research Centre have no problem accepting Jews as of the Institute of Sociology at the their neighbours.11 Academy of Sciences of the Czech Both surveys further revealed that Republic conducts a regular survey the level of sympathy towards Jews called “Our Society”. One section of increased according to the respon- this survey also attempts to describe dent’s level of education. Generally the relationship between the public speaking, attitudes towards Jews and national and ethnic minorities range from indifferent to rather pos- living in the country. Respondents itive. The Anti-Defamation League’s are asked to define their sympathies

10 Institute of Sociology at the Czech Academy of Sciences, Public Opinion Research Centre, “Media,” https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a2050/f9/ov160420.pdf (accessed January 2, 2017). 11 STEM Non-Profit Institute, Vztah české veřejnosti k cizincům – březen 2015, https://www.stem.cz/ vztah-ceske-verejnosti-k-cizincum-brezen-2015 (accessed January 2, 2017).

24 Index of Antisemitism stands at sections, with the possibility of up 13% for the Czech Republic, which is to two years’ imprisonment in the one of the lowest in Europe, as well case of conviction. 12 as in the world. The fact that the Chapter XIII of the Criminal Code on level of antisemitism and its mani- Criminal Offences against Human- festations are significantly lower in ity, Peace and War Crimes covers the Czech Republic than in other Eu- other criminal acts relating to an- ropean countries helps explain why tisemitism in Sections 400 to 405, more complex research on antisem- including: ; attacks against itism and antisemitic behaviour has humanity; apartheid and discrim- not been conducted there to the ination against a group of people; same extent as in other Central Eu- the establishment, support and ropean countries. promotion of movements aimed at suppression of human rights and freedoms; the expression of sympa- Legislative background thies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and free- The Czech Criminal Code describes doms; and the denial, impugnation, various types of hate crimes and approval and justification of geno- crimes relating to extremism that cide. Anyone convicted under the are relevant to the issue of antisem- sections on genocide and attacks itism. The most important of these against humanity may be sentenced are Section 355: Defamation of Na- to a prison term of at least twelve tion, Race, Ethnic or other Group of years or to an exceptional term of People and Section 356: Instigation life imprisonment. of Hatred towards a Group of People or Suppression of their Rights and According to the FJC’s 2015 Annual Freedoms, which appear in Chapter Report on Antisemitism, antisemitic X on Criminal Offences against Or- hatred on the Internet constitutes der in Public Matters. Most antise- more than 80 per cent of all record- mitic offences are tried under these ed antisemitic incidents. Despite the

12 Anti-Defamation League, The ADL Global 100 – Czech Republic, http://global100.adl.org/#country/ czech-republic/2014 (accessed January 2, 2017).

25 fact that some of the content post- ration of diplomatic ties between the ed on extremist websites constitutes countries in February 1990. The me- a criminal offence, the perpetrators dia often refer to the Czech Repub- cannot be sued under Czech law be- lic as the strongest ally of the State cause their websites are registered of Israel within the abroad. As a result, there is no ef- on account of the stable diplomatic fective way to prevent these web- and trade relations between the two sites from publishing such content. countries. Many steps that have been The phenomenon of cyberbullying is taken during the past two decades also on the rise. So far, only indi- clearly attest to this, including the viduals have been affected, but the fact that the Czech Republic was the phenomenon could also spread to only European country to vote against the Jewish community and Jewish granting Palestine non-member ob- organizations. Efforts must be made server state status in the UN General to prevent this, in cooperation with Assembly in November 2012.13 In ad- other European countries. Combat- dition, the Czech Republic and Israel ing hate speech on the Internet, have held regular government-level including all forms of antisemitism, meetings since 2012, and in 2015 the has proved to be extremely chal- Czech parliament refused to change lenging—and not only in the Czech the labelling of goods from Israeli Republic. There is a clear need for settlements and called on the gov- a discussion on further common ernment to reject the EU guidelines legislative steps to counter this phe- in this regard. Last but not least, nomenon. governmental relations remain stable Governmental relations no matter what political party is in with Israel power. Compared to other European coun- Diplomat and author Moshe Yegar be- tries, all Czech governments have lieves that these good relations have maintained surprisingly good rela- their roots in several historical events tions with Israel ever since the resto- linked to Czechoslovakia’s first presi-

13 “General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Sta- tus in ,” UN press release, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm (accessed January 2, 2017).

26 dent, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. As far of Israel on the provision of mili- back as 1883, and thirteen years be- tary supplies and military training, fore Theodor Herzl published Der Ju- which were duly initiated in defiance denstaat. Masaryk believed that the of a UN embargo.16 Masaryk’s trag- Jews had their own nationality and ic death in March 1948 marked the should be seen as a nation.14 More- beginning of the end of relations be- over, it was thanks to Masaryk that tween the newly-born State of Israel Czechoslovakia was the first state to and Czechoslovakia.17 After the Com- officially recognize the existence of munist coup that took pace later that Jewish nationhood in 1920. Masaryk year, Czechoslovakia became part of went even further by visiting Jewish the Soviet-controlled Eastern Bloc and settlements and the Hebrew Univer- followed Moscow’s official anti-Zion- sity in Mandatory Palestine in 1927. ist policies for the next forty years, Zionism and the notion of a Jewish until the Velvet Revolution of 1989. homeland was also endorsed by oth- er Czech intellectuals, who support- ed the Jews in their efforts to make II. ANTISEMITISM: this dream a reality.15 Czechoslovakia ACTORS AND MANIFESTATIONS hosted the World Zionist Congress in 1921, 1923 and 1933. After World War II, Czechoslovakia re- Actors stored Zionism to its pre-war state. Method of selection Foreign minister Jan Masaryk was The selected actors are meant to particularly instrumental in helping paint a picture of the patterns of create the State of Israel through antisemitism that exist in the Czech his diplomatic work at the United Republic today. Modern antisemitic Nations. In 1947, negotiations took rhetoric is often combined with old place between Czechoslovakia and antisemitic stereotypes, neo- representatives of the nascent State

14 Moshe Yegar, Ceskoslovensko, sionismus, Izrael (Prague: Victoria Publishing and East Publishing, 1997), 19. 15 Ibid., 27. 16 Ibid., 99. 17 Ibid., 125.

27 and extreme-left ideology. As a result, The actors: parties, groups, there are many similarities between associations and persons the antisemitic rhetoric of the Far Left and the Far Right. When it comes an- tisemitic statements relating to the National Democracy (Národní Middle East conflict, in particular, it is demokracie) often difficult to identify the perpetra- The National Democracy (ND) par- tor’s political views. This trend is no ty20 was founded at the beginning different from what we are witness- of 2014. Its chairman is Adam B. ing in other European countries or the Bartoš. The party identifies itself United States. It is due to globalization as patriotic and as a guardian of and modern forms of communication classical and Christian civilization. such as social media that antisemi- Its main objective is to see the tism, which used to have a specific Czech Republic leave the European local character, is now a global ide- Union, and it is staunchly opposed ology of hatred that has even spread to the current liberal political and to places where it has no historical social order. The party’s platform roots.18 However, despite strong pres- is highly controversial, and many sures arising from the Ukraine and of its members have been recruit- the European refugee crises, the an- ed from movements with extreme tisemitic scene in the Czech Republic right-wing ideologies. For example, remains fragmented and consists of Patrik Vondrák, who was meant to several small groups, political parties, be a party candidate, has been individuals and media organizations convicted for promoting neo-Na- from both ends of the political spec- zism. Only later was aquitted.21 To- trum.19 In this context, it is worth not- gether with Bartoš and Erik Sed- ing that Muslim radicalism is not an lacek, another person with close issue in the Czech Republic. links to ND, Vondrák organized a

18 Pavlat, “Antisemitismus,” 107. 19 Zbyněk Tarant, “Antisemitism in Response to the 2015 Refugee Wave – Case of the Czech Repub- lic,” ISGAP Flashpoint no. 13, January 28, 2016, http://isgap.org/flashpoint/antisemitism-in-response- to-the-2015-refugee-wave-the-case-of-the-czech-republic (accessed January 2, 2017). 20 National Democracy Party, http://narodnidemokracie.cz (accessed January 2, 2017). 21 See http://praha.idnes.cz/propagace-neonacismu-055-/praha-zpravy.aspx?c=A121017_134942_ praha-zpravy_zep.

28 march through the Jewish Quarter Bartoš’s Facebook page, where he of Prague on the anniversary of shared links to his articles, promoted in 2007.22 his blogs and ND and gained a wide audience, has now been banned. He has since created a new profile that Adam B. Bartoš is not as active as the previous one Adam B. Bartoš is a former jour- and more moderate in its approach. nalist and blogger, as well as an This could be connected to the fact ultra-conservative and overt an- that he has been investigated by tisemite. In the past, former Czech the police for other antisemitic acts, president Václav Klaus was favour- such as publishing a new transla- ably disposed towards Bartoš, and it tion of The Protocols of the Elders was only after he was investigated of Zion with an introduction that at- by the police that Klaus decided to tempts to disprove the book’s false distance himself from him. Current- origins. ly the chairman of the anti-liberal, ultra-conservative ND party, Bartoš is known for his strong antisemitic Free Resistance (Svobodný odpor) and anti-Israel tendencies. Some of Free Resistance (FR), formerly Na- his published articles meet the crite- tional Resistance, is a neo-Nazi or- ria for the identification of antisemi- ganization established in 1998 that tism of the European Union’s Agency serves as an umbrella organization for Fundamental Rights (FRA) or the and ideological platform for Czech working definition of the Internation- right-wing extremists and as a re- al Holocaust Remembrance Alliance placement for the defunct neo-Nazi (IHRA).23 Conspiracy theories form organization Blood and Honour. FR’s the leitmotif of his articles, several ideology is based on National So- of which were condemned in a state- cialist ideas and contains strong an- ment issued by the FJC and the Eu- ti-Roma, antisemitic and anti-sys- ropean Shoah Legacy Institute (ESLI). tem elements. The movement’s

22 See http://www.antifa.cz/content/patrik-vondrak-cesky-forrest-gump. 23 See https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/media-room/stories/working-definition-antisemi- tism-0.

29 horizontal organizational structure fering from high unemployment and comprises many small autonomous economic stagnation, such as the regional cells and it accordingly Highlands region, the Moravian-Sile- lacks a centralized leadership. In the sian region and the Ústi nad Labem past, certain influential individuals region. Right-wing extremists are publicly represented the movement aware of their plight and are seeking but did not present themselves as inspiration from abroad from politi- part of its leadership. cal parties like Hungary’s Jobbik and In 2009, the Czech authorities carried Greece’s Golden Dawn, which entered out a large and fairly successful op- into public consciousness by estab- eration to crack down on right-wing lishing direct contact with ordinary extremists. FR has not really recov- citizens, for example by organizing ered from the operation, not least food and clothing drives for peo- because the operation triggered the ple affected by the economic crisis. movement’s fragmentation, split- Czech right-wing extremists are also ting it into many small groups that engaged in long-term and significant seem unable to take coordinated cooperation with Germany’s far-right action. This lack of cooperation may National Democratic Party (NDP). also be related to internal conflicts, A notable incident coordinated by since the movement has long lacked FR was its 2007 attempt to stage a the kind of prominent individuals neo-Nazi demonstration in Prague’s who could develop a clear strategy old Jewish Quarter on the anniver- to advance its “struggle against the sary of Kristallnacht. The munici- system”. Last but not least, there ap- pality prohibited the demonstration, pears to be a split within the move- but approximately thirty members ment’s ranks between die-hard ex- of the movement still managed to tremists and those favouring a more reach Maiselova Street,24 despite a populist direction. This has led to massive police presence. Today, the the movement’s disintegration into movement’s activities are mainly smaller autonomous cells, which are confined to the Internet and social particularly prevalent in regions suf- media, where it posts strongly an-

24 The main street in Prague’s Jewish Quarter. The Maisel Synagogue and the Old-New Synagogue are located there.

30 tisemitic material. Its social media more, the owners of the publish- accounts still have a significant ing house are directly linked to the number of followers, who can eas- extreme-right scene. For example, ily access this radical material and Pavel Kamas was among those who may be influenced by the move- visited the Anežka Hrůzová memori- ment’s neo-Nazi propaganda. al with Adam B. Bartoš (see below).

Guidemedia etc Parlamentní listy and other an- Guidemedia etc25 is one of several ti-liberal online media Czech publishing houses specializing Parlamentní listy26 (PL) is a web in antisemitic literature, mostly re- portal claiming to be an alternative prints of old and new translations to the mainstream media but is, of antisemitic books, as well as new in fact, home to many anti-liberal titles. Its content focuses on Holo- authors and bloggers. In the past, caust denial and conspiracy the- Adam B. Bartoš was one of its main ories. Publishing such material is editors. The portal covers a wide very dangerous and helps spread range of opinions from across the antisemitism throughout society political spectrum, including those in various ways. First, such books of the Far Left and the Far Right. are published without any foreword In addition to publishing editorials, or preface explaining the emer- it provides a platform for bloggers, gence and origin of the text or its which attracts numerous radical historical context. Second, the rev- and antisemitic writers. In addition, enue from the books can be used PL provides web-hosting services to finance the activities of radical for several radical websites, such as groups. Third, the possibility to or- protiproud.parlemtnilisty.cz, which der them anonymously over the publishes xenophobic, anti-liberal Internet makes it easier to reach and ultra-nationalistic articles, as a wider range of readers. Further- well as articles on conspiracy theo-

25 Guidemedia, http://guidemedia.cz (accessed January 2, 2017). 26 Parlamentní listy, http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz (accessed January 2, 2017).

31 ries.27 There are a number of other non-violent methods. Its activities websites offering similar content, therefore generally take the form of such as czechfreepress.cz, zveda- organizing demonstrations, deliver- vec.org, svobodnenoviny.eu and ing lectures, writing articles or open nwoo.org. In the past, most antise- letters and supporting boycotts of mitic websites were largely run by Israeli goods, cultural events and neo-Nazi and right-wing extremist public figures. groups linked to FR. More recently, ISM Czech Republic is very active anti-liberal websites have become through its website and social me- the main source of antisemitic con- dia accounts and is similar to other tent, focusing on conspiracy theo- pro-Palestinian movements, such 28 ries. Articles on these sites often as the Palestinian Club in the Czech reveal the writers’ leanings towards Republic. According to Sharansky’s Putin’s . “3D” test, statements issued by ISM Czech Republic often incorporate International Solidarity Movement29 elements of new antisemitism. The movement also has links to left- The International Solidarity Move- wing extremists in the Czech Re- ment Czech Republic is the most public. active pro-Palestinian movement in the Czech Republic and a member of the worldwide network of the Haló noviny30 Palestinian-led International Soli- Haló noviny (HN) is a daily newspa- darity Movement (ISM). The move- per that is published both in print ment is focused on furthering the and online. HN presents itself as a Palestinian cause in the Israeli-Pal- left-wing, anti-capitalist, anti-Fas- estinian conflict. Unlike the Boycott, cist and Marxist publication. It has Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) direct links with the Czech Commu- movement, ISM is dedicated to nist Party and shares the party’s

27 Protiproud, http://protiproud.parlamentnilisty.cz (accessed January 2, 2017). 28 Tarant, “Antisemitism in Response to the 2015 Refugee Wave.” 29 International Solidarity Movement Czech Republic, http://ism-czech.org (accessed January 2, 2017). 30 Haló noviny, http://www.halonoviny.cz (accessed January 2, 2017).

32 ideology. On account of the newspa- Manifestations per’s blatant extreme-left rhetoric, of modern antisemitism Czech Radio has banned any citing : of HN articles in all broadcasts on all , trivialization its channels. HN is renowned for its and relativization anti-Israel propaganda, publishing articles that focus on military oper- In the Czech Republic, Holocaust ations in the and accuse denial, trivialization and relativiza- Israel of war crimes, genocide and tion is a common activity among apartheid. HN defiantly spreads the neo-Nazis and forms an integral same Communist anti-Zionist pro- part of the rhetoric that appears on paganda that was popular during their websites and in their publica- the Cold War. It often depicts Israel tions. However, they rarely deny the as an imperialist state that deliber- Holocaust in public, most probably ately obstructs peace in the Middle because the penalties for doing so East and terrorizes the are extremely harsh. Holocaust de- through racist and exploitative pol- nial is very specific to the neo-Nazi icies. Most of the anti-Israel articles scene and in many ways perpetuates published by HN do not stand up to pre-war Nazi racial, political and scrutiny and their content qualifies cultural antisemitism by focusing as new antisemitism under Sha- on the same arguments concern- ransky’s “3D” test. ing the existence of a global Jewish conspiracy and the Jews’ never-end- ing efforts to conquer and rule the world. In this context, the Holocaust is presented as an imaginary con- struct fabricated by Jews in order to achieve their goals, which include establishing the State of Israel and securing financial resources in the form of war reparations.31

31 Deborah Lipstadt, Popírání holocaustu. Sílící útok na pravdu a paměť (Prague-Litomyšl: Paseka, 2001), 135-136.

33 World War II and the Holocaust pre- tory of World War II that minimizes sented post-war antisemites with the scope of the Holocaust or even a difficult legacy that needed to be denies it altogether. transformed before they could re- The Czech neo-Nazi movement is gain their place in society. This ini- obviously an avid supporter of Ho- tially led to attempts to trivialize locaust denial theories, which it the Holocaust and subsequently to shares through articles, videos, pic- its complete denial, as witnessed tures and books that are available in the works of well-known deniers on various neo-Nazi websites. The such as David Irving or Ernst Zün- FR’s website contains download del. Holocaust denial encompasses links for entire books by well-known many theories that have evolved Holocaust deniers such as David over the decades and are still being Duke, Ernst Zündel, Paul Rassinier disseminated despite the legislative and Robert Faurisson. Unfortunate- steps that have been taken in many ly, all the material is located on for- countries to counter this trend. eign servers, which means that the Holocaust deniers try very hard to Czech authorities are unable to take portray their work as proper scien- legal action. According to statistics tific scholarship. Their goal is to con- collected by the FJC, Holocaust deni- vince readers that mainstream his- al accounted for 10% of all recorded torical research has been subverted antisemitic incidents on the Internet by the Jews in order to spread false in 2015.32 information about the Holocaust. In recent years, Holocaust denial has This tactic is accompanied by false moved beyond the neo-Nazi cyber- arguments based on distortions of sphere and into the realm of pub- the testimony of lishing. Guidemedia etc sells Germar and concentration camp guards. Us- Rudolf’s Dissecting the Holocaust: ing these false arguments and other The Growing Critique of ‘Truth’ and unsourced claims, Holocaust deniers ‘Memory’ on its website as the first seek to present an alternative his- volume in its so-called Holocaust

32 Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic, Annual Report on Antisemitism in the Czech Republic in 2015, https://www.fzo.cz/en/520/annual-report-on-anti-semitismin-the-czech-re- public-in-2015 (accessed January 2, 2017).

34 Handbook Series.33 Guidemedia the book. As a result of the trial, etc also resells books published by however, Guidemedia etc captured Adam B. Bartoš, as well as Germar the attention of the mainstream Rudolf’s Lectures on the Holocaust media and became known to a wid- and David Hoggan’s The Myth of the er public. Six Million, which are published by In March 2015, Adam B. Bartoš was Bodyart Press. All of these books, one of the representatives of several each one a masterpiece of Holocaust radical antisemitic movements that denial, are now easily accessible in visited the town of Polna, which its online store. Publishers of Holo- was the scene of an infamous an- caust denial literature also use social tisemitic in 1899 that media, especially Facebook, to ad- became known as the Hilsner affair. vertise their books and add to their Bartoš, accompanied by the former credibility by making pseudo-scien- leader of the neo-Nazi National Re- tific claims about their publications. sistance, the owner of Guidemedia This highlights the emergence of etc and the vice-chairman of ND, a new trend. What was once pro- attached a sign with the following vided as informative material for statement to the memorial: “During members of radical groups on their Easter 1899 an innocent girl, Anež- own websites is now disseminated ka Hrůzová, was murdered here. Her as widely as possible. This “return death united the Czech nation and from cyber exile” is indicative of the showed the urgent need to resolve newly increased self-confidence of the Jewish question. The Jewish 34 Czech antisemites. question has not been resolved in Guidemedia etc’s activity in this area a satisfactory manner yet.” Bartoš has been increasing year on year. was given a three-year suspended In 2015, it was involved in a trial sentence for his actions. concerning the publication of a book on ’s speeches, which did not result in the conviction of the company’s owners or the author of

33 Guidemedia etc, http://guidemedia.cz/item/holocaust-pod-lupou (accessed January 2, 2017). 34 Tarant, “Antisemitism in Response to the 2015 Refugee Wave.”

35 Conspiratorial antisemitism migration crisis. Most of the articles In 2012, in the process of monitoring recorded by the FJC in the category antisemitism in the Czech Republic, of conspiracy theories pertaining to the FJC recorded a rapid rise in the the refugee crisis and the wave of popularity of anti-Jewish conspiracy Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe theories disseminated through tra- in 2014-2015 blame the Jews for ditional channels by right-wing ex- orchestrating these events in order 37 tremist groups, as well as through to destroy European culture. Rad- texts produced by a variety of indi- icals from anti-liberal and right- viduals.35 This rise continued in the wing extremist groups cultivate and years that followed, as conspiracy promote such theories, and their theories became the most popu- anti-Islamic rhetoric is similar to lar topic of antisemitic discourse in their antisemitic rhetoric in a num- 2015, accounting for 41% of all re- ber of respects. This shift of focus corded articles.36 Historically speak- to immigration and is ing, conspiracy theories based on significant in comparison to earlier the idea of Jewish world domination themes. In previous years, articles in are one of the most enduring mani- this category covered topics ranging festations of antisemitism. They of- from the Jewish ancestry of Czech presidential candidate Jan Fischer ten quote or refer to The Protocols to the bizarre theory that the Olym- of the Elders of Zion, an early twen- tieth-century antisemitic fabrication pic Games in London were being 38 purporting to describe a plan to en- controlled by the Jews. slave and bring about glob- However, theories concerning the al Jewish hegemony. Such conspira- role of the Jews in the Islamization cy theories are still very much alive of Europe are nothing new. Before within Czech antisemitic circles, es- the current migration crisis, they pecially in light of Europe’s current were being used to illustrate the

35 Jewish Community in Prague, Annual Report on Anti-Semitism Symptoms in the Czech Republic in 2014, http://antisemitism.org.il/webfm_send/143 (accessed January 2, 2017). 36 Federation of Jewish Communities, Annual Report on Antisemitism 2015. 37 Ibid. 38 Radical Revival, Hlavně nenápadně, July 30, 2012, http://radicalrevival.wordpress.com/2012/07/30/ hlavne-nenapadne/#comments (accessed January 2, 2017).

36 failure of multiculturalism and in- In 2012, Bartoš posted a number of tegration in EU countries. Due to articles on his personal blog claim- the Czech political elite’s inability to ing that the Czech government was address the challenges presented merely a puppet government of Is- by the migration crisis in a ratio- rael and that the country’s presi- nal and constructive manner, these dential candidates were Jews and, theories began to surface on the thus, Zionists.39 In 2012, he also Internet and in speeches delivered started compiling a list of Jews and during numerous anti-Islam demon- “pravdolaskaru”40 called the “Jewish strations organized by anti-liberals Hall of Fame”,41 which he promot- and right-wing extremists. ed with the slogan “Do not let our In recent years, Adam B. Bartoš has country become the new Israel.” He been the most prominent author of also stated: “Famous Jews among articles and studies on the so-called us have posted numerous texts Jewish conspiracy in the Czech Re- about predominantly domestic lib- public. However, as a result of the eral personalities from the world of escalation of the European refugee culture and politics, which they of- crisis during the past two years, the ten erroneously attributed to be of topic has become increasingly pop- Jewish origin.” This was not the first ular on various websites known for to attempt to compile such a list. In their anti-liberal, anti-American and the early 1990s, a pamphlet entitled anti-EU content. Bartoš has none- “Masonic Lodge Charter 77” was theless succeeded in maintaining published. The pamphlet claimed his leading position in this regard, that changes to the political system and his notoriety has increased due in Czechoslovakia after 1989 were to ongoing police investigations into conducted by the KGB, which se- his activities. lected about 7,000 people in 1974,

39 Adam B. Bartoš, “Příští prezident bude sionista,” October 11, 2012, http://abbartos.wordpress. com/2012/10/11/pristi-prezident-bude-sionista (accessed January 2, 2017). 40 This word, which translates roughly as “truthers and lovers”, is reminiscent of a well-known motto used by President Vaclav Havel, namely “Truth and love should win over lies [and hatred”. The term is used pejoratively to describe liberals who continue to support Havel’s legacy. Basically, anti-liberals refer to anyone who opposes their ideology in this way. 41 Slavní Židé mezi námi, Čechy Čechům, https://cechycechum.wordpress.com/category/slavni-zide- mezi-nami (accessed January 2, 2017).

37 of whom around 180 went on to ties, which claimed in a joint state- play a leading role in governing the ment that the Czech Republic was a country after 1989. The pamphlet puppet of Brussels, Washington and implied that numerous people of Tel Aviv. Jewish origin held important func- ND focused heavily on the situa- tions at that time, many of whom tion arising from the migration cri- were dangerous Zionists who posed sis, which led to an increase in the a real threat to the existence of the number of anti-refugee and anti-Is- 42 Czech nation. lam demonstrations organized by In 2014 and 2015, Bartoš’s ND drew right-wing extremist groups. These a lot of attention to itself on numer- issues also occupied centre stage ous occasions. During the election on ND’s websites and social media campaign, Czech television decided pages. As already mentioned, these to cancel ND’s election broadcasts anti-Islamic attitudes also gave rise because of their inappropriate con- to manifestations of antisemitism tent, which was deemed to be an- in the form of conspiracy theories ti-Zionist and antisemitic.43 After about Jewish involvement in the mi- this incident, the mainstream media gration crisis. also started monitoring the content of Bartoš’s website.44 In July 2014, ND joined forces with the extreme New antisemitism right-wing Workers’ Party of Social The intersection between the ex- Justice to establish the National treme Right and other radical Congress election platform.45 After groups has already been mentioned its failure in the municipal elections in the context of anti-Jewish con- held in the autumn of 2014, the spiracy theories. It is important to platform adopted three other par- note that, when it comes to Israel,

42 Zdenek Zbořil, “Antisemitismus: Evropské dědictví nenávisti a intolerance,” Mezinarodní politika, July 2001, http://www.dokumenty-iir.cz/MP/MPArchive/2001/MP072001.pdf, 36 (accessed January 2, 2017). 43 See http://zpravy.idnes.cz/ct-odmitla-prijmout-spot-od-bartosovy-strany-ne-bruselu-pkx-/doma- ci.aspx?c=A140505_112710_domaci_kop. 44 See http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/seznam-zidu-novy-rozmer-pravicoveho-extremis- mu-v-cesku_305898.html#.VR0GTPmUfTo. 45 See http://www.dsss.cz/euroskeptici-se-dohodli-na-spolupraci_-ustavili-narodni-kongres.

38 right-wing and left-wing extremist manifestation of antisemitism took websites and groups also display a place in 2012 during the Czech presi- lot of similarities. The issues they dential elections. Presidential candi- raise are so similar that the ideo- date and former prime minister Jan logical differences between them Fisher provoked strong opposition are becoming increasingly blurred among right-wing extremists, who in this regard.46 One difference that expressed their frustrations on FR’s remains is that left-wing extremists website and social media channels. generally do not equate the domes- Fischer, who is well-known for being tic Jewish community with Israel, open about his Jewish origins, be- while right-wing extremists promote came a target of antisemitic hatred. the conspiracy theory that the Czech The most discussed aspect of his government is a puppet government candidacy was the question of his controlled by the domestic Jewish loyalty to the country and wheth- community in order to support Israel er he exhibited the right degree of and the United States. “Czechness”. The idea that Fischer New antisemitism is thus a theme identified more closely with the in- that extends across the political terests of Israel than those of the spectrum of extremism, although Czech Republic overshadowed his right-wing extremists do not mon- campaign. itor Israeli military operations in The first attempt by ISM Czech Re- Gaza as closely as left-wing extrem- public, or in fact any left-wing ex- ists do, for example. Indeed, left- tremist group, to publicly boycott a wing extremists and pro-Palestinian cultural event linked to Israel took groups work tirelessly in this re- the form of an open letter and pe- spect and are highly proactive when tition against the Days of Jerusa- it comes to organizing lectures and lem festival in Prague and Pilsen demonstrations and sharing anti-Is- in 2015, despite the fact that the rael articles on social media. festival hosted both Jewish and Pal- The last significant and noteworthy estinian artists from Jerusalem (see below).

46 Jewish Community in Prague, Annual Report on Antisemitism Symptoms in the Czech Republic in 2013, http://antisemitism.org.il/webfm_send/107 (accessed January 2, 2017).

39 In the Czech Republic, manifesta- not least, before and during the tions of antisemitism that draw Days of Jerusalem festival. links between Israel and the do- The migration crisis has become a mestic Jewish community, as wit- major topic for right-wing extrem- 47 nessed in Western Europe, are ist and anti-liberal groups. With re- only expressed verbally. Examples gard to relations between Muslims of this include depicting Jews as and Jews, FR is of the opinion that agents of Israel, as in the case of “my enemy’s enemy is my enemy”. Jan Fischer. No threats or physical According to FR, Muslims do not violence against Jews motivated by belong in Europe but rather in the events in the Middle East have ever Middle East, which has been taken been recorded by the FJC. Howev- away from them by the Zionists. In er, the FJC has recorded an increase other words, FR believes that the in the number of articles with new influx of immigrants from Muslim antisemitic content since 2012. In countries stems from the activities 2015, the number of posts including of Zionist Jews. The Jews are there- new antisemitic content constituted fore a common enemy. This attitude 34% of all recorded posts, making shows that, despite the recent in- this the second most common top- crease in Islamophobia, right-wing ic within the monitored antisemitic extremist ideology does not change 48 scene. In recent years, the number and remains faithful to the original of new antisemitic posts has spiked ideas of National Socialism, while in four situations: during military exploiting the recent upsurge in new conflicts in Gaza and their after- antisemitism for its own purposes.49 math, during meetings between Is- In 2015, a new theory blaming the raeli and Czech politicians in Prague creation of the so-called Islamic or Jerusalem (which receive a lot of State (hereinafter Daesh) on Israel media coverage), during the Czech and the Jews has appeared on web- vote at the United Nations on the sites and social media. Right-wing recognition Palestine and, last but

47 As in the case of Mohamed Merah’s terror attack on a Jewish school in Toulouse in March 2012 and the attack on the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels in May 2014. 48 Federation of Jewish Communities, Annual Report on Antisemitism 2015. 49 Jewish Community in Prague, Annual Report on Anti-Semitism Symptoms 2014.

40 extremists and anti-liberals have organized demonstrations against also accused Israel and the United Israel’s military operations in Gaza, States of masterminding terror at- which it compared to the massacre tacks in Europe, the war in , and genocide that took place during the activities of Daesh and the Eu- the Holocaust. ropean migration crisis in order to A total of three demonstrations were discredit Islam, enhance their power organized between July and August in the Middle East and bring about 2014 in the centre of Prague. A the destruction of Europe. Despite number of antisemitic slogans were these accusations, right-wing ex- used to highlight the violation of the tremists have never organized a human rights of Palestinians in the demonstration against Israel, and Gaza Strip. According to the “3D” their overtly anti-Israel rhetoric has test, new antisemitic statements therefore thus far only been shared are those that, when assessing the on the Internet. political and security steps taken by Left-wing extremist and pro-Pal- Israel, apply double standards, de- estinian groups are generally rep- monize Israel, for example by com- resented by ISM Czech Republic paring it to , question and other smaller pro-Palestinian its right to exist or equate its ac- groups such as Friends of Pales- tions with genocide. In 2015, ISM tine.50 ISM Czech Republic has taken Czech Republic went even further by a strong stand against Israel, but publishing an open letter and peti- the FJC never identified any acts tion on its website calling for the that could be construed as antisem- boycott and cancellation of the Days itism according to Sharansky’s “3D” of Jerusalem festival.51 The letter test, the FRA’s criteria for identi- falsely claimed that the festival fying antisemitism or the IHRA’s was a political campaign designed working definition of antisemitism, to promote Israel’s illegal annex- or at least not until 2014, when ISM ation of Jerusalem, yet ISM Czech

50 Friends of Palestine, http://pratelepalestiny.blogspot.cz (accessed January 2, 2017). 51 ISM Czech Republic, Open Letter Calling on Pilsen 2015 to Withdraw from Hosting the Days of Jerusalem Festival, http://ism-czech.org/2015/04/28/open-letter-calling-for-the-abandonment-of-or- ganizing-the-days-of-jerusalem-festival-within-the-event-pilsen-2015 (accessed January 2, 2017).

41 Republic managed to get several engaging in antisemitism and even well-known Czech left-wing politi- claims to oppose it. cians and public figures to sign it. In Manifestations of new antisemitism 2016, ISM Czech Republic continued and older Soviet-style anti-Zionism its attempts to discredit the festival, can still be found in the rhetoric of distributing pamphlets against Isra- the Czech Communist Party, espe- el close to the entrance of the fes- cially in groups and media associ- tival venue. Its efforts in this regard ated with the party. For example, are most likely the first attempt in the strong anti-Israel overtones of the Czech Republic to publicly boy- the Communist newspaper Haló cott a cultural event linked to Israel. noviny call to mind the rhetoric of During the wave of antisemitism the Communist era while simultane- that accompanied Israel’s 2014 ously epitomizing new antisemitism. Protective Edge military operation According to the FJC’s statistics for in Gaza, a substantial amount of 2015, Haló noviny articles comprised anti-Israel content and propagan- almost one-third of all articles with da was recorded as appearing on new antisemitic content,53 such as websites and social media. Israe- articles comparing Israel to Nazi li politicians were depicted as Nazi Germany. As in classic Communist officers, and Israel was frequently propaganda, these articles often re- compared to Nazi, racist and apart- fer to Israeli politicians as fascists, heid regimes. Images proclaiming racists, imperialists or colonizers, “Death to Israel” or “Shitrael” were while military action is categorized posted regularly. A well-known blog as organized genocide or a Holo- in this context is that of Jiri Hrebe- caust of Arab citizens and domestic nar,52 which focuses on the Middle policies are dubbed apartheid. Com- Eastern conflict. According to the paring Zionism to or Nazism “3D” test, every article on this blog is thus as typical of contemporary uses antisemitic rhetoric to attack Communist propaganda as it was of Israel. Despite this, Hrebenar denies the propaganda disseminated prior

52 Blízký východ – Izrael, Hřebenář, http://www.hrebenar.eu/category/blizky-vychod-izrael (accessed January 2, 2017). 53 Federation of Jewish Communities, Annual Report on Antisemitism 2015.

42 to 1989. ing that, according to polls conduct- ed over the past three decades,54 these attitudes have remained sta- III. CONCLUSIONS ble and constant. As a result, an- tisemitism may be regarded as a relatively marginal phenomenon. All forms of modern antisemitism are in evidence in the Czech Repub- However, the European migration lic today, although most manifesta- crisis has led to a significant in- tions of antisemitism are confined crease in the number of extremist to cyberspace. The FJC’s Annual Re- groups and political movements, port on Antisemitism points to year- which have managed to move a on-year increase in the number of little closer to the political main- recorded antisemitic incidents, but stream. The infiltration of former more than 80% of them occur on leaders of the neo-Nazi scene into extremist websites, blogs and so- these anti-liberal and ultra-conser- cial media. Physical and/or public vative movements is also a major manifestations of antisemitism are of source concern, since they could sporadic and are limited to extreme have an adverse impact on these groups. In mainstream politics, any movements and rekindle antisemit- form of antisemitism is unaccept- ic sentiments within the population. able and would end the political The hysterical reaction to the mi- career of those who engage in it. gration crisis in Czech society has In comparison to Western or Cen- already opened the door to overt tral European countries, the Czech anti-Islamic hatred, as well as sev- Republic therefore remains a safe eral anti-Jewish and anti-Israel con- country for the Jewish community, spiracy theories. This, in turn, could due in part to the wider population’s give rise to a new wave of unmiti- neutral to fairly sympathetic atti- gated antisemitic rhetoric. The re- tude towards Jews. It is worth not- cent increase in the number of an-

54 Andrea Mikutowská, “Antisemitismus jako sociální jev v současnosti v rámci českého prosto- ru optikou strukturálně-funkcionalistického paradigmatu,” Rexter, November 11, 2015, http://www. rexter.cz/antisemitismus-jako-socialni-jev-v-soucasnosti-v-ramci-ceskeho-prostoru-optikou-strukt- uralne-funkcionalistickeho-paradigmatu/2015/11/15 (accessed January 2, 2017).

43 tisemitic publications may just be a and emboldens other radical groups. sign of things to come. This is a major cause for concern The increase in antisemitic content not only for the Czech Republic and on the Internet is also alarming, its Jewish community but also for since such content has the ability to the future of democracy, tolerance go viral within a matter of hours. and diversity throughout Europe. This phenomenon is very challeng- ing. Manifestations of hatred to- wards minorities, extremist propa- ganda and fake news are all issues that need to be addressed at na- tional and/or EU level through ap- propriate legislative steps, in coop- eration with social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Another danger is posed by foreign connections and cooperation be- tween extremist groups. Successful groups share their know-how and methods with other groups, which are then able to apply this knowl- edge in their own environment. In the past, neo-Nazi groups collabo- rated mainly with other local groups. Today, however, we are witnessing international cooperation between extreme right-wing groups and political parties across several EU countries. The ongoing polarization of European society and the grow- ing preference for extremist political parties at the ballot box encourages

44 References • Hornanová, Sidonia and Milan Hrabovský, eds. Faces of Hatred: Contemporary Antisemitism in its Historical Context (Pilsen: Západočeská univerzita v Plzni, 2008). • Kieval, Hillel J. Formovaní českého židovstva. Národní konflikt a židovská společnost v Čechách 1870- 1918. Prague: Paseka, 2011. • Krupp, Michael. Dějiny státu Izraell. Od založení do dneška 1948-2013. Prague: Vyšehrad, 2013. • Lipstadt, Deborah. Popírání holocaustu. Sílííi útok na pravdu a paměť. Prague-Litomyšl: Paseka, 2001. • Pavlát, Leo. “Antisemitismus – nejsetrvalejší zášť v dějinách lidstva.” I n Židé – dějiny a kultura. Edited by Leo Pavlát. Prague: Jewish Museum in Prague, 2005. • Pěkný, Tomáš. Historie Židu v Čechách a na Moravě. Prague: Sefer, 2001. • Yegar, Moshe. Československo, sionismus, Izrael. Prague: Victoria Publishing and East Publishing, 1997.

Internet sources

• Anti-Defamation League. The ADL Global 100 – Czech Republic. http://global100.adl.org/#country/czech-republic/2014. • Blumethal, Helaine. “Communism on Trial: The Slansky Affair and Anti-Semitism in Post-WWII Europe.” PhD diss. Department of History, University of , Berkeley, 2009. http://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/ default/files/u4/bps_/publications_/2009-08-Blumenthal.pdf.

• Czech Statistical Office. Obyvatelstvo podle náboženské víry v krajích. https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/faces/ cs/index.jsf?page=vystup-objekt-vyhledavani&vyhltext=n%C3%A1bo%C5%BEenstv%C3%AD&bkvt=bsO- hYm_FvmVuc3R2w60.&katalog=all&pvo=SLD9100PU-KR. • Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic. “About Us.” https://www.fzo.cz/en/about-us/ organization.

• Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic. Annual Report on Antisemitism in the Czech Republic in 2015. Prague: FJC, 2016. https://www.fzo.cz/en/520/annual-report-on-anti-semitism-in- the-czech-republic-in-2015. • “General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations.” UN press release, November 29, 2012. https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc. htm. • Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Public Opinion Research Centre. “Media.” https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a2050/f9/ov160420.pdf

• Jewish Community of Prague. Annual Report on Anti-Semitism Symptoms in the Czech Republic in 2014. http://antisemitism.org.il/webfm_send/143. • Jewish Community of Prague. Annual Report on Anti-Semitism Symptoms in the Czech Republic in 2013. http://antisemitism.org.il/webfm_send/107. • Jewish Museum in Prague. “Murder in Polná – Exhibition to Mark the Centenary of the Hilsner Affair.” http://www.jewishmuseum.cz/en/program-and-education/exhibits/archive-exhibits/363. • Mikutowská, Andrea. “Antisemitismus jako sociální jev v současnosti v rámci českého prostoru optikou strukturálně-funkcionalistického paradigmatu.” Rexter, November 11, 2015. http://www.rexter.cz/an-

45 tisemitismus-jako-socialni-jev-v-soucasnosti-v-ramci-ceskeho-prostoru-optikou-strukturalne-funkcio- nalistickeho-paradigmatu/2015/11/15.

• STEM Non-Profit Institute. Vztah české veřejnosti k cizincům – březen 2015. https://www.stem.cz/vz- tah-ceske-verejnosti-k-cizincum-brezen-2015 (accessed January 2, 2017).

• Tarant, Zbyněk. “Antisemitism in Response to the 2015 Refugee Wave – Case of the Czech Republic.” ISGAP Flashpoint no. 13, January 28, 2016. http://isgap.org/flashpoint/antisemitism-in-response-to- the-2015-refugee-wave-the-case-of-the-czech-republic.

• Zbořil, Zdeněk. “Antisemitismus: Evropské dědictví nenávisti a intolerance.” Mezinárodní politika, July 2001. http://www.dokumenty-iir.cz/MP/MPArchive/2001/MP072001.pdf. Other sources • Bartoš, Adam B. “Příští prezident bude sionista,” October 11, 2012. http://abbartos.wordpress. com/2012/10/11/pristi-prezident-bude-sionista. • Blízky východ – Izrael. Hřebenář. http://www.hrebenar.eu/category/blizky-vychod-izra • Friends of Palestine: http://pratelepalestiny.blogspot.cz • Guidemedia etc: http://guidemedia.cz • Haló noviny: http://www.halonoviny.cz • “Hlavně nenápadně.” Radical Revival, July 30, 2012. http://radicalrevival.wordpress.com/2012/07/30/ hlavne-nenapadne/#comments. • International Solidarity Movement Czech Republic: http://ism-czech.org • International Solidarity Movement Czech Republic. “Open Letter Calling on Pilsen 2015 to Withdraw from Hosting the Days of Jerusalem Festival,” April 28, 2015. http://ism-czech.org/2015/04/28/open- letter-calling-for-the-abandonment-of-organizing-the-days-of-jerusalem-festival-within-the-event- pilsen-2015. • National Democracy Party: http://narodnidemokracie.cz • Parlamentni listy: http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz • Slavní Židé mezi námi. Čechy Čechum. https://cechycechum.wordpress.com/category/slavni-zide-mezi- nami (accessed on January 2, 2017).

46 04 HUNGARY Ildikó Barna

47 I. BACKGROUND the nineteenth century, numerous emancipatory laws and regulations Jewish population were passed, the most important be- and community ing the Law of Emancipation of 1867 and the Law of Reception of 1895, It is assumed that the first Jews ar- which declared Judaism to be an rived in the territory of modern-day officially accepted religion. The com- Hungary, a province of the Roman promise between the liberal nobility Empire known at the time as Pan- and the Jews is referred to in the nonia, in the first century. However, literature as an “assimilationist social the first written sources referring contract”. The liberal nobility had a to a Jewish community in Hungary monopoly on political power but sup- date back to the eleventh century. ported the Jews’ role in the economic Jews living in Hungary today are the modernization of Hungary and pro- descendants of Jews who arrived in vided safeguards against antisemitic the country in the seventeenth and attacks. For their part, the Jews re- eighteenth centuries from Austria, ciprocated with loyalty and efficient Moravia and Galicia. It is important assimilation.1 This assimilation was to note that all these territories, in- very much needed, since native Hun- cluding Hungary, were part of the garian speakers did not constitute a Habsburg Empire at this time. majority within Hungary. The history of Hungarian Jewry in Out of a total Jewish population the nineteenth century is often de- of 760,000-780,000, approximate- scribed as a combination of eman- ly 500,000-530,000 Hungarian cipation and assimilation, meaning Jews (200,000-300,000 in pres- that the Jews were granted civil ent-day Hungary2) died during the rights if they proved their willingness Shoah. A relatively large group to assimilate. In the second half of survived, due to the fact that the

1 Viktor Karády, The Jews of Europe in the Modern Era: A Socio-Historical Outline (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004), 170-171; András Kovács, “Az asszimilációs dilemma,” Világosság 8-9 (1988): 605-612. 2 Present-day Hungary refers to Hungary beyond the Trianon borders. The Treaty of Trianon was the peace agreement that formally ended World War I. It was signed in 1920 between most of the Allies of World War I and Hungary. As a result of the treaty, Hungary lost 72% of its territory and 64% of its total population. Although Hungary expanded its borders during World War II, the Treaty of Paris of 1947 reversed these territorial gains.

48 Jews of Budapest were ultimate- assimilation after the Holocaust. In ly not deported. However, the Sho- addition, the newly established re- ah resulted in the almost complete gime not only expected but over time annihilation of provincial Jewry. even required complete assimilation. The majority of Holocaust survivors There is no accurate data on the wanted to rid themselves of the number of survivors. According to tormenting burden of being Jewish, a brief survey carried out by the which coincided with the Communist Hungarian Statistical Office in June regime’s “policy of silence”, when the 1945, there were just 14,480 Jews Holocaust and the Jews were hardly in Hungary based on religious affil- mentioned in the public discourse. iation. However, this figure does not According to the last census con- coincide with the total number of ducted in 2011, 10,965 people in survivors, which was estimated to lie Hungary identified their religion as between 190,000 and 200,000.3 Judaism. The fact that answering Compared with Jews from neigh- questions about one’s religion is vol- bouring countries, Hungarian Jews untary in Hungary and that Hungari- left their country in much smaller an Jews have a long-lasting aversion proportion after the Holocaust. Giv- to appearing on lists suggests that en the above-mentioned historical this number does not reflect the ac- background and the fact that the tual number of Jews in the country. most assimilated stratum of Hun- Estimates of the number of Jews in garian Jewry was over-represented contemporary Hungary range from 4 among the survivors, most of the 80,000 to 150,000, representing 0.8- 5 Jews in Hungary opted for further 1.5% of the Hungarian population.

3 László Csorba, “Izraelita felekezeti élet Magyarországon a vészkorszaktól a nyolcvanas évekig (1945-1983),” in Hét évtized a hazai zsidóság életében. II. rész., ed. Pál Horváth (Budapest: MTA Filozó- fiai Intézet, 1990), 61-190; Viktor Karády,Túlélők és újrakezdők. Fejezetek a magyar zsidóság szocioló- giájából 1945 után (Budapest: Múlt és Jövő Kiadó, 2002); Tamás Stark, Zsidóság a vészkorszakban és a felszabadulás után 1939-1955 (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézet, 1995), 41-47. 4 András Kovács, ed., Zsidók és zsidóság a mai Magyarországon (Budapest: Múlt és Jövő Kiadó, 2002), 23-24. 5 The estimate depends on the definition of who is a Jew. The high rate of mixed marriages and the secular character of Hungarian Jewry raise the question whether only those Jews born to a Jewish mother (i.e. those who are Jewish according to Jewish law) should be considered Jews or whether those of paternal lineage should be included as well.

49 Although the exact number is un- Approximately 85% of Hungarian known, the Hungarian Jewish com- Jews live in Budapest. Their so- munity is certainly the largest in cio-economic status, manifested in Central and . their educational and occupational In 2011, in the process of drafting a ranking, is considerably higher than new constitution, the Hungarian gov- that of the overall population. For ernment introduced a new system historical reasons, the majority of for the registration of religious insti- Hungarian Jews are highly secular tutions, creating a two-tiered classi- and assimilated. fication consisting of “incorporated churches” and “religious communi- Historical context 6 ties”. In the course of the re-regis- of modern antisemitism tration procedure that all previously registered religious institutions had Until the eighteenth century, the sit- to undergo, three Jewish commu- uation of Hungary’s Jews and the nities were granted incorporated intensity of Hungarian antisemi- church status, namely the Federation tism were primarily influenced by of Hungarian Jewish Communities two factors. The first factor was the (MAZSIHISZ, which represents the situation of the Treasury – in other Neolog community), the Hungarian words, whether the King could af- Autonomous Orthodox Jewish Com- ford to forgo the taxes paid by the munity (MAOIH) and the Unified Hun- Jews. The second factor was the garian Jewish Congregation (EMIH, strength of the kingdom – in other which is affiliated with Chabad). Re- words, whether the King had enough form congregations in Hungary were power to impose his will, for example deprived of church status. In addition against those cities that were trying to religious organizations, there are to prevent Jews from settling there. also many Jewish secular, cultural Until the first manifestations of mod- and youth organizations operating in ern antisemitism in the nineteenth Hungary. century, Hungarian antisemitism

6 Religious communities have far fewer rights than incorporated churches. One of the most import- ant differences is that the former are not entitled to collect the voluntary 1% of personal income tax paid by citizens and the corresponding state subsidy.

50 was based on the common themes ed to the right as openly antisemitic of Christian Judeophobia. political views gained traction. The In the nineteenth century, the pro- rise of was also marked by tection of Jews against antisemitism a series of anti-Jewish laws that be- was part of the aforementioned as- gan by limiting the rights of Jews similationist social contract. This set- and ultimately denied their status as up worked well in 1875, when na- human beings. These events culmi- tionalist Hungarian politician Győző nated in the physical annihilation of 7 Istóczy made his first speech in par- the Jews during the Shoah. liament about the “Jewish question”, The postwar period in Hungary can marking the beginning of modern be divided into four subperiods. The antisemitism in Hungary. For some first was a short democratic period time, however, nobody took Istóczy between 1945 and 1948, which was seriously. While antisemitism became also characterized by the transition much more entrenched in Hungary to Communism. The second was the after the Tiszaeszlár blood libel of Stalinist period, between the Com- 1882, it was only after the Treaty munist takeover in 1948 and the of Trianon that high-level Hungari- Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The an politics turned in this direction. At next, between 1957 and 1989, was this time, Hungary became a single the post-Stalinist Kádár era. The final nation-state, and the Jews were no subperiod, the present era from 1990 longer required as an “ethnic ally”. onwards, began with the collapse of This changing attitude was clearly Communism. manifested in what many consider to Zionism did not take root in Hungary be the first antisemitic act of twen- before World War II. Reasons for this tieth-century Europe, namely the include the high level of assimila- numerus clausus law of 1920. This tion of Hungarian Jewry, on the one clearly signified the end of the- as hand, and the fact that the commu- similationist social contract. nity historically defined itself along In the 1930s, Hungary clearly shift- religious rather than ethnic lines,

7 Ildikó Barna, “Jewish Identity of Three Generations of Holocaust Survivors in Hungary: Quantitative Analysis Using Structural Equation Modeling,” in Diversity and Identity, ed. Michael Brenner, Johannes Heil and Guy Katz (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, forthcoming).

51 on the other. Nevertheless, the role Their reasons for emigrating includ- of the Zionists in rescue activities ed the antisemitic incidents that had during the Holocaust, coupled with occurred during the revolution and a negative evaluation of the role of the fear that full-blown antisemitism the Jewish community, resulted in a would ensue. However, the motiva- postwar surge of the Zionist move- tion for emigration also included the ment, which came to an end with the widespread realization that it was “voluntary” disbanding of the Zionist impossible to lead a Jewish life in Federation in 1949. Hungary in either a religious or a From 1949 until 1954, a whole series secular sense. This wave of emigra- of political trials based on accusa- tion had devastating consequences tions of Zionist activity took place. insofar as it led to the almost com- Those imprisoned or interned in plete disappearance of provincial, Or- connection with these trials included thodox and Zionist Jewry. former Zionists and orthodox Jews, After the 1956 revolution, the regime as well as those who succumbed to of János Kádár offered a new assim- the wave of anti-Zionist purges with- ilationist contract, namely protection in the Communist party. In Hungary, against antisemitism in exchange the anti-Zionist campaign that be- for the willingness of Jewish orga- gan in the Soviet Union in 1952-1953 nizations to impose a rule defining led not only to the imprisonment of Jewishness exclusively as a religion various senior officers of the- Com and encourage assimilation, which in munist political police – a majority of this case meant complete identifica- whom were of Jewish descent – but tion with the Communist regime. As also to the arrest on charges of Zi- a result, public manifestations of an- onism of those Jewish leaders who tisemitism were indeed suppressed had consistently represented Com- from 1956 onwards. munist interests within the Jewish Like other Soviet Bloc countries, 8 community. During and soon after Hungary, severed its diplomatic re- the revolution of 1956, approximate- lations with Israel after the Six-Day ly 20,000-30,000 Jews left Hungary.

8 András Kovács, “Jews and Jewishness in Post-War Hungary,” Quest: Issues in Contemporary Jewish History, Journal of the Fondazione CDEC 1 (2010): 34-56.

52 War of 1967. This did not mean that ways exploitable. Accusations of Zi- relations between the two coun- onism could cover several things: the tries ceased altogether, but their promotion of a Jewish national iden- volume and intensity remained low. tity, “wicked imperialism” or simply a The reasons for this were twofold. positive attitude towards Israel. This First, Hungary still had a relatively continuation of antisemitism under large Jewish community with sub- the guise of anti-Zionism during the stantial non-political connections to Kádár era led to an explosion of out- Israel. Second, it was in desperate rage against Hungarian Jews after need of Western currency.9 From the the democratic transition in 1989. mid-1980s onwards, the volume of Many openly antisemitic neo-Nazi cultural, humanitarian and scientif- and skinhead groups emerged at this ic relations, in particular, began to time. However, it was not these largely rise, and diplomatic relations were marginal groups that posed the real restored in September 1989, just danger but rather the antisemitic in- before the transition to democracy. tellectuals at the centre of the fray. This move led to the intensification The most prominent of these was of bilateral relations in all areas. István Csurka, a founding member Although antisemitism was public- of the Hungarian Democratic Forum ly suppressed during the Kádár era, (Magyar Demokrata Fórum or MDF), it continued to simmer beneath the the governing party between 1990 surface. The Jewish question was an and 1994. Csurka’s extreme-right age-old one, and non-Jews always tendencies were initially hidden but saw themselves as distinct from the became apparent in 1992 when, in Jews, with a separate group identity his capacity as vice-president of the of their own.10 Although there was MDF, he published an openly antise- no public stigma attached to being mitic article in the weekly Magyar 11 Jewish, the same could not be said Fórum (Hungarian Forum), which of being Zionist, a fact that was al- he used as a mouthpiece for the par-

9 Csaba Békés, László J. Nagy and Dániel Vékony, “Bittersweet Friendships: Relations between Hun- gary and the Middle East, 1953-1988,” CWIHP e-dossier no. 67 (2015). 10 András Kovács, “A zsidókérdés a mai magyar társadalomban,” in Zsidóság az 1945 utáni Mag- yarországon, ed. Péter Kende (Paris: Magyar Füzetek, 1984). 11 István Csurka, “Néhány gondolat a rendszerváltozás két esztendeje és a MDF új programja

53 ty’s ideological and political views. In tween 2006 and 2011, but it seems 1993, Csurka and his followers were to have been decreasing slightly since expelled from the MDF for various then. Among antisemites, however, reasons but later that year went on people with extreme prejudices out- to found the first far-right party to number those with moderate views. enter the Hungarian parliament af- When analyzing the substance of an- ter the country’s transition to de- tisemitic views, it is clear that agree- mocracy. The Hungarian Justice and ment with statements about the ex- Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet cessive influence of Jews,13 including Pártja or MIÉP) was represented in the existence of a secret Jewish con- parliament only once in its history. spiracy,14 is higher than agreement In 1998. it won fourteen seats in the with statements reflecting tradition- Hungarian national assembly, which al Christian Judeophobia.15 Moreover, comprised 386 MPs at the time. agreement with statements about Jewish influence has increased over Opinion polls on antisemitism the years. At the end of 2015, the Hungarian Statements connected to new an- polling institute Medián conducted a tisemitism were also included in public opinion survey at the behest the survey. Respondents were asked of the Action and Protection Founda- an open question about the kind of tion.12 According to its findings, 65% things they associated with Israel. of the population were not antisemit- Of these associations, 47% were de- ic, 12% were moderately antisemitic scriptive or neutral, and 34% were and 23% were extremely antisemitic. negative (mentioning such issues as Antisemitism grew significantly be- terrorism and war). In those cases,

kapcsán,” Magyar Fórum, August 20, 1992, 9-16. 12 Endre Hann and Dániel Róna, Anti-Semitic Prejudice in Contemporary Hungarian Society Research Report. (Budapest: Medián/Action and Protection Foundation, 2016). 13 Such statements in the survey included the following: “Intellectuals of Jewish origin keep media and culture under their influence” (acceptance rate in 2015: 33%), and “Jewish influence is too great in Hungary today” (acceptance rate in 2015: 32%). 14 There is a secret Jewish conspiracy that determines political and economic processes” (acceptance rate in 2015: 35%). 15 “The crucifixion of Jesus is the unpardonable sin of the Jews” (acceptance rate in 2015: 25%); “The sufferings of the Jews were God’s punishment” (acceptance rate in 2015: 18%).

54 it was not specified whether respon- munity (Section 332 of Chapter XXXII dents blamed the Arabs or the Jews on Criminal Offences against Public for the situation in the Middle East. Peace). In the case of other types of Eleven per cent of respondents had crime, it is considered an aggravating mainly positive associations regard- circumstance if they were committed ing Israel, while only 7% harboured with a racist motivation. In such cas- negative associations regarding es, the court is obliged to impose a Jews. When asked about relations more severe sentence.16 In addition, between Hungarian Jews and Israel, Section 333 of the Civil Code crimi- the picture was somewhat darker. nalizes public denial or relativization Twenty-nine per cent of of the crimes of National Socialism believed that “Hungarian Jews would (and Communism), as well as the rather support Israel in a match be- distribution, public use or public ex- tween Hungary and Israel”, 28% be- hibition of symbols of totalitarianism lieved that “Israel is an aggressor (such as the swastika, the insignia and commits genocide against the of the SS, the five-pointed red star Palestinians” and 27% believed that and the hammer and sickle) in such “Jews living here are more loyal to a way as to offend the dignity of vic- Israel than to this country”. tims of totalitarian regimes and their right to inviolability, or when such actions risk breaching public order in Legislative background any way (Section 335).17 The newly amended Hungarian Crim- In addition, in March 2014 a new inal Code (Act C of 2012) identifies Civil Code (Act V of 2013) came into two types of hate crimes: violent of- effect penalizing hate speech, stating fences committed against a member in subsection (5) of Section 2:54 that: of a group (Section 216 of Chapter XXI on Crimes against Human Dig- In the event of a violation of nity and Fundamental Rights) and rights committed before the incitement to hatred against a com- wider public and seriously

16 The Hungarian Criminal Code does not explicitly include racist motives, but the condition of “con- temptible motives” is fulfilled if a person commits a crime based on racist motives. 17 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents in Hungary 2014: Annual Report (Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2015), 41-42.

55 offensive to the Hungarian Governmental relations nation or to some nation- with Israel al, ethnic, racial or religious In the period under review, the Israe- community or unreasonably li ambassador to Hungary, Ilan Mor, insulting for these groups and the Hungarian government high- in its manner of expression, lighted the importance of bilateral any member of these groups relations and on several occasions is entitled to enforce his or confirmed the good quality of the her personality right in rela- relations between the two countries. tion to him or her belonging At the end of 2015, the Hungarian to such groups, being an es- government stood up for Israel in a sential trait of his or her per- dispute with the European Union. In sonality. The right to make a November of that year, the Europe- claim will be precluded after an Union issued guidelines stating a period of thirty days from that most products made in Israeli 18 the survivors wanted to rid. settlements built in territories occu- pied by Israel in or after 1967 should including the obligation to pay restitu- be labelled as “product of the Golan tion.19 Moreover, the Fourth Amend- Heights (Israeli settlement)” or “prod- ment to the Hungarian Constitution uct of the (Israeli settle- declares that the right to free speech ment)” and not as a product of Israel. is restricted by the need to protect The European Union claimed that the the dignity of communities and cre- resolution was purely technical and ates the possibility for members of that it resulted from the fact that violated communities to turn to the the Union does not recognize Isra- legal system to enforce their claims.20 el’s sovereignty over these territories In contrast, Israel believed that the resolution was discriminatory and indicative of double standards and

18 http://eltelawjournal.hu/regulation-offensive-speech-new-hungarian-civil-code/ (accessed 18 June, 2017). 19 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents in Hungary 2014: Annual Report (Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2015), 42. 20 Ibid., 15.

56 that it would strengthen the hand the latter had attended a memorial of the BDS movement. Hungary was service honouring Nazi collaborator, the first EU member state to oppose author and member of parliament this special labelling from the very József Nyírő.22 Soon after, however, beginning. Hungarian Foreign Minis- Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ter Péter Szijjártó put it as follows: hosted Hungarian President János “It is an inefficient instrument. It is Áder in Jerusalem.23 Although Is- irrational and does not contribute to rael has expressed appreciation for a solution [to the Israeli-Palestinian the Hungarian government’s strong conflict], but causes damage”.21 statements expressing zero tolerance In the period under review, Isra- for antisemitism, it constantly urges el nevertheless expressed concerns Hungary to take more action. about rising antisemitism in Hunga- ry, the Hungarian government’s at- II. ANTISEMITISM: tempts to rewrite the history of the ACTORS AND MANIFESTATIONS Holocaust, the relativization of the role of Miklós Horthy, who served as Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary Actors between World Wars I and II and Method of selection throughout most of World War II, and the inclusion of openly antise- Actors have been selected based on mitic figures in Hungary’s historical their impact on Hungarian politics. pantheon. In June 2012, for exam- The aim of this section is not only ple, Speaker Reuven Rivlin to describe these organizations but cancelled a visit by his Hungarian also to reveal their networks and counterpart, László Kövér, because connections. Extremist actors are

21 Raphael Ahren, “Hungary: Labeling of Settlement Goods is Counterproductive,” Times of Israel, December 22, 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hungary-labeling-of-settlement-goods-is-counter- productive (accessed January 3, 2017). 22 Stuart Winer, “Knesset Speaker Uninvites Hungarian Counterpart over Attendance at Memorial for Nazi Collaborator,” Times of Israel, June 24, 2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/outraged-knes- set-speaker-cancels-visit-of-his-hungarian-counterpart (accessed January 3, 2017). 23 Stuart Winer, “Hungarian President Assures Netanyahu of His Opposition to Anti-Semitism,” Times of Israel, July 17, 2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hungarian-president-visit-netanyahu-in-jerusa- lem (accessed January 3, 2017).

57 almost exclusively from Hungary’s actor explains why it forms the focus Far Right, since popular support for of this country report. In the 2006 the only far-left party – the Work- parliamentary elections, an alliance er’s Party (Munkáspárt) – is almost between Jobbik and MIÉP won only invisible. However, the exact nature 2.2% of the vote. After this failure, of relations between far-right and Jobbik broke up the alliance and far-left organizations is unclear, and started to acquire its own voice. The it appears that they have under- party’s growing impact became clear gone some fundamental changes. in the 2009 European parliamentary While the chair of the Worker’s Party elections. Jobbik won almost 15% of wrote an open letter to the President the vote and was able to send three of Hungary and the Speaker of the members to the European Parlia- Hungarian parliament in 2006 to ment. As Jobbik gained in popularity, initiate new legislation against rac- MIÉP almost completely disappeared ism and Nazism, the president of from the scene. In the 2010 national the Worker’s Party, Gyula Thürmer, parliamentary elections, Jobbik ob- was simultaneously cooperating with tained 17% of the vote. This result certain far-right organizations, espe- clearly confirmed the enormous rise cially those with close Russian con- in the acceptance of radical right- nections. wing thought in Hungarian society. By 2014, support for Jobbik had in- creased even further, and the party The actors: parties, groups, secured 20% of the vote in parlia- associations and persons mentary elections and again won Jobbik, the Movement for a Better three seats in the European Parlia- Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért ment. The party was also able to in- Mozgalom) crease its representation at munici- pal level. The most prominent and visible an- tisemitic actor in Hungary is the far- Jobbik appears to have undergone right Jobbik, which was founded in considerable changes in the past four 2003. The fact that its influence is to five years, at least from the out- much greater than that of any other side. The party’s transformation is closely connected to its burgeoning

58 popularity and its efforts to become Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) a “people’s party”. It is hard to detect In 2007, Vona founded a far-right exactly when this change started, paramilitary organization called but in June 2012 Jobbik was willing the Hungarian Guard. It played a to retain Csanád Szegedi as one of crucial role in the rise of Jobbik by its leaders after he confessed to his mobilizing the masses and drawing Jewish origins. The party’s rebrand- media attention to topics that Job- ing was clearly reflected in its cam- bik considered important. Although paign during the 2014 parliamenta- the organization became known for ry elections, which was referred to its demonstrations and marches, as the “cutie campaign”. The name in particular against “Gypsy crime”, caught on after Jobbik’s chairman, antisemitism was also a key part Gábor Vona, posted a photo on Face- of its ideology. After the authorities book during the campaign in which banned and disbanded the Hungar- he was pictured posing with three ian Guard in 2009, a former lead- puppies in his lap. There have been er of the movement named Róbert several signs of this rebranding. Kiss almost immediately founded For example, in April 2016, before the New Hungarian Guard, together the party’s electoral congress, Vona with roughly one hundred followers. used his presidential veto to block The new organization was practically the re-election of three of Jobbik’s identical to the previous one, but it vice-presidents, who were all regard- failed to achieve the importance and ed as members of the party’s radical popularity of its predecessor. More- right wing. Vona was subsequently over, Jobbik distanced itself from the re-elected chairman of the party for organization, since it did not match a sixth term. The fact that many of its new, softer image. However, when the party’s new vice-presidents also asked about his vision for the future had a long history of right-wing ex- after Jobbik’s presumed victory in tremism proved that this was not a the 2018 parliamentary elections, real change in the orientation of the János Volner MP, vice-president and party but rather a trick in the pursuit parliamentary leader of the party, of political power. talked about resurrecting the Hun- garian Guard with public money.

59 Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement are. The Outlaws’ Army defines itself (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági as a “self-defence army”. Tyirityán Mozgalom) and the Outlaws’ Army has recently described the organiza- (Betyársereg) tion as a “patriotic sports movement”, The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Move- which only those who have signifi- ment (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági cant experience in combat sports Mozgalom or HVIM) and the Outlaws’ can join. The organization has close Army (Betyársereg) adhere to a rac- relationships with other groups, and ist, antisemitic and anti-Roma ideol- there are many references to HVIM ogy and can be connected to Jobbik on its website. It is also closely con- not only through their ideology but nected to Jobbik, although from time also through their leaders. HVIM was to time the party tries to distance founded in 2001 by László Toroczkai, itself from the organization. In No- who now serves as vice-president of vember 2015, the above-mentioned Jobbik. Toroczkai resigned from the Jobbik politician János Volner dubbed leadership of HVIM in 2014, and was the Outlaws’ Army the “most effec- succeeded by György Gyula Zagyva, tive patriotic self-organizing group”, who was a Jobbik MP between 2010 and in March 2016 he participated in and 2014. In 2016, Jobbik admit- the organization’s annual assembly. ted to financially supporting HVIM Although Tyirityán, who still serves through various foundations that as the leader of the organization, were closely connected to the party. has revamped his public image and rhetoric to a certain extent, he was The Outlaws’ Army was founded by willing to talk openly about racial war László Toroczkai and Zsolt Tyirityán and the murder, if necessary, of Gyp- in 2008 after a Hungarian court dis- sies and Jews. During one demon- banded the racist Blood and Honour stration, he said that some Zionists Cultural Association. The organiza- support those who incite the Gypsies tion is not legally registered but – like against Hungarian society.24 other neo-Nazi organizations – oper- ates under the aegis of others that In 2009, Gábor Vona and the leaders of HVIM (László Toroczkai and Györ-

24 “Devecser 2012.08.05. Élni és élni hagyni – demonstráció a jogos magyar önvédelemért,” https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=3akDfwyf_O4 (accessed January 6, 2017).

60 gy Gyula Zagyva), the Outlaws’ Army viet military base in Bőny, a village (Zsolt Tyirityán) and the Hungarian in north-west Hungary. The organi- Guard (Róbert Kiss) announced their zation regularly holds paramilitary cooperation during a press confer- training camps and military camps ence. Later, as these organizations for youngsters, and has also host- became less and less convenient for ed other hate groups. MNA claims Jobbik, the party tried to distance to be a Hungarian supremacist and itself from them. However, their National Socialist group. It is also ongoing connections were clearly overtly antisemitic.25 revealed in March 2015, when an In 1997, MNA established the “Day of audio recording was leaked in which Honour”, which is one of the most Jobbik vice-president Tamás Sneider important neo-Nazi events in Hun- explained the “division of labour” be- gary. It commemorates the Buda tween Jobbik, HVIM and the Outlaws’ Castle break-out attempted by the Army to party sympathizers, claim- Hungarian defence forces, the Ger- ing that these organizations could man Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS talk and act in ways that Jobbik, as in 1945 during the Soviet siege of a political party, could not. Budapest. Over the years, it has be- come a gathering for many far-right organizations, including HVIM and Hungarian National Front (Magyar the Outlaws’ Army. Extremist groups Nemzeti Arcvonal) from abroad also attend the event. The Hungarian National Front (MNA) The organization and its leader, Ist- is a far-right, Hungarist and neo-Na- ván Győrkös, were recently in the zi paramilitary hate group, which was mainstream media spotlight af- founded in 1989 by István Györkös. ter Győrkös shot dead a policeman The organization has a strong affin- who was about to enter his house in ity for World War II Hungarist lead- Bőny to conduct a search. The po- er, Ferenc Szálasi. The organization’s lice were sent to the house to search main centre of activity is located at for illegally held firearms, which they the shooting range of a former So- subsequently found. Since Győrkös’s

25 See http://www.athenainstitute.eu/en/map/olvas/20 (accessed 2 January, 2017).

61 arrest, the Hungarian police have to other far-right organizations. For conducted several raids against example, the founding charter of the MNA members, uncovering sizeable Free Spirit Foundation states that, if weapons stockpiles in the process. it ceases to exist, HVIM will take over It subsequently became clear that all its assets. In addition, the leader MNA had extensive ties to Russian of the Outlaws’ Army, Zsolt Tyirityán, military intelligence and was running is a regular participant and speaker a right-wing web portal called Hídfő at events organized by Pax Hungar- (Bridgehead), which had served as a ica. channel for Russian disinformation for some time.26 Lóránt Hegedűs and the Church of Homecoming Pax Hungarica Reformed Church minister Lóránt Like the Outlaws’ Army, Pax Hun- Hegedűs is a former member of the garica was founded after a Hungar- Hungarian parliament for MIÉP and ian court disbanded the Blood and the husband of a Jobbik MP. Hege- Honour Cultural Association. Pax dűs is well known for his far-right Hungarica adheres to an extremely views and is a regular speaker at racist, antisemitic and anti-Roma Jobbik demonstrations, where he ideology. It is engaged in an open ri- takes on the role of a spiritual lead- valry with MNA, since it has also de- er. Hegedűs’s church – the Church of clared itself the spiritual heir of the Homecoming – is located in the cen- Hungarist Movement. Pax Hungarica tre of Budapest and forms a venue is not legally registered and instead for many far-right events. Hegedűs uses a registered cover organization often uses the pulpit to disseminate known as Free Spirit – Hungarian his antisemitic views, which focus Culture Foundation. It is clear that on anti-Jewish conspiracy theories. Pax Hungarica has close connections Although many of his sermons and

26 Joseph Fitsanakis, “Hungarian Media Accuses Russia of Working with Far-Right Militia,” Intel- news.org, November 29, 2016, https://intelnews.org/tag/hungarian-national-front (accessed January 2, 2017); Eva S. Balogh, “Russian Military Intelligence and the Hungarian National Front,” Hunga- rian Spectrum, October 27, 2016, http://hungarianspectrum.org/2016/10/27/russian-military-intelli- gence-and-the-hungarian-national-front (accessed January 2, 2017).

62 speeches should be unacceptable to May 2016. the Hungarian Reformed Church, the Echo TV was founded in 2005 by Gá- latter has not expelled him as yet. bor Széles, one of Hungary’s wealth- iest men. Although the channel was Far-right media initially meant to cover business Kuruc.info, which defines itself as news, its profile quickly changed, “unrestrictedly Hungarian”, is a news and it became a forum for the Far portal that has played a key role in Right. The most extreme manifesta- spreading Jobbik’s message. After tions of antisemitism were presented pursuing certain other endeavours, by Ferenc Szaniszló in a programme it finally got underway in 2006. As entitled “World Panorama”. Szanisz- the leading far-right news site, Ku- ló left the channel in the summer of ruc.info had approximately 100,000 2016. No public data is available on daily readers at the height of its the ratings of the channel’s various popularity. Although Jobbik regular- programmes, but its overall number ly denied any connection to the site, of viewers is around 20,000. it was an open secret that Jobbik’s Founded in 2009, Barikád (Barricade) then vice-president, Előd Novák, was is Jobbik’s weekly newspaper, with a one of the site’s editors and regularly readership estimated at 10,000. The contributed articles under different editor-in-chief is Sándor Pörzse, who pen names. The portal is nothing but is one of the founders of the Hun- a source of antisemitic, anti-Roma, garian Guard and served a Jobbik MP anti-migrant material, Holocaust de- between 2010 and 2014. Antisemi- nial and incitement to violence. Ever tism surfaces on a regular basis in since Jobbik has tried to become a the newspaper. One of the most em- “people’s party” by distancing itself blematic Barikád covers featured a from radicals, the popularity of the well-known statue of a Catholic saint site appears to have decreased. This with a menorah in his hands instead loss of popularity is also due to the of a cross. The accompanying head- fact that Novák was one of afore- line read: “Wake up Budapest! Is that mentioned radical right-wing Jobbik what you want?” leaders who were removed from the party’s leadership by Gábor Vona in Alfahir.hu, an online news site, and

63 N1 TV, an online channel, can both ple, Előd Novák, then a Jobbik MP, be considered media outlets of Job- referred to the government’s deci- bik. Both sites have undergone sub- sion to restore Józsefváros railway stantial changes in recent years, in station as a Holocaust memorial line with Jobbik’s image overhaul. It establish a civil fund to finance is clear from their appearance and remembrances as “the 2014 Holo- content that they are aiming to reach caust industry”.27 a wider audience. Jobbik representatives have also trivialized the Holocaust on other Manifestations occasions. In January 2014, Tibor of modern antisemitism Ágoston, a Jobbik representative in the municipality of Debrecen, Hun- Secondary antisemitism: gary’s second-largest city, referred Holocaust denial, relativization to the Holocaust as a “Holohoax” and trivialization in a speech. Feigning a slip of the Although there are few instances tongue, he subsequently corrected of Holocaust denial in Hungary, himself and used the word Ho- Holocaust relativization is a com- locaust instead, yet only contin- mon occurrence. It has also been ued his speech after interjecting: an integral part of Jobbik’s ideol- “It was deliberate, please excuse 28 ogy. Hungary’s Holocaust Memo- me.” In May 2014, Dóra Dúró, a rial Year, which commemorated Jobbik MP, said on a TV programme the seventieth anniversary of the that “there are many kinds of Ho- country’s occupation by Germany, locaust” and that the greatest took place in 2014 and got caught tragedy of the Hungarian people in Jobbik’s cross-hairs. At a meet- was not the “so-called Holocaust, ing of the Committee on Culture but Trianon”. In December 2014, and Media of the Hungarian par- state support for Holocaust sur- liament in October 2013, for exam- vivors was debated in parliament.

27 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports – October 2014 (Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2014). 28 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports – January 2014 (Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2014).

64 Jobbik MP Előd Novák addressed as a crime. On this basis, the Ac- the assembly on this matter, us- tion and Protection Foundation has ing expressions such as “Holocaust brought several legal actions against industry” and “so-called Holocaust Holocaust denial and relativization, survivors”.29 many of them relating to social me- Manifestations of Holocaust denial dia posts. and relativization also occur ran- There are certain other phenomena domly. For example, in March 2014, in Hungary that need to be men- some graves in the Jewish cemetery tioned here. Although they do not in Tatabánya were vandalized. On amount to Holocaust denial as such, one of the graves, the vandals left they constitute a deliberate attempt the following message: “There was to distort history, whitewash the Hor- no Holocaust, but it’s coming!!!” On thy-era and place sole responsibility two other graves, they wrote: “stink- for the Holocaust on the Germans. ing Jews” and “Holohoax”. On a third In 2014, a controversial memorial to grave, they sprayed a swastika to- the victims of the German occupa- gether with the abbreviations “S.H.” tion was erected in one of Budapest’s 30 (Sieg Heil) and “H.H.” (Heil Hitler). main squares, despite fierce protests Antisemitic slogans of this type are from Jewish organizations, histori- also used at football matches. ans and other intellectuals. An article Holocaust denial and relativization signed by professionals stated that are also widespread on the Internet. the monument “relativizes the events For example, one of the banners on of the Holocaust. … By representing Kuruc.info displays the word “Holo- the victims and the responsible col- hoax”. As mentioned earlier, the Hun- laborators of the Holocaust as one garian Criminal Code defines denial single victim, the monument dese- and relativization of the Holocaust crates the memory of the victims.”31

29 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports – December 2014 (Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2014). 30 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports – March 2014 (Bud- apest: Brussels Institute, 2014). 31 “Történészek tiltakozása a ‘Magyarország német megszállása 1944. március 19.’ emlékmű ellen,” Galamus Group, January 22, 2014, http://www.galamus.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti- cle&id=352719_torteneszek_tiltakozasa_a_magyarorszag_nemet_1944 (accessed May 28, 2017).

65 In 1941, approximately 14,000 Jews were not only openly antisemitic but who could not properly prove their also played a key role in the destruc- Hungarian citizenship were deported tion of Hungarian Jewry. to Kamenets-Podolsk and killed there. When these examples of historical Sándor Szakály, head of the Veritas distortion were raised in 2014, they Historical Institute, has referred to threatened to derail Hungary’s forth- this event simply as a “police action coming presidency of the Interna- against aliens”. On another occasion, tional Holocaust Remembrance Alli- he tried to justify the numerus clau- ance (IHRA). However, the Hungarian sus, a law introduced in 1920 to re- government made a concerted effort strict the number of Jews who could to secure the presidency, and it final- enter higher education in Hungary. ly assumed the role in March 2015 Szakály stated that he did not regard after months of controversies. the law as discriminatory and that it was “a case of positive discrimi- Conspiratorial antisemitism nation in favour of those youngsters As already mentioned, statements who had less of a chance when it about Jewish influence and anti-Jew- came to entering an institution of ish conspiracy theories are widely 32 higher education”. In this context, it accepted in Hungarian society. As a is important to note that the Veritas result, they also feature in the rhet- Historical Institute was founded by oric of Jobbik and other right-wing the Hungarian government and that extremists. it operates under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s chef de cabinet. For example, Sándor Pörzse has stated that “we are witnessing a Since 2010, when the current co- global conspiracy that aims to col- alition of and KDNP came onize Hungary and steal its resourc- into power, there have been many es”. In addition, Ferenc Szaniszló attempts to whitewash politicians, spends hours explaining anti-Jewish writers and other public figures from conspiracy theories on his television the Horthy-era who in many cases programme on Echo TV. He frequent-

32 “Orbán’s Veritas Institute Looks at Anti-Semitism in the Horthy Era,” Hungarian Spectrum, June 26, 2016, http://hungarianspectrum.org/2016/06/26/orbans-veritas-institute-looks-at-anti-semitism- in-the-horthy-era (accessed June 1, 2017).

66 ly talks about left-liberals “who are Demonstration posters were upload- Hungarian citizens by passport only”, ed on to the village’s website. Orosz’s “contaminating the Hungarians” and rhetoric included clear references to “drawing their blood as parasites”. In a Jewish conspiracy. He made con- his opinion, the whole world is gov- stant references to “foreign-heart- erned by a secret financial cabal (i.e. ed,34 anti-Hungarian strata of civil the Jews). servants” who follow the orders of 35 36 In February 2014, Loránt Hegedűs Jr, “Uncle Kohn” and “Gyurka Soros”. a Calvinist priest and well-known fig- Conspiracy theories became much ure on the Far Right, said that “the more prevalent following the start global financial power does not- in of the migration crisis and the wave tend to integrate the Roma. On the of terrorist attacks in European cit- contrary, it uses them as biological ies. In February 2015, for example, weapons … to force Hungarians to the aforementioned Tibor Ágoston emigrate”.33 In addition, when Job- shared a post on Facebook with bik won its first by-election in April words to the following effect: “Charlie 2015, it turned out that the member Hebdo by mere coincidence got into of parliament in question, Lajos Rig, the hands of the Rothschilds some had been sharing and distributing days before the attack. What a coin- antisemitic content on Facebook. In cidence! A Rothschild-owner behind a post from 2013, he also described Charlie Hebdo; interesting parallels the Roma as “the Jews’ biological between the Paris attack and the ex- weapon against Hungarians”. plosion of the World Trade Center”.37 In October 2014, Mihály Zoltán Oro- New antisemitism sz, the mayor of Érpatak, launched In order to analyze new antisemitism a four-month demonstration that in- in Hungary, we have to go back to cluded approximately 200 protesters.

33 Hegedűs said this at a Jobbik forum organized by his wife, Enikő Hegedűs. It is noteworthy that she already used this wording back in 2011. 34 In Hungary, the expression “foreign-hearted” unequivocally refers to Jews. 35 Kohn is a well-known Jewish family name. For example, many Hungarian Jewish jokes are about Kohn and Grün. 36 Gyurka is a nickname for György, the Hungarian equivalent of George. 37 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports – February 2015 (Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2015).

67 2007, when the President of Israel issues. The first relates to the situ- at the time, Shimon Peres, told the ation of Palestine and the Palestin- chamber of commerce in Tel Aviv that ians and, in this connection, certain “[n]owadays you can build empires agreements concluded between the without establishing colonies and European Union and Israel and be- sending in the army. … Israeli busi- tween Hungary and Israel. The party nessmen are investing all around the has organized several demonstra- world, enjoying unparalleled success, tions, and its MPs have delivered earning economic independence. speeches against Israel in the Hun- We’re buying up Manhattan, Poland, garian parliament. At these demon- Hungary and Romania.” These un- strations, speakers have referred to fortunate words have served as a Israel as a “baby killer” or “child kill- point of reference for the Far Right er”, as the “enemy of world peace” in Hungary ever since. For example, and as a “terrorist state” that “op- during a solidarity demonstration for erates a racist dictatorship”. Jobbik Palestine in 2012, Jobbik chairman has referred to Gaza as the “largest Gábor Vona demanded that the Hun- open-air prison and concentration garian Parliament “take an inventory camp in the world” and blamed Israel of the presence of Israeli capital in for committing genocide against the Hungary immediately and publish Palestinians, which it describes as a the data” while referring to Peres’s “Palestinian holocaust”. During one speech. In Jobbik’s view, the speech of these demonstrations, in Novem- not only serves as a justification for ber 2012, Gábor Vona talked about its fear that Hungary will become an an “Israel deal”. Among other things, Israeli (meaning Jewish) “colony” but he claimed that, during its first term supposedly provides clear proof of in office in 1998-2002, the Orbán the Jews’ extensive influence around cabinet had signed a contract stating the world, thereby validating several that Hungary, in addition to Poland anti-Jewish conspiracy theories. and Germany, “would accommodate Jobbik’s new antisemitism can be 500,000 Jews if there is big trou- 38 clustered around a few well-defined ble”. During another demonstration

38 “Vona Gábor speech,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EtfZgSPc8NM (accessed December 22, 2016).

68 in July 2014, Vona said that the pres- that this conflict is not between Jews ident of Hungary should summon the and non-Jews but between those Israeli ambassador to his office and “fighting for human rights, dignity tell him that “you have twenty-four and the truth” and those “speaking hours to pack your things and leave the language of money and power, this country because we will not tol- who contaminate all of them”. 39 erate your presence here”. Jobbik Based on these concerns, Jobbik has also voices its opinions on the in- called on the European Union and ternational stage, especially through Hungary to suspend or terminate Krisztina Morvai, who is one of the the EU association agreement with party’s three MEPs. Israel until “it is willing to observe Jobbik often seeks to base its argu- the mandatory EU norms regarding ments on the international human human rights”.40 In 2014, the party rights framework, claiming that its submitted a draft resolution to the “struggle for truth” focuses not only Hungarian parliament proposing that on the Palestinians but also on hu- Hungary put pressure on Israel by man rights, human dignity and jus- suspending all diplomatic relations tice in general. In its opinion, the fact until such time as a sovereign State that the fate of humanity as a whole of Palestine is established.41 is at stake is well evidenced by the In support of its arguments, Jobbik of- fact that there are also Jews who op- ten refers to external authorities (e.g. pose Israel’s human rights infringe- the United Nations42) and influential ments. Jobbik accordingly argues intellectuals (e.g. Noam Chomsky43

39 “Speech for the Palestine solidarity – Speech of Vona Gábor, president of Jobbik,” https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=OOp3rqdYkYo (accessed December 22, 2016). 40 Letter from Krisztina Morvai, cited by Gábor Vona during a demonstration in support of Palestine in November 2012. 41 “Jegyzőkönyv az Országgyűlés Külügyi Bizottságának 2014. szeptember 23-dikai üléséről,” http:// www.parlament.hu/documents/static/biz40/bizjkv40/KUB/1409231.pdf (accessed December 22, 2016). 42 For example, Krisztina Morvai often refers to a report written by Richard Falk, who served as the UN Special Rapporteur on “the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967” between 2008 and 2014. It is important to note that Israel opposed Falk’s appointment to this post because of his anti-Israel extremism. For example, Falk once stated: “[i]s it an irresponsible ov- erstatement to associate the treatment of Palestinians with this criminalized Nazi record of collective atrocity? I think not.” 43 Noam Chomsky, the world-famous scientist, regularly refers to Gaza as “the world’s largest open- air prison” and has said that “in the Occupied Territories, what Israel is doing is much worse than

69 and Stephen Hawking44), as well as I don’t know how much we from the anti-Zionist ultra-Or- will have to struggle and fight thodox Neturei Karta movement.45 To for our freedom. I don’t know lend emotional force to its argument, if they will liquidate us with it often draws parallels between Pal- targeted precision strikes. I estinians and Hungarians, as both know one thing, however: We nations have yearned and fought for will never give our freedom freedom. In 2012, during a demon- and our holy Hungarian land stration against “the attack of the Is- to anybody.46 raeli state against Gaza”, Vona went Jobbik’s frequent use of the expres- so far as to say: sion “our Palestinian brothers” also We are Hungarians, not Pal- reflects this sense of togetherness. estinians, yet we came here Jobbik’s anti-Zionism is closely con- today to show our solidarity nected to the above-mentioned with the Palestinian people, agenda, but it is more overtly antise- because we Hungarians are mitic. In May 2013, the party orga- the Palestinians of Europe, nized a demonstration entitled “Jus- right in the centre of the con- tice for Hungary! A Commemoration tinent. We are Europe’s Pal- for the Victims of Bolshevism and estinians. And I don’t know Zionism” just a few days before the what the future holds for us. plenary meeting of the World Jewish

apartheid”. When using Chomsky as a reference, it is also important to Jobbik that he is of Jewish origin. For more on this issue, see Noam Chomsky, “My Visit to Gaza, the World’s Largest Open-Air Prison,” Truthout, November 9, 2012, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/12635-noam-chomsky-my- visit-to-gaza-the-worlds-largest-open-air-prison (accessed December 14, 2016). 44 Stephen Hawking joined the academic boycott of Israel in 2013 when, after accepting an invitation to a conference hosted by Israeli President Shimon Peres, he changed his mind and joined the BDS movement. See Harriet Sherwood and Matthew Kalman, “Stephen Hawking Joins Academic Boycott of Israel,” Guardian, May 8, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/08/stephen-hawking-is- rael-academic-boycott (accessed 3 January, 2017). 45 Neturei Karta, an international ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionist movement with a strong support base in the United States, views itself as the religious Jewish authority on Zionism and Israel and claims to “pray for the peaceful dismantlement of the State of Israel”. According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), which regards Neturei Karta as one of the top anti-Israel groups in the United States, the mo- vement has close connections to extreme antisemites (e.g. ) and participated in a “Holocaust review conference” in Teheran. For more on this issue, see Anti-Defamation League, The 2013 Top Ten Anti-Israel Groups in the US (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2013), 17-19. 46 “Vona Gábor speech,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EtfZgSPc8NM (accessed December 22, 2016).

70 Congress in Budapest.47 Moreover, in The issue of dual citizenship as a na- July of the same year, it announced tional security risk was first raised the launch of the Hungarian Par- in parliament by Gábor Vona in 2010 liamentary Anti-Zionist Group. Af- during a debate on the future as- ter László Kövér, the speaker of the sociation agreement between the Hungarian parliament, declared that European Union and Israel.48 Vona he would not permit the formation of also raised the issue in 2012 during such a group, two Jobbik MPs stated a solidarity demonstration for Pales- at a press conference that this had tine, calling on “the relevant author- merely been an exercise to test the ities to conduct a national security limits of free speech. screening of government members The second key issue that charac- and MPs to see whether they hold terizes in Jobbik’s new antisemitism Israeli citizenship. In Jobbik’s opinion relates to Israeli-Hungarian dual cit- Israeli citizens must not be mem- izens who are members of the Hun- bers of government or MPs in our garian parliament or government. country, Hungary!” Five days later, According to Jobbik, these individu- Márton Gyöngyösi went further and als pose a national security risk as a talked specifically about Jews, stat- consequence of Israel’s behaviour to- ing that “the conflict [between Is- wards the Palestinians and because rael and the Palestinians] makes it Israeli-Hungarian dual citizens (e.g. timely to tally up people of Jewish Hungarian Jews who also hold Israeli ancestry who live here, especially in citizenship) are allegedly more loyal the Hungarian parliament and the to Israel than to Hungary. Hungarian government, who pose a national security risk to Hungary”.49

47 To prevent Jobbik’s anti-Zionist rally, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán initially ordered a blanket ban on all demonstrations that might offend the WJC conference participants. A few days later, the courts annulled this decision. Orbán then wrote the following in an e-mail statement: “I request the chairman of the Supreme Court to assess the legal means for a constitutional decision and I also called on the Minister of the Interior to apply all legal means to ban the unconstitutional event.” See Veronika Gulyás, “Hungary’s Prime Minister Slams Court for Allowing Anti-Zionist Rally,” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2013/05/03/hungarys-premier-slams-court-for-al- lowing-anti-zionist-rally (accessed December 21, 2016). 48 “Vona Gábor: Vita az EU és Izrael állam közötti társulás létrehozásáról (2010.11.08),” https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=huejl9ZaBfU&t=1s (accessed December 19, 2016). 49 “Gyöngyösi Márton antiszemita parlamenti felszólalása 2012.11.26,” https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=SyVZVLgAZVs (accessed December 19, 2016). As a result of this speech, Gyöngyösi became

71 In the days that followed, Gyöngyösi Israeli-Hungarian dual citizenship and Jobbik did everything they could merely as an example of any dual to play down his statement and draw citizenships that could pose a nation- attention away from the fact that he al security risk. was speaking about the Jews. Lat- The Boycott, Divestment and Sanc- er, at a press conference, he said tions (BDS) movement is not wide- that “what I said could be misun- spread in Hungary.51 However, Jobbik derstood and I’m sorry because my brings up BDS from time to time, statement wasn’t against our Jewish mostly during demonstrations. In compatriots. It was targeted at dual July 2014, for example, Gábor Vona Hungarian-Israeli citizens and the said the following during such a 50 potential national security risks.” demonstration: “We announce a In 2013, Jobbik MP Ádám Mirkóczki boycott of all Israeli products import- brought up the issue again by stat- ed to Hungary. We will announce a ing that “knowing about these dual boycott on them; we will not spend citizenships is more important than our money enriching people who kill the declaration of property”, which children and babies.” He went on to is compulsory for MPs in Hungary. say: “Let me remark that this is the Although Jobbik keeps this topic on most painful kind of strike on them”, its agenda, the wording it uses has referencing the widely-held stereo- softened in line with its aforemen- type of rapacious, money-grubbing tioned image overhaul. For example, Jews.52 Kuruc.info also appealed to Gyöngyösi himself said in a television its readers to look for the 729 bar- interview in 2016 that he had cited

one of the most well-known exponents of Jobbik’s new antisemitism, although he had used this rhet- oric before during demonstrations against Israel. For example, in 2011, while protesting against the conference of the International Israel Allies Caucus Foundation (IIACF) in Budapest, he stated that there was a “Zionist dependence in the government’s foreign policy”. 50 In reaction to Gyöngyösi’s speech, tens of thousands of people gathered in front of the parliament building in protest. This was an exceptional event, as it represented the first and last time in the past ten years at least that speakers from the ruling Fidesz party and opposition parties shared the same stage. 51 In connection with the BDS movement, it should be mentioned that the CEU Students for Justice in Palestine organization invited Joseph Massad, a university professor well-known for his hatred of Israel and support for anti-Jewish violence, to Hungary. Massad frequently describes Israel as a “colonialist, racist apartheid state” and sees its elimination as a precondition for peace in the Middle East. 52 “Speech for the Palestine solidarity – Speech of Vona Gábor, president of Jobbik,” https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=OOp3rqdYkYo (accessed December 22, 2016).

72 code53 and listed Israeli trademarks a friendly football match between to help people avoid them. Hungary and Israel in August 2012, a Jobbik makes a concerted effort to few dozen fans chanted “filthy Jews” “educate” its followers to defend and “Buchenwald” and also voiced their anti-Zionist views by presenting support for Palestine. the most popular counter-arguments In December 2012, Balázs Lenhardt, and counter-accusations. For exam- a former Jobbik member and MP, ple, it warns its supporters that they burned an Israeli flag during an will be condemned as antisemites if anti-Zionist demonstration. The Ac- they talk about the sins of Israel. Job- tion and Protection Foundation duly bik also teaches its supporters how lodged a complaint against him for to respond to accusations regarding incitement. Although demonstrators Palestinian terrorism and rocket at- shouted slogans like “filthy Jews” and tacks: “This is a war, and unfortu- “to Auschwitz with you all”, the Pros- nately where there is war there are ecutor’s Office considered that his act victims as well”. Jobbik does not just fell within the bounds of freedom of mention such counter-arguments but expression. As a result, he was only actually provides “good answers” to convicted of vandalism in 2014.55 54 its followers. In August 2014, the Érpatak munic- Although Jobbik plays a dominant ipality and the Sixty-Four Counties role in the field of new antisemitism Youth Movement held a protest in in Hungary, there have been mani- support of Palestine. The mayor of festations of new antisemitism that Érpatak, Mihály Zoltán Orosz, first were not – or not directly – connect- wiped his boots on a paper flag of Is- ed to the party. For example, during rael and then hung effigies of Shimon

53 Many supporters of the BDS movement believe that a barcode starting with the numbers 729 indicates that the product in question was made in Israel. However, this is not entirely accurate. What it actually means is that the barcode on the product was generated or requested by a company based in Israel. Many Israeli-made products are sold by non-Israeli companies and do not have this number. 54 See, for example, “Törődjünk-e Izrael bűneivel és a palesztinok szenvedéseivel? – Morvai Krisztina előadása,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mb8bdNCJGO8 (accessed December 15, 2016) and “Spe- ech for the Palestine solidarity – Speech of Vona Gábor, president of Jobbik,” https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=OOp3rqdYkYo (accessed December 22, 2016). 55 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports – June, July and October 2013 (Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2013).

73 Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu. The III. CONCLUSIONS Israeli ambassador to Hungary filed a complaint with the Chief Prosecutor, while nationalist politician and MEP New antisemitism is less prevalent Krisztina Morvai sent him an open and less visible in Hungary than letter defending Orosz by saying that secondary antisemitism and con- his “performance” had only been an spiratorial antisemitism. This is not expression of his outrage.56 The case simply due to the lower frequency of is still ongoing at the time of writing. manifestations of new antisemitism but rather to the fact that it is often In November 2015, Gábor Huszár, the interwoven with the other types of independent mayor of Szentgotthárd, antisemitism. the western-most town in Hunga- ry, said: “Everyone should acknowl- Few people participate in demonstra- edge that what happened in Paris tions against Israel. However, video is clear proof that certain business recordings of such events are widely circles want Christian Europe to turn distributed on the Internet, and it is against Islam. And now I will voice therefore impossible to estimate the that the Jewish state may also be number of people reached. It seems behind all this…”. Huszár released an that “Zionism” is a much better buzz- official statement soon after in which word than “Palestine” when it comes he apologized for his words, stating to attracting the masses. While that he had not thought through demonstrations in support of Pales- what he had said and that it was not tine attract a maximum of 200-300 intended for public consumption. The participants, an anti-Zionist rally or- following month, he paid a visit to ganized by Jobbik in May 2013 drew Israel’s ambassador to Hungary and approximately 1,000 people. This is a apologized for his statement.57 considerable number, especially giv- en the fact that the police used all the legal means at their disposal to prevent the event from taking place.

56 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports – August 2014 (Bu- dapest: Brussels Institute, 2014). 57 Ildikó Barna, Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports – November and December 2015 (Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2015).

74 The issue of Palestine is unequivocally regarded as a “Jewish question”, and it therefore serves as a code word. This is abundantly clear from the actions of the demonstrators. It was also evident during a football match in July 2014 between PMFC (Pécs) and MTK, which has been regarded as a “Jewish club” since the 1930s. During the match, PMFC supporters chanted political messages relating to Palestine and sang outrageous songs. The word Zionism also serves as a code word and is often used as a synonym for Jews or Judaism in expressions such as “Zionist scum”, “Zion-liberalism” and “Zion-liberals”. In light of the many interconnec- tions between the various types of antisemitism that exist in Hungary today, new antisemitism does not require special treatment. Although Jobbik and – to some extent – cer- tain other far-right organizations have undergone a considerable im- age makeover over the past few years, their inherent character has not changed. It is therefore extreme- ly important to keep the public in- formed about the true nature of far- right organizations in Hungary.

75 References • Ahren, Raphael. “Hungary: Labelling of Settlement Goods is Counterproductive.” Times of Israel, De- cember 22, 2015. Accessed January 3, 2017. http://www.timesofisrael.com/hungary-labeling-of-settle- ment-goods-is-counterproductive. • Anti-Defamation League. The 2013 Top Ten Anti-Israel Groups in the US. New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2013. • Barna, Ildikó. Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents in Hungary 2014: Annual Report. Budapest: Brussels Institute, 2015. • Barna, Ildikó. Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Incidents Report: Monthly Reports. Budapest: Brussels Insti- tute, 2013-2015. • Barna, Ildikó. “Jewish Identity of Three Generations of Holocaust Survivors in Hungary: Quantitative Analy- sis Using Structural Equation Modeling.” In Diversity and Identity, edited by Michael Brenner, Johannes Heil and Guy Katz. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, forthcoming. • Balogh, Eva S. “Russian Military Intelligence and the Hungarian National Front.” Hungarian Spectrum, Oc- tober 27, 2016. Accessed January 2, 2017. http://hungarianspectrum.org/2016/10/27/russian-military-in- telligence-and-the-hungarian-national-front. • Békés, Csaba, László J. Nagy and Dániel Vékony. “Bittersweet Friendships: Relations between Hungary and the Middle East, 1953-1988.” CWIHP e-dossier no. 67 (2015). Accessed January 5, 2017. http://real.mtak. hu/32805/1/hungarymiddleeastcwihp_edossier.pdf. • Chomsky, Noam. “My Visit to Gaza, the World’s Largest Open-Air Prison.” Truthout, November 9, 2012. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/12635-noam-chomsky-my-visit-to-ga- za-the-worlds-largest-open-air-prison. • Csorba, László. “Izraelita felekezeti élet Magyarországon a vészkorszaktól a nyolcvanas évekig (1945-1983).” In Hét évtized a hazai zsidóság életében. II. rész., edited by Pál Horváth, 61-190. Budapest: MTA Filozófiai Intézet, 1990. • Csurka, István. “Néhány gondolat a rendszerváltozás két esztendeje és a MDF új programja kapcsán.” Magyar Fórum, August 20, 1992, 9-16. • Fitsanakis, Joseph. “Hungarian Media Accuses Russia of Working with the Far-Right Militia.” Intelnews.org, November 29, 2016. Accessed January 2, 2017. https://intelnews.org/tag/hungarian-national-front. • Gulyás, Veronika. “Hungary’s Prime Minister Slams Court for Allowing Anti-Zionist Rally.” Wall Street Jour- nal, May 3, 2013. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2013/05/03/hunga- rys-premier-slams-court-for-allowing-anti-zionist-rally. • Hann, Endre and Dániel Róna. Anti-Semitic Prejudice in Contemporary Hungarian Society Research Report. Budapest: Medián/Action and Protection Foundation, 2016. • Karády, Viktor. Túlélők és újrakezdők. Fejezetek a magyar zsidóság szociológiájából 1945 után. Budapest: Múlt és Jövő Kiadó, 2002. • Karády, Viktor. The Jews of Europe in the Modern Era: A Socio-Historical Outline. Budapest: CEU Press, 2004. • Kovács, András. “A zsidókérdés a mai magyar társadalomban.” In Zsidóság az 1945 utáni Mag- yarországon, edited by Péter Kende. Paris: Magyar Füzetek, 1984. • Kovács, András. “Az asszimilációs dilemma.” Világosság 8-9 (1988): 605-612. • Kovács, András, ed. Zsidók és zsidóság a mai Magyarországon. Budapest: Múlt és Jövő, 2002.

76 • Kovács, András. “Jews and Jewishness in Post-War Hungary.” Quest: Issues in Contemporary Jewish Histo- ry, Journal of the Fondazione CDEC 1 (2010): 34-56. • Sherwood, Harriet and Mathew Kalman. “Stephen Hawking Joins Academic Boycott of Israel.” Guardian, May 8, 2013. Accessed January 3, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/08/stephen-hawk- ing-israel-academic-boycott. • Stark, Tamás. Zsidóság a vészkorszakban és a felszabadulás után 1939-1955. Budapest: MTA Történettu- dományi Intézet, 1995. • Winer, Stuart. “Knesset Speaker Uninvites Hungarian Counterpart over Attendance at Memorial for Nazi Collaborator.” Times of Israel, June 24, 2012. Accessed January 3, 2017. http://www.timesofisrael.com/out- raged-knesset-speaker-cancels-visit-of-his-hungarian-counterpart. • Winer, Stuart. “Hungarian President Assures Netanyahu of His Opposition to Anti-Semitism.” Times of Israel, July 17, 2012. Accessed January 3, 2017. http://www.timesofisrael.com/hungarian-president-vis- it-netanyahu-in-jerusalem.

77 78 05 POLAND Rafal Pankowski

79 I. BACKGROUND al waves of emigration after World War II further diminished the Polish Jewish community. According to an Jewish population official population census conducted and community in 2011, approximately 8,000 peo- Historically, Poland was home to ple declared themselves as hav- a large Jewish population. In the ing a Jewish identity (nationality/ tenth century, the first words about ethnicity). Within this group, 2,000 the existence of Poland as a country declared their identity as Jewish were penned by Ibrahim ibn Jacob, only, with the vast majority declar- a Jewish merchant representing the ing their identity as both Polish and Caliph of Cordoba. For one thousand Jewish. According to the census, years, the Jews contributed to the Poland’s total population was 38.5 cultural, economic and political life million. Thus, the Jews constitute of the country. From the thirteenth only a small fraction of the coun- century, the Jewish community was try’s population. No precise data granted a degree of legal autonomy are available on the socio-economic by Polish rulers. After the Third Par- status of Jews in Poland, but it is tition of Poland in 1795 and until generally accepted that they are a 1918, the emancipation of the Jews predominantly urban community, generally followed the diverse paths with high levels of secularism and of the legislative frameworks of the assimilation into mainstream Polish occupying powers (Russia, Austria culture. and Germany). In the interwar pe- riod, Polish Jews officially enjoyed full rights as Polish citizens, but in Historical context practice they frequently suffered of modern antisemitism discrimination, especially after 1935. Modern political antisemitism sur- Before 1939, the Jewish community faced in Poland at the turn of the amounted to 10% of Poland’s pop- twentieth century, in conjunction ulation. Approximately three million with the rise of the ethno-national- Polish Jews were murdered by the ist “Endek” or “National Democracy” Nazis during the Holocaust. Sever- movement led by Roman Dmowski.

80 Antisemitism became a crucial part similation of Jews even when they of the movement’s ideology, and converted to Christianity. In 1904, antisemitic propaganda played an he wrote: important role in the construction of In the character of this race a nationalist political identity. Clear- [the Jews], so many differ- ly, the rise of modern antisemitism ent values alien to our mor- was made possible by the heritage al constitution and harmful of traditional Catholic antisemitism, to our life have accumulat- which had existed since the Middle ed that assimilation with Ages. The Endek movement had a a larger number of Jews mass following and sought to build would destroy us, replacing a modern national identity rooted us with decadent elements, in ethnic (or ethno-religious) ties, rather than with those excluding ethnic and religious mi- young creative foundations norities from the imagined nation- upon which we are building al identity. When Poland regained the future.1 independence in 1918, the Endek movement did not obtain power, but By the mid-1930s, a new, more rad- it enjoyed mass support during the ical generation of activists grew out interwar period, especially among of the National Democracy move- the middle classes and the Roman ment. In 1934, they formed their Catholic clergy. The Endek tradition own group, the National-Radical arguably still has a strong influence Camp (Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny on the understanding of national or ONR), which was strongly in- identity in Poland. spired by European fascist models. In the wake of the international Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, economic crisis, the ONR included the struggle against the Jews grad- both nationalist and anti-capitalist ually became a central element slogans in its ideology and equat- of the Endek ideology, which was ed capitalism with Jewish influence. permeated with Jewish conspiracy The ONR was notorious for using theories. Dmowski opposed the as-

1 Roman Dmowski, Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka (1904), quoted in: Rafal Pankowski, The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots (London: Routledge, 2010), 28.

81 violence against Jews and political twined with anti-Communist rheto- opponents. The bulk of its support ric. According to estimates, around came from university students. Af- one-fourth of the Polish Communist ter several months, it was banned Party’s membership was made up of by the Polish authorities for inciting Jews during the 1920s and 1930s. hatred, but it continued to function In practice, however, the Jewish informally (subsequently splitting Communists were a marginal group into two factions known as ONR- within the wider Jewish community ABC and ONR-Falanga, which was in Poland. The Communist Party was led by Bolesław Piasecki). This ex- illegal in Poland; it remained unpop- treme nationalist ideology and sym- ular and was eventually dissolved by bolism made a spectacular come- Stalin in 1937. Many of its activists back among young in the were subsequently murdered by the 2010s. Soviet secret police (NKVD) during was perpe- the mass repressions. trated by German Nazis. This basic After World War II, the stereotype of fact is not in dispute, but there is a “Jewish Communism” became even debate about the role of the Polish stronger, despite the fact that Jew- neighbours of the Jewish victims. ish Communists constituted a very The attitudes of the Polish popula- small part of the postwar Commu- tion ranged from sympathy to indif- nist leadership and generally did ference and hostility. The role of the not identify themselves as Jews. Polish perpetrators of wartime and Throughout the postwar years, the postwar anti-Jewish pogroms (e.g. official propaganda emphasized in in 1941 and Kielce in ethnic homogeneity and the lack 1946) remains a subject of contro- of significant minorities as a major versy to the present day.2 achievement of the Communist re- Both before and after 1939, an- gime. Symbolically, a group of activ- tisemitic discourse was often inter- ists of the prewar ONR-Falanga, led

2 The main contribution to the debate can be found in Jan T. Gross’s ground-breaking books: Neigh- bors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 2001); Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz (New York: Random House, 2006); and Golden Harvest, co-authored with Irena Grudzińska-Gross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

82 by Bolesław Piasecki, was allowed aggressive anti-Zionist government to reorganize legally in the form of propaganda that highlighted the the PAX Association, which com- “cosmopolitan” background of the bined nationalism and Catholicism student activists, pointing to their with Socialist rhetoric. For decades, family connections with the Jewish PAX had its own representatives Communists of the Stalinist period. in Poland’s Communist-dominated Government-controlled newspapers parliament. Nevertheless, during listed the Jewish-sounding names the first two decades of Communist of the dissidents and stressed their rule, cases of officially sanctioned, “unpatriotic” outlook. overt antisemitism were relatively In particular, the Jewish-Communist rare. family background of the eighteen- In the latter half of the 1960s, an- year-old student leader Adam Mich- tisemitic rhetoric disguised as an- nik was frequently exploited in the ti-Zionism became increasingly propaganda. Such attacks on Mich- common. The antisemitic campaign nik were repeated during the ensuing reached its peak in the wake of Is- decades and continue to this day. At rael’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day present, they feature prominently in War. At this time, Israel’s success the discourse of the Polish extreme was viewed with some sympathy in right. Since 1989, Michnik has been certain sectors of Polish society, but the editor-in-chief of the country’s the authorities reacted with hostility main liberal newspaper Gazeta Wy- to any displays of solidarity with Is- borcza. He is regarded as one of the rael. At the same time, a new dem- founding fathers of Polish liberal ocratically-minded student move- democracy, which makes him a fre- ment emerged in Poland, supported quent target of hatred among na- by dissident intellectuals such as tionalist populists. Another activist Jacek Kuron, Karol Modzelewski, in the student movement of the late Leszek Kolakowski, Zygmunt Bau- 1960s, Jan Gross, later became the man, Wlodzimierz Brus and others. author of ground-breaking books on The violent crushing of the demo- antisemitism in Poland. cratic movement by the authorities In the Communist propaganda of in March 1968 was accompanied by

83 the late 1960s, the term “Zionism” towards Jews and Israel have been simply served as shorthand for be- conducted in recent decades. Due to ing Jewish or sympathizing with the different methodologies – and Jews. The “Zionists” (i.e. Jews) were differing ideological perspectives presented as a united group work- – of the researchers, the results ing for the benefit of Israel and the tend to differ considerably. Writing United States. They were simultane- in 2011, Professor Antoni Sułek of ously accused of “cosmopolitanism” the Institute of Sociology at Warsaw and “nationalism”. As a part of the University ascertained that there repressive measures that followed was generally a small (or diminish- the student unrest, hundreds of ing) range of antisemitic attitudes students were expelled from uni- in Poland. As an example, he quot- versities, while professors who were ed the results of a survey conducted seen as sympathizers of the student by the TNS OBOP polling institute movement were sacked. In 1968- in 2002 and 2010. Those surveyed 1969, approximately 15,000-20,000 were asked to name groups with Jews were forced to leave Poland “too much influence on the coun- amid an atmosphere of intimida- try’s affairs”. Jews were named by tion. Roughly 25% of them settled a marginal percentage of the re- in Israel. Many of the rhetorical spondents (0.8% in 2002 and 1.7% themes developed and popularized in 2010).3 during the 1968 anti-Zionist cam- However, a different picture emerg- paign have been in circulation ever es from the research of Professor since, including during the post- Ireneusz Krzemiński, also of the In- 1989 period. stitute of Sociology at Warsaw Uni- versity, who conducted a series of Opinion polls on antisemitism surveys beginning in 1992. These surveys demonstrate the relative Numerous sociological studies on persistence of certain antisemitic antisemitism and Polish attitudes attitudes. Elements of “tradition-

3 Antoni Sułek, “Władza Żydów a władza stereotypu,” Otwarta , , 2011, http://www.otwarta.org/prof-antoni-sulek-wladza-zydow-i-wladza-stereotypu (accessed January 15, 2017).

84 al” (i.e. religiously motivated) an- that “The Jews rule the world”.5 tisemitism were shared by 11.5% These results are supplemented by of those surveyed in 1992, 11.6% an additional report on attitudes to- in 2002 and 8% in 2012, while el- wards Israel published by the same ements of “modern” (i.e. ideolog- institute. According to this survey, ical) antisemitism were shared by 7% of informants held a “strongly 17% of respondents in 1992, 27% negative” opinion about contempo- in 2002 and 20% in 2012. Accord- rary Israel, and 42% held a “rather ing to Krzemiński, there is a strong negative” opinion. At the other end correlation between a high level of of the spectrum, 4% held a “strong- religious practice and both types of ly positive” opinion about Israel, and antisemitism in certain sectors of 47% held a “rather positive” opinion. Polish society.4 According to the research, antise- Yet another picture is presented by mitic views are frequently correlat- the Polish Prejudice Survey, which ed with anti-Israel opinions. In other was conducted by Warsaw Univer- words, those who hold antisemitic sity’s Faculty of Psychology in 2013. views are inclined to express nega- 6 The authors of this survey note a re- tive opinions about Israel. vival in both traditional and modern According to the results of the An- forms of antisemitism. For example, ti-Defamation League’s 2015 global 22% of those surveyed answered survey, Poland’s antisemitism index “yes” to the question “Are contem- (the percentage of adults in the coun- porary Jews to blame for the death try who answered “probably true” in of Christ?” In the same poll, a record response to a majority of the antise- 67% of respondents confirmed their mitic stereotypes presented to them) belief in the statement: “The Jews was estimated at 45%.7 The percent- are trying to impose their influence age of those answering “probably in the world”, while 44% agreed true” in response to specific stereo-

4 Ireneusz Krzeminski, “Dmowski i antysemityzm narodowo-katolicki,” Nigdy Więcej, no. 22 (2016): 93-98. 5 Paweł Wronski, “Coraz wiecej Polakow wierzy, że Żydzi porywali dzieci,” , January 18, 2014. 6 Dominika Bulska and Mikolaj Winiewski, Postawy antyizraelskie a antysemityzm w Polsce. Raport na podstawie Polskiego Sondażu Uprzedzeń (Warsaw: Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami, 2013). 7 See http://global100.adl.org/#country/poland/2014 (accessed January 15, 2017).

85 typical statements was as follows: In conclusion, it seems clear that, – “Jews are more loyal to Israel although the results of the various than to [this country/the coun- sociological surveys differ signifi- tries they live in]” – 57% cantly, they illustrate the presence of antisemitic attitudes in Poland – “Jews have too much power in despite the very small size of the the business world” – 57% Jewish community. – “Jews have too much power in international financial markets” Legislative background – 55% – “Jews still talk too much about On the subject of antisemitism (and what happened to them in the other forms of incitement), the Pol- Holocaust” – 62% ish legislative framework is similar to that of most European countries. – “Jews don’t care what happens Article 13 of the Polish Constitution to anyone but their own kind” – states that political parties and oth- 45% er organizations whose programmes – “Jews have too much control are based upon totalitarian meth- over global affairs” – 42% ods and the modes of activity of na- zism, fascism and communism, as – “Jews have too much control well as those whose programmes or over the United States govern- activities sanction racial or national ment” – 30% hatred, shall be prohibited. Article – “Jews think they are better than 35 gives national and ethnic minori- other people” – 39% ties the right to establish educa- – “Jews have too much control tional and cultural institutions and over the global media” – 35% institutions designed to protect re- ligious identity. Article 32 prohibits – “Jews are responsible for most discrimination for any reason. Un- of the world’s wars” – 16% der Article 196 of the Polish Penal – “People hate Jews because of Code, anyone found guilty of inten- the way Jews behave” – 33% tionally offending religious feelings by profaning an object or place of

86 worship is liable to a fine, a restric- has often been noted, such as Po- tion of liberty or imprisonment for land’s failure to ratify the Council of a maximum of two years. Under Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime Article 256, anyone found guilty of and its Additional Protocol concern- promoting a fascist or other totali- ing the criminalization of acts of a tarian system of state or of inciting racist and xenophobic nature com- hatred based on national, ethnic, mitted through computer systems racial or religious differences, or for until 2015 despite signing them reason of the lack of any religious in 2003, and even then only after denomination, is liable to a fine, a years of campaigning and lobbying restriction of liberty or imprison- by the “Never Again” association. To ment for a maximum of two years. date, the implementation of legal Under Article 257, anyone found norms regarding online hate speech guilty of publicly insulting a group has been particularly lax. or a particular person because of their national, ethnic, racial or re- ligious affiliation, or because of the Governmental relations lack of any religious denomination, with Israel is liable to a fine, a restriction of liberty or imprisonment for a maxi- Diplomatic relations between Poland mum of three years. and Israel were severed in 1967 and Although these legal provisions officially restored in 1990. Since generally seem sufficient, over the then, cooperation at state level has years representatives of minority progressed in the political, econom- communities (including the Jewish ic and military fields. For example, community) and civil society groups bilateral intergovernmental consul- have pointed to a discrepancy be- tations involving several ministers tween the letter of the law and the from both countries took place in Is- everyday practices of various insti- rael in November 2016. In 2007, the tutions. This discrepancy has result- then Israeli ambassador to Poland, ed in the inadequate implementa- David Peleg, was outspoken in his tion of the legal provisions against condemnation of the antisemitism hate speech. A lack of political will promoted by Radio Maryja, calling

87 on the Catholic church and the Pol- Some of these models are similar to ish state institutions to intervene.8 the models of antisemitic discourse and activity in other countries, while others are specific to Poland. II. ANTISEMITISM: ACTORS AND MANIFESTATIONS Political parties, civic associations Actors and other groups

Method of selection Kukiz’15 Poland is a large country with a population of about 38 million and, Kukiz’15 is a populist political move- traditionally, a plethora of political ment created and led by Pawel Kukiz, groups of all shades. The nationalist a former rock singer, who became a and antisemitic groups, in particular, politician in 2015. In May 2015, Kukiz have a tendency to split and multi- ran for the Polish presidency as an ply, and antisemitism is rife within independent candidate and came some sectors of Polish society and third with more than three million politics, especially on the Far Right. votes (20.8%). In the parliamentary It is therefore impossible to provide elections of October 2015, Kukiz’15 an exhaustive list of the many ac- received more than 1.3 million votes tors that engage in some form of (8.8% of the national vote) and won antisemitism in Poland. As a result, forty-two seats in the Polish parlia- the following selection is somewhat ment. Since the elections, however, arbitrary, but we have tried to in- six MPs have left the movement. clude several actors that are sig- Kukiz’15 is composed of several nificant on account of their social sub-groups, including the far-right and political influence and/or their nationalist “Endecja” association, tendency to represent characteristic, which was established in May 2016 and often long-standing, models of and lays claim to the heritage of antisemitic discourse and activity. the historic Endek movement. The

8 Paweł Smolenski, “Imperium antysemityzmu,” Gazeta Wyborcza, August 30, 2007.

88 Endecja group within Kukiz’15 con- Communities in Poland claimed that sists of seven MPs. Since its cre- Kukiz’s remark was antisemitic and ation in 2015, Kukiz’15 has been demanded a firm response from moving in a radical right direction. President and Prime It has launched a major “Stop ref- Minister Beata Szydło, which did not ugees!” campaign and has collect- materialize. The head of the Union ed signatures in support of a Hun- of Jewish Religious Communities, garian-style referendum on closing Lesław Piszewski, noted that Kukiz’s Poland’s borders to refugees. The comments set a worrying precedent: campaign employs strong anti-mi- “For the first time since [Poland’s] grant and Islamophobic rhetoric. democratic elections in 1989, a pol- The Kukiz movement has tried to es- itician in parliament, who has run tablish itself as the main right-wing for the presidency, has used such populist opposition to the current obvious antisemitic rhetoric.”9 conservative-nationalist govern- ment of the (PiS) party. However, it has supported the National-Radical Camp PiS in several key votes aimed at The National-Radical Camp (Oboz dismantling the liberal-democratic Narodowo-Radykalny or ONR) is the constitutional order. At the same contemporary incarnation of the time, it has viciously attacked the fascist ONR originally established liberal and left-wing opposition. For in 1934. The modern-day ONR was example, in a December 2015 radio created as a predominantly skinhead broadcast, Pawel Kukiz alleged that youth group in the early 2000s. Its the mass demonstrations in defence extremist symbolism came complete of democracy were “sponsored from with uniforms and fascist salutes. the pocket of a Jewish banker”. He In 2009, the regional court in Opole later explained that this offensive banned the ONR association in comment was aimed at George So- Brzeg for promoting fascism. Nev- ros. The Union of Jewish Religious ertheless, the ONR has continued

9 “Jewish Community Accuses Prominent Polish Politician of Anti-Semitism,” Radio Poland, Decem- ber 22, 2015, http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/234028,Jewish-community-accuses-prominent-Pol- ish-politician-of-antiSemitism (accessed January 15, 2017).

89 its activities and today comprises a the sentence, complaining it was national network of branches that too harsh.10 On 16 April 2016, ONR enjoys considerable support within a members marched through the certain section of Poland’s younger city centre of Bialystok, which was generation. In recent years, the ONR a multicultural and predominantly has been particularly active in or- Jewish town until the Holocaust and ganizing street marches in various has experienced numerous neo-Nazi Polish cities, often in cooperation incidents in recent years. The dem- with the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież onstrators chanted “Zionists will Wszechpolska or MW). For example, be hanging from the trees instead on 18 November 2015, members of of leaves”, as well as other radical the ONR and the MW held a racist nationalist and xenophobic slogans. demonstration against refugees in Polish priest Jacek Międlar, who is Poland in front of Wroclaw City Hall. known for his support of far-right At the end of the demonstration, nationalist movements, held a holy Piotr Rybak (a former collaborator mass for the ONR members and of Paweł Kukiz) burnt an effigy of addressed them with the following a Jew that was decorated with a words: “The oppressors, together skullcap, sidelocks and an EU flag. with the dazed, passive Jewish mob, To the applause of the event’s oth- will try to bring you down to your er participants, Rybak shouted: “I’m knees, drag you around, grind you not going to be told by any German, down and spit you out because you Jew or American that Islam has any are an inconvenience.” He also called good intentions towards Christian- for “zero tolerance for the Jewish ity.” The police did not intervene, cowardice.” An investigation was but the Prosecutor’s Office received launched into the abovementioned a crime report from the mayor of events, but the public prosecutor did Wrocław, Rafał Dutkiewicz, among not bring any charges. others. In November 2016, Ry- bak was sentenced to ten months in prison. In December 2016, the public prosecutor appealed against

10 Description of the incident from “Never Again” association sources.

90 All-Polish Youth The language cannot be a The All-Polish Youth (Młodzież decisive argument that de- Wszechpolska or MW) movement termines the national char- was recreated in 1989 and con- acter of a literature and the tinues the tradition of the antise- aspirations of Jewish writers mitic youth organization of the do not determine it either. same name that was active in the Their psyche determines it, 1920s and 1930s. It is appropriate and it reveals the Jewish to remember that the MW, like the character of the literature ONR, was responsible for numer- they produce. The Jewish ous attacks on Jewish students in psyche is crippled, sick, de- 11 the interwar period. In 1998, Grze- generate and abnormal. gorz Sielatycki, a leading member Since 2010, the MW, together with of the MW in Gdansk in the 1990s the ONR, has organized an annual and 2000s, wrote as follows in the Independence Day march in Warsaw pages of the movement’s magazine on 11 November. It has arguably Walka (The Struggle): become the largest far-right gath- The pollution of our own ering in contemporary Europe, if not culture by alien elements is the world. According to estimates, dangerous. Why do they in- it attracted between 50,000 and clude Jewish authors such as 100,000 participants in 2016. The Julian Tuwim, Bruno Schulz, bulk of the marchers are mobilized Bolesław Lesmian, Tadeusz by formal and informal football fan Peiper, Roman Brandstaet- networks (Polish football fan culture ter, Andrzej Szczypiorski or has been largely hijacked by far- many others under the la- right nationalists). In recent years, bel of Polish culture in Pol- the gathering has attracted grow- ish textbooks? Why do they ing interest from foreign extrem- consider Jewish literature in ists. Numerous representatives of the Polish language as ours? the Hungarian extreme-right Job- bik party are highly visible on the

11 Quoted in Rafal Pankowski, The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots (London: Routledge, 2010), 116.

91 streets of Warsaw every year. They liament after cooperating with the are joined by extreme-right delega- Kukiz’15 movement. As a result of tions from other countries, includ- subsequent disagreements, the ma- ing Slovakia, , France, Spain, jority of them left the RN and joined Croatia and many others. One of the newly founded “Endecja” associ- the keynote speeches in 2016 was ation in 2016. As of January 2017, delivered by Roberto Fiore, the con- party leader Robert Winnicki (a for- victed terrorist and leader of the mer chairman of the MW) is the only neo-fascist Forza Nuova. In 2015, remaining MP representing the RN. the official slogan of the march was The RN is closely allied with Jobbik “Poland for the Poles, the Poles for and other foreign extreme-right Poland.” As it happens, “Poland for groups. For example, on 10 Novem- the Poles” was the main antisemitic ber 2016, Winnicki hosted leaders slogan of the interwar period. During of Our Slovakia (Milan Mazurek) and the march, several far-right extrem- Forza Nuova (Roberto Fiore) in the ists interrupted a news report being Polish parliament. On 21 July 2016, filmed by Polsat News, with one of he made a speech in parliament them shouting “F*** the Jews” to protesting against “the history pol- the camera. In 2016, chants such as icy ordered by Jewish groups with “Hit the Jewish scum with the ham- claims on Poland”. His speech was mer and the sickle” were heard at interrupted several times by cheers the march, alongside anti-migrant, of support from members of the anti-Muslim and other xenophobic ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party. slogans.

National Movement National Rebirth of Poland The National Movement (Ruch National Rebirth of Poland (Naro- Narodowy or RN) is a far-right po- dowe Odrodzenie Polski or NOP) is litical party born out of the cooper- the radical neo-fascist party asso- ation between MW and ONR activ- ciated with the International Third ists in 2014. In October 2015, ten Position and the European National members and sympathizers of the Front. The NOP’s annual Indepen- RN were elected to the Polish par- dence Day march in Wroclaw at-

92 tracts between 5,000 and 10,000 The Israeli government and participants, including fans of the other organizations involved Slask Wroclaw football club, led by in the Holocaust industry Roman Zielinski (author of the no- are hoping to cadge another torious book How I Fell in Love with 65 million dollars from us. … Adolf Hitler). It is also particularly The Foreign Office, dominat- active among the Polish commu- ed by the team put together nity in the United Kingdom, where by the late Bronisław Ge- it cooperates with the neo-Nazi remek, is continuing to use National Action. For example, on 4 Communist tactics against July 2014, the NOP England Divi- Polish emigrants; it prevents sion participated in an anti-Jewish any attempts at founding a rally in Whitehall, London. The NOP Polish lobby in the countries is renowned for its open endorse- of settlement. It is, in terms ment of Holocaust denial since the of national interest, simply late 1990s, including the active pro- unbelievable!12 motion of David Irving’s writings. Encouraged by TV Trwam presenter It is also particularly outspoken in Robert Knap, Michalkiewicz elabo- its violently hostile attitude towards rated: “In terms of the interests of Israel and often uses the slogan this particular , which “Bombs against Israel now!” makes its presence in the Foreign Office visible – I’m talking about the Jewish lobby – it is understandable, Stanislaw Michalkiewicz in particular in the case of a con- Stanislaw Michalkiewicz is a regular flict of interest between the Pol- commentator on Radio Maryja and ish and Jewish nations.” The same TV Trwam who is notorious for his programme was broadcast on Ra- vicious antisemitism. For example, dio Maryja on 22 April 2013. On 5 in a TV Trwam broadcast on 20 October 2016, Michalkiewicz read April 2013, Michalkiewicz made the one of his columns on air, stating: following antisemitic statement: “The Jewish circles in Poland are

12 Transcripts and recordings in the archive of the ‘NEVER AGAIN’ Association.

93 tasked with providing the Europe- sold in mainstream distribution out- an Commission with as much proof lets and focus on lists of real and as possible that democracy and the alleged Jews who are active in Pol- rule of law in our unhappy country ish political and cultural life. Bubel’s is threatened by the fascist regime.” fake lists are a good example of the On 20 October 2016, he said: “Today phenomenon known as the “Juda- the mischievous Jews understand ization of the opponent” in Polish what it is about and they have public life. transformed themselves into liber- als.” On 23 November 2016, Radio Maryja aired Michalkiewicz’s weekly Grzegorz Braun broadcast, in which he alleged that Grzegorz Braun is a documentary “the Jewish lobby in Poland demon- film maker and far-right activist. In strates its racial solidarity with the 2015, he ran for the Polish presi- Ukrainian oligarchs.” In December dency on an openly antisemitic and 2016, Michalkiewicz toured Polish anti-democratic (monarchist) plat- churches and cultural centres in the form, polling less than 1% of the United States, delivering lectures vote. During the electoral campaign, based on his anti-Jewish conspiracy Braun warned against Poland be- theories. coming “a German-Russian con- dominium under Jewish manage- ment”. In September 2016, he was Leszek Bubel shortlisted as one of the top three Leszek Bubel is a publisher of rabid- candidates for the post of chair- ly antisemitic publications and was man of Polish state television by a member of parliament for the Pol- the PiS-dominated National Media ish Party of Beer Lovers in the early Council, although the job eventually 1990s. In the early 2000s, he was went to former PiS MP Jacek Kurski. involved with the populist Self-De- fence (Samoobrona) movement and eventually founded his own Polish (Polska Partia Naro- dowa or PPN). His publications are

94 Media TV Trwam and

Radio Maryja TV Trwam and Nasz Dziennik are Radio Maryja, the nationalist-Cath- Radio Maryja’s associated media olic radio station run by the Re- outlets, comprising a TV channel demptorist Order, has been the and a daily newspaper that follow single most powerful disseminator the same editorial line. The net- of antisemitic rhetoric for the past work of organizations around Radio twenty-five years, as documented Maryja reportedly received approx- in numerous reports by the “Never imately $7.5 million in Polish state Again” association, the Anti-Defa- funds in 2016. mation League, the Council of Eu- rope and other organizations. Ac- cording to the US State Department Gazeta Warszawska report on global antisemitism that Gazeta Warszawska goes by the was delivered to Congress in 2008: same name as an historical ul- “Radio Maryja is one of Europe’s tra-conservative and antisemit- most blatantly anti-Semitic media ic newspaper that dates back to venues.” Radio Maryja’s founder, 1774. Today, it is a radical national- Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, routinely ist weekly newspaper, published by refers to Polish state television as Polish-American businessman Piotr “TELAVision”, suggesting that it is Bachurski, that follows a particular- dominated by Jews. During a reli- ly hostile anti-Jewish line. For exam- gious ceremony broadcast on Radio ple, in August 2016, in a long article Maryja on 3 September 2016, Father devoted to the recent visit of an An- Rydzyk reprimanded the faithful ti-Defamation League delegation to for their misbehaviour, exclaiming: Poland, it alleged that “the ADL in “This is not a synagogue!” America stands for total destruc- tion: decriminalization of sodomy and abortion and the promotion of racial diversity.” It also warned that “the idea of basing Polish security on an alliance with American Jews

95 is an illusion because they won’t his academic post. Upon his death care for Polish interests if Putin due to alcohol poisoning in 2010, he guarantees Israel’s interests in the again became an icon of the radical Middle East.”13 wing of the Polish Far Right. In a more general sense, debates Manifestations about collective (national) memory of modern antisemitism and identity in the context of World War II have often led to a radical Secondary antisemitism: polarization of views and have been Holocaust denial, relativization used as a platform for the pro- and trivialization motion of antisemitic stereotypes. Outright Holocaust denial is rare in Ireneusz Krzeminski points to two Poland, not least because the Nazi frequently competing national nar- Holocaust took place on Polish terri- ratives (Polish and Jewish), both tory. Nevertheless, Holocaust denial claiming supreme martyrdom or appeared on the right-wing extrem- vying with each other in terms of ist scene in the 1990s. In 1999, a their degree of suffering. The field court in Opole declared that Dr Dar- of history and national memory is iusz Ratajczak, a researcher at the arguably the main area in which University of Opole, had infringed the antisemitic stereotypes are em- law against Holocaust denial in his ployed in the contemporary Polish book Dangerous Topics but that the public discourse. crime was socially harmless. Leszek In this context, the denial of Pol- Bubel issued a paperback edition of ish responsibility for the 1941 Jed- the book, which was widely distrib- wabne pogrom is part of a recur- uted by the state-owned company ring phenomenon. For example, in Ruch. Ratajczak and two other his- a television interview in July 2016, torians defended Holocaust denial in Polish education minister Anna Za- a Radio Maryja broadcast in Janu- lewska claimed that “Jedwabne is a ary 2000, after which the University historical fact that has led to many of Opole dismissed Ratajczak from misunderstandings and very biased

13 Krzysztof Balinski, “I ty zostaniesz antysemitą,” Gazeta Warszawska, August 28, 2016.

96 opinions.” The journalist responded can-Hungarian millionaire George by saying: “Poles burned Jews in Soros is frequently identified as a a barn.” “That’s your opinion,” re- central figure in the international torted Zalewska, adding that Jan conspiracy against the Polish na- Gross’s award-winning book on the tionalist right, despite the fact that Jedwabne pogrom was “full of lies”. Soros’s involvement in Polish affairs On the subject of the 1946 Kielce through the Stefan Batory Founda- pogrom, she claimed that the per- tion, which he established in 1987, petrators “were not quite Polish”.14 has decreased significantly over the In addition, two government minis- past decade. Tellingly, Piotr Rybak, ters publicly alluded to the conspir- who set the aforementioned effigy acy theories espoused in the Proto- of an Orthodox Jew on fire in Wro- cols of the Elders of Zion and, when claw in November 2015, explained challenged about it by the national his actions as being directed against and international media, stopped Soros. The effigy was said to repre- short of condemning the infamous sent Soros as the author of a secret document as an antisemitic forg- plan to bring Muslim refugees into ery.15 Europe. On a more general level, this incident can be interpreted as showing that antisemitism remains Conspiratorial antisemitism the paradigmatic form of xenopho- bia in Poland. The Jew is a common Conspiracy theories about Jewish and deeply rooted symbol of “the influence occasionally surface in the Other” in Polish culture, and hence Polish public discourse. Radio Mary- even anti-Muslim demonstrations ja’s Stanislaw Michalkiewicz (see end up being accompanied by an- above) is arguably the most prolif- ti-Jewish symbolism. ic author of such theories. Ameri- In a similar vein, an alleged conspir-

14 Vanessa Gera, “Polish Official Criticized over Jewish Massacre Remarks,” AP News, July 14, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0343e3d10bad435e8ce24d5f9e69c974/polish-official-criticized-over-jew- ish-massacre-remarks (accessed January 15, 2017). 15 Don Snyder, “Two Polish Right-Wing Ministers Blasted over ‘Protocols’,” Forward, November 17, 2015, http://forward.com/news/breaking-news/324904/2-polish-right-wing-ministers-blasted-over- protocols (accessed 30 May 2017).

97 acy against the Polish political right anti-Zionist magazine Inny Świ- was attributed to former Foreign at), but unlike the Far Right they Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and, in have little or no influence on Polish particular, his US-born wife Anne public opinion. A violently anti-Is- Applebaum. Applebaum, a Pulitzer rael discourse is clearly present in Prize-winning journalist who writes the activities of antisemitic groups for The Washington Post and other such as the NOP (see above), but it media, has been accused of “inspir- appears to accompany more estab- ing” numerous articles critical of the lished forms of antisemitism rather post-2015 political climate in Poland than occupying centre stage in their that appeared in the international discursive strategy. Some leaders media. of the Polish nationalist right ac- tually claim to support Israel out of hostility towards Islam and the New antisemitism , while retaining their Various factors, including the “rich- anti-Jewish attitudes in the field of ness” of the antisemitic discourse domestic policy and national histo- in Poland from the late nineteenth ry. In this context, a former PiS MP century onwards and a lack of in- and leading member of the Nation- terest in events in the Middle East, alist Movement (RN), Artur Zawisza, have meant that Poland’s home- has publicly described himself as a grown antisemites tend not to focus “pro-Israel antisemite”.16 on Israel’s occupation of Palestine In September 2016, Radio Maryja’s or other related themes character- Tadeusz Rydzyk was received as a istic of the new antisemitism that guest by the Israeli ambassador to has swept the Western world. A Poland, Anna Azari. In response to few small radical left and anarchist this highly publicized meeting, the groups are preoccupied with the Israeli embassy received an open Palestinian question and share a letter of protest written by sever- radically anti-Israel position (which al highly respected figures in the is expressed in the low-circulation Polish Jewish community, including

16 Konrad Rękas, “Pro-izraelscy antysemici?” Portal Myśli Konserwatywnej, July 21, 2012, http:// konserwatyzm.pl/artykul/4861/pro-izraelscy-antysemici (accessed 15 January 2017).

98 Konstanty Gebert, Stanislaw Kra- MPs. During the Israeli intervention jewski and Joanna Sobolewska-Pyz. in the -controlled Gaza Strip Nevertheless, contacts between the in 2010, Szczypińska led a group Israeli embassy and Radio Maryja of Polish MPs who flew to Gaza to continued, and embassy represen- support the Palestinian resistance tatives attended ceremonies orga- in defiance of the Israeli military nized by Father Rydzyk. Another blockade. According to media re- meeting took place on 26 November ports, she and her colleagues were 2016 in the form of a Shabbat din- subsequently detained by the Israeli ner attended by Father Rydzyk, Am- border police on their way back to bassador Azari, Director of the Zion- Poland from Ramallah later that ist Organization of America Morton year. Szczypińska complained of Kleinand and Deputy Speaker of the mistreatment and stated in an in- Knesset Yehiel Bar. Despite these terview: “Now I know how the Pal- meetings, Radio Maryja continues estinians are feeling.”18 In 2014, she to broadcast antisemitic views.17 wrote to a pro-Israel right-wing Broadly speaking, the position of journalist, saying: “I feel sorry for the PiS in international affairs has you because it must be difficult to been pro-Israel. Nevertheless, some defend the crimes committed by the high-profile members of the party Israeli army in that occupied land 19 have expressed pro-Palestinian and for so many years.” anti-Israel views. For example, well- Since the mid-1990s, the “Never known PiS MP Jolanta Szczypińska Again” association has document- has for years headed the cross-par- ed antisemitic and other xenopho- ty Polish-Palestinian Parliamentary bic incidents taking place in Poland. Group, which is dominated by PiS What follows is a selection of re-

17 Donald Snyder, “European Jews Alarmed by Israeli Outreach to Anti-Semitic Far Right,” Forward, January 18, 2017, http://forward.com/news/world/360436/european-jews-alarmed-by-israeli-out- reach-to-anti-semitic-far-right (accessed February 17, 2017). 18 “Szczypińska o zatrzymaniu w Izraelu: to oczywiste szykany,” TVN 24, March 26, 2016, http://www. tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/szczypinska-o-zatrzymaniu-w-izraelu-to-oczywiste-szykany,129760. html (accessed January 15, 2017). 19 Kamil Sikora, “Prawicowa kłótnia o Strefę Gazy. Janecki do Szczypińskiej: W przeciwieństwie do pani nie kupuję propagandy,” na:Temat, n.d., http://natemat.pl/110589,prawicowa-klotnia-o-strefe-ga- zy-janecki-do-szczypinskiej-w-przeciwienstwie-do-pani-nie-kupuje-propagandy (accessed January 15, 2017).

99 cent incidents involving Israeli cit- national stepped outside the shop- izens or relating to the theme of ping centre, he was approached by new antisemitism in other ways. It a man who grabbed his skullcap is important to point out that the and threw it into a rubbish bin. following cases do not include other The victim reported the incident antisemitic incidents such as ceme- to the police. Officers subsequently tery desecrations, neo-Nazi graffiti launched an investigation regarding and so forth. the public insult of another person In September 2011, a gigantic ban- on religious grounds. ner with the words “Jihad Legia” On 29 November 2013, unknown was displayed in the Legia Warsaw perpetrators painted antisemit- football stadium during a Europa ic slogans and symbols, including League game between Legia War- “F*** Israel” and the Star of Da- saw and the Israeli football club Ha- vid embedded in a vulgar image, poel Tel-Aviv. around the platform area of one On 13 August 2013, while driving of Warsaw’s railway stations. The his car in the town of , Piotr incident was reported to the PKP P. shouted “Poland for Poles” and Polish Railways and the graffiti was made offensive gestures towards a removed. few dozen Israeli tourists. His be- In July 2014, Bistro Tel-Aviv in War- haviour was reported to the police saw city centre was covered with by the tour group’s security staff, graffiti proclaiming “Zionism is rac- and he was subsequently detained ism”, “Boycott Israel” and “Free Pal- by the police. The Prosecutor’s Office estine”. Similar graffiti appeared on in Białystok charged him with pub- the same bistro in March 2016. licly insulting a group of individuals On 14 July 2014, supporters of the on the grounds of their nationality NOP held an antisemitic rally out- and religion. side the Israeli embassy in Warsaw On 18 August 2013, an antisemitic using the slogan “Time to bomb incident occurred in front of War- Israel!” During the demonstration, saw’s main shopping centre, the the nationalists handed out leaflets Golden Terraces. When an Israeli containing the following call: “Our

100 political efforts must be aimed not On 2 February 2015, the Dia- only at the ‘ceasefire’ or isolation log-Pheniben Foundation filed a re- of this quasi-nation at the interna- port with the Warsaw district prose- tional level, but also at its complete cutor’s office concerning a suspected abolishment.” unlawful act against Jews commit- On 27 January 2015, the seventieth ted by a far-right activist who wrote anniversary of the liberation of Aus- a blog post accusing Jews of “de- chwitz-Birkenau, during a ceremony stroying the American and European commemorating International Holo- economies, causing the world crisis caust Remembrance Day on Stawna and striving towards eradication of Street in Poznan, near the offices the Polish nation”. He also labelled of the Union of Jewish Religious Jews “Zionist scum”, “Zionist crea- Communities in Poland, members tures”, “Zionist bandits”, “Zionist of the Poznan Patriotic Union orga- thugs” and “Jewish media thugs”. nized an antisemitic demonstration On 27 March 2015, the district pros- called “Let’s defend Poland lest it ecutor’s office refused to launch an becomes another Palestine”. The or- investigation. ganization’s leader, Bogdan Freytag, In late February 2015, an Israeli stated as follows: “There is a simi- journalist notified the police of an- larity between the circumstances of tisemitic graffiti on the city’s build- Poles and Palestinians. … Palestin- ings, including: “Jews to the furnace” ians are consistently murdered [by and “Anti-Jude”. The police refused Jews], while Poles are being dena- to investigate the case. tionalized and exterminated.” Par- On 12 January 2017, NOP mem- ticipants brandished a banner with bers confronted a small pro-Israel a swastika and a Star of David with demonstration in Warsaw, chanting an equals sign between them, and anti-Israel and pro-Hezbollah slo- another banner bearing the racist gans. symbol of the Celtic cross. The po- lice intervened, and four men were apprehended. They were subse- quently charged with inciting hatred on religious grounds.

101 III. CONCLUSIONS sufficient to offset the persistence of antisemitic discourse in domestic contexts. Compared to traditional It appears that antisemitism is still and modern forms of antisemitism, a significant feature of public life in new antisemitism (directed primarily Poland, despite the very small size of against Israel) does not take centre the contemporary Polish Jewish com- stage but forms part of a broader munity. Antisemitism is a popular repertoire of antisemitic and xeno- and deeply rooted way of expressing phobic sentiments. These sentiments hostility towards any type of other- have been endorsed, in particular, ness or social diversity. Anti-Zionist by a broad spectrum of far-right slogans were first employed by the groups. The number of antisemitic Communist authorities in the late and xenophobic manifestations has 1960s, resulting in a large wave of risen in recent years, especially since Jewish emigration from Poland. To- the start of the European refugee day, anti-Israel themes are not cen- crisis in 2015. These two trends are tral to the antisemitic discourse but perfectly illustrated by the afore- still form a part of the discursive mentioned anti-refugee demonstra- repertoire of extremist groups. In this tion in Wroclaw in November 2015, context, the growing popularity of which culminated in the burning of radical nationalist movements such an effigy of a Jew. Together with the as the ONR must be viewed with par- “older” forms of antisemitism, new ticular concern. The delegitimization antisemitism thus poses a serious of Israel and the revival of antisemit- threat as part of an even larger so- ic conspiracy theories are both the cial and political trend. result of a general rise in xenophobic attitudes in Polish society, especially among the young. These develop- ments have been accompanied and amplified by a sharp rise in antise- mitic and xenophobic comments on social media. Clearly, official support for Israel at international level is not

102 References • Gebert, K. Living in the Land of Ashes. Kraków: Austeria Publishing House, 2008. • Gross, J.T. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. • Gross, J.T. Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. New York: Random House, 2006. • Gross, J.T. and Irena Grudzińska-Gross. Golden Harvest. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. • Pankowski, R. The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots. London: Routledge, 2010.

103 104 06 SLOVAKIA Grigorij Mesežnikov

105 I. BACKGROUND by declaring and implementing the principles of equality, democracy, tolerance and freedom of religion. Jewish population and community Prior to World War II, some 88.000 Jews inhabited the territory of Slo- The first mention of Jews living in vakia.1 Between 1942 and 1944, the territory of what is now known the pro-Nazi regime of the Slovak as Slovakia dates back to the first state deported as many as 72,000 century, while the first Jewish com- Jews to death camps in Poland.2 As munity in the place that is current- a result of the Holocaust and two ly called Bratislava was founded in waves of Jewish emigration during the thirteenth century. The Jewish the Communist regime (in 1948 and population spread throughout this 1968), the Jewish population of Slo- part of as a result vakia was dramatically reduced and of migratory movements in the sev- currently constitutes less than 0.1% enteenth and eighteenth centuries. of the country’s total population. The social status of the Jewish peo- ple improved as a result of the Edict The democratic transition that be- of Tolerance, issued by Emperor Jo- gan in 1989 created positive con- seph II. This document abolished the ditions for Jews and Jewish social, special individual taxation of Jews, cultural and religious life in Slova- as well as their obligation to wear kia. At the same time, democratiza- a distinct . Jews were tion gave rise to activities by polit- also allowed to attend universi- ical forces with different ideological ty and pursue various professions, orientations, including nationalist and restrictions were lifted on their forces whose stance is character- business activities. The first Czecho- ized by antisemitism, anti-Zionism slovak Republic, which existed from and anti-Israel rhetoric. 1918 to 1939, created favourable According to a census conducted in conditions for the country’s Jews 2011, a total of 1,999 Slovak citizens

1 Eduard Nižňansky, “Slováci a Židia – vzťah slovenskej majority a židovskej minority počas vojny,” in Park ušľachtilých duší, ed. Miloš Žiak and Ladislav Snopko (Bratislava: Izraelská obchodná komora na Slovensku, 2007), 72, 74. 2 Ibid.

106 declared themselves to be members though a majority of people of Jew- of the Jewish faith, and 631 claimed ish origin are registered members of to be of Jewish ethnicity. According religious communities, for many it is to other estimates, however, the an expression of their identification overall number of persons of Jewish with the Jewish community as such, origin in Slovakia, including those and with Jewish traditions and cul- who are not formally registered ture, rather than being indicative of members of a Jewish religious com- their status as believers. The level of munity, is around 4,000. The Central assimilation is also quite high, with Union (Federation) of Jewish Reli- few being able to speak Yiddish or gious Communities includes twelve Hebrew. communities with approximately 1,500 registered members. Regis- tered Jewish religious communities Historical context are located in Bratislava, Trenčín, of modern antisemitism Dunajská Streda, Nové Zámky, From 1939 to 1945, the pro-Nazi Žilina, Galanta, Komárno, Rimavská regime of , president of Sobota, Košice, Prešov, Nitra and the puppet Slovak state and leader Banská Bystrica. The community in of the clerical-fascist Hlinka’s Slovak the capital city of Bratislava com- People’s Party (Hlinkova slovenská prises approximately 600 members. ľudová strana or HSĽS), pursued a The social status of Jews living in discriminatory and repressive poli- Slovakia may regarded as relatively cy towards Jews, which led to the high today. Their presence in certain demise of the country’s Jewish pop- professional categories – namely ulation. In 1941, Tiso’s regime ap- those areas in which Jews have tra- proved the so-called Jewish Code, ditionally been active as educated legislation that deprived Jews of professionals (business, law, health- their basic rights. The regime also care, the economy, academia, high- organized the “Aryanization” (con- er education, culture, media and the fiscation) of Jewish property and the arts) – is evident. The level of sec- deportation of the country’s Jews to ularization among Slovakia’s Jews the Nazi death camps in Poland. may be defined as fairly high. Al-

107 Jozef Tiso was a Catholic priest who authentic cultural and religious life. actively supported the inclusion of Under Communism, the activities of the ideas of traditional Christian Jewish religious communities came antisemitism in the regime’s an- under strict state control. In the ti-Jewish practices and propagan- 1970s and 1980s, many persons da, specifically the idea of the Jews’ of Jewish origin in Czechoslova- collective guilt for rejecting Jesus kia were engaged in the dissident Christ as the Messiah and bringing movement, a fact which the Com- about his crucifixion. Tiso publicly munist regime used to strength- characterized the Jews as historical en its antisemitic (“anti-Zionist”) enemies of Slovaks and Christians propaganda targeting the Jewish and encouraged the population to population. In 1948, Czechoslovakia get rid of them. He thus made am- recognized Israel and established ple use of religiously motivated an- diplomatic relations with the Jew- ti-Jewish rhetoric. ish state. However, from the early After the establishment of the Com- 1950s onwards, bilateral relations munist regime in Czechoslovakia in were complicated by the pro-Soviet 1948, those Jews who survived the line in foreign policy (including Mid- Holocaust in Slovakia not only came dle East affairs) and antisemitic ex- under the pressure of totalitarian cesses in Czechoslovakia’s domestic practices, as did all other citizens, political developments, such as the but also fell victim to antisemit- infamous trials of alleged “Zionist ic government policies. The small agents” (i.e. Jews) in the leadership minority of Jews who engaged in of the Communist party. In 1967, politics within the Communist party after Israel’s victory over the Arab after the war were subjected to per- states in the Six-Day War, diplomat- secution and internal party purg- ic relations between Czechoslovakia es in the framework of the fight and Israel were interrupted due to against “bourgeois nationalism” pressure from the Soviet Union. In and “Zionism”, with the vast ma- 1975, Czechoslovakia supported UN jority of the dramatically reduced Resolution no. 3379, which defined Jewish population being deprived Zionism as a form of racism and ra- of the opportunity to cultivate an cial discrimination. From 1967 until

108 1989, the state policy of Czechoslo- revealed the persistence of certain vakia’s Communist regime towards stereotypes concerning Jews and Jews was influenced by “anti-Zion- their role in Slovak society and the ist” propaganda and an anti-Israel world. In July 2013, in cooperation line in foreign policy and was there- with the Political Capital Institute fore either openly or covertly antise- in Budapest, the Institute for Public mitic. Following the USSR’s invasion Affairs (IVO) conducted an opinion in August 1968, and throughout poll that revealed various stereo- the period of occupation, anti-Jew- typical views among respondents, ish tones were evident in the ruling such as the perception that Jews pro-Soviet Czechoslovak Communist are too powerful and form an in- elite’s condemnation of the Prague fluential community that is mainly Spring of 1968 and its leaders. preoccupied with its own interests and tries to dominate other nations. This reveals the persistence of deep- Opinion polls on antisemitism ly rooted negative attitudes not only The results of public opinion polls towards Jews but also towards the conducted in Slovakia in the 1990s Jewish state, its right to exist, its and 2000s indicated that the de- policies towards other states and its gree of social distance towards role in international politics, all of Jews had decreased.3 However, al- which create a broad backdrop for though many Slovaks had almost the existence of different and new no personal experience or interac- forms of antisemitism, particularly tion with the country’s diminutive within certain sections of the pop- Jewish population, the opinion polls ulation.4 Opinion polls indicate that Israel does not belong to the cat-

3 In the 1990s, approximately one-fifth of respondents usually expressed their disapproval of Jews as neighbours. However, according to a representative opinion poll conducted in 2008 by the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO) in Bratislava, in collaboration with the Cabinet of Social and Biological Commu- nication of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, only 11% of respondents stated that they would not wish to have a Jewish family as neighbours. This was the lowest level of social distance reported in the entire survey. The figures for other ethnic or religious groups exceeded this level (e.g. Roma family – 69%, Muslim family – 32%, Asian family – 22%, Afro-Americans – 21%, immigrants/foreigners – 21%, Ukrainian family – 17%, Hungarian family – 16%). Source: IVO/KVSBK/COPART, May 2008. 4 Various social factors relating to anti-Jewish attitudes in Slovakia are analyzed in the following paper: Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti, “Hating Thy Imaginary Neighbor: An Analysis of Anti-Semi- tism in Slovakia,” Journal for the Study of Anti-Semitism 4, no. 2 (2012): 469-493.

109 egory of countries that are viewed denial) was considered a criminal sympathetically by the public in Slo- act. Since 2002, however, Holo- vakia. According to the Transatlan- caust denial has become a separate tic Trends survey conducted by the criminal offence. According to Sec- German Marshall Fund of the United tion 422(2) of the Penal Code (Act States in selected EU countries and no. 300/2005 Coll.), “imprisonment the United States in 2008, respon- from six months to three years shall dents in Slovakia gave Israel thir- be imposed on a person who pub- ty-two points on a sympathy scale licly denies, puts in doubt, approves of 0 to 100.5 or tries to justify the Holocaust”. In 2009, penalties for extremist crimes and hate speech became strict- Legislative background er. Under certain circumstances, a The Anti-Discrimination Act (Act Holocaust denier may now be im- no. 365/2004 Coll. on Equal Treat- prisoned for up to five years under ment in Certain Areas and Protec- Section 424a(2) of the Penal Code. tion against Discrimination) protects Slovak citizens belonging to various Governmental relations groups from any form of discrim- with Israel ination. Jews are protected under this law as members of a national, Diplomatic relations between ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious Czechoslovakia and Israel were re- group. Discrimination is explicitly newed in 1990 after the Velvet prohibited under Article I, Section Revolution and the collapse of the 2(2), of this Act. Since 2002, Holo- Communist regime, and in 1993 the caust denial has been considered a independent Slovak Republic estab- criminal and punishable act in Slo- lished diplomatic relations with the vakia. Prior to 2002, the act of sup- Jewish state. Slovak-Israeli bilateral porting and promoting fascism and relations have been balanced and hate speech (including Holocaust friendly since their renewal. Slova-

5 In comparison, India gained 33 points, China and both gained 35 points, the United States gained 50 points, Russia gained 52 points, Spain gained 57 points and the European Union gained 73 points. Palestine gained fewer points than Israel, namely 25. Source: German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends 2008 (Washington, DC).

110 kia generally abides by the line tak- II. ANTISEMITISM: en by the European Union in han- ACTORS AND MANIFESTATIONS dling Middle East affairs and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although it tends to avoid voting against Is- Actors rael at the United Nations and in Method of selection other international organizations. In In contemporary Slovakia, the most December 2016, for example, sev- common antisemitic narratives are enty-nine out of 150 Slovak mem- spread by right-wing extremist pol- bers of parliament signed an appeal iticians, activists and authors, as condemning the UNESCO resolution well as supporters of neo-fascist or denying the link between the Jewish neo-Nazi ideology. Another category people, the Temple Mount and the of actors includes those who hold Western Wall, calling on the Slovak “purely” anti-Israel views. Some of government to reject the resolution them combine anti-Israel rhetoric as well as any other similar initia- with anti-Zionism. Others adopting tives leading to the delegitimization a radical anti-Israel stance do not of the State of Israel and the dis- openly use anti-Zionist arguments, semination of antisemitism.6 respecting the fact that the existing discourse on antisemitism in Slo- vakia links criticism of Zionism to antisemitism.7

6 The appeal was initiated by MPs František Šebej and Marek Krajčí, both members of the Slova- kia-Israel parliamentary friendship group (document in author’s personal archive). 7 It should be pointed out that there is a certain consensus within Slovakia’s political and ideological mainstream about the link between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. As a result, openly criticizing or attacking Zionism as an ideology risks exposure to allegations or suspicions of antisemitism. For right- wing extremists, neo-fascists and neo-Nazis, such allegations are irrelevant, since they regard them as a badge of honour, but for mainstream actors such allegations would mean an irrevocable loss of reputation and credibility as participants in the public debate. Therefore, for those Slovak authors and activists who criticize Israel as a state (rather than just the policies of the Israeli government or the statements of individual Israeli politicians), use of the word “Zionism” has become more or less taboo. However, the less they focus on Zionism, the stronger their criticism of Israel and the role and policies of the Jewish state becomes. Nevertheless, these authors deny that they are engaging in antisemitism, emphasizing that they are only expressing their views on the inappropriate policies of one of the many states that exist in the world.

111 The actors: parties, groups, dissemination of antisemitic associations and persons views and constructs, usually with conspiratorial undertones. After People’s Party Our Slovakia 1990, no significant political party in Slovakia engaged in or included The most prominent political actor in its platform or communications combining all forms of antisemitism anything that could be construed as (old, new and modern) is the fascist, overt antisemitism. ĽSNS is therefore right-wing extremist People’s Party the first significant political actor in Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana Naše Slovakia to openly use antisemitism Slovensko or ĽSNS), which was of- as one of its operational tools. An- ficially established in 2009. Follow- tisemitism manifests itself in the ing elections in 2016, ĽSNS entered activities of ĽSNS and its represen- parliament after gaining 8% of the tatives in three ways, which corre- vote. Although voter support was not spond to the three basic types of based purely on the party’s antise- antisemitic discourse in Slovakia, mitic appeal, antisemitism is a con- namely: (1) by fostering mistrust stituent part of its credo and image. and hostility towards Jews as a ĽSNS representatives openly express religious or ethnic community; (2) their views on issues relating to by praising the fascist Slovak state Jews, the Jewish agenda and Israel. and its antisemitic genocidal poli- When ĽSNS leader Marian Kotleba cies; and (3) by delegitimizing Israel was a member and leader of Slovak and inciting hostility towards the Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitosť Jewish state under the guise of the or SP), a right-wing extremist civic struggle against Zionism. Adoration association, he often expressed of the fascist Slovak state and its antisemitic views by quoting anti- leader Jozef Tiso is an inherent part Jewish remarks made by Slovak of ĽSNS’s propaganda efforts, which personalities such as Ľudovít Štúr, include celebrating the anniversary particularly his statements about of its foundation and commemorat- Jews being a foreign element in the ing its prominent representatives. Slovak nation. SP representatives Criticism of Zionism and Israel forms have engaged in the obsessive an integral part of ĽSNS’s views on

112 international relations and foreign the parliamentary ĽSNS, is a former policy issues. Hostility towards Jews leader of the SP. The association’s is being spread through the Face- political stance is characterized by book pages of ĽSNS’s regional or- open opposition to parliamenta- ganizations, which publish posts ry democracy, radical nationalism, containing blatant and offensive fierce anti-Hungarian rhetoric and anti-Jewish content. The authors of virulent antisemitism, anti-Zionism these posts include ordinary mem- and hostility towards Israel. The bers and ĽSNS sympathizers, local association lays claim to the legacy party officials and ĽSNS MPs. of the fascist Slovak state, led by Jozef Tiso. In January 2005, Slovak Togetherness was registered as a Slovak Togetherness political party, the Slovak Together- ness-National Party (SP-NS). How- The Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská ever, in October 2005, the attorney pospolitosť or SP) association has general filed a complaint with the been a constituent part of the right- Supreme Court requesting the par- wing extremist scene in Slovakia ty’s dissolution on account of its since the mid-1990s. Its activities programme and activities. In March have contributed significantly to the 2006, the Supreme Court duly dis- formation of the present right-wing solved the party, concluding that its extremist movement. For nearly two activities were in breach of the law, decades, the association was con- since its aim was to establish a po- sidered a symbol of Slovak right- litical regime in Slovakia similar to wing extremism, especially in terms the one that existed during World of its operations, rhetoric, organiza- War II. However, the SP put its dis- tional basis and the appearance of solution as a party down to the fact its members, who for a time attend- that its “intense struggle against ed public events dressed in uniforms Zionism attracted attention from emblematic of the country’s fascist state authorities and also from the regime during World War II. Mari- so-called third sector, organizations an Kotleba, the current chairman of

113 operating in Slovakia and controlled New Free Slovakia 8 by foreign groups”. SP materials Compared to other right-wing ex- refer to the “so-called Holocaust” tremist groups, members of the now and characterize the punishment of diminished radical nationalist New Holocaust denial as a violation of Free Slovakia (Nové Slobodné Slov- 9 the right to freedom of expression. ensko or NSS) association focused more strongly on issues relating to Action Group Resistance Kysuce Zionism and Israel. In its prime, the association was notorious for orga- Action Group Resistance Kysuce nizing anti-Israel public events and (Akčná skupina Vzdor Kysuce or VK), publishing radical antisemitic and which was formed in 2011, is one of anti-Israel documents. the most radical and violent group- ings within the far-right movement in Slovakia. The group’s members Slovak Movement of Revival conduct forest training sessions in The Slovak Movement of Revival the field of close combat and oth- (Slovenské hnutie obrody or SHO) er military skills and its views are is a radical nationalist organization characterized by radical antisemi- that has adopted a specific approach tism, adoration of Jozef Tiso and de to issues relating to Jews, antisem- facto approval of the Holocaust. The itism, Zionism and Israel. SHO has group lays claim to the legacy of the recently attempted to transform it- wartime Slovak state army, which self into a political party and take fought alongside the German Weh- a leading role on the ultra-nation- rmacht “against Bolshevism”. VK’s alist stage. The movement takes a leader, Marián Magát, is renowned revisionist approach to Slovakia’s for his vicious hatred of Jews and twentieth-century history and open- anything Jewish or Jewish-related. ly lays claim to the legacy of the country’s fascist wartime regime

8 “Obnovená činnosť SP-NS!” Blog SP, March 11, 2008. https://pospolitost.wordpress.com/2009/03/11/ obnovena-cinnost-sp-ns (accessed January 13, 2017). 9 “Je Ficova vláda skutočne národná, sociálna a kresťanská?” Blog SP, June 30, 2008, https://pospoli- tost.wordpress.com/2008/06/30/907 (accessed January 13, 2017).

114 led by Jozef Tiso. SHO’s representa- China and certain Arab states (e.g. tives justify the regime’s genocidal Bashar al-Assad’s Syria). KSS’s dep- policies towards the Jews, includ- uty chairman, Jamal Suleiman, is ing their deportation, by pointing originally from Syria himself. out that that they were part of “a development of history” in the con- 10 text of the situation that existed in Anti-Israel authors Europe at that time. References to Slovak anti-Israel authors sharply openly antisemitic publications can criticize the actions of the Israe- be found on the movement’s web- li government, various Israeli pol- site, and its deputy chairman, Pavol iticians and institutions, as well Privalinec, is renowned for his crude as the State of Israel itself, which and offensive antisemitic posts on they imbue almost exclusively with Facebook. negative characteristics. Their de- liberate selectivity is apparent from their assessment of the role of the Communist Party of Slovakia two sides to the Israeli-Palestinian The Communist Party of Slovakia conflict. Responsibility for all events (Komunistická strana Slovenska or with a negative impact is attribut- KSS) is a radical left-wing party with ed to Israel (no matter what gov- overt anti-Israel leanings. It has long ernment happens to be in power at maintained a rigorously anti-Israel the time), while the positions and stance, combining criticism of Israel actions of the Palestinian side are and Zionism with resistance to the assessed in a more positive light. United States, the European Union, Palestinian actions that produce NATO, the Western world and the negative effects are circumvented, global economy. It also supports the trivialized or justified and excused. foreign policy positions of Russia,

10 In this country report, the term “anti-Israel” refers to positions, narratives and discourses that are hostile towards Israel as an entity (and whose disseminators position themselves as fierce opponents of Israel), as opposed to critical evaluations of particular aspects of Israel’s policies or the performance and conduct of its institutions and nationals. It is important to note that the proponents of anti-Is- rael positions, whose views are analyzed in this part of the report, publicly distance themselves from antisemitism and refrain from criticizing Zionism. They also reject any allegations of antisemitism as misleading, unfair and offensive.

115 A selection of posts by two bloggers, he has published dozens of posts, Kamil Kandalaft and Barbora We- including many relating to the Israe- berová, provides a clear and indic- li-Palestinian conflict.11 ative example of the views outlined Barbora Weberová is a blogger and above. An analysis of these posts activist who adopts extreme, viru- appears towards the end of this re- lent anti-Israel positions that aim port, since both bloggers may be re- to delegitimize the State of Israel. garded as key opponents of Israel as She publishes her posts on the blog an entity, and not just as critics of a of the liberal (centrist) daily news- certain aspect of the Jewish state’s paper, Denník N, which she sharp- policies. Nevertheless, they deny all ly criticizes – just like she criticizes allegations of antisemitism. other Slovak media, especially an- A civil activist with a clear-cut other centrist daily newspaper called pro-Palestinian position, Kamil Kan- Sme – for its alleged pro-Israel po- dalaft blogs on the web portals sitions, ignorance of Palestine and Sme.sk and Pravda.sk. He presents the Palestinians and its “celebration himself as a representative of the of the occupation”.12 She even sug- informal civil Initiative for a Just gests that certain journalists work- Peace in the Middle East. Of mixed ing for Denník N should stop writing Slovak-Arab/Palestinian descent, he about Israel (e.g. Peter Morvay) or is an Israeli citizen who grew up in criticizes them for their ignorance Israel and currently lives in Slova- about Palestinians and their justifi- kia. He is an active contributor to cation of all Israeli policies (e.g. Jana the public debate about Middle East Shemesh). Although she denies being affairs, Palestine, Israel and related antisemitic in some of her posts, her issues, including antisemitism, atti- writings on Israel, its policies, its at- tudes towards Jews and interfaith titude towards Palestinians and life and intercultural relations, to name in Israel show that she does not just but a few. In the past few years, single out Israel as a state, whose

11 All statements by Kamil Kandalaft quoted in this report are extracted from posts listed in the Refer- ences. 12 All statements by Barbora Weberová quoted in this report are extracted from posts published on the Denník N blog (see References).

116 right to existence she questions, but of the book Silence,14 in which he also the Jews living there. All her explains the “real background and comments on Israel and anything true reasons” for events and trends related to Israel are wholly negative, in global development. The book unlike some of the posts written by was full of conspiracy theories cen- Kamil Kandalaft, who acknowledges tring on antisemitic and anti-Zionist positive elements and occasionally themes. The private radio station sides with individual Israeli Jews. VIVA has offered Rostas airtime to read chapters from his book. In 2013, he established a monthly Media magazine focusing on anti-Western Zem a Vek and pro-Russia conspiracy theories, which regularly publishes antise- The monthly Zem a Vek (Earth and mitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israel Age),13 an “alternative” periodical articles. Rostas frequently express- that deals in conspiracy theories and es his views on Jews, Zionism and publishes material about the US and Israel, claiming inter alia that the Zionist (i.e. Jewish) domination of the word “Jew” was invented in the world, is a typical antisemitic and nineteenth century, that Eastern anti-Israel media outlet. It claims to European “Jews” are not Semites have a circulation of 25,000. Articles but “Khazars” and that “Israel is a published in the magazine are char- fascist state”. He is also quoted as acterized by their total resistance to saying: “As soon as possible, I will liberal democratic values and their contribute in my own modest way criticism of the West, the European and will be doing my best for Free Union and NATO. The editor-in-chief Gaza and to stop massacres in Pal- of Zem a Vek, Tibor Rostas, who is a estine committed by Israeli Nazi musician and PR expert, started his commandos.”15 career by contributing to the public and political discourse as the author

13 See http://www.zemavek.sk (accessed January 13, 2017). 14 See http://www.databazeknih.cz/knihy/mlcanie-166670 (accessed January 13, 2017). 15 Ján Benčík, “Silvestrovské rostašoviny,” Denník N, December 30, 2016, https://dennikn.sk/blog/ silvestrovske-rostasoviny (accessed January 13, 2017).

117 Slobodný vysielač web portal that publishes anti-lib- The online radio station Slobodný eral, anti-Western and, especially, vysielač (Free Broadcaster)16 is a antisemitic, anti-Zionist and an- fringe “alternative” outlet estab- ti-Israeli articles. Since its establish- lished in Banská Bystrica in early ment, it has served as a platform 2013. In light of its “ideological” for nationalist and right-wing ex- orientation and content, it can be tremist discourse. Since November regarded as the radio equivalent of 2016, however, the portal has been Zem a Vek. It combines anti-cor- inactive. ruption rhetoric with calls for direct Protiprudu.org or “true” democracy, along with a Protiprudu.org18 (Against the broad range of esoteric and con- stream) is an “alternative” website spiracy-related topics, criticism of with a nationalist orientation that liberal democracy and the West, publishes anti-American and an- and anti-American and pro-Russian ti-EU content. It includes a special views. The station has offered air- section on “Zionism”19 that contains time to right-wing antisemitic ex- harsh antisemitic and anti-Israel ar- tremists and helped them mobilize ticles. support in the 2016 parliamenta- ry elections. Norbert Lichtner, who heads the station, is renowned for Manifestations his offensive and profane antisemit- of modern antisemitism ic statements. Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust denial, relativization Beo.sk and trivialization Established in 2004, Beo.sk (former- The boundless sympathy of the ly Národný pozorovateľ – National ĽSNS for Tiso’s genocidal regime Observer)17 is a radical nationalist and its staunch opposition to the anti-fascist

16 See https://slobodnyvysielac.sk/?v=13dd621f2711 (accessed January 13, 2017). 17 See https://beo.sk (accessed January 13, 2017). 18 See https://www.protiprudu.org (accessed January 13, 2017). 19 See https://www.protiprudu.org/category/hs/sionizmus (accessed January 13, 2017).

118 of 1944 serves as a clear indicator Slovakia since 1989 in which a legal of the party’s antisemitic character. entity or person had sought punish- Among the contributions posted on ment for something related to the ĽSNS’s Facebook page and those of fight against Nazism and the salva- its regional organizations are par- tion of the Jews during World War adoxical posts that both deny and II, although in practice it was an at- support the Holocaust, including tempt to criminalize the “propagan- positive references to Germany’s da of Zionism”. Nazi regime and its leader, Adolf In September 2016, Róbert Švec, Hitler. In November 2015, ĽSNS filed the chairman of the revisionist and criminal charges in connection with radical nationalist SHO movement, the anti-fascist exhibition “Stories wrote as follows on his Facebook of the 20th Century”, which was page: organized by the NGO Post Bellum. ĽSNS complained that the exhibi- The Slovak National Archives tion presented documents relating released photos of the Slo- to the activities of anti-Nazi activ- vak labour camps for Jews ist Štefánia Lorándová, who was from the time of the first a member of the wartime Jewish Slovak Republic [1939-1945]. organization Ha-Shomer. ĽSNS de- And these photos are proof manded that the “offenders” re- that Jews in the camps were sponsible for this “propaganda of treated well. They were pro- Zionism” should be punished, since vided with medical care and Zionism was a “form of racism and meals. We will continue in racial discrimination”. The right- the future with what worked 20 wing extremists based this allega- well in the past. tion on UN Resolution no. 3379 of The prosecutor’s office duly began to 1975, which had actually been re- investigate whether this statement voked by the UN General Assembly violated any laws. in 1991. This was the first case in

20 Filip Struhárik, “Nacionalisti chvália pracovné tábory a chcú ich využiť aj v budúcnosti. Polícia ich vyjadrenia preveruje,” Denník N, September 22, 2016, https://dennikn.sk/minuta/565697 (accessed January 13, 2017).

119 Conspiratorial antisemitism ist associations, who do not mask Right-wing extremists and neo-fas- or camouflage their opposition to cists frequently make assertions Israel. For them, Israel is the em- about sinister Jewish intentions in bodiment of the worst evil, a sym- order to promote a certain inter- bol of global Jewry that seeks to pretation of reality (or particular rule over other nations. The Slovak events) based on the Jewish origin neo-fascists and neo-Nazis do not of certain individuals. In the case of recognize Israel’s right to exist and ĽSNS, a typical way to incite hos- openly support any actions leading tility towards Jews involves empha- to its physical destruction, regard- sizing the real or imagined Jewish less of who undertakes them. They origin of persons whom ĽSNS lead- constantly reiterate allegations of ers attack for ideological or political “Zionist crimes in Palestine” and call reasons. Examples of this include for retribution. articles in the ĽSNS party newslet- ĽSNS equates Zionism with ter in which former US Secretary of totalitarian ideologies. Politicians State Madeleine Albright is called a and other public officials who “Czech Jew”, LGBTI activist Roma- display a positive attitude towards na Schlesinger is characterized as the Jewish state are automatically “making no secret of her Jewish or- disqualified in the eyes of right- igin” and the American philanthro- wing extremists. For example, ĽSNS pist George Soros is described as a reacted to the death of the former “Jewish financier”. Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel by publishing a disparaging text in which it pointed out, inter alia, that New antisemitism Havel was “a big supporter of Israel”. New antisemitism in the form of In its political materials, ĽSNS has radical anti-Israel positions and an- called for the introduction of a visa ti-Zionism, combined with elements requirement for Israel (as well as for of traditional antisemitism, is typ- the United States) and announced ical of the members of right-wing that it “would always oppose EU extremist and radical-national- enlargement for non-European and non-Christian states”, mentioning

120 Israel and Turkey, although unlike letter accused Israel of committing Turkey Israel is not interested in war crimes and causing the over- joining the EU.21 all destabilization of the situation In late 2009, three NSS activists dis- in the Middle East. He also accused rupted a speech delivered at Prešov Zionism of “inhumanity, racism and University (Eastern Slovakia) by the war crimes”, calling on Israel to “re- Israeli ambassador to Slovakia, Zeev turn Palestine to the Palestinians”, Boker, by heckling him and bran- and concluded with a reference to The Holocaust Industry dishing a poster with the words the book , “Stop the Jewish racism” until they written by Norman Finkelstein, an were eventually forced to leave. One American anti-Zionist historian of 22 of the protesters, Igor Cagaň, sub- Jewish origin. sequently published a letter on the In February 2010, the NSS invit- radical nationalist web portal Beo.sk ed Finkelstein to give a lecture in in which he elaborated on his views Košice, entitled “Memento of the on Zionism, Israel and its policies. Age: Zionism”. The lecture ultimate- He pre-empted any accusations of ly did not go ahead, as Finkelstein antisemitism by emphasizing that decided to cancel the event, alleged- NSS members “have good relations ly after finding out that an antise- with the Palestinian Semites”, al- mitic organization was behind it.23 though he was obviously referring In a letter distributed to multiple to Palestinian Arabs. He also re- addresses, the NSS stated that Fin- called UN resolution no. 3379, which kelstein’s lecture on Zionism would he referred to as “a resolution about deal with such issues as “disregard Zionism as a form of Jewish rac- for international law, earning mon- ism”, a fact he claimed was indi- ey through the Holocaust industry, rectly confirmed by the Goldstone broad multinational operational net- Report on the Israeli military opera- works, religious intolerance, racial tion in Gaza in early 2009. Cagaň’s genocide, and world power”. The Is-

21 Naše Slovensko – noviny politickej strany Mariana Kotlebu (April-May 2014): 2. 22 See https://beo.sk/domace-udalosti/1343-list-izraelskemu-velvyslancovi (accessed January 13, 2017). 23 See http://www.antifa.cz/content/poprask-kolem-normana-finkelsteina (accessed January 13, 2017).

121 raeli operation in Gaza was labelled personal mission to redress this im- as a “genocidal attack by the Israeli balance. However, Kandalaft’s way army in the occupied Gaza Strip”. of describing the Israeli-Palestinian The writers also claimed responsi- conflict reveals a clear double stan- bility for attempting to disrupt the dard. In the same post, he writes Israeli ambassador’s aforemen- about “violence” and “crimes” com- tioned lecture, describing the very mitted by the State of Israel and notion of delivering such a speech its institutions, such as the armed as the “politicization and Zioniza- forces, but with regard to Palestin- tion of the Slovak education sys- ian acts of violence he only uses the tem”. The letter also declared that word “violence” but never the word one of the participants in the debate “crimes”. Writing in the same post, after the planned Finkelstein lecture he attributes all blame for the fail- would be the “well-known expert on ure of the peace process to Israel, the issue”, Palestinian writer Nidal which he claims has no interest in Saleh, who lives in Slovakia and has concluding a peace agreement. This authored several anti-Zionist and leads him to the conclusion that Is- anti-Israel publications published in rael benefits from the status quo the Czech Republic and Slovakia.24 and that it is a “racist, brutal oc- The anti-Israel authors mentioned cupation regime” that is erecting a in the previous section of this chap- “huge racist wall” around Gaza and ter have adopted a similar one-sid- committing horrendous crimes, in- ed and biased position concerning cluding the “intentional murder of Israel. According to Kamil Kandalaft, innocent people”, who are tyran- for instance, Palestinian violence is nized and eventually killed. widely publicized and needs no ad- Although Kandalaft does not call ditional attention and coverage, into question Israel’s right to exist, while Israeli violence is intentionally the fact that he only attributes neg- covered up and consequently needs ative characteristics to Israel and Is- to be revealed to a wider audience. raeli government policy is evidence He has therefore embarked on a of his bias and apparent desire to

24 All citations in this paragraph are from a document entitled “Memento doby: Sionizmus,” received by email from [email protected] (author’s personal archive).

122 demonize Israel. He consistently Soviet tanks committed ag- presents defence and security mea- gression by the very fact of sures conducted by Israel as base- their presence must under- less and illegitimate, thus effective- stand the same about Israeli ly delegitimizing certain essential tanks in Palestinian towns functions of the state. and villages. Whoever un- An example of the way in which Kan- derstands that the residents dalaft shifts and distorts the context of Košice defended their city of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can must understand that Pal- be found in a post entitled “Intifada estinians throwing stones at on the streets of Košice” (a city in Israeli tanks were defending eastern Slovakia), in which he com- their motherland as well. No pares the Soviet Union’s invasion of reason exists for assessing Czechoslovakia to the occupation of these two situations differ- Palestinian territories by Israel and ently. the Slovak citizens’ resistance to the Barbora Weberová does not recog- Soviet occupiers in 1968 to the Pal- nize the term “Israeli Arabs” and estinian resistance to Israel during suggests using the term “Palestin- the Intifada. Writing about the vi- ians” to define the Arab population sual images of both cases (protests, of Israel. This suggestion, which clashes, stone throwing, civilians seeks to deny the citizenship status resisting troops, fires and burning of Israel’s Arab population, is a clear vehicles, fatalities and so forth), and attempt to delegitimize Israel. Like completely ignoring the substantial Kandalaft, Weberová is convinced differences between the two cases, that the Slovak media and Slovak he comes to conclusion that politicians – with the exception of no reason exists to con- the fascists (a fact she says she demn the Soviet occupation laments) – are unfairly biased in fa- of Czechoslovakia and at the vour of Israel and against Palestine same time defend the Israeli and the Palestinians. However, she occupation of Palestine. … herself clearly demonizes one side of Whoever understands that the conflict in her narratives, name- ly Israel and the Israelis. According

123 to her, Israel is not a liberal de- ian leader , whom mocracy with Western values but a she refers to as “the president racist state that has established an elected by nobody”, for sending con- apartheid regime (both inside Israel dolences to Peres’ family after his and in the Occupied Territories) and death. Her double standards are is guilty of: conducting a genocidal evident from the fact that she be- policy towards Palestinians; violat- lieves that expressions of sympathy ing all the human rights of the resi- towards Israel from certain far-right dents of Palestinian territories; sys- politicians in Europe and the United tematically attacking the Gaza Strip States only serve to discredit Isra- and keeping it on the verge of a el, while the fact that Slovak fas- humanitarian catastrophe; causing cists sympathize with Palestinians suffering to children in the - Occu is simply regrettable (“a tragedy”). pied Territories; perpetrating ethnic In her narratives, Weberová uses cleansing and racial segregation in context shifting and distortion more the name of the creation of a “Jew- often than Kandalaft to promote a ish state”; systematically destroying “better understanding” of her criti- Palestinian Arab heritage in Jeru- cisms of Israel (e.g. the occupation salem; disseminating “disgusting, of Crimea, the refusal to grant Pal- racist and xenophobic propaganda”; estinians from the Gaza Strip access and many other similar wrongdo- to Tel-Aviv beaches, unlike foreign ings. tourists visiting Israel, the Soviet Weberová also criticizes Israeli pol- occupation of Czechoslovakia, the iticians regardless of their ideolog- Soviet oppression of the Hungarian ical orientation or party affiliation. revolution, and so on). Weberová’s According to her, the late Shimon interpretation of the reasons for Peres was guilty of multiple war Palestinian terrorism comes as no crimes (together with his colleague surprise. She writes that it emerged Yitzhak Rabin), and she even goes as a “result of Israeli actions in Pal- so far as to quote and agree with estine”. In practice, she justifies such one Arab scholar who argues that acts, arguing that “it is something Peres supported all Israel’s war of an exception in the world not crimes. She also criticizes Palestin- to see a violent response to a vio-

124 lent occupation”. She also expresses In recent years, a group of anti-Is- passionate support for the anti-Is- rael activists has succeeded in or- rael BDS campaign and strongly ganizing several petitions. The first criticizes Slovak officials and politi- was an appeal to President Andrej cians for maintaining contact with Kiska to express solidarity with the Israeli partners. victims of the massacre in Gaza.25 Based on an analysis of selected No names of signatories appeared posts written by Barbora Weberová, on the petition, but one observ- it is abundantly clear that many of er subsequently pointed out that her statements fall within the pa- the informal civil Initiative for Just rameters of Natan Sharansky’s 3D Peace in the Middle East had signed test of antisemitism: demonization, the petition and that it was pro- double standards and delegitimiza- moted by pro-Palestinian blogger tion. Kamil Kandalaft. However no other names were published and the total The Slovak authors and activists number of signatories remains un- who are fervent critics of Israel are known.26 Another petition demand- involved in lobbying on behalf of the ing the cancellation of the Israeli Palestinian Authority in the form of justice minister’s visit to Slovakia petitions, appeals and public events, was signed by some mainstream, including BDS campaigns and pro- predominantly leftist Slovak civil tests against the activities of rep- activists and 135 citizens (includ- resentatives of Israel in Slovakia. ing thirty anonymous signatories).27 As yet, the BDS movement has not Previously, in November 2014, six taken any real action in Slovakia, Slovak organizations with mainly except for issuing verbal appeals for leftist and pro-Palestinian lean- support. ings28 signed a petition calling for

25 “Vyzvali prezidenta, aby vyjadril solidaritu s obeťami masakra v Gaze,” Changenet.sk, September 6, 2014, http://www.changenet.sk/?section=spr&x=784754 (accessed January 13, 2017). 26 Kamil Kandalaft, “Keď SME o Palestíne klamali,” Je to tak, December 18, 2014, http://www.jetotak. sk/ludskeprava/ked-sme-o-palestine-klamali (accessed January 13, 2017). 27 “Za zrušenie návštevy izraelskej ministerky spravodlivosti,” Changenet.sk, n.d., http://www.chan- genet.sk/?section=kampane&x=888110 (accessed January 13, 2017). 28 These organizations were the Slovak Initiative for a Just Peace in the Middle East, the Human Rights Institute, the Palestinian Club in Slovakia, the Slovak Anti-Poverty Network, Slovakia Without Nazis, NGO Utopia and the United for Peace Initiative.

125 the suspension of the EU associa- to the emergence of coalitions or tion agreement with Israel.29 None clusters that support or subscribe to of the petitions had any demonstra- illiberalism, anti-Western views, au- ble effect. thoritarianism, delusional conspir- acy theories, general , opposition to the European Union III. CONCLUSIONS and NATO and anti-Americanism. In many cases, the main actors engag- ing in new antisemitism in Slova- Antisemitism in Slovakia is a real kia are the same as those engaging social problem that has recently in traditional antisemitism. They acquired special significance as a include right-wing extremists, far- result of the election of right-wing right radical nationalists, neo-fas- extremist forces to the Slovak par- cists and neo-Nazis. liament in March 2016. This devel- opment has afforded them the op- The main manifestations of new an- portunity to disseminate their toxic tisemitism include the delegitimiza- political messages more widely, in- tion of Israel as the democratic state cluding the antisemitic ideas and of the Jewish people, the question- anti-Israel positions that form an ing or denial of its right to exist and organic part of their political plat- the singling out of the Jewish state form and ideology. Thanks to the for special opprobrium. Such actions growing role of the “alternative” are not only common among overt media and social networks, sup- antisemites and right-wing extrem- porters of all forms of antisemitism ists but are also prevalent in circles have been able to include antisemit- that publicly distance themselves ic content in their communications from antisemitism and anti-Zion- with voters and influence the views ism. Objectively speaking, however, of ordinary citizens. Slovakia’s expe- biased and one-sided criticism of rience confirms that antisemitism Israel, especially when coupled with in all its forms usually contributes delegitimization or demonization, helps strengthen antisemitic senti-

29 See http://www.eccpalestine.org/a-european-call-to-suspen-the-eu-israel-association-agreement (accessed January 13, 2017).

126 ments and contributes to the long- on the political spectrum and lack term survival of antisemitism in all the ability to gain wider support for its forms (old, modern and new). their views. Efforts to campaign in With the election of the fascist favour of BDS in Slovakia have so ĽSNS to the Slovak parliament, new far been largely ineffective, and it is antisemitism has obtained an ad- unlikely that they will be successful ditional platform. As yet, however, in the foreseeable future. this type of anti-Jewish sentiment At the same time, however, it would is no more widespread in Slovakia be a mistake to underestimate the than any of the other types, and risk of intensified antisemitic and there are no tangible indications openly anti-Israel sentiment at a that it has been on the rise in recent time of mounting turbulence not only years. On a positive note, moreover, in the Middle East but also in Europe it appears that Slovakia’s political, and in relations between Europe and cultural and intellectual elites, its the United States. Slovakia’s reason- mainstream political forces (both able politicians and mainstream me- centre-left and centre-right) and dia must therefore continue to op- its mainstream media do not en- pose all forms of antisemitism and gage in antisemitic or anti-Israel hateful anti-Israel rhetoric. discourse. In a majority of cases concerning the situation in the Mid- dle East and relations between Is- rael and its Arab neighbours, they adopt a balanced or even pro-Israel position, showing ample immunity to the various attempts to dele- gitimize and demonize the Jewish state. Another positive factor is that right-wing extremists are ostracized and heavily criticized by the political mainstream for their antisemitism, while left-wing anti-Israel activists occupy a fairly marginal position

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The late Congressman Tom Lantos drew attention to the phenomenon of ‘new antisemitism’ already in his 2002 article, The Durban Debacle.1 Antisemitism has been around since the existence of Jews. Recently, it has manifested itself worldwide in a contemporary form. New antisemitism refers to the use of double standards towards the State of Israel, demonizing its acts as well as questioning the country’s raison d’être. The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement, present in many aspects of everyday life from trade to academia, is widely regarded as the most obvious type of new antisemitism. While there are several studies focusing on the emergence of new antisemitism in the Western world, there is a lack of academic research regarding its existence and forms of manifestation in Central and Eastern Europe. There are even fewer reports examining the phenomenon from a regional perspective based on a uniform set of criteria. This research fills this gap by examining the different forms of antisemitism in the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), with a particular focus on new antisemitism. This report examines the phenomenon in country- specific case studies, considering the region’s historical, legal, and political context in its comprehensive analysis.

1 Tom Lantos. “The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the World Racism Conference at Durban.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter/Spring, 26:1, 2002.