Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021)

ORSAM POLICY BRIEF 161 MARCH 2021

Insecurıty ın Southern Syrıa: Trackıng Daraa, Quneıtra and Suwayda (January – February 2021)

Suhaıl al-Ghazı

INTRODUCTION This was without an actual presence of the regime forces and security services in Daraa he Syrian regime forces took control western countryside and parts of the city of T of the governorates of Daraa and Quneitra in the summer of 2018 after Daraa in addition to the return of official and reaching a reconciliation agreement allowing service institutions to all regions of the opposition fighters to remain inside their province. However, this agreement could not areas and join the forces of the Fifth Corps. improve the security situation in the region. Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021)

Southern Syria has witnessed ongoing as- a series of assassinations and attacks sassinations and clashes that left hundreds launched by unknown persons against the of dead and wounded for several reasons. Syrian regime forces and reconciled fighters. These reasons include the regime forces’ at- The attacks have increased in intensity in tempts to extend the regime’s control to new December 2020, especially the attack on the areas in violation of the settlement agreement 31st of the same month, which killed 4 soldiers and the desire of internal or external parties and an officer from Fourth Division near the to make the province an arena for settling town of Tsail in the western countryside of scores. This is especially so with the involve- Daraa. This attack angered the 4th Division, ment of Iranian-backed militias trying to ex- headed by Maher Al-Assad, which is consid- pand near the Israeli border and its recruitment ered the most important military division in of local fighters in the ranks of its militia. This terms of deployment in the governorate, in report monitors the most important security addition to several attacks against the divi- incidents and their causes in the three gov- sion's soldiers. These operations gave the ernorates of southern Syria; Daraa, Quneitra pretext for the Fourth Division to mobilize its and As Suwayda in first two months of 2021. forces in the governorate, especially the DARAA western countryside, to try to storm it. The Central Reconciliation Committee in Daraa, Tensions returned to the Daraa Gover- which consists of local figures and former norate at the beginning of January 2021 after leaders of the opposition groups, began ne-

INSECURITY IN SOUTHERN SYRIA QuneitraQuneitra

IED Gunfire Attacks in Daraa/Quneitra Jan/Feb 2021

Gunfire Attacks

IED Attacks

The map shows the areas and the intesity of attacks

Detailed Control Map of Southern Syria February 2021

Regime Forces & Allied Militias

Reconciled Locations (Ex Opposition)

Airbase (Active/Not-Active)

International Airport

International Crossing Border

International/Main Roads

Southern Syria Control Break Down February DaraaDaraa Daraa Province (87 City/Town/Village) kezi * Center Mer for rı Mi la dd a le rm E ı a t s ş t a e r r 63 Locations A n

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r s O * ﻄ* Locations 24 ﻣ ﺳ ﺭ ﻭ ﻜﺯ ﺎﻷ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻕ ﺎﺳﺎﺕ ﺎﻟﺸ (Quneitra Province (12 City/Town/Village

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gotiations with regime officials reached an agreement on Feb- under Russian auspices to reach ruary 3. In this agreement the a truce. However, the regime local factions were to hand over requested the deportation of 6 their heavy and medium people to northern Syria, in- weapons to the regime forces, cluding Muhammad al-Subaihi, to hand over the wanted people who killed 9 policemen in the to the Eighth Brigade in the town of Muzayrib in May 2020, Fifth Corps, which is composed The Fourth Division after his son and son-in-law of the local reconciled factions, was able to reach were found dead in the coun- while Muhammad al-Subaihi new areas and tryside of Daraa. The regime and his family will be displaced establish also demanded that the local to another area in Daraa. The checkpoints inside factions hand over the medium agreement also will allow the western weapons in exchange for guar- regime forces to enter Tafas countryside and antees of not being attacked. and revitalize state institutions, weaken the local These requests were rejected establishing a military post for factions by forcing by the local figures in the Daraa the Fourth Division in the west them to hand over western countryside and con- part of Daraa as well as estab- their weapons. sidered them unreasonable, lishing a Russian military police While Russia while the six persons refused post in the region. However, benefited by to be displaced to northern Syr- the implementation of the avoiding a military ia. After the end of the negoti- agreement was delayed until escalation that ations, the forces of the Fourth the ninth of February, and it might lead to the Division launched an attack on was agreed that all wanted per- collapse of the the town of Tafas on January sons will move outside Tafas reconciliation 24 and clashed with local fight- but remain in the Daraa gover- agreement if the ers with heavy weapons. This norate. clashes spread to was while the regime's war- other regions, and planes flew over the area for The tension in the Tafas and Russia was able to the first time since the end of Daraa western countryside establish its the military operations in Daraa shows that it was clear that the presence in the in the summer of 2018 but no Fourth Division was the main western airstrikes were reported. Mean- beneficiary of it. The Fourth Di- countryside as well. while, tension and clashes shift- vision was able to reach new ed to other areas in the western areas and establish checkpoints countryside of Daraa, in an at- inside the western countryside tempt by the local factions to and weaken the local factions pressure the regime forces to by forcing them to hand over stop the attack on Tafas. The their weapons. While Russia Central Reconciliation Commit- benefited by avoiding a military tee and the regime forces escalation that might lead to

3 Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021)

the collapse of the reconciliation agreement Assassinations against civilian officials returned if the clashes spread to other regions, and after two chairmen of Jasim and Nahta town Russia was able to establish its presence in municipalities were assassinated, in addition the western countryside as well. Although to the member of the Central Committee of the local factions and the Central Reconcili- Daraa, but no party has claimed responsibility ation Committee were able to avoid the mil- for any assassination. itary operation and the destruction it carries, the loss of heavy weapons in the region will QUNEITRA weaken the factions in the future if the regime The Quneitra governorate witnessed an forces, especially the Fourth Division, try to escalation in assassinations and attacks expand and impose new conditions. against the regime forces in January. This The Daraa governorate witnessed 37 as- was due to the fragility of the security situation sassination attempts, including 16 deaths in and the regime forces' attempts to impose a January, where 6 former members of the new status quo in the region by provoking armed opposition who joined the regime the reconciliation agreement for 40 young. forces were killed, while 5 former opposition This left them with two options, either dis- members, who did not join any group after placement to northern Syria or arrest, which the reconciliation, were targeted, and two led local figures to reject regime demands officers in military security were assassinated. and to consider it a direct threat to the locals.

Total Assassinations: 16

Figure-1: The targets of assassinations in Daraa Governorate based on the numbers from the Daraa network 24

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The escalation is also connected to the recent tension in the towns of Kanaker and Sa’sa in the Damascus southwestern countryside where the locals have family ties to clans from Quneitra. Both towns witnessed regime forces' attempts to fully regain control over these areas and impose new conditions on civilians in the late 2020s. The regime forces, mainly the Fourth Division and the Military Security Branch in Sa`sa, are attempting to A view of houses destroyed after the civil war in expand in the Quneitra governorate to give Quneitra, Syria. cover for the entry of Iranian forces to enter into the province far from the eyes of the since Iranian militias are using money and Israeli army. These attempts also caused an drugs to lure young people in light of the increase in the intensity of confrontations in deteriorating economic situation and the high the southern region, as the locals feel the cost of living. imminent danger to their lives. This is especially so for those who were among the ranks The assassinations returned to the Quneitra of the opposition forces in the past, especially governorate at the beginning of January,

Total Assassinations: 8

Figure – 2: The targets of assassinations in Quneitra Governorate based on various local sources

5 Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021)

A building destroyed in As Suweyda as a result of the conflict. when Lieutenant Muhammad Ahmad al- were wounded in a similar attack in Al-Baath Shamali, from the State Security Branch, was city on the same day. killed when gunmen attacked his car in the town of Qusaybah. The former leader of the AS SUWAYDA Free Army, Yassin al-Sari, was killed and 3 Tension and security events continue in others were injured in an IED explosion that the As Suwayda governorate due to security targeted his car in Rasm Khawalid town in chaos and the ongoing conflict between the the countryside of Quneitra on January 7. Al- security services and Hezbollah on one side, Sari was one of the leaders of the Quneitra and local factions on the other. The month Martyrs Brigade before he formed a local of January was marked by the persistence of militia linked to the Military Security Branch kidnappings in the governorate, either for in Sa`sa after the reconciliation agreement. In addition, two members of the Hezbollah- ransom demands, or local factions kidnapping affiliated Golan Regiment militia were killed members of the regime forces to exchange and 3 others were wounded in two separate them for local youths who were arrested for attacks, one of them on a militia checkpoint compulsory service or for other reasons. On in the town of Jaba, and an explosive device January 7, one of the Israeli air strikes targeted targeting the commander Ahmed Al-Majbal a radar facility in the Najran Brigade in the in the town of Al-Qusaybah. Unidentified countryside of As-Suwayda. This means that gunmen also attacked one of the regime's the raids could extend in the future to new checkpoints in Al-Ruhaina near the occupied areas inside As-Suwayda to target Iranian- Golan area on January 17, killing 3 soldiers backed forces' positions, with local sources and wounding 3 others. This was while an warning about the escalating role of local officer in the security forces named Muham- militias linked to Hezbollah in drug smuggling mad Abdullah was killed and 3 members and recruiting local youth.

6 policy brief 161 Suhail al-Ghazi

The month of January also tinue to rally around the Druze witnessed a crisis in the gov- leadership despite some pre- ernorate between the local vious differences between Druze Religious Leadership and some factions of the Men of the security services after the Dignity Movement and Sheikh head of the Military Security Al-Hijri, caused by his pro- Branch in the southern region. regime stance against the fac- Brigadier General Luay Al-Ali, tions and his constant call for insulted the leader of the Druze the people of the province to community, Sheikh Hikmat Al- join the regime forces. Hajri, during a phone call after Al-Hijri requested the release In conjunction with this crisis, of a detainee from the gover- the issue of reconciliation re- It is estimated that norate. This insult led to an in- turned to the fore after several the number of crease in the tension of the lo- visits by Russian delegations wanted persons of cals of As-Suwayda against the to the province and their meet- the people of the security services in the gover- ing with local religious leaders. province is about norate. While local figures vis- According to local sources, the 20 thousand. These ited the leadership’s house and Russian delegation requested wanted persons are expressed solidarity with Sheikh local leaders to encourage cit- under the Al-Hajri, several local organi- izens to do a reconciliation process, especially young peo- protection of the zations and factions issued local factions, ple who are required for com- statements denouncing the whose checkpoints pulsory and reserve service. It regime’s behaviour and de- have always is estimated that the number manded a public and official prevented the of wanted persons of the peo- apology. Local websites also military police from ple of the province is about 20 published photos showing anti- entering the thousand. These wanted per- regime slogans on the walls in governorate's areas. the city of As-Suwayda and sons are under the protection footage of the tearing down of the local factions, whose pictures of Bashar al-Assad. The checkpoints have always pre- Druze leadership also called vented the military police from on the residents to remain calm entering the governorate's ar- and avoid any outside provo- eas. When military police ar- cation. Local media affiliated rested draft dodgers, local fac- with the regime said Bashar al- tions kidnapped officers and Assad called Sheikh al-Hajiri, soldiers to exchange them for but the official media did not the detained young men. At the report any call. This incident beginning of February, a com- shows that the residents, local mittee composed of several figures and local factions con- security branches in the gov-

7 Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021)

ernorate began receiving reconciliation re- tamper with the reconciliation agreement quests from persons known to be associated and reject the settlement of former opposition with the security services. Despite the at- fighters to force them to join the militias of tempts of Russia and the regime to lure the Fourth Division or to be forcibly deported young people into reconciliation and prom- to northern Syria. These attempts have been ising them to spend compulsory service in always rejected by local notables. The gov- the First Corps in southern Syria, the numbers ernorates of Daraa and Quneitra witnessed of applicants for reconciliation are still weak the killing of 24 people in assassinations from for several reasons. These reasons include the beginning of January 2020 until mid- lack of confidence in the regime’s promises February. Most of the victims were regime and the youth’s knowledge that there is no forces and former opposition fighters, in ad- definite end to compulsory and reserve serv- dition to 3 civilians. However, no party has ice. Thus, they prefer to be interested in work claimed responsibility for these assassinations. in light of the difficult living situation. On the other hand, the As-Suwayda governorate did not witness assassinations but The recruitment of young men from the kidnappings for a ransom or kidnapping of As-Suwayda governorate to fight in Libya on regime soldiers continued to exchange them behalf of Haftar's forces also continued, as for civilians from the governorate who were the “Sweida 24” news network documented arrested by the regime for their compulsory the continued recruitment of local youths, in service. Recruited fighters from the As-Suway- addition to the death of a young man from da governorate also continued to fight in the As-Suwayda governorate in Libya. The Libya alongside the Haftar forces through difficult living situation inside the governorate local mediators affiliated with the Russian and the high unemployment rate are among mercenaries, coinciding with the start of the the most important reasons for young people reconciliation process. to fight in Libya or to engage with militias affiliated with Hezbollah and to work in drug Developments in Southern Syria show smuggling. that the Syrian regime cannot provide stability CONCLUSION in the areas that it has managed to bring under military control. This situation reveals The deteriorating security situation in that the regime does not have adequate southern Syria continues due to the contin- means and sufficient means to counter non- uous attempts of the regime forces, especially military challenges. In addition to the deteri- the Fourth Division and the Iranian militias, oration of the security environment, there is to infiltrate areas that are to some extent an increase in political and economic based away from the regime’s grip. In addition to civil protests in southern Syria. The deepening this, poor living conditions and poor services economic crisis throughout Syria may cause contribute to an increasing tension and hatred such social events to increase. Such trends against the Syrian regime. Assassinations are in southern Syria will affect the Syrian regime's escalating in the governorates of Daraa and moves towards Idlib and to the east of the Quneitra because the regime forces try to Euphrates.

8 policy brief 161 About the Author

Suhail al-Ghazi

Suhail al-Ghazi holds a Bachelor of History degree holder from Damascus University. He is a research assistant at ORSAM and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. He's specialized in security, economy and governance in regime-held areas.

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