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The African Review 47 (2020) 357–376 TARE THE AFRICAN REVIEW

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The Dragon’s March into the Indian Ocean: Implications for International Trade

Fred Jonyo Associate Professor; Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Main Campus, Gandhi Wing ‒ 4th Flr, Office No. 403 C, Nairobi, Kenya [email protected]

Samuel Mbutu PhD Candidate; Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Main Campus, Gandhi Wing ‒ 4th Flr, Office No. 403 C, Nairobi, Kenya [email protected]

Abstract

This article reviews China’s engagement in the Indian Ocean Region, implications for international trade and strategies to mitigate its vulnerabilities. Premised on maritime theory, it argues that China’s interests in the Indian Ocean will influence its relations with India, extra-regional powers and African states. China is likely to leverage on its presence in the Indian Ocean to boost its levels of international trade volumes, while at the same time forge alternative strategies such as string of pearls, Maritime Silk Road and access through Myanmar to mitigate its vulnerabilities in the region.

Keywords

China ‒ Indian Ocean Region Maritime ‒ India

1 Introduction

There is no generally agreed definition of the Indian Ocean Region, however the most popular version conceptualizes the region as comprising the ocean

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/1821889X-12340023Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 07:00:39PM via free access 358 Jonyo and Mbutu itself and the countries that border it. These include the Northern Indian Ocean littorals: Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Iran and Yemen. The South Eastern littoral is made of Australia and the Western Indian Ocean littorals comprises Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Sudan and Eritrea. Although some scholars have also included the gulfs, seas, and islands that surround the water. The countries bordering the Indian Ocean are home to about 2.5 billion people representing which is one-third of the world’s population (Pherson, 1993). The region encompasses a wide variety of cultures, races and religions. The level of political stability, the quality of governance, ethnic and sectarian tensions, the demo- graphic pressure and the economic growth pace creates a difference in the mix for opportunities and risks in each of the states (Doyle, 2018). The strategic value of the Indian Ocean region is that it holds both a political and economic spotlight as the key emerging region in strategic priorities and world affairs. Eighty percent of the world’s maritime oil trade and other economic products are transported through the Indian Ocean via three major narrow passages, namely the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Lombok and the Malacca Strait (Doyle, 2018). The Strait of Hormuz is located between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and it is the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. The Malacca Strait also known as the “Gibraltar of the East” connects the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean is about 1080 km long and 25 to 115 m deep, and since the end of the Second World War the Malacca Strait has been under joint governance by Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. As the longest and busiest waterways in the world, it supports almost a quarter of the maritime world’s trade, and currently over 50,000 vessels pass through this passage whereby 60 percent encompasses China’s vessels. Many investors seek new opportunities across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) hence the expansion of the countries in this region. In 2017, countries like Malaysia, Bangladesh, Tanzania and India witnessed an economic growth of 5% which was attributed to the increased economic activities in the Indian Ocean. This level of economic growth was above the average global economic growth of 3.2%. According to the World Bank report of 2017, India has got the most growing economy in the IOR and it has an increasing population which is assumed that in the coming decades it will be the world’s largest market. Most states in this region would really want to establish their pence in the Indian ocean since the Indian ocean is an important international trade root, the ex- pected benefits that these countries are anticipating as a result of establishing their presence is the Indian ocean includes; trade expansion, economic expansion and increment of their citizen’s welfare among others. However, this only remains a desire since in actualizing this desire, it will demand that each state

The African ReviewDownloaded 47 from (2020) Brill.com10/01/2021 357–376 07:00:39PM via free access The Dragon’s March into the Indian Ocean 359 must have sufficient resources, favorable geographical characteristics such as an access to the sea, a developed navigation power as well as an updated naval system just to mention but a few. This requires supporting geographical features such as an access to the sea or an ocean and a well developed navigation system. The IOR has increasingly become a zone for strategic competition having different countries and private investors showing their interest in the region. China being one of these countries has invested millions of dollars on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) whose Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) passes through the region. China has also invested in state-backed firms in building ports in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The US and India have also projects in this region so that they could counter the Chinese competition on trade, security and navigation. The US has invested on a 113 million funds on the digital, energy and infrastructure projects. In security terms, piracy, un- regulated migration and the continued presence of the extremist’s groups in Somalia, Bangladesh and parts of Indonesia pose significant threats to the Indian Ocean countries. Therefore, the combination of Chinas strong economic power and its growing interests in the region raises the question of what portends for international Trade. The region, therefore, could be viewed as the Clausewitz’s center of gravity as far as great power interests are concerned. The bare-knuckle competition currently being staged by China could as well clash with the interests or other states such as India which uses the ocean as its trade routes and business hub, Australia which also relies on the Indian ocean as its trade route and the United States of America which wants to establish a military base in the Indian ocean in a bid to advance its security interests to control the region and its resources should therefore be seen in this context. Drawing empirical data from secondary sources, this article utilizes maritime theory to understand China’s engagement in the Indian Ocean Region, implications for international trade and strategies to mitigate its vulnerabilities. The central arguments of this theory are that national politics and international politics affect maritime and naval activities. The theory also argues that since states rely on the sea and oceans to carry out trade, communications and immigrations; science, technology and innovation matter, an enemy state may choose to interfere with all these activities of the state in question as way of weakening their economic strength or as a strategy of exerting economic pressure of that state in question to do certain things according to the wishes of the enemy state. The article is structured as follows: After this introductory section, the next section presents strategic importance of IOR, followed by theoretical framework. Subsequently, China’s strategic interests in the IOR is presented then followed by a discussion on implication for international trade.

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The penultimate section presents strategies to mitigate threats before the final section summarizing the article.

2 The Indian Ocean Region and Its Strategic Global Importance

First, the region is emerging as the center stage for the 21st century and it remains a stage for pursuit of the global strategic and regional military interests of all world and regional powers. The IOR has assumed great significance due to rising economic dependence on trans-national trade, energy, security and human resource wealth. The region is also bridging the gap between East and West and has thrown open new economic opportunities. The economic importance of the Indian Ocean to the emerging Asian powers and global economy is unquestionable: About 70 percent of the world’s oil and 50 percent of the world’s container traffic passes through the Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs) of the IOR (Ryan, 2013). The power struggle to control energy resources is a major vulnerability which has the potential to create instability in the IOR and even the South China Sea. Secondly, the region is home to approximately one third of the world’s population in a landmass of just about 25 percent ‒ a huge human resource. It contains approximately 40 percent of world’s gas and oil reserves (Brewster, 2014). The region therefore directly impacts multilateral trade and transit. The economic imperatives and strategic challenges are leading China and other world economic powers to expand their activities to different regions of the world. For instance, areas with high concentration of world population have large market sizes; therefore, all the commercial interests of states through their multinational corporations and other companies would be pursued ag- gressively. The major motivation behind all this is that a state wants to maxi- mize their power over other states and improve on the standards of living of her people. Power in Cobbett and Mahan’s conceptualization involves the pursuit of these interests against the interests of other competitor states. These interests are always clashing on the global area hence reinforcing the idea of security dilemma in the international system. Thirdly, with a booming economy and aspiring to enhance their great power status, China, USA, UK, India and Russia seem to have entered the Indian Ocean by becoming active players in there. This shows the strategic shift in their maritime focus from the long standing focus on the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans to that of looking into the Indian Ocean. This is informed by the World Bank observation that the IOR serves as entry points to most of the Africa states where potential economic activities are in plenty. All these powers have

The African ReviewDownloaded 47 from (2020) Brill.com10/01/2021 357–376 07:00:39PM via free access The Dragon’s March into the Indian Ocean 361 in one way or the other increased their military activities in the region and addresses the geopolitical issues against their competitors. It should also be noted that it is in the IOR that there has been increased terrorist activities such as piracy, smuggling in of contrabands, drug trafficking, human trafficking as well as destruction of the marine wealth. Therefore, as much as the region has got its own highs, it has also its own corresponding lows which every power that wants to enter the IOR must contend with. Fourthly, the region has become very important in the international politics because of its unusual geography and vulnerability in the trade corridor. Its vulnerability lies on its key importance in the SLOC and also the maritime chokepoints. The Indian Ocean is where the north of Asia and China se- cures its vital raw materials from. About sixty-four percent of the oil traded worldwide travels via its shipping routes and around 40 percent of the oil ex- tracted offshore is produced in its depths. Currently, more than 28 percent of the global fishing occurs in the Indian Ocean and this is growing rapidly. The Malacca Strait transports two thirds of Korea’s energy, almost 60 percent of Japan’s, three quarters of India’s and 80 percent of China’s oil needs (Hastings, 2011). This therefore means that anyone who controls these waters controls the global trade and also the energy supply chain. Access into the IOR by China involves the provision of loans and other incentives like trade agreements, pur- chase of energy armaments and also the construction of Confucius Institutes. Fifthly, the question of oceans as an important resource to states and no state actors is real in the day to day operations of these states and the no state actors. This is partly because in the 21st century, international trade which heavily characterizes important and export trade has been placed at the center stage. This implies that Oceans is the newest theater where global politics and interstate interactions takes place. This explains why the IOR has been transformed into an important trade and economic route for most states. Almost every state wants to control the IOR from strategic purposes. Part of the rea- sons to why this is the case is because it’s an important geo-political landscape for both international peace and security as well as an important economic hub. This argument has been vehemently advanced by Mahan who is one of the notable scholars of international relations, “whoever attains maritime su- premacy in the Indian Ocean would be a prominent player in the international scene. Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters” (Ghosh, 2004). This implies the fact that states are between off organizing their maritime structures and operations early enough to ensure that they have an upper hand in their future undertakings. It’s more of a political and economic strategy to ensure that their objectives are met.

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Brewster (2014) argued that since China and India are bigger powers among all the countries in the East, they are likely to cause a security dilemma in the IOR if they don’t control their urge to control the Indian Ocean. The author explains that the Sino-Indian strategic competition presents a case where India is far much stronger than China in terms of maritime control and there is no way China can defeat India in the near future. Therefore, he recommended a soft power diplomacy on the part of China as it seeks to advance its maritime interests in the IOR. Close to this Hastings (2011) who noted that the US does not have a serious geopolitical interest in the IOR because it has not invested much in the area politically and militarily, only having some strategic allianc- es with their trade partners in the IOR. The US has also not put in place any military command structure in the IOR which makes it not to have any say in the IOR. Finally, the Indian Ocean has been vehemently transformed into the most active trade route in the international system in the 21st century. This area is the only one which connects the rest of the world from America to Asia, from Asia to Europe and from Europe Africa to Asia to Europe and to the American region. It implies that when matters international politics are brought on the

FIGURE 1 The Indian ocean is becoming the center of international maritime rivalry Source: International Maritime Bureau (2019)

The African ReviewDownloaded 47 from (2020) Brill.com10/01/2021 357–376 07:00:39PM via free access The Dragon’s March into the Indian Ocean 363 table, the IOR must be brought in the limelight and any attempts to ignore this fact is suicidal. This is because both security matters, economic matters and maritime matters are heavily operationalized in this region by the most important world players. This reinforces the idea that all powerful states may want to move into the IOR since it has always been their joy to be at the center of every busy lane where busy economic activities goon. Therefore, a combination of all these factors gives them a basis of finding their way into the Indian Ocean Region.

3 Maritime Theory

Maritime is commonly understood as all those activities which go on in the sea and the oceans such as cartography, science, technology and innovation activities, politics, economics, imperial growth communications, migrations social affairs, industrial activities among others (Swaran, 2011). According to Mahan, given that state interests such as pursuit for more power to ensure survival and enhancement of the economy for the wellbeing of their citizens are pursued on the sea and oceans, would require a sufficient maritime strategy (Zeng and Liu, 2018). It should also be noted that it is in the sea that aquatic animals are found and countries which control the sea utilizes these natural resources to their advantage. Juliana Corbett reinforces Mahan’s ideas on different maritime strategies that can advance states national interests. Corbett argues that the influence of the naval and maritime activities are linked to national and international politics, for instance issues such as national policy, sea power, sea control, of- fensive vs. defensive operations, speed and mobility, communications, trade, concentration of force and strategic positions (Li, 2017). This therefore means that since the interests of many states are on the sea, these states are likely to take their conflicts and daily struggles on the sea. Meaning that the main operations will be affected by the national powers of these states at all times whether during the times of peace or during the times of war. This is because Corbett conceptualizes war as a tool of foreign policy which is a form of political intercourse and a continuation of foreign policy of a state in another way. This implies that the states that have their operations on the sea and oceans will either attempt to interfere with the trade of another state on the sea or ocean as a way of triggering a reaction from that particular state. The reaction of the other state can either be positive or negative which will lead to a further reaction either in support or in resisting. In short, according to Corbett maritime theory combines state politics and diplomacy which may either promote maritime peace or chaos in the sea or ocean (Li, 2017).

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This theory was reinforced by the earlier writings of Holmes and Toshiyoshikara (2008) and Klein (2004), who argued that the controller of the sea will also be able to access quite a number of water resources such as oil, natural gas and fisheries. In short, the key assumptions of the theory are; one, a state which wants to control the sea must have sufficient economic and military might to lay claim in the sea, two, the state in question must have no rival or competitor in controlling the sea and three, the state in question must control the strategic trade routes and the SLOC s. Once the state in question misses one of the three assumptions, it’s impossible of it to have a geo strategic advantage in the maritime zones (Holmes & Toshiyoshihara, 2008). This means that the way a state organizes itself internally will have a lot of impact on the way it is treated externally. With regards to China, Holmes and Toshiyoshihara argue that China needs to be very cautious as it pursues its military and commercial interests in the Indian Ocean. This is because there are other states with mighty sea power than China such as India and the USA in combination with its allies in the Pacific Ocean and India in the IOR. Since the USA has taken full control of the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, China has no option but to focus on the IOR for its maritime interests, however China will have to contain itself with India which controls many strategic points. The theory argues that China should adopt soft power diplomacy in engaging with India since it cannot tilt India’s maritime might in the near future (Christian and Crumpling, 2013), China needs to devise ways and means to ensure that its economic activities in the IOR will not be derailed or affected by any other state as a way of weakening it or forcing it to do certain things in the interests of the enemy state.

4 China’s Strategic Interests in the Indian Ocean Region

Throughout history Khurana (2008) observes that China has always played a central role in continental and global matters. However, since the year 2000, the increasing level of the Chinese influence in the global matters has continued to alter the perceptions of other players, some see China as a good friend, while others see china as an emerging global threat. Initially, the primary focus of China’s interests has always been seen to be the Pacific Ocean, however as a result of the changing dynamics in the international system, the Chinese maritime interests has shifted to the Indian ocean hence the IOR has been con- verted into a major center of interest in the larger maritime strategy of the new China. The rationale of this can be understood in the following ways. First, the modern China like any other big powers has been heavily involved in different affairs in the international system. These affairs ranges from the

The African ReviewDownloaded 47 from (2020) Brill.com10/01/2021 357–376 07:00:39PM via free access The Dragon’s March into the Indian Ocean 365 matters of security, trade, global warming, import and export trade, diplomatic matters, international organizations global monetary systems, communications systems, investment matters just to mention but a few. This implies that for china to meet all these international obligations and fulfils its national interests, it must gain full access of all the perceived strategic locations as well as protecting al its critical transport and trade routes across the world. In the Chinese defense white paper of 2013, one of the objectives of china in the international stayed was to protect its maritime rights and all its interests outside its territorial boundaries. The white paper emphasized that China was willing to go out of its way to protect all its international interests. The initial interests of China in the Indian ocean was informed by the presence of the of the US and the Soviet Union in the region, however as result of the emergence of tensions between China and other states such as South Korea, India, and other states in the South East China. China decided to place its focus on ac- cessing the IOR through the Karakoram highway and Karachi. this high way was to pass through the China-Burma road to Burmese ports which also passes through the Malacca strait. The presence of China is greatly influenced by the presence of the United states and India in the IOR. Secondly, as a vital area in international trade, there is an increased interest in the IOR leading to high security demand and consequently security strategies as China is increasingly growing, there is need for resources to meet its population’s needs which mean protecting the major routes where its imports pass through in the Indian Ocean, especially the Strait of Malacca. The strategic interest of China in this area can majorly be seen as being driven by the energy security, whereby Ghosh (2004) views it as safeguarding the supplies of much needed energy and material resources from the Middle East and Africa. In order to have a wealthy society in the future, China needs to have an increased supply of energy. Thirdly, another reason as to why China is working so hard to strengthen its influence in the IOR according to Khurana (2008) is because of its military strategic ends and the desire to secure its trade routes in the sea. The main strategy which China is using to stamp its authority in the Indian Ocean according to the author is through creating some sense of solidarity with some Afro Asian states by way of giving financial aid and military supplies to these countries. The recipient countries in turn feel indebted to China hence making it easier for China to bulldoze their interests in the maritime zones without any serious opposition. The author further emphasizes that by the mere fact that 30 percent of Chinese sea trade amounting to US$ 300 billion an- nually moves across the IOR and 77 percent of all their imports sourced from West Asia and Africa comes in through the IOR, in addition to these, some IOR countries are rich in minerals such as copper, aluminum, diamonds, uranium

The African Review 47 (2020) 357–376 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 07:00:39PM via free access 366 Jonyo and Mbutu among others demanded by China means that it has to guard the Indian Ocean jealously. Fourthly, China has shown interest in the Indian Ocean because of its unique geographical features which are good for international trade. The other factor which makes the IOR unique is because it’s the home of SLOCs which offers maritime Choke points that re narrow in terms of entry points and from adjacent waters. For instance, the straits of Hurmuz, that connects the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf as well as the straits of Malacca. They are the primary entry and exist points between the Indian and the Pacific oceans on your way to the US and the European Union states. The other vital check points include Babbel Mandaab, which is that narrow strait linking the Indian ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, as well as with the Mozambican channel and the Cape of Good hope in South Africa. These forms a critical gate between the Indian ocean and the South Atlantic oceans which together are important trade routes and energy (oil and Gas) supply trade routes. All these stretches combined are responsible for carrying over 50 percent of the global container traffic as well as over 80 percent of the sea borne oil trade that passes through the Indian ocean maritime corridor stretch. Fifthly, the strategic interest of China has always lied in the Pacific Ocean, however due to the global Dynamics, China has slowly shifted these strategic focus into the IOR. This is because it’s in the IOR that its thurstful interests on energy and other strategic resources found in the area are located. Despite the fact that India continues to have an upper hand over China when it came to the strategic control of the IOR, it will be a suicidal idea if India ignores the ability of China to dislodge it from the center of control over the Indian ocean. This is partly because of the rennet robust activities of China in in the IOR as well as the strategic partnerships that China has made with other states which got an access to the Indian Ocean. These strategic partnerships have no only boosted the Chinese Naval and maritime power, but it has also Given China an upper hand when it came to the access of important resources such as Oil a gas and their tarsportation.it should be noted that over 70 percent of the Chinese imported energy supplies passes through the IOR as well as other strategic entry points such as the Malacca strait. for the purposes of China securing its national interest, china has expanded its military as well as its naval activities in the Indian ocean. So much has been the huge investments to an extent of causing tensions with India and other states such as South Korea. The two states see all these Chinese interests in the IOR as geared towards making China a reliable regional power in the IOR over India and the South Korea. Sixthly, the Chinese interests have found way in the IOR as a deterrent mea- sure of safeguarding itself from numerous threats to its energy supply, thereby

The African ReviewDownloaded 47 from (2020) Brill.com10/01/2021 357–376 07:00:39PM via free access The Dragon’s March into the Indian Ocean 367 designing other alternative transit routes. China decided to put in place sev- eral measures towards achieving this end, these measures included, the pursuit of equity stakes in overseas energy upstream projects outside china, the construction of overland and underwater pipelines, massive investments in pariah states like Myanmar, Iran, Sudan among others as well as the establishment of the Strategic Petroleum reserves (SPRs) to guard is energy interests. The rising story of China can also be promoted by the geopolitical consider- ation which is encouraged by the desire to expand on their maritime capacity and enhance its claim as a major global power. Holmes (2009) views this motivation as reaction of the kind of naval power which its arch rival India has in the IOR on one hand, and the strong presence of the US in the IOR. These two states have an important role to play in the Chinese freedom to navigate freely in the IOR. This means that the new Chinese IOR navigation strategy is widely seen as a new alternative which gears towards avoiding the “Malacca dilemma” (Holmes, 2009). Finally, the strategic thinking of china is also guided by the presence of India. China sees India as one of the greatest stumbling blocks to the Pursuit of its global interests due to its rapid rise. This is because India is the most dominant state in the IOR as a result of its geographical location, futuristically, India will have a serious competition from China for the hegemonic space. China has projected its sphere of influence through the creation of new partnerships with states such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka just to mention but a few. These kind of partnerships have come to be popularly known as the “string of pearls”. This strategy is mostly seen by many as a way of encircling India military as well as with commercial facilities such as new and modern ports. This is because through these string of Pearls, China has mas- sively increased on its trade and other security activities in the IOR. This has got a serious ripple effects on the security of the Chinese trade routes which is a favorable attribute in the Chinese desire to become a major global player economically and militarily. Although Bouchard and Crumpling (2013) argue that the competition between China and India in controlling the IOR is informed by the current situa- tion of most African states that are landlocked. This means that those 10 littoral African states and the three French Island territories as well as the extended African Indian Ocean covering 24 states are crucial to the Chinese trade in the Indian Ocean. There is also another fact that all these powers competing to control the Indian Ocean have their eyes set on the African states and their markets. Accordingly, therefore, it is prudent enough that African states need to reorganize themselves commercially so that they reap maximum benefits from each these powers.

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Despite the strong relationships between African states and the Indian Ocean countries during pre-colonial era and its alteration during colonialism, decades of neo-colonialism and Cold War experiences (Bouchard and Crumpling, 2013), currently African states are trying to change these narratives through increased interactions with other states in the IOR which is advanta- geous to Chinese interests. But the major question remains, are the benefits drawn from their relations with China mutual? Do their trade deals and other agreements signed with China observe the principle of reciprocity? Although China’s official rhetoric has denied its superpower ambition, some observers view China’s engagement in the IOR as driven by its superpower ambitions which would require that it enhances its capabilities. Increased in- volvement in the Indian Ocean it attracts a lot of enemies, consequently China needs to ensure that its sea routes are well protected so as to minimize the impact of enemy states activities on its trade routes. For instance, it must ensure that its cargo ships are tamper proof from being hijacked by the pirates while on transit. China has heavily invested on the SLOCS as way of stamping its authority in the Indian Ocean region. In order to ensure that it has stronger say in the IOR, it has ensured that there exists stability on its national politics and kept its house in order so as to comprehensive maritime strategy. China has also enhanced on its diplomatic influence across the African continent in the recent years like establishing diplomatic offices to enhance its foreign policy.

5 Implications for International Trade

The northern edge of the Indian Ocean an arc from the red sea to the Strait of Malacca, constitutes the “soft underbelly” of Eurasia that covers many con- flict zones, and is also known as the “arc of Islam”. It was believed that anyone who could have power over the Eurasian continent on the northern part of the Indian Ocean would definitely gain control over the whole of the Indian Ocean (Kaplan, 2009). As already mentioned, the Strait of Malacca joins the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and it is under joint governance of three states since the end of the Second World War. It supports about a quarter of the world’s maritime trade therefore making among the busiest international waterways. Sixty percent of the Chinese vessels pass through this waterway every year (Wu, 2009). China relies more on the Malacca Strait for its energy import and any threat to it would definitely be a threat to China’s energy security. This is what has been popularly referred to as “Malacca Dilemma” for China over the past decades. China accounts for the world’s most energy consumer and this is increasingly growing.

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Any disruption that would interrupt the free flow of energy into China would definitely affect the economic growth of China. The Lombok/Makassar Strait is also of much significance to China as the Malacca Strait because it is mainly used by large crude carriers. Oil from the Persian Gulf and Africa is either shipped via the Malacca Strait or the Strait of the Lombok. President Hu Jintao in 2003 declared that there are certain powers that wanted to gain control of these straits hence they needed new strategies to deal with this vulnerability. Whoever controls the Strait of Malacca would have a stranglehold over the energy of China. The Malacca Strait has attracted the attention of security analysts not just because of China’s interests but also it has witnessed cases of pirate attacks. The terrorists and the pirates link up together and disrupt the maritime traffic hence the global commerce. Due to the sensitivity over sovereignty, the littoral states have refused to accept external help from the major powers in the Strait. Instead, they have accepted help in form of intelligence exchange, capacity building and training. Meanwhile, China is looking for another means on energy to rely on so that it can reduce its vulnerabilities. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, China as a rational actor is financing new transit routes consisting three parts: reducing its dependence of imported energy and looking for other alternatives, building of pipelines that would bypass the Malacca strait and building of credible naval forces that would be capable of securing China’s SLOC’s. Although these components prove to be expensive and time consuming, Chinese government regards the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean as the key road to the 21st century Maritime Silk Road. In order to sure that the Road is successful, China needs to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean so as to promote a safe and free passage in the region. However, whether this will trigger any economic reaction from other powers such as the US, UK and India or from those states that earns their for- tunes from Malacca area is another subject of debate. However, from its as- sessment, China concluded that avoidance of any physical confrontation is the only way out. According to the UNDP (2017) report, given the increased number of ships navigating through the Indian ocean on a monthly basis, there was a con- stant increase of trade volumes of many commodities such as capital in- tensive goods in the Atlantic Ocean in the last decade. There was similar increase in the Pacific Ocean where trade volumes of agriculture and industrial products increased from 13 percent in 2014 to 34 percent in 2017. As a result of these increased trade there were ripple effects on the relationship between the US and the UK and the European Union member states, seeing increased transport infrastructural developments of ports, roads and railway network. For instance, expansion of existing ports which can accommodate

The African Review 47 (2020) 357–376 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 07:00:39PM via free access 370 Jonyo and Mbutu more than 13,000 bigger container ships and creation of over 5 million jobs an- nually in these countries. The report further observes that the fishing industry also greatly expanded in that in the Pacific Ocean alone, 2.6 million tons of fish products were sold across the Pacific Ocean in the year 2017. Therefore these figures should serve as a wakeup call for the states in the IOR to put in place policy measures which can expand the trade volumes of trade.

6 Strategies to Mitigate Threats

China has been involved in various strategies that require it to safeguard its critical sea lanes from any threat that might hinder its economic development. With this China aims at forging a link to the Indian Ocean so as to have unimpeded market access, to have a more direct energy supply line and also the option of bypassing dangerous bottlenecks of the Malacca Strait. In order to accomplish its national interests, the strategies of China can best be assessed through its string of pearls strategy, maritime silk road and access in Myanmar. They are explained as follows.

7 String of Pearls

The string of pearls strategy is a geopolitical explanation theory of Chinese intentions in the IOR. The string of pearls mechanism by China aims at building the economic and military network from the Indian Ocean up to the South China Sea and other regions of interest. This strategy begins by increasing and gaining its access to major ports and airports. However, the focus has majorly been on the sea where there is a connection on the major straits such as Hormuz Malacca, Mandeb and the Lombok. The strategy involves the use of maritime assets in the strategic location in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Maldives. The increasingly military strength by China is mostly to protect its energy source path in the Indian Ocean. The establishment of the naval bases by China coupled by the diplomatic presence is to strengthen ties in this region because of the fear of the US naval blockade at the strategic chokepoints so as to prevent the oil tankers from reaching China especially at the strait of Hormuz and Malacca. With the help of “String of Pearls Project” China is trying to create threat in the mind of the Asian countries so that it can emerge as the regional power in the Asia. But this is just one face of the same coin; another face is that India is also setting naval base in its surrounding countries so that any Chinese invasion can be tackled.

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However, India on the other hand is having a lot of suspicion on Chinas main interests along the string of pearls, whereas there are those who view china as trying to advance its commercial interests in the Indian ocean, there are those who are totally concerned that China is trying to spy on India’s security activities in the Indian ocean. This is because according to Indian officials have constantly argued out that most Chinese companies have evidently been seen financing a lot of resources in building man commercial port facilities in states such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Although China has not been directly managing the day to day operations of this port, there has been a lot of reliable rumors that China could have signed a secret deal with these states in under whose territories the ports lie. The alleged secret deal is to enable China to have secret access rights as logistical hubs of military naval bases once in a while. It is these occurrences that has consistently made India to strongly believe that china is targeting them in a clandestine manner. They view Chinese activities in these countries water spaces as a strategy of encircling them with an aim of thwarting their level of influence in the Indian ocean and in the entire Asian region.it should be remembered that that china had used the same strategy in dislodging India from having influence in South Asia by developing strong bonds with Pakistan. This line thought is so deep to an extent of India fearing that the end game of China is to put India in this circular radar, or to surround India in the Indian ocean. This has made these two countries to be at the center of diplomatic conflicts all the time. Unless the interests of these two countries in the Indian ocean are well addressed and an amicably solution is found, there is a very big likelihoods that these scenarios can lead to a fully-fledged war which is not good for the two states and the entire world since the Indian ocean is an important sea trade route for most states across the world.

8 Maritime Silk Road (MSR)

As part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided US$ 1.6 billion to build ports and also to boost the maritime connectivity with the Indian Ocean littoral countries. Cooperation with the littoral countries has led to building of the China-Pakistan economic corridor and the China-India-Myanmar-Bangladesh economic corridor. Having this major project investments, China’s intention is to mitigate the security concerns in the MSR which ranges from the problem of territorial issues in South China Sea and to the threats caused by robbery, piracy and terrorism.

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The MSR seeks to fill infrastructural deficit in some parts of Southern Asia, a strategic move that has spurred the India-China rivalry and also it overlaps with the US-China relations. China is increasingly adding its military presence in the Indian Ocean so as to protect its economic investments along the MSR . China has great interest of securing its trade routes and getting natural resources from Africa and the Middle East. The presence of China has increased in the Indian Ocean since 2008, which started with the anti-piracy patrols then later on the nuclear and conventional submarine deployments. This has projected the rise of China as a maritime power keen protect its interests in the IOR China is also building up ports in parts vital for its SLOCs as part of its MSR in Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania. The commercial and military use of these ports along the Indian Ocean has increasingly become an emerging trend. The acquisition of these strategic ports by China could eventually serve for military purposes.

9 The Access through Myanmar

The access through Myanmar by China is to reduce its dependency on the strait for the supply of oil and other vital commodities. Myanmar is like a gate- way to secure the Indian Ocean (Amrita, 2008). China is establishing a strategic network of road, rail and air transport from Yunnan province in the south west through Myanmar to the Indian Ocean because Myanmar is strategically convenient as a land bridge to the Indian Ocean both for the acquisition of the trade goods and security concern. The connection to Myanmar would be achieved by the construction of oil, gas and water pipelines so as to transport crude oil from Africa and the Middle East through Myanmar to the Yunnan province in China.

10 The Way Forward

This article recognizes the fact that the IOR is an important resource not only for the states that have access to the Indian ocean, but largely to all states across the International system, for this reason the article proposes that in managing the IOR, priority should not be given to only the states in in the IOR but to all the interested parties from across the world. in fact, the UN security council and all its relevant agencies should also be involved in the affairs of managing the IOR region. Its only in this way that each state be it India or China or

The African ReviewDownloaded 47 from (2020) Brill.com10/01/2021 357–376 07:00:39PM via free access The Dragon’s March into the Indian Ocean 373 even the United states of America will be tamed and made to behave according to the agreed norms. The following measures are suggested by this article as the best way forward. That first, Maritime security cooperation in the IOR should be enhanced through the creation of a new Track one security entity. This entity should deal with all the strategic and maritime security dialogues and act as the link between all the concerned governments on maritime issues, besides these, the main objective of this entity would be to bring all the states in the IOR together, also to ensure that all the states with maritime grievances against each state in the IOR could be brought forward and be received officially, Reconcile the sates it the IOR or beyond on their maritime differences and create a new maritime interests regime that would serve all concerned states wherever they may be. This means that the track one entity will be binding to very state and ensure that no state is left behind when it comes ensuring that all the benefits derived from this resource are evenly distributed to all the concerned states. However, this article is quick to caution that in order for this proposal to prop- erly work, a number of conditions must exist, these conditions include, that all member states, most especially China, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Africa, USA, UK, states in the EU, all the island states within the IOR, all the African states who may be having an access to the Indian ocean, must be brought on board. No state which has got a massive interest in the IOR should be left out, its only through this method that all the grievances that concerned states have will be addressed comprehensively. The other benefit is that all the major powers who have got the capacity of causing a major security havoc will be included in the entity as participants hence diffusing the tensions by way of discussing the strategic and security matters of the IOR. Secondly, this article promotes the creation of a track two forum which will see each member states seconds a number of the academicians and research- ers as well as their representatives to this important body. The major objective of this organization will be to ensure that all technical and research issues are addressed in a professional manner. Secondly this body will be responsible for identifying concreter issues from some concerned member states and send them to the tack one entity for their considerations. The body will also task itself with the duty of studying, analyzing all the controversial and sensitive matters that each state may have and developing an alternative policy, legal and administrative frameworks which the track one entity can adopt in order to deserve those sensitive and controversial matters. This article further cau- tions that in order for this track two organization to work, a number of factors must exist, these factors include; one, there must be a sufficient financing of this organization and provision of adequate resources, staff, equipment and

The African Review 47 (2020) 357–376 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 07:00:39PM via free access 374 Jonyo and Mbutu enough facilities to the staff members of the officers in charge. this will mean that a proper working environment should be accorded to these officers so that they are able to do a good job for the organizations. Secondly, that the staff, officers in charge and various segments of these organizations must be representative of the concerned member states, these will ensure that No state feels left out. Thirdly that the two organizations must be given enough space to carry out their functions by all the member states. this will mean that the two bodies are left to do their work independently without any form of interfer- ence or influence from outsiders. Thirdly, this article suggests that the membership of the states in the ION s should be expanded to include regional, extra-regional powers maritime enforcement organizations. This mean that the African states should send their representatives to the UN security council, the same case with Asia, Australia, EU, member states and the United states of America. This will ensure that the Un security council is well updated on everything about the IOR at the opera- tional and the technical level. Also that the UN security council is able to do its part in promoting cooperation for all the maritime enforcement organizations, ports and shipping organizations including the regional anti-piracy of organizations and maritime science. The reason as to why the Un security council must be involved in these matters is because it’s the final arbiter between all these states in case anything goes wrong in this region. secondly, in this error of terrorism and sea piracy, it has been one of the concerns of the UN security council in containment of these two sets of pandemic. This new strategy will offer a bigger boost to the Un security council and various regional security Architecture in preventing the most undesirable opportunities that the sea pirates and terrorist groups may want to take advantage off as a result of the maritime differences and agreements between the concerned states. Finally, this article wishes to encourage the concerned member states to have a political good will towards embracing the new normal which is to fos- ter maritime and strategic cooperation in the IOR between all the concerned parties. This will mean that each member states should be free to speak their minds and lay all their cards on the table as opposed to participating in these forums half-heartedly while clandestinely they are putting in place secret and dangerous cards against each other. Also when it comes to adherence of all the provisions of the set agreements, each state must adhere to all the set rules without fail. This will include the practice of providing all the required finances, resources and presence whenever they are needed. Its only through these practice that the intended objectives of these new strategies of attaining unity and peaceful coexistence among states in the Indian ocean region will be achieved. Consequently, a proper communication channels of these track

The African ReviewDownloaded 47 from (2020) Brill.com10/01/2021 357–376 07:00:39PM via free access The Dragon’s March into the Indian Ocean 375 one, track two and other organizations prosed in this new strategy should be established so as to ensure that all the concerned states and interested parties are informed at all times. this will also have the benefit of eliminating all forms of secrecy, rumors, propaganda and innuendos that a state may level against each other.

11 Conclusion

From the above discussion it is evident that China’s strategic interests in the IOR can be explained by maritime theory. The decisive move by China to cir- cumvent the “Malacca Dilemma” by developing strategic initiatives such as the String of Pearls and MSR mirrors a desire by China to optimally secure the (SLOCs) to facilitate unimpeded flow of energy and natural resources, raw materials and both exports and imports, the cornerstone of the Chinese economic development. Whatever reaction or counter reaction this will cause to Chinas competitors is yet to be identified, however it must be pointed that other powers are closely monitoring the Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, whether their reaction is active or passive, only time will tell. Despite all these possible scenarios which this article is emphasizing on is the fact that all these competing state interests in the Indian ocean should never be at one point be allowed to let the interstate differences escalate to appoint of war and international disorder, this is because the IOR is an important trade area for most states not only in Asia and Africa but in the entire world. Also its this region that has been characterized by a lot of sea piracy from different pirate groupings the rising cases of terrorism activities whereby new terrorism recruits are shipped to their intended destinations to cause havoc. In order to ensure conflicts and war does not happen, the issues of the management of the maritime security and the strategic interests of different states should be placed at the collective hands of the concerned states and not just two or three states to have the big- gest say at the expense of other concerned states.

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